Journal articles: 'Polarization (Social sciences)'

1

Leifeld, Philip. "Polarization in the social sciences: Assortative mixing in social science collaboration networks is resilient to interventions." Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 507 (October 2018): 510–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2018.05.109.

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Jiang, Tianji. "Studying opinion polarization on social media." Social Work and Social Welfare 4, no. 2 (2022): 232–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.25082/swsw.2022.02.003.

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Opinion polarization on social media raises a lot of concerns today. In this study, the author provides a systematic review of publications about the issues since 2013 to show the achievements in the existing research on the topic, to sort out the relevant knowledge, and to provide some inspirations for future research in this area. This paper finds that opinion polarization on social media is initiated by three patterns of factors: increasing the homophily in discussions, increasing conflict in social media discussions, and facilitating the spread of misinformation. It also summarizes the existing findings on how to detect and measure opinion polarization in social media, and comes up with opportunities for further researches on this topic.

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Kwon, Hyunku, and John Martin. "Subjective Political Polarization." Sociological Science 10 (2023): 903–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.15195/v10.a32.

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Mason, Lilliana. "Losing Common Ground: Social Sorting and Polarization." Forum 16, no. 1 (April 25, 2018): 47–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/for-2018-0004.

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Abstract The alignment between partisan and other social identities has generated a rift between Democrats and Republicans that is deeper than any seen in recent American history. Without the cross-cutting identities that have traditionally stabilized the American two-party system, partisans in the American electorate are now seeing each other through prejudiced and intolerant eyes. In this article, partisan social divisions are examined in the 2016 electorate, with an eye to the co-occurrence between these social divisions and contemporaneous resistance to compromise and intolerance of social outgroups. In particular, as Republicans and Democrats grow more socially distinct, they like outgroups less and privilege victory over the national greater good. This effect is particularly visible among Republicans, whose social makeup is particularly homogeneous, even in comparison with Democrats. Some potential solutions are briefly addressed.

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Nevryuev, A., and M. Gagarina. "“After the Discussion, I am Even More Confident in My Point of View”: An Overview of Studies of Group Polarization." Review of Business and Economics Studies 8, no. 3 (March 2, 2021): 6–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.26794/2308-944x-2020-8-2-6-11.

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The polarization of the population in Russia is reflected in the psychological state of society. The article deals with the phenomenon of “group polarization”. First, we define the phenomenon formulated in the framework of social psychology. Next, we presented the main theories that explain the mechanism of action of this phenomenon. Further, we considered in more detail psychological experiments aimed to study group polarization empirically. Separately, we considered studies that also established the features of group polarization, but were carried out in related social sciences. The examples of recent events that took place in Russia illustrate the process of group polarization in modern society in the period from 2014 to 2020. Based on the described studies, we formulated the need for a more detailed empirical analysis of this phenomenon in the current conditions of society in Russia. Finally, we outlined the main ways related to the study of the connection between group polarization and the psychological state of society and people’s behaviour.

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Gu, Chao-lin. "Social polarization and segregation in Beijing." Chinese Geographical Science 11, no. 1 (March 2001): 17–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11769-001-0003-7.

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Kuzin, V. Yu. "TYPES OF POLARIZATION AND MODERN FEATURES OF THEIR RESEARCH." Bulletin of Udmurt University. Series Biology. Earth Sciences 32, no. 4 (December 27, 2022): 494–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.35634/2412-9518-2022-32-4-494-503.

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The article considers polarization as an extreme form of spatial differentiation. Its essence and complex multidimensional nature are noted. It allows to distinguish separate types of polarization for the research objectives. In general, there are five types of polarization - economic, social, ekistical, demographic and polarization of social and economic development processes. Their specificity, outstanding characteristics and ratios of different types of polarization are considered. Based on the works on polarization types of Russian and foreign experts since 2010 the key characteristics, modern peculiarities of research and indicators describing every type of polarization are outlined. The common features are also indicated. It suggests further prospects and features of the polarization types research. The common (designate an all-inclusive polarization types) and specific (characterizing the separate polarization types) perspectives are distinguished.

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Kashima, Yoshihisa, Andrew Perfors, Vanessa Ferdinand, and Elle Pattenden. "Ideology, communication and polarization." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 376, no. 1822 (February 22, 2021): 20200133. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0133.

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Ideologically committed minds form the basis of political polarization, but ideologically guided communication can further entrench and exacerbate polarization depending on the structures of ideologies and social network dynamics on which cognition and communication operate. Combining a well-established connectionist model of cognition and a well-validated computational model of social influence dynamics on social networks, we develop a new model of ideological cognition and communication on dynamic social networks and explore its implications for ideological political discourse. In particular, we explicitly model ideologically filtered interpretation of social information, ideological commitment to initial opinion, and communication on dynamically evolving social networks, and examine how these factors combine to generate ideologically divergent and polarized political discourse. The results show that ideological interpretation and commitment tend towards polarized discourse. Nonetheless, communication and social network dynamics accelerate and amplify polarization. Furthermore, when agents sever social ties with those that disagree with them (i.e. structure their social networks by homophily), even non-ideological agents may form an echo chamber and form a cluster of opinions that resemble an ideological group. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms’.

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Ellis, Richard J. "Polarization and presidentialism." Society 36, no. 3 (March 1999): 8–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12115-999-1001-0.

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Clark, Kevin M., and Eric Bain-Selbo. "Tribalism and Compassion in the Age of a Pandemic." Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal 105, no. 2 (May 2022): 143–223. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/soundings.105.2.0143.

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Abstract This essay draws on resources in philosophy, psychology, and related social sciences—specifically, works by Joshua Greene, Jonathan Haidt, George Lakoff, and Martha Nussbaum—to analyze the moral and political dimensions of the recent polarization in the United States related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Three questions are addressed: (a) What psychological factors may have contributed to this polarization? (b) Why have conservatives and liberals taken the positions they have on issues relating to the pandemic (e.g., masks, economic reopening, vaccines, science)? and (c) How can we reduce this polarization and work more effectively with others to face societal challenges, despite our differences?

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Lavric, Miran, and Andrej Naterer. "Religious polarization among youth in southeast Europe: The role of secularization and prevailing confession." Sociologija 65, no. 4 (2023): 580–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/soc2304580l.

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Recent rapid secularization has been a major force behind the overwhelming political and ideological polarization in some Western countries. Focusing on Western European countries, Ribberink et al. (2018) found that religious polarization was associated with higher levels of secularization, and at the same time, with the relative dominance of Catholicism. Based on national representative surveys from 2018, this paper analyses religious polarization among young people from ten countries in Southeast Europe. The results show that the level of religious polarization is indeed positively correlated to the level of secularization, as well as to the predominance of Catholicism among young people. Slovenia and Croatia, two countries where youth is both highly secularized and predominantly Catholic, stood out with the highest levels of religious polarization. Furthermore, it is only in these two countries that young people became more secularized between 2008 and 2018. We interpret these results mainly in light of the rise of the individual-choice norms that parallel secularization, combined with the mechanism of religious defence, which can be successful largely because of the Catholic Church?s abundant material and cultural resources.

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Zhao, Weize, Lukasz Walasek, and Gordon D. A. Brown. "The Evolution of Polarization in Online Conversation: Twitter Users’ Opinions about the COVID-19 Pandemic Become More Politicized over Time." Human Behavior and Emerging Technologies 2023 (July 5, 2023): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2023/9094933.

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Political polarization on social media has been extensively studied. However, most research has examined polarization about topics that have preexisting associations with ideology, while few studies have tracked the onset of polarization about novel topics or the evolution of polarization over a prolonged period. The occurrence of COVID-19 provides a unique opportunity to study whether social media discourse about a novel event becomes increasingly polarized along ideological lines over time. This paper analyzes trends in Twitter polarization in relation to COVID-19 and other geopolitical events of 2020. The first two studies use topic analysis to examine the evolving difference over time in discussions of COVID-19 and other topics by liberals and conservatives on social media. COVID-19-related polarization is initially absent but gradually increases over time, in contrast to polarization related to other events. A third study examines structural polarization in retweet networks and finds that the frequency of counterpartisan retweets reduces over time. Across all three studies, we find evidence that Twitter discussion of COVID-19 has become more polarized over time.

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Beall, Sabrina, Stephann Makri, and Dana McKay. "Stronger Than Yesterday: Investigating Peoples' Experiences of View Strengthening on Social Media." Proceedings of the Association for Information Science and Technology 60, no. 1 (October 2023): 41–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/pra2.767.

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ABSTRACTPolarization of views (known as ideological polarization) is one of the greatest societal challenges of our time, potentially sewing distrust and hate among individuals and communities and threatening to undermine the fabric of democracy. Divisive issues such as abortion and gun control are ever‐present and can drive issue polarization, and even affective polarization—a disdain for ‘the other side,’ which can further divide society. Social media has been flagged as a breeding ground for polarized views, with private groups and personalized algorithms facilitating self‐creation of echo chambers that may lead to polarization. While there is prior research on the technological influences on view strengthening, scant Human‐centered research exists and most of it has focused on view change in general, rather than view strengthening specifically. To investigate peoples' experiences of view strengthening on social media, we interviewed 10 people who recently strengthened their views on important topics. While some took steps to avoid creating echo chambers (e.g., by seeking out opposing views), others intentionally created them to allow their views to strengthen without interference. These findings have important implications for designing social media platforms that support careful and conscious view strengthening while mitigating against the risk of information manipulation.

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Biegert, Thomas, Berkay Özcan, and Magdalena Rossetti-Youlton. "Household Joblessness in U.S. Metropolitan Areas during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Polarization and the Role of Educational Profiles." Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 9 (January 2023): 237802312311580. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/23780231231158087.

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The authors use Current Population Survey 2016 to 2021 quarterly data to analyze changes in household joblessness across metropolitan areas in the United States during the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. The authors first use shift-share analysis to decompose the change in household joblessness into changes in individual joblessness, household compositions, and polarization. The focus is on polarization, which is the result of the unequal distribution of individual joblessness across households. The authors find that the rise in household joblessness during the pandemic varies strongly across U.S. metropolitan areas. The initial stark increase and subsequent recovery are due largely to changes in individual joblessness. Polarization contributes notably to household joblessness but to varying degree. Second, the authors use metropolitan area–level fixed-effects regressions to test whether the educational profile of the population is a helpful predictor of changes in household joblessness and polarization. They measure three distinct features: educational levels, educational heterogeneity, and educational homogamy. Although much of the variance remains unexplained, household joblessness increased less in areas with higher educational levels. The authors show that how polarization contributes to household joblessness is shaped by educational heterogeneity and educational homogamy.

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Chakravarty, Satya R., and Bhargav Maharaj. "Measuring ethnic polarization." Social Choice and Welfare 37, no. 3 (September 5, 2010): 431–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0498-x.

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16

Goldner, Ilona, and Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom. "Polarization and Moral Threat: Insights from Systemist Analysis." Social Sciences 12, no. 8 (August 14, 2023): 453. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/socsci12080453.

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This article presents a theoretical framework for understanding the social consequences of polarization-driven behaviors by conceptualizing them as a moral threat to the self. Our argument employs systemist graphics, illustrating key connections and patterns from two distinct scientific works. First, an analysis of polarization-driven behavior, which reveals Americans’ willingness to trade democratic values for partisan goals. Second, research on moral disengagement strategies, revealing the role of resentment as a coping mechanism in armed conflicts. We offer a synthesis analysis between these two studies and uncover a twofold role of morality in polarization: as a factor in forming partisan animosity and a catalyst in its perpetuation and intensification. We further highlight the role of outgroup hate, rather than ingroup love, in driving negative actions resulting from polarization, and the challenge of reconciling morally-driven conflicts. Our framework sheds new light on the complex interplay between morality and conflicts, with implications for social cohesion, erosion of moral values, and democratic backsliding.

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McCoy, Jennifer, and Murat Somer. "Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms Democracies: Comparative Evidence and Possible Remedies." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 681, no. 1 (December 20, 2018): 234–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716218818782.

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This article compares the dynamics of polarization in the eleven case studies analyzed in this special issue to draw conclusions about antecedents of severe political and societal polarization, the characteristics and mechanisms of such polarization, and consequences of severe polarization for democracy. We find that the emergence of pernicious polarization (when a society is split into mutually distrustful “Us vs. Them” camps) is not attributable to any specific underlying social or political cleavage nor any particular institutional make-up. Instead, pernicious polarization arises when political entrepreneurs pursue their political objectives by using polarizing strategies, such as mobilizing voters with divisive, demonizing discourse and exploiting existing grievances, and opposing political elites then reciprocate with similarly polarizing tactics or fail to develop effective nonpolarizing responses. We explain how the political construction of polarization around “formative rifts” (social or political rifts that arise during the fundamental formation/reformation of a nation-state), the relative capacity of opposing political blocs to mobilize voters versus relying on mechanisms such as courts or the military to constrain the executive, and the strategic and ideological aims of the polarizing actors contribute to the emergence of its pernicious form. We analyze the consequences for democracy and conclude with reflections on how to combat pernicious polarization.

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Somer, Murat, and Jennifer McCoy. "Déjà vu? Polarization and Endangered Democracies in the 21st Century." American Behavioral Scientist 62, no. 1 (January 2018): 3–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002764218760371.

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As political and societal polarization deepens, democracies are under stress around the world. This article examines the complex relationship and causal direction between democracy and polarization and posits three theoretical possibilities: (1) polarization contributes to democratic backsliding and decay, (2) polarization results from democratic crisis, and (3) polarization contributes to democratic deepening. We argue “politics” is central to polarization and identify as a key feature of the process of polarization the manner in which it simplifies the normal complexity of politics and social relations. Polarization does so by aligning otherwise unrelated divisions, emasculating cross-cutting cleavages, and dividing society and politics into two separate, opposing, and unyielding blocks. As such, it often has pernicious consequences for democracy, emerging as an intended or unintended consequence of political interest–based and purposeful political mobilization. Polarization over the very concept of democracy may also be the product of democratic crisis. Finally, in certain circumstances, polarization may strengthen democratic institutions and citizen choice. The article then introduces the articles in this issue that address these three theoretical and empirical possibilities.

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Campbell, David E. "Social Capital in a Divided America: The Relationship between Economic Bridging and Affective Polarization." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 708, no. 1 (July 2023): 102–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00027162241228121.

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Does political polarization decline as relational bridges are built between people from different social and economic backgrounds? Circumstantial evidence supports the existence of a relationship: social capital has declined during the same period that affective polarization has risen. To date, though, we have lacked data to test whether the two are, in fact, dynamically related. In this article, I measure the extent of bridging social capital among people within zip codes, generated from 21 billion Facebook friendships of 72.2 million Americans. Using two measures of affective polarization—feeling thermometers and partisan traits—the analysis shows that people who live in communities with more economic bridging are less affectively polarized and that conversations among people who have different political views is a possible causal mechanism. These effects are more pronounced for the affluent and for Republicans—and for affluent Republicans most of all.

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Lu, Yun, and Xiaozhao Y. Yang. "The Two Faces of Diversity: The Relationships between Religious Polarization, Religious Fractionalization, and Self-rated Health." Journal of Health and Social Behavior 61, no. 1 (February 13, 2020): 79–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022146520904373.

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A dominant discourse in the social sciences theorizes that religious diversity puts individuals’ health at risk via interreligious hostility. However, this discourse overlooks the different subtypes of religious diversity and the moderation of political institutions. To better understand the issue of diversity and health, in this study, we distinguish between two subtypes of religious diversity—polarization and fractionalization—and argue that their impacts on health are heterogeneous. Using a sample of 67,399 individuals from 51 societies drawn from the 2010–2014 wave of the World Values Survey, our multilevel analyses show that religious polarization is negatively associated with individual health, whereas the health effects of religious fractionalization are positive. Moreover, the associations between religious polarization/fractionalization and individual health are found to depend on the democratic level of the state. In more democratic countries, the negative effects of polarization on health are mitigated, and the positive effects of fractionalization are stronger.

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Akanak, Emre. "Ontological Roots of the Schism in Economics and the Origins of the Conflicts between Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy." Economics Literature 4, no. 1 (December 8, 2022): 22–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.22440/elit.4.1.2.

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This paper discusses the roots of the unending conflicts between Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy in economics, including the paradigms behind the main disagreements. Historically, it is impossible to define any school of economics and thought – in Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy – via homogeneous and monolith terms, concepts, outlines, definitions, and ideas. The most essential and obvious fact of the economy (and the especially central fact of political economy) is the "transformation of economics," including concepts, methodologies, understanding, and even perception(s). Since the early 19th Century, the "concept of economics" has transformed and changed. This process has been advancing on controversial studies based on concrete facts and phenomena in human life (especially inflation, unemployment, growth, wealth, poverty, development, etc.). But just like the methodologies and understanding of the facts, thoughts, and focuses of economic studies, the concepts (and outcomes of these concepts) have also been transforming. Unfortunately, most economists still choose to label themselves via one of the "poles" (Orthodox or Heterodox) and become part of/this polarization. And the economy has much more profound and solid polarization than any other social sciences and natural sciences (math, statistics, physics, chemistry, etc.). Also, this polarization means more than just methodologic differentiation. It also includes biases and, most of the time, ideologic backgrounds. This fact makes "the schism" much deep, unique and vital, especially in critical periods (such as like financial crisis in 2007, Covid19 in 2019, and many others). Also, unlike other social sciences, economics is directly related to daily life (and political dilemmas).

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Oliveira, Amurabi. "Reading the world through the educational curriculum: The Social Sciences curriculum in Brazil in the context of the rise of conservatism." Bellaterra Journal of Teaching & Learning Language & Literature 14, no. 2 (July 20, 2021): e948. http://dx.doi.org/10.5565/rev/jtl3.948.

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In Brazil, the growing political polarization that culminated in the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 consolidated a shift in educational policy that had already been pointed out in previous years, as demonstrated by the Nonpartisan school movement performance. In this article, we analyze the curriculum of human and social sciences in secondary education in Brazil from the Brazilian Learning Standards, and how that document reflects the rise of these conservative movements. On the one hand, it was observed that important categories for the social sciences, such as gender, were removed, thus removing the centrality of categories such as racism and social inequalities; on the other hand, there is a strong dispute over the meanings of other concepts, such as human rights. Both actions converge to fine-tune the human and social sciences curriculum with the guidelines of conservative movements in the educational field.

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Matthews, Abigail A., Rebecca J. Kreitzer, and Emily U. Schilling. "Gendered Polarization and Abortion Policymaking in the States." Forum 18, no. 1 (September 21, 2020): 51–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/for-2020-1003.

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AbstractWidening, asymmetric polarization is evident in both the U.S. Congress and state legislatures. Recent work unveils a new dimension to this polarization story: newly elected Republican women are driving this polarization. Women are more likely to legislate on women’s issues than men, yet women’s shared interest in representing women doesn’t preclude their identity as partisans. In this article, we explore the effect of today’s political climate on state legislators’ policy representation of women’s issues. We ask what effect does gendered polarization have on women’s issues? To test this, we evaluate bill sponsorship in the states on the quintessential “women’s issue” of abortion. Our research design focuses on bill introductions and uses on an original dataset of pro- and anti-abortion rights bill introductions, which we analyze using an event count model. We find that overall polarization leads to the introduction of fewer restrictive abortion bills, but as polarization between women lawmakers grows, legislators are more likely to introduce anti-abortion rights legislation. Gender polarization has consequences on the types of bills legislators introduce and for how scholars should study polarization.

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Rawlings, Craig. "Becoming an Ideologue: Social Sorting and the Microfoundations of Polarization." Sociological Science 9 (2022): 313–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.15195/v9.a13.

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LeBas, Adrienne, and Ngonidzashe Munemo. "Elite Conflict, Compromise, and Enduring Authoritarianism: Polarization in Zimbabwe, 1980–2008." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 681, no. 1 (December 20, 2018): 209–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716218813897.

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How do elites play a role in crafting polarization? And what effects do elite-led conflicts have on democracy and mass politics? To examine these questions, we compare two separate episodes of party-based polarization in Zimbabwe, from 1980 to 1987 and from 2000 to 2008. Each of these moments of polarization ended in an elite power-sharing settlement, but a comparison of the two moments yields insights about both the causes of polarization and its effects. We find that the episodes of polarization were rooted in elite instrumentalization of conflict. They differed, however, in the extent to which they activated foundational myths and built larger master cleavages. We suggest that the latter episode conforms more closely to McCoy, Rahman, and Somer’s pernicious polarization, which we argue is marked by deeper societal penetration and segregation than other forms of political polarization and is also less amenable to resolution.

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Lelkes, Yphtach. "Affective Polarization and Ideological Sorting: A Reciprocal, Albeit Weak, Relationship." Forum 16, no. 1 (April 25, 2018): 67–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/for-2018-0005.

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Abstract American partisans are far more hostile towards out-party members than they were 40 years ago. While this phenomenon, often called affective polarization, is well-documented, political scientists disagree on its cause. One group of scholars believes that affective polarization is driven by processes related to social identity theory. In particular, cross-cutting identities have declined in America, and toxic political communication continuously primes partisan identities and resentment. Recently, several scholars have pointed to another phenomenon as the root cause of affective polarization: partisan sorting, i.e. the alignment of partisan identities with ideologically consistent issue positions. I review evidence in favor of each claim, and provide additional evidence that affective polarization has increased about as much among those who are not sorted as among those who are sorted. Furthermore, while sorting is only related to affective polarization among the most politically knowledgeable, affective polarization has increased across all levels of political knowledge. Finally, affective polarization may also increase sorting, further complicating any clear cut causal relationship.

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Salloum, Ali, Ted Hsuan Yun Chen, and Mikko Kivelä. "Separating Polarization from Noise: Comparison and Normalization of Structural Polarization Measures." Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 6, CSCW1 (March 30, 2022): 1–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3512962.

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Quantifying the amount of polarization is crucial for understanding and studying political polarization in political and social systems. Several methods are used commonly to measure polarization in social networks by purely inspecting their structure. We analyse eight of such methods and show that all of them yield high polarization scores even for random networks with similar density and degree distributions to typical real-world networks. Further, some of the methods are sensitive to degree distributions and relative sizes of the polarized groups. We propose normalization to the existing scores and a minimal set of tests that a score should pass in order for it to be suitable for separating polarized networks from random noise. The performance of the scores increased by 38%-220% after normalization in a classification task of 203 networks. Further, we find that the choice of method is not as important as normalization, after which most of the methods have better performance than the best-performing method before normalization. This work opens up the possibility to critically assess and compare the features and performance of different methods for measuring structural polarization.

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Yuan, Yaqi, Kristen Schultz Lee, and Yunmei Lu. "Public Support for Government Intervention in Health Care in the United States from 1984 to 2016." Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 8 (January 2022): 237802312110723. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/23780231211072394.

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Research on public opinion regarding government’s role in health care has paid little attention to how public opinion has changed among different age groups over time and to how the intersection of age, birth year, political affiliation, and historical time shape public opinion. In this article, the authors ask, Who supports governmental spending on health care, and how has this changed over time? The authors propose a life-course perspective to study political polarization in the health care domain using General Social Survey 1984 to 2016 data. The results indicate that the growing political polarization in support for government intervention in health care across the 32 years studied occurred among middle-aged adults. The findings of this study contribute new understandings of how age and party membership interact in contributing to political polarization regarding government’s role in health care over time.

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Cozzi, Guido, and Giammario Impullitti. "Globalization and Wage Polarization." Review of Economics and Statistics 98, no. 5 (December 2016): 984–1000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00551.

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Somer, Murat, and Jennifer McCoy. "Transformations through Polarizations and Global Threats to Democracy." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 681, no. 1 (December 20, 2018): 8–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716218818058.

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This volume collects and analyzes eleven country case studies of polarized polities that are, or had been, electoral democracies, identifying the common and differing causal mechanisms that lead to different outcomes for democracy when a society experiences polarization. In this introduction, we discuss our goals for the volume, the comparative logic we apply to the cases, our overall methodological approach, and the concepts that ground the analyses. The goal of this volume is to explore pernicious polarization, i.e., when and how a society divides into mutually distrustful “us vs. them” blocs, which endangers democracy. Accordingly, we discuss the effects of such polarization on democracies, and start building a foundation for remedies. In this introductory article, we highlight and explain the inherently political and relational aspects of polarization in general and pernicious polarization in particular, present the concept of formative rifts, and discuss how opposition strategies should be part of an explanation of severe polarization.

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Lauka, Alban, Jennifer McCoy, and Rengin B. Firat. "Mass Partisan Polarization: Measuring a Relational Concept." American Behavioral Scientist 62, no. 1 (January 2018): 107–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002764218759581.

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With recent political developments sparking sharp divisions within democracies, an understanding of the dynamics of polarization is ever more necessary. Yet we still lack the tools necessary for its comparative study at the mass level. Finding that conventional measures of polarization as ideological distance between parties or among voters do not fully capture political polarization, we develop a new index of mass partisan polarization based on support and rejection of political parties by the public. We argue that measuring polarization over political parties allows us to capture divisions over a broader range of identities or issues which parties can represent or take positions on. Using Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data, our empirical validity tests support this argument. It is our hope that this index may facilitate the further comparative study of mass political polarization on a global scale.

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Indra, Indra, Suahasil Nazara, Djoni Hartono, and Sudarno Sumarto. "Expenditure inequality and polarization in Indonesia, 2002-2012." International Journal of Social Economics 45, no. 10 (October 8, 2018): 1469–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijse-02-2017-0051.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationships between expenditure inequality and expenditure polarization in Indonesia during the post-reformation era in 2002–2012. It also explores the various dimensions of regional groups; and finds out in which dimension did the expenditure inequality and polarization occur in Indonesia during the period. Design/methodology/approach Gini index was employed to measure expenditure inequality and a number of developed polarization measurement was applied to investigate the linkage between inequality and polarization at national levels. It also applied a polarization index based on inequality decomposition to investigate how the polarization occurs in the regional dimension. It covered several groups of regional dimensions; those are rural and urban areas; eastern and western regions, as well as natural resource-rich provinces and non-natural resource-rich provinces. Findings This study found that expenditure inequality and polarization in Indonesia have moved in line, showing an increasing trend during the observation period. In the regional context, the greatest rise was in the region with low initial levels of expenditure inequality and polarization. The trends in each of the regional dimension showed a convergent pattern. It also showed that a significant portion of total polarization was attributed to expenditure differences between urban and rural areas rather than the other groups of regions. Research limitations/implications The similar upward movement of expenditure inequality and polarization indicates that not only the differences between groups of expenditure are getting larger, but also the identification of the within groups expenditure are getting stronger. Since the high degree of inequality and polarization are closely related to conflict among groups of communities, this finding is a strong message to the policymaker that the development process in Indonesia during 2002–2012 tended to encourage the creation of social instability. Practical implications This study provides an evaluation for further development of social economy in Indonesia. Originality/value This paper attempts to give an overview of the relationship between expenditure inequality and polarization in Indonesia during 2002–2012. It also tries to reveal in which regional dimension, expenditure inequality and polarization occurred in Indonesia during the mentioned period. The issues have not been examined in previous empirical studies in Indonesia.

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Hubert, Wit, and Aleksandra Wagner. "Does “Social” Mean “Public”?" Nature and Culture 18, no. 1 (March 1, 2023): 65–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/nc.2023.180104.

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Abstract The article presents an analysis of the use of Facebook on the over 400-day-long anti-fracking protest by farmers in the village of Żurawlów in Poland against the global corporation Chevron. Analysis of this case study was used to discuss the deliberative potential of social media and their power in countering hegemonic discourse and providing visibility in the public sphere to actors and arguments marginalized or excluded by the traditional media. The results discuss Facebook's potential for mobilizing and providing identity while emphasizing the problem of visibility in the public sphere, which was key to the inclusion of discourse in public debate. Harnessing emotions and legitimizing minority interests helped create counter-power, while polarization and “homophile acts” against deliberation geared toward arriving at an agreement.

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Valdivia, Pablo, Lars Rensmann, Florian Lippert, Alberto Godioli, and Vera Alexander. "Introduction: European Crises." Journal of European Studies 49, no. 3-4 (August 16, 2019): 211–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047244119859171.

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This introduction addresses the increased levels of social, political and ideological polarization and the socio-political conflicts in contemporary Europe that are often subsumed under notions of ‘crisis’. We argue that the humanities and social sciences must react to these scenarios in at least two ways: by critically reflecting on the European project, and by analysing key elements of current ‘crisis’ discourses, such as post-factual narratives of ‘decline’, ‘survival’ and ‘emergency’, and populist fictions of homogeneous, ‘tribal’ cultural domains.

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Williams, Colin C., and Jan Windebank. "Social Polarization of Households in Contemporary Britain: A ‘Whole Economy’ Perspective." Regional Studies 29, no. 8 (April 14, 1995): 723–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00343409512331349323.

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Nikulin, A. M. "Peripherization of the old-developed Russian regions." RUDN Journal of Sociology 22, no. 2 (June 30, 2022): 439–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-2272-2022-22-2-439-450.

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The article is a review of the book Old-Developed Regions in the Sociogeographic Space of Russia: History and Contemporaneity prepared by a team of authors under the scientific editorship of T.G. Nefedova and A.V. Starikov (Moscow: Association of Scientific Publications KMK, 2021. 379 p.). The book is the result of the long-term research project “Development of the old-developed areas under the social-economic polarization and shrinkage of the developed space in European Russia” supported by the Russian Science Foundation in 2019-2021. The authors of the book note that it is time to abandon unrealistic declarations about the further development of all regions of the country, and to start rethinking the significance of the old-developed Russian regions and the possibilities of their re-development on the basis of their accumulated cultural heritage and human capital. The research focuses on two macro-regions of the Russian Federation - Central Russia and the Urals. The study is multiscale and interdisciplinary, it combines a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods of social sciences. Despite the statement that there is a further polarization and shrinkage of the developed Russian spaces, the authors find many confirmations of the possibilities of self-organization and sustainable development in the old-developed regions for the benefit of the whole country.

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Kahan, Dan M., Hank Jenkins-Smith, Tor Tarantola, Carol L. Silva, and Donald Braman. "Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 658, no. 1 (February 8, 2015): 192–222. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716214559002.

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The cultural cognition thesis posits that individuals rely extensively on cultural meanings in forming perceptions of risk. The logic of the cultural cognition thesis suggests that a two-channel science communication strategy, combining information content (“Channel 1”) with cultural meanings (“Channel 2”), could promote open-minded assessment of information across diverse communities. We test this kind of communication strategy in a two-nation (United States, n = 1,500; England, n = 1,500) study, in which scientific information content on climate change was held constant while the cultural meaning of that information was experimentally manipulated. We found that cultural polarization over the validity of climate change science is offset by making citizens aware of the potential contribution of geoengineering as a supplement to restriction of CO2 emissions. We also tested the hypothesis, derived from a competing model of science communication, that exposure to information on geoengineering would lead citizens to discount climate change risks generally. Contrary to this hypothesis, we found that subjects exposed to information about geoengineering were slightly more concerned about climate change risks than those assigned to a control condition.

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Latané, Bibb, Andrzej Nowak, and James H. Liu. "Measuring emergent social phenomena: Dynamism, polarization, and clustering as order parameters of social systems." Behavioral Science 39, no. 1 (1994): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830390102.

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McCoy, Jennifer, Tahmina Rahman, and Murat Somer. "Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Patterns, Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Polities." American Behavioral Scientist 62, no. 1 (January 2018): 16–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002764218759576.

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This article argues that a common pattern and set of dynamics characterizes severe political and societal polarization in different contexts around the world, with pernicious consequences for democracy. Moving beyond the conventional conceptualization of polarization as ideological distance between political parties and candidates, we offer a conceptualization of polarization highlighting its inherently relational nature and its instrumental political use. Polarization is a process whereby the normal multiplicity of differences in a society increasingly align along a single dimension and people increasingly perceive and describe politics and society in terms of “Us” versus “Them.” The politics and discourse of opposition and the social–psychological intergroup conflict dynamics produced by this alignment are a main source of the risks polarization generates for democracy, although we recognize that it can also produce opportunities for democracy. We argue that contemporary examples of polarization follow a frequent pattern whereby polarization is activated when major groups in society mobilize politically to achieve fundamental changes in structures, institutions, and power relations. Hence, newly constructed cleavages are appearing that underlie polarization and are not easily measured with the conventional Left–Right ideological scale. We identify three possible negative outcomes for democracy—“gridlock and careening,” “democratic erosion or collapse under new elites and dominant groups,” and “democratic erosion or collapse with old elites and dominant groups,” and one possible positive outcome—“reformed democracy.” Drawing on literature in psychology and political science, the article posits a set of causal mechanisms linking polarization to harm to democracy and illustrates the common patterns and pernicious consequences for democracy in four country cases: varying warning signs of democratic erosion in Hungary and the United States, and growing authoritarianism in Turkey and Venezuela.

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Druckman, James N., Donald P. Green, and Shanto Iyengar. "Does Affective Polarization Contribute to Democratic Backsliding in America?" ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 708, no. 1 (July 2023): 137–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00027162241228952.

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A notable development in 21st-century American politics is the rise of affective polarization: partisans increasingly dislike and distrust those affiliated with the other political party. We offer a wide-ranging review of the nature of party identification; the factors that contribute to affective polarization; and the consequences of this kind of polarization on electoral politics, democratic transgressions, and democratic functioning. We conclude that there is scant evidence of a direct link between affective polarization and democratic backsliding in the U.S., and we argue that understanding the erosion of democratic norms and institutions means that we should consider a wider range of potential causal factors among elites and the general citizenry. Affective polarization has likely made democratic functioning more difficult, though, so interventions to address it are worthwhile: these should focus on core causes rather than on behavioral symptoms.

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Basile, Roberto. "Productivity Polarization across Regions in Europe." International Regional Science Review 32, no. 1 (January 2009): 92–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0160017608326944.

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Andreadis, Ioannis, and Yannis Stavrakakis. "Dynamics of Polarization in the Greek Case." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 681, no. 1 (December 20, 2018): 157–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716218817723.

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This article focuses on the dynamics of polarization emerging within Greek political culture in the postauthoritarian setting. Following a brief historical framing, we trace Left–Right polarization between the two major parties of the period: Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and New Democracy (ND). The party-based polarization of PASOK/ND was arguably the main axis of political antagonism in Greece from the 1970s until the end of the 2000s. By 2009, polarization had ebbed due to an ideological convergence of the two parties toward the center, but the onset of the 2009 economic crisis dislocated the established two-party system and facilitated the emergence of a new political landscape comprising many new political actors, most notably the Coalition of the Radical Left, SYRIZA. Using a predominantly quantitative methodology, we focus on a set of dimensions of polarization brought forward or re-activated within the context of economic crisis.

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Yang, Song, and Michael Nino. "Political Views, Race and Ethnicity, and Social Isolation: Evidence from the General Social Survey." Societies 13, no. 11 (November 4, 2023): 236. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/soc13110236.

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Using data from the General Social Survey, we investigate whether political views increase the risk of social isolation for Black and White Americans. Our findings reveal an increase in conservative political views differently shaping social isolation patterns for Black and White Americans. For instance, changes in political views from liberal to conservative are associated with reduced risk of social isolation for White Americans, whereas a rise in conservative political views is related to increases in social isolation for Black Americans. Results also demonstrate that these patterns remain after accounting for important covariates such as gender, age, education, occupation, marital status, social class, work status, and religion. We discuss the implications of our findings in the context of social relationships, race, and political polarization in the U.S.

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Iyengar, Shanto, and Masha Krupenkin. "Partisanship as Social Identity; Implications for the Study of Party Polarization." Forum 16, no. 1 (April 25, 2018): 23–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/for-2018-0003.

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Abstract Partisanship continues to divide Americans. Using data from the American National Election Study, as well as implicit attitude tests, we argue that Americans’ partisan identity has become highly salient. Partisans have become more negative towards the opposing party on both explicit and implicit measures, and these biases spill over into their everyday decisions. Partisanship has become one of Americans’ most salient social identities.

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LeBas, Adrienne. "Can Polarization Be Positive? Conflict and Institutional Development in Africa." American Behavioral Scientist 62, no. 1 (January 2018): 59–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002764218756923.

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Can political polarization, typically viewed as detrimental for political development, have positive effects on institution-building and democratization in the long run? This article argues that the overall impact of polarization on a political system is determined by two factors: the character of preexisting identity cleavages and the balance of forces between groups on either side of the political divide. Where there exists a history of formal group exclusion or differential citizenship rights, political polarization is more likely to result in large-scale violence and democratic breakdown. Where power is strongly imbalanced, on the other hand, polarization is unlikely to be sustained, and the status quo ante will be retained. When these two conditions are absent, however, a relatively high degree of polarization can have surprising institution-building effects for new democracies. The article illustrates these arguments with reference to four key cases in sub-Saharan Africa.

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Jaimovich, Nir, and Henry E. Siu. "Job Polarization and Jobless Recoveries." Review of Economics and Statistics 102, no. 1 (March 2020): 129–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00875.

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Job polarization refers to the shrinking share of employment in middle-skill, routine occupations experienced over the past 35 years. Jobless recoveries refers to the slow rebound in aggregate employment following recent recessions despite recoveries in aggregate output. We show how these two phenomena are related. First, essentially all employment loss in routine occupations occurs in economic downturns. Second, jobless recoveries in the aggregate can be accounted for by jobless recoveries in the routine occupations that are disappearing.

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Somer, Murat. "Turkey: The Slippery Slope from Reformist to Revolutionary Polarization and Democratic Breakdown." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 681, no. 1 (December 20, 2018): 42–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716218818056.

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Under the Justice and Development Party AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey has become one of the most polarized countries in the world, and has undergone a significant democratic breakdown. This article explains how polarization and democratic breakdown happened, arguing that it was based on the built-in, perverse dynamics of an “authoritarian spiral of polarizing-cum-transformative politics.” Furthermore, I identify ten causal mechanisms that have produced pernicious polarization and democratic erosion. Turkey’s transformation since 2002 is an example of the broader phenomenon of democratic erosion under new elites and dominant groups. The causes and consequences of pernicious polarization are analyzed in terms of four subperiods: 2002–2006, 2007, 2008–2013, and 2014–present. In the end, what began as a potentially reformist politics of polarization-cum-transformation morphed into an autocratic-revolutionary one. During this process, polarization and AKP policies; the politicization of formative rifts that had been a divisive undercurrent since nation-state formation; structural transformations; and the opposition’s organizational, programmatic, and personal shortcomings fed and reinforced each other.

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MERKLEJN, Iwona, and Jan WIŚLICKI. "Hate Speech and the Polarization of Japanese National Newspapers." Social Science Japan Journal 23, no. 2 (2020): 259–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ssjj/jyaa015.

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Abstract In 2016, the first anti-hate speech law in Japan was introduced against the backdrop of verbal attacks on ethnic Koreans who were targeted with particular force by radical right organizations in the early 21st century. We argue that while the role of social media in the proliferation of hate speech in Japan has received considerable attention, the coverage of hate speech and related issues in mainstream news media has not been sufficiently studied. This article offers an interdisciplinary analysis, grounded in media studies and in linguistics, of the positions of five national newspapers in public discourse about hate speech, discussed as a current issue in Japan from 2016 until mid-2018. We combine agenda-setting theory with discourse analysis of factual reporting in order to evaluate the Japanese media landscape, which, when scrutinized through the lens of the hate speech issue, reveals ideological polarization.

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Wilkins-Laflamme, S. "Toward Religious Polarization? Time Effects on Religious Commitment in U.S., UK, and Canadian Regions." Sociology of Religion 75, no. 2 (March 5, 2014): 284–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/socrel/sru001.

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Crankshaw, Owen. "Social polarization in global cities: measuring changes in earnings and occupational inequality." Regional Studies 51, no. 11 (October 6, 2016): 1612–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2016.1222072.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Polarization (Social sciences)'

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