Journal articles on the topic 'Pleasure'
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1
Jaulin, Annick. "Aristote : le plaisir des differences." Chôra 17 (2019): 127–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/chora2019178.
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Given the necessary connection between pleasure and energeia, the value of an aristotelian pleasure depends on the value of its correlative activity. Since the absolute pleasures the philokalos takes in his virtuous activities might go hand in hand with pains, the definition of absolute pleasure cannot rely on the distinction between mixed pleasure (pleasure with pain) versus pure pleasure (pleasure without pain). So, how can we characterize the pleasures of the temperate man (sophron) ? My thesis is that the right way to define the pleasures of the temperate man is to describe them as pleasures derived from differences. A pleasure derived from differences is involved in the pleasure human beings get from the formal use of their senses. It then belongs to the kind of pleasure they take in knowing. This formal use of the senses helps understanding how the pleasures of the temperate man can be separated from the pleasures enjoyed by children and animals.
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Adamson, Peter. "MISKAWAYH ON PLEASURE." Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 25, no. 2 (July 31, 2015): 199–223. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957423915000028.
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AbstractThis paper provides an analysis and translation of a previously edited, but otherwise unstudied work by Miskawayh (d. 1030) entitled On Pleasures and Pains (Fī al-Laḏḏāt wa-al-ālām). After a brief orientation regarding the Aristotelian account of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics, which is Miskawayh's main source, the theory of pleasure set out in On Pleasures and Pains is compared to the discussion of pleasure in Miskawayh's better known Refinement of Character (Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq). Despite considerable harmony between the two texts, their treatments of pleasure differ in that the Refinement accepts, whereas On Pleasures and Pains rejects, the “restoration” theory of pleasure of Plato's Timaeus.
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Hunter, J. F. M. "Pleasure." Dialogue 26, no. 3 (1987): 491–500. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300047302.
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What is pleasure? Don't we all know? How could so many of us pursue it so eagerly otherwise? Or how could we so readily and confidently say whether this, that and the other are pleasures? Having one's back rubbed, dancing, listening to a Bach flute sonata and eating a cheese soufflé are pleasures, while having a cold, smelling rotten eggs and reading Hegel are not. We may not be able to define pleasure, but if we can readily say what is a pleasure and what is not, must we not know what it is, just as we know what a chair is if we can correctly identify chairs, distinguishing them from stools, benches and couches?
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Newark, Daniel A. "Desire and pleasure in choice." Rationality and Society 32, no. 2 (May 2020): 168–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463120921254.
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This article considers how desire leads to pleasure through choice. A typical assumption of rational choice models is that decision makers experience pleasure or utility primarily when their desires are satisfied by decision outcomes. This article proposes that, in addition to desire yielding pleasure through its satisfaction, desiring can also yield pleasure directly during choice. Beyond the pleasures of getting what we want, there may be pleasures in the wanting. In particular, four psychological and behavioral mechanisms through which desire can yield pleasure during choosing are identified: imagining the desired object, learning about the desired object, constructing one’s self while clarifying the desired object, and pursuing the desired object. This said, although desire may, through these mechanisms, offer considerable immediate pleasure, this article posits that indulging these pleasures tends to foster subsequent disappointment with decision outcomes. The article concludes by considering the implications for decision making of this expanded view of desire’s relationship to pleasure in choice.
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Classen, Albrecht. "Pleasure in the Middle Ages, ed. Naama Cohen-Hanegbi and Piroska Nagy. International Medieval Research, 24. Turnhout: Brepols, 2018, xxiii, 383 pp., 10 b/w ill." Mediaevistik 31, no. 1 (January 1, 2018): 309–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.3726/med012018_309.
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The term ‘pleasure’ has many different meanings, and can be understood both in physical, emotional terms and in religious, or philosophical contexts. Pleasure pertains both to the body and to the spirit, so it turns out to be a very malleable concept which cannot be easily examined in a cultural-historical framework. The contributors to the present volume, however, who originally presented their studies orally at the 2013 International Medieval Congress at Leeds, pursue, as the two editors formulate it themselves, very diverse approaches, depending on their individual research discipline. However, pleasure is regularly associated with emotions, whether from a historical, theological, philosophical, art-historical (only one study), or literary (practically left out) perspective. Of course, this opens another Pandora’s box since ‘emotions’ represent a vast range of aspects in human life that are commonly not easy to identify or to determine in a critical fashion. Cohen-Hanegbi (Tel Aviv University) and Nagy (Université du Quebec à Montréal) offer the approximate definition of pleasure as being “an affect sustained by the interaction between physical and sensory knowledge, between cultural and social mores, and between religious thought and ethics” (xix). It might be difficult to grasp what they really mean by this, especially because they consider such features as “pleasured bodies, didactic pleasures, and pleasure in God” (ibid.), which again leaves us groping for straws. However, we are assured at the end of the introduction that all contributors, despite vast differences in their methodologies and materials, “attempt to define and analyze pleasures, joys, enjoyments, and delights through the language and mindset of the source material” (xxii).
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Renaut, Olivier. "Le plaisir dans la cite platonicienne." Chôra 17 (2019): 17–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/chora2019173.
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This article aims at showing that the definition of pleasure in Plato’s dialogues cannot be separated from a political educational program and an anthropology that consider pleasure as the main vehicle towards virtue. The political use of pleasure is as important as its definition, insofar as its manifestation and content are the prerogatives of the legislator. All pleasures are politically meaningful in the Republic and in the Laws, and among them especially the triad hunger, thirst and sex ; in making pleasures a “public” issue, as pleasures are object of surveillance and political control, Plato gives several means in order to shape the way pleasures are felt in the city, and in order to make the community of pleasure and pain a fundamental role in unifying the city under the reason’s commands.
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Carone, Gabriela Roxana. "Hedonism and the Pleasureless Life in Plato's Philebus." Phronesis 45, no. 4 (2000): 257–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852800510225.
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AbstractThis paper re-evaluates the role that Plato confers to pleasure in the Philebus. According to leading interpretations, Plato there downplays the role of pleasure, or indeed rejects hedonism altogether. Thus, scholars such as D. Frede have taken the "mixed life" of pleasure and intelligence initially submitted in the Philebus to be conceded by Socrates only as a remedial good, second to a life of neutral condition, where one would experience no pleasure and pain. Even more strongly, scholars such as Irwin have seen the Philebus' arguments against false pleasures as an actual attack on hedonism, showing in Irwin's words "why maximization of pleasure cannot be a reasonable policy for the best life." Against these claims, I argue that the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is presented in the Philebus as a rst best and not just as a second best for humans, and that, accordingly, Socrates proposes to incorporate rather than reject pleasure as one of the intrinsically desirable aspects of the happy life. Thus, I offer alternative readings of controversial passages that have given rise to the prevalent interpretation criticized here, and advance positive evidence that at least some pleasures are seen by Plato as inherently good. In addition, I demonstrate that Plato's arguments against false pleasures do not by themselves constitute an attack on hedonism. Rather, they can be seen as a strategy to show the hedonist that, in order to be a maximal, or even a consistent, hedonist, he should go for true, and not fake pleasures, if after all pleasure is the object of his pursuit. But, since this cannot be achieved without intelligence, then the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is to be accepted even by hedonist themselves.
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Alwood, Andrew H. "How Pleasures Make Life Better." KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy 31, no. 1 (January 1, 2017): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/krt-2017-310102.
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Abstract In this paper, I argue that Phenomenalists about pleasure can concede a key claim, Heterogeneity, commonly used to object to their theory. They also can then vindicate the aspirations of J. S. Mill's doctrine of higher pleasures, while grounding their value claims in a naturalistic metaethics. But once Phenomenalists concede Heterogeneity they can no longer consistently endorse Hedonism as the correct theory of wellbeing, since they implicitly commit to recognizing distinct kinds of pleasure that are independently good-making. I also explore further issues that arise for a Pluralist theory of pleasure: How could there be distinct kinds of pleasure? How can pleasures be measured? Is it possible for some pleasures to be superior in kind to others? What unifies the category of pleasant experiences? Is the value of pleasant experiences natural or non-natural?
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Cooke, Brandon. "‘Guilty’ pleasures are often worthwhile pleasures." Journal of Scandinavian Cinema 9, no. 1 (March 1, 2019): 105–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/jsca.9.1.105_1.
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A guilty pleasure is something that affords pleasure while being held in low regard. Since there are more opportunities to experience worthwhile pleasures than one can experience in a finite life, it would be better to avoid guilty pleasures. Worse still, many guilty pleasures are thought to be corrupting in some way. In fact, many so-called guilty pleasures can contribute to a good life, because they are sources of pleasure and because they do not actually merit guilt. Taking pornography as a case study, I argue that in the absence of compelling evidence for its harmfulness, pornography can contribute to well-being by promoting autonomy, social recognition, knowledge and flourishing personal relationships. The case of pornography demonstrates an argumentative strategy for defending many so-called guilty pleasures as worthwhile elements of a flourishing life.
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HEATHWOOD, CHRIS. "Unconscious Pleasures and Attitudinal Theories of Pleasure." Utilitas 30, no. 2 (August 11, 2017): 219–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820817000188.
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This article responds to a new objection, due to Ben Bramble, against attitudinal theories of sensory pleasure and pain: the objection from unconscious pleasures and pains. According to the objection, attitudinal theories are unable to accommodate the fact that sometimes we experience pleasures and pains of which we are, at the time, unaware. In response, I distinguish two kinds of unawareness and argue that the subjects in the examples that support the objection are unaware of their sensations in only a weak sense, and this weak sort of unawareness of a sensation does not preclude its being an object of one's attitudes.
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Parry, Richard D. "Deceptive Pleasures in Republic ix." Ancient Philosophy 43, no. 2 (2023): 379–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343222.
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In Republic ix, Socrates begins his argument that deceptive pleasure causes insatiable desire by citing the error that cessation of pain is the greatest pleasure. Some interpret this error as an illusion, experiencing pleasure when there is no pleasure; but illusion cannot explain insatiable desire. Our interpretation explains insatiable desire—and Socrates’ restatement of wisdom and justice to include pleasures, which links the knowledge of unchanging reality with these virtues.
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Liebersohn, Yosef Z. "Epicurus’ Varietas and ἡ κινητικὴ ἡδονή." Mnemosyne 71, no. 5 (September 13, 2018): 777–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568525x-12342428.
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AbstractAccording to Epicurus’ view which locates the summit of pleasure in the absence of all pain, once pain has been removed pleasure cannot be increased, but it can be embellished. This article has two main aims. Firstly I shall deal with this embellishment, namely the pleasure beyond the absence of pain (thevarietas), and discuss its exact place within the Epicurean theory of pleasures; I argue thatvarietaspertains only to pleasures concerning the body. Secondly, and on the basis of my findings concerning the Epicureanvarietas, I shall offer a redefinition of the concept of kinetic pleasures and argue that the pair natural-unnatural is the axis by which the kinetic pleasures are to be divided into pleasures concerning the body and pleasures concerning the soul respectively. I shall end by referring to a well disputed question concerning the Epicurean way of living, namely the question: “was Epicurus an ascetic?”.
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Fletcher, Emily. "Plato on Incorrect and Deceptive Pleasures." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 100, no. 4 (November 28, 2018): 379–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/agph-2018-4001.
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Abstract In the Philebus, Socrates argues that pleasure, like judgment, can be “false” (pseudēs). Most scholars who discuss this claim restrict their interpretation to Socrates’ first argument that pleasure can be “false”, where Socrates uses pseudēs as a synonym of “incorrect” (ouk orthēs) (37a–40e). As a result, scholars have failed to recognize that in the next argument (41a–42c) Socrates uses pseudēs to pick out a different problem with pleasure: in certain circumstances, a pleasure can deceptively appear to a subject to be larger or smaller than it really is. As Socrates explicitly distinguishes between these two problems with pleasure, he is guilty of neither confusion nor intentional equivocation in his application of the predicate pseudēs. The distinction also resolves many longstanding interpretive puzzles, including the relationship between mixed and “false” pleasures and why Socrates describes the pleasures of sight, hearing, smell and learning as both pure and “true” (alētheis).
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Pringle, Richard. "Defamiliarizing Heavy-Contact Sports: A Critical Examination of Rugby, Discipline, and Pleasure." Sociology of Sport Journal 26, no. 2 (June 2009): 211–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1123/ssj.26.2.211.
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Pleasure can be regarded as a productive force in the constitution of the social significance of sport and desiring sport subjects. The organization and use of sport pleasure has been a relatively marginalized topic of examination. To promote and examine sport pleasure, I conducted semistructured interviews with seven passionate rugby players. Transcripts were analyzed via Foucauldian theorizing and revealed the intertwined workings of technologies of dominance and self in the constitution of rugby pleasures. As a strategy to defamiliarize and disrupt habitual and uncritical acceptance of rugby aggression, I argued that rugby pleasures were akin to sadomasochism. Rugby can be understood as a taboo-breaking game associated with transparent relations of power connected with the pleasure induced from physical domination and the fear of pain.
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Brielmann, Aenne A., and Denis G. Pelli. "Tracking two pleasures." Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 27, no. 2 (January 2, 2020): 330–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-019-01695-6.
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AbstractCan people track several pleasures? In everyday life, pleasing stimuli rarely appear in isolation. Yet, experiments on aesthetic pleasure usually present only one image at a time. Here, we ask whether people can reliably report the pleasure of either of two images seen in a single glimpse. Participants (N = 13 in the original; +25 in the preregistered replication) viewed 36 Open Affective Standardized Image Set (OASIS) images that span the entire range of pleasure and beauty. On each trial, the observer saw two images, side by side, for 200 ms. An arrow cue pointed, randomly, left, right, or bidirectionally. Left or right indicated which image (the target) to rate while ignoring the other (the distractor); bidirectional requested rating the combined pleasure of both images. In half the blocks, the cue came before the images (precuing). Otherwise, it came after (postcuing). Precuing allowed the observer to ignore the distractor, while postcuing demanded tracking both images. Finally, we obtained single-pleasure ratings for each image shown alone. Our replication confirms the original study. People have unbiased access to their felt pleasure from each image and the average of both. Furthermore, the variance of the observer’s report is similar whether reporting the pleasure of one image or the average pleasure of two. The undiminished variance for reports of the average pleasure of two images indicates either that the underlying pleasure variances are highly correlated, or, more likely, that the variance arises in the common reporting process. In brief, observers can faithfully track at least two visual pleasures.
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Fletcher, Emily. "Plato on Pure Pleasure and the Best Life." Phronesis 59, no. 2 (March 4, 2014): 113–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341263.
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Abstract In the Philebus, Socrates maintains two theses about the relationship between pleasure and the good life: (1) the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is better than the unmixed life of intelligence, and: (2) the unmixed life of intelligence is the most divine. Taken together, these two claims lead to the paradoxical conclusion that the best human life is better than the life of a god. A popular strategy for avoiding this conclusion is to distinguish human from divine goods; on such a reading, pleasure has merely instrumental value, and it benefits human beings only as a result of their imperfect nature. I argue that certain ‘pure’ pleasures are full-fledged, intrinsic goods in the Philebus, which are even worthy of the gods (thus Socrates ultimately rejects thesis 2). This positive evaluation of pure pleasure results from a detailed examination of pleasure, which reveals that different types of pleasures have fundamentally different natures.
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Chao, Li-Wei, Helena Szrek, Rui Leite, Karl Peltzer, and Shandir Ramlagan. "Risks deter but pleasures allure: Is pleasure more important?" Judgment and Decision Making 10, no. 3 (May 2015): 204–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500004617.
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AbstractThe pursuit of unhealthy behaviors, such as smoking or binge drinking, not only carries various downside risks, but also provides pleasure. A parsimonious model, used in the literature to explain the decision to pursue an unhealthy activity, represents that decision as a tradeoff between risks and benefits. We build on this literature by surveying a rural population in South Africa to elicit the perceived riskiness and the perceived pleasure for various risky activities and to examine how these perceptions relate to the pursuit of four specific unhealthy behaviors: frequent smoking, problem drinking, seatbelt nonuse, and risky sex. We show that perceived pleasure is a significant predictor for three of the behaviors and that perceived riskiness is a significant predictor for two of them. We also show that the correlation between the riskiness rating and behavior is significantly different from the correlation between the pleasure rating and behavior for three of the four behaviors. Finally, we show that the effect of pleasure is significantly greater than the effect of riskiness in determining drinking and risky sex, while the effects of pleasure and riskiness are not different from each other in determining smoking and seatbelt nonuse. We discuss how our findings can be used to inform the design of health promotion strategies.
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O'Keefe, Tim. "The Cyrenaics on Pleasure, Happiness, and Future-Concern." Phronesis 47, no. 4 (2002): 395–416. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852802321016550.
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AbstractThe Cyrenaics assert that (1) particular pleasure is the highest good, and happiness is valued not for its own sake, but only for the sake of the particular pleasures that compose it; (2) we should not forego present pleasures for the sake of obtaining greater pleasure in the future. Their anti-eudaimonism and lack of future-concern do not follow from their hedonism. So why do they assert (1) and (2)? After reviewing and criticizing the proposals put forward by Annas, Irwin and Tsouna, I offer two possible reconstructions. In the first reconstruction, I explain claim (1) as follows: happiness has no value above and beyond the value of the particular pleasures that compose it. Also, there is no "structure" to happiness. The Cyrenaics are targeting the thesis that happiness involves having the activities of one's life forming an organized whole, the value of which cannot be reduced to the value of the experiences within that life. I explain claim (2) as follows: a maximally pleasant life is valuable, but the best way to achieve it is to concentrate heedlessly on the present. In the second reconstruction, the good is radically relativized to one's present preferences. The Cyrenaics assert that we desire some particular pleasure, e.g., the pleasure that results from having this drink now. Thus, our telos - which is based upon our desires - is this particular pleasure, not (generic) 'pleasure' or the maximization of pleasure over our lifetime. As our desires change, so does our telos. I conclude that the scanty texts we have do not allow us to decide conclusively between these reconstructions, but I give some reasons to support the second over the first.
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Deslauriers, Marguerite. "Le plaisir et le temps dans le livre X de l’Éthique a Nicomaque." Chôra 17 (2019): 105–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/chora2019177.
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Aristotle begins the discussion of pleasure in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics with the claim that pleasure “is thought to be most properly connected with our kind,” (EN X 1, 1172a19‑23). In his positive account of pleasure in X 4, he suggests that we can somehow experience pleasure otherwise than “in time” (1174b2‑10). The aim of this article is to show how the claim that pleasure does not occur ‘in time’ might illuminate the claim that pleasure is most properly connected to our kind. The point, I will argue, is not only that pleasure is complete at every moment – that will be true of many activities – but also that pleasure has the same structure as the best activity available to us, and a structure different from the best activity available to other kinds. Several passages indicate that Aristotle believes that all living things act for the sake of immortality, understood as divine and eternal life, and connect the pursuit of eternal life with the activities that are natural to a species. These offer us a way to understand why the pleasure of contemplation is the best pleasure, and why pleasure is most intimately connected with our kind. I begin in section (ii) with an exploration of the pleasures proper to different activities which are in turn proper to different kinds. In subsequent sections (iii) I take a closer look at contemplation, particularly insofar as it is an activity that does not take place ‘in time’ but rather ‘in a moment’, and consider Aristotle’s reasons for describing such activities as wholes, or indivisible, or without parts ; and (iv) I turn to the relation between the activities and pleasures proper to different kinds and the possibilities available to those different kinds for approximating divine life. In the final section (v) I return to question of pleasure and its intimate connection with our kind.
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Hargons, Candice N., Della V. Mosley, Carolyn Meiller, Jennifer Stuck, Brett Kirkpatrick, Caroline Adams, and Blanka Angyal. "“It Feels So Good”: Pleasure in Last Sexual Encounter Narratives of Black University Students." Journal of Black Psychology 44, no. 2 (January 4, 2018): 103–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095798417749400.
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A sex-positive lens is needed to investigate Black sexuality, which is often depicted through deficit and risk models. Extant sex research leaves an opportunity to understand Black experiences of sexual pleasure untapped. Using narrative inquiry coupled with constructivist grounded theory methods, we examined 18 Black university students’ last sexual encounter narratives. An explication of their disclosure about and meaning making around pleasure is presented. Themes included the following: monitoring mutual pleasure, relegating pleasure to men’s performance, and positioning pleasured possibilities as hope or expectation. Research implications for Black psychology are addressed.
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Wolfsdorf, David. "PLEASURE AND TRUTH INREPUBLIC9." Classical Quarterly 63, no. 1 (April 24, 2013): 110–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838812000882.
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AtRepublic9, 583b1–587a2, Socrates argues that the pleasure of the philosophical life is the truest pleasure. I will call this the ‘true pleasure argument’. The true pleasure argument is divisible into two parts: 583b1–585a7 and 585a8–587a2. Each part contains a sub-argument, which I will call ‘the misperception argument’ and ‘the true filling argument’ respectively. In the misperception argument Socrates argues that it is characteristic of irrational men to misperceive as pleasant what in fact is a condition of neither having pleasure nor being pained. In the true filling argument Socrates argues that in so far as pleasure entails somatic or psychic filling and there are more and less true fillings, there are more and less true pleasures. Philosophical filling is the truest filling and thus the truest pleasure. The misperception argument critically contributes to the true pleasure argument by clarifying what pleasure is not: merely an appearance (φαινόμενον) or merely the absence of pain. The misperception argument thereby clears the ground for the constructive contribution of the true filling argument.
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Worth, Sarah, and Ben Davids. "Epicurus, Pleasure, and the Twenty-First-Century Diet." Journal of Aesthetic Education 55, no. 3 (October 1, 2021): 59–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/jaesteduc.55.3.0059.
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Abstract In this paper, we address the question of the ways in which pleasure, as associated specifically with eating food, can help us understand the philosophical complexities of pleasure and how it can be neither purely physical nor purely intellectual. Philosophers have argued for centuries that intellectual pleasure is superior to physical pleasure, but here we make it clear that they are inextricably linked and interdependent on one another. We appeal to Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine, but rely heavily on the ideals of Epicurus for an understanding of the relationship between moderation and pleasure. In the end, we argue for a balanced approach to eating that can serve as a model for both physical, sexual, and intellectual pleasures.
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Holberg, Erica A. "Can we Modify our Pleasures? A New Look at Kant on Pleasure in the Agreeable." Kantian Review 25, no. 3 (August 12, 2020): 365–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415420000205.
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AbstractMany of us are all too familiar with the experience of taking pleasure in things we feel we ought not, and of finding it frustratingly hard to bring our pleasures into line with our moral judgements. As a value dualist, Kant draws a sharp contrast between the two sources of practical motivation: pleasure in the agreeable and respect for the moral law. His ethics might thus seem to be an unpromising source for help in thinking about how we can bring our agreeable pleasures into line with our moral values. But I argue that a careful reading of Kant’s texts reveals a helpfully realistic view about the extent to which we can modify our agreeable pleasures. On my interpretation, Kant shows us how to hold together two seemingly incompatible ideas: on the one hand, that pleasure in the agreeable is resistant to rational direction, and on the other hand, that we can cultivate these pleasures with a view to ethical self-transformation.
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FELDMAN, FRED. "Unconscious Pleasures and Pains: A Problem for Attitudinal Theories?" Utilitas 30, no. 4 (April 2, 2018): 472–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820818000109.
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Ben Bramble, Dan Haybron and others have endorsed the idea that there are unconscious, or unfelt, pleasures and pains. These would be sensory experiences that are genuine pleasures or pains, but experiences of which the subject is unaware. The idea that there are such things is worthy of attention in its own right; but I am interested in this alleged phenomenon for a further reason. I am attracted to an attitudinal theory of sensory pleasure and pain. Bramble has claimed that the existence of unconscious pleasures and pains reveals that attitudinal theories cannot be true. Chris Heathwood has offered a reply on behalf of attitudinalism. I think a better reply can be provided. In this article I explain why an attitudinal theory of pleasure and pain is consistent with whatever is plausible in the ‘unconscious pleasure and pain’ phenomenon.
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Doran, Ryan Paul. "Restorative Aesthetic Pleasures and the Restoration of Pleasure." Australasian Philosophical Review 1, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 73–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1296399.
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Adnyana, Putu Eka Sura. "Empirisme Penggunaan Tumbuhan pada Pengobatan Tradisional Bali: Lontar Taru Pramana dalam Konstruksi Filsafat Ilmu." Sanjiwani: Jurnal Filsafat 12, no. 1 (March 31, 2021): 64. http://dx.doi.org/10.25078/sjf.v12i1.2059.
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<p><em>Man is never separated from the desires in the fulfillment of his life. The development of life also affects the form of human desire. The influence of materialism is sometimes human hedonism which is sometimes incompatible with Hindu ethics. But Epicurean Hedonism has a different view to hedonism in general. This paper aims to describe Epikuros's thoughts related to Hedonism. The pleasure-oriented attitude of hedonism is different from Epikuros hedonism that not only seeks material pleasure but also seeks spiritual pleasure. Spiritual pleasure can make man calm and wise, such situations are commonly called anarakxia. The hedonism taught by Epikuros aligns with the teachings on Hindu ethics that not only pursue earthly pleasures but are led to try to control themselves from earthly pleasures in order to achieve the happiness of life. The benefits of this paper can contribute to the understanding of the intersection between Epicurean thought and Hindu ethical views.</em></p>
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Jorgenson, Cameron H. J. "The pleasures of food and the good life." Review & Expositor 117, no. 4 (November 2020): 483–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0034637320974785.
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Contrary to the claims of some critics, the Christian tradition is not opposed to bodily pleasure. In fact, approached rightly, the pleasures of good food and drink can be occasions of divine encounter. Despite outlying examples of extreme asceticism, Christianity holds two truths in tension: pleasure is rooted in the goodness of God and God’s creative work, and yet, due to human “disordered loves,” pleasure can be powerfully corrosive to virtue. This article explores the tension by sketching the history of caution toward the pleasures of the palate by way of select philosophers and theologians (Pythagoras and Plato, the Desert Fathers and Mothers, Thomas Aquinas, and contemporary figures such as C. S. Lewis and Norman Wirzba). Drawing on the theology of the icon and Aquinas’s distinction between joy and delight, this article also offers a constructive case that affirms the goodness of pleasure and its positive role in spiritual formation such that even humble onions and coffee mugs can serve as implements of worship.
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Vilar, Mariano A. "Pleasure and Variety in Thomas More’s Utopia." Moreana 53 (Number 203-, no. 1-2 (June 2016): 147–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/more.2016.53.1-2.7.
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The goal of this article is to provide a better understanding of the organization of pleasure (voluptas) in the moral philosophy and in the social practices of the inhabitants of Utopia, the fictional island created by Thomas More. For this purpose, we will focus on the classifications of pleasure into a series of species which tend to suppress the individual nature of pleasure and its connection to subjectivity in order to establish the traits of “natural pleasures,” which fit perfectly the social organization of the island. Our main hypothesis is that this is accomplished by breaking the connection of pleasure and “variety” (varietas), which was firmly established by many of the authors (ancient or modern) that discussed this topic. In this article, we argue that the use of the Epicurean texts circulating at the beginning of the 16th century were instrumental in the elaboration of a theory of “negative pleasures” which are used to keep the homeostasis of the society in Utopia.
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Liebersohn, Yosef Z. "Epicurus’ “Kinetic” and “Katastematic” Pleasures. A Reappraisal." Elenchos 36, no. 2 (June 1, 2015): 271–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/elen-2015-360204.
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Abstract In this paper I shall offer new definitions for what seem to be the most dominant terms in Epicurus’ theory of pleasures - “kinetic” and “katastematic”. While most of the scholarly literature treats these terms as entirely concerned with states of motion and states of stability, I shall argue that the distinction concerns whether pain is or is not removed by this or that pleasure. As the removal of pain is a necessary condition for the Epicurean goal of ataraxia and aponia, “katastematic” pleasure, having to do with the removal of pain, is the necessary pleasure pertaining both to the process of removing pain and to its result, namely the absence of pain, while “kinetic” pleasure is an unnecessary pleasure having nothing to do with the removal of pain, e.g. it starts after pain has been removed. If my analysis and interpretation prove correct, the two conventional classifications - “kinetic-katastematic” and “necessary-unnecessary” - turn out to be referring to the same phenomenon and are aspects of one classification. Moreover, this new interpretation resolves some of the main problems arising from our testimonia concerning “kinetic” and “katastematic” pleasures.
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Delcomminette, Sylvain. "False Pleasures, Appearance and Imagination in the Philebus." Phronesis 48, no. 3 (2003): 215–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852803322519226.
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AbstractThis paper examines the discussion about false pleasures in the Philebus (36 c3-44 a11). After stressing the crucial importance of this discussion in the economy of the dialogue, it attempts to identify the problematic locus of the possibility of true or false pleasures. Socrates points to it by means of an analogy between pleasure and doxa. Against traditional interpretations, which reduce the distinction drawn in this passage to a distinction between doxa and pleasure on the one hand and their object on the other, it is argued that, rather, Socrates distinguishes between the mere fact of having a doxa or a pleasure, on the one hand, and the content of these acts, on the other hand. Consequently, the possibility for a pleasure to be false does not concern its relation to an object, but the affective content which defines it. In order to show how the affective content of a pleasure can be false, it is necessary to examine the three species of false pleasures described by Socrates in their relation to appearance and imagination. Appearance is not identical with perception for Plato: it consists in a mixture of perception and doxa. As for imagination, it consists in "illustrating" a doxa present in the soul by means of a "quasi-perception". It is the presence of a doxa in each of these processes which makes it possible for them to be true or false, while mere perception cannot be either true or false. It is then argued that according to the Philebus pleasure can be false precisely because its affective content is not a mere perception, but either an appearance or an imagination.
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Kazez, Jean. "Persistent Anosmia." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 92 (2021): 108–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20219222.
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John Stuart Mill famously maintained that “animal pleasures” – like enjoying good smells and tastes – are lower quality than the pleasures tied to higher cognition, like the pleasure of enjoying an opera or understanding a mathematical proof. This downgrading is particularly common in the ethical literature about eating animals. Peter Singer, James Rachels, Gary Francione, Alastair Norcross and dozens of other ethicists make quick work of defending vegetarianism by presuming that “gustatory pleasure” is trivial. But is it?
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Shaw, J. Clerk. "Poetry and Hedonic Error in Plato’s Republic." Phronesis 61, no. 4 (September 15, 2016): 373–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341312.
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This paper reads Republic 583b-608b as a single, continuous line of argument. First, Socrates distinguishes real from apparent pleasure and argues that justice is more pleasant than injustice. Next, he describes how pleasures nourish the soul. This line of argument continues into the second discussion of poetry: tragic pleasures are mixed pleasures in the soul that seem greater than they are; indulging them nourishes appetite and corrupts the soul. The paper argues that Plato has a novel account of the ‘paradox of tragedy’, and that the Republic and Philebus contain complementary discussions of tragic and comic pleasure.
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Milhet, Maitena, Jalpa Shah, Tim Madesclaire, and Laurent Gaissad. "Chemsex experiences: narratives of pleasure." Drugs and Alcohol Today 19, no. 1 (March 4, 2019): 11–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/dat-09-2018-0043.
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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to understand the dynamics of pleasure related to chemsex from the perspective of French gay men and other men who have sex with men (MSM). Recognising that participants in chemsex are social actors, the authors diverge from the prominent “pathology paradigm” used in public health.Design/methodology/approachIn-depth interviews were conducted with gay men and other MSM engaging in chemsex via snowball sampling (n=33). The authors explored the definitions of pleasure and the role of stimulants, sexual activity, smartphones and partners in chemsex pleasures.FindingsChemsex pleasures encompass multiple dimensions that go far beyond bodily pleasures, such as love or romantic relationships, socializing with significant others and sexual discovery through disinhibition. Narratives of pleasure were also, simultaneously, stories of suffering and distress. This dissonance can pose challenges to the participants in chemsex, their entourages and care providers.Practical implicationsGiven that the focus of care for gay men and other MSM is on risk behaviors, the findings of this paper help nurture discussions where pleasure is integrated into a new, value-neutral framework of care that incorporates chemsex pleasures.Originality/valueThis study examined the perspectives of those actually participating in chemsex, allowing gay men and other MSM to relate the entirety of their experiences, in which pleasure is often at the forefront, without restriction.
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Agustin, Eva, and Wening Udasmoro. "Women and Pleasure in Guillaume Apollinaire’s Calligram Collection Poèmes à Lou." k@ta 20, no. 2 (January 3, 2019): 60–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.9744/kata.20.2.60-67.
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This article attempted to examine the connections between poetry and the constructions of women and pleasure emphasized by the author. The works examined were those of Guillaume Apollinaire, a famous French poet whose calligramatic poetry collections specifically positioned women as objects of pleasure. Most interestingly, in Apollinaire's poetry, the depiction of women as objects of pleasure through connotative symbols that could only be given significance by decoding the highly cultural meanings contained in the connotative symbols. The theory of the male gaze was used here to examine how visual pleasure had been operated by the poet. Meanwhile, semiotics had been used to decode the calligrammatic aspects of Apollinaire's poems. This research found that symbols of exoticism, reproduction, and fantastic pleasures were utilized by Apollinaire in his poetry to emphasize his dominance of women by positioning them as objects of pleasure.
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Rutsky, R. L., and Justin Wyatt. "Serious Pleasures: Cinematic Pleasure and the Notion of Fun." Cinema Journal 30, no. 1 (1990): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1224847.
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Conque, João Gabriel. "A fisiologia do prazer no livro IX da República e os seus problemas." ΠΗΓΗ/FONS 2, no. 1 (December 14, 2017): 137. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/fons.2017.3856.
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Resumo: Este artigo tem o objetivo de apontar alguns dos problemas decorrentes da concepção fisiológica do prazer apresentada por Platão no livro IX da República. Inicialmente, apresentarei como Platão lida com o tema do prazer no Górgias, destacando o papel de uma certa fisiologia nutricional em tal contexto. Em seguida, veremos que Platão lida com o tema do prazer no penúltimo livro da República de um modo mais amplo, uma vez que este diálogo fornece exemplos além da esfera nutricional. Apesar da abrangente discussão sobre o prazer na República mencionar os prazeres intelectuais, não encontramos uma acurada descrição dos mesmos nesse diálogo. Um dos obstáculos para a compreensão de tais tipos de prazeres diz respeito à controversa concepção fisiológica do prazer psíquico como um processo de preenchimento. Assim, chamaremos atenção na última seção para a frequente analogia entre corpo e alma no pensamento de Platão com o intuito de contribuir para as discussões sobre o prazer na República.Palavras-chave: Platão, prazer, Górgias, República, fisiologiaAbstract: This article intends to point out some problems arising from the physiological conception of pleasure presented by Plato in Republic Book IX. Initially, I will show how Plato addresses the theme of pleasure in the Gorgias, highlighting the role of a kind of nutritional physiology in such context. Next, we will see Plato returns to the theme of pleasure in the penultimate book of the Republic in a more comprehensive way since this dialogue provides examples beyond nutritional sphere. Although the extensive discussion on pleasure in the Republic mentions intellectual pleasures, it does not provide us an accurate description of them. One of problems for the correct under-standing of such types of pleasures concerns the controversial conception of psychic pleasures as a process of replenishment. Thus, in the last section, I will draw attention to frequent analogy body/soul in Plato’s thought in order to contribute to the discussions on pleasure in the Republic.Keywords: Plato, pleasure, Gorgias, Republic, physiology
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Nikolsky, Boris. "Epicurus On Pleasure." Phronesis 46, no. 4 (2001): 440–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852801753736490.
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AbstractThe paper deals with the question of the attribution to Epicurus of the classification of pleasures into 'kinetic' and 'static'. This classification, usually regarded as authentic, confronts us with a number of problems and contradictions. Besides, it is only mentioned in a few sources that are not the most reliable. Following Gosling and Taylor, I believe that the authenticity of the classification may be called in question. The analysis of the ancient evidence concerning Epicurus' concept of pleasure is made according to the following principle: first, I consider the sources that do not mention the distinction between 'kinetic' and 'static' pleasures, and only then do I compare them with the other group of texts which comprises reports by Cicero, Diogenes Laertius and Athenaeus. From the former group of texts there emerges a concept of pleasure as a single and not twofold notion, while such terms as 'motion' and 'state' describe not two different phenomena but only two characteristics of the same phenomenon. On the other hand, the reports comprising the latter group appear to derive from one and the same doxographical tradition, and to be connected with the classification of ethical docrines put forward by the Middle Academy and known as the divisio Carneadea. In conclusion, I argue that the idea of Epicurus' classification of pleasures is based on a misinterpretation of Epicurus' concept in Academic doxography, which tended to contrapose it to doctrines of other schools, above all to the Cyrenaics' views.
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Donner, Wendy. "Mill on Liberty of Self-Development." Dialogue 26, no. 2 (1987): 227–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s001221730003818x.
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John Stuart Mill's commitment to liberty and individual development is one of the most exoteric themes of his moral and political philosophy. But the linkages between this commitment to liberty and development and Mill's conception of utility and principles of the good are not as commonly recognized. As part of a more general transformation of his utilitarianism, Mill repudiated Bentham's principles of the good and instead adopted a more sophisticated form of hedonism. While Bentham admits only the total quantity of pleasure as contributing to value, Mill expands the circle to admit quality or kind of pleasure as well into the value reckoning. I have elsewhere interpreted and defended Mill's qualitative hedonism, and in this paper I can offer only a brief overview of that account and must largely assume its plausibility. Bentham and Mill agree that only pleasurable experiences and the absence of painful experiences have value and so both are called hedonists. But they have very different views about what properties of pleasures makes them valuable, or in other words what are the good-making properties of pleasure. Bentham thinks that only intensity and duration, or quantity, are good-making properties of pleasures, and thus he includes only these properties in measuring value. As a consequence, in the context of value measurement he is not interested in the kinds of things in which people take pleasure. But Mill is a qualitative hedonist, and thinks that the quality or kind of pleasure is also a good-making characteristic and thus should be included in value measurement. The things that are sources of pleasure matter to Mill.
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Lubin, David M. "Pleasure." American Art 23, no. 1 (March 2009): 7–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/599050.
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Frannie Lindsay. "Pleasure." Missouri Review 32, no. 1 (2009): 145. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/mis.0.0114.
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Reinhard, Rick, and Linda Gembrell. "Pleasure?" Language Arts 76, no. 2 (November 1, 1998): 151–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.58680/la199817.
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Kerimov, Khafiz. "The Time of the Beautiful in Kant’s Critique of Judgment." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 24, no. 1 (2019): 71–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/epoche20191011145.
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The present article considers the problem of the preservation of pleasure in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. The problem stems from the fact that the Critique of Judgment contains not one but two distinct definitions of pleasure. In the definition of pleasure in §10 of the Analytic of the Beautiful Kant emphasizes that all pleasure is characterized by the tendency to preserve itself. On the other hand, in the definition of §VII of the unpublished Introduction Kant makes a sharp distinction between interested and disinterested pleasures, whereby only the former kind is defined by the tendency for self-preservation. Yet, how can the disinterested pleasure of the beautiful preserve itself, given that insofar as it is disinterested it can be based on neither desire for its own preservation nor continued existence of the object? In addressing this issue, most commentators erroneously reintroduce desire (whether explicitly or surreptitiously) in the pleasure of aesthetic reflection. By contrast, I propose to resolve this issue by turning to Kant’s account of lingering in §12 of the Analytic of the Beautiful and, more importantly, §§43-53 of the Deduction, where Kant affords his conception of aesthetic ideas.
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Kaur, Harpreet, and Amandeep Rana. "From Pure Aesthetics to Sensory Gratification: Shifting Paradigm of Aesthetic Pleasure in Indian Popular Campus Fiction." International Journal of English and Comparative Literary Studies 3, no. 3 (July 2, 2022): 13–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.47631/ijecls.v3i3.436.
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This paper explores the shifting paradigm of ‘aesthetic pleasure’ in the field of popular literature with an emergence of cultural studies in Literary Theory. It focuses on the concept of pleasure as a significant measure in analyzing the origin and development of Indian popular campus fiction as a distinct genre. It examines how the concept of ‘pleasure’ has shifted from a purely aesthetic appreciation of the values of truth, beauty and goodness to the contemporary aspects of hedonistic and somatic pleasures in the works of popular arts. The paper also sheds light on various theories, propounded by different cultural critics like Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and Leo Lowenthal to analyze the ways the cultural industry has incorporated the values of enjoyment and entertainment into the aesthetic appreciation of pleasure, offering the emotional engagement of readers in these popular texts.
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Lewis, Reina. "Looking Good: The Lesbian Gaze and Fashion Imagery." Feminist Review 55, no. 1 (March 1997): 92–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/fr.1997.6.
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This paper is concerned with the different forms of pleasure and identification activated in the consumption of dominant and subcultural print media. It centres on an analysis of the lesbian visual pleasures generated through the reading of fashion editorial in the new lesbian and gay lifestyle magazines. This consideration of the lesbian gaze is contrasted to the lesbian visual pleasures obtained from an against the grain reading of mainstream women's fashion magazines. The development of the lesbian and gay lifestyle magazines, in the context of the pink pound, produces a situation in which an eroticized lesbian visual pleasure is the overt remit of the magazine, rather than a clandestine pleasure obtained through a transgressive reading of dominant cultural imagery. In contrast to the polysemic free-play of fashion fantasy by which readers produce lesbian pleasure in the consumption of mainstream magazines, responses to the fashion content in the lesbian magazine Diva suggest that in a subcultural context readers deploy a realist mode of reading that demands a monosemic positive images iconography. The article uses the concept of subcultural competency to consider the different ways lesbians read mainstream and subcultural print media and suggests that the conflict over Diva‘s fashion spreads may be linked to changing patterns of identification and the use of dress for recognizability.
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Kurowicka, Anna, and Agnieszka Kotwasińska. "Readings in queer pleasure." Science Fiction Film & Television 17, no. 1 (February 2024): 105–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.3828/sfftv.2024.5.
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This article analyzes the queer pleasures of the 2015 sf movie by the Wachowski sisters, Jupiter Ascending . We find that these pleasures operate on two intertwined levels: the movie’s campy villains and over-the-top aesthetics reflect the themes of queer temporality and reproduction on the textual level, while the straight romance of the protagonist draws on the queer archive of fan fiction. We engage with queer studies and fan studies as critical frameworks that allow us to center affective pleasures of recognizing well-established romantic tropes and character archetypes. Critical debates surrounding Jupiter Ascending point to a larger discussion concerning the space for pleasure within sf texts and sf fan communities, while the movie’s commitment to fan fiction tropes and narrative practices anticipates recent changes in media consumption and production patterns.
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Marx, William. "Catharsis et plaisir tragique selon Aristote." Chôra 17 (2019): 163–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/chora20191710.
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Catharsis and tragic pleasure according to Aristotle. According to Aristotle, tragedies induce three different kinds of pleasures. First, there is the cognitive pleasure of imitation, since it is pleasurable to recognize in the imitation an object one already knows. Second, there is the aesthetic pleasure linked to the material parameters of the tragedy, that is the language, the show, and the performance (verses, singing, acting). Third, there is the “specific” pleasure of tragedy. This specific pleasure is linked to the affects of pity and fear through the process of catharsis. Although pity and fear are two opposite affects depending on the position of the subject relatively to an event, the spectator of the tragedy is bound to experience both of them simultaneously because of the ethical similarity the playwright must keep between him and the tragic hero. But pity and fear are also two opposite affects on the physiological level : pity is a warm affect, fear a cold one. Catharsis is then a physiological balancing of pity by fear, of warmth by cold, and reciprocally, and this continuous suppression of excesses of temperature through the tragic imitation, while bringing a feeling of relief and pleasure, rids the spectator of all excessive affects. Catharsis provides a healthy and hygienic pleasure, and so can Aristotle effectively reply to Plato’s criticism of tragedy.
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Dufresne-Tassé, Colette, Thérèse Lapointe, and Hélène Lefèbvre. "Étude exploratoire des bénéfices d'une visite au musée." Canadian Journal for the Study of Adult Education 7, no. 1 (May 1, 1993): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.56105/cjsae.v7i1.2236.
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Résumé Une "analyse de besoin" ne semble pas une façon appropriée de rassembler les données nécessaires à la préparation d'expositions muséales à caractère éducatif pour l'adulte. Une "analyse de benefices" semble plus appropriée. Description d'une étude des gains, des bénéfices issus d'une visite à un musée de sciences naturelles réalisée par 45 adultes de 25 à 65 ans. Les principaux résultats de cette étude montrent que le bénéfice majeur d'une visite réside dans le fonctionnement même du visiteur, à cause de la série de plaisirs suscités par ce fonctionnement. Ces plaisirs forment des paires opposées: plaisir de la contemplation et plaisir de l'action; plaisir de la manipulation du monde extérieur et plaisir du retour sur soi-même; plaisir de ce qui se livre dès que l'attention est entière et plaisir de vaincre la difficulté; plaisir de I'imaginaire et plaisir du rationnel; plaisir de la nouveauté et agrément des habitudes. Implications de ces résultats pour l'éducation des adultes. An "analysis of needs" does not appear to be a suitable way of gathering data from which to prepare museum exhibits of an educational nature. An "analysis of benefits" seems to be more appropriate. This study describes the benefits perceived by 45 adults resulting from their visit to a natural history museum. The results indicate that the greatest benefit to the museum visitor is the opposing pleasures that are experienced: pleasure of contemplation and pleasure of action; pleasure of self-reflection and pleasure of interacting with the outside world; pleasure of thinking deeply about a problem and the pleasure of solving the problem; pleasure derived from the imaginary and pleasure of reality; pleasure of novelty and the pleasure associated with routine. Implications of the results for adult education are presented.
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Tordo·Rombaut, Karine. "Protagoras 351b3‑358d4 : le plaisir et rien d’autre." Chôra 17 (2019): 59–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/chora2019175.
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In Protagoras 351b3‑358d4, Socrates apparently admits the use of pleasure and pain as criteria for distinguishing between good and bad. Focusing on this passage, my paper outlines three problems, raising from : (1) the contradiction between Socrates’ objection to pleasure in other platonic dialogues and his assent here to a hypothesis which identifies good with pleasure ; (2) the petitio principii apparently involved in Socrates’ argument to support the thought that knowledge is more powerful than emotions ; (3) the compatibility of his “ hedonist ” hypothesis with his “intellectualist” thought. My paper undertakes to reconstruct Socrates’ argument, in order to answer problem (2). I contend that this argument makes the humans admit they are deprived of the knowledge both of good and evil and of pleasant and painful, a point sufficient to silence them when they speak of “knowledge being defeated by pleasure”. This contention helps answering problem (1), through a distinction between so‑called pleasures (to which Socrates objects) and real ones (which he might accept). My conclusion answers problem (3), by showing that, held together, both the “hedonist” hypothesis and the “intellectualist” thought lead to not take pleasure for granted, as required to secure a philosophical approach.
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전헌상. "Activity and Pleasure - Aristotle’s Theory of Pleasure -." Sogang Journal of Philosophy 44, no. ll (February 2016): 69–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.17325/sgjp.2016.44..69.
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Fennell, David A. "The Nature of Pleasure in Pleasure Travel." Tourism Recreation Research 34, no. 2 (January 2009): 123–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02508281.2009.11081584.
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