Journal articles on the topic 'Police administration – European Union countries – International cooperation'

PurposeThis article provides the first assessment of the training program of African gendarmes from the so-called Sahel countries in the Special Training Center of the Spanish Civil Guard in Spain. This action is part of the European Union GAR-SI Sahel project, embedded in the framework of the international cooperation of the European Union with Africa and aims to create effective counter-terrorism police tactical units in the area.Design/methodology/approachThe study exploits instructors' assessment on the evolution of the 167 participants over the program from 2017 to 2019 and the satisfaction of attendants with the training action, using 22 Likert-type items and an open question. It employs both quantitative tools (descriptive and inferential statistical methods and multivariate techniques) and qualitative methods (content analysis of participants' comments).FindingsThe research finds evidence of a high participants' performance according to trainers and large levels of satisfaction among participants. The authors also discuss the differences found by country of origin and rank of the gendarmes who participated in the trainings.Originality/valueThis study is the first to provide an evaluation of the police training actions embedded GAR-SI Sahel project, part of much larger initiative of cooperation of the European Union with Africa.

Since 2009, the European Union has developed strategies for the Baltic Sea, Danube, Adriatic-Ionian and Alpine macro-regions. These macro-regional strategies represent a new tool of European Union governance that seeks to combine the community’s territorial cooperation and cohesion policy repertoire with intergovernmental ‘regional cooperation’ involving European Union member and partner countries. By establishing comprehensive governance architectures for cross-sectoral and trans-boundary policy coordination in areas such as transport infrastructure and environmental protection, macro-regional strategies seek to mobilise European Union member and non-member states alike in promoting and harmonising territorial and trans-governmental cooperation. Both the macro-regional strategies and the macro-regions themselves have been met with increasing interest across several disciplines, including geography, regional planning, political science and public administration, triggering questions and debates on issues such as their impacts on existing practices of territorial cooperation and their relation to previously established forms of regional cooperation. Authored by scholars based in the above-mentioned fields of study, this contribution seeks to take stock of research on the subject to date, reflect on conceptual starting points and highlight new directions for future research in the political sciences.

The pandemic caused by the spread of the novel coronavirus has presented challenges to the international community that it has never faced before. The high rate of spread of the infection and the economic, social and political challenges associated with it have pushed individual states and international organisations to the limit in proposing the most effective methods to combat the pandemic. The article examines various examples of government support for vaccine development programs in the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, China and Russia, as well as the specifics of using COVID-19 vaccination programs in these countries. Based on the data presented in the article, it is concluded that government support for these programs become one of the most effective ways to increase the availability of vaccines for large-scale vaccination of citizens. Particular attention is paid to aspects of the regulatory environment for vaccine approval in a time of pandemic, the financing of vaccination programs, and international cooperation at WHO and UN level to counter the novel coronavirus pandemic. Additionally, the article analyzes contracts for the supply of vaccines in the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom. Based on the data presented in the article, a conclusion is drawn about the possible reasons for the delays in the supply of vaccines under contracts concluded by the countries of the European Union. The results of this study can be used in the future to plan other vaccine development programs and strengthen government policy in the field of combating infectious diseases, strengthening public and private partnerships in the health sector.

Svanaug Fjær: The European Union and Drug Policy. Integration through control and production of knowledge In this article the influence of EU initiatives on national drug policies is discussed with special attention paid to the separation between control and prevention in drug policy. At national levels, policy administration is separated between the ministries responsible for treatment and prevention and the ministries responsible for control and punishment. This separation is parallel to the division established by the pillar structure of the Treaty of the European Union. A study of the Europeanization processes at the central administration level in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands showed that the growth in co-operative activity in the EU has been largest in the Ministries of Justice, while, due to establishment of focal points in the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), the growth in the health sector has happened in administrative bodies outside of the ministries. The networks which are developed and the means available are different in the justice and health sectors. In the third pillar (justice), practical and technical cooperation have developed in the form of EUROPOL and the Early Warning System on Synthetic Drugs. Sharing of information and the development of a common knowledge-base seems to be the basis of first-pillar (health) cooperation. In the three countries studied the Ministries of Health, which traditionally have had a central position at the national level, seem to have been allotted a less important role in the international co-operation. It is, however, argued that the impact of co-operation in the EM-CDDA should not be underestimated. Both common control and the development of a European base of knowledge contribute to the integration process in the drug field, but the premises for the process are set by the demand for control.

With Poland's accession to the European Union in 2004, the visible institutional and legal differences between our country and Western Europe began to blur. The establishment of the European Administrative Space, as a general model of public administration aiming at similar or common administrative solutions, influenced the development of public administration and its organisational structures. In Poland, as in most European countries, the system of local government is based on the principle of dualism, i.e.: some local tasks are performed directly by the government administration subordinated to the relevant ministers, while the remaining tasks are performed by the local government representing the interests of a particular local community. The aim of the article is to discuss the issue of mutual cooperation between the government administration with representatives of local governments on the example of realization of investments. The aim of the article is to discuss the issue of mutual cooperation of the government administration with the representatives of local self-governments, on the example of implementation of investments of international and national importance, such as key linear road investments planned to be carried out, which run through the territory of Poland and to present the conflicts of interests of the local society with the global benefits of the state, which are often fundamentally different and not always properly understood. The intensive development of road transport infrastructure currently taking place in Poland, with the participation of EU policy, has a significant impact on the economic development of micro-regions managed by local self-governments.

The European Union is an important player in the U.S. policies aimed at maintaining liberal world order. The US-EU interaction has been shaped by a number of key variables, including international environment, specific goals of the U.S. administrations, institutional maturing of the EU, and a complex interplay of American and European diverging and overlapping interests. President D. Trump’s tenure was the most strained period in the US-EU relations, with an erosion of mutual trust and a ghost of trade war looming large. The Biden administration has reversed the U.S. policy towards the European Union. The US-EU summit held last June signified a return of normality in the relations of the transatlantic partners. Washington and Brussels outlined a broad agenda that embraces security, trade and economic issues, coordination in international affairs (concerning, in particular, Russia, China, and Iran), cooperation in decarbonizing of the world economy and promotion of a climate-friendly environment. A broad web of links between the United States and Europe facilitates their joining efforts in addressing global and regional challenges. Although, the US and the EU reached a series of compromises to mitigate their most acrimonious disagreements (Boeing–Airbus subsidies dispute is a vivid example in this regard), there are still unsettled major issues like a comprehensive free trade treaty unsuccessfully negotiated since the Obama presidency. The “Chinese factor” may turn out to be the most divisive one in the transatlantic relations, since the U.S. tough policy towards Beijing makes the EU countries to take hard decisions they prefer to avoid. While it is premature to predict precise implications of the Biden administration’s policy, one can reasonably expect the EU to become a more helpful partner to Washington in diplomatic and economic affairs.

The article deals with the place of Ukraine in German foreign policy. The Federal Republic of Germany is a leading partner in the process of Ukraine’s gradual entry into European and Transatlantic international institutions. It is noted that the methods of conducting German foreign policy were formed during the «Cold War». This has led to the predominant use of tools, which Joseph Nye summarized in the concept of ‘soft power’. However, Germany is faced with new challenges, such as, inter alia policy towards post-Soviet countries, including Ukraine. The main interests of Germany in relation to Ukraine are considered. Firstly, it is the preservation of the independence, territorial integrity and effectiveness of Ukraine as an actor in international relations. Other important factors include the political consolidation of Ukraine, the implementation of reforms in the economy, public administration and other spheres of public life and support for the European integration of Ukraine as a powerful tool for the transformation of the country. However, Ukraine’s admission to the European Union in the near future is not an option. It is argued that part of the population and politicians in Germany believe that Russia has legitimate interests in the post-Soviet space. However, after the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, Germany gave wide support to the European choice of Ukraine and became one of the main allies and assistants of Ukraine in reforming public administration and economy. Germany was involved in Minsk-1 and Minsk-2. Emphasis is attached to the vigorous development of economic cooperation between the two states. Summing up, the author draws several conclusions. Firstly, there is a gradual intensification of bilateral relations. Germany, along with the United States, provides Ukraine with transformational assistance, which began before the proclamation of its independence in 1991. Additionally, the undeclared Russian aggression against Ukraine and Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 have amply demonstrated that political power factors continue to be the key tools of international politics. Ukrainian vector was not clearly conceptualized in the German foreign policy till the Russian aggression of 2014, and it was in the circum-stances of the Russian aggression that Germany opted for political support to Ukraine. Keywords: Ukraine, Germany, Russia, international relations.

Abstract This article focuses on the effects of corrections to the budgetary policy in eurozone economies. The goal of the text is to check if advancement in implementing modern tools of public management is helpful in the time of fiscal adjustment. We assume that the most important role of a performance approach in conducting fiscal policy is the ability of government to implement active policy meant as structural changes in the composition of public expenditures. In the case of the need to cut general levels of public spending, public sector managers who have knowledge of performance effects of public policies should be able to conduct fiscal adjustment in such a way as to minimise negative outcomes of spending correction on society. The structure of the text is as follows. First, we present some insights on the economic effects of fiscal adjustment. Then, we discuss the concept of performance management presented in the theory and policy agendas of international institutions such as the European Union or the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). Finally, we present the result of an empirical exercise that is designed to combine the level of advancement in implementing performance budgeting (PB) and the social cost of fiscal adjustment in eurozone economies. The most important finding of the research is that PB tools seem to have very limited usefulness in a time of fiscal adjustment. There is no statistical evidence that countries advanced in utilisation of PB tools conduct more active fiscal policy – approach of cutting all expenditures across the border by given percentage rather than looking at priorities and social outcomes of fiscal adjustment dominates in all cases.

Introduction. The most important task of the sovereign state of Ukraine nowadays is the victory in the war with the Russian aggressor, as well as ensuring sustainable innovation development in close cooperation with the international community. Problem Statement. In countries with economies in transition in the preparation of non-financial reporting we can notice the following : lack of institutional levers of impact and motivation for the disclosure of environmental, social and other indicators; lack of standard approaches to the content of non-financial reporting and procedures for its administration, etc Purpose. The aim of the study is: to substantiate the improvement to Ukraine’s public policy in Ukraine on non-financial reporting on sustainable development; to study contradictions of the new reality and directions to overcome them for the countries with transition economies while preparing non-financial reporting and applying indicators of sustainable development; to develop proposals on the content of such reporting in emergency situations, in particular during hostilities, as well as post-war reconstruction. Materials and methods. The following methods: institutional, systemic, empirical, structural and functional and others have been applied while using UNCTAD guidelines and factual data., Results. The authors suggest ways to overcome these obstacles and to supplement the “Guidance on core indicators for entity reporting on contribution to the implementation of SDGs” (GCI) with a block of indicators on crisis management trends in conditions of uncertainty and post-war overcoming of the effects of destabilization. Conclusions. The martial law in the country, the consequences of hostilities have a profound impact on the activities of companies and should be shown in the reports. On the basis of regulatory initiatives of the European Union on non-financial reporting in the electronic format in Ukraine it is necessary: to regulate the Taxonomy of non-financial reporting (EU Regulation 2020/852); to show in the management report the disclosure of basic performance indicators of enterprises in various fields (economic, environmental, social, institutional); to implement the concept of sustainable development in the national non-financial reporting infrastructure.

The modern police formation to which the Police in Poland aspires cannot be limited only to independent execution of tasks. Performing statutory tasks by the Police is related to undertaking various forms of cooperation and interaction with legally and organizationally diverse entities. Apart from national cooperation, legal regulations impose an obligation to cooperate with police forces of other countries and their international organizations, as well as with European Union bodies and institutions. The subject of deliberations is widely understood international cooperation of the Police and the role of entities responsible for its conduct. The areas of cooperation and forms in which it is undertaken have been investigated. Special research attention was also paid to legal regulations relating to police activity on the international arena. In the study attempts were made to assess the current system of international police cooperation.

China’s soft-power practice in its international activity boils down to four areas: culture, education, diplomacy, and economy. The most important element of China’s soft-power policy seems to be the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Announced in 2013, the BRI is a complex, long-term and large-scale strategic political and economic project by the Chinese government with an infrastructure character. In this way, China is seeking to invest its capital surpluses in resurrecting the ancient Silk Road to create railroad and maritime networks with its most important trading partner – the European Union. In these circumstances, in September 2015, the presidents of Central and Eastern EU member states announced the establishment of the separate Three Seas Initiative (TSI), a political and economic project bringing together 12 EU states, including 11 ‘new’ members and Austria. These entities constitute an informal bloc of states between the Adriatic, Baltic and Black seas, though without a permanent secretariat but with rotating leadership. In addition to the lack of a formal structure, the TSI region, located mainly in the EU’s eastern part, is characterized by a weaker infrastructure network than Western Europe, lower GDP (except Austria), and high dependence on gas supplies from Russia (except Croatia). To overcome these disparities, the TSI has developed a catalogue of 48 investment priorities in three economic areas: energy, transport, and digitalisation. China’s soft-power policy towards the ‘new’ EU members may be decided by the American patronage of the TSI and the fact that one of the flagship projects is the North-South Gas Corridor, which will enable the sale of American LNG in Central Europe, which has been dependent on gas supplies from Russia, China’s partner in the BRI. In the context of the US-China trade war, White House planners recognise Central Europe as both a peripheral and key area for their policy and seek to strengthen the Three Seas project, which may lead to limiting areas of cooperation under the ‘17+1’ format, involving CEE countries and China. On the other hand, the development of better energy, transport and digital connections in the EU’s east clearly intersects with China’s idea of building a New Eurasian Land Bridge under the BRI to connect the most economically developed edges of Eurasia. The new US strategy towards the countries of the CEE seems to boil down to involvement in specific energy-related projects. Instead of blocking or diminishing BRI-related infrastructure projects in China, they seem in fact to complement the Chinese activity in the CEE. Increased investment by American enterprises in the region may allow the administration in Washington to maintain control of Chinese infrastructure investments, and the US involvement may even lead to the participation of American companies in projects originally started by Beijing.

The success of Ukraine's strategic course towards full membership in the European Union depends on many factors, in particular, on establishing effective cooperation with the Member States of the European Union and its bodies in the field of prevention and counteraction to various manifestations of organized crime. Among the various agencies of the European Union, European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) performs the largest amount of work in this field. In this regard, the article analyzes the history of Europol from its inception as an international intergovernmental organization (European Police Office) to its current state - an independent European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). To disclose the legal status of Europol, the focus is on the purpose and objectives of its creation, the types of crimes against which Europol’s work is directed, the competence of Europol, which covers more than forty forms of criminal activity, the structure of internal bodies, the normative legal bases of Europol’s interaction with the Member States and other agencies of the European Union, third countries (strategic cooperation agreements and operational cooperation agreements) and international organizations, the genesis of the normative legal bases for relations between Europol and Ukraine. According to the results of the study, the history of the formation of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) is proposed to be divided into two stages: 1. Europol as an international intergovernmental organization of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office of 26 July 1995; 2. Europol as the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). At each stage of Europol's formation, its legal status also changed. At the present stage of Europol's work, its legal status is determined by the Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol).

Abstract Cooperation is key to policing and keeping mankind safe and secure; this includes protecting citizens from various crimes, including terrorist attacks. However, it is not an easy feat to always achieve – as is explained within this paper. The related research considers the complexities and challenges of sharing and coordinating across divides – or, in other words, cooperating across borders (be they open or closed). Specifically, it discusses the advancements made between one bloc of countries – the European Union; and, how the evolutionary process has aided to expand cooperative community practices via various means between the police and other lea’s. As part of this, transport and movement are viewed as an essential element to be discussed and factored in. Finally, the paper considers the, arguably, devolutionary position of the UK and the implications – post 2020, in terms of marking a ‘potentially’ regressive position, one that stands to compromise safety and security.

The article aims to identify the impact of the crisis of the Bretton Woods monetary system on the beginning of European monetary cooperation. Russian scholars' publications on European monetary integration usually examine in detail the internal prerequisites for the emergence of the Werner Plan and only sketch the external environment. Drawing on available European and American sources, this research provides a more nuanced picture of the origins of European monetary cooperation in the context of a general collapse of the post-war international monetary order. The article begins with the characteristic of the main features of the Bretton Woods monetary system. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the intrinsic contradictions of the Bretton Woods mechanism, such as the problem of liquidity, confidence in the key currencies, and the adjustment mechanism, generated numerous monetary crises. All efforts to reform the international monetary system stalled because of disagreements between countries with surplus and deficit payment balances. The research also focuses on the US monetary policy. As the US dollar was the main reserve currency, the stability of the entire monetary system depended on its position. Since the late 1960s, conflicts over monetary issues developed between the United States and Western European countries, culminating in the Nixon administration's unilateral decision to abolish the gold standard in August 1971. Monetary crises and the weakness of the dollar pushed the countries of the European Economic Community to develop their own currency grouping. The article analyses the Werner Plan of 1970 that proposed the creation of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with a single European currency as the ultimate goal. Based on fixed exchange rates between European currencies, the EMU represented a regional replica of the Bretton Woods system. The single European currency was seen by Europeans as an alternative to the dollar and the unpredictable American policy. The author concludes that the end of transatlantic monetary cooperation gave an additional impetus to the development of European monetary integration. Although first European efforts to create the EMU had failed because of the different approaches of France and the Federal Republic of Germany as well as the economic crisis of the early 1970s, the Werner Plan marked a crucial phase in the history of European integration. The Werner Report became a blueprint for the European Monetary System (EMS) of the late 1970s. The success of the EMS paved the way for the creation of the European Monetary Union envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 establishing the European Union and the adoption of a single European currency - the euro.

The article reviews history and contemporary state of such an economic and trade policy phenomenon as regionalism. Three consecutive stages of regionalization are identified. First stage – prehistory of regionalism – lasted from the middle of the XIX century till 1940-s and was characterized by the formation of bilateral customs unions in Europe with strong political motivation. Second stage – classic regionalism – covers the second part of the XX century and is mostly determined by integration processes in the European region, creation of the EEC and then the EU, organization of a big number of alliances among developing countries mainly in the form of customs union following the EU example and some trade blocs between developed economies beyond the EU (i.a. NAFTA). In this period special disciplines for RTA’s were elaborated under the framework of GATT/WTO. Third stage – globalizing networking regionalism – gained momentum at the start of 2000-s and continues, with certain reservations, till nowadays. Contemporary regionalism has qualitative distinctions from regionalism of the past century. Besides fast and universal, covering all regions and subregions of the world, growth of RTA’s number, their agenda is widening and deepening significantly going far beyond WTO. We could also witness increasing frequency of interregional and transcontinental RTA’s, as well as RTA’s with participation of trade blocks, including interbloc RTA’s. Peculiarity of the current decade is the appearance of a considerable number of RTA’s parties to which represent large and largest world economies, and that was not the case before. But the principal shift is related to the formation of megaregional trade agreements with ambitious, prointegration agenda. New generation RTA’s, containing wide regulatory garmonization agenda and suggesting increasing institutional homogenity of participating economies, de facto promote alternative vis-à-vis classic approach model for the creation of common economic space, though without supranational elements. Nowaday regionalism is definitely drifting towards megaregionalism – the higher stage of regionalization process. Politics of the new American administration and Brexit, which stimulated deglobalization and isolationist tendencies in part of Western world, in practice have only led to some regrouping and deceleration of certain megaregional projects followed by enhancing China’s position on the track of megaregionalism (RCEP, Belt and Road, megaproject with accompanying RTA’s, latest BRICS+ and BRICS++ initiative). Megaregionalism, under any scenario, will exert deep influence on the world trading system and the WTO. In certain conditions megaregional agreements could serve as the foundation for the emergence of new and by large universal system of global management in the sphere of international trade and economic cooperation either as a WTO plus arrangement or in some other form. But this needs long-lasting preparatory interaction for the convergence and finding common denominators between quite different megaprojects as regards their scope and depth.

The article analyses the main fields of activities of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (NUJU) and specifies its main partners and topical joint projects for cooperation. The article states that the development of international communication with associations and media employees’ organisations, diplomatic and non-governmental organisations, and higher educational establishments allows the union to ensure the protection of journalists’ rights and develop information space. The NUJU is the key partner in Ukraine for the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media in Vienna. The article mentions a round table in Odesa attended by the Head of the European Federation of Journalists, where matters of journalists’ safety and other important issues were discussed. The authors also substantiate the means the NUJU uses for solidarity campaigns with its Ukrainian counterparts illegally detained in uncontrolled territories or Russian prisons. In addition, the article singles out the consequences of the partnership between UNESCO and the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine, such as a textbook entitled Journalists and Police: Recommendations for Ensuring Understanding. The NUJU’s close involvement in international conferences and other events offering an opportunity for the organisation to render its views in respect of many issues is also delineated. In addition, the NUJU maintains contact with journalism organisations of Poland, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Sweden, Germany, and other European countries. The authors examines the main principles of the international cooperation of the NUJU, which enable it to take advantage of international platforms for promulgating position of the Union, carry out international solidarity campaigns with Ukrainian journalists, distribute information about activities of the Union, share experience, and conduct joint events with journalists from other countries. Keywords: National Union of Journalists of Ukraine, OSCE, international cooperation, protection of freedom of speech, assistance to journalists.

The European Communities did not cease to exist after the foundation of the European Union by the Treaty of Mastricht in 1992. In fact, they act as pillars on which the European Union stands, together with the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters and Common Foreign and Security Policy. The European Union does not have the status of a legal entity or a capacity to enter into treaties with third countries or international organization. In both foreign and domestic proceedings it relies upon the institutions and instruments of the European Communities. The European Communities are autonomous in relation to the European Union and act in accordance with the rules contained in the foundation Treaties, which, however, make a constituent part of the Treaty on European Union. The foundation Treaties of the European Communities provide for a possibility for the Communities to enter into international treaties with third countries or international organizations. Stabilization and Association Treaties belong to the category of Association Treaties defined in Article 310 of the Treaty on European Union. Considering that these treaties regulate certain fields which belong to competence of the member states, the member states are usually parties to these treaties along with the European Communities. International treaties entered into between the European Communities and third countries are binding upon the Community institutions and upon member states. International treaties entered in this way are considered a part of Community law. Member states are bound to recognize such effects to these treaties as are provided in the Community law itself.

This article provides an overview of European minorities’ language rights in the administration of justice, public administration, and public services in 2019. Relevant legal developments are presented in the activities of the major international organizations, i.e. the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, and the Council of Europe. Since the most relevant treaties on the language rights of minorities in Europe are the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, special attention is paid to the implementation thereof. Whereas international monitoring mechanisms devoted to the effective protection of minorities are abundant, language rights of national minorities receive less attention, especially in the fields of official language use, that is, in public administration and justice. The regulation of these areas has been traditionally considered as almost exclusively belonging to the states’ competence, and international organizations are consequently reluctant to interfere. As a result, the official use of minority languages differs in the various countries of Europe, with both good practices (e.g. the Netherlands, Spain, Finland) and unbalanced situations (e.g. Estonia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan).

Purpose. The purpose of the article is to study the features of the main modern forms of cross-border cooperation in the European Union, in particular, organizational forms of cross-border cooperation, historical background, and stages of cross-border cooperation, to analyse the functioning of Euro-regions at the present stage, including financial instruments, and especially the implementation of these processes in a pandemic COVID-19. Methodology of research. The study uses generally accepted methods in economics: a monographic, theoretical, and comparative analysis – to reveal the conceptual foundations of cross-border cooperation; analysis and synthesis, system-structural, abstract and logical, statistical groupings – to determine and analyse the forms of cross-border cooperation in the European Union. Findings. The main theoretical approaches to defining the essence of cross-border cooperation, its place, and its role in the process of economic development of the regions and participating countries are analysed. The main forms of implementation of cross-border cooperation are systematized, the results of cross-border cooperation are considered on the example of the functioning of separate Euro-regions and realization of cross-border projects. It is determined that in the conditions of globalization and strengthening of integration processes between the states the need to expand and deepen international relations between local self-government bodies grows. An analysis of the peculiarities of the development of cross-border cooperation in the face of the global pandemic COVID-19 was conducted. Originality. For the first time, it was established that the peculiarities of the implementation of forms of cross-border cooperation taking into account the new conditions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which will allow the development of an adaptive mechanism of organizational and economic support of this process. Practical value. The results of the conducted study can be used in the educational process, in particular, in the training of specialists in project management, management and administration, as well as in the implementation of practical activities of public authorities and local governments of urban settlements, cities, and regions that are cross-border regions. Key words: cross-border cooperation, forms of cross-border cooperation, Euro-region, cross-border project.

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FOR SOME YEARS NOW, WESTERN ACADEMICS AND POLICY-MAKERS HAVE embraced the cause of democratic reform in Central and Eastern Europe. To take but one well-known example, President Clinton in the 1994 State of the Union Address cited the absence of war among democracies as a reason for promotion of democracy around the world. Assistance to former Warsaw Pact and newly independent states has been made conditional to varying degrees on the acceptance of democratic change. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, the United States Agency for International Development and associated non-governmental organizations have unleashed armies of promoters of democracy throughout the region to: observe elections; monitor human rights; draft new constitutions and laws defending civil and political rights; train judges and police personnel; and organize and assist political parties, media and non-governmental pressure groups. In short, they have sought to transplant the fabric of civil society and democratic institutions. These armies have landed on terrain often quite foreign to them and have often displayed little sensitivity to the social, economic and political context in which they are operating. This may have contributed to results other than those intended.

Environmental crime is one of the most lucrative forms of criminal activity. The illegal dumping of hazardous waste, trafficking of dangerous substances and smuggling of protected natural resources is estimated to be worth between EUR18 and EUR25 billion per year. The trafficking of endangered species generates the highest revenue of all types of environmental crime and is widely considered to be second in value only to drug trafficking. Environmental crime is believed to be expanding constantly. In spite of this, it is not currently a political priority, having taken a back seat to anti-terrorism measures since 11 September 2001. This article aims to show that environmental crime is one of the most serious forms of criminal activity - it threatens the very existence of mankind. In order to do this, the article begins by advancing a definition of environmental crime, which is intended to allow the reader better to understand its implications for our society. An attempt is then made to provide a financial estimate of the worldwide value of this criminal activity, in order to shed light on its scale and diversity. Next, the article examines various examples from European Union (?EU?) countries (Member States and candidate countries) in order to illustrate the ways in which police combat environmental crime. Examples of international cooperation in this field are also provided. Finally, the article proposes a number of possible paths for future action which might push environmental crime up the criminal law and crime-fighting policy agenda in EU Member States and EU policy as a whole. In this respect, the recent judgment by the European Court of Justice (?ECJ?) concerning European Community competence in criminal law provides interesting material for reflection.

The purpose of the research is the specifics of ensuring the right to vocational higher education for persons with disabilities: the administrative and legal aspect in foreign countries, in particular the experience of three European countries that entered the top ten according to the results of the international study PISA-2018: Estonia, Finland and Poland.. Main content. It considers the experience of building an education management system on a democratic basis, in cooperation between government bodies and society. It is determined that education in the studied countries is one of the priorities of the state and society. Methodology: The methodological basis of the research consists of comparative legal and system analyses, a formal legal method, interpretation method, hermeneutical method and methods of analysis and synthesis. Conclusions. Similar approaches to administration and financing were identified. A trend characteristic of all countries is clarified: the state guarantees free education, including science, and ensures equal access to quality education and science. Mechanisms for financing education, science, and the main sources of funding inherent to each country were defined. Thus, the experience of the European Union countries, which were included in the top 10 best countries according to the PISA-2108 international survey showing the best performance (Estonia, Poland, Finland) for the administration of education and science based on such indicators as management, financing, public involvement in the process of managing education and science, was analyzed. This approach made it possible to identify the main approaches to the administration of education and science at the local level that can be implemented in Ukraine, namely: involvement of local self-government bodies in the selection of teaching staff; financial autonomy of educational institutions; replenishment of the school budget through the provision of additional paid services; reducing education costs by attracting outsourcing companies; motivating highly qualified teachers to work in rural educational establishments; creation of a national register that would contain a comprehensive about educational institutions; maintenance by communities of underfilled educational institutions.

: Reforms implemented in recent years by the Polish government of Law and Justice party are described as a manifestation of democratic backsliding. Changes in the judiciary and the media are seen as the main signs of departing from the basic values ​​of liberal democracy and the rule of law. They met with strong international criticism, mainly from the institutions of the European Union and Western European countries. These changes are also observed with concern in the United States, but so far the US reaction has been moderate. This was primarily due to the limited interest of President Donald Trump’s administration in promoting democracy. Later, this issue has been overshadowed by the destabilization of military security in the region. Anyway, the US reaction to the deviation of the Polish authorities from the principles of the democratic state of law must be decisive, but also constructive, based on dialogue, cooperation, clear criteria and a joint search for solutions. First of all, it must not violate the American security guarantees towards Poland.

Abstract The English translation of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure (Gialuz, Lupária, and Scarpa 2014) represents a step forward in fostering judicial and police cooperation in Europe. This is made possible by making the content of the Code accessible to a wide English-speaking audience. Given the informative purpose of the translation (Cao 2007), whose intended readers are mainly European citizens, the target language chosen by the translation team is European English, i.e. the English used in European Union texts, the international English used in Council of Europe texts, the English found in the translations of the Codes of Criminal Procedure of other European countries and the English used by law scholars (Scarpa, Peruzzo, and Pontrandolfo 2014). The European continent is a multidimensional and multilayered legal reality in which different languages co-exist and legal transplants and terminological transfers are commonplace. Based on such premises, however, the embeddedness of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Italian legal system poses several translation difficulties, especially in the search for supranational/international English translation equivalents for terms that refer to nationally developed legal concepts. For these terms, established translation equivalents are not necessarily available. The aims of this paper are threefold: to describe the features of the interdisciplinary translation team consisting of ten members (linguists and lawyers), to lay out the peculiarities of the translation process in which professionals with a different background were involved, and to illustrate the methodology applied as regards terminological choices. To do so, a concrete example from the translated text will be provided to lay out the challenges faced and the solution adopted by the translation team.

The main aim of this article is to present the concept of the Euroregion as a platform for cooperation in the area of social security. The issue itself needs to be constantly updated not only because of the constant challenges facing the European Union and other countries. The outlook character of the article presents a view on the importance of cooperation between self-government administration bodies and other subjects of economic life for the development of cooperation within the Euroregions. The article mainly focuses on the fight against often negative stereotypes and undertakings whose task is to increase the standard of economic life by increasing activities aimed at improving the quality of Euroregional cooperation. The Euroregion "Beskidy" was selected for the study, which is diverse in ethnic, sociological, historical, but also economic and social terms. Its unique features have allowed the authors to more clearly emphasize the message of the article. Tourism and its international, Euro-regional character is also an important element of cooperation. In order to carry out the research that resulted in this article, the methods of researching the sources sucked in in terms of critical analysis of literature were used, as well as juxtaposing them with the previously conducted research on Euroregions and safety by the authors. On the basis of the analysis, the article presents a significant contribution of social integration and cross-border cooperation to the development of the Euroregion as well as to the development of social security as a non-military part of the research topic. The creation of new types of innovative pro-social undertakings opens up the Euroregions, and thus the Member States to further internal integration and intensification of activities to strengthen socio-economic cooperation with neighbouring countries.

In the context of current debates on sustainable public service provision, austerity, debts and cutback management, the governance and management of and in state-owned enterprises is a crucial issue. An aggregate holdings report is an important tool for public administrations to provide accountability and the necessary overall view on the institutional service provision structures of core administration and state-owned enterprises. On the basis of a developed quality index with 175 test criteria, this study analyses the diffusion of aggregate holdings reports in 17 countries and the quality of 12 existing reports at the national level. First, the study provides a conceptual contribution for assessing aggregate holdings reports and future research on the issues of the model categories. Second, for an empirical contribution, the analysis enhances our state of knowledge on aggregate holdings report diffusion and quality patterns. Findings show that, in many cases, public administrations do not meet the requirements from theory and practice. Newer Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union members reach comparably higher quality scores. This comparative study offers new insights that can enhance the sustainable public management and control of state-owned enterprises. Points for practitioners The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, which were published after an intensive consultation process in 2005 and revised in 2015, demand public authorities to develop aggregate holdings reports that cover all SOEs, and make them a key disclosure tool directed to the general public and politicians. This study develops a quality model for assessing the quality of aggregate holdings reports. The model can also answer questions that are often raised in reform debates, such as ‘Which is the best aggregate holdings report?’ or ‘Which aggregate holdings report can I use as a reference to further develop my own aggregate holdings report?’. The model is a conceptual contribution and the empirical results can be used for international bench-learning. They are also useful for international organisations such as the European Union, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Chartered Institute of Public Finance & Accounting and development aid/cooperation agencies in each country. The results of this study indicate that policymakers at the national and international levels should give more emphasis to the diffusion and quality of aggregate holdings reports and should reflect on establishing and revising legal obligations for aggregate holdings reports because the recommendations of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development guidelines, as a soft-law approach, are often not put into practice.

The article is devoted to the study of the main aspects of international protection of intellectual rights. The authors consider a number of international conventions and treaties, as well as the main provisions of cooperation between WIPO and the WTO under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. International treaties form a network that serves all member states, depriving them of the opportunity to act arbitrarily, at their discretion. They establish common norms and standards of IP protection, deviation from which is punishable by sanctions. By signing such treaties, states agree to partially abandon their own IP laws and follow the path of convergence with the laws of other countries. Such agreements exist for almost all categories of IP. The international system of public administration procedures in the field of intellectual property today is based on two conventions concluded in the late XIX century: Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 20 March 1883 (Paris Convention) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 9 September 1886 (Berne Convention). These two Conventions played a fundamental role in the subsequent development of legal institutions. In the modern world, a certain system of international legal regulation of related rights has already developed, which directly affects the European related law, since, in particular, the norms of international law form the basis of the legal system of the European Union, and form international, including European, standards of intellectual property rights, including copyright and related rights. The main institutions dealing with IP protection on a global scale are the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). All member states of the European Union, as well as the European Community are members of the WTO organization, which has gained great importance in the field of intellectual property in connection with the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. The reason that prompted states to choose a forum other than WIPO to negotiate this agreement was the growing dissatisfaction with the existing contrast between the precision, elegance, even sophistication of the treaty documents that were negotiated at WIPO and the inadequacy of the means to ensure the practical implementation and uniform interpretation of these treaties in different countries. The TRIPS Agreement addresses five important issues: the principles of the trade system and international agreements on intellectual property, the minimum level of protection of intellectual property rights, measures to enforce these rules, the procedure for resolving disputes in the field of intellectual property, as well as transitional measures during the implementation of the systems. Ukraine is a party to more than 50 multilateral and bilateral international treaties on intellectual property. Therefore, it is advisable to determine the role of international standards in the system of intellectual property rights protection as integral components of the national legal system in Ukraine. This has become especially important since 24.02.2022 due to the outbreak of a full-scale war on the territory of Ukraine. The occupation of the territory of Ukraine by Russian invaders and the theft of industrial infrastructure, cultural heritage, art objects, which are also objects of intellectual property. Absolutization of copyright and related rights protection does not automatically mean bringing such protection to international standards. Recently, in Europe and the United States there has been an understanding of the need to find a consensus between the interests of copyright and related rights holders and the interests of society for access to cultural heritage. It is necessary to amend the legislation of Ukraine in order to harmonize the interests of copyright and related rights holders and the interests of society for access to cultural heritage, in the context of introducing only the minimum requirements of international legal acts for the protection of copyright and related rights and simplifying access to copyright and related rights.

The end of this year, more precisely 13 December, will mark the first anniversary of the initiation of PESCO. The acronym PESCO is derived from the English name Permanent Security Cooperation. The objective of PESCO is to deepen defence cooperation of EU Member States (EU) in the development of common defence capabilities, joint projects and operational readiness as well as military contribution. In its early beginnings, the EU devoted most of its attention to the economic progress of its member states, which was a very logical goal in the decade following the end of World War II. Later on, the rudiments of security and defence appeared in the form of the Western European Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy and the like. Until the start of war in the former Yugoslavia, the EU did not have a serious need or reason to particularly focus on security. Security policy was just one of the policies that had mainly been present on paper and in various debates. This became particularly obvious in the case of the intensive developments in the Balkans. This case very well tested the functioning of the EU and revealed the need for fundamental changes. One of the results was also an increased engagement in the field of international operations and missions: an observation mission in Georgia, a police and the rule of law mission in Kosovo, mission to assist in the aftermath of a tsunami in Indonesia, a counter-piracy mission in Somalia, and a mission protecting refugees in Mali. The second key milestone in the EU's security and defence engagement was the European migration crisis in 2015. Here, the lack of appropriate policies at the EU level became most evident. More precisely, it revealed the contradictory application of the policies within the EU to member states and their citizens, and to those other countries and their inhabitants who do not benefit from the high values, ethical standards and social advantages when they arrive in unimaginably large numbers. Before the important EU bodies met, consulted, decided and acted, many problems in different areas had been identified. One of the key issues was the security problem. However, there were still many other influences that gave rise to the creation of PESCO. They are discussed by the authors in this issue. Nevertheless, let me just mention that the EU has in some way found itself at a turning point due to the increasingly present Euroscepticism, which was also discussed at this year’s Strategic Forum at Bled.

The three key conditions for the existence of a state, according to the theory of state and law, are geographical territory, population and organized political power in that area. However, during the twentieth century in some African and Asian countries, due to various political, economic and other factors, problems began to appear in performance of their basic functions: ensuring public order and peace, providing health services, education. Modern science has introduced the term failed states to describe such countries. This scientific phenomenon has been the subject of numerous researches, and international organizations have been publishing annual indices of fragile, failed or unsuccessful world states for years. The first index of its kind was created in 2005 by the American non-profit organization The Fund for Peace in cooperation with the magazine Foreign Policy, which initially included 76 countries. The original term failed state was considered politically extremely incorrect, even when it referred to countries like South Sudan or Somalia, noting that such a term originated in the political terminology of developed countries by which all other countries at a lower level of development were considered to be failed ones. Therefore, in 2014, a new notion of a fragile state was created, and accordingly the existing index was renamed the Fragile State Index (FSI). This parameter determines the degree of fragility for each country on an annual basis, assessing four basic indicators: cohesion (functionality of the state apparatus), economic (overall economic situation), political (legitimacy of the state, availability of public services, respect for human rights and freedoms) and social (demographic structure of the community, number of displaced persons and refugees, external interventions). Based on the values of these indicators, countries are positioned in four groups: sustainable, stable, endangered and alarming. The paper also discusses Bosnia and Herzegovina as a potentially fragile state. Although it enjoys sovereignty and political independence, the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement still provides for the strong participation of the international community in the performance of its basic state functions. Examples include the presence of international military and police forces from the early post-war years to the present (EUFOR), with a special emphasis on the position of High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The peace agreement gave him the status of his supreme interpreter, as well as the well-known Bonn powers that he used on several occasions to remove Bosnian political officials and the imposition of laws (Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Law on the Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina) due to the inability of domestic parliamentary bodies to pass them independently. In addition to the extremely complicated constitutional structure, the functioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina is hampered by the inability to reach an agreement between political representatives on key issues in the country. In the first place, these are much-needed changes to the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina that would in the future allow members of minorities (Jews and Roma) to elect their own representatives in the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this regard, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 2009 in the case of Sejdić-Finci assessed that the impossibility of minority participation in political decision-making is a gross violation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Numerous international organizations, primarily Human Rights Watch, have been warning for years about other problems in the country: national segregation of children under two schools under one roof, numerous attacks on Bosniak returnees in Republic of Srpska without adequate sanctions and extreme slowness in war crimes proceedings and the administration of transitional justice with the emergence of increasingly frequent denials of war crimes and victims. Although more than 25 years have passed since the end of the war, the participation of the international factor is still noticeable, and in some cases necessary.

The Republic of Azerbaijan is among the countries with a fairly high potential for renewable energy sources (RES). According to preliminary estimates, the total potential of the country's economically viable and technically usable BEMs is 26,940 MW, including 3,000 MW for wind energy, 23,040 MW for solar energy, 380 MW for bioenergy and 520 MW for mountain rivers[1]. At present, the country is using this potential to some extent. Over the past seven years, the production of energy from BEMs in Azerbaijan has increased many times. According to the Ministry of Energy, wind and solar power plants generated 408 million kWh of electricity in Azerbaijan in 2013-2019. Thus, in 2013, these stations produced only 1.6 million kWh of electricity. In 2019 this figure was 149 million. kWh, which is an increase of 93 times in the last 7 years. At present, Azerbaijan's total power generation capacity is 7,516 MW, and the capacity of renewable energy power plants, including large hydropower plants, is 1,278 MW, which is 17% of the total capacity, including 1,135 MW of hydropower capacity (22 HPP, 12 small hydroelectric power plants), wind power capacity 66 MW (5 plants, 1 hybrid), bioenergy capacity 38 MW (2 plants, 1 hybrid), solar power capacity 40 MW (9 plants, 1 hybrid). One hybrid power plant (Gobustan) is equipped with wind - 2.7 MW, solar - 3 MW and bioenergy - 1 MW. There are 2 solar power plants with a total capacity of 27 MW in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. The installed capacity of renewable energy sources, excluding large hydropower plants, in 2020 was 168.3 MW, which is 2.2% of the total electricity generation capacity. In 2020, the country's electricity production amounted to 25.8 billion kWh. During this period, electricity production was 24.3 billion kWh at thermal power plants and 1,069.5 million kWh at hydro power plants and 343.55 mln. kWh at other sources (WPP, SPP and Waste-to-Power). During the year, 96.1 mln. kWh of power generated at WPPs, 46.9 million kWh in solar power plants, 200.6 million kWh at the Solid Waste Incineration Plant. Electricity generated by RES accounted for about 6% of total production. In 2014, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed with the State Agency and the Ministry of Energy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as in 2015 between the State Administration of Energy of the People's Republic of China. The main goal is to increase the country's renewable energy investment capacity to 30% by 2030 [3]. Within the framework of pilot projects on RES (wind and solar), the project "Strengthening the network to support renewable energy projects in Azerbaijan" was implemented with the involvement of an international consulting company in connection with the connection of power plants to the power grid and the integration of BEMs into the power grid. According to a report prepared by VPC, in order to achieve the 30% target, new renewable power plants with an installed capacity of 1,500 MW must be installed, which will increase the total capacity to 440 MW in 2020-2022 and 460 MW in 2023-2025. MW, 600 MW in 2026-2030, it was considered expedient to integrate into the network in 3 periods. At the same time, along with public investment, measures are being taken to launch new production facilities at the expense of private and foreign investment.. On January 9, 2021, the Ministry of Energy of Azerbaijan and ACWA Power of Saudi Arabia and Masdar of the United Arab Emirates signed executive agreements on the implementation of pilot projects on renewable energy. According to the agreements, pilot projects will be implemented in Azerbaijan with ACWA Power for the construction of 240 MW wind farms, and with Masdar for the construction of 200 MW solar power plants. In total, about 1.4 billion kWh/year of electricity is forecasted to be produced by wind and solar energy projects. These companies will invest about $ 400 million in pilot projects in the field of renewable energy in Azerbaijan. The projects will take about 2 years to implement and will be implemented in stages. The commissioning of these production facilities will save 300 million cubic meters of gas per year, which is equal to 10% of gas consumption in Azerbaijan. The development of alternative energy sources will also increase the country's export potential due to the saved gas. Azerbaijan cooperates with the following international organizations on the application of BEMs: Azerbaijan State Agency for Alternative Renewable Energy Sources, European Economic Commission of the UN, UNDP, European Union, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, German KFW Bank, France's International Development Agency, US Development Agency, Economic Cooperation Organization, Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, Japan International Cooperation Agency, Korea International Cooperation Agency, European Interstate Oil and Gas Transport Program, etc. as well as Germany, Turkey, France, Iran, Lithuania, UAE, Sweden and others. Keyswords: renewable energy sources (RES), wind power plant (WPP), solar power plant (SPP), bioenergy station, hybrid station, integration.

The peninsula of Athos in Chalkidiki became a center of organized monachal life in monasteries in the year 963, when with the initiative of the Byzantine emperor Nichephorus Phocas the Monastery of Great Laura was founded. Since that time Mount Athos (=MA) became the "Holy Mountain" and has attracted the moral and material support of the Byzantine emperors, various Orthodox countries and the flock till today. During this long period of more then one thousand years, MA was armed with a privileged legal status, the existence of which continues till now. The legal status of MA is based on three foundations: I. The law of the Hellenic Republic, II. The Public International Law, and III. The European Law. I. Fundamental significance for the status of MA have the provisions of article 105 of the Greek Constitution. Then is the Charter of MA, which is drawn up and voted by the Athonite monachal authorities and afterwards ratified by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Greek Parliament. The Charter is a law of superior formal force in comparison to the other laws. According to the Constitution and the Charter, MA has an ancient privileged status and is a self-governed part of the Greek State, whose sovereignty remains intact. Spiritually MA is under the direct jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, direct in the sense that the Ecumenical Patriarch is also the local bishop of MA The territory of the peninsula is exempt from expropriation and is divided among the twenty Athonite monasteries exclusively. The administrative power lies in self-administration of the first and the second degree. The first is exercised by the ruling twenty monasteries. This number may not be changed, nor may their position in the preeminence, nor towards their dependencies (skates, cells, hermitages). Nowadays all the monasteries are coenobitic, i.e. the monks share a common life and have no private property. The monasteries are administered by the abbot, the Elders' Assembly and the Brotherhood. Second degree administration is operated by: 1. the Holy Community. It is comprised by twenty monks members, each of whom represents one monastery, 2. the Holy Community's executive organ is the Hiera Epistassia, which comprises four monks drawn annually from four monasteries in rotation. The leader of the Hiera Epistassia is called the First (= Protos). The Hiera Epistassis also performs specific duties as police force, police court and municipality of Karyes, the capital town of MA The legislative power is in the hands of: 1. The Holy Community as far as concerns the Charter of MA, 2. the Extraordinary Biannual Twenty-Members Assembly, which draws up the regulative provisions, and 3. the Greek State, as far as concerns: a) the rights and the duties of the (civil) Governor of MA, b) the judicial power of the Athonite authorities, and c) the custom and taxation privileges granted by the State to MA The judicial power belongs to: 1. the monastic courts (the abbot with the Elders' Assembly), 2. the Holy Community, 3. the Hiera Epistassia, and 4. the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The observance of the regimes is in the spiritual field under the supreme supervision of the Patriarchate and in the administrative under the supervision of the State, which is also exclusively responsible for safeguarding public order and security. These responsibilities of the State are exercised through the (civil) Governor of MA, whose rights and duties are determined by common law. All persons leading a monastic life in MA acquire the Greek citizenship without further formalities, upon admission in a monastery as novices or monks. Also persons who are not Orthodox Christians or they are schismatic Orthodox are prohibited from dwelling in MA II. The first international treaty that recognized an international protection of the MA status was that of San Stefano (1878), but only for the Russian monks. The Treaty of Berlin (also 1878) recognized the same protection for all the monks who were not borne in the Ottoman empire. Its article n? 62,8 was as follows: "Les moines du Mont Athos, quel que soit leur pays d'origine, seront maintenus dans leurs possessions et avantages ant?rieurs et jouiront, sans aucune exception, d'une enti?re ?galit? de droits et prerogatives". This provision was repeated in the special treaties of S?vres (1920) and then in the protocol of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). These treaties safeguarded the rights and the liberties of the non-Greek monastic communi ties in MA as follows: "La Gr?ce s'engage ? reconna?tre et maintenir les droits traditionnels et les libert?s, dont jouissent les communaut?s monastiques non grecques du Mont Athos d'apr?s les dispositions de l'article 62 du trait? de Berlin du 13 juillet 1878". The same provision has been repeated in the Legislative Decree of 29.9/30.10.1923 "On the Protection of Minorities in Greece", article 13. III. Because a lot of provisions of the MA law are opposite to the principles of the European Union (for example the clausura to women, the special license in order to visit the peninsula, the taxation and customs privileges etc.), Joint Declaration n? 4 concerns MA was included in the Final Act (1979) of the Agreement concerning the accession of the Hellenic Republic in the European Economic Community, now-a days European Union. According to this Declaration, recognizing that the special status granted to MA, as guaranteed by the Greek Constitution, is justified exclusively on grounds of a spiritual and religious nature, the Community will ensure that this status is taken into account in the application and subsequent preparation of pro visions of Community law, in particular in relation to customs franchise privileges, tax exemptions, and the right of establishment. .

Models of relations between the state and religious organizations and the basic principles of their implementation are analyzed with the aim to determine which model of relations is being realized in the Republic of Latvia as well as to establish whether a model of relations, secured by a normative act, corresponds to the one implemented in practice. Within this work, the method of analysis has been used when considering the models of relations between the state and religious organizations, as well as the comparative method in the comparison of application of the basic principles of these models in the Republic of Latvia. The relations between the State and religious organizations are examined from the administratively legal and constitutionally legal aspect. The normative acts of the Republic of Latvia are discussed, as well as their mutual interaction and the collisions having sprung up between them. Laws and regulations of the Republic of Latvia are evaluated in connection with the norms of other European Union Member States, which regulate the relations between the state and religious organizations, and their experience. Evaluating the practice of other countries and the implemented models of relations between the state and religious organizations monographs and scientific papers by the scientists of the respective countries have been used. The content of international legal norms regulating freedom of religion have been analyzed as well as the requirements of the normative acts of the Republic of Latvia and their interaction. As grounds for conclusions, rulings by the court are chosen in cases where the application of legal norms is adjudicated concerning the realization of the right to the freedom of religion. Three fundamental principles are pointed out in the research basing on which the relations between the state and religious organizations are formed: association between the state and religious organizations, cooperation between the state and religious organizations and segregation between the state and religious organizations. Basing on the abovementioned principles, all models of relations between the state and religious organizations are formed. The model being implemented in a state can be determined by the regulation of the activity of religious organizations ensured with normative acts, by the range of rights of religious organizations, by peculiar features of preconditions, by the range of privileges, and by the burden of responsibilities imposed on religious organizations. To a large extent, the model of relations between the state and religious organizations depends on state traditions, historical development, distribution and impact of the definite religion within the state territory. The principle of unity between the state and religious organizations indicate the unity between them, institutions of religious organizations are identified as state institutions. Implementation of the abovementioned principle can manifest as an absolute unity between the state and church when state laws are based on definite religious norms and, in case of collisions, the principles of religious doctrine are applied. Or, within the abovementioned principle, two models of relations can be distinguished: a model of religious state and a model of state religion (church). The principle of cooperation between the state and religious organizations provides for separation of the state and religious organizations, they are functioning as autonomous subjects, religious organizations form their own structure and define their inner administration, the state on its part does not interfere in the inner affairs of religious organizations. Nevertheless, the state and religious organizations cooperate in order to achieve definite aims. Such a model of cooperation can be called the model of cooperation. In countries where the principle of separation of the state and religious organizations is in force and the model of segregation is functioning, the autonomy of religious organizations and the state are strictly separated. Each of these subjects is functioning in its own sphere, in parallel to one another. Religious organizations are not vested the rights to perform the functions of the state, and they do not receive financial support. Registration of a religious organization is the starting point where the activities of the state and of religious organizations come into contact. Registration of a religious organization is a basis for the model of relations between the state and religious organizations to be implemented in the given country. In the Republic of Latvia, the process of registration of religious organizations is regulated by the Law on Religious Organizations which provides for the order of registration of religious organizations as well as the legal status of the religious organizations to be registered; registration has a multi-stage structure. Initially, a congregation is registered as reregistrable, but later it acquires a regular status and after uniting the congregations can form a religious union (church). Religious unions (churches) have the right to establish dioceses and institutions. The next step in the mentioned chain includes religious organizations whose relations with the Republic of Latvia can be regulated by special laws. The State has established special relations with Evangelical Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Old Believer, Methodist, Baptist, Seventh-day Adventist and Moses faith (Judaist) denominations. These denominations have a peculiar status in the Republic of Latvia, the range of their rights differs from the rights of other congregations. Relations between the religious unions (churches) of these denominations and the State are regulated by special laws that define their rights and status. The Latvian Constitution (Satversme) contains a reference to the model of relations between the Republic of Latvia and religious organizations providing that the State is separated from the church. Evaluation of the features of a model of separation and its application to the relations between the Republic of Latvia and religious organizations allows to determine whether the implemented model is a model of separation or whether the relations between the State and religious organizations realized in practice belong to quite another model. The requirement for autonomy of religious organizations and the State can be regarded as satisfied, since the demand for non-interference by the State in the inner activities of religious organizations (except for the cases of violating laws) is included in the Law on Religious Organizations. Separation of religious organizations from the public rights sector presently is not being implemented. In state schools there are religious instruction lessons, religious organizations carry out religious activity in medical institutions and prisons, a service of chaplains has been established whose activity is funded from the state budget. Equality of the forms of activity of religious organizations is not guaranteed, since there exists a multi-stage registration system. A state function of performing marriage ceremonies is delegated to religious organizations. Thus, state functions are delegated to religious organizations. Besides the religious organizations are offered direct and indirect financial support which manifests in allotting tax relief as well as allocating direct grants from the state budget. The model having been established in the Republic of Latvia is a model of cooperation between the State and religious organizations. In the Constitution no state religion is provided but also no segregation of the State and religious organizations is realized. The State acknowledges the autonomy of religious organizations, however, the religious organizations receive financial support, definite functions are delegated to them, and religious organizations are operating in the public sector. Satversme lacks provisions that would truly provide that no state church exists in Latvia, but at the same time definite procedures and operations are being delegated to the church as stated by the law. The idea of amending the Satversme of the Republic of Latvia ought to be considered that would contain the provision about the model of cooperation between the State and religious organizations being realized in practice.

The article is devoted to the study of public administration in the field of tourism in terms of adaptation to the standards of the European Union. Emphasis placed on the fact that the state of domestic policy in the field of tourism does not meet modern world standards of industry management at the state level. In connection with the transition from a planned to a market model of state development in the last two decades, there have been clear problems that prevent the full use of the tourist and recreational potential of Ukraine. On the one hand, the underdevelopment of domestic tourism correlates with the general problems of political, social and economic nature inherent in developing countries at a certain stage of their development. On the other hand — the lack of the necessary methodological framework and lack of methodological developments for state regulation of tourism correlates with the impossibility of practical application of tourism laws, tourism development programs and the formation of tourism regulation structures at the national level, which directly and indirectly affect the adaptation of Ukrainian legislation and state-management activities in accordance with the standards of the European Union. Based on the results of doctrinal and comprehensive research, it concluded that in the context of promoting the gradual convergence of domestic and European public administration environment, strengthening economic and trade relations that will lead to Ukraine’s gradual integration into the EU internal market, expanding cooperation based on the rule of law and respect for the rule of law. Human rights and fundamental freedoms, the sphere of tourism occupies one of the key aspects not only at the national level but also at the international level. At the same time, in the context of adaptation of domestic legislation and public administration to EU standards, it is advisable to develop a methodology and action plan aimed at implementing the holistic guidelines and principles enshrined at the European level.

Abstract The impact of international law on national legal systems varies considerably according to the forms not only of each national legal system, but also of specific regions. The highest level of influence has been traced on the European continent, especially the European Union (EU). The author investigates the acts of the European Union institutions and concludes that they can serve as a model for national legal regulation. In the relations of the European Union with third countries, there is a tendency to more actively promote the ideas of European integration and with different regions at different stages of integration. The aim of the paper is to analyze the legal capacity of the EU with third countries and its implementation in association agreements with third countries, which determine the first step towards “Europeanization”. Thus, the most common form of EU cooperation with third countries is association agreements. The authors carefully examine the features of associative agreements in the practice of the European Union’s external relations and pay great attention to the association as a special partnership of EU Member States with a third country.

This article delves into the role of bureaucrats and administrations in the development of national migration policies in West Africa. Based upon 87 interviews conducted in Accra, Dakar, and Brussels, it argues that the process of developing migration policies in Ghana and Senegal exhibits features of “bureaucratic politics.” West African bureaucracies have gained more national policy-making agency, due to the opportunities created by external funding from the European Union (EU) and the International Organization for Migration. EU funding fostered the policy expertise of local officials and provided certain administrative branches with resources to grow. In the process, bureaucracies in Ghana and Senegal have become more receptive to developing national migration policies and adapting to the EU external migration agenda. These findings add to an often-heard assumption in the literature about EU conditionality in its migration policy with non-EU countries — namely, that adaption to EU standards may be determined by not only the rewards given to foreign governments but also by the donors’ ability to establish a longer-term engagement with the bureaucracy. The research also demonstrates that EU migration cooperation reinforces the typical pattern of the postcolonial state, wherein the bureaucracy is funded by the state and external donors. The article addresses a gap in research on EU migration cooperation with the Global South and acknowledges the role of domestic bureaucracies in maintaining dependent postcolonial relationships with the EU in the realm of migration governance.

IntroductionBritish initiatives to manage both the number of arrivals of asylum seekers and the experiences of those who arrive have burgeoned in recent years. The budget dedicated to asylum seeker management increased from £357 million in 1998-1999 to £1.71 billion in 2004-2005, making the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) the second largest concern of the Home Office behind the Prison Service in 2005 (Back et al). The IND was replaced in April 2007 by the Border and Immigration Agency (BIA), whose expenditure exceeded £2 billion in 2007-2008 (BIA). Perhaps as a consequence the number of asylum seekers applying to the UK has fallen dramatically, illustrating the continuing influence of exclusionary state policies despite the globalisation and transnationalisation of migrant flows (UNHCR; Koser).One of the difficulties with the study of asylum seekers is the persistent risk that, by employing the term ‘asylum seeker’, research conducted into their experiences will contribute towards the exclusion of a marginalised and abject group of people, precisely by employing a term that emphasises the suspended recognition of a community (Nyers). The ‘asylum seeker’ is a figure defined in law in order to facilitate government-level avoidance of humanitarian obligations by emphasising the non-refugeeness of asylum claimants (Tyler). This group is identified as supplicant to the state, positioning the state itself as a legitimate arbiter. It is in this sense that asylum seekers suffer a degree of cruel optimism (Berlant) – wishing to be recognised as a refugee while nevertheless subject to state-defined discourses, whatever the outcome. The term ‘forced migrant’ is little better, conveying a de-humanising and disabling lack of agency (Turton), while the terms ‘undocumented migrant’, ‘irregular migrant’ and ‘illegal migrant’ all imply a failure to conform to respectable, desirable and legitimate forms of migration.Another consequence of these co-opted and politically subjugating forms of language is their production of simple imagined geographies of migration that position the foreigner as strange, unfamiliar and incapable of communication across this divide. Such imaginings precipitate their own responses, most clearly expressed in the blunt, intrusive uses of space and time in migration governance (Lahav and Guiraudon; Cohen; Guild; Gronendijk). Various institutions exist in Britain that function to actually produce the imagined differences between migrants and citizens, from the two huge, airport-like ‘Asylum Screening Units’ in Liverpool and London where asylum seekers can lodge their claims, to the 12 ‘Removal Centres’ within which soon-to-be deported asylum seekers are incarcerated and the 17 ‘Hearing Centres’ at which British judges preside over the precise legal status of asylum applicants.Less attention, however, has been given to the tension between mobility and stillness in asylum contexts. Asylum seeker management is characterised by a complex combination of enforced stillness and enforced mobility of asylum seeking bodies, and resistance can also be understood in these terms. This research draws upon 37 interviews with asylum seekers, asylum activists, and government employees in the UK conducted between 2005 and 2007 (see Gill) and distils three characteristics of stillness. First, an association between stillness and safety is clearly evident, exacerbated by the fear that the state may force asylum seekers to move at any time. Second, stillness of asylum seekers in a physical, literal sense is intimately related to their psychological condition, underscoring the affectual properties of stillness. Third, the desire to be still, and to be safe, precipitates various political strategies that seek to secure stillness, meaning that stillness functions as more than an aspiration, becoming also a key political metric in the struggle between the included and excluded. In these multiple and contradictory ways stillness is a key factor that structures asylum seekers’ experiences of migration. Governing through Mobility The British state utilises both stillness and mobility in the governance of asylum seeking bodies. On the one hand, asylum seekers’ personal freedoms are routinely curtailed both through their incarceration and through the requirements imposed upon them by the state in terms of ‘signing in’ at local police stations, even when they are not incarcerated, throughout the time that they are awaiting a decision on their claim for asylum (Cwerner). This requirement, which consists of attending a police station to confirm the continuing compliance of the asylum seeker, can vary in frequency, from once every month to once every few days.On the other hand, the British state employs a range of strategies of mobility that serve to deprive asylum seeking communities of geographical stillness and, consequently, also often undermines their psychological stability. First, the seizure of asylum seekers and transportation to a Removal Centre can be sudden and traumatic, and incarceration in this manner is becoming increasingly common (Bacon; Home Office). In extreme cases, very little or no warning is given to asylum seekers who are taken into detention, and so-called ‘dawn raids’ have been organised in order to exploit an element of surprise in the introduction of asylum seekers to detention (Burnett). A second source of forced mobility associated with Removal Centres is the transfer of detainees from one Removal Centre to another for a variety of reasons, from the practical constraints imposed by the capacities of various centres, to differences in the conditions of centres themselves, which are used to form a reward and sanction mechanism among the detainee population (Hayter; Granville-Chapman). Intra-detention estate transfers have increased in scope and significance in recent years: in 2004/5, the most recent financial year for which figures are available, the British government spent over £6.5 million simply moving detainees from one secure facility to another within the UK (Hansard, 2005; 2006).Outside incarceration, a third source of spatial disruption of asylum seekers in the UK concerns their relationship with accommodation providers. Housing is provided to asylum seekers as they await a decision on their claim, but this housing is provided on a ‘no-choice’ basis, meaning that asylum seekers who are not prepared to travel to the accommodation that is allocated to them will forfeit their right to accommodation (Schuster). In other words, accommodation is contingent upon asylum seekers’ willingness to be mobile, producing a direct trade-off between the attractions of accommodation and stillness. The rationale for this “dispersal policy”, is to draw asylum seekers away from London, where the majority of asylum seekers chose to reside before 2000. The maintenance of a diverse portfolio of housing across the UK is resource intensive, with the re-negotiation of housing contracts worth over a £1 billion a constant concern (Noble et al). As these contracts are renegotiated, asylum seekers are expected to move in response to the varying affordability of housing around the country. In parallel to the system of deportee movements within the detention estate therefore, a comparable system of movement of asylum seekers around the UK in response to urban and regional housing market conditions also operates. Stillness as SanctuaryIn all three cases, the psychological stress that movement of asylum seekers can cause is significant. Within detention, according to a series of government reports into the conditions of removal centres, one of the recurring difficulties facing incarcerated asylum seekers is incomprehension of their legal status (e.g. HMIP 2002; 2008). This, coupled with very short warning of impending movements, results in widespread anxiety among detained asylum seekers that they may be deported or transferred imminently. Outside detention, the fear of snatch squads of police officers, or alternatively the fear of hate crimes against asylum seekers (Tyler), render movement in the public realm a dangerous practice in the eyes of many marginalised migrants. The degree of uncertainty and the mental and emotional demands of relocation introduced through forced mobility can have a damaging psychological effect upon an already vulnerable population. Expressing his frustration at this particular implication of the movement of detainees, one activist who had provided sanctuary to over 20 asylum seekers in his community outlined some of the consequences of onward movement.The number of times I’ve had to write panic letters saying you know you cannot move this person to the other end of the country because it destabilises them in terms of their mental health and it is abusive. […] Their solicitors are here, they’re in process, in legal process, they’ve got a community, they’ve got friends, they may even have a partner or a child here and they would still move them.The association between governance, mobility and trepidation highlights one characteristic of stillness in the asylum seeking field: in contra-distinction to the risk associated with movement, to be still is very often to be safe. Given the necessity to flee violence in origin countries and the tendency for destination country governments to require constant re-positioning, often backed-up with the threat of force, stillness comes to be viewed as offering a sort of sanctuary. Indeed, the Independent Asylum Commission charity that has conducted a series of reviews of asylum seekers’ treatment in the UK (Hobson et al.), has recently suggested dispensing with the term ‘asylum’ in favour of ‘sanctuary’ precisely because of the positive associations with security and stability that the latter provides. To be in one place for a sustained period allows networks of human trust and reciprocity to develop which can form the basis of supportive community relationships. Another activist who had accompanied many asylum seekers through the legal process spoke passionately about the functions that communities can serve in asylum seekers’ lives.So you actually become substitute family […] I think it’s what helps people in the midst of trauma when the future is uncertain […] to find a community which values them, which accepts them, which listens to them, where they can begin to find a place and touch a creative life again which they may not have had for years: it’s enormously important.There is a danger in romanticising the benefits of community (Joseph). Indeed, much of the racism and xenophobia directed towards asylum seekers has been the result of local community hostilities towards different national and ethnic groups (Boswell). For many asylum seekers, however, the reciprocal relations found in communities are crucially important to their well-being. What is more, the inclusion of asylum seekers into communities is one of the most effective anti-state and anti-deportation strategies available to activists and asylum seekers alike (Tyler), because it arrests the process of anonymising and cordoning asylum seekers as an homogenous group, providing instead a chance for individuals to cast off this label in favour of more ‘humane’ characteristics: families, learning, friendship, love.Strategies for StillnessFor this reason, the pursuit of stillness among asylum seekers is both a human and political response to their situations – stillness becomes a metric in the struggle between abject migrants and the state. Crucial to this political function is the complex relationship between stillness and social visibility: if an asylum seeker can command their own stillness then they can also have greater influence over their public profile, either in order to develop it or to become less conspicuous.Tyler argues that asylum seekers are what she calls a ‘hypervisible’ social group, referring to the high profile association between a fictional, dehumanised asylum seeking figure and a range of defamatory characteristics circulated by the popular printed press. Stillness can be used to strategically reduce this imposed form of hypervisibility, and to raise awareness of real asylum seeker stories and situations. This is achieved by building community coalitions, which require physically and socially settled asylum seeking families and communities. Asylum advocacy groups and local community support networks work together in the UK in order to generate a genuine public profile of asylum seekers by utilising local and national newspapers, staging public demonstrations, delivering speeches, attending rallies and garnering support among local organisations through art exhibitions, performances and debates. Some activist networks specialise explicitly in supporting asylum seekers in these endeavours, and sympathetic networks of journalists, lawyers, doctors and radio producers combine their expertise with varying degrees of success.These sorts of strategies can produce strong loyalties between local communities and the asylum seekers in their midst, precisely because, through their co-presence, asylum seekers cease to be merely asylum seekers, but become active and valued members of communities. One activist who had helped to organise the protection of an asylum seeker in a church described some of the preparations that had been made for the arrival of immigration task forces in her middle class parish.There were all sorts of things we practiced: if they did break through the door what would we do? We set up a telephone tree so that each person would phone two or three people. We had I don’t know how many cars outside. We arranged a safe house, where we would hide her. We practiced getting her out of the room into a car […] We were expecting them to come at any time. We always had people at the back […] guarding, looking at strangers who might be around and [name] was never, ever allowed to be on her own without a whole group of people completely surrounding her so she could feel safe and we would feel safe. Securing stillness here becomes more than simply an operation to secure geographic fixity: it is a symbolic struggle between state and community, crystallising in specific tactics of spatial and temporal arrangement. It reflects the fear of further forced movement, the abiding association between stillness and safety, and the complex relationship between community visibility and an ability to remain still.There are, nevertheless, drawbacks to these tactics that suggest a very different relationship between stillness and visibility. Juries can be alienated by loud tactics of activism, meaning that asylum seekers can damage their chances of a sympathetic legal hearing if they have had too high a profile. Furthermore, many asylum seekers do not have the benefits of such a dedicated community. An alternative way in which stillness becomes political is through its ability to render invisible the abject body. Invisibility is taken to mean the decision to ‘go underground’, miss the appointments at local police stations and attempt to anticipate the movements of immigration removal enforcement teams. Perversely, although this is a strategy for stillness at the national or regional scale, mobile strategies are often employed at finer scales in order to achieve this objective. Asylum seekers sometimes endure extremely precarious and difficult conditions of housing and subsistence moving from house to house regularly or sleeping and living in cars in order to avoid detection by authorities.This strategy is difficult because it involves a high degree of uncertainty, stress and reliance upon the goodwill of others. One police officer outlined the situation facing many ‘invisible’ asylum seekers as one of poverty and desperation:Immigration haven’t got a clue where they are, they just can’t find them because they’re sofa surfing, that’s living in peoples coffee shops … I see them in the coffee shop and they come up and they’re bloody starving! Despite the difficulties associated with this form of invisibility, it is estimated that this strategy is becoming increasingly common in the UK. In 2006 the Red Cross estimated that there were some 36 000 refused and destitute asylum seekers in England, up from 25 000 the previous year, and reported that their organisation was having to provide induction tours of soup kitchens and night shelters in order to alleviate the conditions of many claimants in these situations (Taylor and Muir). Conclusion The case of asylum seekers in the UK illustrates the multiple, contradictory and splintered character of stillness. While some forms of governance impose stillness upon asylum seeking bodies, in the form of incarceration and ‘signing in’ requirements, other forms of governance impose mobility either within detention or outside it. Consequently stillness figures in the responses of asylum seeking communities in various ways. Given the unwelcome within-country movement of asylum seekers, and adding to this the initial fact of their forced migration from their home countries, the condition of stillness becomes desirable, promising to bring with it stability and safety. These promises contrast the psychological disruption that further mobility, and even the threat of further mobility, can bring about. This illustrates the affectual qualities both of movement and of stillness in the asylum-seeking context. Literal stillness is associated with social and emotional stability that complicates the distinction between real and emotional spaces. 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