Academic literature on the topic 'Price theory'
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Journal articles on the topic "Price theory"
Weyl, E. Glen. "Price Theory." Journal of Economic Literature 57, no. 2 (June 1, 2019): 329–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.20171321.
Full textShiyan, D., and Y. Babochkina. "Expectations theory and wheat price dynamics." Agricultural Economics (Zemědělská ekonomika) 53, No. 10 (January 7, 2008): 483–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.17221/926-agricecon.
Full textDastagiri, M. B., and L. Bhavigna. "The Theory of Agricultural Price Bubble & Price Crash in Global Economy." Applied Economics and Finance 6, no. 5 (August 21, 2019): 168. http://dx.doi.org/10.11114/aef.v6i5.4464.
Full textMelching, Konstantin, and Tristan Nguyen. "On the Impact of Dividend Payments on Stock Prices - an Empirical Analysis of the German Stock Market." Studies in Business and Economics 16, no. 1 (April 1, 2021): 255–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/sbe-2021-0020.
Full textKaplan, Greg, Guido Menzio, Leena Rudanko, and Nicholas Trachter. "Relative Price Dispersion: Evidence and Theory." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11, no. 3 (August 1, 2019): 68–124. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170126.
Full textCurry, David J., and Peter C. Riesz. "Prices and Price/Quality Relationships: A Longitudinal Analysis." Journal of Marketing 52, no. 1 (January 1988): 36–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002224298805200104.
Full textXu, Chao Yu. "The Prediction of Shadow Price Based on Grey Theory." Applied Mechanics and Materials 501-504 (January 2014): 2610–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.501-504.2610.
Full textMADAN, DILIP B. "CONIC PORTFOLIO THEORY." International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance 19, no. 03 (April 21, 2016): 1650019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219024916500199.
Full textBlank, Steven C. "Price Dependence and Futures Price Theory." Northeastern Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 14, no. 2 (October 1985): 169–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0899367x00000933.
Full textEndres, Tony. "Schumpeter’s Price Theory." History of Economics Review 68, no. 1 (September 2, 2017): 83–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10370196.2018.1444325.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "Price theory"
Lim, Cheng Hoon. "The UK housing market : theory and evidence." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.320114.
Full textNayyar, Ashish. "Contributions to equilibrium price dispersion theory /." Digital version accessible at:, 1998. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/main.
Full textAl-Wattar, Obey M. "On price inflation." Thesis, University of Southampton, 1986. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/192475/.
Full textMartínez, López-Pardina Irene. "3 essays on first-price auctions." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/4033.
Full textEl primer mecanismo que analizamos es una subasta de múltiples unidades en la que los objetos son vendidos secuencialmente por medio de subastas de precio descendente. La característica que hace a esta subasta diferente de la "estándar", analizada por Weber (1983) es que después de la venta del primer objeto el precio no vuelve a subir, sino que los objetos que quedan son ofrecidos al resto de los compradores al mismo precio. Si los objetos no se venden a ese precio, la subasta continúa dejando que el precio siga descendiendo. Esta subasta se analiza en dos contextos: con un modelo de valoraciones continuas y con uno de valoraciones discretas. Se demuestra que si existe un equilibrio simétrico con pujas monótonas, el resultado de la subasta es ineficiente con probabilidad positiva. Aplicando el teorema de equivalencia de rentas se concluye que la subasta no maximiza los beneficios esperados del vendedor. Para poder comparar los precios medios y las varianzas analizamos un modelo de valoraciones discretas. Demostramos que los precios esperados son menores en nuestra subasta y que también lo es la varianza de los beneficios del vendedor. Damos un ejemplo de una familia de funciones de utilidad von Neumann- Morgenstern tal que la utilidad esperada del vendedor es mayor en una u otra de las subasta dependiendo de los valores del parámetro a.
El segundo mecanismo que analizamos es una subasta asimétrica de primer precio donde la valoración de uno de los postores es conocida. Demostramos que no existe ningún equilibrio en estrategias puras y caracterizamos un equilibrio en estrategias mixtas en el que el postor cuya valoración es conocida randomiza su puja, mientras que los demás postores juegan una estrategia pura (y monótona). El resultado de la subasta es ineficiente con probabilidad positiva y el beneficio esperado del postor cuya valoración es conocida es menor que en una subasta estándar. Sin embargo, no es obvio que los demás postores mejoren su situación: el hecho de que uno de los postores juegue una estrategia mixta tiene el mismo efecto en sus rivales que un precio de reserva aleatorio. Esto puede obligarles a pujar más agresivamente de lo que pujarían en una subasta normal. El efecto en los beneficios del vendedor también es ambiguo. Tomando un ejemplo con la función de distribución uniforme y comparando los beneficios esperados del vendedor y de los compradores en las dos subastas, obtenemos que, en nuestro ejemplo (con 2 y con 3 postores) los beneficios esperados del vendedor son mas altos en la subasta asimétrica que en la normal.
Para terminar, hacemos un repaso de la literatura en subastas secuenciales cuando los compradores desean más de una unidad del bien que se subasta, y analizamos una subasta secuencial de primer precio con y sin opción de compra. Para ello usamos el mismo modelo que Black y de Meza (1992) usan para analizar la subasta secuencial de segundo precio. Demostramos que cuando las preferencias son unidimensionales no existe ningún equilibrio monótono y simétrico, lo cual implica que el resultado de la subasta no puede ser eficiente. Cuando se introduce una opción de compra que permita comprar la segunda unidad al mismo precio al que se adquirió la primera, existe un equilibrio en estrategias puras para algunos valores de los parámetros del modelo. En este caso la opción siempre se ejerce, lo cual lleva a una asignación de los bienes diferente que la que resulta en la subasta secuencial de segundo precio. Cuando la valoración por la segunda unidad es aleatoria, las subastas de primer y segundo precio sin opción de compra son equivalentes. Por último, exponemos las dificultades de caracterizar un equilibrio cuando cuando se introduce la opción de compra en este modelo.
In this thesis we analyze three different auction mechanisms, all of them under the private and independent valuations assumption.
The first auction we analyze is a multi-unit auction where the objects are sold sequentially by descending-price auctions. The feature that makes this auction different from the "standard" one is that after one object has been sold, the price does not return to a high level, but the remaining objects are offered to the rest of the bidders at the same price. If the objects fail to be sold at that price, the auction is resumed letting the price descend again. We analyze this auction in two different contexts: a continuous valuation model, and a discrete valuation one. We show that if a symmetric, monotone bidding functions equilibrium exists, the outcome of the auction is inefficient with positive probability. Applying the revenue equivalence theorem we conclude that the auction cannot maximize the seller's expected revenue. In order to be able to compare the averages expected prices and variances, we analyze a discrete-valuation model. We show that the average expected prices are lower in our auction, and that so is the variance of the seller's expected revenue. We give an example of a family of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions under which the seller's expected utility may be higher in each of the auctions depending on the value of a parameter a.
The second mechanism we analyze is an asymmetric first-price auction where the valuation of one of the bidders is common knowledge. We show that no pure strategy equilibrium exists and we characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the bidder whose valuation is common knowledge randomizes his bid while the other bidders play a (monotone) pure strategy. The outcome of the auction is inefficient with positive probability, and the expected profit of the bidder whose valuation is common knowledge is lower than in a standard auction in which her valuation is private knowledge. However, it is not obvious that the other bidders are better off: the fact that one of the bidders plays a mixed strategy has the effect of on the other bidders as a random reserve price bidder. This may force all them to bid more aggressively than they would in the standard auction. The effect on the seller's expected revenue is also ambiguous. In an example with the uniform distribution, we compare the expected profits of seller and buyers in this auction with those in a standard symmetric private valuation model. In our example, with 2 and 3 bidders, the seller's expected revenue is higher in the asymmetric auction than in a standard auction.
To finish, we survey the literature on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand, and we analyze a sequential first-price auction with and without a buyer's option. To do it we use the same model that Black and de Meza (1992) used to analyze the secuencial second-price caution. We show that when the preferences are unidimensional, no monotone symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists, which implies that the outcome of the auction cannot be efficient. When an option to buy the second unit at the price paid for first one is introduced, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium for some values of the parameters of the model. In this case the option is always exercised, leading to a different allocation than that of the sequential second-price auction. When the valuations for the second unit is stochastic, the first-price and second-price auctions without a buyer's option are efficient and revenue equivalent. To finish, we give some insights into the difficulties of solving for an equilibrium when the buyer's option is introduced in this model.
Choudhary, Muhammad Ali. "A contribution to the theory of the customer markets." Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.249236.
Full textLawson, John, and not provided. "Theory of Real Estate Valuation." RMIT University. Economics, Finance & Marketing, 2009. http://adt.lib.rmit.edu.au/adt/public/adt-VIT20090306.125134.
Full textWeldegebriel, Habtu Tadesse. "Price transmission in vertically-related markets." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2004. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/14436/.
Full textRamanan, Sisir. "Essays in asset price bubbles." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2016. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/7357/.
Full textKurmann, André. "New Keynesian price and cost dynamics : theory and evidence /." Full text, Acrobat Reader required, 2002. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/557985994.pdf.
Full textFraser, W. D. "The price determination of property investments : Theory and evidence." Thesis, City University London, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.370931.
Full textBooks on the topic "Price theory"
Friedman, Milton. Price theory. [S.l.]: Richest Man in Babylon Publ., 2008.
Find full textHammond, J. Daniel, Steven G. Medema, and John D. Singleton. Chicago price theory. Cheltenham, UK: Elgar, 2013.
Find full textModern price theory. Glenview, Ill: Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown College Division, 1988.
Find full textPrice theory and applications. 5th ed. Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western Pub., 2002.
Find full textLandsburg, Steven E. Price theory and applications. Chicago: Dryden Press, 1989.
Find full textPrice theory and applications. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995.
Find full textHirshleifer, Jack. Price theory and applications. 5th ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall International, 1992.
Find full textPrice theory and applications. 3rd ed. Minneapolis/St. Paul: West Pub. Co., 1995.
Find full textHirshleifer, Jack. Price theory and applications. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1985.
Find full textHirshleifer, Jack. Price theory and applications. 4th ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1988.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Price theory"
Otani, Yoshihiko, and Mohamed El-Hodiri. "Price Taking Firms." In Microeconomic Theory, 87–106. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-72791-7_5.
Full textKurz, Heinz D. "Factor price frontier." In Capital Theory, 155–60. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20861-6_11.
Full textBetz, Frederick. "Price Disequilibrium Theory." In Stability in International Finance, 1–18. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26760-9_1.
Full textKoslowski, Peter. "Just Price Theory." In Principles of Ethical Economy, 211–43. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0956-0_10.
Full textMiravete, Eugenio J. "Price Discrimination (Theory)." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–5. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2630-1.
Full textMiravete, Eugenio J. "Price Discrimination (Theory)." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 10687–91. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2630.
Full textCase, John, Keh-Jiann Chen, Sanjay Jain, Wolfgang Merkle, and James S. Royer. "Generality’s Price." In Learning Theory and Kernel Machines, 684–98. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45167-9_50.
Full textHammock, Michael R., and J. Wilson Mixon. "Price-Searcher Markets." In Microeconomic Theory and Computation, 247–80. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-9417-1_12.
Full textBeckmann, Martin J. "Spatial Price Policy." In Lectures on Location Theory, 21–44. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03762-1_3.
Full textHaugom, Erik. "Fundamentals of price theory." In Essentials of Pricing Analytics, 12–35. New York: Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429345319-2.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Price theory"
Liang, Ma. "Price point and price rigidity: One micro-basis of price rigidity theory." In Business Management and Electronic Information. 2011 International Conference on Business Management and Electronic Information (BMEI 2011). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icbmei.2011.5921054.
Full textLi Xie, Hua Zheng, and Guo-ying Fan. "Price volatility analysis by Grey disaster theory." In 2008 3rd IEEE Conference on Industrial Electronics and Applications (ICIEA). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iciea.2008.4582963.
Full textMa, Lu, and Yuanbiao Zhang. "Evaluate House Price with Relative Deprivation Theory." In 2011 International Conference on Computational and Information Sciences (ICCIS). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iccis.2011.144.
Full textZhengjun Liu, Hongming Yang, and Mingyong Lai. "Electricity price forecasting model based on chaos theory." In 2005 International Power Engineering Conference. IEEE, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ipec.2005.206950.
Full textDong-hong, Cui, and Zhang Xi-yan. "Application of game theory on bidding price decision." In EM). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icieem.2009.5344636.
Full textMuresan, Anton S. "On a Functional-Differential Equation from Price Theory." In 2009 11th International Symposium on Symbolic and Numeric Algorithms for Scientific Computing (SYNASC). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/synasc.2009.14.
Full textLiu, Yi. "E-commerce Price War Based on Game Theory." In 2021 3rd International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI 2021). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.211209.533.
Full textFeldman, Michal, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, and Vasilis Syrgkanis. "The price of anarchy in large games." In STOC '16: Symposium on Theory of Computing. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2897518.2897580.
Full textToliyat Abolhassani, AmirMohsen, and Mahdi Yaghoobi. "Stock price forecasting using PSOSVM." In 2010 3rd International Conference on Advanced Computer Theory and Engineering (ICACTE 2010). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icacte.2010.5579738.
Full textGhosh, Arnob, and Saswati Sarkar. "Quality sensitive price competition in spectrum oligopoly." In 2013 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isit.2013.6620730.
Full textReports on the topic "Price theory"
Farhi, Emmanuel, Alan Olivi, and Iván Werning. Price Theory for Incomplete Markets. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w30037.
Full textKaplan, Greg, Guido Menzio, Leena Rudanko, and Nicholas Trachter. Relative Price Dispersion: Evidence and Theory. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w21931.
Full textGordon, David, and Eric Leeper. The Price Level, the Quantity Theory of Money, and the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9084.
Full textStoye, Jorg, John Quah, Yuichi Kitamura, and Rahul Deb. Revealed price preference: theory and empirical analysis. The IFS, October 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1920/wp.cem.2018.5718.
Full textMontgomery, Edward, Kathryn Shaw, and Mary Ellen Benedict. Pensions and Wages: An Hedonic Price Theory Approach. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3458.
Full textChristiano, Lawrence, and Terry Fitzgerald. Understanding the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w7668.
Full textBrunnermeier, Markus, Sebastian Merkel, and Yuliy Sannikov. The Fiscal Theory of Price Level with a Bubble. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w27116.
Full textMcCallum, Bennett. Is the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level Learnable? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9961.
Full textVélez-Velásquez, Juan Sebastián. Banning Price Discrimination under Imperfect Competition: Evidence from Colombia's Broadband. Banco de la República de Colombia, December 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.32468/be.1148.
Full textBuiter, Willem. The Fallacy of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w7302.
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