Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Political science Greece Philosophy'

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2007.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 55-60).
Despite their common Ottoman heritage, Greece and Turkey have diverged widely in their modem history of civil-military relations. The armed forces have a long record of intervention in both countries, but there is a crucial difference: the military emerged as a roughly unitary, independent political actor in Turkey, whereas in Greece it remained divided into factions aligned with civilian political parties through patronage relationships. This empirical observation is then used as a basis for an attempt at theory building. Several countries exhibit a pattern of military interventions more similar to Turkey and others to those found in Greece. Societies which developed a strong parliamentary tradition early in the modernization process also acquired organized civilian political groups with clientelist networks extending into the armed forces. On the contrary, in countries with limited or weak parliamentary development and strong security pressures, political activism was often channeled through the military, which emerged as a hotbed of political thinking, predating and pre-empting any civilian party tradition. The former type of civil-military relations was more commonly found in Southern European and Latin American countries while the latter was predominant in non-Western societies that resisted Western colonization.
by Evangelos Liaras.
S.M.

The scope of this study is the examination of various theoretical contributions to the literature of the determinants of government expenditure growth. In the beginning we give a critical overview of different theories, starting with Wagner's Law, then passing onto Peacock and Wiseman's Displacement Effect Hypothesis and then putting bureaucracy, politics and other economic and social factors into perspective. We conclude that the best way of examining the growth of the public sector is by means of interdisciplinary approaches. Then, after giving a synoptic description of the Greek economy, polity and society we proceed into the empirical testing of theoretical propositions, which covers the years 1950-1980. We stress the fact that government expenditures is a non-uniform set interacting with the private sector and we employ empirical causality tests to a large number of variables in an attempt to identify causal relationships rather than assume them ex ante. Having done this, we proceed into calculating income elasticities for various categories of government expenditures, and we find that, in general, they are unitary except for those which are associated with transfer payments and are higher than unity. Furthermore, we were not able to identify any displacements in the Peacock and Wiseman sense, although we did find out that defence expenditure affects non-defence expenditure negatively. Finally, we constructed a model in order to examine the relative price effect, and the results we obtained were not fully in accordance with Baumol's assertions, any differences, however, being explained by the bureaucratic way of production.

The Austrian school of economics is an unorthodox approach to economics whose adherents have mostly been libertarian in their political outlook. This dissertation explores the connections between Austrian economic theory and libertarian political philosophy, and casts doubt on the claim often propounded that Austrian economics itself naturally leads to libertarianism. Instead it is claimed here that Austrian economics is an open-ended theory that can lead to very different political conclusions, depending on the normative principles with which it is combined. Therefore it is crucial to analyze both the economic theory and the ethics of any political thinker of the Austrian school, and the bulk of the analysis must lean on the latter since the economic theory itself does not lead to the types of libertarianism that is put forward by the most famous economists and philosophers of the Austrian school. The ethical theories of four Austrian school proponents are analyzed in this dissertation: Ludwig von Mises, F. A. Hayek, Murray Rothbard and Hans-Hermann Hoppe. The conclusion is that there are several problems with their theories, although the problems are of different kinds, ranging from metaethics to empirical application and operationalization.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of the fiscal deficit on the Greek economy. The emphasis is on the inflationary, crowding-out and balance of payments problems that have arisen from the deficits in the budget of the Greek government. The study starts with the description of the means through which the fiscal stance can be examined and analyses the virtues and the drawbacks of the traditional and the new measures of fiscal stance. After we describe the characteristics of the Greek monetary system and the structure of the reserve requirements in order to present the relation of the monetary and budgetary policies, we proceed to estimating annual and quarterly measures of fiscal stance for Greece. We then empirically investigate the relationship between private and government investment, which in general is found to be of a complementary character. Furthermore, we deal with the short-run impact of the fiscal deficit on the output, balance of payment and inflation by using quarterly data. Finally, the output and price behaviour were examined under the assumption of rationally formed expectations.

This thesis endeavours to present a systematic and rigorous examination of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in relation to the Weak European Union member states, by analysing the role, contribution, and participation of Greece in the CFSP framework. Reference is also being made to other weak EU member states such as Ireland, Portugal and Belgium. Chronologically, the thesis is focused on the period from 1981 to 1994 and it is built upon thematic entities and does not intend to follow any chronological sequence. It attempts to address the following key issues: The distinctive elements of EU's weak member states' attitudes towards EPC/CFSP; the ways in which Greece had responded to the institutional development of the CFSP; the way in which Greece had handled its role and participation in the EPC and CFSP frameworks; the impact of EPC/CFSP participation on the formulation and implementation of Greece's foreign policy; and Greece's contribution in EPC/CFSP. The thesis addresses four important dimensions of European Union framework for political co-operation and co-ordination: first, its theoretical basis; second its impact upon the weak EU member states; third, its institutional development; and finaffy its implications in the formulation of Greek foreign and security policy. its main theoretical ambition is to assess the validity of the theory of Modified Structural Realism to the extent that it is applied as an explanatory theoretical framework for the institutional development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in relation to its irnpact on the weak EU member states having Greece as a case study. To measure CFSP's overall success and its inipact upon Greek politics, the thesis will examine key structural and procedural developments and policy initiatives and assess whether the Greek objectives have been fulfilled based on the following key variables: the behavioural patterns of weak states in foreign policy issues; the domestic sources of weak states' foreign policy; the dynamics of changing relationships and the adaptation of weak states; and the resources and perspectives of the diplomatic and strategic regimes.

This thesis presents a synthetic and exegetical survey of William Connolly's writings over the past decade. The most important concepts in Connolly's political philosophy are explained in detail: identity formation through difference, resentment in late modernity, and the importance of affect for thought processes related to ethical and political judgment. Connolly's focus on the psychological and existential dimension of politics, and his serious engagement with the notion of difference, lead him to propose deep pluralism as a model for politics and ethics. This is based on his assessment of the positive dynamics at play in late modernity. Deep pluralism centres on the cultivation of an ethos of engagement, a distinctive sensibility which promotes the exercise of relational modesty, forbearance and generosity in our exchanges with others. Connolly's pioneering work on affect, immanence, culture, pluralism, fundamentalism and resentment show the value of his alternative framing of contemporary issues for political analysis.

My dissertation aims to answer two questions: (1) Is democracy epistemically valuable? (2) Is the epistemic value of democracy, if it has any, necessary for justifying its legitimacy? I argue that democracy in certain form can be epistemically valuable. However, I also argue that the epistemic value of democracy is not necessary for justifying its legitimacy. To defend the epistemic value of democracy, I propose a post-deliberation version of Condorcet’s jury theorem. I argue that this version of the jury theorem can avoid the common challenges against the classic version. To reject the necessity of epistemic value for democratic legitimacy, I argue that, given that the epistemic value of democracy is subject to disagreement, it cannot be used to justify legitimacy. In addition, I provide a purely proceduralist argument for democratic legitimacy, which appeals to the egalitarian principle that every citizens ought to be equally respected by the state. This argument, if succeeds, shows that the epistemic value of democracy is not necessary for justifying democratic legitimacy.

I argue against the claim that normative political theory is 'autonomous' with respect to moral philosophy. I take the simple view that political theory is a form of moral philosophy, and is differentiated by pragmatic rather than theoretically significant criteria. I defend this view by criticizing arguments for the autonomy thesis. In the first three chapters I introduce and analyse the autonomy thesis and provide a framework for understanding the various claims that are made in the literature. In Chapters 4 to 8 I proceed to criticize a series of arguments for the autonomy thesis. In Chapter 4 I explain why Kant's division of morality into ethics and right is not as useful as it may seem to those who wish to defend the autonomy thesis, and argues that Arthur Ripstein gives no reason to think that political philosophy is autonomous that can be endorsed independently of commitment to a Kantian normative theory. In Chapter 5 I examine the political liberal argument for the autonomy thesis, concluding that even if a freestanding political conception of justice can be regarded as autonomous, it does not follow that political philosophy can also. Chapters 6 to 8 tackle various political realist arguments for the autonomy thesis. In Chapter 6 I argue that political theory is not required to deal with empirical facts in any way that distinguishes it from moral philosophy, and any argument for its autonomy that is based on a prior claim about the purpose of political theorizing would be question-begging. In Chapters 7 and 8 I provide various arguments against the idea that there is a distinctively political form of normativity, and diagnose some of the mistaken assumptions about morality that I take to lie at the heart of the realist case. In Chapter 9 I conclude.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2005.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this study it is asked why we do not consider ourselves guiltier and more responsible with regard to the thousands of people who, through no fault of their own, die daily from preventable, poverty-related causes. Such neglect of the global poor is not surprising from certain perspectives. However, when the matter is approached from the perspective of Emmanuel Levinas's ethical philosophy, one is faced with the paradox that Levinas claims we are infinitely and inescapable responsible for the other, while the preventable dying of thousands of poor people indicates that we do not behave as though we are infinitely responsible for the other. It would seem as though Levinas is crudely mistaken. However, Levinas distinguishes between an interpersonal ethical relation and an impersonal political relation with the other. The former is a relation of asymmetrical and infinite responsibility to which we are summoned by the uniqueness of the other's 'face.' The latter is a relation in which the 'third' is present, therefore requiring that the self limit his responsibility to a specific other and disperse it amongst numerous others. The presence of the third indicates the beginning of impersonal justice, institutions, politics, knowledge, as well as equality and reciprocity between the self and the other. However, every person that I encounter is a general other with whom I stand in a political relation, while at the same time, also a specific other who commands my infinite responsibility. With every other, I am simultaneously in a symmetrical political relation and an asymmetrical ethical relation. This is the ambiguity of political society: do I relate to the other politically or ethically? Both options enjoy legitimacy; however, from a Levinasian perspective, the choice to politically respond to the other less so. To understand our indifference to the global poor, this study analyses the principal debate about transnational responsibility, the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, from a Levinasian perspective. Three ways in which the ethical relation with the extremely poor global other have been suppressed, thereby contributing to our ethical indifference to him, are identified. First, writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate seek to preserve the subject in the greatest autonomy and freedom possible and thereby 'legitimise' a political response to the other. Second, when approaching the issue of global justice, cosmopolitan and communitarian theorists suppress the otherness of the other, which is what reminds us of our infinite responsibility for the other and the fact that justice is always incomplete. Third, insofar cosmopolitans prioritise and advocate a greater concern for the global poor, the strategy they favour (they emphasize human equality) is counterproductive for it overlooks and suppresses the uniqueness of both the subject and the other in the interpersonal ethical relation. The criticism of these three aspects of the cosmopolitancommunitarian debate is then extended into claims that a more ethical relating to the globally poor than is presently the case is possible.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie vra waarom ons onsself nie skuldiger en meer verantwoordelik beskou teenoor die duisende mense wat elke dag, sonder enige toedoen van hul eie, as gevolg van voorkombare, armoed-verwante oorsake, sterf nie. Vanuit sekere perspektiewe is sulke nalatigheid te wagte. Wanneer ons egter die kwessie vanuit die perspektief van Emmanuel Levinas se etiese filosofie benader, kom ons voor 'n teenstrydigheid te staan, aangesien Levinas aandring dat ons oneindiglik en onvermydelik verantwoordelik is vir die ander, terwyl die daaglikse voorkombare sterftes van duisende arm mense aandui dat ons nie optree asof ons onsself as oneindiglik verantwoordelik teenoor die ander beskou nie. Dit wil voorkom asof Levinas eenvoudig verkeerd is. Levinas tref egter 'n onderskeid tussen 'n interpersoonlike etiese verhouding en 'n onpersoonlike politiese verhouding met die ander. Eersgenoemde is 'n verhouding van asimmetriese en oneindige verantwoordelikheid waartoe ons beveel word deur die uniekheid van die ander se 'gesig.' Laasgenoemde is 'n verhouding waarby ook 'n 'derde' betrokke is, en daarom moet die self sy verantwoordelikheid teenoor die spesifieke ander beperk om so ook sy verantwoordelikheid teenoor 'n veelheid van andere na te kom. Die teenwoordigheid van die derde dui die beginpunt van onpersoonlike geregtigheid, institusies, politiek, kennis, asook gelykheid en wederkerigheid tussen die self en die ander, aan. Elke person wat ek teëkom is 'n algemene ander met wie ek in 'n politiese verhouding staan, asook, tegelykertyd, 'n spesifieke ander teenoor wie ek oneindiglik verantwoordelik is. Teenoor elke ander staan ek terselfdetyd in 'n simmetriese politiese verhouding en 'n asimmetriese etiese verhouding. Die dubbelsinnigheid van die samelewing lê daarin dat ek moet besluit of ek polities of eties teenoor die ander gaan optree. Beide opsies geniet 'n mate van legitimiteit, alhoewel, 'n politiese respons teenoor die ander minder legitiem is vanuit 'n Levinasiaanse oogpunt. In 'n poging om ons apatie teenoor die wêreld se armes te verstaan, word die sentrale debat rondom die kwessie van transnasionale verantwoordelikheid, die kosmopolitiaanse kommunitêre debat, vanuit 'n Levinasiaanse perspektief geanaliseer. Drie wyses waarop die etiese verhouding met die ander onderdruk word, en sodoende bydra tot ons etiese apatie teenoor die ander, word geïdentifiseer. Eerstens poog skrywers in die kosmopolitiaanse kommunitêre debat om die subjek so 'n groot mate van outonomie en vryheid as moontlik te handhaaf en te bewaar, en 'legitimiseer' in die proses 'n politiese respons teenoor die ander. Tweedens, wanneer die kwessie van globale geregtigheid deur skrywers in die kosmopolitiaanse-kommunitêre debat aangeraak word, word die andersheid van die ander, wat ons aan ons etiese verantwoordelikheid teenoor die ander, asook aan die onvoltooide aard van geregtigheid, herinner, onderdruk. Derdens, in soverre kosmopolitaanse skrywers hulself beywer om 'n groter mate van besorgdheid teenoor arm persone regoor die wêreld te ontlok, blyk die strategie wat deur hulle gevolg word (hulle beklemtoon menslike gelykheid) teenproduktief te wees, aangesien hierdie strategie die uniekheid van die subjek en die ander in die etiese verhouding misken en onderdruk. Die kritiek teenoor hierdie drie aspekte van die kosmopolitiaanse-kommunitêre debat word dan uitgebrei na aansprake dat 'n meer etiese houding teenoor die wêreld se armes moontlik is.

This thesis defends an ontological and epistemological account of Michel Foucault's post-structuralist philosophy, to argue that political philosophy needs to take into account the historical and political contingency of subjectivity and discourse. I show that by addressing the historical and political contingency of knowledge, Foucault's work overcomes the flaw of foundational epistemology in political philosophy, which treats true discourse as universal and disinterested. In doing so I hope to have to refuted the mainly positivistic and humanist schools of thought that lay claim to universal and foundationalist notions, by demonstrating the extent to which their misgivings about Foucault's work are informed by and founded upon an unjustified a-historicism. The thesis is composed of three chapters, the first of which deals with an ontology of the subject, the second, with an ontology of social relations, and the last with epistemology. In each chapter I use dialectical analysis to reveal how interests necessarily mediate subjectivity, social relations, and knowledge. The first two chapters defend Foucault's conception of power, by way of an analysis of the relations between Foucault's work and Sartre's existential phenomenology. I show how both Foucault and Sartre successfully address the problem of historicism for political philosophy with their respective conceptions of human freedom. The final chapter defends Foucault's conception of the relations between power and discourse, to show how it overcomes the a-historicism of universal, foundational epistemology. These three chapters demonstrate the importance of accounting for historicism in political philosophy. Claims to universal interest, because knowledge is conditioned by conflicts of interest, often mask political domination. It is important, then, to remember, in political philosophy, that knowledge is evaluative and interested, reflecting historically and politically mediated evaluations. One should be suspicious of ' natural facts' , used to justify actions or beliefs, thereby masking the choices that inform them. I have used the work of Michel Foucault to motivate this claim.

This thesis analyses the social struggles that occurred between 2010 and 2014 during the crisis in Greece: labour struggles, the movement of the squares, demonstrations and riots, neighbourhood assemblies, solidarity projects and economies, local environmental struggles, and anti-fascist and migrants' struggles. It discusses their internal and external limits in the historical specificity of the contemporary crisis and class relation. Drawing critically on Théorie Communiste's periodising schema, these struggles are framed, first, through a shift in the dynamic of the class relation effected by the crisis and the restructuring, which is a continuation of the first phase of 'neoliberal' restructuring in the 1990s. This shift intensified a central capitalist contradiction: while the capital relation imposes most violently the absolute dependence of subsistence on the wage, the wage relation fails to guarantee subsistence and integrates proletarians as surplus to capitalist reproduction. Second, the struggles are framed through the deep political crisis of state sovereignty and the relation between state and civil society, caused by the relentless imposition of the restructuring in conjunction with supranational institutions. These historical transformations are traced through the mutual constitution of international tendencies and the development of class struggle in Greece, against theories of dependency and underdevelopment. Ideological responses to the financial crisis and the logic of the restructuring are interrogated by employing theories of value, fetishism, and the state influenced by the German 'value-form' debate. Foucault-influenced conceptions of governmentality and sovereignty are also deployed to examine the restructuring's forms of imposition and the biopolitical crisis-management strategies of the state, which reinforced the racialised and gendered constitution of civil society. The thesis argues that these two elements, the changing dynamic of the class relation and the crisis of the state and civil society, defined the struggles of this period, in which two core characteristics can be identified. First, labour struggles confronted the dilemma between the necessity and inadequacy of the wage through an ambivalence between their attachment to work and their estrangement from it. This ambivalence did not question the terms of the dilemma posed, which were only questioned fleetingly in riots that interrupted the normality of commodity exchange. Second, the deep political crisis provoked struggles defending democracy, with the disempowered 'Greek citizen' as their central subject, which constitutively excluded migrants. The splitting of these struggles between leftwing anti-imperialist and rightwing anti-immigration nationalism, and into a struggle between fascism and anti-fascism, were not able to challenge this constitutive exclusion, which was only questioned by migrants' own struggles. Nationalism and the drive to reinforce unsettled social hierarchies played into the governmental effort to contain the political crisis, through the state's biopolitical management of the migrant and marginal, racialised and gendered surplus populations produced in the crisis.

This thesis argues that within political philosophy, property rights deserve closer attention than has been paid to them recently because the legitimacy of a state rests upon their definition and enforcement. In this way property rights differ from the right to liberty or equality. A state may or may not have liberty or equality, but it has no meaning at all if it does not enforce the rights of property. This is not to suggest that normative arguments for property rights are ‘nonsense upon stilts’. Morality may provide many reasons for an individual to exclude other members of a political community from a property. However, the function of property rights is to enforce that exclusion and this suggests that the normative legitimacy of a state is closely bound both to its ability to enforce whatever property rights it already has granted, and its justification of decisions taken when property rights are granted within its borders. My argument is that a proper political philosophy of property rights should acknowledge that a state depends upon its treatment of property rights for justification, not as a matter of justice, but as a matter of its existence.

This dissertation tracks the development of German political philosophy over the course of the first half of the seventeenth century, with an emphasis on the disciplinary, methodological, and pedagogical concerns of Politica writers. These figures produced large-scale technical textbooks on politics, which attempted to make sense of the chaotic civil sphere through the application of disciplinary structures. The main influences on their thought came from the sixteenth century: Aristotelianism, reason of state, natural law, and neostoicism were the competing traditions that they attempted to fit into comprehensive treatments of their subject. Generally, these thinkers have been organized by historians into schools divided by their political and confessional commitments. I argue that, while these factors were important, their disciplinary and methodological choices also decisively shaped their vision of politics, and indeed their positions on the critical questions of their day. I do this by focusing on four specific writers, one from each of the four faculties of the early modern university: Bartholomaus Keckermann from the arts faculty, Henning Arnisaeus from Medicine, Christoph Besold from Law, and Adam Contzen from Theology. I show how each Politica author?s disciplinary background inflected their construction of politics as an academic discipline, and how this in turn shaped their opinions on the confessional and constitutional debates which were then fracturing the Holy Roman Empire. While the dissertation does focus on the differences among these figures, it also tracks a trajectory which they all participated in. I argue that their attempts to discipline politics as a subject resulted in the centering of the state as a disciplinary and administrative institution. Their motivation was to prevent political upheaval through the application of technical expertise, which meant that they were able to find ever more aspects of human life which required treatment under the rubric of political philosophy, because almost anything could be conceived of as either a threat or a source of strength for the political order. This in turn suggested a vastly expanded conception of the regulatory and disciplinary powers of the state. I thus contend that, although the Politica writers are mostly forgotten today, they represent a critical phase in the intellectual development of the idea of the state.

This study examines the loss of original principles that distinguish ancient Western philosophy as a valid conceptual framework for political theory and practice. I explore how the Philosophic Tradition as a centuries-old foundation of inquiry and discourse loses its significance and finally its authority in the postmodern world. With the exclusion of metaphysical reflection and reason as a basis for understanding human existential and political phenomena, the transition to Historicism and Philosophic Positivism effectively redefined the nature and application of politics. Critical to this research and serving as a focal point of this study are the works of theorist and originator of the Positive Philosophy, Auguste Comte. I analyze the author's several volumes, these dedicated to establishing a new foundation of political thought, one in which scientific inquiry would serve as the ground for seeking truth and knowledge and as a basis for methodologically directing social and political reorganization. Essentially, Positive politics would as the theorist proposed, be free of abstract speculation (metaphysics) and work to reframe human nature by achieving a universal social state defined by `Order and Progress' and a futuristic system of advancement alike to no other period in human history. As this study examines this prophesy, it takes into view the rise and popularity of the Positive Philosophy from ancient perspectives to modern and postmodern Western thought. It further illustrates the resistance to and eventual replacement of traditional theoretical foundations leaving an indelible imprint on political philosophy which had experienced a profound transformation from its pre-scientific origins. Once as truth-seeking, self-critical and reflective as to moral values and ethical considerations of justice, prudence, and the public good, the Positive Philosophy would serve instead as the ground and authority for, as Comte envisaged, a modification of human existence. Thus politics reformulated was set to task in ordering the social world into its mission of productivity and progress and reconciling its vision of human perfectibility with a proposed end to political conflict.

The emergence of transnational practices of publicity challenges the established political theories of democracy, which presuppose a national citizenry and a national democratic state. The subjects of transnational public spheres lack a common citizenship status to develop legitimate public opinion, as well as corresponding decision-making institutions to address their demands. However, by creating solidarity, building legitimate public opinion and communicating their demands on the base of alternative premises, transnational public spheres defy Westphalian assumptions. The World Social Forum serves as a paradigmatic case: while it develops new types of solidarity "among strangers" through horizontal debate and articulation, it unfolds antagonistic forms of communication with global neoliberal institutions of power.

This dissertation aims to contribute to the debate on the critical function of the notion of publicity in the context of globalization. Drawing on Habermas's theory of deliberative democracy and Mouffe's democratic theory of "agonistic pluralism," I examine the World Social Forum's forms of communication, creation of solidarity and legitimation of alternative discourses. Agonistic and deliberative theories of democracy have been traditionally regarded as antithetical, since the former stress conflict and dissent, while the latter emphasize dialogue and consensus. However, the analysis of political experiences like the World Social Forum not only shows that both perspectives are not fully incompatible, but also that they are both necessary to grasp the complexity of actual transnational publicity. In particular, I argue that the combination of these theories reveals one of the main characteristics of the WSF: the merging of antagonistic and consensual practices of communication.

Public reason theorists argue that it is permissible for the state to enforce political norms, such as laws or constitutional principles, when those norms are acceptable to ?reasonable people.? Reasonable people are neither actual people, with all their flaws, nor are they perfect people; they are rather a partially idealized group ? realistic in some ways and idealized in others. Each of the major public reason theorists ? John Rawls, Gerald Gaus, Jonathan Quong, Joshua Cohen ? idealizes reasonable people to a different degree, but they all share two claims: 1) Reasonable people hold diverse views of the good life. Nevertheless, 2) Reasonable people can all accept basic liberal political norms grounded in freedom and equality. My dissertation begins by arguing that theorists are not free to choose any level of idealization, but are constrained in this choice by the justifications of their theories. In particular, idealization is constrained by one essential part of public reason?s justification, which I call the ?diversity argument.? The diversity argument explains the first element of reasonable people: why do they disagree about the good? The answers, I argue, attributes certain realistic qualities and tendencies to reasonable people, which therefore constrains how much we can idealize them. In chapters on the major public reason theorists, I argue that they all offer a diversity argument that does not match the level of idealization that they employ. As a result, they are unable to show that liberal norms are acceptable to reasonable people, appropriately idealized. In the final chapter, I argue that the mismatch in these theories goes even deeper, which we can see when we ask why we must accommodate disagreement at all. The answers that philosophers have given us ? reasonable disagreement is the inevitable result of human reasoning, human psychology, or free conditions ? also apply to irrational disagreement. Irrational influences such as implicit bias and motivated reasoning are also inevitable results of who we are and how we live, which means we must accommodate these realistic tendencies in political justification. So, if public reason theories must now accommodate disagreement among reasonable-but-sometimes-irrational people, what could be acceptable to all such people? I conclude by suggesting a new direction for public reason theories. People who disagree about the good life, but recognize their common biases, can still justify their views to each other by supporting institutions that mitigate those biases, such as non-discrimination laws and deliberative institutions. This requires a new kind of social contract theory ? one that is grounded in the shared recognition of our limitations, rather than our shared reasons.

Liberals disagree about the state's legitimate sphere of activity. Some emphasise individual liberty and self-determination, believing the requirements of these principles are best met by the free market. Social liberals argue that citizens are members of a political community, whose obligations are fulfilled through the state. How principles of justice are derived is a matter of controversy, but underlying them are certain ideas about citizens' relationships to the state and to each other. The theories of justice of Nozick, Hobhouse, Rawls and Walzer are compared. To what extent are citizens responsible for each other's welfare in contemporary liberal democracies? The state is characterized by Nozick as a protective association with the sole function of guaranteeing individual rights, and in which concern for others is a private matter; by Rawls as a cooperative association organised in such a way that the position of the least favoured is maximised; by Walzer as a community of shared understandings in which all are entitled to the goods necessary to sustain their membership; and by Hobhouse as a harmonious society of rational men in which individuals find fulfilment in the life of the community. I discuss political obligation, since how citizens are said to have obligations contributes to an understanding of descriptions of the state and the nature of the ties that bind citizens. Maclntyre suggests that individualism renders moral argument unintelligible. There is no way of deciding between the competing theories of Nozick and Rawls. Walzer believes that Maclntyre is mistaken in describing these disputes as a mark of incoherence, since they take place within the liberal tradition. I maintain that the differences within liberalism are so grave that it cannot be argued that we inhabit a world of shared values. The liberal democratic state cannot be described as the embodiment of community.

Seit 2008 ergänzt die sowohl kleine als auch feine Rubrik "Wiedergelesen" die Ausgaben des außenpolitischen Fachjournals WeltTrends. Berühmte Bücher der Politologie und schätzenswerte Raritäten werden für die Füllung dieser Rubrik aus Bücherregalen herausgefischt, abgestaubt und in aktuellem Interesse gelesen - wieder gelesen. Stets ist es das Anliegen, die Schriften sowohl aus ihrer Zeit zu verstehen als auch für unsere Zeit nutzbar zu machen - z. B. Huntingtons The Clash of Civilizations, Lipsets Political Man, Paines Die Rechte des Menschen oder An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain von Linz.

This dissertation investigates Platonic political philosophy as a possible means for understanding the relationship between knowledge and power. Via a close reading of Heinrich Meier's early work on Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss, it attempts to articulate how political philosophy in Meier's sense works, as well as to carry out in actu a piece of interpretation in accord with its characteristic approach. It finds that Meier "purifies" (kathairo) the figures of Schmitt and Strauss into the exemplars of political theology and political philosophy, respectively; that he traces postmodern relativism back to its roots in a moral-theological view associated with revelation; that he is able in this way to sharpen the distinction between political theology and political philosophy, and, more generally, between the orders of knowledge and of power; and that these orders, despite much obvious interpenetration, are incommensurable in view of their extreme cases. Further, it finds that political philosophy operates in the interrogative mode for questioning the assertions and commands of political and theological authorities, and the hypothetical subjunctive mode for protecting itself, and philosophy generally, from persecution at the hands of such authorities; in addition, it employs these modes to gain insight into its own possibility and necessity, or to progress in self-knowledge. Finally, it finds that political philosophy makes a characteristic turn (periagoge) toward the good, and that this is only justified if the good sticks to the real or if truth is somehow primary or if not everything is possible.

Explores the foundations of political community as understood in two complementary ways: first, in contemporary normative political and social theory. Second, in the history of politics and in the history of philosophy. Particular attention is given to David Hume, Adam Smith, and Edmund Burke, as well as their relationship to contemporary political philosophers like Bernard Williams, John Rawls, Jeremy Waldron, Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Mills. Using Wittgenstein’s concept of a form of life (lebensform) in the Philosophical Investigations, argues that there is a family within the history of political thought whose members share the understanding that a shared form of life, which develops organically and historically, is a necessary condition for a free society to work well. Examines how political and social obligation, trust and commerce, as well as sympathy and concepts of rights, all require interdependence and shared assumptions and expectations. This family balances the impulses of political realism and political idealism, though is somewhat more anti-idealist than pro-realist. Bottom-up thinking that doesn’t fall in to the trap of idealism or of rationalism, due to a commitment to epistemological limits and the recognition of our finite capacities. In particular, I am interested in how we can combine the seemingly competing forces of culture and tradition (ways we have been doing things, one might say) with the necessary desire for change, reform, and progress. My approach to these questions can help shape the way we think about the size of states, if and when foreign intervention makes sense, the pace of change, and the necessary variety of political and social orders suited to a varying world.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--Stellenbosch University, 2008.
Nationalism is quite easy to understand, but somewhat difficult to explain. In terms of understanding nationalism, we do not need to know anything more about society and sentiment than what is taken for granted in everyday life. An individual who ‘drops’ into a foreign culture may know absolutely nothing about its people’s songs, rituals, amusements and traditions: why some customs evoke tears, and others, bravado. This person would feel no sense of collective awe or inspiration when touring historic battlefields and monuments of an unfamiliar country. Nevertheless, he or she would likely understand and appreciate that all of these things are steeped in meaning and identity. These instances of meaning and identity may not be felt, shared or even fully known, but their role as expressions of nationalism can be readily appreciated. The global spread of nations entails an array of mutually unfamiliar national identities, but the actual phenomenon nationalism is rarely foreign to anyone. From an outsider’s perspective we do not know how certain expressions are significant to a particular group, but we do understand that they are expressions of national belonging. Explaining nationalism is more difficult for the simple reason that experiencing and recognizing a phenomenon is not sufficient to account for its existence. Customs and rituals are two suggested properties of nationalism, but what is the causal relationship between such properties and the end phenomenon (how does custom actually lead to nationalism, if at all)? The answers to these questions are still a matter of debate. The situation is only made worse by the fact that most theories explaining nationalism seem to rest on a tower of abstractions. For instance, it may seem uncontroversial for some to argue that nationalism is an outgrowth of ethnic identity. However, this just begs the question. What is ethnicity? The potential for regress to abstraction is a major impediment to theory. This thesis will examine the problem of explanation: the reasons why theories of nationalism have struggled with explaining nationalism, and a discussion on how to overcome these difficulties. Specifically, this thesis will show that: 1) The problem of explaining nationalism is due in part to the ‘classical’ problem found in the literature: whether nationalism is an ‘ancient’ social phenomenon, or a ‘modern’ phenomenon which can be dated (roughly) to the late eighteenth century. 2) Debates regarding the classical problem are closely affected by philosophical issues in the social sciences. 3) The incorporation of a consilient methodology (i.e. a research program that unifies theories of social science with theories of natural science) can provide a new strategy for future theories of nationalism and work to solve the classical problem.

Images and imagination are both epistemologically and politically significant in the image of the divided line that Plato has Socrates present at the end of Book VI of the Republic (509d1-511e6). I argue that the twofold nature of images and imagination on the divided line sheds insight into Plato's theory of the forms. And I argue that, according to Plato, images play an important role in the initial formation of ethical and political outlooks. This implies that the divided line as an image itself is being offered by Plato in an attempt to alter our ethical and political imaginations, and turn us away from the dream-like state wherein images are all that exist in politics, and towards the idea of the good as the model for our judgments.
Les images et l'imagination sont épistémologiquement et politiquement importantes à l'image de la ligne divisée que Platon fait présenter par Socrate à la fin du livre VI de la République (509d1-511e6). L'argument développé ci-dessous avance que la double nature des images et de l'imagination permet de révéler certains aspects de la théorie des formes de Platon. L'argument soutient aussi que, selon Platon, les images jouent un rôle important dans le processus de formation initial des idées et opinions éthiques et politiques. Ceci implique que la ligne divisée en tant qu'image elle-même est offerte par Platon en guise de tentative d'altérer nos idées (c'est-à-dire nos 'imaginations') éthiques et politiques, et de nous pousser à quitter l'état de somnolence rêveuse dans lequel nos nous imaginons que les images sont tout ce qui existe en politique, vers l'idée de bien comme modèle à suivre lors de nos jugements.

This thesis examines the lives of women in Classical Greece in the context of war. War is often regarded as the domain of men but actually it is a social phenomenon where everybody is involved. Scholarship has begun to be interested in issues of women and war in Classical Greece, while they are insightful and demonstrate portions of women’s experience, studies to date have not attempted to create a holistic view. In such studies, women are generally depicted as a single homogeneous group, their involvement in war is viewed as limited and exceptional, and they are only seen as the marginal victims of war. This thesis, by contrast, strongly argues for diversity in women’s experiences during war. It demonstrates the centrality of war to women’s lives in Classical Greece, as well as how women’s experience might vary according to (for example) their social and economic circumstances. By analysing both written sources and archaeological material across the Classical period, this thesis intends to produce a broader perspective. By providing the first full-length study on the subject, this thesis, thus, contributes to the disciplines of both gender studies and warfare studies. This thesis begins by investigating the way in which ancient sources outlined wartime boundaries for women. While there were no formal ‘rules of war’, ancient writers nonetheless suggest that there were certain social conventions particular to the treatment of women in Classical Greece at times of war. As chapter 1 shows, perhaps surprisingly, women were not always evacuated from their communities as is commonly thought, they were not supposed to be maltreated, nor killed in Classical Greek warfare. Chapter 2 then examines ancient authors’ positive and negative evaluations on the behaviour of women in war. By analysing the way in which different sources rationalized women’s wartime behaviour, this thesis shows that there existed boundaries for women in war. Having established women’s potential involvement in war, an exploration follows of their contributions to the war effort, both in the city and abroad. Two observations emerge from chapter 3. First, women were heavily involved in crucial wartime activities such as defending the city, distribution of food and missiles, giving military advice, among others. However, they also participated in negative and traitorous wartime behaviour such as facilitating enemy soldiers to escape a city under conflict. Second, their wartime contributions were not perceived to be ‘breaking social norms’ as is commonly maintained in much scholarly discussion. In chapter 4, the analyses of the different social and economic impacts of war on women reveals that war affected them directly through their experience of evacuations and their necessity to find employment due to wartime poverty, but war also affected women in more insidious ways, especially in their family life and relationships. Finally, chapter 5 then analyses the impact of war with special reference to women’s experiences in post-war contexts such as captivity, slavery, and rape and sexual violence. By showing the variety of experiences and how there existed selection processes with regards to women, this chapter demonstrates that not all women were going to experience the same fates after war. The result is the emergence of a rounded picture of the wartime lives of women in Classical Greece.

The Black Christian Nationalists under the leadership of the Reverend Albert B. Cleage, Jr., the founder of the Shrine of the Black Madonna of the Pan-African Orthodox Christian Church, act as a separatist by seeking to establish their own separate black institutions in order to gain power with.in the. black community. Reverend Cleage asserts that the "traditional" black church has failed the black community by addressing only the spiritual -needs of its members. Although Reverend Cleage claims that the Shrine is the only black church meeting the needs of the black community, the majority of their institutions are designed primarily to aid only their members and not the entire community. The research is designed to address the question of whether the "traditional" black church has failed the black community while examining the political, social, and economic philosophy of the Shrine of the Black Madonna. Reverend Cleage's program of "institutional power" acts as a model for other black churches by combining poli tical philosophy with religious doctrine in order to aid the black community. The ideologies of Marcus Garvey, Malcolm X, and the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., are also analyzed in order to examine their contributions to the black religious community. The methodology utilized in conducting the study involves the Descriptive Case Study Method and the Document Study, in addition to David Easton's systems theory as the dominant paradigm.