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Journal articles on the topic 'Populism'
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1
March, Luke. "Left and right populism compared: The British case." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19, no. 2 (March 31, 2017): 282–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1369148117701753.
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This article represents one of the few systematic comparisons of left-wing populism with other populisms. Focussing on the manifestos of six British parties in 1999–2015, the findings confirm that left-wing populists are more socio-economically focussed, more inclusionary but less populist than right-wing populists. The article makes four main substantive contributions. First, empirically, it shows that the much-touted populist Zeitgeist in the United Kingdom barely exists. Second, methodologically, it provides a nuanced disaggregated populism scale that has advantages over existing methods because it can effectively distinguish populist from non-populist parties and analyse degrees of populism. Third, theoretically, it shows that host ideology is more important than populism per se in explaining differences between left and right populisms. Fourth is a broader theoretical point: what is often called ‘thin’ or ‘mainstream’ populism’ is not populism but demoticism (closeness to ordinary people). Therefore, analysts should not label parties ‘populist’ just because their rhetoric is demotic.
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Darmawan, Arif. "Gerakan Populis sebagai Tren Global: Dari Amerika Latin sampai Occupy Movement." Insignia Journal of International Relations 4, no. 02 (November 3, 2017): 01. http://dx.doi.org/10.20884/1.ins.2017.4.02.593.
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AbstractThe gap in Latin American countries is a fertile ground for the emergence of a populist movement, so that populism is not considered as a deviation, but become a rational alternative to address the problems rooted in the failure of the nation-building process. The existence of populism in Latin America indirectly also has an influence on the movement rooted in populism in the global sphere. This paper will analyze the close connection between the recent wave of populism in the international world by looking at the historical roots of how populism developed in Latin America and its effect on the �Occupy Movement� movement phenomenon in order to know how the pattern of populist movements in the global realm. This article will begin by understanding the clear definition of what is populism, then the roots of populist history in Latin America, and how it relates to the emergence of the Occupy Movement as a new form of populist movement that is becoming a global tren.Keywords: populism, Latin America, Occupy MovementAbstrakKesenjangan yang terjadi di negara-negara Amerika Latin memang menjadi lahan subur munculnya gerakan populis, sehingga populisme tidak dianggap sebagai sebuah penyimpangan, tetapi menjadi satu bentuk alternatif rasional untuk mengatasi permasalahan yang berakar pada kegagalan proses nation-building. Keberadaan populisme di Amerika Latin ini secara tidak langsung juga mempunyai pengaruh terhadap gerakan yang berakar pada populisme di ranah global. Makalah ini akan menganalisis keterkaitan yang erat antara gelombang populisme yang akhir-akhir ini terjadi di dunia internasional dengan melihat akar sejarah bagaimana populisme berkembang di Amerika Latin serta pengaruhnya terhadap fenomena pergerakan Occupy Movement dengan tujuan untuk mengetahui bagaimana pola gerakan populisme di ranah global. Artikel ini akan mengawali dengan memahami definisi yang jelas mengenai apa itu populisme, kemudian akar sejarah populisme di Amerika Latin, dan bagaimana keterkaitannya dengan kemunculan Occupy Movement sebagai bentuk gerakan populis baru yang menjadi tren global.Kata kunci: populisme; Amerika Latin; Occupy Movement
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Tushnet, Mark. "Varieties of populism." German Law Journal 20, no. 3 (April 2019): 382–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/glj.2019.27.
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AbstractContemporary discussions of populism elide important distinctions between the ways in which populist leaders and movements respond to the failures of elites to follow through on the promises associated with international social welfare constitutionalism. After laying out the political economy of populisms’ origins, this Article describes the relation between populisms and varieties of liberalism, and specifically the relation between populisms and judicial independence understood as a “veto point” occupied by the elites that populists challenge. It then distinguishes left-wing populisms’ acceptance of the social welfare commitments of late twentieth century liberalism and its rejection of some settled constitutional arrangements that, in populists’ views, obstruct the accomplishment of those commitments. It concludes with a description of the core ethnonationalism of right-wing populism, which sometimes contingently appears in left-wing populisms but is not one the latter’s core components.
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Baykal Fidee, Ece. "The Authoritarian Shift of Populist Discourse in Turkey." Sur le journalisme, About journalism, Sobre jornalismo 9, no. 1 (June 15, 2020): 180–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.25200/slj.v9.n1.2020.426.
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EN. Although the terms “populist,” “populism” and even “people” are deeply ambiguous for theorists working on different aspects of populism in various countries, they have reached a consensus with respect to certain characteristics of populism and its incipient drivers: its emergence following a political or economic crisis (Moffit, ibid.), the presence of a charismatic leader (Taguieff, 2007), etc. The populism of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in Turkey and its leader can be seen to vary from one era to the other, however. A crisis, triggered by the Gezi Protests in 2013, resulted in the existing populist discourse becoming more personalized, with some scholars calling it Erdoğanism (Bora, 2017). With the support of conservative and right-wing columnists, who framed the protests as a plot against Turkey and its democratically elected leader, Erdoğan realized that it would be possible to benefit from the crisis. This article discusses the role played by pro-government columnists during the Gezi protests and attempts to shed light on the emergence of a new populist discourse. It focuses on columns and in-depth interviews of Islamist-conservative or right-wing columnists (14 of 40 columnists interviewed) and relies on discourse analysis theories that underlie the characteristics of populist discourse (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Charaudeau, 2011; Wodak, 2015). The study reveals that the personalization of political power, the argumentation of an economic threat and the demonization of the social groups that joined the protests are the three main elements of the new populist discourse.
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FR. Bien que les termes « populiste » « populisme » ou même « peuple » soient profondément ambigus pour les théoriciens travaillant sur différents aspects du populisme dans différents pays, ils sont parvenus à un consensus sur certaines caractéristiques du populisme et des motifs qui l’incitent: son émergence suite à une crise politique ou économique (Moffit, ibid.); la présence d'un leader charismatique (Taguieff, 2007), etc. Toutefois, le populisme du JDP et de son leader peut varier d'une époque à l'autre. Une crise, déclenchée par les manifestations de Gezi en Turquie en 2013, a entraîné une personnalisation du discours populiste existant, certains universitaires l'appelant l'Erdoğanisme (Bora, 2017). Avec le soutien des éditorialistes conservateurs et de droite, qui ont décrit les manifestations comme un complot contre la Turquie et son dirigeant démocratiquement élu, Erdoğan s'est rendu compte qu'il serait possible de profiter de la crise. Cet article discute du rôle joué par les éditorialistes progouvernementaux lors des manifestations de Gezi et tente de clarifier les motifs de l'émergence d'un nouveau discours populiste. Il se concentre sur les colonnes et les entretiens approfondis des éditorialistes islamistes-conservateurs ou de droite (14 des 40 chroniqueurs interrogés) et s'appuie sur des théories d'analyse du discours qui sous-tendent les caractéristiques du discours populiste (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Charaudeau, 2011; Wodak, 2015) L'étude révèle que la personnalisation du pouvoir politique, l'argumentation de la menace économique et la stigmatisation des groupes sociaux qui ont rejoint les manifestations sont les trois principaux éléments du nouveau discours populiste.
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PT. Embora os termos “populista”, “populismo” e até mesmo “pessoas” sejam profundamente ambíguos para os teóricos que trabalham em diferentes aspectos do populismo em vários países, eles chegaram a um consenso com relação a certas características do populismo e dos padrões que o incitam: seu surgimento após uma crise política ou econômica (Moffit, ibid.), a presença de um líder carismático (Taguieff, 2007) etc. No entanto, o populismo do Partido da Justiça e Desenvolvimento (JDP) na Turquia e de seu líder pode variar de uma época para outra. Uma crise, desencadeada pelos protestos de Gezi em 2013, resultou na personalização do discurso populista existente, com alguns estudiosos chamando-o de erdoganismo (Bora, 2017). Com o apoio de colunistas conservadores e de direita, que enquadraram os protestos como uma conspiração contra a Turquia e seu líder democraticamente eleito, Erdoğan percebeu que seria possível se beneficiar da crise. Este artigo discute o papel desempenhado pelos colunistas pró-governo durante os protestos de Gezi e tenta lançar luz sobre o surgimento de um novo discurso populista. Ele se concentra em colunas e entrevistas em profundidade de colunistas islâmicos-conservadores ou de direita (14 de 40 colunistas entrevistados) e se baseia em teorias de análise de discurso subjacentes às características do discurso populista (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Charaudeau, 2011; Wodak 2015). O estudo revela que a personalização do poder político, a argumentação de uma ameaça econômica e a demonização dos grupos sociais que aderiram aos protestos são os três principais elementos do novo discurso populista.
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5
Capelato, Maria Helena. "Mídia e Populismo/Populismo e Mídia / Media and populism/Populism and media." Revista Contracampo, no. 28 (December 30, 2013): 52. http://dx.doi.org/10.22409/contracampo.v0i28.620.
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Este texto tem como objetivo refletir sobre a relação entre mídia e populismo tendo como eixo central de análise a experiência histórica do “varguismo”. Procuro mostrar como essa experiência foi analisada por intelectuais que procuraram explicá-la a partir do conceito de populismo, e procuro mostrar também de que forma a mídia, ou mais especificamente os jornais brasileiros de grande circulação, transformaram os termos populismo/populista em arma de luta política. Para a realização deste exercício analítico, considero necessário abordar o significado da mídia na sociedade e na política da época e os múltiplos sentidos do termo populismo.
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Halmai, Gábor. "Populism, authoritarianism and constitutionalism." German Law Journal 20, no. 3 (April 2019): 296–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/glj.2019.23.
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AbstractThe paper deals with the relationship of different types of populism with authoritarianism and constitutionalism. In the first part, I try to define various approaches—Left and Right-Wing, “good” or “bad”—to populism, especially from the point of view of whether they aim at changing the liberal democratic constitutional system to an authoritarian one. The following part discusses the rhetoric of authoritarian populists, which makes this type of populism distinct from non-populist authoritarians. The paper also explores the question of whom to blame for the success of authoritarian populisms, and the final part investigates, whether the use of legal tools by an authoritarian populist to dismantle liberal constitutional democracies means that we can speak about a special populist constitutionalism. While the paper tries to find out the joint characteristics of authoritarian populism, it heavily relies on the Hungarian experiences as a kind of model approach in East-Central Europe and maybe even beyond.
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Yilmaz, Ihsan, and Greg Barton. "Political Mobilisation of Religious, Chauvinist, and Technocratic Populists in Indonesia and Their Activities in Cyberspace." Religions 12, no. 10 (October 1, 2021): 822. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel12100822.
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Populism has been on the rise in many countries. As a result, studies on populism have proliferated. However, there are very few studies that investigate and compare different types of populisms in a single nation-state. Furthermore, how these different populists in the same political milieu use cyberspace has not been comparatively studied. This study addresses these gaps by looking at a variety of populist forces within Indonesia that have emerged as major actors and identifying the uses of cyberspace in populist political mobilisation. This paper argues that the three main types of populism that predominate in political rhetoric (religious, chauvinistic, and technocratic) do not exist in isolation but rather borrow from each other. This is reflected in their cyberspace activities.
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Agustín, Óscar García. "European Left Populism and Authoritarian Populism." Comparative Political Theory 1, no. 2 (December 30, 2021): 170–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/26669773-bja10011.
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Abstract The emergence of left populism, mainly in Southern Europe, in the decade of 2010, questioned the impression that populism in Europe was only right-wing oriented. On the other hand, the expansion of populism as a common denomination favored the perception that all populisms were the same, regardless of ideology: a threat to democracy. It explains why many left parties are reluctant towards being labelled as populist. Besides, left-wing populism connected with the one from Latin America one decade before where the tensions between democratization and authoritarianism have been widely discussed. The European public opinion usually relates the Latin American left populist governments with authoritarianism, associated with the situation in Venezuela first with Hugo Chávez and, especially, now with Nicolás Maduro. For this reason, left populism in Europe was made suspicious of being authoritarian.
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Prieto Rudolphy, Marcela. "Populism's Antagonism to International Law: Lessons from Latin America." AJIL Unbound 116 (2022): 346–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/aju.2022.52.
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International legal scholarship often assumes that populists will have an antagonistic relationship with international law.1 But a view from Latin America, where populism has been an object of study since the early twentieth century, tells a more complex story: populist leaders have engaged in multilateralism, promoted regional unity, and attempted to create international institutions. And populists as well as non-populists have resisted international institutions. This essay questions the assumption that populists have an antagonistic relationship with international law, and argues that this assumption lacks robust empirical support and is theoretically underdeveloped. Latin America is a particularly significant site for challenging this assumption, given the prominent role of the executive in foreign relations2 and the rich intellectual history regarding populism itself. The essay concludes by stressing the need for developing a theoretical framework for the study of populism and international law, which international legal scholarship currently lacks. Such a framework should be less Euro-centric and less normatively biased: it should not assume that resistance to international law is always without merit. And it should also allow us to identify what is distinctively populist about populism's relation with international law and which aspects are mediated by populism's host ideologies.
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Margiansyah, Defbry. "Populisme di Indonesia Kontemporer: Transformasi Persaingan Populisme dan Konsekuensinya dalam Dinamika Kontestasi Politik Menjelang Pemilu 2019." Jurnal Penelitian Politik 16, no. 1 (June 28, 2019): 47. http://dx.doi.org/10.14203/jpp.v16i1.783.
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AbstractThe rise of populism is a contemporary global phenomenon occurred in many part of the world, including Indonesia. The rising populism in the country has been epitomized by the emergence of two populist candidates, Jokowi and Prabowo, in the 2014 presidential election and recurring in the 2019 simultaneous election, which brings about new complexities in the dynamics of contemporary political contestation. The uniqueness of such competing populist politics is that both exploit the rhetoric of nationalism and social justice combined with the traits of respective candidates, in contrast to the conventional pattern of populists in other nations. This article attempts to analyze the transformation of competing populisms in two different elections and discusses its consequences to electoral politics, including the elaboration on populist’s working pattern in contestation processes and factors underlying the return of populism in Indonesia’s politics. Employing concept of populism in eclectic way and elite adjustment thesis, this paper demonstrates how populist politics is only instrumented as a vehicle of entrenched elite and oligarchic interests by pragmatically exploiting various aspects ranging from primordial identity, clientalistic relations, achievements and personalities of each candidates, instead of offering greater prospects for substantially political transformation and democratic deepening for the years to come.Keywords: Populism, Indonesia’s Election, Elite Adjusment, Identity Politics, Oligarchy, Democracy
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Moran, Marie, and Jo Littler. "Cultural populism in new populist times." European Journal of Cultural Studies 23, no. 6 (November 3, 2020): 857–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1367549420960477.
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This article unpacks the concept of ‘cultural populism’ in multiple ways, and explores its value for the critical analysis of new formations and expressions of populism in the current conjuncture. Taking Jim McGuigan’s influential book, Cultural Populism, as our point of departure, we begin by exploring its earlier use in cultural studies as a critical term for apolitical/celebratory modes of analysis, and then argue it may be usefully extended today to refer to popular and political efforts to construct a ‘people’ in overtly cultural terms. Second, we make the case for renewing an expressly ‘critical populist’ stance, one that is attentive to ordinary tastes and pleasures, while also locating and analysing them in relation to the production of needs and desires within a capitalist political economy, and that is attuned to the political possibilities for change. Third, we argue that the resources of cultural studies should be mobilised to redress some of the deficiencies of dominant accounts of populism from political science, and suggest that the twin concepts of cultural and critical populism offer an advance over the elitist and culturally reductive mode of analysis associated with Inglehart and Norris’ conception of ‘cultural backlash’. We conclude by offering an overview of the other contributions to the special issue, as they seek to push the concept of cultural populism in new directions, while also critically engaging with residual, dominant and emergent popular and populist currents in these new populist times.
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Peker, Efe, and Emily Laxer. "Populism and Religion." Comparative Sociology 20, no. 3 (August 4, 2021): 317–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691330-bja10037.
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Abstract Although the populism-religion relationship is increasingly recognized in the literature, the focus has predominantly been on Western cases. This article proposes analytical tools for global comparisons. First, drawing on the ideational, performative, and strategic approaches to populism, the authors articulate how populists deploy religion in each category. Existing works have not engaged with these dimensions conjointly. Second, the authors employ this tridimensional conception to operationalize the “covert” and “overt” modes of religious populism identified in the literature. They hold that a populist movement comes closer to the former (“sacralizing the political”) or the latter (“politicizing the sacred”) depending on the extent to which it mobilizes religions in its ideas, performances, and strategies. Third, the authors exemplify these ideal types via two pairs of case studies: France and Québec (covert), and India and Turkey (overt). Finally, the authors consider how religious populisms elsewhere stack up on this spectrum, and discuss future themes for comparative research.
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Destradi, Sandra, and Johannes Plagemann. "Populism and International Relations: (Un)predictability, personalisation, and the reinforcement of existing trends in world politics." Review of International Studies 45, no. 5 (June 18, 2019): 711–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210519000184.
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AbstractAs populists have formed governments all over the world, it becomes imperative to study the consequences of the rise of populism for International Relations. Yet, systematic academic analyses of the international impact of populist government formation are still missing, and political commentators tend to draw conclusions from few cases of right-wing populism in the Global North. But populism – conceptualised as a ‘thin’ ideology based on anti-elitism and anti-pluralism – takes different shapes across world regions as populists combine it with different ‘thick’ ideologies. To reflect such diversity and gain more systematic insights into the global implications of populism, we focus on cases of populist government formation in the Global South. We find that populists in power are not, per se, more belligerent or less willing to engage globally than their non-populist predecessors. Factors like status seeking or a country's embeddedness in international institutions mitigate the impact of populism. Its most immediate effect concerns procedural aspects: foreign policymaking becomes more centralised and personalised – yet, not entirely unpredictable, given the importance of ‘thick’ ideologies espoused by populist parties and leaders. Rather than changing course entirely, populists in power reinforce existing trends, especially a tendency towards diversifying international partnerships.
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Couperus, Stefan, and Pier Domenico Tortola. "Right-wing populism’s (ab)use of the past in Italy and the Netherlands." Debats. Revista de cultura, poder i societat 4 (December 25, 2019): 105–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.28939/iam.debats-en.2019-9.
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Historical analysis is increasingly used as a tool in the study of present-day populism in Europe. The past is often explored as a source of analogies through which to examine today’s populism, and at other times in search of causal mechanisms to explain the current populist wave. In this paper we focus on a third kind of link between populism and the past, namely the ways populist movements and leaders use and abuse history and historical memory in their quest for mass support. This angle on the populism/history nexus can yield deep insight into the ideological make-up of these movements and their voters, and populism’s discursive dynamics and strategies.Focusing on contemporary right-wing populism and its approach to the dark past of European countries, the paper conducts an exploratory analysis that posits three ways in which the past is (ab)used by populists: (a) the positive reassessment of dark history; (b) the recourse to fake history; (c) the evocation and subsequent denial of links with the dark past. In examining each, we use examples taken from the cases of Italy and The Netherlands to check the plausibility of our categories across different national cases.
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Mueller, Axel. "The meaning of ‘populism’." Philosophy & Social Criticism 45, no. 9-10 (October 29, 2019): 1025–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453719872277.
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This essay presents a novel approach to specifying the meaning of the concept of populism, on the political position it occupies and on the nature of populism. Employing analytic techniques of concept clarification and recent analytic ideology critique, it develops populism as a political kind in three steps. First, it descriptively specifies the stereotype of populist platforms as identified in extant research and thereby delimits the peculiar political position populism occupies in representative democracies as neither inclusionary nor fascist. Second, it specifies on this basis analytically–normatively the particular stance towards liberal representative democracy (in particular towards popular sovereignty and democratic legitimacy) that unifies populism’s political position and explains how populist politics can be compelling for democratic citizens. The normative core (populist ideology) turns out to require no more than two general principles of legitimizing political authority by elections. Surprisingly, it does not need a separate anti-pluralist or exclusionary commitment: it entails it. Third, this normative model allows a response to a contested question in the theoretical discussion, namely, whether populism (properly specified) can be democracy-enhancing. The article defends the negative answer in virtue of the normative core alone and does so as much vis-à-vis a minimal (purely electoral) as vis-à-vis a normatively ambitious (liberal) conception of democracy. The reconstruction of the normative core of populist ideology enables a novel argument to show that populism is incompatible with the continued democratic legitimation of political authority even in the normatively most austere conception of ‘electoral democracy’, not just with ‘liberal democracy’. Assuming a normatively more ambitious concept of democratic legitimation in terms of political autonomy, the model also produces an extremely direct argument showing that populists cannot fulfil their promise of ‘taking back control’ over political decision-making to the population.
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Oppermann, Daniel. "Havertz, Ralf. Radical right populism in Germany: AfD, Pegida, and the identitarian movement. New York: Routledge, 2021, 202p. ISBN: 978-0-367-37146-3." Mural Internacional 14 (May 17, 2023): e71252. http://dx.doi.org/10.12957/rmi.2023.71252.
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A direita e o populismo radical de direita ganharam terreno em vários países nos últimos anos. Enquanto os populistas de direita chegaram ao poder em alguns países, outros viram uma presença de populistas de direita nos parlamentos e nas ruas durante anos. Este livro é um estudo de caso de organizações populistas de direita na Alemanha, enfocando especialmente o partido Alternativa para a Alemanha (AfD).Palavras-chave: Populismo. Alemanha. AfD.ABSTRACTRight-wing and radical right populism has gained ground in various countries in recent years. While right-wing populists have come to power in some countries, other countries have seen a presence of right-wing populists in parliaments and on the streets for years. This book is a case study of right-wing populist organizations in Germany, focusing mostly on the party Alternative for Germany (AfD).Keywords: Populism. Germany. AfD. Recebido em: 13 nov. 2022 | Aceito em: 17 mai. 2023.
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Gagnon, Jean-Paul, Emily Beausoleil, Kyong-Min Son, Cleve Arguelles, Pierrick Chalaye, and Callum N. Johnston. "What is populism? Who is the populist?" Democratic Theory 5, no. 2 (December 1, 2018): vi—xxvi. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/dt.2018.050201.
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Both “populism” and “populist” have long been considered ill-defined terms, and therefore are regularly misapplied in both scholarly and popular discourses.1 This definitional difficulty is exacerbated by the Babelian confusion of voices on populism, where the term’s meaning differs within and between global regions (e.g. Latin America versus Western Europe); time periods (e.g. 1930s versus the present), and classifications (e.g. left/ right, authoritarian/libertarian, pluralist/antipluralist, as well as strains that muddy these distinctions such as homonationalism, xenophobic feminism and multicultural neonationalism). While useful efforts have been made to navigate the vast and heterogeneous conceptual terrain of populism,2 they rarely engage with each other. The result is a dizzying proliferation of different definitions unaccompanied by an understanding as to how they might speak to each other. And this conceptual fragmentation reinforces, and is reinforced by, diverging assessments of populism which tend to cast it as either “good” or “bad” for democracy (e.g. Dzur and Hendriks 2018; Müller 2015).
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Moffitt, Benjamin. "The Populism/Anti-Populism Divide in Western Europe." Democratic Theory 5, no. 2 (December 1, 2018): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/dt.2018.050202.
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While the rise of populism in Western Europe over the past three decades has received a great deal of attention in the academic and popular literature, less attention has been paid to the rise of its opposite— anti-populism. This short article examines the discursive and stylistic dimensions of the construction and maintenance of the populism/anti-populism divide in Western Europe, paying particular attention to how anti-populists seek to discredit populist leaders, parties and followers. It argues that this divide is increasingly antagonistic, with both sides of the divide putting forward extremely different conceptions of how democracy should operate in the Western European political landscape: one radical and popular, the other liberal. It closes by suggesting that what is subsumed and feared under the label of the “populist threat” to democracy in Western Europe today is less about populism than nationalism and nativism.
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Lin, Jiawei. "Populism Unveiled: Mechanisms and Triggers of Political Violence." Communications in Humanities Research 32, no. 1 (April 26, 2024): 84–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2753-7064/32/20240019.
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In recent decades, there has been a widespread surge of populism worldwide. Populists strategically utilize media platforms to highlight the suppression of ordinary citizens by political authorities and the perceived unethical behaviors of political elites. Populists, who employ political slogans advocating for the interests of the common masses and eliminating corrupt elites, have swiftly garnered widespread support. However, the ascent of populists to positions of authority has coincided with a notable increase in political violence. While scholars have extensively elucidated definitions and classifications of populism, and numerous theoretical studies have analyzed factors contributing to the emergence of populism in different geographical areas, there remains a shortage of unified comprehension regarding the mechanisms through which populism incites political violence. This paper investigates the various trajectories of political violence triggered by populism through a comprehensive literature review and comparative analysis. The study contends that political violence is incited by populism through two distinct pathways, as evidenced by an analysis of incidents occurring in various regions under populist regimes. The first pathway sees political violence initially prompted by the consolidation of power and the repression of political adversaries by populist leaders. The second pathway involves the xenophobic ideology of populism intensifies conflicts between native citizens and foreign immigrants, thereby heightening the likelihood of political violence.
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Aleknonis, Gintaras, and Renata Matkevičienė. "Populism in Lithuania: Defining the Research Tradition." Baltic Journal of Law & Politics 9, no. 1 (June 1, 2016): 26–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bjlp-2016-0002.
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Abstract The research on populism and populist political communication in Lithuania is rather limited, regardless of the fact that populist movements and politicians are influential on national and local political levels; they also receive sufficient support from a significant share of the population. Because the Western European research tradition is concentrated on the challenges of right-wing populism, Lithuanian political scientists distinguish right-wing populism as more significant in comparison to left-wing populism. Although Lithuanian researchers note, that in the balance of the left-right wing populists, Lithuania stands out with the majority of left-wing populists, in comparison to the popularity and number of right-wing populists in neighbouring countries. Despite the interest of scholars in various fields of policy research in Lithuania, there is still a lack of research on populist political communication, and what interest does exist is mostly concentrated on analysis of practical issues within the political arena, e.g. the study of the processes of political elections. The analysis of populist political communication in Lithuania revealed that populism is a relatively oft-mentioned topic in Lithuanian scientific discourse, but in most cases remains on the margins of other research. The theoretical work presents the assumptions based on the analysis of the political situation in Lithuania and examples from other countries. The empirical research of populism is scarce, and in most cases based on content analysis of political documents and media reports.
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Blokker, Paul. "Populism as a constitutional project." International Journal of Constitutional Law 17, no. 2 (April 2019): 536–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icon/moz028.
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Abstract The engagement of conservative, populist governments with constitutional reform and constitution-making is perceived as a significant threat to the rule of law and democracy within the European Union. Constitutionalists often assume a relation of mutual exclusion between populism and constitutionalism. In contrast, I argue that while populism ought to be understood as a rejection of liberal constitutionalism, it equally constitutes a competing political force regarding the definition of constitutional democracy. The article first discusses populist constitutionalism in the context of the two, main modern constitutional traditions: the modernist and the revolutionary ones. Second, I discuss the populist critique of liberal constitutionalism, with a central focus on the recent cases of right-wing populism in power in East-Central Europe. Four dimensions are prominent: (i) popular sovereignty as the key justificatory claim of populism; (ii) majority rule as the main populist mode of government; (iii) instrumentalism as the legal–practical approach of populists; and (iv) legal resentment as the populists’ main attitude toward public law. In conclusion, I argue that while the populist critique of liberal constitutionalism provides significant insights into structural problems of liberal democracy, populist constitutionalism ultimately fails to live up to its own democratic promise.
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Mede, Niels G., and Mike S. Schäfer. "Science-related populism: Conceptualizing populist demands toward science." Public Understanding of Science 29, no. 5 (June 9, 2020): 473–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963662520924259.
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Populism is on the rise in many countries. Scholars have stated that it is characteristic for political populism to describe society as a fundamental struggle between an allegedly virtuous people and political elites which are portrayed negatively. This anti-elitist sentiment not only targets politicians, however, but also other representatives of the alleged establishment—including scientists and scholarly institutions. But the specifics of such science-related populism have not yet been conceptualized. We aim to do so, integrating scholarship on political populism, the “participatory turn,” and alternative epistemologies. We propose to conceptualize science-related populism as a set of ideas which suggests that there is a morally charged antagonism between an (allegedly) virtuous ordinary people and an (allegedly) unvirtuous academic elite, and that this antagonism is due to the elite illegitimately claiming and the people legitimately demanding both science-related decision-making sovereignty and truth-speaking sovereignty.
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Walker, Neil. "Populism and constitutional tension." International Journal of Constitutional Law 17, no. 2 (April 2019): 515–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icon/moz027.
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Abstract The recent resurgence of populism poses a significant challenge to constitutional law today and to the deeper tradition of modern constitutionalism. Despite resisting formal limitations on their power to represent the “true” popular will, populist regimes nevertheless find instrumental and ideological reasons to endorse their own version of constitutionalism. And despite their nativist commitments, populist leaders across the globe find common constitutional cause and mutual encouragement in their critique of cosmopolitan institutions and values. The distinctiveness of populism’s constitutional orientation rests on its occupation of a space between authoritarian and popular versions of constitutionalism, overlapping both but not reducible to either. There situated, populism involves a reaction against what it condemns as the neglect of the “unitary collective particular” in the liberal version of modern constitutionalism. Many critical of the inflated narratives and methods of populism nevertheless share some its underlying anxieties. For in an age in which an expanding commitment to the democratic pedigree of our constitutional arrangements has unfolded alongside the increasing transnationalization and fragmentation of political authority, the very instability of the balance between various constitutional goods—between plurality and unity, individualism and collectivism, and universal and particular rationalities—that fuels populists’ ire, deepens the defining tension of modern constitutionalism, and poses a challenge to all who continue to endorse it.
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Dawson, Mark. "How Can EU Law Respond to Populism?" Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 40, no. 1 (March 1, 2020): 183–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqaa002.
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Abstract The rise in Europe of populist movements has created severe anxiety about the stability of the EU legal order. This article argues that, while populist ideas challenge numerous elements of the EU’s constitutional settlement, there exists no fundamental incompatibility between populism and EU law. By comparing its response to populism with attempts by EU law to stabilise its legal order in the face of political contestation arising from other political cleavages, the article discusses three different ways to understand the interaction between EU law and populism. EU law may seek to ‘survive’ the growth of populism by (i) bracketing or insulating its institutions from populist contestation, (ii) accommodating populist ideas or (iii) confronting the constitutional strategies populists utilise domestically. In examining the constitutional foundations of populism and its relation to emerging doctrines of EU law, the article seeks to build a road map of how populist movements might utilise or resist EU law in their development.
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Yilmaz, Ihsan, and Nicholas Morieson. "Religious Populisms in the Asia Pacific." Religions 13, no. 9 (August 30, 2022): 802. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13090802.
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Most of the literature on religion’s relationship with populism is Eurocentric and has so far focused on European populist party discourses and, to a degree, on the United States, in particular, on the Christian identity populism of the Tea Party and the Trump movement within the Republican Party. However, across the Asia-Pacific region, religion has become an important component of populist discourses. It has been instrumentalised by populists in many nations in the region, including some of the most populous countries in the world, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan. Moreover, the relationship between religions other than Christianity and populism has all too rarely been studied, except for Turkey. This paper therefore surveys the Asia-Pacific region to comprehend how populists in the region incorporate religion into their discourses and the impact religious populism has on Asia-Pacific societies. It asks two questions: “What role does religion play in populist discourses?” and “How has religion’s incorporation into populist discourse impacted society?” To answer these questions, the paper examines four nations which have recently been ruled by governments espousing, to different degrees and in different ways, religious populism: India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka. By choosing these nations, we can examine the relationship between populism and Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, and between religion and populism within a variety of religious, ethnic, and political contexts. The paper argues that religion is instrumentalised in populist discourses across the Asia-Pacific region in a variety of ways. First, religion is used to construct ingroups and outgroups, which serve a populist narrative in which the religion of the ingroup is superior yet threatened by the religion(s) of the outgroup(s). Second, religion is used to empower religious authorities, which support populist parties and movements. Third, religion is instrumentalised by populists in order to frame themselves, and in particular their leader, as a sacred or holy figure. The paper also argues that religion’s incorporation into populist discourse has impacted society by legitimising authoritarianism, increasing religious divisions, and justifying the oppression of religious minorities. The paper concludes by noting some differences between populists in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.
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Sombatpoonsiri, Janjira. "Rethinking Civil Resistance in the Face of Rightwing Populism: A Theoretical Inquiry." Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 13, no. 3 (December 2018): 7–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2018.1496028.
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This paper seeks to examine some theoretical limitations potentially undermining civil resistance campaigns countering rightwing populism, and suggests how we might rethink the politics of nonviolent struggle. It argues that protests against rightwing populism have generally tackled the ‘supply side’ of populism or populist leaders. However, little attention has been paid to the ‘demand side’, which explains why constituents vote for populists. Increasing support for populist leaders reflects a collective perception that established political institutions are not living up to the expectations of ordinary people. In response to rightwing populism, civil resistance movements will need to engage two fronts of the struggle. The first is economic inequality perpetuated by a neoliberal order against which rightwing populists claim to defend the ‘people’. The second front entails a cultural reconstruction of the notion of the ‘people’ in response to cultural anxiety that has given ground to populist nativist discourses. This article proposes that both of these tasks require a conceptual reconfiguration of nonviolent resistance regarding power and culture.
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Lassila, Jussi. "Putin as a Non-populist Autocrat." Russian Politics 3, no. 2 (June 23, 2018): 175–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00302002.
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This article approaches Vladimir Putinʼs authoritarian rule by adhering to populismʼs minimal definition, and argues – in contrast to vernacular perceptions of populism – that Putin is not a populist by his political identification. Whereas the lack of political plurality is an important obstacle for the emergence of any populism, this factor alone cannot explain the Kremlinʼs lack of a consistent authoritarian populist alternative. For instance, the President of Belarus, Aleksander Lukashenko has justified his longstanding populist rule in a country, which certainly lacks political plurality. It is argued that Russiaʼs historical distrust in ‘the people’ as a political subject and the incompatibility of populismʼs simplified antagonisms for Putinʼs neo-imperial course, are the central explanations for the absence of an authoritarian populism in Russia.
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Klyuchkovych, Anatoliy. "POPULISM IN SLOVAKIA: PECULIARITIES OF A POLITICAL PHENOMENON." 39, no. 39 (July 10, 2021): 100–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.26565/2220-8089-2021-39-13.
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The article analyzes the party-political aspects of populism in the Slovak Republic. The structural distinction between the parties of systemic mainstream and populism has come to the forefront of Slovakia's party-political development. The aim of the article is to highlight the specifics of the phenomenon of populism, its forms and party representatives in Slovakia. Considering the emergence and electoral success of populist parties, there is a need to emphasize the complexity of the phenomenon of populism in the modern Slovak Republic. Populists do not have clear ideological attitudes. they use the maxims of various ideological doctrines, which are based on practical needs. The distinction between systemic and populist parties is becoming more complicated today, as their positions on a number of important political issues have converged recently In the process of post-communist development in the Slovak Republic there was a transition from radical forms of populist politics through nationalism and authoritarianism to more moderate tendencies. Populist parties in the CEE countries, and in particular in the Slovak Republic, are characterized by the following features: opposition of the elite and the people based on moral grounds, desire to act as defenders of the people’s interests; anti-immigration, Eurosceptic, anti-globalization orientation of the messages; low level of institutionalization, etc. The main forms of manifestation of Slovak populism are determined: social, national, charismatic, centrist, far-right populism. The article emphasizes that the key trend is the growth of populism in the election campaigns of Slovak parties and competition on the market of populist slogans. Protest calls, social demagoguery, and national populism are electorally perceptible issues that are being pursued by both the opposition and ruling political force. The parliamentary elections of 2020, which can be characterized as «triumph of populism», were an important stage for the development of the party system in Slovakia. The success of the populists and the defeat of the liberal parties in the 2020 elections testify to the crisis of systemic politics and democratic institutions in general, which poses risks to the stable development of Slovakia.
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Pandu, Moses Stephen, and Diah Ayu Candraningrum. "Karakteristik Populisme Gubernur Jawa Barat (Ridwan Kamil) dalam Postingan Instagram 27 Mei 2018 – 27 Juni 2018." Koneksi 4, no. 2 (October 1, 2020): 380. http://dx.doi.org/10.24912/kn.v4i2.8230.
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Populism is a phenomenon of political communication that can be a political strategy for politicians who want to represent themselves. In the campaign period for the Election of West Java Governor Ridwan Kamil as a candidate for governor used a populist strategy to gain political support from the people of West Java. Populism strategy is very important in democracy, the characteristics of Ridwan Kamil's populism can be found in the form of Instagram posts, starting from May 27, 2018 - June 27, 2018 during the campaign period of the West Java Governor General Ridwan Kamil giving Instagram posts that match 9 characteristics of polulism. To find out the characteristics of Ridwan Kamil's populism on Instagram using data collection methods by taking interview data from Mr. Khalid Zabidi, a Golkar Party cadre, Ridwan Kamil's Instagram direct observation, literature study to support research and document studies.Populisme merupakan fenomena komunikasi politik yang dapat menjadi strategi politik bagi politikus yang ingin merepresentasikan dirinya. Dalam masa kampanye Pemilihan Gubernur Jawa Barat Ridwan Kamil sebagai calon gubernur menggunakan strategi populis untuk mendapatkan dukungan politik dari masyarakat Jawa Barat. Strategi populisme sangat penting dalam demokrasi, karakteristik populisme Ridwan Kamil bisa di temui dalam bentuk postingan Instagram,Terhitung dari 27 Mei 2018 – 27 Juni 2018 saat masa kampanye Pemilihan Gubenur Jawa Barat Ridwan Kamil memberikan postingan Instagram yang sesuai dengan 9 karakteristik polulisme. Untuk mengetahui karakteristik populisme Ridwan Kamil di Instagram menggunakan cara pengumpulan data dengan mengambil data wawancara Bapak Khalid Zabidi Kader Partai Golkar, observasi langsung Instagram Ridwan Kamil, studi pustaka untuk mendukung penelitian dan studi dokumen.
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Belyakov, Gleb. "The Political and Economic Theory of Populism." Issues of Economic Theory 23, no. 2 (May 22, 2024): 30–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2024_2_30_44.
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The paper presents a cross-disciplinary theory of populism. The first part of the article considers a definition of populism, the main electorate of populist forces, and the economic triggers of protest votes for populist parties. The second part deals with the different types of political populism, the reasons for their actualization in the 21st century, and the institutional consequences of populist power. The demand for populism comes from fragmented social groups that lost out in the social transformations following the neoliberal revolution of the 1970s and experienced the negative shocks of globalization. The protest electorate is organized around charismatic leaders who find 'scapegoats' in the form of traditional elites, migrants, or minorities and claim to speak for the «nation». Populism can contribute to democratization in its early stages. However, once in power, populists tend to undermine the system of checks and balances, leading to a decline in the quality of institutions and a slowdown in economic growth. The third part of the paper assesses the impact of economic populism. It is concluded that the definitional approaches used in academic literature do not meet the requirement of universality and do not imply a sufficient level of operationalization necessary for empirical research. An alternative approach is proposed that develops the «classical» definition of R. Dornbusch and S. Edwards: economic policy aimed at provoking economic shocks in order to increase the political ratings of the authorities and downplaying socio-economic risks. This approach enables economic populism to transcend the ideological framework of «right-left» economic policy, separate it from the economic policy of political populists, and evaluate the populist policies of mainstream parties. The theory of economic populism converges with the theory of political business cycles, but is not limited to elections and focuses on assessing demand rather than supply.
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Hewison, Kevin. "Reluctant populists: Learning populism in Thailand." International Political Science Review 38, no. 4 (September 2017): 426–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512117692801.
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Gates, Leslie. "Populism: A puzzle without (and for) world-systems analysis." Journal of World-Systems Research 24, no. 2 (August 14, 2018): 325–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2018.849.
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This essay shows how world-systems analysis provides a more rigorous explanation for the recent rise of disparate populisms, countering negative stereotypes of mainstream accounts that obscure how formative populist leaders emerged from authentic progressive movements which challenged capitalists. Existing analyses have also failed to specify the varied economic projects of populists, their likely social bases and their relationships to world markets. The essay recommends relational comparisons of populists to unravel populism’s puzzles and advance world-systems analysis.
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Funke, Manuel, Moritz Schularick, and Christoph Trebesch. "Populist Leaders and the Economy." American Economic Review 113, no. 12 (December 1, 2023): 3249–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20202045.
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Populism at the country level is at an all-time high, with more than 25 percent of nations currently governed by populists. How do economies perform under populist leaders? We build a new long-run cross-country database to study the macroeconomic history of populism. We identify 51 populist presidents and prime ministers from 1900 to 2020 and show that the economic cost of populism is high. After 15 years, GDP per capita is 10 percent lower compared to a plausible nonpopulist counterfactual. Economic disintegration, decreasing macroeconomic stability, and the erosion of institutions typically go hand in hand with populist rule. (JEL D72, E23, N10, N40, O43)
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Maly, Ico. "ALGORITHMIC POPULISM AND THE DATAFICATION AND GAMIFICATION OF THE PEOPLE BY FLEMISH INTEREST IN BELGIUM." Trabalhos em Linguística Aplicada 59, no. 1 (April 2020): 444–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/01031813685881620200409.
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ABSTRACT Populism studies tend to understand populism as a purely political phenomenon (MUDDE; KALTWASSER, 2017; MÜLLER, 2016). To categorize someone as a populist or not, is in many cases solely based on an evaluation of discourse, style or even ideology. It is much rarer to see approaches to populism that focus on the relation between politics and media and digital media in particular (welcome exceptions are CESARINO 2019 e SILVA, 2019). Throughout this contribution, I will argue that we cannot understand populism in full without focusing in detail on how populists and others actually construct the populist voice, how they communicate themselves on different platforms as the ‘true representatives of the people’. This inevitably means taking the changing media landscape into account as a key-context that shapes contemporary populism. The hybrid media system, its media logics, affordances and its culture of connectivity need to be considered when trying to make sense of populism and politics in general in the 21st century.
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Prade-Weiss, Juliane. "Staging enmity: reading populist productions of shame with Jelinek’s On the Royal Road." Open Research Europe 3 (February 1, 2023): 23. http://dx.doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.15469.1.
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Background: Populism is often perceived as a shamelessly loud segment of political discourse. However, Jelinek’s play On the Royal Road, written on the occasion of Trump’s 2016 election as US president, suggests that populism leads to societal silencing. Jelinek’s text expounds that when a society’s public sphere is marked by ubiquitous enmity against an imagined “we”, grounded in antagonism, then the possibility of speaking to one another disappears, because speaking to one another is based on the willingness to give one’s counterpart space and listen to them. In a public discourse that stages enmity, the counterpart vanishes. Therefore, populism, loud as it is, leads to the silencing of whole communities insofar as they are left with nothing in common but enmity. Method: Critical discourse analysis is used to contextualise Jelinek’s play with recent social sciences and humanities research on global populisms, and combined with close readings of select passages of the play to highlight what literary language and the dramatic form can contribute to understanding populism. Results: The silencing populisms entail is fed, in large part, by a dynamics linking the interpersonal emotion of shame to its discursive exploitation in shamelessness and shaming: populist voices transgress rules of democratic debate in the public sphere to elicit outrage by mainstream politics, media, and civil society, which often retort populist shamelessness by shaming populist actors. The audience excitement populist leaders and supporters generate is an important factor in normalizing the emotional, moralizing populist polarization of “us” versus “them” that undermines differentiated discussion and a dispute of arguments. Conclusion: While media and research commonly suggest that with the populist reduction of politics to a spectacle, citizens become a passive audience, the article expounds that audiences play a key role in the production of populist enmity. This insight offers an alley to counteract populism.
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Prade-Weiss, Juliane. "Staging enmity: reading populist productions of shame with Jelinek’s On the Royal Road." Open Research Europe 3 (July 26, 2023): 23. http://dx.doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.15469.2.
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Background: Populism is often perceived as a shamelessly loud segment of political discourse. However, Jelinek’s play On the Royal Road, written on the occasion of Trump’s 2016 election as US president, suggests that populism leads to societal silencing. Jelinek’s text expounds that when a society’s public sphere is marked by ubiquitous enmity against an imagined “we”, grounded in antagonism, then the possibility of speaking to one another disappears, because speaking to one another is based on the willingness to give one’s counterpart space and listen to them. In a public discourse that stages enmity, the counterpart vanishes. Therefore, populism, loud as it is, leads to the silencing of whole communities insofar as they are left with nothing in common but enmity. Method: Critical discourse analysis is used to contextualise close readings of select passages of Jelinek’s play with recent social sciences and humanities research on global populisms to highlight what literary language and the dramatic form can contribute to understanding populism. Results: The silencing populisms entail is fed, in large part, by a dynamics linking the interpersonal emotion of shame to its discursive exploitation in shamelessness and shaming: populist voices transgress rules of democratic debate in the public sphere to elicit outrage by mainstream politics, media, and civil society, which often retort populist shamelessness by shaming populist actors. The audience excitement populist leaders and supporters generate is an important factor in normalizing the emotional, moralizing populist polarization of “us” versus “them” that undermines differentiated discussion and a dispute of arguments. Conclusion: While media and research commonly suggest that with the populist reduction of politics to a spectacle, citizens become a passive audience, the article expounds that audiences play a key role in the production of populist enmity. This insight offers an alley to counteract populism.
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Adeagbo, Taiwo. "Taking Populism Seriously: A Focus on Global Economy and the International Organizations." International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science VIII, no. III (2024): 49–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.47772/ijriss.2024.803005.
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The focus of this article is to explore the role of populism as a defining feature of the geo-political landscape in the 21st century. This review article examines the theories of populism exclusively and investigates the effects of populists’ backlash against the global economy and international organizations. By engaging in an in-depth review of the literature on the subject, this essay analyzes the various forms of populist backlashes against international organizations. First, I observed the various conceptualizations of populism and adopted the use of Qualitative Data Analysis software to analyze the contents of speeches and political statements of some populist leaders around the world. Second, this essay developed three ideal types of populism and illustrates the condition under which each of these typologies can exist or co-exist. Third, I assess the current literature on the populist backlash against international organizations and argue that although nationalism plays an essential role in the right-wing populist parties and governments in Europe, it is insufficient to explain the backlashes against the global economy and international organizations. Fourth, I combined the theories of populism with the literature on the backlash against international organizations and proposed three forms of backlash available to populist governments. Lastly, I developed a framework for the interaction between the three typologies of populism and these forms of backlashes. I concluded that compliance problems have increased in the face of the current waves of populism.
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Ádám, Zoltán. "Re-feudalizing democracy: an approach to authoritarian populism taken from institutional economics." Journal of Institutional Economics 16, no. 1 (June 18, 2019): 105–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137419000304.
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AbstractResearch on populism has gained importance in the light of the recent global populist surge. Political scientists have become concerned with the problem of authoritarian populism, examining how illiberal, anti-pluralist populist parties have degraded liberal democracies. Economic research on recent forms of populism, although also growing, lack a comprehensive conceptual approach. This paper reduces this gap by conceptualizing authoritarian populism in terms of political transaction costs, arguing that its primary function is to vertically integrate political exchange under conditions of general franchise. If successful, authoritarian populist regimes internalize a large share of political transaction costs inherent in decentralized democratic political exchange. This entails a degraded version of democracy, eliminating a significant part of substantial electoral choice. Through weakening impersonal collective political contracting, authoritarian populists bring back private political contracting as a dominant political coordination mechanism, effectively re-feudalizing democracy.
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Meijen, Jens. "Rethinking the Tensions between Populism and Diplomacy: A Case Study of Regional Sub-State Diplomacy as Populist Image-Building Strategy in Flanders." Hague Journal of Diplomacy 18, no. 1 (December 21, 2022): 35–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1871191x-bja10143.
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Abstract Populism is traditionally understood as a challenge to diplomacy. This article reconsiders that notion through an illustrative case of regional sub-state diplomacy. First, it examines how and why populists discredit diplomacy and the international order through four typically populist discursive strategies: crisis discourse, exceptionalism, underdogism and challengerism. Second, it explores why populists may approach regional sub-state diplomacy differently. To illustrate this, it examines the position of Vlaams Belang (a Flemish populist party in Belgium) in the Flemish Parliament Commission for Foreign Policy. It shows that the party discredits state diplomacy while advocating for stronger Flemish diplomacy, implying that the idea of populism as a challenge to diplomacy does not necessarily hold up for regional sub-state diplomacy. As such, the article suggests that the multifarious ways in which populism and diplomacy intersect deserve greater scrutiny and that diplomacy studies should approach populism not as a monolith but as a multi-faceted concept.
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Goldstein, Ariel Alejandro. "The Press and Classical Populism in Argentina and Brazil." Latin American Perspectives 45, no. 3 (March 22, 2018): 109–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0094582x18767396.
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Comparison of the policies vis-à-vis the press of the classical populist governments of Argentina and Brazil reveals that the populist elites came into conflict with traditional media elites over exclusionary views that modified the contours of the public sphere. Newspapers committed to liberal principles engaged in intransigent struggle with populism, and this struggle created opportunities for new entrepreneurs to form political alliances with these governments to expand their businesses. The relationship between these “mediatized populisms” and the new media entrepreneurs contributed to the patrimonialism that came to characterize the link between the media and Latin American states in subsequent years. Una comparación de las políticas relativas a la prensa por parte de los gobiernos populistas clásicos de Argentina y Brasil muestra que las élites populistas entraron en conflicto con las élites de los medios tradicionales. Dichas desavenencias fueron causadas por puntos de vista excluyentes que alteraban el contorno de la esfera pública. Los periódicos comprometidos con los principios liberales sostuvieron una lucha intransigente con el populismo, lucha que dio la oportunidad a nuevos empresarios de formar alianzas políticas con dichos gobiernos y expandir así sus negocios. La relación entre estos “populismos mediáticos” y los empresarios de los nuevos medios contribuyó al patrimonialismo que asumiría el vínculo entre dichos medios y los Estados latinoamericanos en años subsiguientes.
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COLLINS, JENNIFER N. "New Left Experiences in Bolivia and Ecuador and the Challenge to Theories of Populism." Journal of Latin American Studies 46, no. 1 (February 2014): 59–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022216x13001569.
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AbstractThis article explores a paradox at the heart of New Left populism in Bolivia and Ecuador – namely, the election of populist leaders in movement societies. Employing Laclau's theory about the emergence of populism, it demonstrates how social movements, not charismatic leaders, first constructed the popular identities that laid the foundations for these regimes. In re-examining theories of populism in light of these cases, this article suggests that populism's transformative and counter-hegemonic potential needs to be given renewed attention, and that the central role of charismatic leadership should be qualified in terms of the origins of populist identity formation.
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Stašienė, Jogilė. "POPULIST DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL REPRESENTATION: A CASE STUDY OF ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN LITHUANIA." Baltic Journal of Political Science 5, no. 5 (January 17, 2017): 53. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/bjps.2016.5.10336.
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Today’s party democracy crisis coincides with an increasing influence of populist political actors. This article— prompted by notions of populist understandings of politics as expressions of the people’s will and of the populist idea of an antagonism between the people and the elite—explores whether populism and party democracies are compatible. Assertions, that populism contradicts party democracies, should rest on research of populist understandings of political representation. This case study, of the populist discourse of Lithuania’s anti-establishment organizations, fills this research gap in the literature on populism’s compatibility with party democracies. The qualitative analysis of this case study focuses on how political representation is perceived and presented. The study provides new insights for theoretical debate on the compatibility of populism and party democracy and also presents a nuanced picture of populist perceptions of political representation.
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Joppke, Christian. "Explaining the Populist Right in the Neoliberal West." Societies 13, no. 5 (April 25, 2023): 110. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/soc13050110.
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With the 2016 double shock of Brexit and Trump, the populist right has become a game-changing force on both sides of the North Atlantic. A proper explanation needs to combine political, economic, and cultural elements. Qua populism, the populist right addresses a political condition, which is neoliberalism’s endemic democracy deficit. However, the illiberal democracy that populists advocate is not a cure for it. Cleavage theory in the Lipset–Rokkan tradition sheds light on the rightist orientation and the nationalist content of this populism. The main explanatory challenge remains the combination of economic and cultural factors in the rise of populism. In economic respect, middle-class decline under a neoliberal order seems to be the root cause of populism. However, its agenda is culture-focused, amounting to a nationalist opposition to immigration and cosmopolitanism. This “cultural deflection” is a persistent puzzle. The minimum to conclude is that one-sided accounts of populism in exclusively economic or cultural terms are unconvincing.
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Jati, Wasisto. "Dampak Populisme Agama dalam Pemilu Kepala Daerah: Pengalaman Pemilihan Gubernur DKI Jakarta 2007-2017." Dialog 46, no. 2 (December 31, 2023): 255–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.47655/dialog.v46i2.752.
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Abstrak Populisme agama menjadi kata kunci penting dalam membahas pola kebangkitan politik Islam kontemporer. Absennya kemenangan partai politik Islam sebagai pemenang pemilu di Indonesia paska reformasi menjadikan populisme menjadi pilihan logis dalam menyampaikan aspirasi mengatasnamakan umat islam. Hal ini setidaknya terjadi pemilu gubernur DKI kontemporer yang dimulai sejak 2007 hingga 2017. Populisme agama menjadi poin penting dalam memberikan narasi penting yang berpengaruh kepada pemilih maupun kandidat yang akan maju di pemilihan Gubernur DKI Jakarta. Tulisan ini akan berusaha mengelaborasi lebih lanjut mengenai transformasi populsime agama yang berlangsung dalam pemilihan Gubernur DKI Jakarta baru-baru ini. Adapun metode riset yang digunakan metode riset campuran berbasis studi lapangan dan juga studi kepustakaan. Hasil riset ini memperlihatkan bahwa dampak populisme agama dalam pemilu kepala daerah menjadikan kompetisi elektoral bertensi lebih tinggi. Terlebih lagi ketika di ruang publik, populisme agama berdampak pada labelisasi hitam dan putih yang berdampak pada relasi sosial. Abstract Religious populism becomes a main keyword to discuss the recent pattern of Islamic revivalism in Indonesia. Th rise of religious populism comes to appear due to unfortunate position for Islamic parties in every election. This condition eventually encourages Muslim to look for alternative political aspiration that currently ends up in populism form. The populism itself has been growing up in recent Jakarta gubernatorial election from 2007 t0 2007. More importantly, religious populism is very strategic to attract voters because the extensive use of religion. Following up this background, this paper aims at further elaborating the transformation of religious populism during the recent Jakarta gubernatorial elections. The research method I use was mixed method that consists of fieldwork case study and archival research. This paper shows that the impact of religious populism on regional election turned the electoral competition more heated. Most importantly, when it comes to the public spaces, religious populism caused the social segmentation “black” and “white” that affects daily social interaction.
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Dyer-Witheford, Nick. "Left Populism and Platform Capitalism." tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 18, no. 1 (January 13, 2020): 116–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v18i1.1130.
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This paper contextualizes and analyses the policy proposals of new “left populisms” (Mouffe 2018) for the regulation and reform of the “platform capitalism” (Srnicek 2017) that increasingly organizes digital communication. The era of the 2008 crash and subsequent recession saw the emergence in North America and Europe of new left-wing electoral initiatives, either as new parties or fractions within older parties. These include, in the USA, Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Democrats; in the UK, Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party; in Spain, Podemos; in Germany, Die Linke; in France, La France Insoumise. While many of these groupings might be described as socialist, or democratic socialist, they often also distinguish themselves from older socialist or social democratic formations; so, for lack of a better term, we call them left populisms. Left populisms are connected in contradictory ways to the appearance of platform capitalism, a corporate model exemplified by Google, Facebook, Apple, Amazon and Uber, deploying proprietorial software as a launch-point for user activities accessing commodified or advertising-driven goods and services. The rise of left populism correlates with the ascent of platform capitalists. Left populist parties emerged from the anti-austerity movements (Occupy in the USA, the Indignados in Spain, student campus occupations in the UK) organized with the help of social media platforms. However, it is also the failures and scandals of platform capitalism have been important to left populism. Edward Snowden’s revelations of ubiquitous surveillance and the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica-Russian hacker imbroglio around the 2016 US election have fuelled a “techlash” against giant digital corporations that is now an important component of left populist sentiment. Drawing on policy documents, manifestos, speeches, position paper, this paper analyses the policy platforms in which left populist parties confront platform capitalism around issues of content regulation; concentration of ownership; the rights of digital workers; alternative ownership models; and proposals for a high-tech driven transition to “postcapitalism” (Mason 2016). It considers the similarities and difference between and within left populist parties on these issues; the extent of their departure from neoliberal policies; and their differences, and occasional erratic similarities, with right-wing populisms, such as that of Trump. It then reviews critiques of left populism made from Marxist and ecological anti-capitalist positions, with particular reference to technological issues. The paper concludes with a summary of the opportunities and problems for a left wing “data populism” (Morozov 2016) in the current political conjuncture.
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Postill, John. "Populism and social media: a global perspective." Media, Culture & Society 40, no. 5 (May 8, 2018): 754–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0163443718772186.
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The link between the spread of social media and the recent surge of populism around the world remains elusive. A global, rather than Western, theory is required to explore this connection. Such a theory would need to pay particular attention to five questions, namely, the roots of populism, ideology and populism, the rise of theocratic populism, social media and non-populist politicians, and the embedding of social media in larger systems of communication. In this essay, I draw from a range of cross-cultural examples to argue that social media are inextricable from a dense web of highly diverse online and offline communicative practices. Like most other forms of political communication, populism is twice hybrid, in that it entails the ceaseless interaction between old and new media as well as between online and offline sites of communication. Populists never operate in a vacuum or indeed in a filter bubble: they share hybridly mediated spaces and arenas with other populists and with non-populists. Over time, these varied political actors have co-evolved media strategies and tactics in full awareness of one another’s existence.
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BUROVA, OLGA. "Populism: Drivers, measurements and protectors." Sociology: Theory, Methods, Marketing, Stmm. 2022 (4) (2022): 46–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/sociology2022.04.046.
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Populism is a fairly young concept. It does not have a single definition, neither does it have a single ideology. Populists can operate in a wide spectrum — from the extreme left to the extreme right. They gain popularity by focusing on issues important to large groups of the population that are avoided by the political elite. In Europe it is immigration issue, in the USA it is the loss of jobs in industry; in Ukraine it is low income, unequal opportunities, unfair distribution of wealth, and corruption. Recently, there has been growing support for populist parties and politicians. Populists, in particular, support traditional social values, nationalism, and oppose immigration. Populists can influence politics, for example, the populist United Kingdom Independence Party initiated a referendum in June 2016 on the UK's membership in the European Union, which resulted in the victory of the supporters of Brexit - the exit of the UK. As Professor Inglehart notes, populism is spreading as a response to the transformation of values, populism expresses a "rollback" from post-materialist values. Populist politicians are unsuccessfully trying to find a solution to the new challenges that have arisen as a result of globalization and the formation of an artificial intelligence society. Thus, Donald Trump's proposals are predominantly xenophobic and authoritarian in nature. Another American politician, Bernard Sanders, notes the solution to the acute problem of economic inequality, but the reforms he proposes are ineffective. In this article, the author try to understand what this phenomenon is, what forms and drivers it has, and most importantly, how populism is measured in Europe and what examples of measurement there are in Ukraine. The results of a study in Ukraine presented in the article make it possible to identify trends of populism growth and find ways to oppose it.
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Scholtes, Julian. "The complacency of legality: Constitutionalist vulnerabilities to populist constituent power." German Law Journal 20, no. 3 (April 2019): 351–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/glj.2019.26.
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AbstractWhat role do public law and liberal constitutionalism play in an era of political populism? This article approaches this question by exploring the concept of constituent power in the light of recent constitutional developments in countries with populist governments. It attempts to outline and contrast conceptions of constituent power as inherent in liberal constitutionalist and populist thinking, respectively. While constitutionalists draw heavily upon Kelsenian normativism in framing the way political power is generated, populists juxtapose this with a concept of constituent power that is inspired by Carl Schmitt’s ‘decisionist’ view. The complacency of legality inherent in liberal constitutionalist thinking is susceptible to a populist challenge that draws attention to the necessity for the social embeddedness of any legal order. Populism, it is argued, exposes a core tension inherent in constitutionalism: How do constitutionalists reconcile their democratic aspirations with the simultaneous preclusion of certain political choices from the democratic realm? Populists can attack constitutionalism also because of the deficient conception of constituent power that underlies the latter. The article concludes that, where challenged by populists, public law can at some point no longer rely on its own force to defend itself. Its authority needs to be re-established from an extra-legal, pre-positive perspective. In an era of political populism, constitutionalist public law becomes a discourse that can challenge populism by means of the powerful reasons that inhere in the former.
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Durazo-Herrmann, Julián, Tania Gosselin, and Allison Harell. "Populism, Media and Journalism." Brazilian journalism research 17, no. 3 (December 30, 2021): 522–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.25200/bjr.v17n3.2021.1487.
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The articles in this special issue on populism, media and journalism build on, but also contribute to the extensive literature on the nature and consequences of populism. Among the questions raised are those about the gap between populism’s radical democratic discourse and actual practice, the destructive effects of populism on the structure and dynamics of various social fields, the importance of context in determining the actual nature of populist discourse and practice, as well as the role of globalization as it interacts with local context. Anti-elitism, anti-pluralism, polarization, charismatic leadership are not new tropes in studies of populism, yet they gain new tones when its effects on media and journalism are assessed. All in all, the study of populism in media and journalism raises important questions about its specificity in the context of new forms of communication and connection, how crises can create opportunities for its emergences, and how difference political systems engage with, or are resistant to, populist critiques. This special issue contributes to these questions and suggests new avenues for future research.
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Jansen, Robert S. "Populist Mobilization: A New Theoretical Approach to Populism." Sociological Theory 29, no. 2 (June 2011): 75–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2011.01388.x.
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