Journal articles on the topic 'Prejudices – Psychology – Testing'

- The process of psychoanalytic interpretation should include also a critique of society, i.e., an analysis of the social and economical dynamics that may influence the patients' inner conflict. In other words, the analyst should pay attention both to the patient's unconscious dynamics and to social dynamics, for example concerning power relationships, prejudices, interests linked to a given social class, etc. The theoretical aspects of this argument are discussed in detail, also regarding the relation between the concepts of "reality testing" and "reality principle", and some clinical example are presented. This paper originally appeared in German in issue no. 2, 1975, of Psyche, and the Italian translation appeared in issue no 1/2, 1976, of Psicoterapia e Scienze Umane. Here it is republished in order to remember Paul Parin, who died in Zurich on May 18, 2009, at the age of 92.KEY WORDS: critique of society, psychoanalytic interpretation, adaptation, reality principle, reality testing

The poor reality testing and the thinking disorder in schizophrenia may be attributed to a deficiency in cognitive resources related to the neurobiological deficiencies. Recent therapy and research have demonstrated that, far from being a bizarre psychologically incomprehensible phenomenon, schizophrenia can be understood within our conventional conception of human nature. This humanizing trend is especially evident in the cognitive approaches to this disorder. Research has established that there is a continuum from normal experiences of paranormal beliefs, hallucinations, thinking problems, and withdrawal to their counterpart in schizophrenia. The kinds of biases in schizophrenia are also evident in common social problems such as prejudices and ethnocentrism as well as in interpersonal strife. Dysfunctional attitudes about attachment and performance in schizophrenia form the infrastructure for persecutory delusions and negative symptoms, respectively. Grandiose delusions, on the other hand, are shown to be an overcompensation for a sense of loneliness, inferiority, and vulnerability.

This paper reports the results of a medical research that measured prejudice and attitudes towards mentally ill people and towards the mental illness. Three groups of respondents were studied: medical students, psychology students and the general population. Medical students and psychology students represented a population that is educated in regards to mental illness, and the general population was not trained so much about mental illness. The hypothesis was that the respondents who have been working with mentally ill people and had lots of knowledge about mental illnesses were the persons with less prejudice towards people with mental illness. The main objective of research was to examine the differences in prejudice and attitudes between respondents who had experience and knowledge related to mental illness and people with mental illness compared to those without such knowledge and experience. Testing was conducted using an anonymous online survey consisting of thirteen questions. The research confirmed the hypothesis and it could be an incentive for education aimed at specific groups.Disclosure of interestThe authors have not supplied their declaration of competing interest.

Many diversity courses in psychology originally aimed to reduce student racial bias and raise their awareness of racism. However, quantitative data testing the effectiveness of such courses are lacking. This study assessed a required diversity course's effectiveness in raising awareness of White privilege and racism; increasing support for affirmative action; and reducing prejudice, guilt, and fear of other races. Students ( N = 146) completed identical surveys during the first and last weeks of the semester. Results indicated greater awareness of White privilege and racism and more support for affirmative action by the end of the term. White students ( n = 131) also expressed greater White guilt after completing the course.

Recent research demonstrates that intergroup contact effectively reduces prejudice even among prejudice-prone persons. But some assert that evidence regarding the benefits of contact among prejudice-prone individuals is “mixed,” particularly for those higher in social dominance orientation (SDO), one of the field’s most important individual differences. Problematically, person variables are typically considered in isolation despite being intercorrelated, leaving the question of which unique psychological aspects of prejudice proneness (e.g., authoritarianism, antiegalitarianism, cognitive style) are responsive to intergroup contact unresolved. To address this shortcoming, in a large sample of White Americans ( N = 465) we simultaneously examined the contact–attitude association at varying levels of ideological (SDO, right-wing authoritarianism), cognitive style (need for closure), and identity-based (group identification) indicators of prejudice proneness. Examining a broad range of intergroup criterion measures (e.g., racism, support for racial profiling) we reveal that greater contact quality is associated with lower levels of intergroup hostility for those both lower and higher on a variety of indicators of prejudice proneness, simultaneously considered.

Abstract. Although research has revealed that more progressive LGB (lesbian, gay, and bisexual) rights are positively associated with more favorable attitudes toward sexual minorities, little is known about why LGB rights co-occur with positive attitudes. The present contribution fills this gap by testing whether the prevalence of intergroup contact with LGB individuals explains the relationship between more progressive LGB rights and sexual prejudice. Utilizing representative Eurobarometer data from 28 European Union Member States, we find that progressive institutional arrangements positively predict favorable attitudes toward sexual minorities by rendering intergroup contact with LGB individuals more commonplace. Importantly, this pattern of findings replicates for different measures of prejudice and LGB-related legislation. The theoretical and practical implications of the current findings are discussed.

Abstract This paper presents a meta-analysis of 79 cases (N = 21,857) testing the effectiveness of mediated intergroup contact on prejudice. Positive mediated contact decreased (r = −.23; 95% CI, −.29 to −.17), whereas negative mediated contact increased prejudicial attitudes (r = .31; 95% CI, .24 to .38) and intergroup anxiety and empathy were both significant mediators of these relationships. Furthermore, the data revealed no significant differences between parasocial and vicarious effects, positive and negative mediated-contact effects, or the effects of the duration of mediated-contact stimulus exposure on prejudice. However, the data did reveal experiments to have stronger effects than survey research. These and other results are discussed along with implications, limitations, and future research directions.

Fear of crime (FoC) has dominated the political landscape over the last 20 years, with many crime policy developments during this period linked not to actual experiences of violence but to the fear of victimization. Fear of crime studies, in most cases, are conducted with populations that have only a passing, mediated knowledge of crime victimization. The research discussed in this article, in contrast, considers the impact of FoC with a highly victimized community, and establishes psychometric testing to validate an instrument to measure the impact of that fear ( Fear of Heterosexism Scale [ FoHS]). If FoC is related to experiences of crime as the existing research suggests, then victims of heterosexist prejudice, discrimination, and/or violence would be more likely to fear such incidents in the future. It was also predicted that participants who concealed their sexual and/or gender identity and had lower levels of social connectedness would experience higher levels of fear. The findings highlight the importance of contextual factors in FoH, and identify the critical roles that disclosure and social connectedness play in ameliorating the damaging effects of heterosexist victimization.

The present study aims at explaining individual differences in self-reported political violence. We integrate key concepts from the field of criminology that are conceptually related to social identity theory (Flemish identity, feelings of group superiority, and ethnocentrism) and the dual process model on prejudice (perceived injustice, perception of threat, and right-wing authoritarianism). In our model, social identity concepts are hypothesized to play a mediating role between mechanisms derived from the dual process model and political violence. To test the integrated model, a model was run for testing the strength of direct and indirect effects of perceived injustice, authoritarianism thrill-seeking behavior, feelings of superiority, Flemish nationalism, ethnocentrism, right-wing extremist beliefs, and exposure to racist peers on political violence. The analyses are based on a web survey ( N = 723) among adolescents and young adults in Flanders, Belgium. Results indicate that social identity variables play an important mediation role between perceptions and ideological attitudes related to injustice, and political violence. The main path revealed by our study is that perceived injustice may result in heightened perceptions of threat, which in turn positively influence levels of right-wing authoritarianism. Mediated by ethnocentrism, this variable has a significant and positive effect on right-wing beliefs, which in turn has a positive effect on political violence.

AbstractThe paper discusses the conceptual and methodological challenges of developing measures of stereotypes and prejudice for use in Slovakia. Developing these measures was the first step in a research project aimed at testing the effectiveness of direct and indirect contact interventions to reduce prejudice against stigmatized minorities, particularly the Roma. The first major problem in this kind of research relates to measuring the impact of interventions, as standardized instruments for measuring prejudice have yet to be developed in Slovak. The second problem concerns the risk that the interventions will fail to reduce anti-Roma prejudice, because of the strong stigmatization of the Roma minority in Slovakia. The paper also reviews existing measures of stereotypes and prejudice in social psychology and discusses their applicability for measuring anti-Roma prejudice in Slovakia. It is argued that measures of stereotypes and prejudice should be designed and used in a sensitive manner and that in the process of measuring various forms of social bias we should avoid reproducing its cognitive, emotional and behavioural manifestations.

Against the backdrop of an increase in reported hate crimes, we present the development of a U.K.-focussed instrument designed to evaluate the nature of public beliefs about hate crime, legislation, offenders and victims. In Study 1, 438 participants completed an Anglicized version of the Hate Crime Beliefs Scale (HCBS). Factor analyses revealed three subfactors: Denial (high scores represent a denial of hate crime severity and need for legislation), Compassion (high score reflect compassion toward victims and affected communities) and Sentencing (higher scores reflect more punitive attitudes). In Study 2 ( N = 134) we show that scores on Denial are positively associated with those on Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), ideologies known to be associated with prejudice. Compassion was negatively associated with these ideologies. Mediation analyses showed that Big Five personality traits Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness predicted Denial and Compassion via RWA, whereas Agreeableness and Openness predicted scores via SDO, consistent with a dual-process motivation model of hate crime beliefs. Results are discussed in terms of the nature of hate crime beliefs and the importance of understanding public attitudes which may support undesirable social norms and influence jury decision making in trials of hate related offenses.

As a particularly vulnerable group, children from rural areas in China whose families migrate to urban areas often encounter social exclusion, prejudice, and discrimination as they adjust to city life. Hence, migrant children may experience a sense of relative deprivation when they feel they are treated unjustly when compared to their urban counterparts. Although previous research has demonstrated that relative deprivation is a risk factor for prosocial tendencies, this association has not yet been examined in the population of migrant children in China. Further, few studies have revealed the mediating and moderating mechanisms between relative deprivation and prosocial tendencies. Therefore, this study constructed an integrated model examining the possible mediating role of perceived social support and moderating role of in-group identity on the association between relative deprivation and prosocial tendencies. A large sample of 1,630 Chinese rural-to-urban migrant children (845 girls; Mage = 12.30, SD = 1.74) completed a battery of self-report questionnaires regarding relative deprivation, prosocial tendencies, perceived social support, in-group identity, and demographic variables. The results indicated that relative deprivation was negatively correlated with migrant children's prosocial tendencies and this connection was partially mediated by perceived social support. Moderated mediation analysis further indicated that in-group identity moderated the effect of perceived social support on prosocial tendencies, with a high level of in-group identity strengthening the positive association between perceived social support and prosocial tendencies. Parents, educators, and other members of society concerned about migrant children's psychosocial adaptation should provide adequate social support resources and help them foster positive in-group identity to migrant populations to mitigate the adverse effects of relative deprivation and promote their prosocial tendencies.

AbstractThe southern U.S. has both high HIV and incarceration rates in comparison to its population. As in the rest of the country, HIV prevention is based on education, behavior change, and biomedical efforts, such as pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP). This study examined the implementation of an educational intervention and supportive services to obtain PrEP in a population of individuals (N = 218) involved in an Adult Drug Court (ADC) or on probation or parole (P-P). Nearly all ADC and P-P participants self-reported risk behaviors linked to HIV acquisition. Results supported the acceptance and usefulness of the intervention as rated by participants. Participants showed increased knowledge of HIV risks and testing post-education. In multivariate analysis, predictors of interest in using PrEP included low stigma beliefs, specifically their level of prejudice views, high depressive symptoms, and white race. The intervention shows promise. Given the high risk documented for ADC and P-P individuals, HIV prevention is a critical component for increased protective behaviors.

I. First Brexit, then Trump: Has the past year or so ushered in a “wave” (Weisberg), a “barrage” (Desmond-Harris) or a “deluge” (Sidahmed) of that notoriously noxious affect, hate? It certainly feels that way to those of us identified with progressive social and political causes—those of us troubled, not just by Trump’s recent electoral victory, but by the far-right forces to which that victory has given voice. And yet the questions still hanging over efforts to quantify emotional or affective states leaves the claim that there has been a clear spike in hate moot (Ngai 26; Massumi 136-7; Ahmed, Promise 3-8). So let’s try asking a different question. Has this same period seen a rise, across liberal media platforms, in the rhetorical work of “hate-attribution”? Here, at least, an answer seems in readier reach. For no one given to scrolling distractedly through liberal Anglophone media outlets, from The New York Times, to The Guardian, to Slate, will be unfamiliar with a species of journalism that, in reporting the appalling activities associated with what has become known as the “alt-right” (Main; Wallace-Wells; Gourarie), articulates those activities in the rubric of a calculable uptick in hate itself.Before the U.S. Presidential election, this fledgling journalistic genre was already testing its wings, its first shudderings felt everywhere from Univision anchor Jorge Ramos’s widely publicized documentary, Hate Rising (2016), which explores the rise of white supremacist movements across the South-West U.S, to an edition of Slate’s Trumpcast entitled “The Alt-Right and a Deluge of Hate,” which broached the torment-by-Twitter of left-wing journalist David French. In the wake of the election, and the appalling acts of harassment and intimidation it seemed to authorize, the genre gained further momentum—leading to the New Yorker’s “Hate Is on the Rise After Trump’s Election,” to The Guardian’s “Trump’s Election led to Barrage of Hate,” and to Vox’s “The Wave of Post-Election Hate Reportedly Sweeping the Nation, Explained.” And it still has traction today, judging not just by James King’s recent year-in-review column, “The Year in Hate: From Donald Trump to the Rise of the Alt-Right,” but by Salon’s “A Short History of Hate” which tracks the alt-right’s meteoric 2016 rise to prominence, and the New York Times’ recently launched hate-speech aggregator, “This Week in Hate.”As should already be clear from these brisk, thumbnail accounts of the texts in question, the phenomena alluded to by the titular term “hate” are not instances of hate per se, but rather instances of “hate-speech.” The word “hate,” in other words, is being deployed here not literally, to refer to an emotional state, but metonymically, as a shorthand for “hate-speech”—a by-now widely conventionalized and legally codified parlance originating with the U.N. Declaration to describe “violent or violence-inciting speech or acts that “aim or intend to inflict injury, or incite prejudice or hatred, against persons of groups” because of their ethnic, religious, sexual or social affiliation. And there is no doubt that, beyond the headlines, these articles do incredibly important work, drawing connections between, and drawing attention to, a host of harmful activities associated with the so-called “alt-right”—from a pair of mangled, pretzel-shaped swastikas graffiti-ed in a children’s playground, to acts of harassment, intimidation and violence against women, African-Americans, Latinos, Muslims, Jews, and LGBTQ people, to Trump’s own racist, xenophobic and misogynistic tweets. Yet the fact that an emotion-term like hate is being mobilized across these texts as a metonym for the “alt-right” is no oratorical curio. Rather, it perpetuates a pervasive way of thinking about the relationship between the alt-right (a political phenomenon) and hate (an emotional phenomenon) that should give pause to those of us committed to mining that vein of cultural symptomatology now consigned, across the social sciences and critical humanities, to affect theory. Specifically, these headlines inscribe, in miniature, a kind of micro-assessment, a micro-geography and micro-theory of hate. First, they suggest that, even prior to its incarnation in specific, and dangerous, forms of speech or action, hate is in and of itself anathema, a phenomenon so unquestioningly dangerous that a putative “rise” or “spike” in its net presence provides ample pretext for a news headline. Second, they propose that hate may be localized to a particular social or political group—a group subsisting, unsurprisingly, on that peculiarly contested frontier between the ideological alt-right and the American Midwest. And third, they imply that hate is so indubitably the single most significant source of the xenophobic, racist and sexist activities they go on to describe that it may be casually used as these activities’ lexical proxy. What is crystallizing here, I suggest, is what scholars of rhetoric dub a rhetorical “constellation” (Campbell and Jamieson 332)—a constellation from which hate emerges as, a) inherently problematic, b) localizable to the “alt-right,” and, c) the primary engine of the various activities and expressions we associate with them. This constellation of conventions for thinking about hate and its relationship to the activities of right-wing extremist movement has coalesced into a “genre” we might dub the genre of “hate-attribution.” Yet while it’s far from clear that the genre is an effective one in a political landscape that’s fast becoming a political battleground, it hasn’t appeared by chance. Treating “hate,” then, less as a descriptive “grid of analysis” (Sedgwick 152), than as a rhetorical projectile, this essay opens by interrogating the “hate-attribution” genre’s logic and querying its efficacy. Having done so, it approaches the concept of “alternatives” by asking: how might calling time on the genre help us think differently about both hate itself and about the forces catalyzing, and catalyzed by, Trump’s presidential campaign? II.The rhetorical power of the genre of hate-attribution, of course, isn’t too difficult to pin down. An emotion so thoroughly discredited that its assignment is now in and of itself a term of abuse (see, for example, the O.E.D’s freshly-expanded definition of the noun “hater”), hate is an emotion the Judeo-Christian tradition deems not just responsible for but practically akin to murder (John 3:1). In part as a result of this tradition, hate has proven thoroughly resistant to efforts to elevate it from the status of an expression of a subject’s pestiferous inner life to the status of a polemical response to an object in the world. Indeed, while a great deal of the critical energy amassing under the rubric of “affect theory” has recently been put into recuperating the strategic or diagnostic value of emotions long scorned as irrelevant to oppositional struggle—from irritation and envy, to depression, anger and shame (Ngai; Cvetkovich; Gould; Love)—hate has notably not been among them. In fact, those rare scholarly accounts of affect that do address “hate,” notably Ahmed’s excellent work on right-wing extremist groups in the United Kingdom, display an understandable reluctance to rehabilitate it for progressive thought (Cultural Politics). It should come as no surprise, then, that the genre of “hate-attribution” has a rare rhetorical power. In identifying “hate” as the source of a particular position, gesture or speech-act, we effectively drain said position, gesture or speech-act of political agency or representational power—reducing it from an at-least-potentially polemical action in or response to the world, to the histrionic expression of a reprehensible personhood. Yet because hate’s near-taboo status holds across the ideological and political spectrum, what is less clear is why the genre of hate-attribution has achieved such cachet in the liberal media in particular. The answer, I would argue, lies in the fact that the work of hate-attribution dovetails all too neatly with liberal political theory’s longstanding tendency to laminate its social and civic ideals to affective ideals like “love,” “sympathy,” “compassion,” and, when in a less demonstrative humor, “tolerance”. As Martha Nussbaum’s Political Emotions has recently shown, this tradition has an impressive philosophical pedigree, running from Aristotle’s philia (16), John Locke’s “toleration” and David Hume’s “sympathy” (69-75), to the twentieth century’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with its promotion of “tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups.” And while the labour of what Lauren Berlant calls “liberal sentimentality” (“Poor Eliza”, 636) has never quite died away, it does seem to have found new strength with the emergence of the “intimate public sphere” (Berlant, Queen)—from its recent popular apotheosis in the Clinton campaign’s notorious “Love Trumps Hate” (a slogan in which “love,” unfortunately, came to look a lot like resigned technocratic quietism in the face of ongoing economic and environmental crisis [Zizek]), to its revival as a philosophical project among progressive scholars, many of them under the sway of the so-called “affective turn” (Nussbaum; Hardt; Sandoval; hooks). No surprise, then, that liberalism’s struggle to yoke itself to “love” should have as its eerie double a struggle to locate among its ideological and political enemies an increasingly reified “hate”. And while the examples of this project we’ve touched on so far have hailed from popular media, this set of protocols for thinking about hate and its relationship to the activities of right-wing extremist movements is not unique to media circles. It’s there in political discourse, as in ex-DNC chair Debbie Wasserman Schultz’s announcement, on MSNBC, that “Americans will unite against [Trump’s] hatred.” And it’s there, too, in academic media studies, from FLOW journal’s November 2016 call for papers inviting respondents to comment, among other things, on “the violence and hatred epitomized by Trump and his supporters,” to the SCMS conference’s invitation to members to participate in a pop-up panel entitled “Responding to Hate, Disenfranchisement and the Loss of the Commons.” Yet while the labor of hate-attribution to which many progressive forces have become attached carries an indisputable rhetorical force, it also has some profound rhetorical flaws. The very same stigma, after all, that makes “hate” such a powerful explanatory grenade to throw also makes it an incredibly tough one to land. As Ahmed’s analysis of the online rhetoric of white supremacist organizations should remind us (Cultural Politics), most groups structured around inciting and promoting violence against women and minorities identify, perversely, not as hate groups, but as movements propelled by the love of race and nation. And while left-wing pundits pronounce “hate” the signature emotion of a racist, misogynist Trump-voting right, supporters of Trump ascribe it, just as routinely, to the so-called “liberal elite,” a group whose mythical avatars—from the so-called “Social Justice Warrior” or “SJW,” to the supercilious Washington politico—are said to brand “ordinary [white, male] Americans” indiscriminately as racist, misogynistic, homophobic buffoons. Thus, for example, The Washington Post’s uncanny, far-right journalistic alter-ego, The Washington Times, dubs the SPLC a “liberal hate group”; the Wikipedia mirror-site, Conservapedia, recasts liberal objections to gun violence as “liberal hate speech” driven by an “irrational aversion to weapons”; while one blood-curdling sub-genre of reportage on Steve Bannon’s crypto-fascist soapbox, Breitbart News, is devoted to denouncing what it calls “ ‘anti-White Racism.’” It’s easy enough, of course, to defend the hate-attribution genre’s liberal incarnations while dismissing its right-wing variants as cynical, opportunistic shams, as Ahmed does (Cultural Politics)—thereby re-establishing the wellspring of hate where we are most comfortable locating it: among our political others. Yet to do so seems, in some sense, to perpetuate a familiar volley of hate-attribution. And to the extent that, as many media scholars have shown (Philips; Reed; Tett; Turow), our digital, networked political landscape is in danger of being reduced to a silo-ed discursive battleground, the ritual exchange of terminological grenades that everyone seems eager to propel across ideological lines, but that no one, understandably, seems willing to pick up, seems counter-productive to say the least.Even beyond the genre’s ultimate ineffectiveness, what should strike anyone used to reflecting on affect is how little justice it does to the ubiquity and intricacy of “hate” as an affective phenomenon. Hate is not and cannot be the exclusive property or preserve of one side of the political spectrum. One doesn’t have to stretch one’s critical faculties too far to see the extent to which the genre of hate-attribution participates in the emotional ballistics it condemns or seeks to redress. While trafficking in a relatively simple hate-paradigm (as a subjective emotional state that may be isolated to a particular person or group), the genre itself incarnates a more complex, socially dynamic model of hate in which the emotion operates through logics of projection perhaps best outlined by Freud. In the “hate-attribution” genre, that is, hate—like those equally abjected categories “sentimentality,” “worldliness” or “knowingness” broached by Sedgwick in her bravura analyses of “scapegoating attribution” (150-158)—finds its clearest expression in and through the labor of its own adscription. And it should come as no surprise that an emotion so widely devalued, where it is not openly prohibited, might also find expression in less overt form.Yet to say as much is by no means to discredit the genre. As legal scholar Jeremy Waldron has recently pointed out, there’s no particular reason why “the passions and emotions that lie behind a particular speech act” (34)—even up to and including hate—should devalue the speech acts they rouse. On the contrary, to pin the despicable and damaging activities of the so-called “alt right” on “hate” is, if anything, to do an injustice to a rich and complex emotion that can be as generative as it can be destructive. As Freud suggests in “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,” for example, hate may be the very seed of love, since the forms of “social feeling” (121) celebrated under the liberal rubric of “tolerance,” “love,” and “compassion,” are grounded in “the reversal of what was first a hostile feeling into a positively-toned tie in the nature of an identification” (121; italics mine). Indeed, Freud projects this same argument across a larger, historical canvas in Civilization and its Discontents, which contends that it is in our very struggle to combat our “aggressive instincts” that human communities have developed “methods intended to incite people into identifications and aim-inhibited relationships of love” (31). For Freud, that is, the practice of love is a function of ongoing efforts to see hate harnessed, commuted and transformed. III.What might it mean, then, to call time on this round of hate-attribution? What sort of “alternatives” might emerge when we abandon the assumption that political engagement entails a “struggle over who has the right to declare themselves as acting out of love” (Ahmed, Cultural Politics 131), and thus, by that same token, a struggle over the exact location and source of hate? One boon, I suggest, is the license it gives those of us on the progressive left to simply own our own hate. There’s little doubt that reframing the dangerous and destructive forms of speech fomented by Trump’s campaign, not as eruptions of hate, or even as “hate-speech,” but as speech we hate would be more consistent with what once seemed affect theory’s first commandment: to take our own affective temperature before launching headlong into critical analysis. After all, when Lauren Berlant (“Trump”) takes a stab at economist Paul Krugman’s cautions against “the Danger of Political Emotions” with the timely reminder that “all the messages are emotional,” the “messages” she’s pointing to aren’t just those of our political others, they’re ours; and the “emotions” she’s pointing to aren’t just the evacuated, insouciant versions of love championed by the Clinton campaign, they’re of the messier, or as Ngai might put it, “uglier” (2) variety—from shame, depression and anger, to, yes, I want to insist, hate.By way of jump-starting this program of hate-avowal, then, let me just say it: this essay was animated, in part, by a certain kind of hate. The social critic in me hates the breathtaking simplification of the complex social, economic and emotional forces animating Trump voters that seem to actuate some liberal commentary; the psychologist in me hates the self-mystification palpable in the left’s insistence on projecting and thus disowning its own (often very well justified) aggressions; and the human being in me, hating the kind of toxic speech to which Trump’s campaign has given rise, wishes to be able to openly declare that hatred. Among its other effects, hate is characterized by hypervigilance for lapses or failings in an object it deems problematic, a hypervigilance that—sometimes—animates analysis (Zeki and Romoya). In this sense, “hate” seems entitled to a comfortable place in the ranks of what Nick Salvato has recently dubbed criticism’s creative “obstructions”—phenomena that, while “routinely identified as detriments” to critical inquiry, may also “form the basis for … critical thinking” (1).Yet while one boon associated with this disclosure might be a welcome intellectual honesty, a more significant boon, I’d argue, is what getting this disclosure out of the way might leave room for. Opting out of the game of hurling “hate” back and forth across a super-charged political arena, that is, we might devote our column inches and Facebook posts to the less sensational but more productive task of systematically challenging the specious claims, and documenting the damaging effects, of a species of utterance (Butler; Matsuda; Waldron) we’ve grown used to simply descrying as pure, distilled “hate”. And we also might do something else. Relieved of the confident conviction that we can track “Trumpism” to a spontaneous outbreak of a single, localizable emotion, we might be able to offer a fuller account of the economic, social, political and affective forces that energize it. Certainly, hate plays a part here—although the process by which, as Isabelle Stengers puts it, affect “make[s] present, vivid and mattering … a worldly world” (371) demands that we scrutinize that hate as a syndrome, rather than simply moralize it as a sin, addressing its mainsprings in a moment marked by the nerve-fraying and life-fraying effects of what has become known across the social sciences and critical humanities as conditions of social and economic “precarity” (Muehlebach; Neil and Rossiter; Stewart).But perhaps hate’s not the only emotion tucked away under the hood. Here’s something affect theory knows today: affect moves not, as more traditional theorists of political emotion have it, “unambiguously and predictably from one’s cognitive processing,” but in ways that are messy, muddled and indirect (Gould 24). That form of speech is speech we hate. But it may not be “hate speech.” That crime is a crime we hate. But it may not be a “hate-crime.” One of the critical tactics we might crib from Berlant’s work in Cruel Optimism is that of decoding and decrypting, in even the most hateful acts, an instance of what Berlant, herself optimistically, calls “optimism.” For Berlant, after all, optimism is very often cruel, attaching itself, as it seems to have done in 2016, to scenes, objects and people that, while ultimately destined to “imped[e] the aim that brought [it to them] initially,” nevertheless came to seem, to a good portion of the electorate, the only available exponent of that classic good-life genre, “the change that’s gonna come” (“Trump” 1-2) at a moment when the Democratic party’s primary campaign promise was more of the free-market same. And in a recent commentary on Trump’s rise in The New Inquiry (“Trump”), Berlant exemplified the kind of critical code-breaking this hypothesis might galvanize, deciphering a twisted, self-mutilating optimism in even the most troublesome acts, claims or positions. Here’s one translation: “Anti-P.C. means: I feel unfree.” And here’s another: “people react negatively, reactively and literally to Black Lives Matter, reeling off the other ‘lives’ that matter.” Berlant’s transcription? “They feel that they don’t matter, and they’re not wrong.”ReferencesAhmed, Sara. The Promise of Happiness. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010.———. The Cultural Politics of Emotion. London: Routledge, 2004.Aristotle. Rhetoric. Trans. W. Rhys Roberts. New York: Cosimo Classics, 2010.———. Politics. Trans. Ernest Barker. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.Berlant, Lauren. Cruel Optimism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011.———. “Trump, or Political Emotions.” The New Inquiry 5 Aug. 2016. <http://thenewinquiry.com/features/trump-or-political-emotions/>.———. “Poor Eliza.” American Literature 70.3 (1998): 635-668.———. The Queen of America Goes to Washington City. Durham, NC: Duke UP: 1998.Butler, Judith. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York and London: Routledge, 1997.Campbell, Karlyn Kohrs, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. “Introduction to Form and Genre.” Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A Twentieth Century Perspective. Eds. Bernard Brock, Robert L. Scott, and James W. Chesebro. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1990. 331-242.Conservapedia. “Liberal Hate Speech.” <http://www.conservapedia.com/Liberal_hate_speech>.Cvetkovich, Ann. Depression. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012.Desmond-Harris, Jenna. “The Wave of Post-Election Hate Reportedly Sweeping the Nation, Explained.” Vox 17 Nov. 2016. <http://www.vox.com/2016/11/17/13639138/trump-hate-crimes-attacks-racism- xenophobia-islamophobia-schools>.Freud, Sigmund. “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.” Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Vol. XVIII: 1920-1922. Trans James Strachey. London: Vintage, 2001.———. Civilization and Its Discontents. Trans. James Strachey. 1930. <http://www.stephenhicks.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FreudS-CIVILIZATION-AND-ITS-DISCONTENTS-text-final.pdf>.Gould, Deborah. “Affect and Protest.” Political Emotions. Eds. Janet Staiger, Anne Cvetkovich, Ann Reynolds. New York: Routledge, 2010.Gourarie, Chava. “How the Alt-Right Checkmated the Media.” Columbia Journalism Review 30 Aug. 2016. <http://www.cjr.org/analysis/alt_right_media_clinton_trump.php>.Hardt, Michael. “For Love or Money.” Cultural Anthropology 26. 4 (2011): 676-82.hooks, bell. All about Love: New Visions. New York: Harper Collins, 2001. Horowitz, David. “Anti-White Racism: The Hate That Dares Not Speak Its Name.” Breitbart News 26 Apr. 2016. <http://www.breitbart.com/big-journalism/2016/04/26/anti-white-racism-hate-dares-not-speak-name-2/>.Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. London: Thomas and Joseph Allman, 1817.KCRW. “The Rise of Hate and the Right Wing.” <http://www.kcrw.com/news-culture/shows/press-play->.King, James. “This Year in Hate.” Vocativ 12 Dec. 2016. <http://www.vocativ.com/383234/hate-crime-donald-trump-alt-right-2016/>.Locke, John. A Letter Concerning Toleration. London: Huddersfield, 1796.Main, Thomas J. “What’s the Alt-Right?” Los Angeles Times 25 Aug. 2016. <http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-main-alt-right-trump-20160825-snap-story.html>.Massumi, Brian. Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002.Matsuda, Mari. Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment. Westview Press 1993.Muehlebach, Andrea. “On Precariousness and the Ethical Imagination: The Year in Sociocultural Anthropology.” American Anthropologist 115. 2 (2013): 297-311.Neilson, Brett, and Ned Rossiter. “From Precarity to Precariousness and Back Again: Labour, Life and Unstable Networks.” Fibreculture 5 (2005). <http://five.fibreculturejournal.org/fcj-022-from-precarity-to-precariousness-and-back-again-labour-life-and-unstable-networks/1>.Ngai, Sianne. Ugly Feelings. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.Nussbaum, Martha. Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013.Okeowo, Alexis. “Hate on the Rise after Trump’s Election.” New Yorker 17 Nov. 2016. <http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/hate-on-the-rise-after-trumps-election>.Phillips, Angela. “Social Media Is Changing the Face of Politics—and It’s Not Good News.” The Conversation 9 Feb. 2016. <https://theconversation.com/social-media-is-changing-the-face-of-politics-and-its-not-goodnews-54266>.Reed, T.V. Digitized Lives: Culture, Power and Social Change in the Internet Era. New York: Routledge, 2014.Salvato, Nick. Obstructions. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016.Sandoval, Chela. Methodology of the Oppressed. Minneapolis; Minnesota University Press, 2001. Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. Epistemology of the Closet. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.Sidahmed, Mazin. “Trump's Election Led to 'Barrage of Hate', Report Finds.” The Guardian 29 Nov. 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/nov/29/trump-related-hate-crimes-report-southern-poverty-law-center>.Stengers, Isabelle. “Wondering about Materialism.” The Speculative Turn: Continental Philosophy and Realism. Eds. Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman. Melbourne: re.press, 2001. 368-380. Stewart, Kathleen. “Precarity’s Forms.” Cultural Anthropology 27.3 (2012): 518-525. Tett, Gillian. The Silo Effect: The Peril of Expertise and the Promise of Breaking. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016.Turow, Joseph. The Daily You: How the New Advertising Industry Is Defining Your Identity and Your Worth. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011.Waldron, Jeremy. The Harm in Hate Speech. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Wallace-Wells, Benjamin, “Is the Alt-Right for Real?” New Yorker 5 May 2016. <http://www.newyorker.com/news/benjamin-wallace-wells/is-the-alt-right-for-real>.Washington Times. “Editorial: The FBI Dumps a ‘Hate Group’.” 28 Mar. 2014. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/28/editorial-the-fbi-dumps-a-hate- group/>.Weisberg, Jacob. “The Alt-Right and a Deluge of Hate.” Slate 1 Nov. 2016. <http://www.slate.com/articles/podcasts/trumpcast/2016/11/how_the_alt_right_harassed_david_french_on_twitter_and_at_home.html>.Zeki, S., and J.P. Romaya. “Neural Correlates of Hate.” PLoS ONE 1.3 (2008). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0003556>.Zizek, Slavoj. “Love as a Political Category.” Paper presented to the 6th Subversive Festival, 16 May 2013. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b44IhiCuNw4>.