Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Price theory'
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Lim, Cheng Hoon. "The UK housing market : theory and evidence." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.320114.
Full textNayyar, Ashish. "Contributions to equilibrium price dispersion theory /." Digital version accessible at:, 1998. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/main.
Full textAl-Wattar, Obey M. "On price inflation." Thesis, University of Southampton, 1986. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/192475/.
Full textMartínez, López-Pardina Irene. "3 essays on first-price auctions." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/4033.
Full textEl primer mecanismo que analizamos es una subasta de múltiples unidades en la que los objetos son vendidos secuencialmente por medio de subastas de precio descendente. La característica que hace a esta subasta diferente de la "estándar", analizada por Weber (1983) es que después de la venta del primer objeto el precio no vuelve a subir, sino que los objetos que quedan son ofrecidos al resto de los compradores al mismo precio. Si los objetos no se venden a ese precio, la subasta continúa dejando que el precio siga descendiendo. Esta subasta se analiza en dos contextos: con un modelo de valoraciones continuas y con uno de valoraciones discretas. Se demuestra que si existe un equilibrio simétrico con pujas monótonas, el resultado de la subasta es ineficiente con probabilidad positiva. Aplicando el teorema de equivalencia de rentas se concluye que la subasta no maximiza los beneficios esperados del vendedor. Para poder comparar los precios medios y las varianzas analizamos un modelo de valoraciones discretas. Demostramos que los precios esperados son menores en nuestra subasta y que también lo es la varianza de los beneficios del vendedor. Damos un ejemplo de una familia de funciones de utilidad von Neumann- Morgenstern tal que la utilidad esperada del vendedor es mayor en una u otra de las subasta dependiendo de los valores del parámetro a.
El segundo mecanismo que analizamos es una subasta asimétrica de primer precio donde la valoración de uno de los postores es conocida. Demostramos que no existe ningún equilibrio en estrategias puras y caracterizamos un equilibrio en estrategias mixtas en el que el postor cuya valoración es conocida randomiza su puja, mientras que los demás postores juegan una estrategia pura (y monótona). El resultado de la subasta es ineficiente con probabilidad positiva y el beneficio esperado del postor cuya valoración es conocida es menor que en una subasta estándar. Sin embargo, no es obvio que los demás postores mejoren su situación: el hecho de que uno de los postores juegue una estrategia mixta tiene el mismo efecto en sus rivales que un precio de reserva aleatorio. Esto puede obligarles a pujar más agresivamente de lo que pujarían en una subasta normal. El efecto en los beneficios del vendedor también es ambiguo. Tomando un ejemplo con la función de distribución uniforme y comparando los beneficios esperados del vendedor y de los compradores en las dos subastas, obtenemos que, en nuestro ejemplo (con 2 y con 3 postores) los beneficios esperados del vendedor son mas altos en la subasta asimétrica que en la normal.
Para terminar, hacemos un repaso de la literatura en subastas secuenciales cuando los compradores desean más de una unidad del bien que se subasta, y analizamos una subasta secuencial de primer precio con y sin opción de compra. Para ello usamos el mismo modelo que Black y de Meza (1992) usan para analizar la subasta secuencial de segundo precio. Demostramos que cuando las preferencias son unidimensionales no existe ningún equilibrio monótono y simétrico, lo cual implica que el resultado de la subasta no puede ser eficiente. Cuando se introduce una opción de compra que permita comprar la segunda unidad al mismo precio al que se adquirió la primera, existe un equilibrio en estrategias puras para algunos valores de los parámetros del modelo. En este caso la opción siempre se ejerce, lo cual lleva a una asignación de los bienes diferente que la que resulta en la subasta secuencial de segundo precio. Cuando la valoración por la segunda unidad es aleatoria, las subastas de primer y segundo precio sin opción de compra son equivalentes. Por último, exponemos las dificultades de caracterizar un equilibrio cuando cuando se introduce la opción de compra en este modelo.
In this thesis we analyze three different auction mechanisms, all of them under the private and independent valuations assumption.
The first auction we analyze is a multi-unit auction where the objects are sold sequentially by descending-price auctions. The feature that makes this auction different from the "standard" one is that after one object has been sold, the price does not return to a high level, but the remaining objects are offered to the rest of the bidders at the same price. If the objects fail to be sold at that price, the auction is resumed letting the price descend again. We analyze this auction in two different contexts: a continuous valuation model, and a discrete valuation one. We show that if a symmetric, monotone bidding functions equilibrium exists, the outcome of the auction is inefficient with positive probability. Applying the revenue equivalence theorem we conclude that the auction cannot maximize the seller's expected revenue. In order to be able to compare the averages expected prices and variances, we analyze a discrete-valuation model. We show that the average expected prices are lower in our auction, and that so is the variance of the seller's expected revenue. We give an example of a family of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions under which the seller's expected utility may be higher in each of the auctions depending on the value of a parameter a.
The second mechanism we analyze is an asymmetric first-price auction where the valuation of one of the bidders is common knowledge. We show that no pure strategy equilibrium exists and we characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the bidder whose valuation is common knowledge randomizes his bid while the other bidders play a (monotone) pure strategy. The outcome of the auction is inefficient with positive probability, and the expected profit of the bidder whose valuation is common knowledge is lower than in a standard auction in which her valuation is private knowledge. However, it is not obvious that the other bidders are better off: the fact that one of the bidders plays a mixed strategy has the effect of on the other bidders as a random reserve price bidder. This may force all them to bid more aggressively than they would in the standard auction. The effect on the seller's expected revenue is also ambiguous. In an example with the uniform distribution, we compare the expected profits of seller and buyers in this auction with those in a standard symmetric private valuation model. In our example, with 2 and 3 bidders, the seller's expected revenue is higher in the asymmetric auction than in a standard auction.
To finish, we survey the literature on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand, and we analyze a sequential first-price auction with and without a buyer's option. To do it we use the same model that Black and de Meza (1992) used to analyze the secuencial second-price caution. We show that when the preferences are unidimensional, no monotone symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists, which implies that the outcome of the auction cannot be efficient. When an option to buy the second unit at the price paid for first one is introduced, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium for some values of the parameters of the model. In this case the option is always exercised, leading to a different allocation than that of the sequential second-price auction. When the valuations for the second unit is stochastic, the first-price and second-price auctions without a buyer's option are efficient and revenue equivalent. To finish, we give some insights into the difficulties of solving for an equilibrium when the buyer's option is introduced in this model.
Choudhary, Muhammad Ali. "A contribution to the theory of the customer markets." Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.249236.
Full textLawson, John, and not provided. "Theory of Real Estate Valuation." RMIT University. Economics, Finance & Marketing, 2009. http://adt.lib.rmit.edu.au/adt/public/adt-VIT20090306.125134.
Full textWeldegebriel, Habtu Tadesse. "Price transmission in vertically-related markets." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2004. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/14436/.
Full textRamanan, Sisir. "Essays in asset price bubbles." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2016. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/7357/.
Full textKurmann, André. "New Keynesian price and cost dynamics : theory and evidence /." Full text, Acrobat Reader required, 2002. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/557985994.pdf.
Full textFraser, W. D. "The price determination of property investments : Theory and evidence." Thesis, City University London, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.370931.
Full textFitchett, Christian. "Asset price inflation- theory, history, and an alternative model." Oberlin College Honors Theses / OhioLINK, 2000. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=oberlin1354820913.
Full textYANG, JR-MING JIMMY. "A MARKET STABILIZATION MECHANISM - CIRCUIT BREAKER: THEORY AND EVIDENCE." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2003. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1054125077.
Full textGarner, John Clifford. "An analysis of Friedman's modern quantity theory." Thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1995. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/30506.
Full textRaykov, Radoslav S. "Essays in Applied Microeconomic Theory." Thesis, Boston College, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104087.
Full textThis dissertation consists of three essays in microeconomic theory: two focusing on insurance theory and one on matching theory. The first chapter is concerned with catastrophe insurance. Motivated by the aftermath of hurricane Katrina, it studies a strategic model of catastrophe insurance in which consumers know that they may not get reimbursed if too many other people file claims at the same time. The model predicts that the demand for catastrophe insurance can ``bend backwards'' to zero, resulting in multiple equilibria and especially in market failure, which is always an equilibrium. This shows that a catastrophe market can fail entirely due to demand-driven reasons, a result new to the literature. The model suggests that pricing is key for the credibility of catastrophe insurers: instead of increasing demand, price cuts may backfire and instead cause a ``race to the bottom.'' However, small amounts of extra liquidity can restore the system to stable equilibrium, highlighting the importance of a functioning reinsurance market for large risks. These results remain robust both for expected utility consumer preferences and for expected utility's most popular alternative, rank-dependent expected utility. The second chapter develops a model of quality differentiation in insurance markets, focusing on two of their specific features: the fact that costs are uncertain, and the fact that firms are averse to risk. Cornerstone models of price competition predict that firms specialize in products of different quality (differentiate their products) as a way of softening price competition. However, real-world insurance markets feature very little differentiation. This chapter offers an explanation to this phenomenon by showing that cost uncertainty fundamentally alters the nature of price competition among risk-averse firms by creating a drive against differentiation. This force becomes particularly pronounced when consumers are picky about quality, and is capable of reversing standard results, leading to minimum differentiation instead. The chapter concludes with a study of how the costs of quality affect differentiation by considering two benchmark cases: when quality is costless and when quality costs are convex (quadratic). The third chapter focuses on the theory of two-sided matching. Its main topic are inefficiencies that arise when agent preferences permit indifferences. It is well-known that two-sided matching under weak preferences can result in matchings that are stable, but not Pareto efficient, which creates bad incentives for inefficiently matched agents to stay together. In this chapter I show that in one-to-one matching with weak preferences, the fraction of inefficiently matched agents decreases with market size if agents are sufficiently diverse; in particular, the proportion of agents who can Pareto improve in a randomly chosen stable matching approaches zero when the number of agents goes to infinity. This result shows that the relative degree of the inefficiency vanishes in sufficiently large markets, but this does not provide a "cure-all'' solution in absolute terms, because inefficient individuals remain even when their fraction is vanishing. Agent diversity is represented by the diversity of each person's preferences, which are assumed randomly drawn, i.i.d. from the set of all possible weak preferences. To demonstrate its main result, the chapter relies on the combinatorial properties of random weak preferences
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2012
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Economics
Iozzi, Alberto. "Essays on regulation : theory and practice." Thesis, University of York, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.313959.
Full textSpahni, P. "The Common Wine Policy and price stabilization." Thesis, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.372934.
Full textTozendemir, Suat. "Analysis of First Price Sealed Bidding (FPSB) using game theory." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 1997. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA342280.
Full text"December 1997." Thesis advisor(s): Katsuaki L. Terasawa, Mark W. Stone. Includes bibliographical references (p. 289). Also available online.
Keough, Kate. "Economic restructuring ; who pays the price? : feminists and regulation theory /." Title page, contents and introduction only, 1996. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09AR/09ark37.pdf.
Full textParkin, Vincent Nicholas. "Structural bottle necks, the wage price spiral and financial influences : a study of price formation and inflation in Brazil." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1987. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.238544.
Full textRibeiro, Diana. "Models for the price of a storable commodity." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2004. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/4063/.
Full textGhandi, Hojjatallah. "Essays on Applied Microeconomic Theory." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/27736.
Full textPh. D.
Hughes, Matthew. "Price Signaling in a Two-Market Duopoly." University of Akron / OhioLINK, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=akron1458311593.
Full textRaith, Michael Alexander. "Product differentiation, uncertainty and price coordination in oligopoly." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1996. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1439/.
Full textAnderson, Kyle J. "Essays on online price comparison site competition." [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University, 2009. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3380058.
Full textTitle from PDF t.p. (viewed on Jul 12, 2010). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-12, Section: A, page: 4791. Adviser: Michael R. Baye.
Plante, Michael. "Three essays on monetary policy responses to oil price shocks." [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University, 2009. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3380121.
Full textTitle from PDF t.p. (viewed on Jul 14, 2010). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-12, Section: A, page: 4803. Advisers: Edward F. Buffie; Eric M. Leeper.
Schade, Don F. "Fixed-price-award-fee an economic motivational, and contracting theory analysis /." Thesis, Monterey, California : Naval Postgraduate School, 1990. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA241829.
Full textThesis Advisor(s): Gates, William R. ; Terasawa, Katsuaki L. "December 1990." Description based on title screen as viewed on April 2, 2010. DTIC Identifier(s): Award fee, economic incentives, cost reimbursement contracts, fixed price contracts, fixed price award fee. Author(s) subject Fixed Price Award Fee, FPAF, award fee, pricing arrangement, incentive contract, contractor motivation, economics, contracting, acquisition. Includes bibliographical references (p. 66-67). Also available in print.
Grindley, Peter Conrad. "A strategic analysis of the diffusion of innovations : theory and evidence." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.308388.
Full textFoster, Andrew J. "Information, volatility and price discovery in oil futures markets." Thesis, Brunel University, 1994. http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/5871.
Full textBennett, G. F. "The determinants of relative price change : An empirical investigation." Thesis, University of Manchester, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.374550.
Full textRougier, Jonathan. "Price change and trading volume in a speculative market." Thesis, Durham University, 1996. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/5347/.
Full textWong, Mei Wa. "Price and volatility behaviour of four Asian stock markets." Thesis, Durham University, 1999. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/4306/.
Full textLorusso, Marco. "The effects of oil price shocks on the UK economy." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2015. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/6961/.
Full textYang, Qian. "Stock bubbles : The theory and estimation." Thesis, Brunel University, 2006. http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/3597.
Full textCardoso, Larissa Barbosa. "Essays on economics of obesity and food prices : theory and evidences for Brazil." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/132933.
Full textThe objective of this thesis is to analyze the influence of the price of food on the growth of obesity in Brazil and to assess the effects of a policy based on price as a prevention instrument against obesity. These issues were analyzed in three essays that make use of the economic structure, based on the principle of economic rationality, in order to understand individual choices about calorie intake and expenditure and the dynamics of weight gain of Brazilians. Essay 1 identifies the main changes in Body Mass Index (BMI) of Brazilians and estimates the contribution of food prices from the relative distribution method and of counterfactual decomposition. It was verified that, concomitant to the increase in obesity, there is a shift towards the right of the BMI distribution revealing: a) a greater density of individuals in the regions of overweight and obesity; and b) an increase of the medium BMI a major dispersion around this. The results indicated that the price increases observed between 2002 and 2009 were important to contain the advance of obesity. However, the effect of that variation (level effect) was lower than that observed for the change of the impact of food on BMI (structure effect). The prices of foods such as soft drinks, meat and whole milk showed to be quite significant. On the other hand, income and years of study contributed positively for the increase of the BMI in the analyzed period. Considering the effect obtained for the price of soft drinks on BMI, as well as the positive association of consumption of this type of beverage with obesity, essays 2 and 3 evaluated the individual and aggregate effects, respectively, of the adoption of a health policy based on the increase of taxes on sugary drinks. In essay 2, the two part model was adopted in order to estimate the price-demand elasticity, which indicated that the price increase of sugary drinks (soft drinks and juices) reduce the consumption, especially of the groups that most consume these beverages. The result on weight presented a modest magnitude; however this measure showed to be relevant in the prevention of obesity, since the greater weight losses were observed in the group nearest to the BMI corresponding to obesity. The effects in aggregate terms were simulated parting from the price model derived from the product input matrix, and the results show that a tax policy on soft drinks tends to generate few adverse effects for the economy, with a production reduction of that sector and those directly interrelated being offset by increased production in other sectors. The same was observed for employment, which presented a positive variation. Regarding consumption, since in individual terms the 10% tributary increase contributed to reduce consumption in 6,1%, the aggregate consumption expenditure of households would suffer a reduction of 2.1%, with greater reductions observed in the middle-income range. Therefore, it is concluded that the reduction in the price of high-calorie foods observed in recent years has had an impact on the weight of Brazilians, and therefore, could be taken into account in the structuring of public policies for the fight against obesity.
Lozano, Moncada Carlos Arturo. "Game theory application to the analysis of wheeling charges allocation and bidding strategies." Thesis, University of Strathclyde, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.269898.
Full textPrice, Jason. "Popescu's Conjecture in Multiquadratic Extensions." ScholarWorks @ UVM, 2009. http://library.uvm.edu/dspace/bitstream/123456789/213/1/Price%20Dissertation.pdf.
Full textEllul, Andrew. "Trading behaviour, price discovery and volatility in competing market microstructures." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2001. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2102/.
Full textFortune, Christopher Joseph. "Factors affecting the selection of building project price forecasting tools." Thesis, Heriot-Watt University, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/10399/1271.
Full textBazzazan, Fatemeh. "A dynamic input-output price model with application to Iran." Thesis, University of Liverpool, 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.250332.
Full textSONNERVIG, MARCOS KIEHL. "THE FISCAL THEORY OF THE PRICE LEVEL WITH NOMINAL REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2017. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=31795@1.
Full textCOORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR
PROGRAMA DE EXCELENCIA ACADEMICA
A hipótese usual de que a política fiscal é definida em termos reais não é nem realista, nem inócua. Neste artigo, propomos um modelo que leva em consideração a existência de receitas e despesas nominais. Essa característica cria um canal inexplorado pelo qual as políticas monetária e fiscal interagem. Nós mostramos que, neste ambiente, o nível de preços pode ser fiscalmente determinado, mesmo quando toda a dívida do governo é real. Além disso, os efeitos das políticas monetária e fiscal são sensíveis ao grau de indexação no orçamento do governo. Usando técnicas de estimação Bayesiana, nós estimamos o modelo para a economia norte-americana e encontramos que a corrosão do valor real das despesas desempenha um papel importante no financiamento dos déficits do governo, sob o regime de dominância fiscal.
The usual assumption that fiscal policy is set in real terms is neither realistic nor innocuous. In this article, we propose a model that accounts for the existence of nominal revenues and expenditures. This creates an unexplored channel through which monetary and fiscal policies interact. We show that, in this environment, the price level can be fiscally determinate, even when all government debt is real. Also, the effects of monetary and fiscal policies are sensitive to the degree of indexation in the government budget. Using Bayesian techniques, we estimate the model for the US economy and find that the revaluation of these nominal components plays an important role as a source of fiscal financing, under a fiscally dominant regime.
Strader, J. M. "The impact of neoclassical price theory on monopolization law : a transatlantic perspective." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2015. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1468568/.
Full textFrömmel, Tomáš. "A Contribution to the Austrian Business Cycle Theory: Uncertainty and Price Expectations." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2016. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-205312.
Full textNomikos, Nikos K. "Risk management, price discovery and forecasting in the freight futures market." Thesis, City University London, 1999. http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/7749/.
Full textRomp, Graham. "Rational dynamic disequilibrium macro models with wage, price and inventory adjustment." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1988. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/109855/.
Full textJin, Binping. "Dynamics of price cycles in agent-based models of financial markets /." View abstract or full-text, 2009. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?PHYS%202009%20JIN.
Full textKaluwa, Ben Meshack. "Barriers to entry, price controls, and monopoly power in Malawian manufacturing." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/19886.
Full textTurner, Peter Robert. "Price formation within the UK electricity industry and the application of auction theory." Thesis, University of Sunderland, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.272584.
Full textDuhamel, Marc. "Essays on second-best economic policymaking with price makers." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape3/PQDD_0017/NQ56535.pdf.
Full textKim, Byungkuk. "Revisiting the relationship between price stickiness and the non-neutrality of money." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2016. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/86758/.
Full textJoslyn-Battaglia, Kari. "The Relationship Between an Industry Average Beta Coefficient and Price Elasticity of Demand." Thesis, North Texas State University, 1986. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc500999/.
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