Academic literature on the topic 'Politics and Government - Referenda - Referendum, 1967'

Abstract2016 is likely to be recalled – in Europe, at least – as a temporal bordering, after a majority in the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. The “Brexit” referendum result has been pinned on the rise of populist politics and the revenge of so-called “left behind” places. Regardless of reasons, the referendum left the UK with fraught politics and protracted negotiations, especially over how to re-border with a Europe that has held the dismantling of borders at the heart of its philosophical project. While Brexit has already become a byword, an earlier referendum on British borders has long slipped from international note. In 1997, a majority in Wales (one of the four constituent countries of the UK), voted for devolution from central government in Westminster. Like the Brexit referendum twenty years later, the majority in favor of devolution was slight, exposing uneasy fractures and internal cleavages as it opened fresh questions of governance and geography. By attending to a small country at the periphery of Europe, we seek to destabilize the assumption of shared markers of global bordering (1989, 2001), revealing instead the palimpsests of identity and territoriality across which re-made borders run “all over.”

While the questions of how parties seek to address (or not) pressing issues are critically important, scholars have generally paid little attention to where issues are addressed within the political system, and the consequences for party competition of that choice. The fact that issues can be addressed within several institutional (i.e. functional) domains and levels – general elections, parliament, referenda, courts, local government, etc. – implies that political parties may address an issue, and thereby interact with one another, in consequentially different ways depending on the institutional arena or level of government wherein they seek resolution. This article describes how Ireland’s parties addressed the electorally volatile issue of abortion via referendum campaigns. The article draws upon multiple sources of evidence to support its findings, including original data based on results from the author’s two parliamentary surveys following the 2007 and 2011 election campaigns.

Ontario’s general election in Oct. 10, 2007, was unprecedented for several reasons. The election was held on a date fixed by legislation and not one set by the premier or his caucus, something new to Ontario and relatively new to Canadian politics. Turnout declined to 53%, the lowest ever in Ontario history. The incumbent Liberals won a second consecutive majority government, something the party had not achieved since 1937. And finally, the election featured a referendum question that asked voters in Ontario to approve reforms to the electoral system, a proposal that was overwhelmingly rejected. This article explores each of the above-stated elements as they unfolded in the election.

While the western media were directing their gaze towards South Africa's political restructuring, another democratic transition was taking place to the north that was no less remarkable and no more imaginable a few years ago. Since Malawi obtained independence in 1964, it had been governed by Dr Hastings Banda (as he was then known) and the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) under a system of absolute rule which the country's élites refused to reform or relinquish. In March 1992 the Catholic bishops issued a formal protest against President H. Kamuzu Banda's political high-handedness, initiating a popular movement for democratic reform and anti-régime demonstrations by university students and staff, as well as factory workers.1 When additional pressure was exerted by the international community, holding foreign aid hostage to democratisation, the Government finally yielded, holding a referendum for multi-party democracy in June 1993 that led to presidential and parliamentary elections in May 1994. Banda and the MCP were ousted, Bakili Muluzi and the United Democratic Front (UDF) were elected, and Malawians of all parties revelled in the freedom to be openly, aggressively political.

In a national referendum held on 12 June 2008, 53.4 percent of Irish citizens voted “no” to the Treaty of Lisbon. As its provisions require ratification by all member states, the Irish vote marks a further setback for attempts at consti- tutional reform of the European Union (EU). The Lisbon reform treaty, officially entitled the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on Euro- pean Union and the Treaty establishing the Eu- ropean Community,1 was signed by the prime ministers and presidents of EU member states in December 2007. It was the result of a pro- cess set in motion by the European Council in a meeting held in Laeken, Belgium in December 2001. Intended to make the “ever closer union” more democratic, and to facilitate the adjust- ment of European institutions to the new po- litical situation brought on by the accession to the EU of Central and Eastern European states, the “Laeken Council” issued a declaration trig- gering efforts to constitutionalize the European Union. To this end, a reform process was ini- tiated involving a body called the Convention on the Future of Europe (Convention), made up of European and member state government representatives and parliamentarians.2 This re- form process resulted in the recommendation in 2003 of a draft Treaty Establishing a Constitu- tion for Europe (Constitutional Treaty),3 which was subsequently approved by the Intergovern- mental Conference and the European Council in Rome in October 2004. Despite several mem- ber states ratifying the Constitutional Treaty, it was rejected by popular referenda in France and the Netherlands in the spring of 2005. At that time, and in view of the obvious risks to ratifi- cation in some other member states, the process of constitutionalization ground to a halt.

ABSTRACTThe removal of the governing Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) from power through the ballot box in 2007 represents a watershed moment in the growth and maturation of Sierra Leone's teething electoral democracy. This is because the peaceful alternation of political parties in power tends to strengthen democracy and nurture public confidence in elections as mechanisms of political change. In contrast to what happened in 1967, when the SLPP derailed the country's first post-independence democratic experiment by orchestrating a military coup after losing power in parliamentary elections, the SLPP in 2007 found itself isolated both internally and externally, and could rely neither on the support of a restructured army and police nor on external patrons like the United Kingdom which, among other things, suspended budgetary support for the government pending the satisfactory conclusion of the elections. The emergence of the People's Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC), whose membership consists largely of disaffected former SLPP members and supporters, and the electoral alliance forged between the PMDC and the All People's Congress (APC) in the presidential run-off, doomed any chance the SLPP may have had of holding on to power. The elections were referenda on the SLPP, which lost both the presidency and the legislature because its rogue leadership squandered the goodwill of the public, misappropriated donor funds with impunity, and failed to deliver basic social goods and services.

Abstract The Romanian-Bulgarian relations were assigned the role of satellites belonging first to the Axis, and then to U.S.S.R., following the regulation of the territorial statute of South Dobrudja on September 7th 1940, through the Treaty from Craiova. After the Red Army has entered Bulgaria, on September 8th 1944, an unusual fact has intervened between Bucharest and Sofia, from the perspective of Kremlin’s influence, of course: the priority of Bulgarian political, ideological and diplomatic factors over the Romanian ones, unprecedented fact in the history of almost seven decades of the modern bilateral relations. The lack of human and ideological resources of the Romanian Communist Party has become obvious during the not even declared competition with the Bulgarian Communists and their leader, Georgi Dimitrov. The Communist Bulgaria has become a model that Romanian communists do not only seriously took into account, yet, at least the year King Mihai I has abdicated (1947), they zestfully were also studying and copying, as the case may have been. Being a so-called People’s Republic even since September 1946, following a falsified popular referendum, Bulgaria has undertaken during the next months to coordinate plans of internal and external politics of Romania. In order to finalize a “Bulgarian way” in Romania, the government led by Petru Groza and the media of propaganda, and mainly the press official of the Romanian Communist Party, “Scânteia”, have scrupulously assumed the role of protagonists. And Communist Bulgaria, just like U.S.S.R., has become for more than two years (1946- February 1948) an extremely important and valuable topic of the Romanian public speech, of the Romanian Communists’ confirmation, of establishing the project for instituting the totalitarian regime. The similarity of actions and of institutes’ organization is striking for this short period, and the treaty signed in January 1948 is nothing but the final of a stage extremely abundant in models and suggestions for the Romanian communists.

The Council for Aboriginal Rights (CAR) was formed in Melbourne in 1951 in response to strikes by Indigenous workers in Darwin for better wages and conditions. Representing a significant shift in Aboriginal rights advocacy, from labour strike to public organisation, CAR lobbied government, gathered and disseminated information, and built a network of activists. This paper focusses on the formative years of CAR, as a pivotal organisation that bridged strike action and left-wing politics, humanitarianism, feminism and anti-colonialism. Using the seven primary goals of CAR’s constitution as a starting point to identify key themes and approaches to advocacy, this paper concludes that CAR took a broadly educative approach to labour reform that recognised the complexity of Indigenous disadvantage and the importance of increasing public awareness. CAR served as an important intersecting point for sympathetic groups and individuals who came together to create a political environment of support for Indigenous people, laying crucial groundwork for the success of the 1967 referendum.

Each community’s title deed carries the indelible blood stains of our ancestors. (Watson, "Howard’s End" 2)IntroductionAccording to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term coalition comes from the Latin coalescere or ‘coalesce’, meaning “come or bring together to form one mass or whole”. Coalesce refers to the unity affirmed as something grows: co – “together”, alesce – “to grow up”. While coalition is commonly associated with formalised alliances and political strategy in the name of self-interest and common goals, this paper will draw as well on the broader etymological understanding of coalition as “growing together” in order to discuss the Australian government’s recent changes to land rights legislation, the 2007 Emergency Intervention into the Northern Territory, and its decision to use Indigenous land in the Northern Territory as a dumping ground for nuclear waste. What unites these distinct cases is the role of the Australian nation-state in asserting its sovereign right to decide, something Giorgio Agamben notes is the primary indicator of sovereign right and power (Agamben). As Fiona McAllan has argued in relation to the Northern Territory Intervention: “Various forces that had been coalescing and captivating the moral, imaginary centre were now contributing to a spectacular enactment of a sovereign rescue mission” (par. 18). Different visions of “growing together”, and different coalitional strategies, are played out in public debate and policy formation. This paper will argue that each of these cases represents an alliance between successive, oppositional governments - and the nourishment of neoliberal imperatives - over and against the interests of some of the Indigenous communities, especially with relation to land rights. A critical stance is taken in relation to the alterations to land rights laws over the past five years and with the Northern Territory Emergency Intervention, hereinafter referred to as the Intervention, firstly by the Howard Liberal Coalition Government and later continued, in what Anthony Lambert has usefully termed a “postcoalitional” fashion, by the Rudd Labor Government. By this, Lambert refers to the manner in which dominant relations of power continue despite the apparent collapse of old political coalitions and even in the face of seemingly progressive symbolic and material change. It is not the intention of this paper to locate Indigenous people in opposition to models of economic development aligned with neoliberalism. There are examples of productive relations between Indigenous communities and mining companies, in which Indigenous people retain control over decision-making and utilise Land Council’s to negotiate effectively. Major mining company Rio Tinto, for example, initiated an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Policy platform in the mid-1990s (Rio Tinto). Moreover, there are diverse perspectives within the Indigenous community regarding social and economic reform governed by neoliberal agendas as well as government initiatives such as the Intervention, motivated by a concern for the abuse of children, as outlined in The Little Children Are Sacred Report (Wild & Anderson; hereinafter Little Children). Indeed, there is no agreement on whether or not the Intervention had anything to do with land rights. On the one hand, Noel Pearson has strongly opposed this assertion: “I've got as much objections as anybody to the ideological prejudices of the Howard Government in relation to land, but this question is not about a 'land grab'. The Anderson Wild Report tells us about the scale of Aboriginal children's neglect and abuse" (ABC). Marcia Langton has agreed with this stating that “There's a cynical view afoot that the emergency intervention was a political ploy - a Trojan Horse - to sneak through land grabs and some gratuitous black head-kicking disguised as concern for children. These conspiracy theories abound, and they are mostly ridiculous” (Langton). Patrick Dodson on the other hand, has argued that yes, of course, the children remain the highest priority, but that this “is undermined by the Government's heavy-handed authoritarian intervention and its ideological and deceptive land reform agenda” (Dodson). WhitenessOne way to frame this issue is to look at it through the lens of critical race and whiteness theory. Is it possible that the interests of whiteness are at play in the coalitions of corporate/private enterprise and political interests in the Northern Territory, in the coupling of social conservatism and economic rationalism? Using this framework allows us to identify the partial interests at play and the implications of this for discussions in Australia around sovereignty and self-determination, as well as providing a discursive framework through which to understand how these coalitional interests represent a specific understanding of progress, growth and development. Whiteness theory takes an empirically informed stance in order to critique the operation of unequal power relations and discriminatory practices imbued in racialised structures. Whiteness and critical race theory take the twin interests of racial privileging and racial discrimination and discuss their historical and on-going relevance for law, philosophy, representation, media, politics and policy. Foregrounding contemporary analysis in whiteness studies is the central role of race in the development of the Australian nation, most evident in the dispossession and destruction of Indigenous lands, cultures and lives, which occurred initially prior to Federation, as well as following. Cheryl Harris’s landmark paper “Whiteness as Property” argues, in the context of the US, that “the origins of property rights ... are rooted in racial domination” and that the “interaction between conceptions of race and property ... played a critical role in establishing and maintaining racial and economic subordination” (Harris 1716).Reiterating the logic of racial inferiority and the assumption of a lack of rationality and civility, Indigenous people were named in the Australian Constitution as “flora and fauna” – which was not overturned until a national referendum in 1967. This, coupled with the logic of terra nullius represents the racist foundational logic of Australian statehood. As is well known, terra nullius declared that the land belonged to no-one, denying Indigenous people property rights over land. Whiteness, Moreton-Robinson contends, “is constitutive of the epistemology of the West; it is an invisible regime of power that secures hegemony through discourse and has material effects in everyday life” (Whiteness 75).In addition to analysing racial power structures, critical race theory has presented studies into the link between race, whiteness and neoliberalism. Roberts and Mahtami argue that it is not just that neoliberalism has racialised effects, rather that neoliberalism and its underlying philosophy is “fundamentally raced and produces racialized bodies” (248; also see Goldberg Threat). The effect of the free market on state sovereignty has been hotly debated too. Aihwa Ong contends that neoliberalism produces particular relationships between the state and non-state corporations, as well as determining the role of individuals within the body-politic. Ong specifies:Market-driven logic induces the co-ordination of political policies with the corporate interests, so that developmental discussions favour the fragmentation of the national space into various contiguous zones, and promote the differential regulation of the populations who can be connected to or disconnected from global circuits of capital. (Ong, Neoliberalism 77)So how is whiteness relevant to a discussion of land reform, and to the changes to land rights passed along with Intervention legislation in 2007? Irene Watson cites the former Minister for Indigenous Affairs, Mal Brough, who opposed the progressive individual with what he termed the “failed collective.” Watson asserts that in the debates around land leasing and the Intervention, “Aboriginal law and traditional roles and responsibilities for caring and belonging to country are transformed into the cause for community violence” (Sovereign Spaces 34). The effects of this, I will argue, are twofold and move beyond a moral or social agenda in the strictest sense of the terms: firstly to promote, and make more accessible, the possibility of private and government coalitions in relation to Indigenous lands, and secondly, to reinforce the sovereignty of the state, recognised in the capacity to make decisions. It is here that the explicit reiteration of what Aileen Moreton-Robinson calls “white possession” is clearly evidenced (The Possessive Logic). Sovereign Interventions In the Northern Territory 50% of land is owned by Indigenous people under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1976 (ALRA) (NT). This law gives Indigenous people control, mediated via land councils, over their lands. It is the contention of this paper that the rights enabled through this law have been eroded in recent times in the coalescing interests of government and private enterprise via, broadly, land rights reform measures. In August 2007 the government passed a number of laws that overturned aspects of the Racial Discrimination Act 197 5(RDA), including the Northern Territory National Emergency Response Bill 2007 and the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Amendment (Township Leasing) Bill 2007. Ostensibly these laws were a response to evidence of alarming levels of child abuse in remote Indigenous communities, which has been compiled in the special report Little Children, co-chaired by Rex Wild QC and Patricia Anderson. This report argued that urgent but culturally appropriate strategies were required in order to assist the local communities in tackling the issues. The recommendations of the report did not include military intervention, and instead prioritised the need to support and work in dialogue with local Indigenous people and organisations who were already attempting, with extremely limited resources, to challenge the problem. Specifically it stated that:The thrust of our recommendations, which are designed to advise the NT government on how it can help support communities to effectively prevent and tackle child sexual abuse, is for there to be consultation with, and ownership by the local communities, of these solutions. (Wild & Anderson 23) Instead, the Federal Coalition government, with support from the opposition Labor Party, initiated a large scale intervention, which included the deployment of the military, to install order and assist medical personnel to carry out compulsory health checks on minors. The intervention affected 73 communities with populations of over 200 Aboriginal men, women and children (Altman, Neo-Paternalism 8). The reality of high levels of domestic and sexual abuse in Indigenous communities requires urgent and diligent attention, but it is not the space of this paper to unpack the media spectacle or the politically determined response to these serious issues, or the considered and careful reports such as the one cited above. While the report specifies the need for local solutions and local control of the process and decision-making, the Federal Liberal Coalition government’s intervention, and the current Labor government’s faithfulness to these, has been centralised and external, imposed upon communities. Rebecca Stringer argues that the Trojan horse thesis indicates what is at stake in this Intervention, while also pinpointing its main weakness. That is, the counter-intuitive links its architects make between addressing child sexual abuse and re-litigating Indigenous land tenure and governance arrangements in a manner that undermines Aboriginal sovereignty and further opens Aboriginal lands to private interests among the mining, nuclear power, tourism, property development and labour brokerage industries. (par. 8)Alongside welfare quarantining for all Indigenous people, was a decision by parliament to overturn the “permit system”, a legal protocol provided by the ALRA and in place so as to enable Indigenous peoples the right to refuse and grant entry to strangers wanting to access their lands. To place this in a broader context of land rights reform, the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 2006, created the possibility of 99 year individual leases, at the expense of communal ownership. The legislation operates as a way of individualising the land arrangements in remote Indigenous communities by opening communal land up as private plots able to be bought by Aboriginal people or any other interested party. Indeed, according to Leon Terrill, land reform in Australia over the past 10 years reflects an attempt to return control of decision-making to government bureaucracy, even as governments have downplayed this aspect. Terrill argues that Township Leasing (enabled via the 2006 legislation), takes “wholesale decision-making about land use” away from Traditional Owners and instead places it in the hands of a government entity called the Executive Director of Township Leasing (3). With the passage of legislation around the Intervention, five year leases were created to enable the Commonwealth “administrative control” over the communities affected (Terrill 3). Finally, under the current changes it is unlikely that more than a small percentage of Aboriginal people will be able to access individual land leasing. Moreover, the argument has been presented that these reforms reflect a broader project aimed at replacing communal land ownership arrangements. This agenda has been justified at a rhetorical level via the demonization of communal land ownership arrangements. Helen Hughes and Jenness Warin, researchers at the rightwing think-tank, the Centre for Independent Studies (CIS), released a report entitled A New Deal for Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in Remote Communities, in which they argue that there is a direct casual link between communal ownership and economic underdevelopment: “Communal ownership of land, royalties and other resources is the principle cause of the lack of economic development in remote areas” (in Norberry & Gardiner-Garden 8). In 2005, then Prime Minister, John Howard, publicly introduced the government’s ambition to alter the structure of Indigenous land arrangements, couching his agenda in the language of “equal opportunity”. I believe there’s a case for reviewing the whole issue of Aboriginal land title in the sense of looking more towards private recognition …, I’m talking about giving them the same opportunities as the rest of their fellow Australians. (Watson, "Howard’s End" 1)Scholars of critical race theory have argued that the language of equality, usually tied to liberalism (though not always) masks racial inequality and even results in “camouflaged racism” (Davis 61). David Theo Goldberg notes that, “the racial status-quo - racial exclusions and privileges favouring for the most part middle - and upper class whites - is maintained by formalising equality through states of legal and administrative science” (Racial State 222). While Howard and his coalition of supporters have associated communal title with disadvantage and called for the equality to be found in individual leases (Dodson), Altman has argued that there is no logical link between forms of communal land ownership and incidences of sexual abuse, and indeed, the government’s use of sexual abuse disingenuously disguises it’s imperative to alter the land ownership arrangements: “Given the proposed changes to the ALRA are in no way associated with child sexual abuse in Aboriginal communities […] there is therefore no pressing urgency to pass the amendments.” (Altman National Emergency, 3) In the case of the Intervention, land rights reforms have affected the continued dispossession of Indigenous people in the interests of “commercial development” (Altman Neo-Paternalism 8). In light of this it can be argued that what is occurring conforms to what Aileen Moreton-Robinson has highlighted as the “possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty” (Possessive Logic). White sovereignty, under the banner of benevolent paternalism overturns the authority it has conceded to local Indigenous communities. This is realised via township leases, five year leases, housing leases and other measures, stripping them of the right to refuse the government and private enterprise entry into their lands (effectively the right of control and decision-making), and opening them up to, as Stringer argues, a range of commercial and government interests. Future Concerns and Concluding NotesThe etymological root of coalition is coalesce, inferring the broad ambition to “grow together”. In the issues outlined above, growing together is dominated by neoliberal interests, or what Stringer has termed “assimilatory neoliberation”. The issue extends beyond a social and economic assimilationism project and into a political and legal “land grab”, because, as Ong notes, the neoliberal agenda aligns itself with the nation-state. This coalitional arrangement of neoliberal and governmental interests reiterates “white possession” (Moreton-Robinson, The Possessive Logic). This is evidenced in the position of the current Labor government decision to uphold the nomination of Muckaty as a radioactive waste repository site in Australia (Stokes). In 2007, the Northern Land Council (NLC) nominated Muckaty Station to be the site for waste disposal. This decision cannot be read outside the context of Maralinga, in the South Australian desert, a site where experiments involving nuclear technology were conducted in the 1960s. As John Keane recounts, the Australian government permitted the British government to conduct tests, dispossessing the local Aboriginal group, the Tjarutja, and employing a single patrol officer “the job of monitoring the movements of the Aborigines and quarantining them in settlements” (Keane). Situated within this historical colonial context, in 2006, under a John Howard led Liberal Coalition, the government passed the Commonwealth Radioactive Waste Management Act (CRWMA), a law which effectively overrode the rulings of the Northern Territory government in relation decisions regarding nuclear waste disposal, as well as overriding the rights of traditional Aboriginal owners and the validity of sacred sites. The Australian Labor government has sought to alter the CRWMA in order to reinstate the importance of following due process in the nomination process of land. However, it left the proposed site of Muckaty as confirmed, and the new bill, titled National Radioactive Waste Management retains many of the same characteristics of the Howard government legislation. In 2010, 57 traditional owners from Muckaty and surrounding areas signed a petition stating their opposition to the disposal site (the case is currently in the Federal Court). At a time when nuclear power has come back onto the radar as a possible solution to the energy crisis and climate change, questions concerning the investments of government and its loyalties should be asked. As Malcolm Knox has written “the nuclear industry has become evangelical about the dangers of global warming” (Knox). While nuclear is a “cleaner” energy than coal, until better methods are designed for processing its waste, larger amounts of it will be produced, requiring lands that can hold it for the desired timeframes. For Australia, this demands attention to the politics and ethics of waste disposal. Such an issue is already being played out, before nuclear has even been signed off as a solution to climate change, with the need to find a disposal site to accommodate already existing uranium exported to Europe and destined to return as waste to Australia in 2014. The decision to go ahead with Muckaty against the wishes of the voices of local Indigenous people may open the way for the co-opting of a discourse of environmentalism by political and business groups to promote the development and expansion of nuclear power as an alternative to coal and oil for energy production; dumping waste on Indigenous lands becomes part of the solution to climate change. During the 2010 Australian election, Greens Leader Bob Brown played upon the word coalition to suggest that the Liberal National Party were in COALition with the mining industry over the proposed Mining Tax – the Liberal Coalition opposed any mining tax (Brown). Here Brown highlights the alliance of political agendas and business or corporate interests quite succinctly. Like Brown’s COALition, will government (of either major party) form a coalition with the nuclear power stakeholders?This paper has attempted to bring to light what Dodson has identified as “an alliance of established conservative forces...with more recent and strident ideological thinking associated with free market economics and notions of individual responsibility” and the implications of this alliance for land rights (Dodson). It is important to ask critical questions about the vision of “growing together” being promoted via the coalition of conservative, neoliberal, private and government interests.Acknowledgements Many thanks to the reviewers of this article for their useful suggestions. ReferencesAustralian Broadcasting Authority. “Noel Pearson Discusses the Issues Faced by Indigenous Communities.” Lateline 26 June 2007. 22 Nov. 2010 ‹http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2007/s1962844.htm>. Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998. Altman, Jon. “The ‘National Emergency’ and Land Rights Reform: Separating Fact from Fiction.” A Briefing Paper for Oxfam Australia, 2007. 1 Aug. 2010 ‹http://www.oxfam.org.au/resources/filestore/originals/OAus-EmergencyLandRights-0807.pdf>. Altman, Jon. “The Howard Government’s Northern Territory Intervention: Are Neo-Paternalism and Indigenous Development Compatible?” Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research Topical Issue 16 (2007). 1 Aug. 2010 ‹http://caepr.anu.edu.au/system/files/Publications/topical/Altman_AIATSIS.pdf>. Brown, Bob. “Senator Bob Brown National Pre-Election Press Club Address.” 2010. 18 Aug. 2010 ‹http://greens.org.au/content/senator-bob-brown-pre-election-national-press-club-address>. Davis, Angela. The Angela Davis Reader. Ed. J. James, Oxford: Blackwell, 1998. Dodson, Patrick. “An Entire Culture Is at Stake.” Opinion. The Age, 14 July 2007: 4. Goldberg, David Theo. The Racial State. Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2002.———. The Threat of Race: Reflections on Neoliberalism. Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2008. Harris, Cheryl. “Whiteness as Property.” Harvard Law Review 106.8 (1993): 1709-1795. Keane, John. “Maralinga’s Afterlife.” Feature Article. The Age, 11 May 2003. 24 Nov. 2010 ‹http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/05/11/1052280486255.html>. Knox, Malcolm. “Nuclear Dawn.” The Monthly 56 (May 2010). Lambert, Anthony. “Rainbow Blindness: Same-Sex Partnerships in Post-Coalitional Australia.” M/C Journal 13.6 (2010). Langton, Marcia. “It’s Time to Stop Playing Politics with Vulnerable Lives.” Opinion. Sydney Morning Herald, 30 Nov. 2007: 2. McAllan, Fiona. “Customary Appropriations.” borderlands ejournal 6.3 (2007). 22 Nov. 2010 ‹http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol6no3_2007/mcallan_appropriations.htm>. Moreton-Robinson, Aileen. “The Possessive Logic of Patriarchal White Sovereignty: The High Court and the Yorta Yorta Decision.” borderlands e-journal 3.2 (2004). 1 Aug. 2007 ‹http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol3no2_2004/moreton_possessive.htm>. ———. “Whiteness, Epistemology and Indigenous Representation.” Whitening Race. Ed. Aileen Moreton-Robinson. Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 75-89. Norberry, J., and J. Gardiner-Garden. Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Amendment Bill 2006. Australian Parliamentary Library Bills Digest 158 (19 June 2006). Ong, Aihwa. Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 75-97.Oxford English Dictionary. 3rd. ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005. Rio Tinto. "Rio Tinto Aboriginal Policy and Programme Briefing Note." June 2007. 22 Nov. 2010 ‹http://www.aboriginalfund.riotinto.com/common/pdf/Aboriginal%20Policy%20and%20Programs%20-%20June%202007.pdf>. Roberts, David J., and Mielle Mahtami. “Neoliberalising Race, Racing Neoliberalism: Placing 'Race' in Neoliberal Discourses.” Antipode 42.2 (2010): 248-257. Stringer, Rebecca. “A Nightmare of the Neocolonial Kind: Politics of Suffering in Howard's Northern Territory Intervention.” borderlands ejournal 6.2 (2007). 22 Nov. 2010 ‹http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol6no2_2007/stringer_intervention.htm>.Stokes, Dianne. "Muckaty." n.d. 1 Aug. 2010 ‹http://www.timbonham.com/slideshows/Muckaty/>. Terrill, Leon. “Indigenous Land Reform: What Is the Real Aim of Land Reform?” Edited version of a presentation provided at the 2010 National Native Title Conference, 2010. Watson, Irene. “Sovereign Spaces, Caring for Country and the Homeless Position of Aboriginal Peoples.” South Atlantic Quarterly 108.1 (2009): 27-51. Watson, Nicole. “Howard’s End: The Real Agenda behind the Proposed Review of Indigenous Land Titles.” Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 9.4 (2005). ‹http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AILR/2005/64.html>.Wild, R., and P. Anderson. Ampe Akelyernemane Meke Mekarie: The Little Children Are Sacred. Report of the Northern Territory Board of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse. Northern Territory: Northern Territory Government, 2007.

Introduction In 2017, 250 Indigenous delegates from across the country convened at the National Constitution Convention at Uluru to discuss a strategy towards the implementation of constitutional reform and recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples (Referendum Council). Informed by community consultations arising out of 12 regional dialogues conducted by the government appointed Referendum Council, the resulting Uluru Statement from the Heart was unlike any constitutional reform previously proposed (Appleby & Synot). Within the Statement, the delegation outlined that to build a more equitable and reconciled nation, an enshrined Voice to Parliament was needed. Such a voice would embed Indigenous participation in parliamentary dialogues and debates while facilitating further discussion pertaining to truth telling and negotiating a Treaty between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. The reforms proposed are based on the collective input of Indigenous communities that were expressed in good faith during the consultation process. Arising out of a government appointed and funded initiative that directly sought Indigenous perspectives on constitutional reform, the trust and good faith invested by Indigenous people was quickly shut down when the Prime Minster, Malcolm Turnbull, rejected the reforms without parliamentary debate or taking them to the people via a referendum (Wahlquist Indigenous Voice Proposal; Appleby and McKinnon). In this article, we argue that through its dismissal the government treated the Uluru Statement from the Heart as a passing phase or mere “thought bubble” that was envisioned to disappear as quickly as it emerged. The Uluru Statement is a gift to the nation. One that genuinely offers new ways of envisioning and enacting reconciliation through equitable relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations. Indigenous voices lie at the heart of reconciliation but require constitutional enshrinement to ensure that Indigenous peoples and cultures are represented across all levels of government. Filter Bubbles of Distortion Constitutional change is often spoken of by politicians, its critics, and within the media as something unachievable. For example, in 2017, before even reading the accompanying report, MP Barnaby Joyce (in Fergus) publicly denounced the Uluru Statement as “unwinnable” and not “saleable”. He stated that “if you overreach in politics and ask for something that will not be supported by the Australian people such as another chamber in politics or something that sort of sits above or beside the Senate, that idea just won't fly”. Criticisms such as these are laced with paternalistic rhetoric that suggests its potential defeat at a referendum would be counterproductive and “self-defeating”, meaning that the proposed changes should be rejected for a more digestible version, ultimately saving the movement from itself. While efforts to communicate the necessity of the proposed reforms continues, presumptions that it does not have public support is simply unfounded. The Centre for Governance and Public Policy shows that 71 per cent of the public support constitutional recognition of Indigenous Australians. Furthermore, an online survey conducted by Cox Inall Ridgeway found that the majority of those surveyed supported constitutional reform to curb racism; remove section 25 and references to race; establish an Indigenous Voice to Parliament; and formally recognise Indigenous peoples through a statement of acknowledgment (Referendum Council). In fact, public support for constitutional reform is growing, with Reconciliation Australia’s reconciliation barometer survey showing an increase from 77 per cent in 2018 to 88 per cent in 2020 (Reconciliation Australia). Media – whether news, social, databases, or search engines – undoubtedly shape the lens through which people come to encounter and understand the world. The information a person receives can be the result of what Eli Pariser has described as “filter bubbles”, in which digital algorithms determine what perspectives, outlooks, and sources of information are considered important, and those that are readily accessible. Misinformation towards constitutional reform, such as that commonly circulated within mainstream and social media and propelled by high profile voices, further creates what neuroscientist Don Vaughn calls “reinforcement bubbles” (Rose Gould). This propagates particular views and stunts informed debate. Despite public support, the reforms proposed in the Uluru Statement continue to be distorted within public and political discourses, with the media used as a means to spread misinformation that equates an Indigenous Voice to Parliament to the establishment of a new “third chamber” (Wahlquist ‘Barnaby’; Karp). In a 2018 interview, PM Scott Morrison suggested that advocates and commentators in favour of constitutional reform were engaging in spin by claiming that a Voice did not function as a third chamber (Prime Minister of Australia). Morrison claimed, “people can dress it up any way they like but I think two chambers is enough”. After a decade of consultative work, eight government reports and inquiries, and countless publications and commentaries, the Uluru Statement continues to be played down as if it were a mere thought bubble, a convoluted work in progress that is in need of refinement. In the same interview, Morrison went on to say that the proposal as it stands now is “unworkable”. Throughout the ongoing movement towards constitutional reform, extensive effort has been invested into ensuring that the reforms proposed are achievable and practical. The Uluru Statement from the Heart represents the culmination of decades of work and proposes clear, concise, and relatively minimal constitutional changes that would translate to potentially significant outcomes for Indigenous Australians (Fredericks & Bradfield). International examples demonstrate how such reforms can translate into parliamentary and governing structures. The Treaty of Waitangi (Palmer) for example seeks to inform Māori and Pākehā (non-Maori) relationships in New Zealand/Aotearoa, whilst designated “Māori Seats” ensure Indigenous representation in parliament (Webster & Cheyne). More recently, 17 of 155 seats were reserved for Indigenous delegates as Chile re-writes its own constitution (Bartlett; Reuters). Indigenous communities and its leaders are more than aware of the necessity of working within the realms of possibility and the need to exhibit caution when presenting such reforms to the public. An expert panel on constitutional reform (Dodson 73), before the conception of the Uluru Statement, acknowledged this, stating “any proposal relating to constitutional recognition of the sovereign status of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples would be highly contested by many Australians, and likely to jeopardise broad public support for the Panel’s recommendations”. As outlined in the Joint Select Committee’s final report on Constitutional Recognition relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples (Referendum Council), the Voice to parliament would have no veto powers over parliamentary votes or decisions. It operates as a non-binding advisory body that remains external to parliamentary processes. Peak organisations such as the Law Council of Australia (Dolar) reiterate the fact that the proposed reforms are for a voice to Parliament rather than a voice in Parliament. Although not binding, the Voice should not be dismissed as symbolic or something that may be easily circumvented. Its effectiveness lies in its ability to place parliament in a position where they are forced to confront and address Indigenous questions, concerns, opinions, and suggestions within debates before decisions are made. Bursting the ‘Self-Referential Bubble’ Indigenous affairs continue to be one of the few areas where a rhetoric of bipartisan agreement is continuously referenced by both major parties. Disagreement, debate, and conflict is often avoided as governments seek to portray an image of unity, and in doing so, circumvent accusations of turning Indigenous peoples into the subjects of political point scoring. Within parliamentary debates, there is an understandable reservation and discomfort associated with discussions about what is often seen as an Indigenous “other” (Moreton-Robinson) and the policies that a predominantly white government enact over their lives. Yet, it is through rigorous, open, and informed debate that policies may be developed, challenged, and reformed. Although bipartisanship can portray an image of a united front in addressing a so-called “Indigenous problem”, it also stunts the conception of effective and culturally responsive policy. In other words, it often overlooks Indigenous voices. Whilst education and cultural competency plays a significant role within the reconciliation process, the most pressing obstacle is not necessarily non-Indigenous people’s inability to fully comprehend Indigenous lives and socio-cultural understandings. Even within an ideal world where non-Indigenous peoples attain a thorough understanding of Indigenous cultures, they will never truly comprehend what it means to be Indigenous (Fanon; de Sousa Santos). For non-Indigenous peoples, accepting one’s own limitations in fully comprehending Indigenous ontologies – and avoiding filling such gaps with one’s own interpretations and preconceptions – is a necessary component of decolonisation and the movement towards reconciliation (Grosfoguel; Mignolo). As parliament continues to be dominated by non-Indigenous representatives, structural changes are necessary to ensure that Indigenous voices are adequality represented. The structural reforms not only empower Indigenous voices through their inclusion within the parliamentary process but alleviates some of the pressures that arise out of non-Indigenous people having to make decisions in attempts to solve so-called Indigenous “problems”. Government response to constitutional reform, however, is ridden with symbolic piecemeal offerings that equate recognition to a form of acknowledgment without the structural changes necessary to protect and enshrine Indigenous Voices and parliamentary participation. Davis and her colleagues (Davis et al. “The Uluru Statement”) note how the Referendum Council’s recommendations were rejected by the then minister of Indigenous affairs Nigel Scullion on account that it privileged Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander voices. They note that, until the Referendum Council's report, the nation had no real assessment of what communities wanted. Yet by all accounts, the government had spent too much time talking to elites who have regular access to them and purport to speak on the mob's behalf. If he [Scullion] got the sense constitutional symbolism and minimalism was going to fly, then it says a lot about the self-referential bubble in which the Canberra elites live. The Uluru Statement from the Heart stands as testament to Indigenous people’s refusal to be the passive recipients of the decisions of the non-Indigenous political elite. As suggested, “symbolism and minimalism was not going to fly”. Ken Wyatt, Scullion’s replacement, reiterated the importance of co-design, the limitations of government bureaucracy, and the necessity of moving beyond the “Canberra bubble”. Wyatt stated that the Voice is saying clearly that government and the bureaucracy does not know best. It can not be a Canberra-designed approach in the bubble of Canberra. We have to co-design with Aboriginal communities in the same way that we do with state and territory governments and the corporate sector. The Voice would be the mechanism through which Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander interests and perspectives may be strategically placed within parliamentary dialogues. Despite accusations of it operating as a “third chamber”, Indigenous representatives have no interest in functioning in a similar manner to a political party. The language associated with our current parliamentary system demonstrates the constrictive nature of political debate. Ministers are expected to “toe the party line”, “crossing the floor” is presented as an act of defiance, and members must be granted permission to enter a “conscience vote”. An Indigenous Voice to Parliament would be an advisory body that works alongside, but remains external to political ideologies. Their priority is to seek and implement the best outcome for their communities. Negotiations would be fluid, with no floor to cross, whilst a conscience vote would be reflected in every perspective gifted to the parliament. In the 2020 Australia and the World Annual Lecture, Pat Turner described the Voice’s co-design process as convoluted and a continuing example of the government’s neglect to hear and respond to Indigenous peoples’ interests. In the address, Turner points to the Coalition of the Peaks as an exemplar of how co-design negotiations may be facilitated by and through organisations entirely formed and run by Indigenous peoples. The Coalition of the Peaks comprises of fifty Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community-controlled peak organisations and was established to address concerns relating to closing the gap targets. As Indigenous peak organisations are accountable to their membership and reliant on government funding, some have questioned whether they are appropriate representative bodies; cautioning that they could potentially compromise the Voice as a community-centric body free from political interference. While there is some debate over which Indigenous representatives should facilitate the co-design of a treaty and Makarrata (truth-telling), there remains a unanimous call for a constitutionally enshrined Voice to Parliament that may lead negotiations and secure its place within decision-making processes. Makarrata, Garma, and the Bubbling of New Possibilities An Indigenous Voice to Parliament can be seen as the bubbling spring that provides the source for greater growth and further reform. The Uluru Statement from the Heart calls for a three-staged approach comprising of establishing an Indigenous Voice, followed by Treaty, and then Truth-Telling. This sequence has been criticised by some who prioritise Truth and Treaty as the foundation for reform and reconciliation. Their argument is based on the notion that Indigenous Sovereignty must first be acknowledged in Parliament through an agreement-making process and signing of a Treaty. While the Uluru Statement has never lost sight of treaty, the agreement-making process must begin with the acknowledgment of Indigenous people’s inherent right to participate in the conversation. This very basic and foundational right is yet to be acknowledged within Australia’s constitution. The Uluru Statement sets the Voice as its first priority as the Voice establishes the structural foundation on which the conversation pertaining to treaty may take place. It is through the Voice that a Makarrata Commission can be formed and Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples may “come together after a struggle” – the translation of the word’s Yolngu origins (Gaykamangu; Pearson). Only then may we engage in truth telling and forge new paths towards agreement-making and treaty. This however raises the question as to how a Voice to Parliament may look and what outcomes it aims to achieve. As discussed in the previous section, it is a question that is often distorted by disinformation and conjecture within public, political, and news-media discourses. In order to unpack what a Voice to Parliament may entail, we turn to another Yolngu word, Garma. Garma refers to an epistemic and ontological positioning in which knowledge is attained from a point where differences converge and new insights arise. For Yolngu people, Garma is the place where salt and fresh water intersect within the sea. Fresh and Salt water are the embodiments of two Yolngu clans, the Dhuwa and Yirritja, with Garma referring to the point where the knowledge and laws of each clan come into contact, seeking harmonious balance. When the ebb and flow of the tides are in balance, it causes the water to foam and bubble taking on new form and representing innovative ideas and possibilities. Yolngu embrace this phenomenon as an epistemology that teaches responsibility and obligations towards the care of Country. It acknowledges the autonomy of others and finds a space where all may mutually benefit. When the properties of either water type, or the knowledge belonging a single clan dominates, ecological, social, political, and cosmological balance is overthrown. Raymattja Marika-Munungguritj (5) describes Garma as a dynamic interaction of knowledge traditions. Fresh water from the land, bubbling up in fresh water springs to make waterholes, and salt water from the sea are interacting with each other with the energy of the tide and the energy of the bubbling spring. When the tide is high the water rises to its full. When the tide goes out the water reduces its capacity. In the same way Milngurr ebbs and flows. In this way the Dhuwa and Yirritja sides of Yolngu life work together. And in this way Balanda and Yolngu traditions can work together. There must be balance, if not either one will be stronger and will harm the other. The Ganma Theory is Yirritja, the Milngurr Theory is Dhuwa. Like the current push for constitutional change and its rejection of symbolic reforms, Indigenous peoples have demanded real-action and “not just talk” (Synott “The Uluru statement”). In doing so, they implored that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples be involved in all decision-making processes, for they are most knowledgeable of their community’s needs and the most effective methods of service delivery and policy. Indigenous peoples have repeatedly expressed this mandate, which is also legislated under international law through the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Coming together after a struggle does not mean that conflict and disagreement between and amongst Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities will cease. In fact, in alignment with political theories such as agonism and pluralism, coming together within a democratic system necessitates a constructive and responsive embrace of different, competing, and in some cases incommensurable views. A Voice to Parliament will operate in a manner where Indigenous perspectives and truths, as well as disagreements, may be included within negotiations and debates (Larkin & Galloway). Governments and non-Indigenous representatives will no longer speak for or on behalf of Indigenous peoples, for an Indigenous body will enact its own autonomous voice. Indigenous input therefore will not be reduced to reactionary responses and calls for reforms after the damage of mismanagement and policy failure has been caused. Indigenous voices will be permanently documented within parliamentary records and governments forced to respond to the agendas that Indigenous peoples set. Collectively, this amounts to greater participation within the democratic process and facilitates a space where “salt water” and the “bubbling springs” of fresh water may meet, mitigating the risk of harm, and bringing forth new possibilities. Conclusion When salt and fresh water combine during Garma, it begins to take on new form, eventually materialising as foam. Appearing as a singular solid object from afar, foam is but a cluster of interlocking bubbles that gain increased stability and equilibrium through sticking together. When a bubble stands alone, or a person remains within a figurative bubble that is isolated from its surroundings and other ways of knowing, doing, and being, its vulnerabilities and insecurities are exposed. Similarly, when one bubble bursts the collective cluster becomes weaker and unstable. The Uluru Statement from the Heart is a vision conceived and presented by Indigenous peoples in good faith. It offers a path forward for not only Indigenous peoples and their future generations but the entire nation (Synott “Constitutional Reform”). It is a gift and an invitation “to walk with us in a movement of the Australian people for a better future”. Through calling for the establishment of an Indigenous Voice to Parliament, a Makarrata Commission, and seeking Truth, Indigenous advocates for constitutional reform are looking to secure their own foothold and self-determination. The Uluru Statement from the Heart is more than a “thought bubble”, for it is the culmination of Indigenous people’s diverse lived experiences, outlooks, perspectives, and priorities. When the delegates met at Uluru in 2017, the thoughts, experiences, memories, and hopes of Indigenous peoples converged in a manner that created a unified front and collectively called for Voice, Treaty, and Truth. 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The 1961 general election has not received much publicity over the years possibly because it was overshadowed by the referendum of the previous year. It was regarded at the time as being a comparatively unexciting election with a predictable result and it did not produce any really great change in the number of seats held by the National Party (NP). Most of what excitement was engendered by the election lay in the conflict between the United Party (UP) and the Progressive Party (PP). There has also been comparatively little written about this election. Stultz and Butler wrote one short article on the 1961 election and Kenneth Heard also wrote a chapter about it in his study of South African general elections between 1943 and 197C. In his memoirs entitled My Lewe in die Politiek, Ben Schoeman devoted very little space to the 1961 general election, and much of what appeared on pages 281 and 282 dealt with Japie Basson and the performance of the National Union Party (NUP) as well as the way that English-speaking whites seemed to have accepted the idea of the republic. In his memoirs, Sir de Villiers Graaff devoted only two short paragraphs on page 185 to this election in which he mentioned the difficulties attached to fighting an elect on on two fronts against both the NP and the PP while simultaneously facing the reality of having lost much of the support of the English press. Sir de Villiers also discussed the way that the UP regained all but one of their seats lost to the Progressives in 1959. Memoirs and biographies of PP politicians give a much more comprehensive account of the 1961 general election, possibly because it was the first general election ever fought by that party as a separate political entity and also because it represented such a major political reversal. Ray Swart's Progressive Odyssey, Jeremy Lawrence's Harry Lawrence, and Helen Suzman's autobiography, In no uncertain terms, all provide interesting accounts of the 1961 general election although the account in Suzman's autobiography does not pay much attention to the Progressive campaign outside her own constituency of Houghton. Joanna Strangwayes-Booth's biography of Helen Suzman also provides very useful information on the formation and the early years of the PP. Dr FA Mouton's thesis on Margaret Ballinger is also very interesting and useful, and gives a lucid description of the dissension within the ranks of the Liberal Party. Terry Wilks's comparatively short biography of Douglas Mitchell describes Mitchell's frequent clashes with members of his own party. Some readers may, however, regard this biography as being rather skimpy on details and too flattering towards Mitchell at times. Catherine Taylor's autobiography, If courage goes, gives little detail on the 1961 general election. Unfortunately Nationalist politicians do not seem to be as prolific in writing their autobiographies as do opposition politicians. particularly Ben Schoeman's memoirs are interesting reading, as they describe the antipathy felt towards Dr Verwoerd by many Nationalist politicians in the early years of his premiership. DS Prinsloo's biography of PW Botha naturally focuses more on the years of his premiership and does not provide much new information on the NP during the period 1958 to 1961. Dirk and Johanna de Villiers' biography of Paul Sauer gives a very interesting account of the strained relationship between Sauer and Verwoerd. There are several useful publications on the history of the various parties, including Brian Hackland's thesis on the earlier years of the PP, and an Afrikaans study Die Verenigde Party Die Groot Eksperiment, edited by Barnard and Marais. This latter work is very informative on the dissension that was endemic within the UP for much of its existence. Also very useful were Dan O'Meara's Forty Lost Years and the book edited by R Schrire, Leadership in the Apartheid State. This dissertation has a threefold purpose. Its primary objective is to determine and describe the course, background and significance of the 1961 general election. Its second purpose is to analyse the relative position of the political parties in the years leading up to the 1961 general election. Thirdly it quantifies statistically some of the assumptions made about South African politics over the years e.g. the effect of delimitation on the successes or defeats of the National and the United Parties, the effect of the distribution of the support enjoyed by the UP on the fortunes of that party, the strength of the NP during various critical elections and the relationship between percentage turn-out of voters and support received by the UP and the PP. In many respects the 1961 general election was not as important for the NP as was the 1958 general election. The reason for this assertion is firstly that the gains made by the NP in 1961 were not nearly as significant or extensive as those made in 1958. Furthermore the 1958 general election was most probably one of the most decisive general elections contested by the NP as it was in this election that its position became virtually impregnable. The UP's hopes of ever being returned to office suffered a blow that can be seen as final and irreversible. However, the 1961 general election was important in that it was probably the first general election in which the NP could realistically be described as enjoying the support of more than half the white electorate. Despite the optimistic claims made by some sections of the Nationalist press after the results of the 1958 general election had been announced, the NP probably did not command the support of half the white electorate in 1958 although it came rather close to doing so. In addition the themes of the two elections do differ slightly in that in 1961 the Nationalists made a much more concerted effort to capture the votes of as many English-speaking whites as possible. Certain themes are prominent in any study of South African politics of this period. One of them is how the UP's numerical strength in parliament failed to reflect the full extent of its support among the electorate. This was to be a perennial source of discontent among UP supporters. In this dissertation certain statistical comparisons have been drawn with other general elections such as the influence of delimitation on the performance of certain parties and the percentage swings required to unseat the NP in some general elections. These comparisons provide a very interesting perspective on the growth and decline of various parties over nearly two decades. Another theme is how certain marginal seats made the position of the NP a trifle insecure in the early years of its rule and how this situation was remedied by the general election of 1958. Also interesting is the dilermna in which the UP found itself for much of its post-1948 history whether to adopt a more liberal approach or to attempt instead to fight the Nationalists on behalf of its traditionally conservative supporters who party loyalties. What was might have been also of great wavering interest in their was the relationship between the English-language press and the leadership of the UP. It was particularly striking how many editors appeared to dislike Douglas Mitchell intensely and how even in 1961 some editors already seemed disenchanted with the leadership of Sir de Villiers Graaff. It should be remembered that the voters in South West Africa were represented by six members of parliament. Their constituencies were, however, determined by a separate delimitation commission. This dissertation naturally pays much more attention to the 150 seats in which white voters in the Republic of South Africa cast their votes. The coloureds in the Cape Province were represented by three members of parliament, who were not elected on the same day as their 156 fellow parliamentarians representing white voters in South Africa and South West Africa. In researching this dissertation I have found the newspapers of the period to be invaluable as well as certain periodical publications such as Round Table, African Digest, and Forum. Much useful material has also been found in the archival collections of Harry Lawrence, Oscar Wollheirn, Sydney Waterson, and Colin Eglin in the University of Cape Town Library as well as the collection of Dr Eben Donges in the provincial archives in Cape Town. Useful and interesting information was also gleaned from the various United Party collections in the UNISA library. The Progressive Party collections and the Liberal Party papers in the William Cullen library at the University of the Witwatersrand were also well worth consulting, as was the Liberal Party Collection in the Alan Paton Centre at the University of Natal. Most archival information concerning the National Party during this period came from the various collections at the Institute for Contemporary History at the University of the Orange Free State. My thanks are due to the staff of all these archival repositories for their assistance and to my two supervisors, Professor JCH Grabler and Mrs BM Theron, for their guidance. Some readers might regard general elections as being a trivial or inconsequential topic of study, particularly as some people might regard white politics or parliamentary politics as being somewhat irrelevant in the light of contemporary historical events. Nevertheless general elections are a very interesting and fruitful field of research as they provide fascinating revelations on the attitudes held at various times by certain political parties as well as the white population of the time. Thus, even though while not nearly as momentous as, for example, the 1948 general election, the 1961 general election was an interesting contest. In the late 1950s, Professor GHL le May of the University of the Witwatersrand regarded the state of election analysis in South Africa as "abysmal", but hopefully this situation is in the process of being remedied. politicians. particularly Ben Schoernan'::; memoirs are interesting reading, as they describe the antipathy felt towards Dr Verwoerd by many Nationalist politicians in the early years of his premiership. DS Prinsloo's biography of PW Botha naturally focuses more on the years of his premiership and does not provide much new information on the NP during the period 1958 to 1961. Dirk and Johanna de Villiers' biography of Paul Sauer gives a very Page (iii) interesting account of the strained relationship between Sauer and Verwoerd. There are several useful publications on the history of the various parties, including Brian Hackland's thesis on the earlier years of the PP, and an Afrikaans study Die Verenigde Party Die Groot Eksperiment, edited by Barnard and Marais. This latter work is very informative on the dissension that was endemic within the UP for much of its existence. Also very useful were Dan O'Meara's Forty Lost Years and the book edited by R Schrire, Leadership in the Apartheid State. This dissertation has a threefold purpose. Its primary objective is to determine and describe the course, background and significance of the 1961 general election. Its second purpose is to analyse the relative positcon of the political parties in the years leading up to the 1961 general election. Thirdly it quantifies statistically some of the assumptions made about South African politics over the years e.g. the effect of delimitat on on the successes or defeats of the National and the United Parties, the effect of the distribution of the support enjoyed by the UP on the fortunes of that party, the strength of the NP during various critical elections and the relationship between percentage turn-out of voters and support received by the UP and the PP. In many respects the 1961 general election was not as important for the N? as was the 1958 general election. The reason for this assertion is firstly that the gains made by the NP in 1961 were not nearly as significant or extensive as those made in 1958. Furthermore the 1958 general election was Page (iv) most probably one of the most decisive general elections contested by the NP as it was in this election that its position became virtually impregnable. The UP's hopes of ever being returned to office suf ered a blow that can be seen as final and irreversible. However, the 1961 general election was important in that ic was probably the first general election in which the NP could realistically be described as enjoying the support of more than half the white electorate. Despite the optimistic clains made by soma sections of the Nationalist press after the results of the 1958 general election had been announced, the NP probably did not command the support of half the white electorate in 1958 although it came rather close to doing so. In addition the themes of the two elections do differ slightly in that in 1961 the Nationalists made a much more concerted effort to capture the votes of as many English-speaking whites as possible. Certain themes are prominent in any study of South African politics of this period. Ono of them is how the UP's nQmerical strength in parliament failed to reflect the full extent of its support among the electorate. This was to be a perennial source of discontent among UP supporters. In this dissertation certain statistical comparisons have been drawn with other general elections such as the influence of delimitation on the performance of certain parties and the percentage swings required to unseat the NP in some general elections. These comparisons provide a very interesting perspective on the growth and decline of various parties over nearly two decades. Another theme is how certain marginal seats made the position of the NP a trifle insecure in the early years of its rule and how this situation was remedied by Page (v) the general election of 1958. Also interesting is the dilemma in which the UP found itself for much of its pcst-1948 history whether to to fight adopt a more liberal approach or to attempt instead the Nationalists on behalf of its traditionally conservative supporters who might have been wavering in their party loyalties. What was also of great interest was the relationship between the English-language press and the leadership of the UP. :t was particularly striking how many editors appeared to dislike Douglas Mitchell intensely and how even in 1961 some editors already seemed disenchanted with the leadership of Sir de Villiers Graaff. It should be remembered that the voters in South West Africa were represented by six rr rnbers of parliament. Their constituencies were, however, determined by a separate delimitation commission. This dissertation naturally pays much more attention to the 150 seats in which white voters in the Republic of South Africa cast their votes. The coloureds in the Cape Province were represented by three members of parliament, who were not elected on the same day as their 156 fellow parliamentarians representing white voters in South Africa and South West Africa. In researching this dissertation I have found the newspapers of the period to be invaluable as well as certain periodical publications such as Round Table, African Digest, and Forum. Much useful material has also been found in the archival collections of Harry Lawrence, Oscar Wollheim, Sydney Waterson, and Colin Eglin in the University of Cape Town Library as well as the collection of Dr Eben Donges in the provincial archives in Cape Town. Useful and interesting information was Page (vi) also gleaned from the various United Party collections in the utHistory
M.A. History

This chapter introduces the book as the first of a two-volume study which seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of devolution in the UK. It focuses on the period from 1997 to 2007, addressing the origins and introduction of the original devolution settlements, and the subsequent decade of their development until the end of the Blair government in 2007. In these years, the original devolution reforms followed extensive debate in the 1980s and 1990s, including in Northern Ireland a peace process and talks that led ultimately to the historic 1998 Belfast Agreement. Referenda in each of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were held in 1997. The subsequent development of devolution up to 2007 included the move to start at least a debate about further reform in Scotland, as well as more immediately a second Government of Wales Act in 2006. In Northern Ireland, the 2006 St Andrews Agreement reset the terms of the original 1998 settlement, and enabled the resumption of devolution in 2007, after the Northern Ireland Assembly had spent more time suspended than in session. A referendum on an elected assembly for the North East in 2004 ended in a 'no' vote, but the powers of central government offices in the English regions, Regional Development Agencies and indirectly elected regional assemblies nevertheless increased.

This chapter addresses territorial politics and the introduction of devolution in Scotland. It discusses the validity of the proposition that, even in Scotland, resources were weak relative to reformers' aspirations. Throughout, the chapter addresses the movement for territorial change in Scotland and explores the proposition that in the context of power politics and resource deficiencies, it adopted constrained aims and incorporated an instrumentalist approach to achieve them. Equally, the chapter considers how the British Labour leadership politically managed the emergence of devolution proposals, and explores the idea that in the context of similar relative resource deficiencies, it adopted a code focused on achieving indirect central control. Finally, the chapter considers the policy process by which devolution proposals were created, both in opposition and in government, and the extent to which it contributed to their perceived effectiveness and legitimacy, and whether Scottish devolution overall could be considered to be a successful reform. To address these issues and theoretical questions, the chapter develops chronologically. Section one focuses on territorial politics and the political debate on the constitutional question in Scotland and at the UK centre in the 1980s. Section two addresses the preparation of devolution policy in Scotland during the 1990s and the significance of the referendum on Scottish devolution held in September 1997. Finally, section three considers the Blair government's preparation of devolution policy 1997–8, the Scotland Act 1998 and plans for its implementation.

This chapter argues that the restoration of democracy in France started in earnest only with the election in October 1945 of a Constituent Assembly. When voters rejected the Constituent Assembly's draft constitution in the requisite referendum, another six months elapsed before a second Constituent Assembly reached sufficient compromises to produce a new draft, which won voter approval by a thin margin. During the long provisional interval, the CNR Common Program helped undergird Charles de Gaulle's unity government and subsequent tripartite coalitions after the general abruptly exited the scene. However, until the fall of 1947, when a great strike wave brought the experiment to an explosive end, tripartism remained the political framework for France's postwar moment. Successive governments addressed the intractable challenges of postwar recovery while they sought to implement the “peaceful revolution” imagined by CNR in such matters as economic controls, social security, housing, and educational opportunity.

The background to the contemporary politics of crime is the historical process between about 1850 and 1920 through which a purely punitive and retributive criminal justice system was replaced by a ‘penal-welfare complex’ involving a range of charitable organizations and public officials, with the aim of control through instruction, regulation, and support, as well as punishment. Despite shifting emphases, no political party has rejected the entire settlement. Trends in crime and public opinion show that political discourse is not driven by crime trends and that politicians have considerable scope to make the weather. After a period of expansion of the penal-welfare complex under Labour (1997–2010), policy under the Conservative-Liberal Coalition (2010–15) was driven by the need to cut expenditure following the financial crash of 2008. This led to the marketization of large parts of the penal system, most notably probation, a development accompanied by the ‘Big Society’ rhetoric about devolution of power to local people. Meanwhile, a hardline punitive rhetoric was accompanied by a remarkable reduction in youth custody. The new Conservative government in 2015 looked set to embark on radical and progressive prison reforms until the resignation of the prime minister following the EU referendum. Thus complex and conflicting policies and ideas did not map onto political parties and allegiances in a simple or coherent way.

Social work has been viewed as one of the most nation-specific of the professions, ‘being closely tied up with national traditions, mentalities and institutions’ (Kornbeck, 2004, p 146). In addition, the political imperatives of national governments, austerity measures and managerialism drive approaches to service delivery which may supersede social work’s professional priorities. This militates against an automatic or easy transfer of professional knowledge from one country to another. In spite of this, there has been an enduring interest in developing international forms of social work that transcend national borders (Gray and Fook, 2004; Lyons et al, 2012). In this chapter, we present a case study of social worker mobility as it has evolved from the establishment of the first national social work registration body in the Republic of Ireland in 1997 with a particular focus on data from 2004-13 capturing the years leading up to, and in the aftermath of, the global financial crisis of 2008. We contrast this with the situation in Northern Ireland (NI), part of the UK and a separate and distinct political and legal entity with its own policies and practices. We draw on statistical and descriptive data provided by Irish social work registration bodies (NSWQB 1997-2011; CORU established in 2011 and NISCC, the Northern Ireland Social Care Council established in 2001) to illustrate (i) how sensitive contemporary mobility patterns are to changing economic and political factors; (ii) how rapidly patterns of mobility change and (iii) how much more mired in complexity European social work mobility is likely to be if the European project itself fractures, as is possible following the Brexit referendum vote in the UK.