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Journal articles on the topic 'Posted price'

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Published: 9 March 2023

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1

Shelegia, Sandro, and Joshua Sherman. "Bargaining at Retail Stores: Evidence from Vienna." Management Science 68, no. 1 (January 2022): 27–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4094.

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In the West, where posted prices are the norm, it is uncommon to observe consumers receive discounts below the posted price. Nevertheless, we find that when stores are asked, a discount is granted approximately 40% of the time, with a median discount percentage of 10%. Discounts are more likely to be offered by small-scale firms, for higher-priced products, and for nonsale items. More generally, differences in price delegation behavior across firm types serve as an indicator that monitoring costs and employee skills are important drivers of bargaining behavior. This paper was accepted by Duncan Simester, marketing

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2

Beyhaghi, Hedyeh, Negin Golrezaei, Renato Paes Leme, Martin Pál, and Balasubramanian Sivan. "Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms." Operations Research 69, no. 6 (November 2021): 1805–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2121.

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How to optimize posted price mechanisms? The sequential posted-price (SPP) mechanism is one of the widely used selling mechanisms in practice. In this mechanism, the seller presents each buyer with a price sequentially and the buyer can either accept or reject the mechanism's offer. Despite the widespread use of the SPP mechanism, the problem of optimizing prices in this mechanism has not been fully addressed. In a paper entitled, “Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms,” H. Beyhaghi, N. Golrezaei, R. Paes Leme, M. Pal, and B. Sivan construct SPP mechanisms by considering the best of two simple pricing rules: one that imitates the optimal mechanism and the other that posts a uniform price (same price for every buyer). Their simple pricing rules can be easily generalized to the setting with multiple units and yield the first improvement over long-established approximation factors.

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3

Castiglioni, Matteo, Giulia Romano, Alberto Marchesi, and Nicola Gatti. "Signaling in Posted Price Auctions." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 36, no. 5 (June 28, 2022): 4941–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20424.

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We study single-item single-unit Bayesian posted price auctions, where buyers arrive sequentially and their valuations for the item being sold depend on a random, unknown state of nature. The seller has complete knowledge of the actual state and can send signals to the buyers so as to disclose information about it. For instance, the state of nature may reflect the condition and/or some particular features of the item, which are known to the seller only. The problem faced by the seller is about how to partially disclose information about the state so as to maximize revenue. Unlike classical signaling problems, in this setting, the seller must also correlate the signals being sent to the buyers with some price proposals for them. This introduces additional challenges compared to standard settings. We consider two cases: the one where the seller can only send signals publicly visible to all buyers, and the case in which the seller can privately send a different signal to each buyer. As a first step, we prove that, in both settings, the problem of maximizing the seller's revenue does not admit an FPTAS unless P=NP, even for basic instances with a single buyer. As a result, in the rest of the paper, we focus on designing PTASs. In order to do so, we first introduce a unifying framework encompassing both public and private signaling, whose core result is a decomposition lemma that allows focusing on a finite set of possible buyers' posteriors. This forms the basis on which our PTASs are developed. In particular, in the public signaling setting, our PTAS employs some ad hoc techniques based on linear programming, while our PTAS for the private setting relies on the ellipsoid method to solve an exponentially-sized LP in polynomial time. In the latter case, we need a custom approximate separation oracle, which we implement with a dynamic programming approach.

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4

Wang, Ruqu. "Bargaining versus posted-price selling." European Economic Review 39, no. 9 (December 1995): 1747–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(95)90043-8.

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5

Chang, Chunwei, and Shengli Li. "Study of Price Determinants of Sharing Economy-Based Accommodation Services: Evidence from Airbnb.com." Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research 16, no. 4 (December 28, 2020): 584–601. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jtaer16040035.

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This research aims to identify price determinants for sharing economy-based accommodation services and to further use the identified price determinants to predict accommodation prices. A dataset drawn from Airbnb.com, was collected for analysis. We identify price determinants from five categories. The top five price determinants are identified as room type, city, distance to tourist attractions, number of pictures posted, and number of amenities provided. More importantly, we find that interaction effects between variables can also significantly influence price. Finally, a series of price prediction models are built based on the identified price determinants.

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6

Anwar, Sajid, and Mingli Zheng. "Posted price selling and online auctions." Games and Economic Behavior 90 (March 2015): 81–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.005.

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7

Davis, Douglas D., and Charles A. Holt. "Price rigidities and institutional variations in markets with posted prices." Economic Theory 9, no. 1 (February 1997): 63–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01213443.

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8

Davis, Douglas D., and Charles A. Holt. "Price rigidities and institutional variations in markets with posted prices." Economic Theory 9, no. 1 (December 13, 1996): 63–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050110.

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9

Chowdhury, Subhasish M., Debabrata Datta, and Souvik Dhar. "Auction Versus Posted Price Mechanisms in Online Sales: The Roles of Impatience and Dissuasion." Studies in Microeconomics 7, no. 1 (June 2019): 75–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2321022219838177.

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If all potential buyers participate in a first-price auction, then (theoretically) the auction price weakly exceeds the price placed by the seller under a posted price mechanism. However, it is documented that in online sales sellers prefer posted price mechanism to auction. We aim to explain this empirical contradiction in terms of partial participation of the buyers in auction, prompted by impatience and dissuasion. Auction on Internet often requires waiting, and hence, many impatient participants may not join the auction process. Furthermore, a previous experience of failure in auction may also prompt buyers’ non-participation. We show, theoretically, that in the case of partial participation, the price in auction may be lower; posted price turns out to be payoff dominant for both the buyers and the sellers. We then run a laboratory experiment and verify the presence of impatience (through waiting cost) and dissuasion factor (through previous failure) among the subjects.

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10

Engel, Yagil, and Moshe Tennenholtz. "Posted Prices Exchange for Display Advertising Contracts." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 27, no. 1 (June 30, 2013): 276–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v27i1.8656.

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We propose a new market design for display advertising contracts, based on posted prices. Our model and algorithmic framework address several major challenges: (i) the space of possible impression types is exponential in the number of attributes, which is typically large, therefore a complete price space cannot be maintained; (ii) advertisers are usually unable or reluctant to provide extensive demand (willingness-to-pay) functions, (iii) the levels of detail with which supply and demand are specified are often not identical.

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11

Adamczyk, Marek, Allan Borodin, Diodato Ferraioli, Bart De Keijzer, and Stefano Leonardi. "Sequential Posted-Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations." ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 5, no. 4 (December 22, 2017): 1–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3157085.

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12

Coey, Dominic, Bradley J. Larsen, and Brennan C. Platt. "Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search." American Economic Review 110, no. 12 (December 1, 2020): 3748–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190460.

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We present a new equilibrium search model where consumers initially search among discount opportunities, but are willing to pay more as a deadline approaches, eventually turning to full-price sellers. The model predicts equilibrium price dispersion and rationalizes discount and full-price sellers coexisting without relying on ex ante heterogeneity. We apply the model to online retail sales via auctions and posted prices, where failed attempts to purchase reveal consumers' reservation prices. We find robust evidence supporting the theory. We quantify dynamic search frictions arising from deadlines and show how, with deadline-constrained buyers, seemingly neutral platform fee increases can cause large market shifts. (JEL D11, D44, D83, L81)

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13

Holt, Charles A., and Roger Sherman. "Classroom Games: A Market for Lemons." Journal of Economic Perspectives 13, no. 1 (February 1, 1999): 205–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.13.1.205.

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The incentives that arise in markets with asymmetric information are illustrated in the classroom exercise presented here. Student sellers choose both a quality ‘grade’ and a price for their products. Initially, both prices and grades for all sellers are posted, and buyers select from these offerings. In this full-information setup, the market prices and grades quickly reach efficient levels that maximize total surplus. Next, although sellers continue to choose grades and prices, only prices (not grades) are posted for buyers to see when they shop. The grades and prices then fall to inefficiently low levels. The observed market outcomes in this exercise can stimulate useful discussion of asymmetric information, market failure, and remedies such as quality standards and warranties.

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14

Ozcelik, Yasin, and Zafer D. Ozdemir. "Market Transparency in Business-to-Business e-Commerce." International Journal of E-Business Research 7, no. 4 (October 2011): 62–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jebr.2011100105.

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Market transparency refers to the level of current trade information revealed to participants by market makers. This paper analyzes the effect of market transparency on the outcomes of posted-offer style Business-to-Business e-commerce markets. First, increasing market transparency improves the price-tracking ability of sellers, and results in higher efficiency. However, revelation of quantity information on transactions is not very crucial as opposed to price information. Second, although sellers extract significantly higher surplus (profit) than buyers can do in a posted-offer market, the difference vanishes with increasing market transparency. Lastly, sellers in posted-offer markets respond poorly to external demand shocks. Interestingly, the poor price-tracking performance of sellers hurts buyers more. In other words, seller profits are much less sensitive to demand shocks as compared to buyer surpluses.

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15

Maslov, Alexander. "A Note on Buyers’ Behavior in Auctions with an Outside Option." Games 11, no. 3 (July 18, 2020): 26. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g11030026.

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In this note I show that the equilibrium in cutoff strategies observed in auctions with a buy-it-now price may also arise in markets where objects are sold simultaneously by auctions and posted prices. However, contrary to auctions with a buy-it-now price where buyers need to know only the total number of players in the market, in the latter environment buyers must also observe the number of active bidders in the auction for the equilibrium to exist in cutoff strategies.

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16

Collins, Sean M., Duncan James, Maroš Servátka, and Daniel Woods. "Price-setting and attainment of equilibrium: Posted offers versus an administered price." Games and Economic Behavior 106 (November 2017): 277–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.012.

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17

Cason, Timothy N., Daniel Friedman, and Garrett H. Milam. "Bargaining versus posted price competition in customer markets." International Journal of Industrial Organization 21, no. 2 (February 2003): 223–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(02)00056-5.

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18

Chen, Yongmin, and Ruqu Wang. "Learning buyers' valuation distribution in posted-price selling." Economic Theory 14, no. 2 (September 1, 1999): 417–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050301.

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19

Cavallo, Alberto, and Roberto Rigobon. "The Billion Prices Project: Using Online Prices for Measurement and Research." Journal of Economic Perspectives 30, no. 2 (May 1, 2016): 151–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.30.2.151.

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A large and growing share of retail prices all over the world are posted online on the websites of retailers. This is a massive and (until recently) untapped source of retail price information. Our objective with the Billion Prices Project, created at MIT in 2008, is to experiment with these new sources of information to improve the computation of traditional economic indicators, starting with the Consumer Price Index. We also seek to understand whether online prices have distinct dynamics, their advantages and disadvantages, and whether they can serve as reliable source of information for economic research. The word “billion” in Billion Prices Project was simply meant to express our desire to collect a massive amount of prices, though we in fact reached that number of observations in less than two years. By 2010, we were collecting 5 million prices every day from over 300 retailers in 50 countries. We describe the methodology used to compute online price indexes and show how they co-move with consumer price indexes in most countries. We also use our price data to study price stickiness, and to investigate the “law of one price” in international economics. Finally we describe how the Billion Prices Project data are publicly shared and discuss why data collection is an important endeavor that macro- and international economists should pursue more often.

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20

Nosoohi, Iman. "Posted price and name-your-own-price in a product line design problem." Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 64 (January 2022): 102836. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jretconser.2021.102836.

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21

Waning, Brenda, Warren Kaplan, Matthew P. Fox, Mariah Boyd-Boffa, Alexis C. King, Danielle A. Lawrence, Lyne Soucy, Sapna Mahajan, Hubert G. Leufkens, and Manjusha Gokhale. "Temporal Trends in Generic and Brand Prices of Antiretroviral Medicines Procured with Donor Funds in Developing Countries." Journal of Generic Medicines: The Business Journal for the Generic Medicines Sector 7, no. 2 (April 2010): 159–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jgm.2010.6.

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Pharmaceutical markets in low resource settings are imperfect. Suppliers provide information on ‘suggested’ medicine prices, but actual purchase prices vary substantially across purchasers and these prices paid are typically unavailable. Public procurement databases now, however, provide timely market intelligence on prices for antiretroviral (ARV) medicines purchased with donor funds, allowing for careful examination of market trends. We used data posted by the World Health Organization to create a longitudinal database of 15 111 ARV procurements from 2002–2008. We noted dramatic price reductions for ARVs over this 6-year time period. Most generic ARVs were cheaper than branded counterparts, with the exception of protease inhibitors (PIs) in which some generic versions were more expensive than branded counterparts. Less price variation was noted for ARVs in low-income countries than middle-income countries where price variations of threefold or greater were noted in five of 28 (18 per cent) generic and 15 of 25 (60 per cent) brand dosage forms. In order to meet global goals of universal access to HIV/AIDS treatment, further price reductions are needed for abacavir, tenofovir and PIs. New approaches are needed to create incentives for generic manufacturers of these ARVs to enter the market and create price competition with these medicines.

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22

Peng, Wei, Wei Guo, Lei Wang, and Ruo-Yu Liang. "Dynamic Pricing in Cloud Manufacturing Systems under Combined Effects of Consumer Structure, Negotiation, and Demand." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2017 (2017): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2017/2073585.

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In this study, we proposed a game-theory based framework to model the dynamic pricing process in the cloud manufacturing (CMfg) system. We considered a service provider (SP), a broker agent (BA), and a dynamic service demander (SD) population that is composed of price takers and bargainers in this study. The pricing processes under linear demand and constant elasticity demand were modeled, respectively. The combined effects of SD population structure, negotiation, and demand forms on the SP’s and the BA’s equilibrium prices and expected revenues were examined. We found that the SP’s optimal wholesale price, the BA’s optimal reservation price, and posted price all increase with the proportion of price takers under linear demand but decrease with it under constant elasticity demand. We also found that the BA’s optimal reservation price increases with bargainers’ power no matter under what kind of demand. Through analyzing the participants’ revenues, we showed that a dynamic SD population with a high ratio of price takers would benefit the SP and the BA.

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23

Kavajecz, Kenneth A., and Elizabeth R. Odders-White. "An Examination of Changes in Specialists’ Posted Price Schedules." Review of Financial Studies 14, no. 3 (July 1, 2001): 681–704. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/14.3.681.

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24

Goldin, Jacob, and Tatiana Homonoff. "Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Cigarette Tax Salience and Regressivity." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5, no. 1 (February 1, 2013): 302–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.5.1.302.

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Recent evidence suggests consumers pay less attention to commodity taxes levied at the register than to taxes included in a good's posted price. If this attention gap is larger for high-income consumers than for low-income consumers, policymakers can manipulate a tax's regressivity by altering the fraction of the tax imposed at the register. We investigate income differences in attentiveness to cigarette taxes, exploiting state and time variation in cigarette excise and sales tax rates. Whereas all consumers respond to taxes that appear in cigarettes' posted price, our results suggest that only low-income consumers respond to taxes levied at the register. (JEL D12, H22, H25, H71, L66)

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Coibion, Olivier, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Gee Hee Hong. "The Cyclicality of Sales, Regular and Effective Prices: Business Cycle and Policy Implications." American Economic Review 105, no. 3 (March 1, 2015): 993–1029. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20121546.

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We study the cyclical properties of sales, regular price changes, and average prices paid by consumers (“effective” prices) using data on prices and quantities sold for numerous retailers across many US metropolitan areas. Inflation in the effective prices paid by consumers declines significantly with higher unemployment while little change occurs in the inflation rate of prices posted by retailers. This difference reflects the reallocation of household expenditures across retailers, a feature of the data which we document and quantify, rather than sales. We propose a simple model with household store-switching and assess its implications for business cycles and policymakers. (JEL D12, E31, E32, L25, L81)

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26

Mehta, Aranyak, Scott Shenker, and Vijay V. Vazirani. "Posted price profit maximization for multicast by approximating fixed points." Journal of Algorithms 58, no. 2 (February 2006): 150–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jalgor.2004.08.002.

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27

Etzion, Hila, and Scott Moore. "Managing online sales with posted price and open-bid auctions." Decision Support Systems 54, no. 3 (February 2013): 1327–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2012.12.005.

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28

PLOTT, C. R. "Laboratory Experiments in Economics: The Implications of Posted-Price Institutions." Science 232, no. 4751 (May 9, 1986): 732–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.232.4751.732.

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29

Chen, Rachel R., Esther Gal-Or, and Paolo Roma. "Opaque Distribution Channels for Competing Service Providers: Posted Price vs. Name-Your-Own-Price Mechanisms." Operations Research 62, no. 4 (August 2014): 733–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1277.

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30

Drichoutis, Andreas C., Rodolfo M. Nayga, Panagiotis Lazaridis, and Beom Su Park. "A Consistent Econometric Test for Bid Interdependence in Repeated Second-Price Auctions with Posted Prices." Atlantic Economic Journal 39, no. 4 (September 18, 2011): 329–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11293-011-9292-0.

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31

Brero, Gianluca, Alon Eden, Matthias Gerstgrasser, David Parkes, and Duncan Rheingans-Yoo. "Reinforcement Learning of Sequential Price Mechanisms." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, no. 6 (May 18, 2021): 5219–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16659.

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We introduce the use of reinforcement learning for indirect mechanisms, working with the existing class of sequential price mechanisms, which generalizes both serial dictatorship and posted price mechanisms and essentially characterizes all strongly obviously strategyproof mechanisms. Learning an optimal mechanism within this class forms a partially-observable Markov decision process. We provide rigorous conditions for when this class of mechanisms is more powerful than simpler static mechanisms, for sufficiency or insufficiency of observation statistics for learning, and for the necessity of complex (deep) policies. We show that our approach can learn optimal or near-optimal mechanisms in several experimental settings.

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32

Coibion, Olivier, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Gee Hee Hong. "The Cyclicality of Sales, Regular and Effective Prices: Business Cycle and Policy Implications: Reply." American Economic Review 109, no. 1 (January 1, 2019): 314–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20171338.

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We address how using different censoring thresholds and imputation procedures affects the baseline results of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015). Higher censoring thresholds introduce measure ment error and outliers that generate wide variability in results across weighting schemes, but methods that explicitly control for outliers confirm the results of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015) for all censoring thresholds. We also illustrate how the BLS’s approach to imputing missing prices can introduce a cyclical bias into measures of posted price inflation when store-switching is present in the data. (JEL D12, E31, E32, L25, L81)

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33

Shah, Sanket, Meghna Lowalekar, and Pradeep Varakantham. "Joint Pricing and Matching for City-Scale Ride-Pooling." Proceedings of the International Conference on Automated Planning and Scheduling 32 (June 13, 2022): 499–507. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/icaps.v32i1.19836.

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Central to efficient ride-pooling are two challenges: (1) how to `price' customers' requests for rides, and (2) if the customer agrees to that price, how to best `match' these requests to drivers. While both of them are interdependent, each challenge's individual complexity has meant that, historically, they have been decoupled and studied individually. This paper creates a framework for batched pricing and matching in which pricing is seen as a meta-level optimisation over different possible matching decisions. Our key contributions are in developing a variant of the revenue-maximizing auction corresponding to the meta-level optimization problem, and then providing a scalable mechanism for computing posted prices. We test our algorithm on real-world data at city-scale and show that our algorithm reliably matches demand to supply across a range of parameters.

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34

Moreira, Mirian Natali Blézins, Cássia Rita Pereira da Veiga, Zhaohui Su, Germano Glufke Reis, Lucilaine Maria Pascuci, and Claudimar Pereira da Veiga. "Social Media Analysis to Understand the Expected Benefits by Plant-Based Meat Alternatives Consumers." Foods 10, no. 12 (December 18, 2021): 3144. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/foods10123144.

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The plant-based alternative meat products market has attracted attention in recent years, as the demand for these products has grown worldwide. To meet the needs of this promising market, marketers must pay attention to the expected benefits of consumers and the insights that can be gleaned from comments posted on social media. This article proposed an investigation of the potential of the content analysis of comments posted on the Instagram social network of food companies that manufacture plant-based alternative meat products to understand the expected benefits by end consumers from the perspective of the classic marketing mix variables. The content posted voluntarily by consumers was organized into 13 categories of expected benefits analyzed within a proposal of evidence from the perspective of the marketing mix. The results showed that, among the insights obtained, 63% were related to the place variable, 21% to the product variable, 11% to the price variable, and 5% to the promotion variable. The insights reinforce the notion that marketing mix variables are crucial factors for companies to make products available in the right place, in the right quantity, and at a fair price, in addition to engaging with consumers through social media.

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35

Yamashita, Takuro. "Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1." Review of Economic Studies 82, no. 3 (May 4, 2015): 1223–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdv018.

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36

Gal-Or, Esther. "Pricing Practices of Resellers in the Airline Industry: Posted Price vs. Name-Your-Own-Price Models." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 20, no. 1 (February 24, 2011): 43–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00283.x.

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37

Patel, Kunal N., Olena Mazurenko, and Eric Ford. "Analysis of Hospital Quality Measures and Web-Based Chargemasters, 2019: Cross-sectional Study." JMIR Formative Research 5, no. 8 (August 19, 2021): e26887. http://dx.doi.org/10.2196/26887.

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Background The federal health care price transparency regulation from 2019 is aimed at bending the health care cost curve by increasing the availability of hospital pricing information for the public. Objective This study aims to examine the associations between publicly reported diagnosis-related group chargemaster prices on the internet and quality measures, process indicators, and patient-reported experience measures. Methods In this cross-sectional study, we collected and analyzed a random 5.02% (212/4221) stratified sample of US hospital prices in 2019 using descriptive statistics and multivariate analysis. Results We found extreme price variation in shoppable services and significantly greater price variation for medical versus surgical services (P=.006). In addition, we found that quality indicators were positively associated with standard charges, such as mortality (β=.929; P<.001) and readmissions (β=.514; P<.001). Other quality indicators, such as the effectiveness of care (β=−.919; P<.001), efficient use of medical imaging (β=−.458; P=.001), and patient recommendation scores (β=−.414; P<.001), were negatively associated with standard charges. Conclusions We found that hospital chargemasters display wide variations in prices for medical services and procedures and match variations in quality measures. Further work is required to investigate 100% of US hospital prices posted publicly on the internet and their relationship with quality measures.

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38

Wang, Ruqu. "Auctions versus Posted-Price Selling: The Case of Correlated Private Valuations." Canadian Journal of Economics 31, no. 2 (May 1998): 395. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/136330.

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39

Yamano, T. "Distribution of the Japanese posted land price and the generalized entropy." European Physical Journal B 38, no. 4 (April 2004): 665–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1140/epjb/e2004-00160-7.

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40

Kujal, Praveen. "Price ceilings and firm-specific quantity restrictions in posted-offer markets." Information Economics and Policy 11, no. 4 (December 1999): 389–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0167-6245(99)00018-9.

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41

Holt, Charles A., and Douglas Davis. "The effects of non-binding price announcements on posted-offer markets." Economics Letters 34, no. 4 (December 1990): 307–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90136-o.

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42

Romano, Giulia, Gianluca Tartaglia, Alberto Marchesi, and Nicola Gatti. "Online Posted Pricing with Unknown Time-Discounted Valuations." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, no. 6 (May 18, 2021): 5682–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16713.

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We study the problem of designing posted-price mechanisms in order to sell a single unit of a single item within a finite period of time. Motivated by real-world problems, such as, e.g., long-term rental of rooms and apartments, we assume that customers arrive online according to a Poisson process, and their valuations are drawn from an unknown distribution and discounted over time. We evaluate our mechanisms in terms of competitive ratio, measuring the worst-case ratio between their revenue and that of an optimal mechanism that knows the distribution of valuations. First, we focus on the identical valuation setting, where all the customers value the item for the same amount. In this setting, we provide a mechanism M_c that achieves the best possible competitive ratio, discussing its dependency on the parameters in the case of linear discount. Then, we switch to the random valuation setting. We show that, if we restrict the attention to distributions of valuations with a monotone hazard rate, then the competitive ratio of M_c is lower bounded by a strictly positive constant that does not depend on the distribution. Moreover, we provide another mechanism, called M_pc, which is defined by a piecewise constant pricing strategy and reaches performances comparable to those obtained with M_c. This mechanism is useful when the seller cannot change the posted price too often. Finally, we empirically evaluate the performances of our mechanisms in a number of experimental settings.

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Jindal, Pranav, and Peter Newberry. "To Bargain or Not to Bargain: The Role of Fixed Costs in Price Negotiations." Journal of Marketing Research 55, no. 6 (December 2018): 832–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022243718818451.

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Retailers routinely allow consumers to negotiate a discount off the posted price for big-ticket items such as home appliances and automobiles, and on online platforms such as Amazon and eBay. The profitability of such a strategy, relative to selling only at posted prices, depends on consumers’ willingness to initiate a negotiation and ability to negotiate a discount. In this article, the authors incorporate consumers’ decision of whether to negotiate into a demand model. The decision to negotiate hinges on how the expected discount from negotiation compares with the magnitude of a nonpecuniary cost that the consumer incurs by initiating the negotiation. The current study shows how this cost can be nonparametrically identified, separately from consumers’ ability to get a discount and marginal utility of income. The application of this model to individual-level data on refrigerator transactions reveals that, conditional on negotiating, consumers get, on average, 41% of the available surplus and incur an average cost of $28 to initiate a negotiation. The magnitude of these nonpecuniary costs’ not only affects retailer profits but also has implications for pricing strategy and consumer surplus. Ignoring these costs results in biased estimates of consumers’ willingness to pay, translating to annual losses of $1.6 million in the current study setting.

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KIM, SUNG-HUN, and JOSEPH P. OGDEN. "INCORPORATING PRICE-RELEVANT INFORMATION BETWEEN QUOTES AND TRADES: A NEW MEASURE OF THE EFFECTIVE BID-ASK SPREAD." International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance 02, no. 02 (April 1999): 179–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219024999000121.

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This paper provides a new measure of the effective bid-ask spread in a dealer-auction. Our measure differs from the "quote-to-trade" measures derived from direct comparisons of trade prices with bid and ask quotes by explicitly incorporating the price effect of information arriving between the time a set of quotes is posted and the next trade, which will tend to be reflected in the trade price but not in the quotes, as well as the price effect in the situation vice versa. For NYSE/AMEX stocks in 1993, our measure yields estimates of the effective spread that are lower than estimates obtained using the quote-to-trade measure, and our estimates are, on average, only 31 percent of the quoted spread. We also find a U-shaped intraday pattern for our estimates of effective spread that is consistent with, but is much more pronounced than, the pattern that has been observed in previous studies. We provide a conjecture as to why this pattern may be related to the U-shaped intraday pattern observed in volume and volatility.

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Thanh, Ho Trung, and Tran Duy Thanh. "Integrating scan mobile with electronic signage solution in supermarket and retail store." Science & Technology Development Journal - Economics - Law and Management 2, no. 1 (December 28, 2018): 98–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.32508/stdjelm.v2i1.506.

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Nowadays, supermarkets or retail chains are increasingly interested in how to increase productivity at their stores. The problem here is that prices, promotions and product information updates need to be immediate. Building an electronic signage solution that uses interactive mobile Internet of Things (IoT) technology including technology for Electronic Commerce to Opticon Electronic signage solutions (ESL) devices allows stores, supermarkets to change product prices in real time and launch promotional campaigns at Any time or place as desired. The system has been widely deployed in Vietnam market. ESL helps eliminate traditional labeling, labor saving, and other costs associated with price changes and product information, especially through mobile devices, users can easily change electronic prices quickly and conveniently. The solution of this article has been posted on http://opticon.vn.

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Sun, Daewon, Erick Li, and Jack C. Hayya. "The optimal format to sell a product through the internet: Posted price, auction, and buy-price auction." International Journal of Production Economics 127, no. 1 (September 2010): 147–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2010.05.006.

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Chetty, Raj, Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft. "Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence." American Economic Review 99, no. 4 (August 1, 2009): 1145–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.4.1145.

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Using two strategies, we show that consumers underreact to taxes that are not salient. First, using a field experiment in a grocery store, we find that posting tax-inclusive price tags reduces demand by 8 percent. Second, increases in taxes included in posted prices reduce alcohol consumption more than increases in taxes applied at the register. We develop a theoretical framework for applied welfare analysis that accommodates salience effects and other optimization failures. The simple formulas we derive imply that the economic incidence of a tax depends on its statutory incidence, and that even policies that induce no change in behavior can create efficiency losses. (JEL C93, D12, H25, H71)

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Chau, Michael, Wenwen Li, Boye Yang, Alice Lee, and Zhuolan Bao. "Incorporating the Time–Order Effect of Feedback in Online Auction Markets through a Bayesian Updating Model." MIS Quarterly 45, no. 2 (June 1, 2021): 985–1006. http://dx.doi.org/10.25300/misq/2021/15324.

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Online auction markets host a large number of transactions every day. The transaction data in auction markets are useful for understanding the buyers and sellers in the market. Previous research has shown that sellers with different levels of reputation, as shown by the ratings and comments left in feedback systems, enjoy different levels of price premiums for their transactions. Feedback scores and feedback texts have been shown to correlate with buyers’ level of trust in a seller and the price premium that buyers are willing to pay (Ba and Pavlou 2002; Pavlou and Dimoka 2006). However, existing models do not consider the time-order effect, which means that feedback posted more recently may be considered more important than feedback posted less recently. This paper addresses this shortcoming by (1) testing the existence of the time-order effect, and (2) proposing a Bayesian updating model to represent buyers’ perceived reputation considering the time-order effect and assessing how well it can explain the variation in buyers’ trust and price premiums. In order to validate the time-order effect and evaluate the proposed model, we conducted a user experiment and collected real-life transaction data from the eBay online auction market. Our results confirm the existence of the time-order effect and the proposed model explains the variation in price premiums better than the benchmark models. The contribution of this research is threefold. First, we verify the time-order effect in the feedback mechanism on price premiums in online markets. Second, we propose a model that provides better explanatory power for price premiums in online auction markets than existing models by incorporating the time-order effect. Third, we provide further evidence for trust building via textual feedback in online auction markets. The study advances the understanding of the feedback mechanism in online auction markets.

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Kujal, Praveen. "Asymmetric surplus distribution and the price convergence path in posted-offer markets." Economics Letters 39, no. 1 (May 1992): 33–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90097-i.

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Tan, Xiaoqi, Alberto Leon-Garcia, Yuan Wu, and Danny H. K. Tsang. "Posted-Price Retailing of Transactive Energy: An Optimal Online Mechanism Without Prediction." IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 38, no. 1 (January 2020): 5–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/jsac.2019.2951930.

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