Relevant bibliographies by topics / Political lobbying

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Political lobbying'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 20 February 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Political lobbying"

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Rudenko, Olha. "Lobbying – political corruption or social compromise." Public administration and local government 45, no. 2 (July 23, 2020): 77–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.33287/102022.

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The article is devoted to the study of the relationship between the concepts of «lobbying» and «corruption». The author analyzes domestic scientific approaches to the definition of lobbying and an understanding of its role in finding a compromise between the interests of citizens, civil servants and representatives of the corporate sector. The identification of lobbying and corruption by a significant part of citizens, according to the researcher, is due to the lack of experience of civilized lobbying in Ukraine. But, the corporate sector realizes its interests through shadow lobbyism, which often borders on outright corruption. This gives rise to a latent social conflict, which has a number of negative consequences: low economic growth rates, the tendency of a significant proportion of citizens to break the rule of law, and the lack of political stability in our state. Particular attention is paid to the study of the norms of domestic anti-corruption legislation and draft laws published by domestic researchers and politicians, that was aimed at regulating lobbying in Ukraine. It has been ascertained that in spite of the rather wide variability of approaches to developing the circle of lobbying subjects, almost all authors of draft laws determine the list of officials who cannot be subjects of lobbying under any circumstances. We are talking about representatives of the armed forces, security structures, the judiciary and the like. Moreover, given the absence of legal regulation of lobbying and the list of officials whose activities are regulated by anti-corruption legislation, the existing shadow lobbyism is appropriate to attribute to corruption. In the process of research, the author convincingly argues that legal lobbying cannot be considered political corruption. The main difference between lobbying and corruption (in practice) is due to the ultimate goal of the process. An analysis of the norms of anti-corruption legislation indicates that after the adoption of any of the bills proposed by the lobbyists, corruption will be considered only the format of interaction between government officials and business representatives (or other initiative groups of citizens) that was not provide by the law. According to the author, a side effect of the adoption of the law on lobbyism will be a reduction in the list of acts that can be considered corruption, and therefore – an automatic reduction in the level of corruption in Ukraine.
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De Bruycker, Iskander, and Jan Beyers. "Lobbying strategies and success: Inside and outside lobbying in European Union legislative politics." European Political Science Review 11, no. 1 (October 25, 2018): 57–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773918000218.

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AbstractIn their pursuit of political influence, interest groups face the choice to contact policy elites directly or to generate pressure indirectly by appealing to the public at large. This article examines whether interest groups should prioritize inside or outside lobbying tactics in order to materialize their policy objectives, with a specific focus on European Union legislative policymaking. This article demonstrates that outside lobbying is not inherently more or less successful than inside lobbying; rather, the effect of inside or outside lobbying is conditional on the extent to which additional lobbying tactics are adopted and on the type of policy issues a lobbyist seeks to influence. The empirical approach of this article consists of an extensive media analysis and over 200 interviews with policy practitioners active on 78 policy proposals. The results indicate that outside lobbying leads to policy success when the lobbyist’s policy position enjoys popular endorsement within media debates and when the lobbyist engages in a coalition with other organized interests.
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Harris, Phil. "Political lobbying commentary." Psychology and Marketing 19, no. 12 (November 21, 2002): 987–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mar.10048.

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Abyzova, Larysa, and Kateryna Nechiporuk. "LOBBYING IN UKRAINE’S CURRENT POLITICAL COORDINATES." Almanac of Ukrainian Studies, no. 23 (2018): 8–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2520-2626/2018.23.1.

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Actualization of development problem of lobbying institution in legal, political and socio-cultural areas is caused not only by practical need in political development of Ukraine, but also by consequence of a general political science theoretical development. This article analyses the study of a powerful resource of political power - groups of pressure in the current political coordinates of Ukraine. Lobbyism is interpreted as a phenomenon conditioned by the peculiarities of American political process and American legislation, but it is emphasized that special mechanisms and methods of pressure on political government by non-governmental structures is inherent in any democratic system of government. It has been found that the system of pressure by "interested groups" is actively forming and operating in Ukraine, however, lobbyism in our country has not received proper coverage and legal regulation. The purpose of lobbying is to consolidate pressure groups’ interests or third parties’ interests in decisions management. It is noted that the methods of lobbyism that contain unlawful actions in spite of external decency (for example, corruption component) are used quite widely. The emphasis is made on the fact that most political decisions are not formed on the level of open official rule, but in the hidden process of rivalry, adaptation and regulation among numerous interested groups. Obviously, political leadership in Ukraine is largely controlled by large business structures. Currently in Ukraine there is awareness about a need in institutionalization of lobbyism as part of political and democratic process, which, under conditions of legally regulated use, can contribute to the formation of a promising strategy for the development of Ukrainian state. It is concluded that dynamics of political space development in Ukraine depend on the constructive interaction between state institutions and pressure groups.
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Karpova, N. V. "Political culture as a factor of civilized lobbying establishment in contemporary Russia." Moscow State University Bulletin. Series 18. Sociology and Political Science 24, no. 4 (January 12, 2019): 135–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.24290/1029-3736-2018-24-4-135-150.

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The article is devoted to the study of civilized lobbyism formation in contemporary Russia in the context of the political culture peculiarities. The author explains the use of the concept of “civilized lobbyism” from the standpoint of the presence of various interpretations of lobbying in political science, which prevents a clear separation of legitimate and illegitimate forms of interests’ representation, while the object of research is primarily the legal technologies of influence on power. Political culture is regarded as one of the subjective factors determining the functioning of the mechanisms of interests’ representation in the political system, as well as the specifics of lobbying activities in each particular state. The influence of political culture on the process of lobbying in Russia is analyzed not only at the level of political orientations and behavior of individuals and groups, but also at the level of institutional structures. To study the impact of the political culture on the formation of social practices of lobbying, the author refers to the institutional concept of D. North, in which the mechanism of functioning of social and political institutions is revealed through the correlation of formal and informal rules, norms, attitudes and behaviours. In the context of the development of the democratic representation of interests in contemporary Russia particular attention is given to the problem of preserving and dominating historically established authoritarian orientations in the relations of society and power, as well as the traditions of paternalism and clientellism. However, the author believes that it is not correct to reduce the influence from the political culture mostly to the national traditions. It is concluded that the fundamental condition for the development of civilized lobbying in present day Russia is the is the parallel formation of legal foundations and the corresponding matrix of political culture, both at the level of subjects of lobbying relations and at the level of interests’ representation institutions.
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Pavroz, A. V. "Trends, problems and prospects of lobbying in Russia." Moscow State University Bulletin. Series 18. Sociology and Political Science 24, no. 4 (January 12, 2019): 151–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.24290/1029-3736-2018-24-4-151-162.

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This article considers the features of the development and institutionalization of lobbyism in Russia. The author analyzes the problems of Russian lobbyism and notes the prospects for its further development. The article emphasizes the need to adopt a law on lobbying in Russia and points out that lobbying, as a socio-political institution, can become a means of systemically solving many problems of Russian society.
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Trofymenko, Anastasiia, and Dmytro Lubinets. "The main lobbying development trends in the United States of America." Історико-політичні проблеми сучасного світу, no. 39 (June 16, 2019): 156–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.31861/mhpi2019.39.156-163.

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The relevance of the issue of decreasing corruption in Ukraine causes the scientific interest in the study of such a political institution as lobbyism. An analysis of the global lobbying experience allows us to distinguish the lessons Ukraine can apply in this field. The article presents an analysis of the American lobbying model, since the United States was the first country to acknowledge and determine lobbying, as well as to develop the most advanced lobbying methods and technologies on the legislative level. The authors specify the main trends in the establishment and functioning of lobbying in the United States of America through studying the requirements of legislation in this field, imposed both on lobbyists and officials, considering ethical norms that lobbyists should be guided by in their work, subject-object determination of American lobbyism, and prevailing forms thereof in the state. As a result of the study carried out, it was found out that the legal framework for lobbying in the United States is based on the following: the principles of compulsory accountability and reporting of lobbyists and their clients, foreign clients, in particular; ethical standards of conduct for employees; restriction of lobbying for former civil servants; lobbying in all the branches of power; lobbying supervision and control by government agencies (these functions are entrusted to the Secretary of the Senate and Secretary of the House of Representatives) and the public, by lobbyists as well through establishing a Code of Lobbying Ethics, mediation between the client and the authorities. Keywords: lobbyism, lobbying, American model, Association of Government Relations Professionals, Code of Lobbying Ethics, lobby register.
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Le Breton, Michel, and François Salanie. "Lobbying under political uncertainty." Journal of Public Economics 87, no. 12 (December 2003): 2589–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(02)00142-1.

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CAMPOS, NAURO F., and FRANCESCO GIOVANNONI. "Political institutions, lobbying and corruption." Journal of Institutional Economics 13, no. 4 (April 4, 2017): 917–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137417000108.

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AbstractAlthough firms use various strategies to try to influence government policy, with lobbying and corruption chiefly among them, and political institutions play an important role in determining policy choices, very little research has been devoted to these topics. This paper tries to fill this gap. Using cross-country enterprise-level data, it investigates (1) the effect of a key political institution, namely electoral rules, on the probability that a firm engages in lobbying activities and (2) the impact of lobbying on influence, accounting for corruption and political institutions. The main conclusion is that lobbying is a significantly more effective way of generating political influence than corruption, and that electoral rules are a key mediating political institution. Our baseline estimate is that the probability of influencing government policy is 16% higher for firms that are members of lobbying groups than for those firms that are not.
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Dolgikh, Fedor I. "Lobbying in the USA as a Competitive Tool." Journal of Modern Competition 16, no. 5 (October 31, 2022): 116–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.37791/2687-0657-2022-16-5-116-129.

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The economic sphere of society in the United States is a highly competitive environment, within which there is a clash of various interest groups seeking to influence political decision-making in order to ensure the most favorable business conditions for themselves. The purpose of the study is to consider lobbying as a competitive tool for various business sectors in the United States. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve the following tasks: to analyze the features of the economic sphere of US society as a competitive environment; to consider the legal basis for regulating lobbying activities in the United States; to determine the methods of lobbying; to analyze the overall structure of lobbying expenses in the United States and determine the share of business expenses in various sectors; to determine the place of the two leading political parties in the United States – Democratic and Republican – in the process of lobbying the interests of various business sectors and the reasons for such a difference. The study covers the period of the 2020 election cycle in the United States. The problem of lobbying the interests of business sectors is considered on the example of the competition between Donald Trump and Joe Biden in the 2020 US presidential election. The work is based on a dialectical research method. According to the results of the study, the author comes to the conclusion that in the structure of lobbying activities, lobbying for business interests repeatedly prevails over lobbying for the interests of the non-profit sector. Lobbying is a form of competitive struggle, one of the ways to carry out competitive actions, an instrument of competition between various business sectors for the establishment of the most favorable conditions for their sector. According to the results of the 2020 presidential election, the communications and electronics sector won in the person of its key lobbyist, Democratic candidate Joe Biden. During the election campaign, both Trump and Biden used a marketing approach, “selling” their “political product” that expressed the interests of certain business sectors, certain groups of voters whose consumer preferences would allow them to “realize” this “product”. The intersectoral competition of various business sectors harmoniously integrated into the political competition of the two leading political parties in the United States.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Political lobbying"

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Lewis, Barbara Bolt. "Ohio Lobbying /." The Ohio State University, 1992. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1487776210796785.

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Jaatinen, Miia. "Lobbying political issues : a contingency model of effective lobbying strategies /." Helsinki : Inforviestintä, 1999. http://www.gbv.de/dms/sub-hamburg/311360769.pdf.

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You, Hye Young. "Three Essays on Lobbying." Thesis, Harvard University, 2014. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:11455.

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My dissertation consists of three essays on lobbying activities by special interest groups. The first paper, "Ex Post Lobbying," systematically documents ex post lobbying, the process by which firms allocate resources during the implementation stage after congressional authorization. Previous theories assume all lobbying is done ex ante, where lobbying activities occur before Congress votes. However, my analysis of over 633,731 lobbying reports demonstrates that almost half of lobbying activity from 1998 to 2012, that targeted specific bills, occurred ex post. I argue that the goal of ex post lobbying is to allow firms to bargain over private benefits that will arise from legislation by targeting regulatory rule-making processes that clarify non-specific parts of bills. Ex post lobbying provides a chance for non-participants in the ex ante lobbying stage to claim their share from government policy.
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Jaffard, Pierre(Pierre J. ). "Lobbying as a hedge on political risk : when size matters." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2020. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/126971.

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Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, May, 2020
Cataloged from the official PDF of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 51-53).
I develop a three-period asset pricing model with heterogeneity in firms size and a government that introduces a policy distortion. I find that large firms can better hedge the political uncertainty associated with this policy change through lobbying, which leads them to earn lower expected returns. I provide two strands of empirical evidence consistent with the model predictions. The first one looks at the behavior of a blue versus red industries around the unexpected results of the 2016 US Presidential election. The second one uses portfolio sorting and double-sorting to reach consistent conclusions.
by Pierre Jaffard.
S.M. in Management Research
S.M.inManagementResearch Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management
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Dinan, William. "Lobbying and devolution : policy and political communication in Scotland, 1997-2003." Thesis, University of Stirling, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/26826.

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This thesis examines the growth of commercial lobbying in Scotland with the devolution of political power to Edinburgh in 1999. The study analyses the nascent public affairs community in Edinburgh in the lead up to, and during, the first session of the Scottish Parliament. This period covers the public debate at Holyrood over the registration and regulation of outside interests, and examines both the public and private political communication of those actors involved. The evidence base for this thesis is drawn from archival and documentary research, extended observational fieldwork in Edinburgh, and in depth interviews with informants from lobbying consultancies, corporations, voluntary sector organisations, elected representatives and public servants. A key focus of this study is the role of commercial and corporate lobbyists in Scottish public affairs and the Scottish public sphere. The analysis concludes that the Scottish Parliament's founding principles of openness, equality and accountability could be served through the regulation of lobbying.
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Unsal, Omer. "Political Contributions and Firm Performance: Evidence from Lobbying and Campaign Donations." ScholarWorks@UNO, 2017. http://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/2361.

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The following dissertation contains two distinct empirical essays which contribute to the overall field of Financial Economics. Chapter 1 titles as “Corporate Lobbying, CEO Political Ideology and Firm Performance”. We investigate the influence of CEO political orientation on corporate lobbying efforts. Specifically, we study whether CEO political ideology, in terms of manager-level campaign donations, determines the choice and amount of firm lobbying involvement and the impact of lobbying on firm value. We find a generous engagement in lobbying efforts by firms with Republican leaning-managers, which lobby a larger number of bills and have higher lobbying expenditures. However, the cost of lobbying offsets the benefit for firms with Republican CEOs. We report higher agency costs of free cash flow, lower Tobin’s Q, and smaller increases in buy and hold abnormal returns following lobbying activities for firms with Republican managers, compared to Democratic and Apolitical rivals. Overall, our results suggest that the effects of lobbying on firm performance vary across firms with different managerial political orientations. Chapter 2 titled as “Corporate Lobbying and Labor Relations: Evidence from Employee” Litigations. We utilize employee litigations and other work-related complaints to examine if lobbying firms are favored in judicial process. We gather 27,794 employee lawsuits (after initial court hearing) between 2000 and 2014 and test the relationship between employee allegations and firms’ lobbying strategies. We find that employee litigations increase the number of labor-related bills in our sample. We document that the increase in employee lawsuits may drive firms into lobbying to change policy proposals. We also find robust evidence that the case outcome is different for lobbying firms compared to non-lobbying rivals, which may protect the shareholder wealth in the long run. Our results present that lobbying activities may make a significant difference in employee allegations. Our findings highlight the benefit of building political capital to obtain a biased outcome in favor of politically-connected firms.
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Nielsen, Fredrik. "Lobbying and democratic policymaking : A study on the impacts of lobbying on democratic policymaking in the European Union." Thesis, Karlstad University, Faculty of Social and Life Sciences, 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-943.

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The overreaching purpose of this study is to examine in what ways lobbying contributes to democratic policymaking in the European Union. Having limited amount of time, a case study has been conducted with the main purpose to examine what impacts lobbying have on the proposed EU-legislation to lower CO2 emissions from newly produced cars, in terms of democratic policymaking. The lobby groups in this case being ACEA and T&E. In order to fulfill the purpose a comprehensive research question is formulated: What impacts do ACEA and T&E have on the proposed EU-legislation to lower the CO2 emissions from newly produced cars, in terms of democratic policymaking?

The theory and definitions of democratic policymaking were drawn from Rinus van Schendelen´s book “Machiavelli in Brussels; The Art of Lobbying the EU”. Definitions of different components essential to democratic policymaking were given here and used together with the material on ACEA and T&E to answer the research question.

The material was based on documents, press-statements, speeches and publications from the European Union, ACEA and T&E to find out how ACEA and T&E lobbied the proposed legislation.

The study has shown mostly positive impacts from ACEA and T&E on the proposed EU-legislation to lower the CO2 emissions from newly produced cars, in terms of democratic policymaking. For the overreaching purpose the conclusion is that lobbying therefore contributes mostly in a positive way to democratic policymaking in the European Union.

This study can in the future be used in further studies to see what impacts lobby groups have on democratic policymaking in the European Union and also in studies concerning how lobby groups carry out their lobbying.

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Wilson, John Kyle. "Essays in public policy : rent seeking, compliance and indirect lobbying /." Title page, table of contents and abstract only, 2004. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09PH/09phw7463.pdf.

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Cheng, I.-Hui. "Three essays on political economy, trade and international economic integration." Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.314295.

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Tien, Hung-Hua. "Strategic lobbying and taxation choice : a political economy of trade policy analysis." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1999. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/59196/.

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In this thesis, I use a political economy of trade policy approach to analyze the issues of strategic lobbying and taxation choice. The thesis contains 4 papers together with an introduction, literature review and conclusion. In Chapter 3, a lobbying-influence model is presented to discuss how the outcomes of trade policy is influenced by lobbying activities during the policymaking process. A comparison of the welfare-maximizing model and the lobbying-influence model under a game theory framework is undertaken. Chapter 4 provides a new explanation on the issue of asymmetric lobbying from the view point of the impact of external environment. Since the incentive of the domestic firm to engage in lobbying activities varies with its marginal costs, the outcomes of lobbying performance are different. This argument holds for both complete and incomplete information settings. Chapter 5 considers whether there is a positive role for lobbying activities in an incomplete information setting when the foreign entry is incorporated. The results suggest that the social welfare under the pooling equilibrium is higher than that under the separating equilibrium. As a result, there is no positive role for lobbying activities in this two-period model. Chapter 6 provides a political economy model to explain why trade taxes rather than more efficient income taxes might be adopted and what links the taxation choice and the economic development. In general, people prefers to pay less tax to the government. In a democratic society, a policy, which yields a higher utility to the majority of voters, is supported through majority voting. Therefore, the choice of taxation instruments depends on the tax payments, which are determined by the tax method, the income level, and the movement of income distribution over time.
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Books on the topic "Political lobbying"

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Political diplomacy & lobbying. Ratmalana, Sri Lanka: Vishva Lekha, 2007.

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Webster, Hugh K. Lobbying and political expenditures. [Washington, D.C.]: Tax Management Inc., 2002.

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Sandak, Cass R. Lobbying. New York: Twenty-First Century Books, 1995.

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Directory of political lobbying, 2002. London: Politico's, 2002.

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Campos, Nauro F. Lobbying, corruption and political influence. Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2006.

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Politico's guide to political lobbying. London: Politico's, 2000.

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Margaret, Moran, and Sanders Adrian, eds. Lobbying government: A guide to lobbying on housing issues. Coventry: Chartered Institute of Housing, 1999.

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Jaatinen, Miia. Lobbying political issues: The contingency model of effective lobbying strategies. Helsinki: Inforviestintä Oy, 1999.

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Descheemaekere, François. Le cyber lobbying. Paris: Hermès science pub., 2007.

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Lobbying: The art of political persuasion. Petersfield, Hampshire: Harriman House, 2008.

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Book chapters on the topic "Political lobbying"

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Garner, Robert. "Lobbying for Animals." In Political Animals, 93–108. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26438-4_5.

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Gregor, Martin. "Lobbying Mechanisms." In Studies in Political Economy, 17–52. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44582-3_2.

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Che, Yeon-Koo, and Ian L. Gale. "Caps on Political Lobbying." In 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, 337–45. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_19.

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Berg, Kati Tusinski, and Sarah Bonewits Feldner. "Political Public Relations and Lobbying." In Political Public Relations, 270–86. Second Edition. | New York : Routledge, 2020. | “First edition published by Routledge 2011”--T.p. verso.: Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351053143-13.

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Morris, Trevor, and Simon Goldsworthy. "Lobbying, Political and Government PR." In PR Today, 121–39. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-34679-6_6.

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Morris, Trevor, and Simon Goldsworthy. "Lobbying, Political and Government PR." In PR today, 109–25. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-49570-9_6.

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Sloof, Randolph. "Lobbying or Pressure?" In Game-theoretic Models of the Political Influence of Interest Groups, 123–85. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5307-3_5.

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Sloof, Randolph. "Lobbying Politicians or Bureaucrats?" In Game-theoretic Models of the Political Influence of Interest Groups, 187–240. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5307-3_6.

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Koehler, Sebastian. "Process Uncertainty: Political Decision-Making." In Lobbying, Political Uncertainty and Policy Outcomes, 41–55. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97055-4_3.

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Ceccarini, Luigi. "Political Participation." In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Interest Groups, Lobbying and Public Affairs, 1–11. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13895-0_141-1.

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Conference papers on the topic "Political lobbying"

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Soņeca, Viktorija. "Tehnoloģiju milžu ietekme uz suverēnu." In The 8th International Scientific Conference of the Faculty of Law of the University of Latvia. University of Latvia Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.22364/iscflul.8.1.18.

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In the last two decades, we have seen the rise of companies providing digital services. Big Tech firms have become all-pervasive, playing critical roles in our social interactions, in the way we access information, and in the way we consume. These firms not only strive to be dominant players in one market, but with their giant monopoly power and domination of online ecosystems, they want to become the market itself. They are gaining not just economic, but also political power. This can be illustrated by Donald Trump’s campaigns, in which he attempted to influence the sovereign will, as the sovereign power is vested in the people. The Trump campaigns' use of Facebook's advertising tools contributed to Trump's win at the 2016 presidential election. After criticism of that election, Facebook stated that it would implement a series of measures to prevent future abuse. For example, no political ads will be accepted in the week before an election. Another example of how Big Tech firms can effect the sovereign is by national legislator. For example, Australia had a dispute with digital platforms such as Facebook and Google. That was because Australia began to develop a News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Code. To persuade the Australian legislature to abandon the idea of this code, Facebook prevented Australian press publishers, news media and users from sharing/viewing Australian as well as international news content, including blocking information from government agencies. Such action demonstrated how large digital platforms can affect the flow of information to encourage the state and its legislature to change their position. Because of such pressure, Australia eventually made adjustments to the code in order to find a compromise with the digital platform. Also, when we are referring to political power, it should include lobbying and the European Union legislator. Tech giants are lobbying their interests to influence the European Union’s digital policy, which has the most direct effect on member states, given that the member states are bound by European Union law.
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Tassinari, Giorgio, Fabrizio Alboni, Arianna Tassinari, and Ignazio Drudi. "STRINGENCY OF COVID-19 RESTRICTIONS AMONG ITALIAN REGIONS AND THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS." In 6th International Scientific Conference ERAZ - Knowledge Based Sustainable Development. Association of Economists and Managers of the Balkans, Belgrade, Serbia, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.31410/eraz.s.p.2020.1.

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The diffusion of COVID-19 pandemic among Italian Regions has been very uneven. The intensity of measures introduced to contrast its spread also shows a high heterogeneity among local jurisdiction, but this does not correspond, prima facie, with the intensity of the pandemic. What shapes the stringency of responses across different localities? Various factors could be hypothesised to be at play: factors related to the intensity of the pandemic, to the political and ideological orientation of governing authorities, to the models of growth and development characterising regional economic systems, and to the strength of lobbying groups pushing for more or less stringent responses. To address these questions, we elaborate a regional stringency index and analyse (using CART regression trees and other statistical methods) its relationships with some of these factors. The results show that the main driver of stringency (in an inverse way) is the weight of exports on regional GDP, suggesting that economic interests and business power might play an important role in shaping political responses to pandemics.
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Schumerth, Dennis J. "The Nuclear Renaissance: Materials of Choice for Surface Condensers and BOP Heat Exchangers." In ASME 2008 Power Conference. ASMEDC, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/power2008-60004.

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Amidst the clamor and increasing world demand for energy, the continued use of fossil fuels for electric power generation has recently emerged as the bane of the industry. Green power is being championed as the new fuel de jour kid on the block. Environmentalists and other global warming advocates are successfully lobbying their political agendas for emission caps, carbon sequestration, NOx and SOx and other greenhouse gas limits. In many cases, these efforts have resulted in the outright cancellation, delay or unit reductions of new coal-fired plants. Similarly, simple and combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) units, popularized during the Enron “gas bubble” era are at the mercy of unstable fuel prices which have, in large part, relegated this generation type from base load to load follow. Wind, biomass, hydro, photovoltaic and other renewables continue to produce an increased percentage of the power base but total contribution remains costly, inefficient and pitifully low. Enter the nuclear renaissance. A dramatic paradigm shift, even by the green power advocates, has allowed the nuclear phoenix to rise with the promise of emission-free power, generation efficiencies, increasing ROI revenues and demonstrating an enviable safety record since TMI and Chernobyl. Assuming this energy source conceives and bears the gestated fruit of a renaissance, the next decade will be telling in terms of the challenges brought forward by licensing, design, financing, construction and operation of a new generation of nuclear power reactors. Paramount among these is a new, time-tested generation of construction materials that will be evaluated to insure a 40 to 60 or even 80 year operational life of these new plants. Consider the problematic copper materials that were chosen during the early 70’s for their high thermal conductivity, competitive cost and ease of fabrication. Contrast these past lessons-learned to current-day, state-of-the-art generation fleet construction standards where demonstrated long-term sustainability coupled with state-of-the-art designs & materials must emerge as the prominent industry players of choice. The paper will examine these and other relevant aspects of the technical and commercial supply chain that is predicted to both challenge and reward designers and material suppliers well into the next decade.
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Reports on the topic "Political lobbying"

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Bertrand, Marianne, Matilde Bombardini, Raymond Fisman, and Francesco Trebbi. Tax-Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a Tool for Political Influence. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24451.

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Bombardini, Matilde, and Francesco Trebbi. Competition and Political Organization: Together or Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14771.

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Iaryczower, Matias, Pablo Spiller, and Mariano Tommasi. Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w11317.

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de Figueiredo, John, and Brian Silverman. How Does the Government (Want to) Fund Science? Politics, Lobbying and Academic Earmarks. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13459.

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