Journal articles: 'Political corruption'

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Ceva, Emanuela, and Maria Paola Ferretti. "Political corruption." Philosophy Compass 12, no. 12 (September 18, 2017): e12461. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12461.

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Soliman, Hussein, and Sherry Cable. "Sinking under the weight of corruption: Neoliberal reform, political accountability and justice." Current Sociology 59, no. 6 (October 20, 2011): 735–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0011392111419748.

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The United Nations adopted the 2003 Convention Against Corruption to reduce corruption in developing nations. Corruption’s determinants include political systems’ permeability to economic influence, state economic intervention, weak political competition and officials’ discretionary power to allocate resources. Corruption’s outcomes are slowed economic development, misallocation of government resources, income inequalities and, less frequently, disasters. Using archival and interview data, this article documents corruption’s shaping of the 2006 sinking of an Egyptian ferry in the Red Sea, which killed 1034; high-level corruption not only caused the disaster but exacerbated its impacts. The study’s findings confirm much of the empirical literature but contradict assertions that corruption is associated with high levels of government intervention in the economy. Based on the findings, the article gives a critique of neoliberal reform that associates it with high-level corruption.

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Bodruzic, Dragana. "Vice or coping mechanism? Bridging political science and anthropological approaches to the study of corruption." Critique of Anthropology 36, no. 4 (July 25, 2016): 363–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0308275x16654552.

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Political science and economics have dominated the study of corruption. Recently, anthropologists have questioned traditional definitions of corruption and have conducted a deeper inquiry into the interplay of cultural dynamics and corruption. However, despite the existence of two strands in anthropology—interpretive and political economy—anthropological contributions to the study of corruption have come primarily from interpretive anthropology. Anthropologists studying corruption have focused on narratives and on understanding corruption’s embeddedness in cultural logics. Ethnography, however, has also revealed the importance of fixed price in many instances of corruption. This paper argues that fixed price is an indicator of the systematization of corruption. Consequently, greater attention needs to be paid to how corruption is also embedded in political economy.

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Klašnja, Marko, Andrew T. Little, and Joshua A. Tucker. "Political Corruption Traps." Political Science Research and Methods 6, no. 3 (October 24, 2016): 413–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2016.45.

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Academics and policymakers recognize that there are serious costs associated with systemic corruption. Stubbornly, many countries or regions remain stuck in a high-corruption equilibrium—a “corruption trap.” Most existing theories concentrate on mutually reinforcing expectations of corrupt behavior among a fixed set of bureaucrats or politicians, implying that changing such expectations can lead to lower corruption. We develop models that more fully characterize the political nature of corruption traps by also analyzing the behavior of voters and entrants to politics, as well their interaction with incumbent politicians. We show that corruption traps can arise through strategic behavior of each set of actors, as well as through their interrelations. By linking politician, voter, and entrant behavior, we provide an explanation for why simply trying to change expectations among one set of actors is likely insufficient for eliminating corruption traps.

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Philp, Mark. "Defining Political Corruption." Political Studies 45, no. 3 (August 1997): 436–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00090.

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Clark, Gordon L. "Political Corruption and Political Geography." New Zealand Geographer 54, no. 1 (April 1998): 59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-7939.1998.tb00526.x.

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Werlin, Herbert H. "Is Lord Acton Right? Rethinking Corruption, Democracy, and Political Power." International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences 1 (September 2013): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.18052/www.scipress.com/ilshs.1.1.

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This article examines Lord Acton’s famous assertion, “power tends to corrupt and absolute power, to corrupt absolutely,” including the suggestion that democratization reduces corruption. This assertion requires us to look at the meaning of political power, corruption, and democracy. By making a distinction between primary and secondary corruption (essentially, controllable and uncontrollable corruption) and between liberal democracy (emphasizing competitive politics) and classical democracy (emphasizing consensus-building politics), together with introducing Political Elasticity (PE) theory, a number of difficult questions are raised: 1. What is political power (with Hobbes and Russia, in mind)? 2. What is the linkage between political power and corruption? 3. Why is it that corruption does not necessarily prevent economic development (with China in mind)? At the conclusion the autocracy-corruption linkage is examined, as exemplified by a comparison of Singapore and Jamaica, indicating: (1) that political power, if persuasive, is not necessarily corruptive; (2) liberal or partisan democracy tends to corrupt and lawless democracy, to corrupt absolutely and (3) authoritarian regimes may recognize that controlling corruption is essential for their legitimacy and economic prosperity.

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Ferreira de Oliveira, Wilson José. "Anti-corruption protests, alliance system and political polarization." Civitas - Revista de Ciências Sociais 20, no. 3 (November 13, 2020): 439–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.15448/1984-7289.2020.2.38032.

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The fight against corruption has become, in recent years, one of the main international causes. Many studies have been done on the effects and consequences of corrupt and corrupting practices for the political system and for the general society. However, there are still few who are dedicated to analyzing the conditions and dynamics of the fight against corruption as a public and international cause and its consequences and impacts on national political systems. Therefore, the objective of this article is to examine the emergence and spread of anti-corruption movements and protests in Brazil, between 2013 and 2018. I aim to demonstrate that the emergence and development of anti-corruption protests and mobilizations in this period are related to the crisis and collapse of the “alliance system” between the main political leaders and organizations, becoming a political resource to recompose and change such alignments. This analysis shows the relevance of the “political dimension” to understand the process of emergence and the development of protests and mobilizations against corruption.

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Hine, David. "“Political corruption in Italy,” political corruption in Europe and Latin America." Trends in Organized Crime 2, no. 4 (June 1997): 64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12117-997-1090-3.

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Shashkova, A. V. "Corruption as a Problem of Political Theory and Political Practice." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 6(45) (December 28, 2015): 64–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2015-6-45-64-73.

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The present article is dedicated to the analysis of "corruption" from point of view of political practice and political theory. The present article studies historical examples of corruption: corruption during the era of Alexander the Great, Carthage, Roman Republic. The article gives the evolution of the term "corruption", pointing out current aspects of the term. The article provides positive and negative results of corruption, gives resume. The present article analyses corruption results: economical, political and social. Most important economical consequences of corruption are the following: increase of shadow economy, decrease of tax payments, weakening of the state budget, breach of market competition, decrease of market effectiveness, destabilization of the idea of market economy. Most important social consequences of corruption are the following: great distinction between the declared and real values, which creates a "double standard" of the moral and behavior, distraction of great sums from public and humanitarian development, increase of property disproportion, increase of social tension. The present article names most important political consequences of corruption: shift of ideas from public development to the security of power of oligarchy, decrease of trust to the state, decrease of image of the country at the international arena, increase of its economical and political isolation, decrease of political competition. The present article gives one of the resumes that the globalization process increases corruption. Together with globalization most important role is given to corporations and corporate corruption comes to the front raw.

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Myndresku, Iuliia. "Corruption Study Paradigm in Modern Political Science." Mediaforum : Analytics, Forecasts, Information Management, no. 7 (December 23, 2019): 285–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.31861/mediaforum.2019.7.285-304.

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In the last decades a growing awareness emerged of the relevance of corruption as an hidden factor which may negatively affect political and economic decision-making processes. In spite of a lively scientific debate there is no general consensus on a commonly accepted definition of what corruption is. The A. distinguishes three main paradigms, focusing on different (though not irreconcilable) variables. The first is the economic paradigm, which usually takes the principal-agent model of corruption as its founding pillar. In this paradigm corruption is considered the outcome of rational individual choices, and its spread within a certain organization is influenced by the factors defining the structure of expected costs and rewards. A second approach – the cultural paradigm – looks at the differences in cultural traditions, social norms and interiorized values which shape individuals’ moral preferences and consideration of his social and institutional role. These are a leading forces that can push a corrupt public or private agent (not) to violate legal norms. A third neo-institutional approach considers also mechanisms which allow the internal regulation of social interactions within corrupt networks, and their effects on individuals’ beliefs and preferences. Though the corrupt agreements cannot be enforced with legal sanctions, several informal, nonwritten rules, contractual provisos and conventions may regulate the corrupt exchange between agent and corruptor. Corruption is the outcome of a multitude of individual and collective choices which change public opinion towards corruption and its diffusion throughout the state, markets and civil society. There is no univocal recipe to deal with anti-bribery measures, since corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Reforms aimed at dismantling systemic corruption have to be finely tuned against its hidden governance structures, i.e. its internal regulation of exchanges and relationships. Otherwise, a vicious circle may emerge: the more an anticorruption policy is needed, because corruption is systemic and enforced by effective third-parties, the less probable its formulation and implementation. Only when official rules are complemented by coherent informal institutions, bottom-up initiatives, they tend to produce the expected outcomes and make anticorruption regulation more effective.

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Navot, Doron, and Itai Beeri. "Conceptualization of Political Corruption, Perceptions of Corruption, and Political Participation in Democracies." Lex localis - Journal of Local Self-Government 15, no. 2 (April 30, 2017): 199–219. http://dx.doi.org/10.4335/15.2.199-219(2017).

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This study empirically examines relationships between conceptions of political corruption, perceived levels of corruption, and political participation among members of the public. Based on a field study of 298 Israelis, we show that the effects of perceived levels of corruption on participation are significantly influenced by how citizens conceptualize corruption. The public's conceptions of corruption influence whether and how they will participate. The findings provide strong evidence that while the perceived extent of political corruption is a powerful determinant of participation, the public's conception of corruption must not be overlooked. Rather, both factors should be considered as important indicators of participation.

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Ullah, Asad, Mamoon Khan Khattak, and Mussawar Shah. "Transition in Pakistani Political Norms of Society and Corruption." Global Social Sciences Review III, no. III (September 30, 2018): 38–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2018(iii-iii).04.

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The Messenger of ALLAH Almighty, the Holy Prophet MUHAMMAD (peace be upon him) has said "Ar-Rashi Wal Murtashi Kila huma Finnar" that mean "the giver and taker of bribes (corrupt) will both go to the fire of hell". This research analyzes corruption's effect on existing social values in Peshawar region of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. A total of 150 respondents were selected as sample using stratified random sampling technique for study using Likert scale as measurement tool in interview schedule. The bi-variate and uni-variate analyses were made for reaching results. The existence of the effect of "corruption perception" as independent variable's effects were assessed on the "social values in political institutions" as dependent variable by applying Chi-square test. Furthermore, Gamma (y) statistics' application was made for finding the bond and relationship's direction. It was concluded that a significant association prevails regarding corruption perception with organized corruption alliance between government servants and politicians (P=0.002), politicians who are corrupt do safeguard corrupt interests (P=0.000) and favoured political environment (P=0.000). Moreover, posting candid politicians on significant government posts (P=0.000), removing political influence form bureaucracy (P=0.000), making politicians accountable to agencies related to stopping corruption (P=0.000), recompensing politicians of honesty (P=0.033), sensitizing politicians to be aware of corruption (P=0.000) and applying court's judgements regarding reducing corruption (P=0.000) were found significantly associated with improving state of corruption.

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Fell, Dafydd. "Political and Media Liberalization and Political Corruption in Taiwan." China Quarterly 184 (December 2005): 875–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741005000548.

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This article examines the relationship between democratic and media reforms and political corruption in Taiwan. Has liberalization resulted in increased corruption or has it created a cleaner political system? I argue that the Taiwan case reveals the potential positive effects of multi-party democracy for tackling political corruption, as opposition parties have exploited a liberalized media to challenge and alter accepted but corrupt norms of governance. Pillars of the KMT party state such as its party assets, vote buying and the corrupt patron–client relationship with local factions were until the 1990s either openly or tacitly accepted as legitimate. The Taiwanese opposition parties took a latent political issue, corruption, and progressively broadened the scope of what is publicly acknowledged as corruption. By exposing cases of KMT government corruption and establishing new norms of clean governance it is possible that in the long term opposition parties can contribute to the creation of a cleaner political system.

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Nisnevich, Y. "What Is Political Corruption." World Economy and International Relations 64, no. 12 (2020): 133–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2020-64-12-133-138.

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The article analyzes the definitions of political corruption based on the following approaches used in political science to classify forms and manifestations of corruption: subject-oriented, actor-based and targeted. Within the framework of these approaches, we offer an updated definition of political corruption which can involve public officials of all levels. Political corruption is instrumentally defined as the unlawful use by a public official of various types of administrative resources of public authority to extract personal and (or) group political benefits (political enrichment), including in favor of third parties. The author singles out such form of corruption as state policy corruption, the essence of which is to skew the state policy in favor of private interests at the expense of public interests in order to unlawfully gain both tangible economic and intangible political benefits. The institutional mechanism of state policy corruption is the unlawful use by public officials of its legislative and regulatory administrative resources not to implement public policy in order to realize national interests and goals in various spheres of life of society and the state, but to create “rules of the game” that allow obtaining illegal advantage, to extract personal and (or) group benefit, which may have both tangible and intangible expression. Actors of such corruption can be senior public officials, whose competence includes adopting laws and regulations that determine state policy in various areas and mechanisms for its implementation. It is noted that state policy corruption is characterized by “autocorruption” – a situation where there is no external stimulation to commit a corruption act, it is not necessary, and its executor and final beneficiary are the same actor and (or) actors belonging to the same community. The author identifies the relationship between state policy corruption as a symbiosis of political and economic corruption at the highest levels of power and the peak of systemic corruption with corrupt state capture.

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Ciric, Jovan. "Problems of political corruption." Socioloski pregled 42, no. 4 (2008): 531–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/socpreg0804531c.

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Moxon-Browne, E. "Political corruption in Africa." International Affairs 63, no. 4 (1987): 699–700. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2619732.

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Philp, Mark, and Elizabeth Dávid-Barrett. "Realism About Political Corruption." Annual Review of Political Science 18, no. 1 (May 11, 2015): 387–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-092012-134421.

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WISEMAN, JOHN A. "Political Corruption in Africa." African Affairs 87, no. 346 (January 1988): 132. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a097989.

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Reed, Steven R. "Political corruption in Japan." International Social Science Journal 48, no. 149 (September 1996): 395–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2451.00040.

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Stratford, Jean Slemmons, Juri Stratford, and Mark Mccullough. "Thinking about political corruption." Journal of Government Information 21, no. 5 (September 1994): 495–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/1352-0237(94)90026-4.

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Fleischer, David. "Political corruption in Brazil." Crime, Law and Social Change 25, no. 4 (1996): 297–321. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00572512.

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Guarnieri, Carlo, Cristina Dallara, and Michele Sapignoli. "Political corruption in Italy." Civitas - Revista de Ciências Sociais 20, no. 3 (November 13, 2020): 324–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.15448/1984-7289.2020.3.37879.

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At least since the 1990s, corruption has continued to be listed as one of the major shortcomings affecting old and new European democracies. In spite of that, measuring political corruption is still a tricky task. In this scenario, some recent studies proposed to turn the attention to the judicial actions to curb corruption, through criminal prosecution, shedding light specifically on the investigations involving high-level politicians (Popova and Post 2018; Dallara 2019). In this paper we aim to present data about judicial prosecution of political corruption in Italy, emphasizing how the number of investigations involving political actors seems rather high, although relatively few cases end with a conviction. Moreover, we aim to suggest some explanatory factors that could account for this situation. Among them: the salience of the issue in the political and public debate; the governance structure of the Italian judicial system and some characters of the Italian criminal law and procedure.

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Kumar, Pawan. "Addressing Political Corruption In India." Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science 20 (June 29, 2013): 14–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.22151/politikon.20.3.

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The debate on the relationship between corruption and democracy involves the fundamental issue of the nature of corruption and that of democracy. Both these concepts can be understood in quite different manners. This paper tries to bring corruption into the realm of democratic theory by focusing on the nature of the problem and its effects on democracy. It begins by discussing the various ways in which theorists and thinkers have conceptualized political corruption, making it a complex phenomenon. This explores how political corruption takes root in and thrives in a democracy. The paper also highlights the importance of focusing more on the effects of corruption so that the systemic nature of the problem can be explored. The intention in this paper is not to come up with any grand theory of corruption but it only seeks to problematize the conventional and prevalent understanding of political corruption. Conventionally, corruption has been considered as a moral, individual or social problem but recent approaches to study corruption have tried to establish link between corruption and democracy by focusing on the effects of corruption on democratic institutions and processes. These different understandings have made corruption a contested field of research as it affects economic, social, and political aspects of a political system almost equally. This exercise insists the need of looking at it from institutional perspective as it is engulfed in social, economic and political fields. The paper presents its arguments by acknowledging the link between reducing corruption and broader process of democratization.

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Shabbir, Ghulam, Mumtaz Anwar, and Shahid Adil. "Corruption, Political Stability and Economic Growth." Pakistan Development Review 55, no. 4I-II (December 1, 2016): 689–702. http://dx.doi.org/10.30541/v55i4i-iipp.689-702.

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This paper gives insight of the role of political stability in investigating the two competing hypotheses in Developing Eight Muslim countries, and also investigates whether conditional liaison between corruption and political stability matters or not. The empirical findings indicate that investment, population and political stability play positive role in promoting economic growth. Corruption not only impact growth but also influenced by the institutional quality that a nation experiences. Corruption acts as sands in the wheels in the nations having higher degree of political stability, and greases the wheels in less politically stable countries such as Nigeria and Pakistan. Thus, political stability is conducive to growth, as it reduces the social unrests, political turmoil, and encourages investment, and there by economic growth. JEL Classification: C30, D73, O43, P48 Keywords: Corruption, Economic Growth, Political Stability, Conditional Cooperation

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Milova, Tatyana, Kateryna Troshkina, Yevhenii Horlov, and Jaroslaw Dobkowski. "Country’s Brand and Corruption Level: Cointegration Analysis." Marketing and Management of Innovations, no. 3 (2019): 366–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.21272/mmi.2019.3-28.

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The paper summarized the arguments and counterarguments in the scientific debate on the impact of corruption on a country's brand. The modern approaches to the analysis of corruption’s impact on the country's macroeconomic indicators were analysed. The authors justified that increasing the corruption’s level is considered as one of the most significant deterrents to the radical political and economic changes taking place in the countries by society. The main purpose of the paper is to analyse the long-term cause-and-effect relationships between Control of Corruption and the country's brand. Four European countries (Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine) were selected as the object of the investigation, which pursued an evolutionary policy of reforming the political and economic system after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which encouraged the practice of eliminating corruption. The research period was 2000-2018. With a purpose to check the hypothesis of the investigation the 3-stage algorithm to estimate the long-term cause-and-effect relationships between Control of Corruption and the key parameters of the country brand is developed. The developed algorithm was based on the Augmented Dicker-Fuller test and granger casualty test. It is established that for Ukraine, the interconnections between Control of Corruption and International migrant stock, Control of Corruption and Exports of goods and services, Control of Corruption and Foreign direct investment had a unidirectional character of influence of the corruption’s level on the components of the country’s brand. The findings proved that 51.73%, 43.79% and 66% of the total fluctuations of International migrant stock, Exports of goods and services, Foreign direct investment depend on changes in the level of corruption in the country. The obtained results allowed concluding that for the European Union countries (Poland, Lithuania and Latvia) it was the country brand that had a positive impact on reducing the corruption’s level. It was justified that the choice of a specific model for combating the corruption’s level in the chosen countries significantly determined the course of their political transformation and influenced the change’s rate of the social and economic development. Keywords: brand, stakeholders, competitiveness, investors, corruption.

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Hu, Yiming, and Mingxia Xu. "China’s anti-corruption campaign, political connections and private firms’ debt financing." China Finance Review International 9, no. 4 (November 18, 2019): 521–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cfri-09-2018-0132.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the deleveraging impact of the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on private firms with political connections, relative to those without political connections. Design/methodology/approach In this paper, taking the anti-corruption campaign employed from the end of 2012 as an exogenous shock, the authors design a quasi-experiment difference-in-difference approach to examine how the loss and failure of political connections impacts private firms’ debt financing. Findings The authors find that the loss and failure of political connections following the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress causes the yearly new debt ratios of treatment firms with political connections to decrease, relative to those of control firms without political connections. This outcome is more pronounced for provinces with more cadres excluded in the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress, which rendered politically connected firms susceptible to lose connections with central or provincial cadres. To explore the mechanism, the authors find that following the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress, politically connected firms limit rent-seeking activities, whereas resource acquisition is weakened. The authors also find that the impact of the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress on the debt financing of politically connected firms, relative to their counterparts, is more pronounced for groups with high levels of information asymmetry and for less explicit guarantee groups. Finally, politically connected firms are more likely to be dominated by internal funds in dealing with a loss of advantages in debt financing, compared with their counterparts without political connections. Research limitations/implications The findings in this study suggest that the loss or failure of previous political connections following Xi’s anti-corruption campaign make politically connected firms lose the advantages in debt financing through the rent-seeking, resource acquisition, information asymmetry, implicit guarantee channels, which provide new evidence for research on the impact of the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress on private firms’ financing behaviors via the loss or failure of existing political connections. Practical implications The findings in the study will have some inspiration for policy makers and entrepreneur. Originality/value This study provides new evidence on the different impacts of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign on private firm’s debt financing between politically connected and unconnected firms.

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Jiménez, Alfredo, and Ilan Alon. "Corruption, political discretion and entrepreneurship." Multinational Business Review 26, no. 2 (July 16, 2018): 111–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mbr-01-2018-0009.

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Purpose While common sense suggests that corruption will likely have a negative impact on the economy as it raises the cost of doing business, research on the topic showed inconsistent results (positive, negative and neutral). This paper aims to verify whether corruption has a “grease” or “sand” effect on the wheels of entrepreneurial rates and under which conditions corruption will have stronger or weaker effects. Design/methodology/approach Using institutional theory as the basis for the hypotheses, generalized least squares estimation is conducted to empirically examine the role of corruption and political discretion in entrepreneurship in a sample of 93 countries. Findings Countries with higher levels of corruption are associated with lower levels of firm creation. However, this negative effect of corruption is weaker when there are higher levels of political discretion. Originality/value This is the first evaluation of the moderating effect of political discretion on the negative impact of corruption on entrepreneurship.

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Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. "Book Review: Political corruption and political geography." Progress in Human Geography 23, no. 1 (March 1999): 161–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1191/030913299670653863.

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Dasgupta, Sandipto. "The Power of Corruption." Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 39, no. 3 (December 1, 2019): 558–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/1089201x-7885524.

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Abstract The central paradox of corruption in the political life of the global South is how such a widely despised phenomenon persists so untroubled by allthe negative attention. The two books under discussion—Steven Pierce's Moral Economies of Corruption and Milan Vaishnav's When Crime Pays—demonstrate that to make sense of that paradox, one needs to go beyond the dominant legal/technocratic understanding of corruption as either private acts of illegality or failures of the civic democratic process. Thinking further with the insights offered by those books, the article sugg ests that the phenomenon of corruption can only be made sense of when placed within the matrix of political and social power relations in the global South democracies. Corruptions appear not as distortions in an idealized democratic marketplace, but in the context of maneuvers of counter-democratic power to maintain existing hierarchies of dominations against tides of democratic mobilization, not merely as a subversion of the public good, but in reaction to attempts to make goods public.

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Naxera, Vladimír. "The Never-ending Story: Czech Governments, Corruption and Populist Anti-Corruption Rhetoric (2010–2018)." Politics in Central Europe 14, no. 3 (December 1, 2018): 31–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pce-2018-0017.

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Abstract Corruption is a phenomenon with significant effects – economically, politically and culturally. Corruption tends to be viewed negatively by the public. As such, anti-corruption rhetoric may be an ideal election strategy for individual political parties. Nevertheless, anti-corruption rhetoric does not necessarily translate into an actual anti-corruption policy. This study analyses the impact of anti-corruption rhetoric that does not reflect the actual practices of its speaker and has been used strategically to gain favour. My focus is on elections and the subsequent formation and exercise of government in the Czech Republic. I analyse how anti-corruption rhetoric directed at political opponents works as an election success strategy. At the same time, I show how electoral success, transformed into real political power, strengthens the ability of actors to engage in activities that amount to borderline or outright corruption, irrespective of any anti-corruption rhetoric.

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Baig, Saranjam, Cuneyt Yenigun, and Khalid Mehmood Alam. "Political Capacity and Corruption Nexus: Re-Examining Evidence for Developing Countries." Economies 10, no. 6 (May 31, 2022): 127. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/economies10060127.

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This article examines the question of whether developing countries with strong political capacity have lower levels of corruption. Despite the ubiquity of literature on corruption, the relationship between a state’s political capacity and corruption has not been addressed by the existing academic literature. To measure the political capacity of a country, the authors have used relative political capacity (RPC), an indicator that gauges the effectiveness of governance by its ability to meet or exceed their expected extractive capabilities and its ability to implement a set of policy choices. On the one hand, politically capable and stable governments are in a position to pursue their political and economic goals, such as reducing corruption. On the other hand, a strong political capacity provides them with the opportunity for rent-seeking and corruption. This implies that a state’s strong political capacity can be either a ‘boon’ or ‘bane’ to implement a set of desired policy goals. Based on this assertion, the authors test the hypothesis of whether a strong relative political capacity increases or reduces the level of corruption. The analysis uses the ordinary least-squares and two-stage least squares methods for 98 developing countries to test the hypothesis. The findings suggest that the explanatory power of political capacity is at least as important as conventionally accepted causes of corruption, such as economic development, and democracy.

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Navot, Doron. "Political Corruption, Democratic Theory, and Democracy." Les ateliers de l'éthique 9, no. 3 (March 12, 2015): 4–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1029057ar.

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According to recent conceptual proposals, institutional corruption should be understood within the boundaries of the institution and its purpose. Political corruption in democracies, prominent scholars suggest, is characterized by the violation of institutional ideals or behaviors that tend to harm democratic processes and institutions. This paper rejects the idea that compromises, preferences, political agreements, or consent can be the baseline of conceptualization of political corruption. In order to improve the identification of abuse of power, the concept of political corruption should not be related directly to democratic institutions and processes; rather, it should be related to ideals whose content is independent of citizens’ preferences, institutions and processes. More specifically, I articulate the relations between political corruption and the notion of subjection, and include powerful citizens in the category of political corruption. Yet, I also suggest redefining under what conditions agents are culpable for their motivations in promoting private gain. By doing this, we better realize how democratic institutions can be the source of corruption and not just its victims. Such a redefinition, I propose finally, is the basis for the distinction between individual and institutional corruption.

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de la Poza, Elena, Lucas Jódar, and Paloma Merello. "Modeling Political Corruption in Spain." Mathematics 9, no. 9 (April 24, 2021): 952. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math9090952.

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Political corruption is a universal phenomenon. Even though it is a cross-country reality, its level of intensity and the manner of its effect vary worldwide. In Spain, the demonstrated political corruption cases that have been echoed by the media in recent years for their economic, judicial and social significance are merely the tip of the iceberg as regards a problem hidden by many interested parties, plus the shortage of the means to fight against it. This study models and quantifies the population at risk of committing political corruption in Spain by identifying and quantifying the drivers that explain political corruption. Having quantified the problem, the model allows changes to be made in parameters, as well as fiscal, economic and legal measures being simulated, to quantify and better understand their impact on Spanish citizenship. Our results suggest increasing women’s leadership positions to mitigate this problem, plus changes in the political Parties’ Law in Spain and increasing the judiciary system’s budget.

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Della Porta, Donatella, and Alberto Vannucci. "Controlling political corruption in Italy." Res Publica 38, no. 2 (June 1996): 353–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.5553/rp/048647001996038002353.

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Kim, Jin Yong. "Political corruption and its control." Korea Association for Corruption Studies 26, no. 1 (March 31, 2021): 159–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.52663/kcsr.2021.26.1.159.

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Navot, Doron. "The Concept of Political Corruption." Public Integrity 16, no. 4 (September 27, 2014): 357–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/pin1099-9922160403.

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Kresina, I. O., and I. V. Kushnaryov. "Political corruption: the ukrainian dimension." Bûletenʹ Mìnìsterstva ûsticìï Ukraïni 9, no. 9 (September 2019): 28–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.36035/2312-1831-9-9-28-33.

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LODGE, T. "POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN SOUTH AFRICA." African Affairs 97, no. 387 (April 1, 1998): 157–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a007924.

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Singh, Ranjit. "Corruption: Political and Bureaucratic Persepective." Indian Journal of Public Administration 57, no. 3 (July 2011): 766–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0019556120110335.

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Adams, Harry. "Against Plutocracies: Fighting Political Corruption." Constellations 15, no. 1 (March 2008): 126–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8675.2008.00477.x.

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McQueen, Alison. "Political realism and moral corruption." European Journal of Political Theory 19, no. 2 (August 30, 2016): 141–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1474885116664825.

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Political realism is frequently criticised as a theoretical tradition that amounts to little more than a rationalisation of the status quo and an apology for power. This paper responds to this criticism by defending three connected claims. First, it acknowledges the moral seriousness of rationalisation, but argues that the problem is hardly particular to political realists. Second, it argues that classical International Relations realists like EH Carr and Hans Morgenthau have a profound awareness of the corrupting effects of rationalisation and see realism as an antidote to this problem. Third, it proposes that Carr and Morgenthau can help us to recognise the particular ways in which realist arguments may nonetheless rationalise existing power relations and affirm the status quo by default, if not by design.

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Strîmbu, Octavian, and Patrick González. "Does transparency reduce political corruption?" Journal of Public Economic Theory 20, no. 2 (September 8, 2017): 123–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12265.

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Evertsson, Nubia. "Political Corruption and Electoral Funding." International Criminal Justice Review 23, no. 1 (February 25, 2013): 75–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1057567713476886.

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CAMPOS, NAURO F., and FRANCESCO GIOVANNONI. "Political institutions, lobbying and corruption." Journal of Institutional Economics 13, no. 4 (April 4, 2017): 917–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137417000108.

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AbstractAlthough firms use various strategies to try to influence government policy, with lobbying and corruption chiefly among them, and political institutions play an important role in determining policy choices, very little research has been devoted to these topics. This paper tries to fill this gap. Using cross-country enterprise-level data, it investigates (1) the effect of a key political institution, namely electoral rules, on the probability that a firm engages in lobbying activities and (2) the impact of lobbying on influence, accounting for corruption and political institutions. The main conclusion is that lobbying is a significantly more effective way of generating political influence than corruption, and that electoral rules are a key mediating political institution. Our baseline estimate is that the probability of influencing government policy is 16% higher for firms that are members of lobbying groups than for those firms that are not.

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Goel, Rajeev K., and James W. Saunoris. "Political uncertainty and international corruption." Applied Economics Letters 24, no. 18 (January 16, 2017): 1298–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2016.1273480.

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Gannett, Allen, and Chad Rector. "The Rationalization of Political Corruption." Public Integrity 17, no. 2 (March 24, 2015): 165–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2015.1000654.

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Rothstein, Bo, and Daniel Eek. "Political Corruption and Social Trust." Rationality and Society 21, no. 1 (February 2009): 81–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463108099349.

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Warren, Mark E. "Political Corruption as Duplicitous Exclusion." PS: Political Science & Politics 39, no. 04 (September 29, 2006): 803–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049096506060975.

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Aragonès, Enriqueta, Javier Rivas, and Áron Tóth. "Voter heterogeneity and political corruption." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 170 (February 2020): 206–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.004.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Political corruption'

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