Relevant bibliographies by topics / Political influence

Academic literature on the topic 'Political influence'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 31 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Political influence"

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Helmlinger, Connie. "POLITICAL INFLUENCE." American Journal of Nursing 98, no. 2 (February 1998): 16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00000446-199802000-00013.

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Lomas, Clare. "Political influence." Nursing Management 22, no. 6 (September 30, 2015): 9. http://dx.doi.org/10.7748/nm.22.6.9.s10.

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Kelly, D. F. "Exerting political influence." Veterinary Record 170, no. 1 (January 6, 2012): 28.1–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/vr.e35.

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Kenaphoom, Sanya. "Political Utility influence on Political Decision." Asian Political Science Review 1, no. 2 (July 2, 2017): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.12778/235108617x15452339029653.

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Demirbağ, Orkun, Kübra Demirbağ, and Gülgönül Batı. "Women Entrepreneurs’ Education Level, Political Skill, and Firm Performance: Political Influence and Human Capital Theories." Central European Management Journal 30, no. 1 (March 15, 2022): 40–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.7206/cemj.2658-0845.69.

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Purpose: Because of the growing interest in the literature in education and political skill as facilitators of firm performance, this article aims to reveal whether there is a moderating role of women entrepreneurs’ political skill on the relationship between their education level and firm performance when firm- and entrepreneur-level characteristics remain under control. Methodology: The study was conducted in Istanbul, Kocaeli, and Bursa, cities with the lowest gender gap in Turkey. The participants of the questionnaires were 291 entrepreneurs who are members of the Women Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey (KAGIDER), the Women Entrepreneur Members of Endeavor Turkey, and the TOBB Women Entrepreneurs. Hierarchical regression analysis was performed to analyze the dataset. Findings: When firm- and the entrepreneur-level characteristics remain under control, women entrepreneurs’ political skill shows a moderator role in the relationship between women entrepreneurs’ education level and firm performance. Practical Implications: A bachelor’s degree or higher, along with political skill, allow women entrepreneurs to increase their firm performance. Furthermore, the higher the political skill, the higher the effect of education level on firm performance. Originality/Value: This is the first study to investigate the moderating role of political skill of women entrepreneurs in the relationship between education level and firm performance. Moreover, political influence and human capital theories are jointly applied to the theoretical model.
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Wyrick, Thomas L. "Management of Political Influence." American Politics Quarterly 19, no. 4 (October 1991): 396–416. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673x9101900402.

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Dawson, P., and P. Dawson. "Teaching Political Influence Experientially." Journal of Management Education 11, no. 3 (August 1, 1987): 133–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/105256298701100315.

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Cherkasova, Victoria, and Anna Ivanova. "Do Political Connections Influence Investment Efficiency in Russian Companies?" Journal of Corporate Finance Research / Корпоративные Финансы | ISSN: 2073-0438 13, no. 2 (November 20, 2019): 36–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.17323/j.jcfr.2073-0438.13.2.2019.36-49.

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The question as to whether political influence can benefit the commercial activity of companies, and the relatedquestions surrounding political corruption that arise, are of perennial fascination for persons at every level of societyand in every country. With this in mind, this article seeks to explore the relationship between political connections incommercial firms and investment efficiency. This relationship will be studied on an empirical basis, and will shed somelight on the actual parameters, mechanisms, and effects of political influence in the business sphere in the RussianFederation.In this research, we consider only direct relations between business operators and the members of Russian ministries,councils, political parties, heads of the regions and cities. These relationships are categorised as being politicallyinfluential depending on the status of the politician, and whether they are active at a federal, regional or municipallevel. Connections with such politicians are examined where there is evidence of direct links with company CEOs andchairmen of the boards of directors of companies.This research is carried out on the sample of 106 Russian non-financial companies for the period 2010–2015. 44companies from the final sample were considered as politically connected on at least one level. Some firms haveconnections more than at one level (11 companies). Companies have politically connected chairman of the board (36companies) more often than connected CEO (26 companies). Using regression analysis, we determined whether thepolitical ties in Russia have a positive or a negative impact on the investment expenditures of companies.Interestingly, and perhaps contrary to popular belief, we identified a negative relationship between political ties and theefficiency of investment decisions for individual companies. The presence of politically-connected CEOs at federal andregional levels is seen to have a significant negative impact on investment efficiency. However, our results also indicatethat the presence of politically-connected chairmen of the board which are active at the municipal level is correlatedwith efficient investment activity. This indicates that political influence at this level may be responsible for more prudentrecommendations regarding commercial and investment decisions. Overall, it can be seen that in this sample ofcompanies from the Russian Federation, the presence of state-tied representatives may be aligned with a tendency forcompanies to follow targets that are favourable for its government connections and not for the firm itself.Although political connections have a mixed impact on the company’s value, the relation with investment efficiency isprimarily negative. Thus, we may reason that the government has a strong power over politically-related companies.Such influences are linked with a tendency for companies to deviate from their primary goal of value maximisation.These results may indicate the influence of undue pressure from a government which strives to reach its own goalsthrough the mechanism of commercial activity, or perhaps the opportunistic behaviour of individuals in managementpositions who are motivated towards personal political gain at the expense of the company. Political connections have amixed effect on the company’s performance and investment efficiency, and we postulate that firms establish relationshipswith government officials pursuing the goal to obtain more advantageous position. The links between political operatorsand business activity demonstrated in this research undoubtedly highlight some uncomfortable areas of discourse inthe commercial sphere. On a granular level, further research into specific transactions and motivations may seem morea research area for journalists or law enforcement investigators, but this may be simply a popular prejudice. There iscertainly ample opportunity for expanding the scope of this study’s results. Beyond the interests of political, sociologicaland legal researchers, the data presented herein will be of immediate interest to persons operating in the commercial,business, and economic spheres of the Russian Federation and internationally.
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Nasirova, Saodat Abdullaevna, Sabohat Abdullaevna Hashimova, and Gulchehra Shavkatovna Rikhsieva. "THE INFLUENCE OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF CHINA ON THE FORMATION OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TERMINOLOGY." Journal of Central Asian Social Studies 02, no. 04 (August 10, 2021): 10–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.37547/jcass/volume02issue04-a2.

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This article examines the influence of the political system of ancient China on the formation of socio-political terminology within the framework of administrative management. The analysis is carried out on the basis of lexicographic material in the chronological order of replenishment of the terminology of administrative division from the period of the slave dynasties of Xia, Shang and Western Zhou to the modern system of government in China.
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Putra, Zaga Kresna Pratama, and Novrys Suhardianto. "The Influence of Political Connection on Tax Avoidance." Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan 22, no. 2 (November 30, 2020): 82–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.9744/jak.22.2.82-90.

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The upper echelon theory and rent-seeking theory propose conflicting arguments related to the relationship between a firm’s political connection and tax avoidance. This research aims to examine the relationship between a firm’s political connection and tax avoidance. The 1,079 samples used in this research are public companies with positive income in the 2014-2018 period. By using regression analysis, this research finds that political connection has a negative relationship with tax avoidance, implying that political connection increases tax payment. This research contributes to providing supporting evidence for upper echelon theory by finding that management’s political experience or the intention to maintain a positive image of politically connected management improves tax obedience
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Political influence"

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Dal, Bó Ernesto. "Essays on political influence." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.273153.

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Mahle, Alexander. "Tax competition and political influence." Diss., lmu, 2012. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-150131.

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Jackson, David Mark. "Measuring political influence on monetary policy." Thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/30521.

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Oz-Salzberger, Fania. "Scottish political ideas in eighteenth century Germany : the case of Adam Ferguson." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1991. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:6ef5e5b0-37a4-42b7-a58f-8c1e35cc451c.

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This thesis examines the reception of the works of Adam Ferguson, a major thinker of the Scottish Enlightenment, by a range of German readers in the late eighteenth century. It provides a survey of Ferguson's main political ideas, and argues that many of his prominent German readers did not come to terms with them. The thesis contrasts the political realities and concerns of Ferguson's Scotland with the profoundly different political concerns of his German readers, and their often vague and inaccurate ideas of Scotland, and of the British constitution. Their documented responses to Ferguson's works are brought as evidence for a cumulative and complex case of misreception. The terms in which Ferguson expressed his political ideas can be fruitfully analyzed as a political language, a vocabulary of recognizable and mutually complementing political terms. After a close examination of this particular vocabulary, the thesis proceeds to show in detail how Ferguson's German translators, commentators, reviewers and readers unwittingly dismantled this vocabulary, lost or ignored its republican and activist elements, and sometimes shifted it into other vocabularies which were far removed from the author's political intentions. However, the differences between the individual readers are emphasized, not only with respect to their varied intellectual backgrounds and works, but also touching on their personal profiles as readers and thinkers. The thesis aims especially to highlight three aspects of this Scottish- German encounter: the capacity of Ferguson's texts to be removed from their contexts and misread; the failure of civic humanist ideas to make a serious entry into German political discourse; and the merits of close textual analysis for supporting a type of explanation, which may supplement or counter-balance other explanations, about the limited effect of "imported" political ideas in eighteenth-century German discourse.
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Vlaseros, Vasileios. "Essays on strategic voting and political influence." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/9932.

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Chapter 1 : I attempt a detailed literature review on the passage from the probabilistic versions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to models augmented by the concept of strategic agents, including both theoretical and relevant empirical work. In the first part, I explore the most influential relevant game theoretic models and their main predictions. In the second part, I review what voting experiments have to say about these predictions, with a brief mention of the experiments' key methodological aspects. In the final part, I provide with an attempt to map the recent strategic voting literature in terms of structure and scope. I close with a philosophical question on the exogeneity of a "correct" choice of a voting outcome, which is inherent in the current strategic voting literature. Chapter 2 : I develop a two stage game with individually costly political action and costless voting on a binary agenda where, in equilibrium, agents rationally cast honest votes in the voting stage. I show that a positive but sufficiently low individual cost of political action can lead to a loss in aggregate welfare for any electorate size. When the individual cost of political action is lower than the signalling gain, agents will engage in informative political action. In the voting stage, since everyone's signal is revealed, agents will unanimously vote for the same policy. Therefore, the result of the ballot will be exactly the same as the one without prior communication, but with the additional aggregate cost of political action. However, when agents have heterogeneous prior beliefs, society is large and the state of the world is sufficiently uncertain, a moderate individual cost of political action can induce informative collective action of only a subset of the members of society, which increases ex ante aggregate welfare relative to no political action. The size of the subset of agents engaging in collective action depends on the dispersion of prior opinions. Chapter 3 : This chapter shows theoretically that hearing expert opinions can be a double-edged sword for decision making committees. We study a majoritarian voting game of common interest where committee members receive not only private information, but also expert information that is more accurate than private information and observed by all members. We identify three types of equilibria of interest, namely i) the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium where each member randomizes between following the private and public signals should they disagree; ii) the asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium where a certain number of members always follow the public signal while the others always follow the private signal; and iii) a class of equilibria where a supermajority and hence the committee decision always follow the expert signal. We find that in the first two equilibria, the expert signal is collectively taken into account in such a way that it enhances the efficiency (accuracy) of the committee decision, and a fortiori the CJT holds. However, in the third type of equilibria, private information is not reflected in the committee decision and the efficiency of committee decision is identical to that of public information, which may well be lower than the efficiency the committee could achieve without expert information. In other words, the introduction of expert information might reduce efficiency in equilibrium. Chapter 4 : In this chapter we present experimental results on the theory of the previous chapter. In the laboratory, too many subjects voted according to expert information compared to the predictions from the efficient equilibria. The majority decisions followed the expert signal most of the time, which is consistent with the class of obedient equilibria mentioned in the previous chapter. Another interesting finding is the marked heterogeneity in voting behaviour. We argue that the voters' behaviour in our data can be best described as that in an obedient equilibrium where a supermajority (and hence the decision) always follow the expert signal so that no voter is pivotal. A large efficiency loss manifests due to the presence of expert information when the committee size was large. We suggest that it may be desirable for expert information to be revealed only to a subset of committee members. Finally, in the Appendix we describe a new alternative method for producing the signal matrix of the game. Chapter 5 : There is a significant gap between the theoretical predictions and the empirical evidence about the efficiency of policies in reducing crime rates. This chapter argues that one important reason for this is that the current literature of economics of crime overlooks an important hysteresis effect in criminal behaviour. One important consequence of hysteresis is that the effect on an outcome variable from positive exogenous variations in the determining variables has a different magnitude from negative variations. We present a simple model that characterises hysteresis in both the micro and macro levels. When the probability of punishment decreases, some law abiding agents will find it more beneficial to enter a criminal career. If the probability of punishment returns to its original level, a subset of these agents will continue with their career in crime. We show that, when crime choice exhibits weak hysteresis at the individual level, crime rate in a society consisted from a continuum of agents that follows any non-uniform distribution will exhibit strong hysteresis. Only when punishment is extremely severe the effect of hysteresis ceases to exist. The theoretical predictions corroborate the argument that policy makers should be more inclined to set pre-emptive policies rather than mitigating measures.
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Halbeisen, Pascal Hans Ruedi. "Electoral economic cycles and the role of political institutions : do political institutions influence the political budget cycle?" Thesis, University of Hull, 2014. http://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:11313.

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The Political Budget Cycle describes the repetitive change of fiscal policy by the office holder in order to improve their chances for re-election. This research investigates the connection between the size and type of the Political Budget Cycle and the institutional framework. The empirical analysis examines the influence of individual institutional variables as well as the resulting effect from the overall complexity of the institutional framework. Analysing the fiscal policy in a panel of 68 developed countries over a period from 1975 until 2009, it is shown that the size of the Political Budget Cycle measured by the budget balance is largely determined by the electoral competition and the concentration of political power. In the absence of a tangible threat of being voted out of office, there is no incentive for the office holder to employ fiscal policy for the purpose of their re-election. In turn, the incumbent’s opportunity to use fiscal policy for their advantage is heavily restricted that in case of dispersed political power. Results reveal further a correlation between the size of the Political Budget Cycle and the political accountability and the mean district magnitude. The significance of their effect, however, is conditional on the concentration of political power. Analysing the existence of electoral fiscal cycles within the budget composition, the research proves conclusively that the type of the Political Budget Cycle and the choice of fiscal instruments is effectively determined by the interaction between the concentration of institutional power and the average district magnitude. The former accounts for the size of the individual electoral cycle whereas the district magnitude determines which fiscal instruments are being utilised. Examining the Political Budget Cycle in a panel of 34 developing countries, the effect of the institutional framework proves to be mostly identical except for the electoral completion. Essentially, the concentration of political power exhibits large explanatory power in justifying for the difference between developed and developing countries. The restricting effect of dispersed political power proves robust when testing in interaction with the age of democracy and the access to free media.
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Heldens, Gijs, and René Paaß. "Maastricht Aachen Airport – Value creation and political influence." Thesis, Jönköping University, Internationella Handelshögskolan, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-48626.

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Background: The debate about the existence of Maastricht Aachen Airport (MAA) has received great media presence in the past years. The subject involves many stakeholders from various perspectives, while focusing on the politicians of Limburg and the government of the region representing the sole shareholder of the airport. Purpose: The limited availability of neutral data regarding MAA created the urge for an unbiased research. The purpose of the research is to generate a political oriented overview of perceptions and values related to MAA that aids in determining the airport’s future by including various stakeholders of the region. Method: A deductive approach has been chosen in order to execute the research, whilst focusing on Freeman’s Stakeholder Theory as a foundation. Qualitative semi-structured interviews have been conducted with seven politicians from six different political parties of the government of Limburg. Furthermore, the director of MAA has been interviewed, as well as a great number of inhabitants. These stakeholders have been identified due to their influential- and voting power with regards to the research purpose. Conclusion: MAA is a regional airport with national significance, which adds value through its cargo handling. As other airports are reaching their maximum capacity in the Netherlands, there is an enhanced prospective for MAA in the future on the field of cargo. Its passenger flight value is limited due to the number of alternative airports in its direct vicinity. The current strategy of MAA depends on political decisions related to campaign promises rather than neutral qualitative and quantitative research. A complete Social Cost and Benefit Analysis would create a well-structured view on the existence of the airport and would aid in determining the position of the national government with regards to potential financial support and decision influence.
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Dollins, Ramona R. "Parental influence on political development among late adolescents." Thesis, This resource online, 1992. http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-10192006-115601/.

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Narasimhan, Vishnu. "Military Influence and Political Development in Turkey and Pakistan." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/484.

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Turkey and Pakistan share a long history of military tutelage, influence, and intervention in politics. This thesis analyzes the evolution of the political role of the military in the two countries, in order to understand the causes of the Turkish military’s diminished political influence since 2002, contrasted with the Pakistani military’s continuing grip over the country’s political system. Three factors can explain this divergence in civilian control of the military between the two countries. In Turkey, there has been a constant process of elite turnover and replacement, culminating in the gradual emergence and consolidation of counter-elite power in the 1990s and 2000s. In Pakistan, the traditional civil-military “Establishment” has remained remarkably unchanged in its constitution and structure. The role of elites in determining the course of civil-military relations has been conditioned by two other factors, (1) external influences and (2) varying patterns of civilian institutional legitimacy.
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Dubois, Elizabeth. "The strategic opinion leader : personal influence and political networks in a hybrid media system." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:35b1e408-a70a-4ea0-9c41-10d7df024ee9.

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Opinion leaders are important political players who bridge the gap between the political elite and the general public. Traditionally opinion leaders use social pressure and social support via interpersonal communication to personally influence the opinions, attitudes and behaviours of their everyday associates (who make up the general public). However, in a hybrid media system opinion leaders have access to added channels which mean they can communicate with audiences beyond their everyday associates and/or engage in non-interpersonal interactions, potentially setting the stage for opinion leaders to become more influential since they can access more members of the general public. Conversely, since the ability of opinion leaders to influence others traditionally relies on strong social bonds, even if audiences are accessible for information transfer, the lack of social connection could mean influence does not flow. As such, opinion leaders' channel choice in a hybrid media system is potentially very important. To investigate the patterns of channel use as well as motivations for, and impacts of, channel choices by opinion leaders, a two phase mixed-methods study is employed. Phase one includes online social network analysis of the #CDNpoli (Canadian politics) hashtag on Twitter and an online survey. Phase two investigates the communication practices of 21 specific digitally enabled opinion leaders drawn from the #CDNpoli network. Two hour in-depth interviews are paired with visualizations of the participants trace data. Telephone interviews with associates (alters) of the primary interviewee were conducted (N=27). This design is therefore responsive to the multi-channel reality of a hybrid media system and improves upon large scale and single channel studies which are most common in this line of research. Now strategic and, at times, impersonal, a fundamental shift in how influence is derived challenges theories of social influence and information dissemination. Two types of strategic opinion leaders emerge: enthusiasts and champions. Their strategies contribute to a wider trend - a "just-in-time" informed citizenry - where those who do not opt in to receiving messages from the political elite only get information at the last possible minute, such as during a scandal or an election. Future research and communication strategy must be sensitive to the varied aims and tactics of digitally enabled opinion leaders as well as the subsequent inconsistent relationship between the uninformed and their political system.
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Books on the topic "Political influence"

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Political influence. New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers, 2003.

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P, Gilbert Christopher, ed. The political influence of churches. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

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Campos, Nauro F. Lobbying, corruption and political influence. Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2006.

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O'Malley, Declan. Political influence in the planning system. Dublin: University College Dublin, 1991.

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Kierkegaard's influence on social-political thought. Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2011.

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Rosenbaek, Eva Marianne. Women's political influence in Northern Ireland. [s.l: The Author], 2005.

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Wilson, Iain. International Education Programs and Political Influence. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137349675.

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Clawson, Dan. Money talks: Corporate PACS and political influence. New York, NY: BasicBooks, 1992.

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Volumes of Influence. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011.

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Andres, Gary J. Lobbying reconsidered: Under the influence. New York, NY: Pearson/Longman, 2009.

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Book chapters on the topic "Political influence"

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Wilson, Iain. "Political Expectations." In International Education Programs and Political Influence, 9–18. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137349675_2.

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de Lange, Deborah E. "Contributions to Political Science and International Relations." In Power and Influence, 201–5. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230115545_14.

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Roberts, Ron. "Social Influence and Malevolent Authority." In Political Psychology, 271–91. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118982365.ch14.

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Luard, Evan. "Inequality in Political Influence." In Socialism without the State, 84–107. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21633-8_7.

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Narayan, Jashwini Jothishna. "Political Influence over Bureaucracy." In Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, 1–8. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_665-1.

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Lunt, Peter. "Political Culture, Political Psychology and Social Influence." In Stanley Milgram, 91–110. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-01911-0_5.

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Welburn, Dominic. "Influence and Nietzsche." In Canon Controversies in Political Thought, 49–64. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41361-3_4.

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Powell, Larry, and Joseph Cowart. "The Role of Interpersonal Influence." In Political Campaign Communication, 343–61. Third edition. | New York : Routledge, 2018. | “First edition published 2003 by Pearson Education, Inc.”—T.p. verso. | “Second edition published 2013 by Pearson Education, Inc.”—T.p. verso.: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315265049-18.

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Finkelshtain, Israel, and Yoav Kislev. "Economic Regulation and Political Influence." In Contemporary Economic Issues, 243–58. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26188-8_12.

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Mansergh, Nicholas. "The Influence of Political Theory." In The Government of Northern Ireland, 27–40. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003326069-2.

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Conference papers on the topic "Political influence"

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Petiy, Natalia. "LINGUISTIC INFLUENCE IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE." In IMPATTO DELL'INNOVAZIONE SULLA SCIENZA: ASPETTI FONDAMENTALI E APPLICATI. European Scientific Platform, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.36074/26.06.2020.v2.31.

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Cox, Sarah. "Political Narratives: The Influence of Text Genre and Political Ideology on Political Attitudes." In 2020 AERA Annual Meeting. Washington DC: AERA, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3102/1578525.

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Bilal, Muhammad, Nadia Malik, Nauman Bashir, Mohsen Marjani, Ibrahim Abaker Targio Hashem, and Abdullah Gani. "Profiling Social Media Campaigns and Political Influence: The Case of Pakistani Politics." In 2019 13th International Conference on Mathematics, Actuarial Science, Computer Science and Statistics (MACS). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/macs48846.2019.9024774.

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Mahestu, Gayes, Mariani Dewi, and Siswantini. "Hoax as Political Influence Tool in Indonesia." In BINUS Joint International Conference. SCITEPRESS - Science and Technology Publications, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0010003901400147.

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Salnikova, O. F., and O. V. Kapshtyk. "Analysis of legal mechanisms of public administration military and political aspects of security." In INFLUENCE OF EUROPEANIZATION ON PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN UKRAINE. Baltija Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.30525/978-9934-26-249-4-15.

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Putri, Nora Eka, and Adil Mubarak. "Influence of Political Literacy on the Political Participation of Beginner Voters in Regional Elections." In International Conference on Public Administration, Policy and Governance (ICPAPG 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200305.213.

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Boldyreva, Elena L., and Natalia Y. Grishina. "Internet Influence on Political System Transformation in Iceland." In IMS2017: International Conference. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3143699.3143710.

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Al-Naimi, Nayla Jaber. "The political influence of the Internet in the Gulf." In Qatar Foundation Annual Research Conference Proceedings. Hamad bin Khalifa University Press (HBKU Press), 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5339/qfarc.2018.ictpd953.

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Kulachai, W., and A. P. Tedjakusuma. "A Study of How Political Behaviors Influence Organizational Effectiveness." In Proceedings of the 17 th International Symposium on Management (INSYMA 2020). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200127.081.

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Wang, Qian, and Qingquan Pan. "Research on the Influence Effect of Team Political Skills." In Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Education, Culture and Social Sciences (ECSS 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/ecss-19.2019.68.

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Reports on the topic "Political influence"

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Levy, Brian. How Political Contexts Influence Education Systems: Patterns, Constraints, Entry Points. Research on Improving Systems of Education (RISE), December 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.35489/bsg-rise-2022/pe04.

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This paper synthesises the findings of a set of country studies commissioned by the RISE Programme to explore the influence of politics and power on education sector policymaking and implementation. The synthesis groups the countries into three political-institutional contexts: Dominant contexts, where power is centred around a political leader and a hierarchical governance structure. As the Vietnam case details, top-down leadership potentially can provide a robust platform for improving learning outcomes. However, as the case studies of Ethiopia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Tanzania illustrate, all-too-often dominant leaders’ goals vis-à-vis the education sector can veer in other directions. In impersonal competitive contexts, a combination of strong formal institutions and effective processes of resolving disagreements can, on occasion, result in a shared commitment among powerful interests to improve learning outcomes—but in none of the case studies is this outcome evident. In Peru, substantial learning gains have been achieved despite messy top-level politics. But the Chilean, Indian, and South African case studies suggest that the all-too-common result of rule-boundedness plus unresolved political contestation over the education sector’s goals is some combination of exaggerated rule compliance and/or performative isomorphic mimicry. Personalised competitive contexts (Bangladesh, Ghana, and Kenya for example) lack the seeming strengths of either their dominant or their impersonal competitive contexts; there are multiple politically-influential groups and multiple, competing goals—but no credible framework of rules to bring coherence either to political competition or to the education bureaucracy. The case studies show that political and institutional constraints can render ineffective many specialised sectoral interventions intended to improve learning outcomes. But they also point to the possibility that ‘soft governance’ entry points might open up some context-aligned opportunities for improving learning outcomes. In dominant contexts, the focus might usefully be on trying to influence the goals and strategies of top-level leadership. In impersonal competitive contexts, it might be on strengthening alliances between mission-oriented public officials and other developmentally-oriented stakeholders. In personalised competitive contexts, gains are more likely to come from the bottom-up—via a combination of local-level initiatives plus a broader effort to inculcate a shared sense among a country’s citizenry of ‘all for education’.
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Levy, Brian. How Political Contexts Influence Education Systems: Patterns, Constraints, Entry Points. Research on Improving Systems of Education (RISE), December 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.35489/bsg-rise-wp_2022/122.

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Abstract:
This paper synthesises the findings of a set of country studies commissioned by the RISE Programme to explore the influence of politics and power on education sector policymaking and implementation. The synthesis groups the countries into three political-institutional contexts: Dominant contexts, where power is centred around a political leader and a hierarchical governance structure. As the Vietnam case details, top-down leadership potentially can provide a robust platform for improving learning outcomes. However, as the case studies of Ethiopia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Tanzania illustrate, all-too-often dominant leaders’ goals vis-à-vis the education sector can veer in other directions. In impersonal competitive contexts, a combination of strong formal institutions and effective processes of resolving disagreements can, on occasion, result in a shared commitment among powerful interests to improve learning outcomes—but in none of the case studies is this outcome evident. In Peru, substantial learning gains have been achieved despite messy top-level politics. But the Chilean, Indian, and South African case studies suggest that the all-too-common result of rule-boundedness plus unresolved political contestation over the education sector’s goals is some combination of exaggerated rule compliance and/or performative isomorphic mimicry. Personalised competitive contexts (Bangladesh, Ghana, and Kenya for example) lack the seeming strengths of either their dominant or their impersonal competitive contexts; there are multiple politically-influential groups and multiple, competing goals—but no credible framework of rules to bring coherence either to political competition or to the education bureaucracy. The case studies show that political and institutional constraints can render ineffective many specialised sectoral interventions intended to improve learning outcomes. But they also point to the possibility that ‘soft governance’ entry points might open up some context-aligned opportunities for improving learning outcomes. In dominant contexts, the focus might usefully be on trying to influence the goals and strategies of top-level leadership. In impersonal competitive contexts, it might be on strengthening alliances between mission-oriented public officials and other developmentally-oriented stakeholders. In personalised competitive contexts, gains are more likely to come from the bottom-up—via a combination of local-level initiatives plus a broader effort to inculcate a shared sense among a country’s citizenry of ‘all for education’.
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Bertrand, Marianne, Matilde Bombardini, Raymond Fisman, Francesco Trebbi, and Eyub Yegen. Investing in Influence: Investors, Portfolio Firms, and Political Giving. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w30876.

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Berger, Daniel, William Easterly, Nathan Nunn, and Shanker Satyanath. Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and Trade During the Cold War. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w15981.

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Bertrand, Marianne, Matilde Bombardini, Raymond Fisman, and Francesco Trebbi. Tax-Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a Tool for Political Influence. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24451.

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Resnick, Danielle. Embracing political economy to enhance policy influence: Lessons from PIM research. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2499/p15738coll2.134440.

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Dhaliwal, Arshia. Reproduction of 'Does Homeownership Influence Political Behavior? Evidence from Administrative Data'. Social Science Reproduction Platform, September 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.48152/ssrp-7kfj-ac91.

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Tatsumi, Yuki, and Robert Weiner. Political Influence on Japanese Nuclear and Security Policy: New Forces Face Large Obstacles. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, February 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada601871.

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Mitlin, Diana. With and beyond the state -- co-production as a route to political influence, power and transformation for grassroots organizations. Sage, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.35648/20.500.12413/11781/ii303.

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Mpofu, David, Michael Ndiweni, Kwanele Moyo, Samuel Wadzai, and Marjoke Oosterom. Youth Active Citizenship for Decent Jobs: A Handbook for Policy & Practice. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), March 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/ids.2022.017.

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This Handbook has been created for development partners and civil society actors that design and implement youth employment interventions, particularly in contexts marked by fragility and political-economic crises. Youth employment programmes usually strengthen young people’s business and entrepreneurship skills. They fail to consider the civic and political competencies needed by young people in order to negotiate fair, safe, and decent working conditions and influence the wider policy environment for decent work. The Handbook offers suggestions for integrating youth active citizenship strategies into youth employment interventions, thus building young people’s civic and political skills. Adopting these strategies will strengthen the capacities of young people to engage both private sector and government actors, foster inclusion, and strengthen coalitions that can influence a enabling environment for decent jobs for youth. Recognising that many young people start their trade and businesses in theinformal economy, the Handbook takes their experiences as the point of departure. It is widely recognised that political economy matters for development and development interventions. This also applies to youth employment programming. Ideas in this Handbook recognise that politics influence youth employment opportunities. This is particularly the case in contexts commonly referred to as fragile, conflict-affected and violent settings (FCVS). Approaches to youth employment interventions need to respond to these dynamics to avoid that powerful actors capture them to serve their interests and avoid increasing risks to conflict. Moreover, the Covid-19 pandemic has proved that fragility is multidimensional and manifests in many countries across the globe. Early on in the pandemic, it quickly became clear that the informal economy would be hard hit. In addition, the challenging politics of FCVS influence opportunities for both formal and informal employment.
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