Journal articles on the topic 'Political executive'
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Niedobitek, Matthias. "The German Bundesrat and Executive Federalism." Perspectives on Federalism 10, no. 2 (June 1, 2018): 198–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pof-2018-0023.
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Abstract The German Basic Law constitutes federalism as a unique political system which is characterised by intertwined decision-making of the Federation (Bund) and the component units (Länder). The executives of the two federal tiers and the Länder executives within the Bundesrat play a major role in making joint decisions. They are forced to make decisions in the ‘joint-decision mode’ (Politikverflechtung) which is detrimental to accountability. Reform efforts were made to unbundle competences and to reduce the number of bills which require the Bundesrat’s consent. Due to the dominance of the executives and the distribution of powers between the federal tiers (legislation is dominated by the Bund, execution is dominated by the Länder), German federalism is rightly called ‘executive federalism’. German federalism can even be regarded as an embodiment of that concept since it covers all possible aspects of ‘executive federalism’. The Bundesrat has an important share in that classification.
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Dalal, Rajbir Singh, and Ekta Chahal. "Ministers and Civil Servants Relations in India: An Evaluation." International Research Journal of Engineering, IT & Scientific Research 2, no. 3 (March 1, 2016): 13. http://dx.doi.org/10.21744/irjeis.v2i3.39.
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In parliamentary form of government, like in India, there exists two types of executives i.e. political or elected and permanent executive. Political executive derives its power from people and enjoys the power by virtue of constitutional position, while permanent executive or civil servant is selected on merit basis and accumulate its power due to administrative position and technical expertise. System of a democratic government is based on the principle of popular sovereignty where in the supreme rests in people or their elected representative. Political executive or Minister is assisted by civil servant. A balanced relationship between them is essential for smooth and efficient functioning of government. Minister and civil servant act as two pillars of parliamentary form of government and weakness of any one of them will adversely affect the performance of government. Theoretically political and permanent executives perform different role in government but in practice their work is often overlapping and difficult to differentiate it.
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Teodoro, Manuel P. "Moving in, managing up: executive job formation and political behaviour." Journal of Public Policy 33, no. 2 (June 4, 2013): 137–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x1300007x.
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AbstractPublic agency executive jobs are temporary matches of individual bureaucrats with government employers. Together, the buyers and sellers of executive labour form jobs in ways that define critical links in the policy process: the relationships between agency administrators and their elected officials. This article argues that when the executive is hired from outside, the job typically carries a mandate for significantly greater engagement with elected officials than when the executive is promoted from within an agency. Analysis of three very different types of agencies demonstrates that individuals who were hired from outside interact with their elected officials more frequently than do those who were promoted from within. These results shed new light on bureaucratic executives’ roles in the policy process, their relationships with the governments that they serve, and the theoretical significance of bureaucratic jobs as units of analysis in public policy studies.
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Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah, and Alissandra T. Stoyan. "Gendered Opportunities and Constraints: How Executive Sex and Approval Influence Executive Decree Issuance." Political Research Quarterly 71, no. 3 (January 5, 2018): 586–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912917750279.
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Do female executives exercise the authority of their office distinctly from their male counterparts? Anecdotal evidence suggests women legislators are likely to govern in a more consensual manner than men. Yet there has been little systematic research extending such claims to women in executive office. Using an original data set, we evaluate one aspect of policy agenda setting—rates of executive decree issuance—among four male–female pairs of Latin American presidents between 2000 and 2014. Female presidents are generally less prone to rule by decree, but this relationship is conditioned by presidential popularity. Female executives with high presidential approval ratings are less likely to rule via unilateral action than similarly popular male executives, but the gendered differences in decree issuance disappear when executives possess low approval ratings. Our findings have implications for understanding the potential benefits of feminine leadership styles for executive–legislative relations and good governance.
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Taylor, Belva. "The Political Role of the Health Services Executive." Healthcare Management Forum 2, no. 4 (December 1989): 26–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0840-4704(10)61409-3.
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The “politicization” of health care in Canada means an increasing political role for health service executives. This article focuses on the political activities and skills required for administrators to become effective in this expanded role. In the 1990s, the administrator must become increasingly externally oriented and proactive. Two externally oriented skills, networking and information processing, are discussed in relation to the current health care environment. Practical examples are provided to illustrate how these skills can be used to ensure both the success of the executive and the position of the organization.
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Daniels, R. Steven, and Carolyn L. Clark-Daniels. "Vulnerability Reduction and Political Responsiveness: Explaining Executive Decisions in U.S. Disaster Policy during the Ford and Carter Administrations*." International Journal of Mass Emergencies & Disasters 20, no. 2 (August 2002): 225–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/028072700202000209.
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Decision-making by elected executives on disaster policy reflects comprehensive vulnerability management, political responsiveness to the media, political negotiation, and intergovernmental conflict. If vulnerability reduction is a significant influence, executive decisions should reflect political and social vulnerability and self-sufficiency. If political responsiveness influences disaster decisions, executive decisions should also reflect media coverage, proximity to elections, and decisions at other levels of government. The data set included 293 major disaster requests between 1974 and 1981. The analysis used multiple regression and logistic regression. Vulnerability reduction had an impact on aid decisions. Political responsiveness affected most decisions on disaster relief. The Ford administration was more sensitive to both responsiveness and vulnerability than the Carter administration. Overall, nationalization of disaster assistance has made the achievement of vulnerability management more difficult. The absence of minimum criteria has increased the discretion of executive choice.
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Cox, Gary W., and Barry R. Weingast. "Executive Constraint, Political Stability, and Economic Growth." Comparative Political Studies 51, no. 3 (August 25, 2017): 279–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414017710254.
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Previous studies have argued that democracy diminishes the extent to which leadership contests depress economic growth, by reducing the violence and uncertainty attendant on such contests. We reconsider the theoretical basis for this claim, highlighting the separate roles of executive constraint and electoral accountability. Exploiting panel data from 1850 to 2005, we show that the executive’s horizontal accountability to the legislature significantly moderates the economic downturns associated with leadership turnover, while its vertical accountability to the electorate does not. These results suggest that, in terms of moderating succession-related downturns and thereby promoting steadier economic growth, the health of legislatures is more important than the health of elections.
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Ferguson, Margaret Robertson. "Chief Executive Success in the Legislative Arena." State Politics & Policy Quarterly 3, no. 2 (June 2003): 158–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/153244000300300203.
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American chief executives are popularly believed to play a crucial leadership role in the legislative process, but this role is not well understood by scholars. This article develops a model of executive leadership success in the legislative arena based on personal, institutional, political, and economic factors and tests that model with data on the legislative priorities of the 50 state governors in 1993–94. Institutional features of the executive, which have been the focus of much scholarship, are found to have little effect on a governor's legislative success. On the other hand, the nature of the legislature is quite important here, with more professional legislatures actually encouraging executive leadership. A governor's personal characteristics, political party, and a state's economy also influence a governor's legislative success. These findings point to the importance of examining chief executives in the context in which they work if we are to understand their role as legislative leader.
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Uhr, John. "RETHINKING THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE: EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT AS POLITICAL EDUCATION." Australian Journal of Public Administration 46, no. 1 (March 1987): 20–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8500.1987.tb01408.x.
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Thomas, Paul E. J., and J. P. Lewis. "Executive Creep in Canadian Provincial Legislatures." Canadian Journal of Political Science 52, no. 2 (October 15, 2018): 363–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423918000781.
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AbstractStudies of parliamentary systems contend that backbench legislators are increasingly marginalized, with power being centralized in the executive. However, such research typically focuses on national legislatures, ignoring subnational jurisdictions. We extend this literature by exploring the process of “executive creep” in Canada's provinces; namely the tendency of executives to erode legislative independence by appointing backbenchers to quasi-executive positions or cabinet committees. We examine executive creep in all provinces since 1968, finding a clear trend towards the increased incorporation of backbenchers into the work of the executive. Moreover, these changes serve to strengthen the power of first ministers relative to their cabinets.
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Scheuerman, William E. "Emergencies, Executive Power, and the Uncertain Future of US Presidential Democracy." Law & Social Inquiry 37, no. 03 (2012): 743–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2012.01311.x.
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This article reexamines the question of how best to restrain executive power in a political and social context that seems to favor its dramatic expansion. Modern interventionist government amidst a dynamic social environment, where the executive faces a seemingly endless series of “crises” or “emergencies,” provides a heightened scope for executive discretion. At the same time, the US-style separation of powers, in which an independent president faces a potentially obstinate Congress, offers executives many incentives to exploit crises, real or otherwise. The works examined in this article confront, with varying degrees of success, the seemingly inexorable expansion of executive power within the US version of liberal democracy. We can only hope to deal with the many intellectual and political tasks posed by the symbiotic nexus between executive-centered and crisis-oriented government by confronting some tough questions about US constitutional design and the possibility of radical institutional reform. Unfortunately, even those scholars who provide plausible accounts of the US system's fragilities seem hesitant to do so.
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Rauf, Fawad, Cosmina L. Voinea, Khwaja Naveed, and Cosmin Fratostiteanu. "CSR Disclosure: Effects of Political Ties, Executive Turnover and Shareholder Equity. Evidence from China." Sustainability 13, no. 7 (March 24, 2021): 3623. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su13073623.
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The context of China fosters different contextual factors, which influences the quality of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure in comparison to firms across the rest of the world. Political ties at a corporate level are one of these vital factors. This paper studies the influence of firm-level political ties (PT) and executive turnover (ET) on the quality of CSR disclosure in the context of shareholding status of departing executive in Chinese listed A-share firms. Stakeholder and Agency theories are applied to the dissemination of CSR disclosures in Chinese firms whereby we used 20,578 firm-years interpretations of Chinese registered companies between 2012 and 2019. The results foster a negative link between executive turnover and quality of CSR disclosures. In addition, a negative relationship has been found between political ties and the quality of CSR disclosure. The findings disclose that the shareholding status of departing executive moderate the relationship between the impact of political ties and executive turnover on firms quality of CSR disclosure, whilst the effect of executive turnover on the quality of CSR disclosure was found more pronounced for firms whose departing executive held larger shareholding (SH). This study contributed to the literature on the quality of CSR disclosure while recognizing the negative effect of executive turnover on a firm’s quality of CSR disclosure for politically tied firms with a reinforcing moderating role of the shareholding status of departing executive.
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Elgie, Robert. "Models of Executive Politics: A Framework for the Study of Executive Power Relations in Parliamentary and Semi-presidential Regimes." Political Studies 45, no. 2 (June 1997): 217–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00077.
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The study of executives politics has been characterized by dichotomous country-specific debates about whether there is, for example, prime ministerial or cabinet government. Recent work has established new terms for these debates leading to more pluralistic conceptualizations of executive politics. Nevertheless, this work has not created the conditions for rigorous cross-national comparison. This article establishes a framework to compare executive branch power relations. It identifies six models of executive politics comprising a comprehensive set of ways in which power may be distributed amongst chief executives, cabinets, ministers and bureaucrats. On the basis of this framework it is argued that it is necessary to engage in empirical observation to determine which models of government occur and to identify the reasons why these models emerge.
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Cohen, Nili. "Political Agreements." Israel Law Review 26, no. 4 (1992): 499–530. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002122370001116x.
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A political agreement is an agreement among political parties, party factions, candidates for public office, or holders of public office in regard to governmental policy, its constituency, or exercise of public authority. Such agreements can be reached both proceeding and following elections. A coalition agreement is the conspicuous example of a political agreement. It is generally concluded following the elections, and it establishes the division of ministerial portfolios among the coalition partners, sets policy guidelines and rules for exercising executive authority (e.g., allocation of monies for certain purposes), and regulates legislation and parliamentary supervision of the executive (e.g., the manner in which party delegates will vote in the Knesset).
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Lorentzen, Paul. "Stress in Political-Career Executive Relations." Public Administration Review 45, no. 3 (May 1985): 411. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3109969.
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Whitford, Andrew B., and Holona L. Ochs. "The Political Roots of Executive Clemency." American Politics Research 34, no. 6 (November 2006): 825–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673x06291674.
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Nelson, Douglas. "Domestic Political Preconditions of US Trade Policy: Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamics." Journal of Public Policy 9, no. 1 (January 1989): 83–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x00007984.
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ABSTRACTThis paper examines the set of norms, rules and institutions (the regime) which regulate the domestic politics of international trade policy in the US. It is particularly concerned to explain the simultaneous occurrence of successful participation in multilateral trade liberalization in the GATT and rising levels of protection via the administered protection mechanisms (e.g. anti-dumping and countervailing duty, and escape clause). The explanation of this phenomenon is the development of a new institutional definition of trade policy that permitted executive dominance of trade policy, in conjunction with a changed perception of the role of trade policy by the executive branch. Specifically, it is argued that post-war executives (at least until Reagan) came to associate trade policy with broader foreign policy goals.
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Shin, Taekjin. "The Gender Gap in Executive Compensation." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 639, no. 1 (December 15, 2011): 258–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716211421119.
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While many studies have explored the issue of women’s representation among top management, little is known about the gender gap in compensation among those who reached the top. Using data on 7,711 executives at 831 U.S. firms, this study investigates social-psychological factors that explain the gender gap in executive compensation. Consistent with theories on social identity and demographic similarity effects, the gender gap in executive pay is smaller when a greater number of women sit on the compensation committee of the board, which is the group responsible for setting executive compensation. However, the presence of a female chief executive officer (CEO) is not associated with the compensation of female non-CEO executives working under the female boss. The findings highlight the need to study women’s representation on corporate boards.
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Fisher, Mark, David L. Franklin, and Jerrold M. Post. "Executive dysfunction, brain aging, and political leadership." Politics and the Life Sciences 33, no. 2 (2014): 93–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.2990/33_2_93.
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Decision-making is an essential component of executive function, and a critical skill of political leadership. Neuroanatomic localization studies have established the prefrontal cortex as the critical brain site for executive function. In addition to the prefrontal cortex, white matter tracts as well as subcortical brain structures are crucial for optimal executive function. Executive function shows a significant decline beginning at age 60, and this is associated with age-related atrophy of prefrontal cortex, cerebral white matter disease, and cerebral microbleeds. Notably, age-related decline in executive function appears to be a relatively selective cognitive deterioration, generally sparing language and memory function. While an individual may appear to be functioning normally with regard to relatively obvious cognitive functions such as language and memory, that same individual may lack the capacity to integrate these cognitive functions to achieve normal decision-making. From a historical perspective, global decline in cognitive function of political leaders has been alternatively described as a catastrophic event, a slowly progressive deterioration, or a relatively episodic phenomenon. Selective loss of executive function in political leaders is less appreciated, but increased utilization of highly sensitive brain imaging techniques will likely bring greater appreciation to this phenomenon. Former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was an example of a political leader with a well-described neurodegenerative condition (cerebral amyloid angiopathy) that creates a neuropathological substrate for executive dysfunction. Based on the known neuroanatomical and neuropathological changes that occur with aging, we should probably assume that a significant proportion of political leaders over the age of 65 have impairment of executive function.
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Beckwith, Karen. "Before Prime Minister: Margaret Thatcher, Angela Merkel, and Gendered Party Leadership Contests." Politics & Gender 11, no. 04 (December 2015): 718–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1743923x15000409.
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Given that most national executives have been men, it is a commonplace to observe that access to executive power is gendered. Men have historically served as heads of government, and few women have been presidents or prime ministers. Women's numbers are increasing, however, as is research focusing on women who have achieved national executive leadership (e.g., Jalalzai 2013; Murray 2010). Such research has emphasized women's individual resources and credentials, family background, and political experience as factors contributing to their political success; research focusing on the strategic and institutional structural factors that contribute to this success has been rare.
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Persolja, Melita, Meri Marin, Loretta Caporale, Bruna Odasmini, Sara Scarsini, Viola Fiorella, Paola De Lucia, and Alvisa Palese. "Chief Nurse Executives involuntary turnover in times of health care reforms: Findings from an interpretative phenomenology study." Health Services Management Research 33, no. 4 (May 13, 2020): 172–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951484820923923.
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In recent years, due to several health care system reforms in different countries, an increased involuntary turnover rate of Chief Nurse Executives has been reported around the World. However, no data on their perceived experience of their dismissal have been documented up to now in the European context. Describing the experience of involuntarily dismissed Chief Nurse Executives was the main aim of this interpretative phenomenological study. Data were collected through face-to-face audiotaped interviews performed by involving a purposeful sample of 13 Chief Nurse Executives; data analysis was performed by using the QSR NVIVO 11 software. The Chief Nurse Executives’ experience of Being fired is characterized by three main themes: (1) “Health Care Institutions are places influenced by political turbulences”; (2) “My competence and presence in the arena is despised by a range of strategies”; and (3) “Transiting from darkness to light”. According to their experience, the reason for dismissal was due to changes in the political climate and the introduction of a new chief executive officer; moreover, Being fired caused a deep pain similar to that experienced during bereavement. In some socio-political contexts, the political climate can influence the role of a Chief Nurse Executive: political membership, whether implicit or explicit, is considered of great value. In other contexts, the Chief Nurse Executives’ value is based on professional competences and achieved outcomes. At times of changes in the political climate, the peculiarities of the specific socio-political context should be evaluated as to whether one should anticipate his/her resignation or not.
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Rottinghaus, Brandon. "Surviving Scandal: The Institutional and Political Dynamics of National and State Executive Scandals." PS: Political Science & Politics 47, no. 01 (December 29, 2013): 131–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049096513001509.
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AbstractWhich factors shorten or lengthen the survival of a scandal involving a chief executive? Using new data tracking scandals involving presidents and governors from 1972 to 2011, I chart the duration of each political, personal, and financial scandal faced by an elected official, their staff, or nominees. I specifically examine institutional, political, and economic factors to investigate what factors quicken a “negative” end to a scandal. National chief executives and their staff are more likely to survive a scandal when they have more partisans in the legislature but are less likely when there is greater political opposition, however there is no comparative effect at the state level. Positive economic growth and public approval have no effect on survival of a scandal at either the national or state levels. These findings clarify how the political environment shapes the duration of executive scandal.
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Levinson, Sanford. "Confronting the Modern Executive: Four Perspectives." Perspectives on Politics 20, no. 2 (June 2022): 646–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592722000585.
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It is no secret that political power in the United States and elsewhere has, overall, shifted to “the executive” and away from legislatures. There may be debate about whether this is a product of willful “overreaching” by executives or whether, within the United States, Congress has instead willingly ceded power by engaging in what Justice Cardozo in 1935 called “delegation run riot.” The concern about executive power has perhaps become heightened in the aftermath of the Trump presidency—just as Boris Johnson, with his own defiance of some of the “conventions” that are essential to the British constitutional order, is provoking debate in Great Britain.
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Fox, Justin, and Mattias Polborn. "On the separation of executive and legislative powers: Executive independence, liberty, and social welfare." Journal of Theoretical Politics 33, no. 4 (October 2021): 430–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/09516298211043234.
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We explore the effects of a particular facet of separation of powers—namely, the executive’s independence from the legislature—on maintaining a norm of legislative restraint in which antagonistic factions refrain from passing laws that infringe on their rival’s liberties. Our main result establishes that executive independence may sometimes undermine and at other times facilitate legislative restraint, depending on the probabilities with which the factions hold legislative and executive power. Our results contribute to the larger game-theoretic literature exploring the effects of political institutions; our results also contribute to the literature exploring how institutions designed to protect liberty affect tacit cooperation among rival factions.
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Fatovic, Clement. "The Political Theology of Prerogative: The Jurisprudential Miracle in Liberal Constitutional Thought." Perspectives on Politics 6, no. 3 (August 18, 2008): 487–501. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592708081243.
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Liberalism ordinarily requires authorities to provide a full public account of their actions so that citizens can critically evaluate those actions for themselves, but in times of life-threatening emergency, liberalism sometimes evinces a willingness to place unquestioning faith in executives who promise to deliver it from such evil. In doing so, liberalism violates its moral and epistemological commitment to “make public use of one's reason in all matters.” This article uses the framework provided by Carl Schmitt's concept of political theology to analyze the reluctance of liberals to ask questions of the executive in times of danger and uncertainty. That framework helps explain how both the content and the structure of liberal thought can shift in a theological (and specifically theistic) direction when faced with an emergency. This article demonstrates that the quasi-religious rhetoric sometimes used to justify expansions of executive power in practice has precedents in the theories of John Locke, William Blackstone, and Alexander Hamilton. Analysis of their writings suggests that the use of quasi-theistic language in discussions of emergency powers can have the effect of insulating “godlike” executives from the kind of scrutiny and criticism that liberalism usually promotes.
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Carreras, Miguel. "Outsiders and Executive-Legislative Conflict in Latin America." Latin American Politics and Society 56, no. 03 (2014): 70–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2014.00241.x.
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AbstractOne of the most significant developments in Latin American democracies since the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization is the rise to power of political outsiders. However, the study of the political consequences of this phenomenon has been neglected. This article begins to fill that gap by examining whether the rise of outsiders in the region increases the level of executive-legislative confrontation. Using an original database of political outsiders in Latin America, it reports a series of logistic regressions showing that the risk of executive-legislative conflict significantly increases when the president is an outsider. The likelihood of institutional paralysis increases when an independent gets elected, due to the legislative body's lack of support for the president and the outsider's lack of political skills. The risk of an executive's attempted dissolution of Congress is also much higher when the president is an outsider.
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Unger, Johann Wolfgang. "Rebranding the Scottish Executive." Journal of Language and Politics 12, no. 1 (May 13, 2013): 59–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/jlp.12.1.03ung.
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This article examines the change in name of the devolved governing body of Scotland from the Scottish Executive (1999–2007) to the Scottish Government (2007-present) following the majority result for the Scottish National Party in the 2007 Scottish Parliament elections. In the wider European political landscape this is unusual: while ministries, departments and even political parties change their names relatively frequently, the same cannot be said for top-level political institutions. This paper investigates this discursive act of “rebranding” from a discourse-historical perspective (see Reisigl & Wodak 2009). In addition to critical analysis of various texts about the act of rebranding itself (media reports, political speeches and parliamentary debates, policy documents), the historical, cultural and political contexts are examined in relation to the wider significance of this move for top-down Scottish national identity construction.
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Grigoriev, Ivan S., and Kirill Zhirkov. "Do political connections make businesspeople richer? Evidence from Russia, 2003–2010." Research & Politics 7, no. 4 (October 2020): 205316802097943. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2053168020979434.
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Extensive literature shows that businesspeople thrive on political connections. Most research, however, does not differentiate between types of political connection, thus effectively assuming that economic return on being connected should not differ systematically between federal and regional, legislative and executive, formal and informal connections. We collect a unique comprehensive dataset on Russia’s richest businesspeople in 2003–2010 and demonstrate that only certain types of connections work, depending on the political context. Our analysis shows that as Russian politics became centralized and the federal executive more powerful during the 2000s, businesspeople with informal connections to the federal executive increased their fortunes much faster compared with everyone else—including those with any other type of connections. Businesspeople’s wealth thus dynamically reflected these important political changes. This suggests a procedure for inferring nominally unobservable changes in the political system from politically connected businesspeople’s fortunes, while also shedding additional light on the institutional origins of informality in Russian politics today.
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Bai, Fuping, Donghui Liu, Kaiyun Dong, Mengting Shang, and Aiguo Yan. "Research on How Executive Connections Affect Enterprise Digital Transformation: Empirical Evidence from China." Sustainability 15, no. 3 (January 20, 2023): 2037. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su15032037.
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In the context of the digital economy, the external connection of executives provides enterprises with a good idea to amplify their potential for digital transformation with the help of external forces. Therefore, we conduct a theoretical exploration and an empirical analysis of the relationship between executive connections and enterprise digital transformation. As the research sample, we use the A-share manufacturing companies listed in China from 2012 to 2021. According to sufficient verifications, we discover that executive connections can effectively support digital transformation. From the perspective of each subdivision dimension, executive business connections, executive technical connections, and executive financial connections can significantly promote digital transformation, among which executive technical connections have the greatest favorable impact. However, the impact of executive political connections on digital transformation is not obvious. Additionally, executive connections primarily foster enterprise digital transformation by reducing enterprise asset specificity. The results of the boundary mechanism test demonstrate that the external environmental dynamics and the internal dynamic capabilities reinforce the positive effect of executive connections on digital transformation. These findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the role of executive connections in digital transformation and provide practical guidance for firms to accelerate digital transformation.
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Scherpereel, John A., Melinda Adams, and Suraj Jacob. "Ratchets and See-Saws: Divergent Institutional Patterns in Women’s Political Representation." Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 4 (January 1, 2018): 237802311773527. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2378023117735271.
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Women’s representation in legislative and executive offices has increased in recent decades. We show, though, that while global legislative and executive trend lines have positive slopes, the two institutions experience distinctive temporal dynamics. When levels of women’s legislative representation rise, they tend not to slip back beyond their newly achieved level—women’s legislative representation tends to be characterized by a ratchet effect. This effect is relatively rare in cabinets, where increases in women’s representation are often followed by decreases. We call the latter phenomenon the see-saw effect: Countries experience one or more steps back for every step forward. These differences have normative and analytical implications. Normatively, we suggest that cabinet see-sawing is particularly problematic when domestic power balances are weighted toward executives. Analytically, we encourage researchers to use indicators of women’s empowerment that account for time and inter-institutional balances and identify factors that affect cross-country variation in temporal trends.
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Lin, Lin. "REGULATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN CHINA: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS." Journal of Law and Commerce 32, no. 2 (July 18, 2014): 207–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jlc.2014.67.
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Executive compensation is an essential element of a corporate governance system and an issue of public concern and academic debate. However, the existing literature on executive compensation has primarily focused on the United States, United Kingdom and continental European jurisdictions. This paper presents a comprehensive comparative study of the law and practices of executive pay in China. It critically examines the processes that produce compensation arrangements, as well as the various legal strategies and market forces that act on these processes in the context of China.Based on extensive empirical evidence, it finds that excessive pay in China is less prevalent than that in the United States. Nevertheless, Chinese executive compensation is not optimal in that there are both excessive executive pay and low levels of equity incentives for executives in Chinese listed companies. Meanwhile, executives of state-owned enterprises are largely compensated by on-duty consumption, grey income and political reward. The article argues that the fundamental problem of executive pay in Chinese listed companies lies in the internal defects of its unique governance institutions, as well as the prevalence of concentrated state ownership in listed companies. It concludes that the primary role of Chinese law in regulating executive compensation should not simply be to curb excessive executive pay, but it should be to improve the regulatory structure for setting executive pay in a fairer and more transparent way. To achieve this, regulatory strategies, especially heightened disclosure and strengthening the independence of the compensation committee, must be taken.
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ABERBACH, JOEL D., and BERT A. ROCKMAN. "Image IV Revisited: Executive and Political Roles." Governance 1, no. 1 (January 1988): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.1988.tb00057.x.
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Knott, Jack H. "The Fed Chairman as a Political Executive." Administration & Society 18, no. 2 (August 1986): 197–231. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/009539978601800204.
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Yeung, Timothy Yu-Cheong. "Political philosophy, executive constraint and electoral rules." Journal of Comparative Economics 45, no. 1 (February 2017): 67–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2016.10.006.
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Balamush, M. A., and О. M. Mykolenko. "POLITICAL SERVICE IN EXECUTIVE AUTHORITIES (ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS)." Constitutional State, no. 46 (June 20, 2022): 43–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.18524/2411-2054.2022.46.257806.
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The article analyzes the classification of positions of public servants, which divides positions in the executive branch into two types - administrative and political. It is emphasized that the effectiveness of any organization depends, inter alia, on the staffing of all parts of its internal management. In this regard, it is noted that the executive authorities are no exception in this regard. The overall effectiveness of the executive in Ukraine depends on the quality of the staff that fills all levels of government. It was noted that the process of legal regulation of government formation and distribution of positions in executive bodies was significantly influenced by competition between “technocratic government” and “influence of political parties”, which received public support in implementing their political programs. It is emphasized that determining the features of the legal regulation of political officials, clarifying their differences from public servants who hold administrative positions in the executive branch, is a relevant and promising subject of research in modern administrative law. It is proved that the legal status of public servants holding administrative positions in executive bodies is sufficiently regulated by national legislation, while the legal status of political servants is enshrined in fragments and with numerous gaps. The existence of public positions in executive bodies is mentioned in such normative legal acts as the Code of Administrative Proceeding of Ukraine, the Laws of Ukraine “On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine”, “On Central Executive Bodies”. However, even today the national legislation does not have a clear list of positions of executive bodies that are political. It is established that the issue of the legal nature of such a position as the head of a local state administration, which was excluded from the list of administrative positions but was not officially recognized as a political position, remains unresolved in the national legislation. It is proved that public servants who hold political positions are characterized by the following features: 1) are appointed to positions according to the procedures provided by the norms of constitutional law; 2) are politicians or persons representing the interests of political forces in the government; 3) the legislation does not impose mandatory requirements on them in terms of practical experience or the appropriate level of professionalism; 4) they maintain contact with society through political technologies and procedures; 5) they are not subject to disciplinary liability.
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RIFA'I, AHMAD, Syamsurijal Tan, Edward Edward, and Zulfina Adriani. "Effect of Political Will Perception and Executive Job Satisfaction Toward Managerial Performance." International Journal of Law Policy and Governance 1, no. 1 (September 9, 2022): 48–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.54099/ijlpg.v1i1.290.
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Purpose – This study aims to determine the effect of executive job satisfaction on managerial performance through political will perception, to determine the effect of political will perception on managerial performance and to determine the effect of executive job satisfaction on managerial performance.
Methodology/approach – A This research is a quantitative research using WarPls 07 to process the data. This research was conducted at the Government of Indragiri Hilir Regency, Riau Province, Indonesia. The sampling technique used is probability sampling with proportionate stratified random sampling. The sample was calculated using the Herry King Nomogram Table with an error rate of 5% where 135 respondents were selected.
Findings – It Test results The effect of executive job satisfaction on managerial performance has a beta coefficient of 0. 272 and a p value of <0.001. Thus it can be concluded that executive job satisfaction has a positive effect on managerial performance. The effect of political will perception on managerial performance has a beta coefficient of 0.389 and a p value of <0.001. Thus, it can be concluded that the political will perception has a positive effect on managerial performance. Testing the effect of executive job satisfaction on the political will perception has a beta coefficient of 0.633 and a p value of <0.001. Thus, it can be concluded that executive job satisfaction has a positive effect on political will perception. Testing the effect of executive job satisfaction on managerial performance through the political will perception has a beta coefficient of 0.246 with a p value <0.001 which is smaller than the sig level of 0.05.
Novelty/value – As executive job satisfaction increases managerial performance through the political will perception and its effect is significant. Thus, it can be concluded that the political will perception can mediate the effect of executive job satisfaction on managerial performance
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Connaughton, Bernadette. "Political-administrative relations: The role of political advisers." Administration 65, no. 2 (May 24, 2017): 165–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/admin-2017-0020.
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Abstract Ministerial advisers were first formally appointed as support for individual Irish ministers in 1973, and since then their numbers and tasks have considerably expanded. As ‘temporary civil servants’, they are regarded as both an accepted and criticised feature of executive government. This article focuses on the role of political staff during the period 2011-16 and centres on the period of the economic crisis and its immediate aftermath. It considers themes arising in the international literature that raise questions for the reform of the Irish ‘special adviser’. In order to unpack the specifics of the Irish case, the position and function of special advisers are explored through two theoretical perspectives - public adviser bargains and the core executive. It is argued that the special adviser continues to fit somewhat uneasily within the imperatives of the political-administrative system because they are personally appointed by ministers and their selection is determined by the level and type of support required by individual ministers, as opposed to any preordained skills set.
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YAP, O. FIONA. "Executive–Legislature Divide and Party Volatility in Emergent Democracies: Lessons for Democratic Performance from Taiwan." Japanese Journal of Political Science 9, no. 3 (December 2008): 305–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109908003150.
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AbstractAre new democracies with divided government and volatile parties politically ill fated? The literature suggests so, but cases of emergent democracies such as Taiwan and Brazil that face both conditions defy the prediction. This paper explains why: party volatility follows from pursuing distinct executive and legislature agendas under divided government; the political ambition that underlies these conditions sustains democratic and even political performance. We evaluate the argument through government spending in Taiwan. The results corroborate our expectations: they show more parties composing the legislature as government spending favors an executive agenda and neglects a legislative welfare-spending agenda. The findings make three contributions to the literature: first, they reveal a political divide between executive and legislature rather than ideological parties to undercut concerns regarding performance. Second, they demonstrate that the strategic use of government spending to institutionalize party development along an executive agenda fuels party fragmentation. Third, they show that legislators split, switch, or create alternative routes to office in reaction to strategic spending to underscore that ambition underlies party volatility and divided government.
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FitzGerald, Clare. "Getting Past “Purposeful”: Exploring Dimensionality in Nonprofit Executive Performance Information Use." Journal of Public and Nonprofit Affairs 6, no. 3 (December 16, 2020): 281–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.20899/jpna.6.3.281-302.
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Although performance information use (PIU) among public managers is a growing and increasingly relevant research area, the existing evidence base has two significant limitations for those interested in its application to nonprofit executives. First, large survey investigations, the predominant method used to assess PIU behaviors, have rarely sampled outside of government. Second, despite theoretical arguments and empirical support for PIU being a multidimensional behavior, only ‘purposeful’ use (i.e., the deliberate and instrumental use of performance information in decision-making to improve organizational operations) has been examined with any regularity. Thus, in addition to developing theory around PIU for nonprofit executives (rather than just public managers within governments), I test established drivers of purposeful and political PIU using survey data from 260 nonprofit executives throughout the United States. Results show that nonprofit executive PIU is driven by different considerations than public manager PIU. Additionally, results show that leadership support of performance measurement is an important driver of purposeful and political PIU, with organizational goal clarity and networking behavior also, specifically, driving political PIU.
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Annesley, Claire, and Susan Franceschet. "Gender and the Executive Branch." Politics & Gender 11, no. 04 (December 2015): 613–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1743923x15000446.
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The executive branch of government constitutes the pinnacle of political power. In principle, presidents and prime ministers, along with their cabinets, set the policy agenda, debate, and deliberate policy initiatives; introduce legislation; and oversee the implementation of public policies. Executives are the most visible political actors, representing the public “face” of government. Until very recently, executives were also the most masculinized of political institutions, with women absent entirely from the position of prime minister or president until the 1960s, and, at least until the last decade, holding only a small number of posts in cabinet. Yet one of the most striking global trends in recent years is the growing number of women elected to the post of prime minister or president: at the time of writing there are 12 countries where a woman occupies the top political office. A growing number of women are also being appointed cabinet ministers and, in some cases, to some of the most traditionally masculine posts. It is common today to define “parity” cabinets as those where women hold between 40% and 60% of ministerial portfolios. With that definition, countries as different as Spain, Bolivia, Sweden, and South Africa have had gender parity in cabinet. What is more, women's presence in cabinet is now a firmly established norm. Among the first questions raised by commentators after a newly elected president or prime minister announces her cabinet are, how many women were appointed? To which portfolios were they assigned?
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Eichbaum, Chris, and Richard Shaw. "Political Staff in Executive Government: Conceptualising and Mapping Roles within the Core Executive." Australian Journal of Political Science 46, no. 4 (December 2011): 583–600. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2011.623668.
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Binzer Hobolt, Sara, and Robert Klemmensen. "Government Responsiveness and Political Competition in Comparative Perspective." Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 3 (July 13, 2007): 309–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414006297169.
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Governments in democratic systems are expected to respond to the issue preferences of citizens. Yet we have a limited understanding of the factors that cause levels of responsiveness to vary across time and between countries. In this article, the authors suggest that political contestation is the primary mechanism driving policy responsiveness and that this, in turn, is mediated by political institutions and government popularity. To test this proposition, the authors analyze the responsiveness of executive policy promises (speeches) and policy actions (public expenditure) in Britain, Denmark, and the United States in the period from 1970 to 2005. These time-series analyses show that higher levels of political contestation are associated with more responsive executives.
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Forestiere, Carolyn. "Political Volatility and Governance in East Central Europe." Slavic Review 69, no. 4 (2010): 903–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0037677900009906.
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In this article, Carolyn Forestiere investigates political volatility as a way to explain varying levels of governance across the new democracies of east central Europe. Specifically, legislative and executive volatility are examined. The results suggest that differences in legislative volatility help explain variations in governance, especially during the beginning of a new democracy. Once party systems begin to consolidate, however, differences in executive volatility begin to matter more. A case study of Poland confirms some of Forestiere's conclusions. While the legislative party system has shown some signs of stabilization, executive volatility remains a salient political problem, which over time has led to a steady decline in the quality of governance.
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Kirgis, Frederic L. "Federal Statutes, Executive Orders and “Self-Executing Custom”." American Journal of International Law 81, no. 2 (April 1987): 371–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2202408.
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A hotly debated issue raised in this publication’s October 1986 Agora and, repeatedly, during the drafting of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) has to do with the relationship between customary international law and federal law in the United States. Most of the debate addressed whether a newly emerged custom would supersede an earlier federal statute or self-executing treaty. The reporters of the Restatement took a strong stand at first, placing custom on the same plane as federal statutes and self-executing treaties: in case of conflict, the latest in time should prevail. Criticism rolled in, and the reporters eventually retreated a bit. The final version says only that since custom and international agreements have equal authority in international law, and both are law of the United States, “arguably later customary law should be given effect as law of the United States, even in the face of an earlier law or agreement, just as a later international agreement of the United States is given effect in the face of an earlier law or agreement.”’
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Perkovich, George. "Executive Privilege." Foreign Affairs 79, no. 6 (2000): 162. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20049975.
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Raunio, Tapio, and Thomas Sedelius. "Presidents and Cabinets: Coordinating Executive Leadership in Premier-Presidential Regimes." Political Studies Review 18, no. 1 (July 12, 2019): 53–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1478929919862227.
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A key factor of semi-presidential regimes is power-sharing mechanisms between president and government. Influenced by Shugart and Carey’s seminal work on premier-presidential regimes, this article addresses intra-executive dynamics in light of recent scholarship on the risks and consequences associated with conflict and cooperation between the president and the cabinet. Through an in-depth comparison of three premier-presidential systems with broadly similar constitutional designs, Finland, Lithuania and Romania, it forces us to reconsider how coordination mechanisms and political context shape presidential influence. Absent of a working constitutional division of labour and established modes of intra-executive coordination, presidents are more likely to use alternative channels of influence – such as the strategy of ‘going public’ or direct contacts with political parties, the legislature or civil society stakeholders – and to intervene in questions falling under the competence of the government. Lack of institutionalized coordination also benefits the presidents as they hold the initiative regarding cooperation between the two executives.
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Smith, Steven Rathgeb. "Executive Director's Report." PS: Political Science & Politics 47, no. 01 (December 29, 2013): 224–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049096513001868.
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This essay is my first report as executive director of APSA. I am honored to be succeeding Michael Brintnall. APSA is one of the leading academic associations in the world. It is more than 110 years old with more than 13,000 members, representing a wide variety of universities and nonacademic settings including think tanks, research institutions, advocacy organizations, and government agencies. Our membership is increasingly international from many different countries. In conjunction with our partner, Cambridge University Press, we publish three highly respected journals, theAmerican Political Science Review,Perspectives on Politics,andPS:Political Science and Politics.
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Kohno, Masaru, and Midori Kobayashi. "Executive Turnovers in 2001." Japanese Journal of Political Science 2, no. 2 (November 2001): 253–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109901000287.
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Political developments in Japan from the latter part of 2000 to the year 2001 were highlighted by the executive transition from unpopular Yoshiro Mori to exceptionally popular Junichiro Koizumu as the nation's leader.
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Kaniskin, N. A. "The Western Executive and the Soviet Executive." Soviet Education 33, no. 11 (November 1991): 45–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/res1060-9393331145.
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McKibben, Heather Elko, and Shaina D. Western. "‘Reserved Ratification’: An Analysis of States’ Entry of Reservations Upon Ratification of Human Rights Treaties." British Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2 (March 9, 2018): 687–712. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123417000631.
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Governing elites often ratify human rights treaties, even when their policies do not align with those treaties’ obligations. This article argues that this can be explained by the fact that executives anticipate the potential challenges these treaties could raise vis-à-vis their domestic policies and enter different types of reservations when they ratify to head them off. The types of reservations they use depend on key characteristics of the executive’s policies and practices, as well as its relationship with the legislative and judicial branches. Domestic actors can raise different types of challenges against the executive depending on variations in these key factors. The types of reservations executives use will therefore vary depending on the specific challenges ratification raises for them. Using an original dataset of the reservations states entered on human rights treaties registered with the United Nations, and employing an event history analysis, this study shows that the particular challenges treaties present for executives in different types of states help explain variation in how they use reservations when they ratify human rights treaties.