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Journal articles on the topic 'Powerful CEOs'

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Author: Grafiati

Published: 10 December 2022

Last updated: 29 January 2023

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1

Humphery‐Jenner, Mark, Emdad Islam, Lubna Rahman, and Jo‐Ann Suchard. "Powerful CEOs and Corporate Governance." Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 19, no. 1 (February 6, 2022): 135–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jels.12305.

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2

Arif, H. M., Mohd Zulkhairi Mustapha, and Azlina Abdul Jalil. "Do powerful CEOs matter for earnings quality? Evidence from Bangladesh." PLOS ONE 18, no. 1 (January 20, 2023): e0276935. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0276935.

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This study investigates the effects of powerful Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) on earnings quality in a setting where CEOs have strong dominance over other top executives and occasionally attempt to exert their influence over corporate regulatory bodies. Using 10-year longitudinal data for the period from 2010 to 2019 and 1,395 firm-year observations from listed non-financial firms in Bangladesh, we found that CEOs’ political power and CEOs with high structural and expert power have a significant detrimental effect on earnings quality. Ownership and prestige power have an insignificant impact on earnings quality. These powerful CEOs use accrual and real activity manipulation techniques together to manage the earnings. This study uses the system-generalized method of moment estimates for estimation purposes, and the results remain robust when alternative earnings quality proxies are used. Taken together, our results suggest that CEOs’ political duality (i.e., serving simultaneously as a member of parliament and a CEO) should be restricted and that a CEO’s tenure should be limited to a reasonable period. This research adds to the existing body of knowledge by offering empirical support for CEO power dynamics on earnings quality, specifically political and prestige power.

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3

Li, Minwen, Yao Lu, and Gordon M. Phillips. "CEOs and the Product Market: When Are Powerful CEOs Beneficial?" Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 54, no. 6 (September 19, 2018): 2295–326. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109018001138.

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We examine whether industry product market conditions are important in assessing the benefits and costs of chief executive officer (CEO) power. We find that firms are more likely to have powerful CEOs in high demand product markets where firms are facing entry threats. In these markets, investors react favorably to announcements granting more power to CEOs, and CEO power is associated with higher market value, sales growth, investment, advertising, and the introduction of more new products. Our results remain significant when addressing the endogeneity of CEO power by instrumenting CEO power with past non-CEO executive and director sudden deaths.

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Galema, Rients, Robert Lensink, and Roy Mersland. "Do Powerful CEOs Determine Microfinance Performance?" Journal of Management Studies 49, no. 4 (February 24, 2012): 718–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2012.01046.x.

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Yau, Jot K. "Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?" CFA Digest 42, no. 1 (February 2012): 57–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/dig.v42.n1.52.

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MORSE, ADAIR, VIKRAM NANDA, and AMIT SERU. "Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?" Journal of Finance 66, no. 5 (September 21, 2011): 1779–821. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01687.x.

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7

Jiraporn, Pornsit, Yixin Liu, and Young S. Kim. "How Do Powerful CEOs Affect Analyst Coverage?" European Financial Management 20, no. 3 (July 3, 2012): 652–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036x.2012.00655.x.

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8

Al Mamun, Md, Balasingham Balachandran, and Huu Nhan Duong. "Powerful CEOs and stock price crash risk." Journal of Corporate Finance 62 (June 2020): 101582. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101582.

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9

Jia, Ming, and Zhe Zhang. "The CEO's Representation of Demands and the Corporation's Response to External Pressures: Do Politically Affiliated Firms Donate More?" Management and Organization Review 9, no. 1 (March 2013): 87–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-8784.2012.00297.x.

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AbstractThis study seeks to explain why firms respond in different ways to similar external administrative pressures, such as government demands for charitable giving, particularly in a transitional economy such as China's. Taking the perspective of the CEO's representation on external demands, the study explores the relationship between political affiliation and corporate giving, stimulated by powerful and politically affiliated CEOs, who are the government's natural constituency and who comply with governmental demands for donation. The study introduces contingent factors that influence the CEO's perception of how to satisfy government demands, and that moderate the relationship between political affiliation and corporate giving. Using firm-level data of corporate contributions following the Sichuan earthquake of May 12, 2008, we find that corporations with CEOs who hold political affiliations have a significantly higher probability of donation and also more cash giving. This relationship is moderated by contingent factors such as government ownership, financial condition, and concentration of voting rights.

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10

Wan, Kam-Ming. "Incentive Contracts are not Rigged by Powerful CEOs." Critical Finance Review 3, no. 1 (January 9, 2014): 99–152. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/104.00000016.

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11

Bachmann, Rebecca L., Anna Loyeung, Zoltan P. Matolcsy, and Helen Spiropoulos. "Powerful CEOs, cash bonus contracts and firm performance." Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 47, no. 1-2 (October 10, 2019): 100–131. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12410.

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12

Boumosleh, Anwar, and Elias Raad. "Market reaction to capital expenditures of powerful CEOs." International Journal of Financial Services Management 5, no. 4 (2012): 356. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijfsm.2012.048850.

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13

Adams, Renée B., Heitor Almeida, and Daniel Ferreira. "Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on Corporate Performance." Review of Financial Studies 18, no. 4 (2005): 1403–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhi030.

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14

Francoeur, Claude, Faten Lakhal, Safa Gaaya, and Itidel Ben Saad. "How do powerful CEOs influence corporate environmental performance?" Economic Modelling 94 (January 2021): 121–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2020.09.024.

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15

Kolev, Gueorgui I. "Underperformance by female CEOs: A more powerful test." Economics Letters 117, no. 2 (November 2012): 436–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.028.

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16

Abernethy, Margaret A., Yu Flora Kuang, and Bo Qin. "The Influence of CEO Power on Compensation Contract Design." Accounting Review 90, no. 4 (October 1, 2014): 1265–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-50971.

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ABSTRACT We investigate whether CEO power influences a firm's decision to change its compensation system in response to regulatory and public pressure. In particular, we assess whether CEO power influences the choice of performance measures as a form of camouflage to minimize the impact of these reforms on their wealth. We examine one component of CEO pay, namely, the use of performance-vested stock option (PVSO) plans, and find that firms with powerful CEOs attach less challenging targets in the initial PVSOs granted to their CEOs. Such firms also appear to adopt PVSO plans early, and are more likely to do so when faced with public outrage over executive compensation. Our results suggest that powerful CEOs attempt to appease public outrage by quickly adopting PVSOs, but that adopting PVSOs early does not appear to be an optimal strategy for increasing shareholder value. Regulators intended that implementation of PVSOs would be beneficial to shareholders by improving the link between CEO pay and firm performance. However, our results indicate that powerful CEOs can negate some of the beneficial effect of PVSOs through their influence on adoption and choice of performance targets. Data Availability: All data used in this study are publicly available from the sources indicated in the paper.

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17

Li, Qianqian, Yong Jae Shin, and Unyong Pyo. "Impacts of CEO Incentives and Power on Employee Wages." International Academy of Global Business and Trade 18, no. 6 (December 31, 2022): 33–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.20294/jgbt.2022.18.6.33.

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Purpose - This study investigates the impact of CEO incentive compensation and power on employee wages. While CEO compensation negatively affects employee wages, powerful CEOs may care for employees, and their compensation can have positive impacts on employee wages. Design/Methodology/Approach - Using data from US capital markets during 1992 - 2017, we employ pay-performance sensitivity to measure incentive compensation and CEO pay slices to proxy CEO power. We also examined the potential interaction effects between CEO compensation and CEO power. We conduct a Heckman two-step analysis to address potential sample bias and two-stage regression to address potential endogeneity. Findings - While incentive compensation negatively affects employee wages, CEO power positively affects employee wages. When examining the interaction effect between incentive compensation and CEO power, we note that the incentive effect is negative on employee wages only when the CEO is less powerful. However, when the CEO is more powerful, the incentive effect is positive on employee wages. Research Implications - When firms grant incentive compensation to CEOs for firm performance, they must also consider CEO power. Our results imply that CEO incentive compensation has a positive impact on employee wages when a CEO becomes more powerful. More incentive compensation to less-powerful CEOs could suppress employee wages and hurt firm performance in the long run.

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18

Diser, Viktoria, and Christian Hofmann. "Hedging and accounting-based RPE contracts for powerful CEOs." Journal of Business Economics 88, no. 7-8 (April 18, 2018): 941–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11573-018-0907-7.

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19

Khan, Farman Ullah, Vanina Adoriana Trifan, Mioara Florina Pantea, Junrui Zhang, and Muhammad Nouman. "Internal Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from Chinese Companies." Sustainability 14, no. 4 (February 16, 2022): 2261. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su14042261.

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Stakeholder management researchers have recently put a lot of effort into figuring out why organizations facing extensive pressure respond differently to social responsibilities. In particular, ethics researchers believe that senior management must drive corporate social responsibility since their attitudes toward such issues are so important. In line with this sentiment, our study develops a framework of management power, composed of CEOs’ power and the organizations’ power, and explores how managerial power heterogeneity affects the corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance of a firm. Using sample data from the largest emerging market—China—for the period 2010–2018, we submit that CEOs with structural power and shareholders with the highest concentration tend to show a lower commitment to CSR activities. On the other hand, we recognize that the ownership, expertise, and prestige power of CEOs’, the supervision, monitoring, and political power of the board can improve a firms’ CSR performance. These results are also validated by using a fixed effect model, two stage least square (2-SLS) regression, and the propensity score matching (PSM) technique. Our results imply that the implementation of social policies fundamentally results not only from powerful CEOs, but also from powerful boards and shareholders. Moreover, our study provides useful implications with regard to the social outcomes of power authorized by CEOs and the organizations.

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20

Harper, Joel, and Li Sun. "CEO power and corporate social responsibility." American Journal of Business 34, no. 2 (July 15, 2019): 93–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ajb-10-2018-0058.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) power on corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. Design/methodology/approach The authors use regression analysis to investigate the research question. Findings Using a 23-year panel sample with 1,574 unique US firms and 8,575 firm-year observations, the authors find a significant and negative relation between CEO power and CSR, suggesting that firms with more powerful CEOs engage in less CSR activities. Originality/value The results reveal that more powerful CEOs become less responsive to the needs of stakeholder groups, confirming the validity of the stakeholder theory of CSR.

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21

Bhattacharya, Debarati, Ya-Yun Kao, and Wei-Hsien Li. "Industry Experiences of Board, CEO, and Acquisition Performance." Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 23, no. 03 (July 31, 2020): 2050022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219091520500228.

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This study examines the collective impact of expert boards and CEOs on acquisition performance, providing new insight into the CEO–board relationship. Acquiring firms with expert boards earns an additional 1.16 percentage points (3.91 percentage points) when the CEOs are new to the target industry (also experts) compared to the firms with “nonexperienced” boards (expert boards alone). Robust to endogeneity checks, our evidence supports the “vigilant-advisor”, “resource-provisioning”, and “shared-experience” hypotheses that take three distinct views of the CEO–board relationship. Generalist CEOs and public targets intensify the shared-experience effect, whereas less powerful CEOs and private targets intensify the resource-provisioning effect. Experienced directors improve the quality of acquisitions by assisting acquirers to avoid large losses, identify targets with higher synergies, and negotiate better deals.

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22

Karnoukhova, Elena, and Anastasia Stepanova. "Does Smart & Powerful CEO Contribute to the Performance of Technology Companies?" Journal of Corporate Finance Research / Корпоративные Финансы | ISSN: 2073-0438 13, no. 4 (December 30, 2019): 39–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.17323/j.jcfr.2073-0438.13.4.2019.39-58.

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In recent decades, innovative companies became one of the major drivers of economy worldwide. According to surveys, nearly 70% of the world’s most innovative companies in 2019 are U.S. firms. However, academic studies mostly focused on the influence of the top management team and the board of director’s on the firm performance, on the relationship between innovations and CEO`s preferences. However, we suppose CEO can exert a significant influence on performance of innovative companies. We strive to show which CEO characteristics could lead to higher firm value. Does highly educated CEO contribute more to innovations in hi-tech sphere? Does CEO power matter? Are founders better CEOs than newcomers or professionals for technological companies with their longer horizons and higher risks? This research uses Generalized Least Square model on a sample of 12565 firm-year observations during 2004-2015 period. For this research we used data for three innovative industries: Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences, Software & Services and Technology Hardware & Equipment industries. We have hand-collected data from the CVs in CIQ database. Overall, the empirical results reveal that educational background, tenure, duality play crucial roles in explaining firm value. This study contributes to the existing literature in two aspects. First, our findings indicate that CEO characteristics play crucial roles in explaining technology firm value and performance. We demonstrated that founding CEO contributes to technology firm performance as well as the CEO with better education. Second, CEOs should be smart and powerful in order to sustain firm performance. We found that CEOs characteristics could mitigate the conflicts between different types of investors and their influence on firm performance. More specifically, CEOfounder was found to add greatly to the firm performance of Software and Pharmaceutical companies. Furthermore, the influence of CEO seems to mitigate the conflict of interest with independent active institutional investors in Hardware industry. We provided examples to prove the validity of our tests.

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23

Locatelli, Letícia Gomes, Fernando Maciel Ramos, and Kélim Bernardes Sprenger. "Earnings Management." Revista Catarinense da Ciência Contábil 20 (December 29, 2021): e3230. http://dx.doi.org/10.16930/2237-7662202132302.

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This study aimed to analyze the influence of powerful CEOs on earnings management (EM) considering the presence of social connections between the CEO and members of the board of directors (CA). The sample consisted of 183 Brazilian companies listed in [B]³ in the period 2011 to 2017, totaling 881 observations. EM was measured by the Jones (1991) and Modified Jones (1995) models and considered the dependent variable, under which the effect of (i) a CEO power metric developed by principal component analysis was analyzed from a multidimensional perspective of power (structural power, ownership power, power of specialization and power of prestige), (ii) an index that measures the level of social connections between the CEO and the Board members based on indicators already reviewed by the literature (educational, professional and family relationships background), and (iii) the interaction between these variables. The results of 6 linear regression estimates (MQO) with cross-section pools and robust errors indicate that powerful CEOs are related to higher levels of discretionary accruals, while social connections mitigate EM. When the interaction between these variables is included, both CEO power and social connections lose their significant effect on EM, indicating that in the presence of social connections, powerful CEOs may fail to engage in EM practices. This result contributes to the discussion about the interference of social factors on economic decisions, drawing attention to the impact of social factors on the quality of profits and the CG of companies.

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24

Morse, Adair. "Compensation Rigging by Powerful CEOs: A Reply and Cross-Sectional Evidence." Critical Finance Review 3, no. 1 (January 9, 2014): 153–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/104.00000019.

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25

Wiggenhorn, Joan, Seema Pissaris, and Kimberly C. Gleason. "Powerful CEOs and employee relations: evidence from corporate social responsibility indicators." Journal of Economics and Finance 40, no. 1 (July 27, 2014): 85–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12197-014-9295-1.

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26

Bajaba, Saleh M., Abdulah M. Bajaba, and Abdulrahman S. Basahal. "Can Powerful Boards Increase Firm Innovativeness When Faced with Exploitative CEOs?" International Journal of Business and Management 15, no. 11 (October 22, 2020): 171. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v15n11p171.

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Although quite amount of research investigated the detrimental effects of destructive leadership styles at the individual level, less has focused on its effect on the organization as a whole. Therefore, this conceptual paper proposes a model of integration between the micro and the macro level of the organization through investigating the impact of CEO exploitative leadership style on firm innovativeness. Exploitative leadership emphasizes the leader’s self-interest through overdelegation of tasks and underchallenging of followers. We propose that CEO exploitative leadership is going to have a detrimental effect on firm innovativeness through TMT behavioral integration as it causes a climate of unfair exchange and hostility, which limits the amount of information being exchanged, collaboration, and joint decision making. We also propose that TMT behavioral integration is an important factor in achieving firm innovativeness, especially when TMT diversity is high. Lastly, board power is proposed to act as an intervention that mitigates the detrimental impact of CEO exploitative leadership on TMT behavioral integration and, ultimately, firm innovativeness, as a powerful board limits/controls any CEO behavior that contradicts the profit-maximizing expectations of the shareholders. Practical implications, limitations, and future directions are also discussed.

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Aguir, Amal, Ahmad Alqatan, and Bilel Bzeouich. "Do the highest-paid CEOs affect the accounting conservatism? An empirical investigation in France." Journal of Governance and Regulation 10, no. 2 (2021): 96–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/jgrv10i2art9.

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Based on 1575 firms-year observations from French companies listed on the Paris stock exchange from 2009 to 2017, this research study investigates the linkage between accounting conservatism and highest-paid chief executive officers (CEOs) and if this linkage increases as executive remuneration-performance sensitivity increases. The study’s findings show that there is a negative association between accounting conservatism and highest-paid CEOs. These findings suggest that the highest-paid CEOs can manage and restrict managerial accounting choices for their own gains, and, in turn, this has a negative effect on accounting conservatism. Firstly, in order to achieve generally discretionary goals, they distort the accounting figures by overvaluing their companies’ gains. Secondly, the negative linkage between accounting conservatism and highest-paid CEOs increases when they receive greater remuneration incentives for accounting performance. These findings indicate that powerful CEOs are incentivized to adjust earnings since the greater incentives help them to inflate their companies’ accounting results; to distort accounting performance, and provide investors with misleading information. In turn, such actions generate the ex-post settling up problems and end, unfortunately, in fraudulent behaviors. This study contributes to the literature that studies the relationship between accounting conservatism and the highest-paid senior executives in order to identify accounting conservatism (Iwasaki, Otomasa, Shiiba, & Shuto, 2018; Li, Henry, & Wu, 2019; Haider, Singh, & Sultana, 2021).

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Martin, John A., and Frank C. Butler. "Agent and stewardship behavior: How do they differ?" Journal of Management & Organization 23, no. 5 (January 30, 2017): 633–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jmo.2016.72.

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AbstractThe purpose of this study is examine how agency theory and stewardship theory lead to different firm-level outcomes on an array of different outcomes. Based on these differences, we argue for the development of an agent–steward measurement scale, which will help researchers classify chief executive officers (CEOs) along an agent–steward continuum. This, in turn, will spur research to predict and test CEO behaviors and firm-level outcomes. Agency theory suggests CEOs take advantage of their powerful positions to maximize their personal economic utility, whereas stewardship theory suggests CEOs are motivated through intrinsic awards and will balance their interests with those of other stakeholders. We use these theories to examine possible differences in CEO behaviors. This is important because different CEO behaviors might lead to differing impacts on important firm-level outcomes. This paper reviews the relevant agency and stewardship literatures, then offers propositions regarding CEO behaviors from agent and steward perspectives.

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29

Bach, Seung B., and Anne D. Smith. "Are powerful CEOs beneficial to post-IPO survival in high technology industries?" Journal of High Technology Management Research 18, no. 1 (January 2007): 31–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.hitech.2007.03.002.

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Jiraporn, P., and P. Chintrakarn. "How do powerful CEOs view corporate social responsibility (CSR)? An empirical note." Economics Letters 119, no. 3 (June 2013): 344–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.026.

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Breit, Emily, Xuehu (Jason) Song, Li Sun, and Joseph Zhang. "CEO power and labor productivity." Accounting Research Journal 32, no. 2 (July 1, 2019): 148–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/arj-05-2016-0056.

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Purpose This paper aims to examine how Chief Executive Officer (CEO) power affects firm-level labor productivity. Design/methodology/approach The authors rely on regression analysis to examine the relation between CEO power and labor productivity. Findings Following prior research (i.e. the sequential rank order tournament theory), the authors predict that powerful CEOs lead to high labor productivity. They find a significant and positive relationship between CEO power and labor productivity. They further decompose labor productivity into labor efficiency and labor cost components and find a positive (negative) relationship between CEO power and labor efficiency (cost) component, suggesting that more powerful CEOs better manage labor efficiency and control labor cost. The results are also robust to various additional tests. Originality/value This study contributes to two streams of research: the CEO power literature in finance and the labor productivity and cost literature in accounting. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, it is the first study that performs a direct empirical test on the relation between CEO power and labor productivity.

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Ahmadloo, Ebrahim, Najmeh Sobhanifar, and Fatemeh Sadat Hosseini. "Modeling of vapor-liquid equilibrium for binary polypropylene glycol/solvent solutions using cubic equation of state models: optimization and comparison of CEoS models." Journal of Polymer Engineering 34, no. 1 (February 1, 2014): 95–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/polyeng-2013-0192.

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Abstract The cubic equation of state (CEoS) is a powerful method for calculation of the vapor-liquid equilibrium (VLE) in polymer solutions. Using CEoS for both the vapor and liquid phases allows one to calculate the non-ideality of polymer solutions based on a single EoS approach. In this research, VLE calculations of polypropylene glycol (polypropylene oxide) [PPG(PPO)]/solvent solutions were carried out. In this approach, eight models containing Peng-Robinson-Stryjek-Vera (PRSV) and Soave-Redlich-Kwong (SRK) CEoS separately combined with four mixing rules, namely van der Waals one-fluid mixing rule with one adjustable parameter (vdW1), van der Waals one-fluid mixing rule with two adjustable parameters (vdW2), Wong-Sandler (WS), and Zhong-Masuoka (ZM) were applied to calculations of bubble point pressure. For a better correlation, the adjustable binary interaction parameters existing in any mixing rule were optimized. The results were very acceptable and satisfactory. The results of absolute average deviations (%AAD) between computed results and experimental bubble point pressure data were calculated and presented. Although the capability of two CEoS had a good agreement with experimental data and illustrated the correct type of phase behavior in all cases, the performance of the PRSV+vdW2 was more reliable than the other models.

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Chintrakarn, Pandej, Pornsit Jiraporn, and Manohar Singh. "Powerful CEOs and capital structure decisions: evidence from the CEO pay slice (CPS)." Applied Economics Letters 21, no. 8 (February 3, 2014): 564–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2013.875102.

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Withisuphakorn, Pradit, and Pornsit Jiraporn. "Co-opted directors and powerful CEOs: evidence from the CEO pay slice (CPS)." Applied Economics Letters 24, no. 6 (August 19, 2016): 381–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2016.1194960.

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35

Munir, Qaiser, Sook Ching Kok, Tamara Teplova, and Tongxia Li. "Powerful CEOs, debt financing, and leasing in Chinese SMEs: Evidence from threshold model." North American Journal of Economics and Finance 42 (November 2017): 487–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2017.08.011.

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36

Jiraporn, Pornsit, Seksak Jumreornvong, Napatsorn Jiraporn, and Simran Singh. "How do independent directors view powerful CEOs? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment." Finance Research Letters 16 (February 2016): 268–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2015.12.008.

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37

Connell, Carol M. "Women CEOs on making strategy happen." Strategic Direction 35, no. 7 (July 11, 2019): 1–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/sd-09-2018-0184.

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Purpose As a professor of strategic management and as a consultant to organizations on strategy and change, the author focused on the activities that are necessary for leaders to create effective strategy and to execute successfully. The author has also been responsible for equipping the larger teams of strategy professionals (and future strategy professionals) who support these leaders with the approaches, the methods, and the tools necessary to plan effectively, to assess effectiveness, and to correct problems in strategy and execution. Whether long-term company leaders, entrepreneurs, or turnaround companies, chief executive officers (CEOs) understand that strategy and execution are requirements for growth and, ultimately, their unique responsibility. The paper aims to offer a view of strategy and execution from women CEOs of top companies, including those who weathered the financial crisis and others changing their business model as the climate changes. The paper offers a set of questions to help company leadership execute their strategy. Design/methodology/approach The paper represents a viewpoint supported by secondary sources and financial data. Findings CEOs whose companies have prospered during the Great Recession and beyond have a lot to teach us about strategic execution in an uncertain world. There is always a crisis or a change in industry structure that threatens strategic execution. This paper focuses on women and how they face this challenge as CEOs of top companies. Research limitations/implications Strategic execution must align with strategy or growth will not happen as planned. Practical implications There are things CEOs and general managers can do to ensure their strategic execution leads to the results they plan. Those things have been identified in this paper. Social implications The most powerful asset companies have is their talent base, their employees. Originality/value The corporate examples, the understanding of industry structure change, and the importance of talent and risk are seen through the lens of women CEOs.

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38

Ouyang, Bo, Zenghui Liu, and Christine Sun. "CEO Power and Auditor Choice." International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies (2147-4486) 4, no. 4 (October 21, 2015): 44–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.20525/ijfbs.v4i4.39.

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In this paper, we examine the impact of CEO power on auditor choice. We are motivated by the competing financial reporting incentives arising from CEO power. Our empirical finding suggests that powerful CEOs are more likely to hire high-quality auditors as a signal of superior financial reporting quality. We contribute to the literature of auditor switch and extend the research on the links between CEO power and firm behaviors.

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Garms, Florian. "Should Entrepreneurial CEOs have Powerful Output function Managers in their Top Management Team? (WITHDRAWN)." Academy of Management Proceedings 2017, no. 1 (August 2017): 12571. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2017.12571abstract.

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Ouyang, Bo, Zenghui Liu, and Xiaojie Christine Sun. "CEO Power and Auditor Choice." International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies (2147-4486) 4, no. 4 (January 1, 2016): 44. http://dx.doi.org/10.20525/.v4i4.39.

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<p><em>In this paper, we examine the impact of CEO power on auditor choice. We are motivated by the competing financial reporting incentives arising from CEO power. Our empirical finding suggests that powerful CEOs are more likely to hire high-quality auditors as a signal of superior financial reporting quality. We contribute to the literature of auditor switch and extend the research on the links between CEO power and firm behaviors.</em></p>

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Zhao, Xia, and J. Richard Harrison. "The adoption of supermajority-independent boards in the post-Enron era." Corporate Ownership and Control 8, no. 2 (2011): 46–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv8i2p5.

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Combining insights from the agency theory and sociopolitical perspectives, this study examines the extent to which factors such as ownership structure, CEO power, and firm performance influence firms’ adoption of board independent reform advocated by shareholder activists. Event history analysis using extensive data on 1083 Standard & Poor’s 1500 companies from January 2002 to December 2004 shows that firms with more powerful CEO were less likely to adopt supermajority-independent boards, while both poorly performing firms and large firms were more likely to adopt such board structure. We also find that higher institutional blockholder ownership increased the likelihood of the adoption in firms managed by less powerful CEOs, while external non-institutional blockholder ownership decreased the likelihood of the adoption.

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González, Maximiliano, Alexander Guzmán, Diego F. Tellez-Falla, and María Andrea Trujillo. "Determinants of corporate tone in an initial public offering: Powerful CEOs versus well-functioning boards." Research in International Business and Finance 58 (December 2021): 101481. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2021.101481.

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Chintrakarn, Pandej, Pornsit Jiraporn, and Shenghui Tong. "How do powerful CEOs view corporate risk-taking? Evidence from the CEO pay slice (CPS)." Applied Economics Letters 22, no. 2 (July 21, 2014): 104–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2014.927565.

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Sohn, Joon-Woo, Jae-Eun Lee, Yun-Sik Kang, and Jae-Hyun Lee. "How Firms Transfer Financial Risks to Employees: Stock Price Volatility and CEO Power." Institute of Management and Economy Research 13, no. 3 (September 30, 2022): 59–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.32599/apjb.13.3.202209.59.

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Purpose - We investigate how firms transfer financial risks to employees in a form of flexible employment contracts and layoffs. Design/methodology/approach - Based on the literature on the prevalence of shareholder value ideology and the associated ‘risk shift’, we examined how stock price volatility is associated with a firm’s use and hiring of nonstandard employees, and the number of employees lay-offed. We test our hypotheses using a longitudinal, multi-source, dataset of Korean firms from 2003 to 2011. Findings - We found support for the relationship between stock price volatility and flexible employment contracts and layoffs after controlling for actual risks such as increased debt or decreased sales. However, we found that the relationship is moderated by the power of professional CEOs relative to that of shareholders, in that powerful CEOs are more likely to transfer the external risks, i.e. stock price volatility, to employees. Research implications or Originality - This study contributes the emerging stream of literature that explore the effect of stock market pressures and governance structures on human resource management.

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Johnson, William C., and Sangho Yi. "Powerful CEOs and Corporate Governance: Evidence from an Analysis of CEO and Director Turnover After Fraud." Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies 43, no. 6 (December 2014): 838–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajfs.12074.

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Chintrakarn, Pandej, Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard, Shenghui Tong, and Pornsit Jiraporn. "How do powerful CEOs view dividends and stock repurchases? Evidence from the CEO pay slice (CPS)." International Review of Economics & Finance 58 (November 2018): 49–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2018.02.023.

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Song, Wei-Ling, and Kam-Ming Wan. "Does CEO compensation reflect managerial ability or managerial power? Evidence from the compensation of powerful CEOs." Journal of Corporate Finance 56 (June 2019): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.11.009.

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Yahya, Farzan, Abdul Manan, Muhammad Wasim Jan Khan, and Muhammad Sadiq Hashmi. "The moderating role of board gender diversity between power-based corporate governance and tax aggressiveness." Economics and Business Letters 10, no. 2 (May 31, 2021): 104–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.17811/ebl.10.2.2021.104-147.

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The purpose of this study is to explore the moderating effect of board gender diversity on the relationship between power-based corporate governance (CEO power and concentrated ownership) and tax aggressiveness. The sample of this study is based on 2,071 firm-year observations over the period 2010 to 2018. We employed two-step GMM estimations to account for endogeneity and other statistical biases. The results show that CEO power increases the likelihood of tax aggressiveness while the link between the large controlling shareholders and tax-avoidance activities is not statistically significant. Lastly, the findings suggest that powerful CEOs manipulate female directors to promote tax aggressiveness behavior.

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Hollandts, Xavier, Nicolas Aubert, Abdelmehdi Ben Abdelhamid, and Victor Prieur. "Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Impact of Employee Ownership on CEO entrenchment." Management international 22, no. 2 (March 11, 2019): 112–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1058165ar.

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Employee stock ownership gives employees a voice and therefore may have a major impact on corporate governance. Thus, employee stock ownership may be a powerful mean to protect CEOs from both market for corporate control and dismissal threat. In this paper, we examine the relationship between employee stock ownership and CEO entrenchment. Following the recent French legislative changes, we use a comprehensive panel dataset of the major French listed companies over the 2009-2012 period. We document inverted U-shaped relationships between employee stock ownership and CEO entrenchment. Board employee ownership representation also plays a role and increases the inflexion points of these curvilinear relationship.

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Kaslow, Florence W. "Handling Transitions from Mother to Son in the Family Business: The Knotty Issues." Family Business Review 11, no. 3 (September 1998): 229–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-6248.1998.00229.x.

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Most of the literature in the field of family business and the majority of cases discussed deals with succession as occurring within the male lineage. Although in the past decade more attention has been given to the role of women in family businesses and their contention for senior level positions, little has been written about women as originators and CEOs of family businesses. This article addresses such situations and the unique difficulties powerful women encounter when designating an only son as their successor. Two cases are discussed to illustrate the kinds of interactions and dynamics that may unfold between motherqsonqdaughter-in-law, and some of the consultative strategies utilized.

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