Academic literature on the topic 'Policy comparison'

This study aims; 1) to describe Masudul Alam Choudhury and Milton Friedman version of monetary policy, 2) to describe the comparison of Masudul Alam Choudhury and Milton Friedman thoughts on monetary policy, 3) to describe the relevance of Masudul Alam Choudhury and Milton Friedman version of monetary policy to monetary policy in Indonesia. The research method used is a qualitative method with a literature review type. The results showed that; 1) Choudhury put forward the endogenous theory of money in Islam, where the central bank as the monetary authority only facilitates the circulation of the money supply volume so that the amount is accordance with actual spending and not spending demand expectation, 2) Friedman argues that money only affects inflation and does not affect economic growth, therefore monetary policy must be directed only affects at controlling inflation and not directed at influencing real economic activity, 3) The relevance of Choudhury and Friedman economic thinking regarding monetary policy on monetary policy in Indonesia can be seen from the implementation monetary policy implemented by Bank Indonesia.

Genetic and economic responses to genetic gain were evaluated for these breeding arrangements: single use of bulls under testing; single and repeated use of proved bulls for two years and for three years (in combination with selection intensity 1%, 5% or 10% of the best bulls for the use of proved bulls); negative selection of cows in the herd – 10%, 20% or 30% of animals are discarded from reproduction and the animals are left in the herd and used for breeding by beef bulls; negative selection of first-calvers in the herd – 10%, 20% or 25% of animals are discarded for slaughter; discarding of heifers and purchase of animals with higher breeding value, and embryo transfer – a group of selected recipients accounts for 10%, 20% or 30% of the cows with lover breeding value in the dairy herds. Simulations for single use of breeding arrangements and their consequences over a fifty-year period were carried out for the above models using the gene flow method. Only minimum changes will occur since the 25^th year of observation. A comparison of the particular models showed the highest gain of proved bulls selected from 1% of the best bulls whose cumulative genetic gain was 41.558 kg of milk proteins on average per cow for the whole observed period. Single use of bulls under testing in the herd resulted in the second highest cumulative genetic gain. Use of proved bulls selected with lower selection intensity (5% or 10%) had worse results. Culling of cows and discarding of first-calvers for slaughter led to lower genetic and economic contribution. The gain of embryo transfer was also lower; moreover, it is not economically advantageous for its very high costs, so it should not be used in production herds generally. High genetic and economic gain was recorded for replacement of all heifers by animals with higher breeding value from other populations.  

The purpose of this article is to discuss the relationship between budgeting and accounting and the need for reporting on the budget to actual comparison in terms of the public policy. Comparison information is necessary for both internal comparisons and external reporting that lead to policy decisions. However, both internal and external reporting are hampered by differences in perspectives, philosophies, bases and definition of the entity between budgeting and accounting.

In public policy, both from Feldman's and Heidenheimer's definitions of CPP (Comparative Public Policy), we can conclude that there are 3 elements (elements) that are keywords that are the center of attention of CPP. In Feldman's terms, the 3 keywords are "process," "output," and "outcomes," while the keywords used by Heidenheimer are "haw," "why," and "to what effect." There are at least 3 reasons and objectives for comparing existing public policies between certain countries and other countries, or between existing policies in our country and policies in other countries. Namely: To get an overview and lessons on how to design a good policy. To gain a more profound and better understanding of how the role of government institutions and political processes (as they should be) is primarily related to the formulation and resolution of concrete problems that develop in society. To review various existing policies across the national level. Qualitative analysis method using SWOT. This is based on a qualitative study, not a quantitative one. This analysis refers to the results of studies and references on the existing Decentralization of education, including relevant books and publications. The comparison of public policies results includes Choices of Scope, Choices of Policy Instruments, Choices of Distribution, Choices of Restraints, and Innovation. In the United States, the education decentralization policy has proven to be an option to make it easier for the Government to deal with problems in detail and create alternative options for further improvement of education policy with innovations that vary from district to district. In Indonesia, the education decentralization policy has been able to help the central Government more quickly and in detail solve problems that arise in the education sector

Since the regional policy nowadays is an important subject in the European institutions, the involvement of regional and local authorities in the programming, management, evaluation and monitoring of operations is essential for the success of EU level policy. A Regional Problem is defined as a problem that arises in an area of a country where there is dependence on a narrow industrial base often faced with declining manufacturing activity, and lack of general infrastructures. Other challenges include low levels of GDP and a net migration out of a country or region. The EU is trying to overcome these challenges by using the Structural funds financing programs to help firms in these regions. This paper presents a comparative analysis of the innovation policy and the industrial policy at the national and regional levels in Ireland and Finland, over the 1990s. In both countries the period from 1991-99 was marked by expansion, as measured by steady output growth for manufacturing as a whole (albeit at substantially lower levels in Finland than in Ireland).
In general, the evidence presented in this paper suggests a positive relationship between innovation policy as reflected in financial support to firms for R&D and business level investment in R&D and innovation activity. R&D financial assistance to firms has been a significant feature of the industrial development policy in Ireland since the 1980s. At the same time, the proportion of manufacturing firms undertaking R&D, product and process innovations increased steadily throughout the 1990s. In Ireland the construction industry boosted economic development as foreign businesses could find favourable conditions for setting up their businesses. Initially tax and grant incentives were given to firms which were later on complemented by high killed labour that could be utilized in high tech businesses.
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The thesis reviews and provides comparison of immigration policies of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands from post-WW2 years to the late 1990s. With regards to the different historical, cultural and social background of each country the dissertation thesis defines the unique approach to immigration and perception of immigrants in each country. The ultimate aim of the thesis is to explain the circumstances that lead to the specific events in the history of immigration policies of the countries in question and bring comprehension in this often overlooked matter.

Researchers suggest that restorative justice processes in schools are a successful alternative to traditional punishments for school discipline, and are used for both reactive and proactive responses to behavior issues. However, the processes are not sustainable if the administration implementing restorative justice do not promote a restorative justice ideology (RJI), and if all systems that impact the student are not aligned. Therefore, study was conducted to compare the level of restorative justice ideology between groups of administrators, teachers, and parents with a validated restorative justice ideology survey instrument that includes cooperation, restoration, and healing, and an accumulative score for RJI as a whole. Data were collected and analyzed with a One-Way ANOVA test at a selected convenience sample of 45 schools in a Western state. Using the theories of restorative justice, pedagogy, and Bronfenbrenner's ecological systems model, the comparison of ideologies between these groups indicated a statistically significant difference between administrators and parents in the restorative justice ideology belief of restoration, and in the overall belief of restorative justice ideology, showing a lack of alignment. The findings can impact social change by the identification of barriers in sustainable implementation of restorative justice in schools. The findings can also be used to suggest an evidence-based model that includes parents and families in all stages of planning, implementation, and continued practice, along with consideration that restorative justice is a belief system rather than a behavior intervention.

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s defense policy and politics has gone through significant changes. Throughout the post cold war period, US-Japan alliance managers, politicians with differing visions and preferences, scholars, think tanks, and the actions of foreign governments have all played significant roles in influencing these changes. Along with these actors, the Japanese prime minister has played an important, if sometimes subtle, role in the realm of defense policy and politics. Japanese prime ministers, though significantly weaker than many heads of state, nevertheless play an important role in policy by empowering different actors (bureaucratic actors, independent commissions, or civil actors), through personal diplomacy, through agenda-setting, and through symbolic acts of state. The power of the prime minister to influence policy processes, however, has frequently varied by prime minister. My dissertation investigates how different political strategies and entrepreneurial insights by the prime minister have influenced defense policy and politics since the end of the Cold War. In addition, it seeks to explain how the quality of political strategy and entrepreneurial insight employed by different prime ministers was important in the success of different approaches to defense. My dissertation employs a comparative case study approach to examine how different prime ministerial strategies have mattered in the realm of Japanese defense policy and politics. Three prime ministers have been chosen: Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996-1998); Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006); and Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio (2009-2010). These prime ministers have been chosen to provide maximum contrast on issues of policy preference, cabinet management, choice of partners, and overall strategy. As my dissertation finds, the quality of political strategy has been an important aspect of Japan’s defense transformation. Successful strategies have frequently used the knowledge and accumulated personal networks of bureaucrats, supplemented bureaucratic initiatives with top-down personal diplomacy, and used a revitalized US-Japan strategic relationship as a political resource for a stronger prime ministership. Though alternative approaches, such as those that have looked to displace the influence of bureaucrats and the US in defense policy, have been less successful, this dissertation also finds theoretical evidence that alternatives may exist.

Since the 1960s, as a result of the rapid and outstanding economic growth and industrialization, Hong Kong and Singapore, the two city-states in Asia, were named Asian Dragons among other Asian countries. Historically, both city-states were British colonies, and thus, they both shared similarities in the develop stage of the city in social, economic and political context. In the housing sectors, both city-states have also launched massive subsidized housing programme to facilitate their rapidly growth population with provision of affordable subsidized housing. To assist more residents to become home owners, a series of housing assistance programmes were implemented periodically to help the low and middle income households to climb up to the housing ladder. Despite that the government of Singapore and Hong Kong has implemented similar housing policies approach to their citizens in the beginning stage; yet, as at today, a different achievement in home ownership rate was resulted mainly due to different ruling of governance. This dissertation will first review the home ownership policies of Hong Kong and Singapore in social, economic and political context. In Chapter 5, evaluation on the effectiveness in the subsidized housing supply, land supply, control of affordability of both city-states will be critically discussed and explained why different home ownership rate of Singapore and Hong Kong was achieved. To make this dissertation more fruitful, in Chapter 6, in-depth interviews with Legco members, scholar and graduated students who have profound knowledge in the housing sector would be discussed and analyzed. Last but not least, political obstacles of Hong Kong would be explained in comparing with Singapore in the final chapter. Recommendation on which part of the housing policies of Hong Kong can be learnt from Singapore will be debated from the result drawn from the key findings and the analysis from the in-depth interviews from the previous chapters.
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Housing Management
Master
Master of Housing Management

This policy note explores the characteristics of community-based armed groups (CBAGs) unique to the Kenyan context through a comparison of local CBAGs with other nonstate armed groups, particularly violent extremist organizations (VEOs). In doing so, it introduces the concept of territoriality—the degree to which government and security agents are able to monopolize political, social, and security control of spaces—and suggests that both CBAGs and VEOs are most likely to thrive in Kenya under conditions of semi-territoriality, where state authority sometimes shifts fluidly from strong to weak depending on capacity or interest. To combat the rise of VEOs it recommends community-oriented policing as a devolved security strategy, strengthening relations between civil society and the police through the Police Reforms Working Group Kenya (PRWGK), helping to monitor and evaluate the police service. Additionally, mapping CBAGs and VEOs through clan structures is a community-oriented strategy that helps strengthen territoriality and counter semi-territoriality.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.