Academic literature on the topic 'Political party organization – Ireland'

ABSTRACTThe Irish Party, the organization which represented the constitutional nationalist demand for home rule for almost fifty years in Westminster, was the most notable victim of the revolution in Ireland, c. 1916–23. Most of the last generation of Westminster-centred home rule MPs played little part in public life following the party's electoral destruction in 1918. This article probes the political thought and actions of one of the most prominent constitutional nationalists who did seek to alter Ireland's direction during the critical years of the war of independence. Stephen Gwynn was a guiding figure behind a number of initiatives to ‘save’ Ireland from the excesses of revolution. Gwynn established the Irish Centre Party in 1919, which later merged with the Irish Dominion League. From the end of 1919, Gwynn became a leading advocate of the Government of Ireland Bill, the legislation that partitioned the island. Revolutionary idealism – and, more concretely, violence – did much to render his reconciliatory efforts impotent. Gwynn's experiences between 1919 and 1921 also, however, reveal the paralysing divisions within constitutional nationalism, which did much to demoralize moderate sentiment further.

Recent literature has renewed interest in the stratarchical model of intraparty decision-making. In this version of party organization, the functions performed by parties are distributed among their discrete levels. The result is a power-sharing arrangement in which no group has control over all aspects of party life. Thus, the model potentially provides an antidote to the hierarchical version of organization. This article examines the principal parties in Australia, Canada, Ireland and New Zealand to test whether there is empirical evidence of stratarchy. An examination of candidate nomination, leadership selection and policy development finds strong evidence of shared authority between both levels of the party in key areas of intraparty democracy. Both levels accept that they cannot achieve their goals without the support of the other and so a fine balancing act ensues, resulting in constant recalibration of power relations. There is, however, little evidence of the commonly presented model of stratarchy as mutual autonomy for each level within discrete areas of competency. Instead, both the party on the ground and in the centre share authority within all three areas, resulting in a pattern of mutual interdependence rather than mutual autonomy.

ABSTRACTAt the 1918 general election, Sinn Féin overtook the Irish Parliamentary Party as the dominant political force within nationalist Ireland, a process that has its origins in the aftermath of the Easter Rising of 1916. This article argues that to understand better this shift in public opinion, from an initially hostile reaction to the Dublin rebellion to a more advanced nationalist position,1it is important to recognize the decisive role played by a political welfare organization, the Irish National Aid Association and Volunteer Dependents' Fund. The activities of the INAAVDF significantly shaped the popular memory of the Rising, but also provided a focus around which the republican movement could re-organize itself. In foregrounding the contribution of the INAAVDF to the radicalization of political life in Ireland between 1916 and 1918, the article argues that this understudied but important organization offers a useful way of charting popular responses to the Rising and its aftermath, as well as laying the foundations for a reinvigorated political and military campaign after 1917.

Until recently, the political influence of trade unions primarily relied on ties to labour-friendly political parties. Since the 1990s, however, party-union relations have deteriorated, forcing unions to consider complementary political strategies. This article reviews different direct democratic instruments at local, national and EU levels. We distinguish popular consultations initiated by government from above from citizens’ initiatives initiated from below and discuss corresponding trade union experiences in Germany, Italy, Ireland, Slovenia and Switzerland. We also analyse the successful right2water European Citizens Initiative (ECI) of the European Federation of Public Service Unions and the failed fair transport ECI of the European Transport Workers’ Federation at EU level. Whereas unions have successfully used direct democratic instruments to (i) defend social achievements or (ii) as a lever to extract policy concessions, direct democracy is also challenging. Successful direct democratic campaigns require unions that are able to mobilise their own rank-and-file and to inspire larger sections of society.

Efforts to evaluate third-party peacebuilding interventions are welcome but many studies rely on experimental approaches that might be at odds with the theories that underpin the discipline. Rigorously evaluating interventions ill-suited to experimental analyses is just as important, however, especially when programmes adopt novel approaches. In this article, we employ an instrumental variables approach to evaluate one such intervention – the EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (PEACE II). Following contemporary peacebuilding theories, PEACE II disseminated funds to grassroots organizations via unique intermediate funding bodies and an innovative open competition. Splitting Northern Ireland into 582 wards, we merge panel data on individuals’ perceptions of neighbourhood quality with PEACE II’s accounts. One-stage analyses show that individuals in treatment regions report significantly elevated perceptions. Two-stage approaches, accounting for biases arising from the rollout method, show no significant relationship. Post-estimation analyses imply that funding did not reach areas with the poorest observable indicators. We thus remain agnostic on the effectiveness of the funded projects but conclude that, despite solid theoretical foundations, weaknesses in the application of these theories hampered potential positive impacts. Future interventions can learn from this and should ensure stronger ties between the theoretical base and how these theories are applied to funding disbursement. JEL Codes: O18; F35

A political party is defined in terms of coalition building: collective effort directed toward capturing public office and governing once that office is attained. Party organization thus defined includes factional organization as well as the administrative apparatus. This definition assumes a linkage between the electoral party and the party inside the government.

Abstract. Based on an examination of constitutional and other party documents, Canadian political parties have been described as stratarchically organized (Carty, 2002). We identify four models of internal party financial flows that correspond to different models of internal party organization. We then trace the financial flows into and within the four major Canadian political parties from 2004 to 2007 with a view to identifying the model of party organization that these flows indicate. Our evidence in some respects supports Carty's assertion that Canadian parties are stratarchically organized, but it also suggests that changes to the regulatory regime governing political finance have contributed to a centralization of power at the level of the national party and at the expense of candidates and local associations. This centralizing tendency is significant, as it may disrupt the bargain that underlies the stratarchical organization of Canadian parties.Résumé. À la lumière d'une revue des constitutions et de divers autres documents des partis politiques canadiens, ces derniers ont été décrits comme étant organisés de manière stratarchique (Carty, 2002). Nous dégageons quatre modèles de flux monétaires internes des partis qui correspondent à différents modèles d'organisation interne des partis politiques. Nous retraçons les entrées de fonds des quatre principaux partis politiques canadiens et leur distribution interne de 2004 à 2007 en vue d'identifier le modèle d'organisation de parti qui correspond à ces flux monétaires. Sous certains rapports, nos résultats appuient l'argument de Carty affirmant que les partis canadiens sont organisés de manière stratarchique, mais ils suggèrent aussi que les changements apportés au régime régulateur gouvernant le financement politique ont contribué à une centralisation du pouvoir au niveau national des partis et ce aux dépens des candidats et des associations locales. Cette tendance centralisatrice est importante, car elle peut rompre le compromis qui sous-tend l'organisation stratarchique des partis politiques canadiens.

Party organization has regained a new momentum in the party literature over the past decade. In this context, we review the most important advances in the literature and critically examine issues such as: the link between party organization literature and organizational theory literature, party organization and intra-party democracy, and between party organization on paper and in reality. We ascertain the need for more conceptual clarifications in the field and raise questions for debate. We further outline the contribution of this special issue to the theme of intra-party democracy in representative democracies.

This study documents the rise of party political public relations in Northern Ireland and explores its impact on the media and the peace/political process more generally. While this research primarily charts and describes the chronological development of public relations pertaining to Northern Ireland's four main political parties (the SDLP, Sinn Fein, the DUP and the UUP), it also explores the media-source relations or interactions between journalists and public relations personnel. Significantly, political public relations has expanded considerably in Northern Ireland since the mid-90s, and political parties are increasingly utilising PR to enhance their media relations capabilities and improve their image (or `brand') with the public. What was once mainly the remit of the British government and its agencies in Northern Ireland (that is, political public relations) has now become an area in which the four main political parties (to varying degrees of success) have become increasingly more professional and well-resourced. The result of this expansion of party political public relations has seen the regional media in Northern Ireland become increasingly more vulnerable to the promotional efforts of `spin doctors' or media relations personnel from all four parties. This research, while acknowledging that there are undoubtedly multiple factors involved in how people decide to vote, argues that the 71.12% Yes vote in favour of the Good Friday Agreement can be partly explained by the significant impact of public relations strategies and techniques employed by a number of key behind-the-scenes players and conducted publicly by influential, high-profile figures. Essentially, it challenges the argument prevalent in the vast majority of literature on elections that public relations campaigns have very little `effect' on voting behaviour or that those changes of voting behaviour are due either to other factors or to long-term media campaigns and influences. This research also argues, on the one hand, that the electoral success of both Sinn Fein and the DUP in recent years (the two parties `hungry' for political power, who became the leading political parties in nationalism and unionism respectively) can be partly explained by their `courting' of the media and their development of strong and efficient communications structures. On the other hand, the recent electoral failure of both the SDLP and the UUP can be partly explained by their laissez-faire or complacent approach to both public relations and the media, and their weak and inefficient communications structures in comparison to both Sinn Fein and the DUP.

The organizations of national and provincial parties in Canada are understood to be separated from one another. However, it is not known whether this separation extends to the constituency-level organizations of those parties. In order to provide a better understanding of how national and provincial parties are linked at the local level (if at all), this thesis describes and accounts for the local organizations of the national Liberal Party and the provincial Liberal parties in sixteen national constituencies selected from the provinces of British Columbia, Ontario, and New Brunswick. Information from interviews with local party activists and participant observation in the ridings is used to develop a continuum of constituency-level party organizations. Descriptions of the activist bases, constituency associations, and local campaigns in each riding allow for each local organization to be placed along this continuum between integrated local organizations, which share important linkages between the national and provincial levels, and differentiated local organizations, where no such linkages exist. The placement of local organizations along this continuum is accounted for by (1) similarities or differences between the national and provincial party systems in the three provinces studied; (2) the actions of incumbent members of the national Parliament and provincial legislatures; and (3) characteristics of the constituencies. The patterns identified lead to a classification of four types of local organizations – One Political World, Interconnected Political Worlds, Distinctive Political Worlds, and Two Political Worlds – that illuminate the different forms of linkages between national and provincial parties that exist at the constituency level. This examination of the local organizations of the Liberal Party calls into question the academic consensus on the separation of national and provincial parties in Canada. Instead, the Liberal Party is characterized as an unevenly integrated party, where the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary parties are separated from provincial counterparts, but where the national and provincial parties on the ground are oftentimes integrated.

This study examines the impact of the European Union and the programmatic and policy changes in two Irish political parties, the Green Party and Sinn Féin. The Europeanization concept is the theoretical basis of the study and it is operationalized by the use of EU salience. The study is carried out by content analysis of national and European election manifestos prepared by the parties during the 2009–2020 time period. The findings showed an increased salience on the European Union in national election campaigns by both parties, and in the European Parliament elections by Sinn Féin. A process of Europeanization has taken place in both parties regarding foreign policy and issues related to external relations. The Green Party showed an increased emphasis on the European Union regarding environmental issues. This study contributes to the research on the European impact on national political parties and the increased importance of European level politics in the national systems.

Political Science
Ph.D.
This dissertation studies political party organization in the United States, Germany and Poland during national election campaigns and regular party operations. According to conventional wisdom, changes in party organization, such as professionalized campaigns and communications technology, have detrimental effects on political parties. Katz and Mair argue (1995) that political parties have become agents of the state and fail to provide linkage between the state and the electorate due to these changes in party organization. As cartel parties, political parties are then financially dependent on the state and do not need the support of the electorate. Katz and Mair further suggest that developing a closer relationship with the state has weakened political parties, especially the party on the ground. This dissertation tests whether Katz and Mair's cartel theory applies to political parties in the United States, Germany and Poland examining the parties' organizations during and in between election campaigns and finds that the political parties do not confirm the cartel theory. American and German political parties do not primarily rely on government financing and possess too strong of an electoral linkage to their voters to be considered cartel parties. Political parties in Poland better fit with the cartel theory due to strong financial ties with the state and insufficient linkage with their electorate, both inside and outside of election campaigns. This dissertation argues that the cartel thesis should not be considered a theory since it cannot explain observations regarding political parties and their organizations in the United States, Germany and Poland. Instead, the cartel thesis should be considered a heuristic tool to characterize political parties, continuing the tradition of prior descriptive party models such as those of the mass and the catch-all parties.
Temple University--Theses

Most recent literature that analyzes parties from an organizational perspective focuses often on the concepts of intra-party democracy and party organizational democratization (Scarrow, 1999a; Scarrow and Kittilson, 2003; LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 2002; Bosco and Morlino, 2007). Le Duc (2001) and Rahat and Hazan (2007) underline that the most used instrument for implementing this ‘democratization’ process is the enhancement of the inclusiveness of the methods for candidate and party leadership selection. The actors endowed with candidate and leader selection powers are the central actors in the functioning of the party according to many authors (Gallagher and Marsh 1988, Marsh 1993; Massari, 2004; Hazan and Rahat, 2010). At the moment, the most inclusive method identified by the literature for selecting candidates for elections or the party leader is represented by party open or closed primaries, i.e. internal direct elections by party members and, in the case of open primaries, supporters and voters (Cross and Blais, 2011; Kenig, 2009b).

In this study, we explore two specific dimensions of party politics: membership and internal activisms, on the one hand, and on the other hand the internal democratization processes and in particular those dealing with broadening the inclusiveness of leadership selection procedures. Therefore, this study integrates in particular the debate on the nature and consequences of party organizational democratization. The debate finds its origins both in the influential work of Michels on the “iron law of oligarchy” thesis but has been more recently boosted by the theories of May (1973), Mair (1994) and also the studies on intra-party democracy in the British Labour (Shaw, 1994; Russell, 2005).

However, we are interested in the point of view of members themselves on the consequences of internal democratization. We are interested on how members perceive these organizational changes, in whether they are frustrated form the actual consequences on their role and powers and whether they perceive them as a potential threat that could undermine their organizational position within the party. In order to respond to the debate on the consequences of intra-party democracy at individual level, we rely mainly on three questions. The main research questions of this study are thus the following: to what extent party organizational changes in the sense of greater democratization affect the membership role at individual level? How are these organizational changes perceived by members? To what extent members’ perceptions of their own role affect their behaviors and in particular their internal activism?

The aim of this study, thus, is to empirically assess the impact on members’ activism of party internal democratization and in particular of the perception of membership role. We are interested in whether party members’ attitudes are changing as a result of parties’ organizational changes, particularly if these changes are giving members more say over outcomes. This is a study of how (and whether) perceived roles affect behaviour. The independent variable is constituted by the members’ perception of their own role within party organizational structures and in particular with regard to the leadership selection methods, whilst the dependent variable is represented by the level of activism of party members, in terms of participation to party activities in general. In fact, the impact of party rules at individual level will be addressed, as well as how the perception of organizational rules affects individual attitudes and behaviors. In particular, the focus is on leadership selection methods that integrate party members at some point in the overall process (Lisi, 2009), such as direct elections (Hazan and Rahat, 2006). The case selection is thus implemented on the basis of the research question: the comparison is developed across parties (and not across time) using different instruments for enhancing intra-party democracy.

Therefore, we analyze the role perception, attitudes and behaviors of grass-roots members of three contemporary Western European parties: the Belgian French-speaking socialist party (Parti Socialiste, PS), the British Labour and the Italian Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD). Among the selected parties, one (PD) holds primaries open to all voters for selecting their leader and one (Belgian PS), on the contrary, has chosen the closed primary (OMOV) system. The British Labour Party uses an electoral college for electing its leader since 1981. The Electoral College method refers to a system in which specific groups are allocated a specific share of the leadership vote. In the case of the UK Labour, the votes are equally divided among its constituency members, the parliamentary caucus and the trade union members.

Concerning the first research question of our study, our empirical results underline that in the three selected cases organizational changes affect indeed the membership role at individual level and that grass-root members perceive very clearly this impact on their status and organizational rights, obligations and privileges. When grass-roots members evaluate their role within the party, in particular with regard to the procedure for selecting the leader and the involvement of non-members and passive members within party organization, their perceptions take into account their organizational power as defined, among other factors, also by their share of votes in leadership selection. Thus, we expect that PD members perceive their role as more blurred than Labour members and particularly than PS members. In the case of parties, such as the PS, adopting direct elections of the party leader only by the affiliates, the majority of the members are expected to perceive clearly the distinction of the position, privileges and functions between members and non-members and the extensive role reserved for the affiliates.

Our data show that the perception of own role vary among members, but also that many members perceive their own role as being rather blurred. They display in fact nuanced but generally negative attitudes towards the integration of voters and supporters within the selection of party leader. On the basis of our survey data, the observed variation in the perception of membership role within and between the three parties seems to correspond to what we expected. A higher proportion of PD surveyed members declare to perceive their role as blurred, while smaller proportions of PS and particularly labour respondents share this evaluation. In general, our data confirm that party members do not evaluate positively the fact that these formal privileges are extended not only to all individual members, not only to activists but even to passive ones, but also to party voters and supporters. Mair’s “activists’ disempowerment” thesis (Mair, 1994) seems to be supported by our data, at least in terms of individual perceptions.

Moreover, our data show that the degree of satisfaction with intra-party democracy significantly vary among parties and is generally not nearly as high as could be expected on the basis of party politics literature. If in the British Labour survey the responses of grass-roots members seem to form a more positive picture, with a great majority of member declaring that the party leader is not too powerful, the level of dissatisfaction with party functioning is rather higher in the other two parties. Nevertheless, PS members are fairly more convinced than PS members that the party internal decision-making is democratic. This is what we expected to find on the basis of our first hypothesis. In fact, our first hypothesis postulated that the perception of the role of party membership by affiliates in terms of (lack of) distinction between members and non-members affects inversely their level of satisfaction with the internal functioning of the party and their degree of perceived political efficacy. The stronger the perception of the blurred role of membership, the lower will be the level of political efficacy and specific support for the party. According to our data, among PD members the perception of the blurred, undefined role of members is rather high and so is the degree of dissatisfaction with intra-party functioning. On the contrary, within the other two parties and especially within the Labour, the role perception by grass-roots members is rather positive and well-defined and the level of specific support for the party is also higher.

The expectations formulated on the basis of our first hypothesis appear to be supported by the empirical data also with regard to the variations in the sense of external political efficacy of members. Our data seem consistent with the hypothesis, developed by several scholars (Katz and Mair, 1995; Carty, 2004; Bolleyer, 2009), that expanding the leadership selectorate and granting formal powers to party members and supporters may hide, on the other hand, the perception by enrolled members to be actually loosing power. On the basis of our data, it is possible to assert that grass-roots members seem to be aware of the possibility of a trade-off between extreme inclusiveness of decision-making procedures and actual centralization of organizational power in the hands of party elites.

With regard to the third research question of this study, our results confirm that indeed members’ perceptions of their own role, in relation to internal democratization, affect their behaviors and in particular their internal participation. The three parties appear to have different features in terms of internal activism, at aggregate but in particular at individual level. Secondly, not only the overall level of intra-party activism of grass-roots members vary between and within the three selected parties, but appears to be influenced by members’ attitudes towards the party. In fact, our second hypothesis postulated that the levels of specific support for the party and political efficacy of party members impact directly on their level of activism. The lower the level of political efficacy and specific support for the party, the lower will be the degree of activism of all members (as well as the quality of the activities they perform) and vice-versa. In a party holding open and direct elections to choose its leader, party membership is thought to be divided between a highly active avant-garde and a larger mass of inactive affiliates, feeling inefficacy, frustrated with intra-party democracy and perceiving their own role as blurred and undefined. Consequently, dissatisfied or low efficacy members are argued to participate less.

Our data only partially support the expectations. In fact, the impact of the sense of external efficacy is clear and strong in all the three cases, while on the contrary the relationship between specific support and intra-party activism is less clear-cut than expected. The results are therefore nuanced with regard to the expectations formulated in the second hypothesis of this study. The explanatory power of external efficacy and specific support in terms of internal mobilization is only partially supported by our data. Therefore, the evaluation of the consequences of the implementation of party organizational changes such as the adoption of open primaries depends on what party elites are interested in: if the goal is to assure membership loyalty, adopting open primaries is not a good way to strengthen membership involvment in the party.

We believe that real intra-party democracy is normatively impossible with regard to the position of members. Organizational power cannot be too dispersed among different units without jeopardizing not only effective functioning of the party, as the old debated on the trade-off between democracy and efficacy asserted (Duverger, 1951; Panebianco, 1988), but also the incentives for internal participation of the party base. Party members are well aware that internal power cannot be too dispersed. From the point of view of members, a party should have a clear chain of command and should be composed by elites, activists and members. Each one of them should also be endowed with clearly defined tasks and responsibilities. In conclusion, we believe that intra-party democracy is a symbolic element of party organization but not as actually implementable.

In sum, intra-party democracy does not mean the same for different party units. For party elites, it represents a process for either legitimizing the party, changing party image, mobilizing electoral support, managing internal faction or even indirectly increasing their own organizational room for manoeuvre. For party members, intra-party democracy represents an incentive for mobilizing and a political identification tool until a certain point. After that, it becomes a threat to their rights and their status. For grass-roots affiliates, intra-party democracy is not a value per se, but it depends on its real intensity and actual implementation. In conclusion, at theoretical level, we can conclude that party organization theories should increasingly take into account membership’s point of view. On the contrary, at practical level, we can conclude that parties should adapt their strategies with regard to intra-party democracy according to their goal. If party elites are interested in tightening their grip on internal decision-making while increasing their room for manoeuvre and legitimizing party image at the same time, increasing intra-party democracy could be the best organizational strategy. On the contrary, if the leadership’s aim is to mobilize members and guarantee a stable and loyal membership, then it should be noted that increasing intra-party democracy is not always the best choice. To this regard, it might be useful for party elites to find other and more effective ways to loyalize member.

Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Political parties are the basic building blocks of representative democracy. They reduce information costs for voters, enhance executive accountability, and contribute to democratic governability by facilitating legislative organization and aggregating the interests of powerful societal groups. Yet we continue to know relatively little about the conditions under which strong parties form. The dominant theories of party-building are mostly based on historical studies of the United States and Western European countries, almost all of which developed stable party systems. Drawing on this literature, a segment of the early scholarship on party-building in third-wave democracies optimistically took "party development" for granted, assuming that parties would follow from democracy, cleavages, or certain electoral rules. Yet party-building outcomes in third-wave democracies fell short of scholars' initial, optimistic expectations. In many third-wave polities, social cleavages, attempts at electoral engineering, and decades of democratic competition did not produce durable parties. On the other hand, in numerous third-wave democracies, new political parties did take root. What accounts for the variation in party-building outcomes observed across the developing world? More generally, under what conditions does party-building succeed?
Government

Research on social movements has traditionally addressed issues of movement emergence and mobilisation, paying little attention to their outcomes and consequences. Moreover, despite research on the political consequences of social movements accelerating in recent years, much has been left under researched, no more so than the impact social movements have on one of the most important actors in liberal democracies: political parties. This paper extends social movement research by examining whether social movements have an impact on political parties and under what conditions impact is more likely to take place. The empirical analysis, investigating whether anti-austerity social movements have had an impact on social democratic parties in Ireland and Spain during the years 2011 to 2016, suggests that the relationship between social movements and political parties is both under-theorised and under-researched, and mistakenly so. The paper finds that while parties are more likely to be influenced by social movements when certain conditions are present, social movements can also have unintended impacts on parties. Ultimately, this paper encourages research on political parties, and particularly research on party change, to pay greater attention to social movements and for social movement research to pay greater attention to political parties.

This paper deals with the organization and teaching methods of the compulsory course “Quantitative Methods of Analysis in the Social Sciences” in the department of Political Sciences (A.U.TH) to postgraduate students. Various interactive teaching methods can be put in practice in order to achieve the initial teaching purposes and outcomes which include understanding the meaning of the electoral and the party system, comprehension of quantitative methods and finally the implementation of the given methods. The course’s aim is for the students to enhance data analysis capabilities and statistical reasoning applied to Social Sciences, by using a project and assigning team-based learning activities. Thus students, beyond conventional teaching methods, participate in an electoral survey, monitor elections and develop research abilities over official sources.

"The period of approving the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq for the year 2005 was surrounded by a state of political turmoil that usually accompanies any transitional phase that carries many political variables through the transition from a phase of dictatorial rule to a new phase bearing the features of democracy. In its approval, the lack of clarity in the political vision and the weakness of the constitutional legal culture of its authors, as well as the way in which it was approved by a popular referendum, which is voted on by yes or no, and does not allow an opportunity to discuss its articles and articles and diagnose its shortcomings. One of the shortcomings in our constitution is that it does not refer to regulating the resignation of the Prime Minister. This position has a political nature, and an administrative nature, and its occupant has the right to decide not to continue with this position and be satisfied with working in this field for any reason, and this must be in accordance with the context Organized legal, which is known as resignation., and this is what we dealt with in this research. For the purpose of researching this topic, we asked a research question that is... How can we address the legislative shortcomings that surrounded the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq for the year 2005 and related to regulating the resignation of the Prime Minister? From this research question, we derived several secondary research questions... 1- What is the limitation of legislative shortcomings? 2- What are the reasons for the legislative deficiencies in the Iraqi constitution? 3- Does the Prime Minister have the right to resign during his tenure? 4- To whom is the resignation submitted? 5- Who is the party that decides whether or not to accept the resignation? 6- What are the procedures that follow the acceptance of the resignation? By discussing these questions, we will try to reach the possibility of developing a legislative text that deals with a complete organization of the resignation of the Prime Minister, especially since the idea of ​​amending the constitution and to this day is still valid and possible, because many political, social and economic conditions in the country have changed from the time of entry into force of this constitution, which makes the idea of ​​the amendment obligatory and necessary"

After parliament failed to approve his revised version of the ‘Withdrawal Agreement’, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson called a snap general election in October 2019 to capitalise on his growing support to ‘Get Brexit Done’. Johnson’s belief was that he had enough support countrywide to gain a majority to push his Brexit mandate through parliament based on a parliamentary seat majority strategy. The increased availability of large-scale Twitter data provides rich information for the study of constituency dynamics. In Twitter, the location of tweets can be identified by the GPS and the location field. This provides a mechanism for location-based sentiment analysis which is the use of natural language processing or machine learning algorithms to extract, identify, or distinguish the sentiment content of a tweet (in our case), according to the location of origin of said tweet. This paper examines location-based Twitter sentiment for UK constituencies per country and aims to understand if location-based Twitter sentiment majorities per UK constituencies could determine the outcome of the UK Brexit election. Tweets are gathered from the whisperings of the UK Brexit election on September 4th 2019 until polling day, 12th December 2019. A Naive Bayes classification algorithm is applied to assess political public Twitter sentiment. We identify the sentiment of Twitter users per constituency per country towards the political parties’ mandate on Brexit and plot our findings for visualisation. We compare the grouping of location-based sentiment per constituency for each of the four UK countries to the final Brexit election first party results per constituency to determine the accuracy of location-based sentiment in determining the Brexit election result. Our results indicate that location-based sentiment had the single biggest effect on constituency result predictions in Northern Ireland and Scotland and a marginal effect on Wales base constituencies whilst there was no significant prediction accuracy to England’s constituencies. Decision tree, neural network, and Naïve Bayes machine learning algorithms are then created to forecast the election results per constituency using location-based sentiment and constituency-based data from the UK electorate at national level. The predictive accuracy of the machine learning models was compared comprehensively to a computed-baseline model. The comparison results show that the machine learning models outperformed the baseline model predicting Brexit Election constituency results at national level showing an accuracy rate of 97.87%, 95.74 and 93.62% respectively. The results indicate that location-based sentiment is a useful variable in predicting elections.

If killing a single person is considered as a major crime that forbidden by Sharia and law at the international level and at the level of all religions and divine legislation, so what about the concept of genocide!! Here, not just an individual with a weak influence on society is killed, but thousands of individuals, that means an entire nation, a future, energy and human and intellectual capabilities that can tip the scales, and on the other hand, broken and half-dead hearts are left behind from the horrific scenes of killing they witnessed before their eyes, moreover, the massacres of genocide continues to excrete its remnants and consequences for long years and for successive generations, and it may generate grudges of revenge among generations that did not receive the adequate awareness and psychological support which are necessary to rehabilitate these generations to benefit from the tragedies and bitter experiences of life to turn them into lessons and incentives to achieve progress and advancement. Genocide is a deadly poison whose toxic effect extends from generations to others unless it is wisely controlled. Here the role of the international community and its legal, legislative and humanitarian stance from these crimes is so important and supportive. Genocide can be occurred on two levels: external and internal. As for genocide on the external level: this is what happened at the hands of foreign powers against a certain people for colonial and expansionist goals in favor of the occupier or usurper. There are many examples throughout history, such as the Ottoman and British occupations...etc Whereas genocide at the internal level, can be defined as the repressive actions that governments practice against their own people for goals that could be extremist, racist or dictatorial, such as t ""Al-Anfal"" massacre in 1988 carried out by the previous regime against the Kurds in the Kurdistan region. The number of victims amounted at one hundred thousand martyrs, most of them were innocent and unarmed people from children, women and the elderly, and also the genocide which was practiced against of the organizers of Al-Shaibania Revolution in 1991 was another example of genocide in the internal level. It is possible to deduce a third level between the external and internal levels, which is the genocide that is done at the hands of internal elements from the people of the country, but in implementation of external agendas, for example, the scenes of organized and systematic sectarian killing that we witnessed daily during (2007) and (2008), followed by dozens of bloody explosions in various regions throughout the capital, which unfortunately was practiced by the people of the country who were misguided elements in order to destabilize the security of the country and we did not know until this moment in favor of which external party!! In the three aforementioned cases, nothing can justify the act of killing or genocide, but in my personal opinion, I see that genocide at the hands of foreign forces is less drastic effects than the genocides that done at the hands of internal forces that kill their own people to impose their control and to defense their survival, from the perspective of ""the survival for the strongest, the most criminal and the most dictatorial. The matter which actually dragged the country into the abyss and the ages of darkness and ignorance. As for the foreign occupier, he remains an occupier, and it is so natural for him to be resentful and spiteful and to keep moving with the bragging theory of that (the end justifies the means) and usurping lands illegally, but perhaps recently the occupier has begun to exploit loopholes in international laws and try to gain the support of the international community and international organizations to prove the legitimacy of what has no legitimacy, in the end to achieve goals which pour into the interest of the occupiers' country and from the principle of building the happiness and well-being of the occupiers' people at the expense of the misery and injustice of other peoples!! This remains absolutely dehumanizing societal crime, but at least it has a positive side, which is maximizing economic resources and thus achieving the welfare of a people at the expense of seizing the wealth of the occupied country. This remains the goal of the occupier since the beginning of creation to this day, but today the occupation associated with the horrific and systematic killing has begun to take a new template by framing the ugliness of the crime with humanitarian goals and the worst, to exploit religion to cover their criminal acts. A good example of this is the genocide that took place at the hands of the terrorist organization ISIS, that contradictory organization who adopted the religion which forbids killing and considers it as one of the greatest sins as a means to practice the most heinous types of killing that contemporary history has witnessed!! The ""Spiker"" and ""Sinjar"" massacres in 2014 are the best evidence of this duality in the ideology of this terrorist organization. We may note that the more we advance in time, the more justification for the crimes of murder and genocide increases. For example, we all know the first crimes of genocide represented by the fall of Baghdad at the hands of the Mongol leader ""Hulagu"" in 1258. At that time, the crimes of genocide did not need justification, as they were practiced openly and insolently for subversive, barbaric and criminal goals!! The question here imposes itself: why were the crimes of genocide in the past practiced openly and publicly without need to justify the ugliness of the act? And over time, the crimes of genocide began to be framed by pretexts to legitimize what is prohibited, and to permit what is forbidden!! Or to clothe brutality and barbarism in the patchwork quilt of humanity?? And with this question, crossed my mind the following ""Aya"" from the Glorious Quran (and do not kill the soul that God has forbidden except in the right) , this an explicit ""Aya"" that prohibits killing and permits it only in the right, through the use of the exception tool (except) that permits what coming after it . But the"" right"" that God describes in the glorious Quran has been translated by the human tongues into many forms and faces of falsehood!! Anyway, expect the answer of this controversial question within the results of this study. This study will discuss the axis of (ideologies of various types and genocide), as we will analyze excerpts from the speeches of the former regime that were announced on the local media after each act of genocide or purification, as the former regime described at that time, but the difference in this study is that the analysis will be according to a scientific and thoughtful approach which is far from the personal ideology of the researcher. The analysis will be based on a model proposed by the contemporary Dutch scientist ""Teun A. Van Dijk"". Born in 1943, ""Van Dijk"" is a distinguished scholar and teaching in major international universities. He has authored many approved books as curricula for teaching in the field of linguistics and political discourse analysis. In this study, Van Dijk's Model will be adopted to analyze political discourse ideologies according to forty-one criteria. The analysis process will be conducted in full transparency and credibility in accordance with these criteria without imposing the researcher's personal views. This study aims to shed light on the way of thinking that the dictatorial regimes adopt to impose their existence by force against the will of the people, which can be used to develop peoples' awareness to understand and analyze political statements in a scientific way away from the inherited ideologies imposed by customs, clan traditions, religion, doctrine and nationalism. With accurate scientific diagnosis, we put our hand on the wounds. So we can cure them and also remove the scars of these wounds. This is what we seek in this study, diagnosis and therefore suggesting the suitable treatment "

One of the leading Western Ukrainian diaspora journals – London «Liberation Way», founded in January 1949, has become the subject of the study for the first time in journalism. Archival documents and materials of the Ukrainian Publishing Union in London and the British National Library (British Library) were also observed. The peculiarities of the magazine’s formation and the specifics of the editorial policy, founders and publishers are clarified. A group of OUN members who survived Hitler’s concentration camps and ended up in Great Britain after the end of World War II initiated the foundation of the magazine. Until April 1951, including issue 42, the Board of Foreign Parts of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists were the publishers of the magazine. From 1951 to the beginning of 2000 it was a socio-political monthly of the Ukrainian Publishing Union. From the mid-60’s of the twentieth century – a socio-political and scientific-literary monthly. In analyzing the programmatic principles of the magazine, the most acute issues of the Ukrainian national liberation movement, which have long separated the forces of Ukrainian emigration and from which the founders and publishers of the magazine from the beginning had clearly defined positions, namely: ideology of Ukrainian nationalism, the idea of ​​unity of Ukraine and Ukrainians, internal inter-party struggle among Ukrainian emigrants have been singled out. The review and systematization of the thematic palette of the magazine’s publications makes it possible to distinguish the following main semantic accents: the formation of the nationalist movement in exile; historical Ukrainian themes; the situation in sub-Soviet Ukraine; the problem of the unity of Ukrainians in the Western diaspora; mission and tasks of Ukrainian emigration in the context of its responsibilities to the Motherland. It also particularizes the peculiarities of the formation of the author’s assets of the magazine and its place in the history of Ukrainian national journalism.

Major multilateral arms control and disarmament treaties dealing with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) often have mandated an international organization to monitor and verify State party compliance and to handle cases of non-compliance. There are marked differences in the mandates and technical capabilities of these bodies. Nonetheless, they often face the same operational and existential challenges. This report looks at the role of multilateral verification bodies, especially their secretariats, in dealing with compliance and enforcement, the extent to which they achieve “agency” and “influence” in doing so, and whether and how such capacities might be enhanced. In WMD organizations it is the governing bodies that make decisions about noncompliance and enforcement. The role of their secretariats is to manage the monitoring and verification systems, analyse the resulting data – and data from other permitted sources – and alert their governing bodies to suspicions of non-compliance. Secretariats are expected to be impartial, technically oriented and professional. It is when a serious allegation of non-compliance arises that their role becomes most sensitive politically and most vital. The credibility of Secretariats in these instances will depend on the agency and influence that they have accumulated. There are numerous ways in which an international secretariat can position itself for maximum agency and influence, essentially by making itself indispensable to member States and the broader international community. It can achieve this by engaging with multiple stakeholders, aiming for excellence in its human and technical resources, providing timely and sustainable implementation assistance, ensuring an appropriate organizational culture and, perhaps most of all, understanding that knowledge is power. The challenge for supporters of international verification organizations is to enhance those elements that give them agency and influence and minimize those that lead to inefficiencies, dysfunction and, most damaging of all, political interference in verification and compliance judgements.