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Journal articles on the topic 'Political lobbying'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 20 February 2023

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1

Rudenko, Olha. "Lobbying – political corruption or social compromise." Public administration and local government 45, no. 2 (July 23, 2020): 77–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.33287/102022.

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The article is devoted to the study of the relationship between the concepts of «lobbying» and «corruption». The author analyzes domestic scientific approaches to the definition of lobbying and an understanding of its role in finding a compromise between the interests of citizens, civil servants and representatives of the corporate sector. The identification of lobbying and corruption by a significant part of citizens, according to the researcher, is due to the lack of experience of civilized lobbying in Ukraine. But, the corporate sector realizes its interests through shadow lobbyism, which often borders on outright corruption. This gives rise to a latent social conflict, which has a number of negative consequences: low economic growth rates, the tendency of a significant proportion of citizens to break the rule of law, and the lack of political stability in our state. Particular attention is paid to the study of the norms of domestic anti-corruption legislation and draft laws published by domestic researchers and politicians, that was aimed at regulating lobbying in Ukraine. It has been ascertained that in spite of the rather wide variability of approaches to developing the circle of lobbying subjects, almost all authors of draft laws determine the list of officials who cannot be subjects of lobbying under any circumstances. We are talking about representatives of the armed forces, security structures, the judiciary and the like. Moreover, given the absence of legal regulation of lobbying and the list of officials whose activities are regulated by anti-corruption legislation, the existing shadow lobbyism is appropriate to attribute to corruption. In the process of research, the author convincingly argues that legal lobbying cannot be considered political corruption. The main difference between lobbying and corruption (in practice) is due to the ultimate goal of the process. An analysis of the norms of anti-corruption legislation indicates that after the adoption of any of the bills proposed by the lobbyists, corruption will be considered only the format of interaction between government officials and business representatives (or other initiative groups of citizens) that was not provide by the law. According to the author, a side effect of the adoption of the law on lobbyism will be a reduction in the list of acts that can be considered corruption, and therefore – an automatic reduction in the level of corruption in Ukraine.

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2

De Bruycker, Iskander, and Jan Beyers. "Lobbying strategies and success: Inside and outside lobbying in European Union legislative politics." European Political Science Review 11, no. 1 (October 25, 2018): 57–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773918000218.

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AbstractIn their pursuit of political influence, interest groups face the choice to contact policy elites directly or to generate pressure indirectly by appealing to the public at large. This article examines whether interest groups should prioritize inside or outside lobbying tactics in order to materialize their policy objectives, with a specific focus on European Union legislative policymaking. This article demonstrates that outside lobbying is not inherently more or less successful than inside lobbying; rather, the effect of inside or outside lobbying is conditional on the extent to which additional lobbying tactics are adopted and on the type of policy issues a lobbyist seeks to influence. The empirical approach of this article consists of an extensive media analysis and over 200 interviews with policy practitioners active on 78 policy proposals. The results indicate that outside lobbying leads to policy success when the lobbyist’s policy position enjoys popular endorsement within media debates and when the lobbyist engages in a coalition with other organized interests.

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3

Harris, Phil. "Political lobbying commentary." Psychology and Marketing 19, no. 12 (November 21, 2002): 987–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mar.10048.

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4

Abyzova, Larysa, and Kateryna Nechiporuk. "LOBBYING IN UKRAINE’S CURRENT POLITICAL COORDINATES." Almanac of Ukrainian Studies, no. 23 (2018): 8–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2520-2626/2018.23.1.

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Actualization of development problem of lobbying institution in legal, political and socio-cultural areas is caused not only by practical need in political development of Ukraine, but also by consequence of a general political science theoretical development. This article analyses the study of a powerful resource of political power - groups of pressure in the current political coordinates of Ukraine. Lobbyism is interpreted as a phenomenon conditioned by the peculiarities of American political process and American legislation, but it is emphasized that special mechanisms and methods of pressure on political government by non-governmental structures is inherent in any democratic system of government. It has been found that the system of pressure by "interested groups" is actively forming and operating in Ukraine, however, lobbyism in our country has not received proper coverage and legal regulation. The purpose of lobbying is to consolidate pressure groups’ interests or third parties’ interests in decisions management. It is noted that the methods of lobbyism that contain unlawful actions in spite of external decency (for example, corruption component) are used quite widely. The emphasis is made on the fact that most political decisions are not formed on the level of open official rule, but in the hidden process of rivalry, adaptation and regulation among numerous interested groups. Obviously, political leadership in Ukraine is largely controlled by large business structures. Currently in Ukraine there is awareness about a need in institutionalization of lobbyism as part of political and democratic process, which, under conditions of legally regulated use, can contribute to the formation of a promising strategy for the development of Ukrainian state. It is concluded that dynamics of political space development in Ukraine depend on the constructive interaction between state institutions and pressure groups.

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5

Karpova, N. V. "Political culture as a factor of civilized lobbying establishment in contemporary Russia." Moscow State University Bulletin. Series 18. Sociology and Political Science 24, no. 4 (January 12, 2019): 135–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.24290/1029-3736-2018-24-4-135-150.

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The article is devoted to the study of civilized lobbyism formation in contemporary Russia in the context of the political culture peculiarities. The author explains the use of the concept of “civilized lobbyism” from the standpoint of the presence of various interpretations of lobbying in political science, which prevents a clear separation of legitimate and illegitimate forms of interests’ representation, while the object of research is primarily the legal technologies of influence on power. Political culture is regarded as one of the subjective factors determining the functioning of the mechanisms of interests’ representation in the political system, as well as the specifics of lobbying activities in each particular state. The influence of political culture on the process of lobbying in Russia is analyzed not only at the level of political orientations and behavior of individuals and groups, but also at the level of institutional structures. To study the impact of the political culture on the formation of social practices of lobbying, the author refers to the institutional concept of D. North, in which the mechanism of functioning of social and political institutions is revealed through the correlation of formal and informal rules, norms, attitudes and behaviours. In the context of the development of the democratic representation of interests in contemporary Russia particular attention is given to the problem of preserving and dominating historically established authoritarian orientations in the relations of society and power, as well as the traditions of paternalism and clientellism. However, the author believes that it is not correct to reduce the influence from the political culture mostly to the national traditions. It is concluded that the fundamental condition for the development of civilized lobbying in present day Russia is the is the parallel formation of legal foundations and the corresponding matrix of political culture, both at the level of subjects of lobbying relations and at the level of interests’ representation institutions.

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6

Pavroz, A. V. "Trends, problems and prospects of lobbying in Russia." Moscow State University Bulletin. Series 18. Sociology and Political Science 24, no. 4 (January 12, 2019): 151–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.24290/1029-3736-2018-24-4-151-162.

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This article considers the features of the development and institutionalization of lobbyism in Russia. The author analyzes the problems of Russian lobbyism and notes the prospects for its further development. The article emphasizes the need to adopt a law on lobbying in Russia and points out that lobbying, as a socio-political institution, can become a means of systemically solving many problems of Russian society.

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7

Trofymenko, Anastasiia, and Dmytro Lubinets. "The main lobbying development trends in the United States of America." Історико-політичні проблеми сучасного світу, no. 39 (June 16, 2019): 156–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.31861/mhpi2019.39.156-163.

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The relevance of the issue of decreasing corruption in Ukraine causes the scientific interest in the study of such a political institution as lobbyism. An analysis of the global lobbying experience allows us to distinguish the lessons Ukraine can apply in this field. The article presents an analysis of the American lobbying model, since the United States was the first country to acknowledge and determine lobbying, as well as to develop the most advanced lobbying methods and technologies on the legislative level. The authors specify the main trends in the establishment and functioning of lobbying in the United States of America through studying the requirements of legislation in this field, imposed both on lobbyists and officials, considering ethical norms that lobbyists should be guided by in their work, subject-object determination of American lobbyism, and prevailing forms thereof in the state. As a result of the study carried out, it was found out that the legal framework for lobbying in the United States is based on the following: the principles of compulsory accountability and reporting of lobbyists and their clients, foreign clients, in particular; ethical standards of conduct for employees; restriction of lobbying for former civil servants; lobbying in all the branches of power; lobbying supervision and control by government agencies (these functions are entrusted to the Secretary of the Senate and Secretary of the House of Representatives) and the public, by lobbyists as well through establishing a Code of Lobbying Ethics, mediation between the client and the authorities. Keywords: lobbyism, lobbying, American model, Association of Government Relations Professionals, Code of Lobbying Ethics, lobby register.

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8

Le Breton, Michel, and François Salanie. "Lobbying under political uncertainty." Journal of Public Economics 87, no. 12 (December 2003): 2589–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(02)00142-1.

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9

CAMPOS, NAURO F., and FRANCESCO GIOVANNONI. "Political institutions, lobbying and corruption." Journal of Institutional Economics 13, no. 4 (April 4, 2017): 917–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137417000108.

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AbstractAlthough firms use various strategies to try to influence government policy, with lobbying and corruption chiefly among them, and political institutions play an important role in determining policy choices, very little research has been devoted to these topics. This paper tries to fill this gap. Using cross-country enterprise-level data, it investigates (1) the effect of a key political institution, namely electoral rules, on the probability that a firm engages in lobbying activities and (2) the impact of lobbying on influence, accounting for corruption and political institutions. The main conclusion is that lobbying is a significantly more effective way of generating political influence than corruption, and that electoral rules are a key mediating political institution. Our baseline estimate is that the probability of influencing government policy is 16% higher for firms that are members of lobbying groups than for those firms that are not.

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10

Dolgikh, Fedor I. "Lobbying in the USA as a Competitive Tool." Journal of Modern Competition 16, no. 5 (October 31, 2022): 116–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.37791/2687-0657-2022-16-5-116-129.

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The economic sphere of society in the United States is a highly competitive environment, within which there is a clash of various interest groups seeking to influence political decision-making in order to ensure the most favorable business conditions for themselves. The purpose of the study is to consider lobbying as a competitive tool for various business sectors in the United States. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve the following tasks: to analyze the features of the economic sphere of US society as a competitive environment; to consider the legal basis for regulating lobbying activities in the United States; to determine the methods of lobbying; to analyze the overall structure of lobbying expenses in the United States and determine the share of business expenses in various sectors; to determine the place of the two leading political parties in the United States – Democratic and Republican – in the process of lobbying the interests of various business sectors and the reasons for such a difference. The study covers the period of the 2020 election cycle in the United States. The problem of lobbying the interests of business sectors is considered on the example of the competition between Donald Trump and Joe Biden in the 2020 US presidential election. The work is based on a dialectical research method. According to the results of the study, the author comes to the conclusion that in the structure of lobbying activities, lobbying for business interests repeatedly prevails over lobbying for the interests of the non-profit sector. Lobbying is a form of competitive struggle, one of the ways to carry out competitive actions, an instrument of competition between various business sectors for the establishment of the most favorable conditions for their sector. According to the results of the 2020 presidential election, the communications and electronics sector won in the person of its key lobbyist, Democratic candidate Joe Biden. During the election campaign, both Trump and Biden used a marketing approach, “selling” their “political product” that expressed the interests of certain business sectors, certain groups of voters whose consumer preferences would allow them to “realize” this “product”. The intersectoral competition of various business sectors harmoniously integrated into the political competition of the two leading political parties in the United States.

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11

Yarovoy, Tikhon Sergeyevich. "OBJECTIVES AND FUNCTIONS OF LOBISTRY ACTIVITY IN UKRAINE: REALITIES TODAY AND EVOLUTIONARY FORECAST." UKRAINIAN ASSEMBLY OF DOCTORS OF SCIENCES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 1, no. 12 (February 14, 2018): 329–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.31618/vadnd.v1i12.74.

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The article is devoted to the research of goals and functions of lobbying activity. The author has processed the ideas of domestic and foreign scientists, proposed his own approaches to the definition of goals and functions of lobbying activities through the prism of public administration. As a result, a generalized vision of the goals and functions of lobbying activities as interrelated elements of the lobbying system was proposed, and a forecast for further evolution of the goals and functions of domestic lobbying was provided. The analysis of lobbying functions allowed us to notice the tendencies in shifting the goals of this activity. If the objectives were fully covered by functions such as mediation between citizens and the state, the information function and the function of organizing plurality of public interests, then the role of strengthening the self-organization of civil society and the function of compromise become increasingly important in the process of formation in the developed countries of civil society and the development of telecommunication technologies. Ukrainian lobbyism will not be left to the side of this process. Already, politicians of the highest level, leaders of financial and industrial groups have to act, adjust their goals (even if they are — declared), taking into account the reaction of the public. In the future, this trend will only increase. The analysis of current research and political events provides all grounds for believing that, while proper regulatory legislation is being formed in Ukraine, the goals and functions of domestic lobbying will essentially shift towards a compromise with the public. It is noted that in spite of the existence of a basic direction of action, lobbying may have several ramified goals. Guided by the goals set, lobbyism can manifest itself in various spheres of the political system of society, combining the closely intertwined interests of various actors in the lobbying process, or even — contrasting them.

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12

Cooper, Christopher A., and Maxime Boucher. "Lobbying and uncertainty: Lobbying's varying response to different political events." Governance 32, no. 3 (February 6, 2019): 441–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/gove.12385.

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13

Yarovoy, Tikhon Sergeyevich. "OBJECTIVES AND FUNCTIONS OF LOBISTRY ACTIVITY IN UKRAINE: REALITIES TODAY AND EVOLUTIONARY FORECAST." UKRAINIAN ASSEMBLY OF DOCTORS OF SCIENCES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 1, no. 11 (January 24, 2018): 329–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.31618/vadnd.v1i11.39.

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The article is devoted to the research of goals and functions of lobby- ing activity. The author has processed the ideas of domestic and foreign scientists, proposed his own approaches to the definition of goals and functions of lobbying activities through the prism of public administration. As a result, a generalized vision of the goals and functions of lobbying activities as interrelated elements of the lobbying system was proposed, and a forecast for further evolution of the goals and functions of domestic lobbying was provided.The analysis of lobbying functions allowed us to notice the tendencies in shift- ing the goals of this activity. If the objectives were fully covered by functions such as mediation between citizens and the state, the information function and the function of organizing plurality of public interests, then the role of strengthening the self-organization of civil society and the function of compromise become in- creasingly important in the process of formation in the developed countries of civil society and the development of telecommunication technologies.Ukrainian lobbyism will not be left to the side of this process. Already, politi- cians of the highest level, leaders of financial and industrial groups have to act, adjust their goals (even if they are — declared), taking into account the reaction of the public. In the future, this trend will only increase. The analysis of current research and political events provides all grounds for believing that, while proper regulatory legislation is being formed in Ukraine, the goals and functions of do- mestic lobbying will essentially shift towards a compromise with the public.It is noted that in spite of the existence of a basic direction of action, lobbying may have several ramified goals. Guided by the goals set, lobbyism can manifest itself in various spheres of the political system of society, combining the closely intertwined interests of various actors in the lobbying process, or even — contrast- ing them.

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14

Harvey, Anna L. "The Political Consequences of Suffrage Exclusion." Social Science History 20, no. 1 (1996): 97–132. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0145553200021556.

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By the close of the first decade following ratification of constitutional female suffrage in the United States, it had become commonplace to read of female political leaders bemoaning the inefficacy of women's lobbying organizations, which despite their lobbying efforts did not engage in any electoral activity such as the mobilization of female voters (see, for example,NYT10 March 1928: 3;NYT31 March 1931: 22). That this should have been the case raises an interesting question: Why not? That is, given the likelihood that women's votes would have increased the efficacy of these lobbying efforts, why weren't the leaders of women's lobbying organizations, in particular those of the former suffrage machine, the National League of Women Voters (NLWV), pursuing those votes?

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15

Guleryuz, Ece H. "Interest Groups and Political Economy of Public Education Spending." International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science (2147-4478) 4, no. 3 (July 22, 2015): 28–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.20525/ijrbs.v4i3.20.

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This paper examines the relationship between the lobbying power of different interest groups and public education spending in a panel data estimation during the period 1996-2009 for 132 countries. The resource rents, manufacture exports, and agriculture value added are used as proxy variables for the lobbying power of the natural resource owners, manufacturers, and landowners, respectively, in order to substantiate the definition of the lobbying power of the interest groups more with economic fundamentals. As lobbying power is mediated through political institutions, different governance indicators are used individually and in interaction terms with the proxy variables in the estimations. It is found that when the country is more politically stable and the more the rule of law applies, the negative (positive) effect of the lobbying power of natural resource owners (manufacturers) on public education spending intensifies. The negative effect of landowners’ lobbying power diminishes as institutional quality as measured by governance indicators improves.

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16

Che, Yeon-Koo, and IanL Gale. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply." American Economic Review 96, no. 4 (September 1, 2006): 1355–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/000282806779468490.

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17

Kaplan, ToddR, and David Wettstein. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment." American Economic Review 96, no. 4 (September 1, 2006): 1351–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/000282806779468517.

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18

Palekar, S. A. "Lobbying in American Political System." Indian Journal of Public Administration 51, no. 4 (October 2005): 826–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0019556120050405.

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19

Palekar, S. A. "Lobbying in American Political System." Indian Journal of Public Administration 52, no. 1 (January 2006): 115–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0019556120060108.

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20

Kaplan, Todd R., and David Wettstein. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment." American Economic Review 96, no. 4 (August 1, 2006): 1351–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.4.1351.

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21

Che, Yeon-Koo, and Ian L. Gale. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply." American Economic Review 96, no. 4 (August 1, 2006): 1355–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.4.1355.

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22

Bennedsen, Morten, and Sven E. Feldmann. "Informational lobbying and political contributions." Journal of Public Economics 90, no. 4-5 (May 2006): 631–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.08.003.

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23

Campos, Nauro F., and Francesco Giovannoni. "Lobbying, corruption and political influence." Public Choice 131, no. 1-2 (November 29, 2006): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9102-4.

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24

Yevtsenko, R. І. "THE PHENOMENON OF LOBBYING: INTERPRETATION OF THE NATURE AND MODELS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF ACTIVITIES." International and Political Studies, no. 35 (November 10, 2022): 157–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.18524/2707-5206.2022.35.263730.

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The article examines the phenomenon of lobbying as actual practice in a pluralistic society, as a complex, modern institution of the political system, which provides a mechanism and tools for the influence of interested groups on decision-making by power structures. Competition between groups in lobbying interests is represented by a condition that ensures freedom and justice without recourse to the concepts of "social interest", "public interest" or "common good". With the help of theoretical and conceptual studies focused on the mechanisms of collective actions of interested groups and interest groups, it is shown that political decisions in modern public systems are no longer the prerogative of official institutions of power, but are the result of a compromise of groups. Lobbying has acquired indicators that are characteristic of institutions that are involved in the decision-making process, and the structures of the organization of lobbying activities reflect the current structure of political interest. It is shown that the historical development of lobbying activities and forms of interpretation of lobbying practices in various socio-political systems developed in the context of the logic of the formation of the socio-political system. The analysis of current regional models of lobbying activity, formed in different socio-political conditions, reflects the nature of the interaction between interest groups in society and demonstrates dependence on the structures of political interest, providing information about who and how transforms it into political decisions and actions. The British-American model of individualized lobbying, formed as a result of the symbiosis of political activity and business, is presented; the continental European model of corporate representation, formed as a result of changes in the rules of the game between business and the state; the Eastern European model of institutionally controlled lobbying with elements of "clientelism". The center of gravity in matters of regulation of lobbying practices has certain options. If in the British model the regulatory process concerns, first of all, politicians (the object of lobbying), then in the American model the lobbyists themselves and the market for lobbying services are subject to state regulation. It is emphasized that the normative indicator of the intensity and effectiveness of lobbying activity is the ability of the political system to solve systemic challenges, which is understood as the number and quality of access points available in it, using which interest groups can join the decision-making process of state authorities

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25

Fedorkin, N. S. "Lobbizm as a structural element of the mechanism of functionation of socio-political systems." Moscow State University Bulletin. Series 18. Sociology and Political Science 24, no. 4 (January 12, 2019): 102–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.24290/1029-3736-2018-24-4-102-116.

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The article reveals the place and role of lobbying in socio-political systems mechanism of functioning in democratic countries. The American version of the group approach to politics and its perception of the European continent are considered in the historical context. The concept of lobbying as a certain activity of pressure groups its mechanism and functions are specified. The concepts of lobbying and corruption correlation is revealed. The features of lobbying in the developing countries are identified. Lobbying is considered as a formal and informal institution of sociopolitical systems mechanism of functioning.

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26

Andrews, Leighton. "The relationship of political marketing to political lobbying." European Journal of Marketing 30, no. 10/11 (October 1996): 68–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03090569610149809.

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27

Tripathi, Micky, Stephen Ansolabehere, and James M. Snyder. "Are PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked? New Evidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Act." Business and Politics 4, no. 2 (August 2002): 131–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1034.

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This paper uses newly available data from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Act to assess the argument that PAC contributions are used to gain access to legislators. First, we find a much stronger connection between lobbying and campaign contributions than previous statistical research has revealed—groups that have both a lobbyist and a PAC account for 70 percent of all interest group expenditures and 86 percent of all PAC contributions. Second, we find that groups that engage in relatively large amounts of lobbying-and therefore presumably have a high demand for access—allocate their campaign contributions differently than groups that do not. Groups that emphasize lobbying pay more attention to members' positions of power inside Congress, and less attention to members' electoral circumstances, than other groups. Groups that emphasize lobbying also appear to be more bipartisan and less ideological than other groups, giving more equally to both parties and more broadly across the ideological spectrum.

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Thibault Puech, Lucas. "Big Dairy: Global Tactics and Political Influence." Animal Ethics Review 3, no. 1 (February 7, 2023): 51–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.31009/aer.2023.v3.i1.04.

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This paper examines the extent to which the dairy industry engages in lobbying activities, measuring not only the methods they employ in this lobbying, but also the calculated outcomes. In doing so, the dairy industry can influence policy and surgically create their public image, all for the sake of expanding profits and providing for long-term business growth.

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29

Baron, David P. "Lobbying dynamics." Journal of Theoretical Politics 31, no. 3 (June 16, 2019): 403–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629819850630.

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Many if not most government policies, regulations, and laws continue in effect unless changed by the legislature, providing a natural dynamic to the political process. Lobbying is a ubiquitous component of that process and can affect both proposal making and voting. This paper characterizes Markov perfect equilibria of a dynamic legislative bargaining model with stable policies and durable coalitions despite lobbying. Interest groups aligned with challenges to the incumbent coalition have a greater willingness to pay than have the defending interest groups, but the defenders have a legislative incumbency advantage in needing to counter-lobby fewer legislators than the challengers lobby. If legislators are sufficiently patient, equilibria exist such that the defenders of the incumbent coalition are successful. More than a minimal majority may be lobbied by the challengers, and coalitions can be surplus. Lobbying can increase proposal power, resulting in a more unequal distribution within a coalition.

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30

Strong, Catherine, and Fran Tyler. "New Zealand media camouflage political lobbying." Pacific Journalism Review : Te Koakoa 23, no. 2 (November 30, 2017): 144–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.24135/pjr.v23i2.96.

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Political lobbyists are a part of government decision-making processes, and many countries have stringent regulations to ensure their activities are somewhat transparent, especially as some use ethically questionable tactics. In New Zealand, however, there are no similar legislative regulations and lobbyists can stay undetected while trying to influence policymaking. More concerning, however, is that the results of this study indicates that lobbyists are also able to skirt around scrutiny in New Zealand media because of current journalism practices. This research’s content analysis indicates the media neglects to identify lobby organisations, thereby allowing them to operate without detection of their agenda, leaving the public unaware of who is influencing decision makers.

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31

Breton, Michel Le, and Vera Zaporozhets. "Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty." Economic Journal 120, no. 543 (July 31, 2009): 281–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02295.x.

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32

Vining, Aidan R., Daniel M. Shapiro, and Bernhard Borges. "Building the firm's political (lobbying) strategy." Journal of Public Affairs 5, no. 2 (2005): 150–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/pa.17.

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33

Yim, Hyung Rok, Jiangyong Lu, and Seong-jin Choi. "Different role of lobbying and bribery on the firm performance in emerging markets." Multinational Business Review 25, no. 3 (September 18, 2017): 222–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mbr-07-2017-0050.

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Purpose Firms influence a government to their advantage in one of two ways: either through lobbying a government to change the rule, or through bribing bureaucrats to circumvent the rule. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether and under what conditions do corporate political activities facilitate firm growth in a multinational context, especially in developing economies. Design/methodology/approach This study is based on the data of the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey, conducted by the World Bank in the 2002 to 2006 period in 12 countries. To deal with a multilevel structure, the authors applied multilevel regression as the main analysis method. Findings The analysis reveals that both political activities are prevalent in emerging markets, but they play very different roles on firm growth. The authors also find that the effect of lobbying is more pronounced in politically durable countries where firms can secure their vested benefits by lobbying. Originality/value The paper contributes to the corporate political activities literature by investigating the distinguishing and contingent role of bribery and lobbying on firm performance.

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34

Kostyaev, S. "Korean Lobby in the U.S.: Free Trade Agreement, Military Cooperation." World Economy and International Relations, no. 8 (2010): 95–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2010-8-95-101.

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In the article, the specificity of the Korean lobbyism in the USA and its activity in a number of principal directions of the U.S.–South Korea relations are analyzed. A glimpse of lobbyism as a political system institute is provided, a comparison between Korean and other foreign lobbies is drawn. The lobbying of the own interests on the Korean part at both governmental and business level is examined.

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Ridge, Jason W., Amy Ingram, and Aaron D. Hill. "Beyond Lobbying Expenditures: How Lobbying Breadth and Political Connectedness Affect Firm Outcomes." Academy of Management Journal 60, no. 3 (June 2017): 1138–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2015.0584.

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Austen-Smith, David, and John R. Wright. "Counteractive Lobbying." American Journal of Political Science 38, no. 1 (February 1994): 25. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2111334.

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Ridge, Jason W., Aaron D. Hill, and Amy Ingram. "The Signaling Role of Politician Stock Ownership: Effects on Lobbying Intensity." Journal of Management 44, no. 5 (April 18, 2016): 2116–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206316642273.

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Adopting a signaling theory perspective, we argue that politician stock ownership sends signals of positive predispositions to firms, thereby alleviating some necessity for firms to emphasize lobbying expenditures to influence political action. Using data on congressional stock ownership, we find support for our arguments. We find that as the proportion of Congress owning stock in a firm increases, the firm decreases the intensity of lobbying. Furthermore, we find that the signals associated with stock-holding politicians with greater ability to affect the legislative agenda (i.e., affiliation with the majority party) relates to lobbying intensity. Our findings add to the literature on lobbying while also offering implications for practice and avenues for future research.

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Monem, Reza M. "Political costs and lobbying activity of Australian gold mining firms." Corporate Ownership and Control 3, no. 2 (2006): 35–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p5.

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This paper provides empirical evidence on the lobbying behaviour induced by political costs in the Australian gold mining industry. The Australian gold mining industry remained tax-exempt for nearly seven decades until 1 January 1991. Due to its rapid prosperity in the early 1980s, the industry came under intense political scrutiny in the mid- to late-1980s. In particular, in December 1985 a federal tax inquiry was commissioned which investigated the economic and social impact of removing the tax-exempt status of the industry. Using the voluntary submissions to the federal tax inquiry as a measure of lobbying activity, this study documents that gold mining firms’ lobbying positions were positively related to the quantity of recoverable gold reserves held by them and profitability of their operations. Results of this paper confirm findings in prior research that firm lobbying positions are consistent with the adverse economic consequences of regulatory changes

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KIM, IN SONG. "Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization." American Political Science Review 111, no. 1 (February 2017): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055416000654.

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Existing political economy models explain the politics of trade policy using inter-industry differences. However, this article finds that much of the variation in U.S. applied tariff rates in fact arises within industry. I offer a theory of trade liberalization that explains how product differentiation in economic markets leads to firm-level lobbying in political markets. High levels of product differentiation eliminates the collective action problem faced by exporting firms while import-competing firms need not fear product substitution. To test this argument, I construct a new dataset on lobbying by all publicly traded manufacturing firms from reports filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. I find that productive exporting firms are more likely to lobby to reduce tariffs, especially when their products are sufficiently differentiated. I also find that highly differentiated products have lower tariff rates. The results challenge the common focus on industry-level lobbying for protection.

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Strickland, James M. "Bifurcated lobbying in America: group benefits and lobbyist selection." Interest Groups & Advocacy 9, no. 2 (May 8, 2020): 131–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41309-020-00090-0.

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Konko, S. G. "FORMATION OF THE CONTINENTAL MODEL OF THE LEGAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING IN MODERN RUSSIA." Territory Development, no. 2(20) (2020): 45–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.32324/2412-8945-2020-2-45-50.

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Lobbying is essential part of a democratic society and it is impossible to deny its existence in modern Russia. Despite that fact, Russia had not officially recognized the existing phenomenon, and the relations in this area had not been regulated by law. Examine the experience of other countries and comparing it with known manifestations of lobbying in Russia, it is necessary to relate it to known models. This will make it possible to identify the state of development of this institution in our country, avoid the specific errors of the system, predict the possible direction of development and improvement of this mechanism. The study of the phenomenon of the emergence of vested interests, their place in the political system, as well as the concept of ‘lobbyism' and the mechanisms of its legal regulation led to the conclusion that a model of state corporatism has developed in Russia, and a continental model of the legal regime-regulation of lobbying. Research had revealed the need to improve and establish new institutions for the articulation of group interests, the adoption of a law on lobbying and the establishment of a public register of lobbyists.

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Editorial, Article. "About the round table “Lobbyism as an informal political institute: problems, national models, mechanisms and technologies”." Moscow State University Bulletin. Series 18. Sociology and Political Science 24, no. 4 (January 12, 2019): 99–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.24290/1029-3736-2018-24-4-99-101.

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On April 27, 2018 at the Department of Political Science and Sociology of Political Processes of the Faculty of Sociology of Moscow State University, a round table was held on the theme “Lobbyism as an Informal Political Institute: Problems, National Models, Mechanisms and Technologies”. The purpose of the round table was to discuss topical issues of lobbying as an informal political institution, a structural element of the mechanism of democratic systems. The analysis of the problem involved the consideration of lobbyism in historical, social, political, economic, cultural and methodological aspects. Current section proposes readers series of publications of those authors who participated in the round table, prepared on the basis of their speeches and sum-maries of the discussion materials.

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Feldman, P. J. "Conceptualization of approaches to the interpretation of the phenomenon of lobbying." Moscow State University Bulletin. Series 18. Sociology and Political Science 24, no. 4 (January 12, 2019): 180–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.24290/1029-3736-2018-24-4-180-187.

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In this article is made an attempt to conceptualize the phenomenon of political lobbyism. The author traces the evolution of the domestic scientific discourse devoted to the relevant problem and comes to the conclusion that it is necessary to return to its theoretical origins. In particular, he questions the applicability of the theory of interest groups and other pluralistic concepts for the study of domestic socio-political realities. As an alternative, a network paradigm is proposed, suggesting the existence of inseparable links between state and non-state actors. Within the framework of the concept of political networks, lobbying acts as one of the key communication mechanisms of hierarchically unorganized institutions and actors. In addition, the article notes a discord between strict (scientific) and philistine approaches to the interpretation of the phenomenon of lobbyism. In this regard, it seems necessary to clarify the content of this concept, taking into account the Russian political specifics.

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Bernhagen, Patrick, and Thomas Bräuninger. "Structural Power and Public Policy: A Signaling Model of Business Lobbying in Democratic Capitalism." Political Studies 53, no. 1 (March 2005): 43–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00516.x.

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This paper develops a signaling model of corporate lobbying in democratic capitalist societies to analyze the conditions that lead to a powerful political position of business. Proceeding from the traditional dichotomy of structural economic determinants versus business' political action, our model predicts the conditions under which elected political decisionmakers modify their policy pledges to accommodate business' political preferences, or override business' lobbying messages and honor their pledges. Our results show that the structural power of business over public policy is contingent on two variables: the size of reputation costs of business in relation to its material costs of lobbying; and the ratio of the policymaker's reputation constraints from policy commitments and campaign pledges to the electoral costs arising from adverse effects of policy. We evaluate our model using case studies of business lobbying on environmental and financial services regulation in Britain and Germany.

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Kim, Sung Eun, and Johannes Urpelainen. "When and how can advocacy groups promote new technologies? Conditions and strategies for effectiveness." Journal of Public Policy 33, no. 3 (October 10, 2013): 259–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x13000159.

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AbstractWhen and how can advocacy groups influence the diffusion of new technologies, such as wind power? We examine the relationship between two different strategies that advocacy groups can adopt: political lobbying and campaigns aimed at potential end users of the new technology. Our game-theoretic analysis shows that without the opportunity to engage in political lobbying, end user campaigns by an advocacy group have the counterproductive effect of reducing the government's incentive to subsidise the new technology. Instead of supporting the advocacy group's campaigning, the government free rides on the social movement's campaigning efforts. While political lobbying cannot prevent free riding, it increases the government's incentive to subsidise the new technology, and thus increases the advocacy group's payoff. These findings suggest that advocacy groups can promote technology diffusion if they can effectively deploy a dual strategy of political lobbying and end user campaigning.

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Stoilova, Veronika. "The Role of Lobbying in the Decision-Making Process in the European Union." International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION 27, no. 2 (June 1, 2021): 219–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/kbo-2021-0077.

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Abstract Lobbying in the modern world is becoming part of decision-making processes at the local, state, supranational and global levels. The lobbying process is characterized by the use of various techniques and tools, which is why there are many definitions. In the European Union, it is perceived as a European representation of interests, through which different groups try to influence the decision-making process in the various institutions. Lobbying is often referred to when it is necessary to describe a particular political process, event or phenomenon that has not reached the general public or has remained opaque due to its specific nature. As lobbying becomes increasingly important, this article aims to clarify what lobbying is and what its legitimate and acceptable forms are. It is not without reason that there is a general distrust of the lobbying process and, in particular, of the real intentions of lobbyists. Therefore, many people believe that such activities distort the political process in terms of transparency, integrity and influence. Given the sensitive nature of the topic of lobbying, some good practices from existing lobbying rules at European level will also be considered.

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Ragimov, A. T. "PROBLEMS OF LEGAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING IN RUSSIA." Law Нerald of Dagestan State University 38, no. 2 (2021): 13–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.21779/2224-0241-2021-38-2-13-17.

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The article examines the problems of the emergence of lobbying in general as a socio-political, including legal phenomenon. Lobbying is considered as one of the possible forms, the use of which can minimize the costs of political and, above all, managerial processes. In this context, it can dramatically affect the extent of corruption in a particular country. According to the author, the legal regulation of lobbying activities in Russia does not find proper political and legal support. However, the research of scientists is increasingly making this problem relevant.

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Timtchenko, A. N. "Lobbizm in Russia in the context of models of political decision making: is evolution possible?" Moscow State University Bulletin. Series 18. Sociology and Political Science 24, no. 4 (January 12, 2019): 168–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.24290/1029-3736-2018-24-4-168-179.

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The Russian political system decision-making models are evolutionizing. Following the trend lobbying models and methods evolve from policy managing to informal practice. The analytical policy-managerial cycle model shows lowering of public and rising corporative lobbying tools. Which remove the lobbing institutionalisation problem. Russia legislative and managerial institutionalisation examples verify lobbying evolution from interest accommodation framework to obligatory tool for policy and public representatives interactions via lobbyists.

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Bombardini, Matilde, and Francesco Trebbi. "Empirical Models of Lobbying." Annual Review of Economics 12, no. 1 (August 2, 2020): 391–413. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-024350.

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This article offers a review of the recent empirical literature on lobbying within political economy. In surveying extant research, we emphasize quid pro quo and informational issues in special interest politics and highlight crucial open questions in both. The two main unresolved methodological issues remain ( a) how to account for the impact of lobbying on which equilibrium policies are chosen and advanced and ( b) how distorted those equilibrium policies are relative to the social optimum. Of the principal open questions within political economy, a comprehensive, quantitative assessment of the welfare effects of lobbying remains one of the most elusive.

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Kanevskiy, P. S. "Development of lobbying in Russia: pre-revolutionary and Soviet periods." Moscow State University Bulletin. Series 18. Sociology and Political Science 27, no. 4 (November 19, 2021): 192–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.24290/1029-3736-2021-27-4-192-215.

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The article is dedicated to the political, sociological and historical analysis of lobbying development in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. This article opens a series of two articles on the genesis of the institution of lobbying in Russia. Numerous discussions on lobbying in Russia over the past three decades boil down to arguments that the country is not ready to institutionalize interaction between interest groups and the government. There is a widespread opinion that this institution is not rooted in Russian political culture and political traditions. However, analysis of interest groups and their interactions with the government in diﬀerent periods of Russian history allows us to conclude that this is not a new phenomenon. Analysis of how of lobbying was formed, ﬁrst under the monarchy, then in Soviet times contributes to a better understanding of the way mechanisms of interest representation evolved over time. It also helps to understand how these mechanisms gave birth to informal lobbying practices that were evolving in the 1990s and why lobbying activities continue to take place in the shadows and under unclear rules of the game.

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