Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Platon. Protagoras'

Quiconque s'avise d'etudier protagoras sous le rapport de la philosophie devrait commencer par se demander comment ces penseurs se sont appropries la pensee de la sophistique. Parler de la sophistique equivaut donc a etablir le commentaire des appropriations. Ceci doit arriver, par exemple, quand on doit lire @protagoras a partir de la critique formulee par platon. Platon est sans doute une source d'importance assuree pour l'etude de la pensee de protagoras. Mais sa critique au sophiste abderitain n'est pas exempte de problemes. En fait, elle risque constamment de separer la pensee de protagoras concernant les vertus (sa pensee politique) de sa reflexion a l'egard des phenomenes (ces choses qui apparaissent a chacun), comme s'il n'etait pas possible de proposer une liaison entre la formule de l'homme mesure et le 'savoir' politique que le sophiste apprenait a ses elves. Cette these, en examinant les textes de la doxographie ancienne (surtout plutarque, sextus et diogene laerce) et les passages ou platon travaille directement sur la pensee de protagoras, se propose d'examiner la possibilite de lier etroitement la recherche de l'objet du savoir de protagoras, telle qu'elle se presente dans le protagoras, avec l'elaboration sous-jacente d'un plan de liaison entre les doctrines gnoseologiques et doctrines ethico-politiques dans la pensee du sophiste abderitain.

Le philologue qui veut interpreter n texte grec est confronte a la masse de la production et a la diversite des lectures. Le protagoras de platon en donne un bon exemple : il a fait l'objet de theses radicalement opposees. Plutot que de renoncer a tout effort interpretatif en invoquant un ineluctable relativisme, on peut tenter de comprendre voire de reduire, cette multiplicite en delimitant les types d'interets universalisables qui, au dela des simples interets particuliers, institutionnels ou sociaux, determinent les diverses positions. Se revelent alors 3 protagoras, allemand, anglais, francais, correspondant a des presupposes dogmatiques antinomiques visant a fonder en verite la comprehension du texte. A l'interieur de ces traditions culturelles nationales, les problematiques nees de ces divers horizons d'attente subissent une evolution qui reflete une volonte de legitimation toujours plus grande par rapport aux systemes de valeurs sous-jacentes. Avec une histoire de l'interpretation qui respecte la dynamique de ces problematiques et une typologie des interpretations qui met en lumiere les divers horizons d'attente, ce travail se veut une reflexion a la fois sur la maniere dont s'est constituee la tradition critique et sur les conditions de possibilite de l'interpretation. Cette hermeneutique des interpretations est ainsi un prealable necessaire a une hermeneutique de l'oeuvre. Loin d'etre la pure negation de toutes les lectures anterieures, la comprehension du protagoras ne peut que tirer parti des problemes qu'elles ont souleves quant au contenu du texte et des difficultes methodologiques qu'elles ont revelees, parfois a leur insu
The philologist who wants to interpret a greek text is confronted to the massive production and the diversity of readings. Plato's protagoras is a perfect illustration of this problem. Quite different theses were put forward about it. Rather than giving up any interpretation by putting forward an ineleuctable relativism, we can try to understand, and even to reduce, this multiplicity by defining the types of universalinterests which, beyond mere personal, institutional or social interests, determine the different positions. Thus, 3 protagoras come to light, a german, an english, a french one, each corresponding to totally antinomic dogmatic presuppositions, intended to found in truth the understanding of the text. Inside these national cultural traditions, the problematics raised up by these various theoric expectations undergo an evolution that reflects a will of legitimation always greater with regard to the underlying system of values. By the way of an history of interpretation that respects the dynamics of these problematics and a typology of these interpretations that brings out the diverse theoric expectations, this work means to be a reflection on the manner the critical tradition has been set up and the conditions of possibility of the interpretation. Thus, this hermeneutics of interpretations appears as a preliminary necessary to hermeneutics of the work in itself. Far from being the pure negation of all the previous readings, the understanding of protagoras cannot but make use of the problems they have raised for

Héritier des présocratiques et des conceptions homériques sur la valeur du discours, Protagoras place l'homme au centre d'un monde en devenir constant, dans lequel la connaissance du kairos guide la production discursive comme l'action.La reconstruction de la pensée de Protagoras d'Abdère requiert d'abord de le situer dans son contexte historique pour dégager les tensions qui existent parmi les intellectuels de l'époque au sujet des trois éléments qui permettent cette reconstruction : le discours (logos), l'action (pragma, chrèma, praxis), le temps (chronos, kairos).Les aspects gnoséologiques et ontologiques sont soulignés dans la doctrine de l'homo mensura. La position de Protagoras relativement à la valeur du logos insiste sur l'importance des éléments relatifs à chaque situation pour la détermination de ce qui est prédiqué au moment de sa prédication. L'aspect éthique est, à son tour, déterminé par cette réalité humaine. Si une axiologie est possible elle doit nécessairement dériver de l'expérience (askesis) de l'homme et être adéquate aux besoins et aux objectifs de la société dans laquelle il se trouve.Deux facteurs déterminent principalement l'homme : la réalité sociale en perpétuel devenir et l'expérience particulière des individus soumise elle aussi au devenir en sorte que selon Protagoras l'homme se construit constamment dans une double dimension temporelle, diachronique et synchronique.L'influence des positions du sophiste sur les philosophes (Platon et Aristote) comme sur les orateurs (Isocrate) postérieurs à Protagoras confirme la reconstruction de la pensée de l'Abdéritain
The legacy of the presocratic and homeric thinking is present in Protagoras' conception of language. He places man in the center of a world constantly changing, in which knowledge of kairos is a guide for discursive production, as well as for action. The reconstruction of the thinking or Protagoras of Abdera requires to place it in its historical context to understund the tensions among the intellectuals of his time. This reconstruction will be done in three axis: speech (logos), action (pragma, praxis), time (chronos, kairos). The epistemological and ontological aspects are emphasized in the doctrine of man-mesure. Protagoras' position on the value of logos stresses the importance of situational factors to determine what is properly predicated. Man is also determined by two other variables: the social reality in constant evolution and the specific experience of individual subjects. Protagoras thinks that man builts this reality in a double temporal dimension: diachronic and synchronic. We can confirm our conclusions in the thought of later philosophers (Plato and Aristotle) and orators (Isocrates)

On examine ici deux concepts fondamentaux touchant la genèse et la structure du système platonicien, en proposant de les rapporter à deux modèles empruntés à la mathématique ancienne. Le premier est un postulat, usuellement désigné sous le nom d’axiome d’Eudoxe – Archimède, le second un algorithme de calcul : l’anthyphérèse. Tous deux ressortissent à la théorie mathématique développée par Théétète à la suite des travaux logistiques de Théodore ; il a semblé que leur articulation constituait le socle théorique de la réponse platonicienne à la thèse protagoréenne de l’homo mensura. On a suggéré de replacer cette dernière dans le cadre d’une polémique ancienne regardant la consistance du concept mathématique de mesure, dont la notion naïve fut remise en cause par la découverte successive des rapports incommensurables puis d’ensembles non–archimédiens : les angles mixtilignes. Cela impliquait de réexaminer les rapports possibles entre mathématiques et sophistique : on a choisi à cet effet l’exemple de la quadratrice d’Hippias d’Élis. Il convenait aussi d’envisager la liaison étroite qu’entretiennent la dialectique platonicienne et cette science métrétique rénovée que Platon nomme «juste mesure». On a tenté de montrer comment celle-ci pouvait informer certains procédés de celle-là, à partir de l’étude de quelques passages des dialogues qui jalonnent la dernière période de Platon. La théorie de la division appliquée aux Idées, comme l’analyse et la constitution des mixtes cosmologique, politique et individuel ont ainsi paru pouvoir être examinées dans le cadre de cette hypothèse
Two mathematical notions seem to structure Plato’s theory of measure. The first one is a postulate, usually known as the “Eudoxus axiom”, the other an algorithm called “anthuphairesis”. Both of them belonged to the mathematical theory developed by Theaetetus expanding Theodorus’ logistics. The main hypothesis of this work is that they constitute the core of Plato’s response against the Homo mensura thesis elaborated by Protagoras. We have thus proposed to replace Protagoras’ theory in the enlarged context of a serious crisis affecting the logical consistency of the mathematical notion of measure, provoked by the discovery of incommensurable magnitudes as well as non–Archimedean sets, exemplified by mixtilinear angles. This implied to examine anew the links between ancient sophistic and mathematics, and particularly Plato’s critics against Hippias’ quadratrix. It was also required to study the close relation between platonic dialectic and the new art of measurement exposed by Plato in the Statesman. Thus, by studying some passages mainly taken from Plato’s last dialogues, an attempt has been made to show how the higher art of measurement could inform dialectics. Plato’s theory of division, as well as the analysis and the generation of the mixed structures which constitute the universe, the city and the individual man have thus been tentatively reduced to this model

Cette thèse étudie comment Platon pratique une stratégie de réappropriation à l'égard de questions et de doctrines utiles à l'élaboration de sa pensée et de son questionnement propres, à partir d'une confrontation avec la pensée de Protagoras, sur des questions d'ordre politique, moral, anthropologique et, surtout, épistémologique. Dans la première partie, j'établis de quelle façon le sophiste entraîne Platon, à partir de la question du relativisme et de l'absence de référence stable, sur la voie de la première définition du concept de mesure, dont je tâche de dresser les contours platoniciens à partir du Protagoras, du Thééète, du Politique, du Philèbe et des Lois. Dans la seconde partie, je tire les conséquences de ce projet dans les limites d'une vaste clarification de la signification des concepts structurants de la philosophie, et de la pensée en général (l'identité et la différence, l'un et le multiple, le semblable et le dissemblable), entreprise par Platon.

La présente recherche vise à faire ressortir certaines particularités chez deux grands penseurs de la Grèce Antique: Protagoras le sophiste et Socrate le philosophe. Le but fondamental de cette étude sera d'établir l'importance de cette maïeutique (la question de l'enseignement de la vertu en relation avec l'art de la citoyenneté) selon ces deux grands penseurs: Socrate ainsi que Protagoras. En effet, le Protagoras de Platon est un ouvrage qui suscite beaucoup de questions, surtout chez certains membres de la communauté philosophique qui s'y intéressent. En revanche, bien que Platon soit la source principale de cette œuvre, il est un témoin peu fiable de l'histoire de la philosophie. C'est la raison pour laquelle cette recherche est essentiellement basée sur l'étude du dialogue du Protagoras de Platon. II serait utile d'explorer d'autres dialogues de Platon afin d'approfondir cette analyse sur la question de l'enseignement de la vertu, mais l'auteur de cet ouvrage a préféré limiter sa recherche à une seule œuvre : Le Protagoras.

La démocratie est liée au temps de manière tout à fait particulière, car elle évolue d’une génération à l’autre et doit donc être sans cesse redéfinie. Elle est niée en même temps que créée. C’est la raison pour laquelle le fait de s’intéresser au passé est une manière de mieux comprendre ce qu’est la démocratie aujourd’hui. Or, si nous voulons savoir à quoi elle correspond, on doit chercher à comprendre ce qu’est le sens véritable de la démocratie dans son idéal. Ainsi, prenons pour exemple la liberté. La démocratie doit apporter la liberté à la communauté à laquelle elle appartient, sans quoi il ne s’agit plus d’une démocratie, mais d’une représentation erronée de celle-ci. Par ailleurs, cette forme de liberté au sein de la démocratie ne peut être complète, car elle est toujours créée au travers de ses limites. De nos jours, elle semble inexistante ou désabusée, comme s’il n’y avait plus de lieu pour discuter de cet idéal, d’un lieu commun à tous, c’est-à-dire d’un endroit où l’on se sent chez soi, comme si l’on ne faisait qu’un avec la culture intellectuelle dans l’espace public. Pis encore, faut-il avoir le temps et le désir de discuter de l’idéal de vie que l’on recherche en tant que société. La démocratie répond-elle toujours à nos besoins intellectuels et moraux? Doit-on rechercher autre chose que la démocratie pour répondre à ces besoins? La démocratie doit être représentative du lieu d’où l’on vient et donner une orientation que la société dans laquelle on vit doit prendre, pour être proche de ses valeurs intellectuelles et morales. Cette démocratie doit vivre dans l’espace civique qui existe et qui doit continuer d’être pour que les générations actuelles et à venir la ressentent comme un parent attentionné et soucieux du futur de ses enfants, car il s’agit de son avenir à elle aussi. Ce lieu a pour but de susciter des réflexions telles que celles qui ont forgé notre passé jusqu’à l’avènement des démocraties libérales modernes et à partir desquelles l’on doit chercher à comprendre avec prudence, quel modèle démocratique répond le mieux à nos besoins intellectuels et moraux actuels, afin d’être bien préparé quant à son avenir. Sans contredit, la démocratie, quelle que soit son époque, est limitée par des événements qui la dépassent sans que l’on puisse pour autant cerner les difficultés à venir afin de les repenser, même si elle ne contrôle point la vie de l’homme en général, car les limites de la démocratie sont toujours en évolution, comme l’est la condition humaine. Les idées politiques changent et évoluent d’une génération à l’autre. Enfin, il semble curieux de vouloir comparer les limites de la démocratie grecque avec la nôtre, mais le fait de s’interroger sur le sens et la valeur du mot démocratie limite l’usure de cet idéal si souvent employé, à tort ou à raison. Le but de cette étude sera modeste, puisqu’il cherchera à réintroduire cette idée à l’aide de l’étude des mouvements de la pensée politique du Ve siècle sous différentes perspectives politiques telles que celles de Platon, d’Aristote et des sophistes. L’objectif est donc de redécouvrir certains aspects des limites de la démocratie antique, afin de mieux s’interroger sur la nôtre, car elles sont à l’origine de nos problèmes humains actuels. Le propos de notre thèse est donc de démontrer que l’étude des limites morales et intellectuelles de la démocratie directe, en lien avec l’histoire de la philosophie politique, permet de réactualiser quelques difficultés théoriques et pratiques irrésolues des démocraties actuelles et à venir. Il faut d’abord comprendre d’où l’on vient si l’on veut saisir le sens réel dans la manière de choisir la direction idéale à prendre dans la recherche du bien commun
Democracy is tied to time in a peculiar way because since it evolves from one generation to the next, it must necessarily be constantly defined and redefined. Because democracy is, so to say, negated and recreated anew, we must concern ourselves with what it will become as a way of understanding what it really is. However, we must search particularly to understand the true meaning of democracy; the ideal that defines it. Take for example the idea of freedom. Democracy must bring freedom to a given community; if it does not, it would not be a democracy. However, this freedom-fostering democracy cannot be absolute because it is constantly confronted with human limitations. Nowadays, democracy seems to be losing its true sense, or to be non-existent even. It seems as if there is no longer a common place where all could discuss the ideal that democracy embodies; in other words, as if there is no longer a common area where all could feel at home in both the cultural and affective parts of our common existence. How can we find the time for this, and how can we again revive this ideal of discussion that gives a higher sense of existence to our present societies? Is democracy the answer to our intellectual and moral needs? Should we be looking at something other than democracy for answers to our present needs? These are some of the major questions that gave rise to this thesis and to which I attempt to find answers

Cette étude se propose de déterminer la nature et les enjeux véritables de la controverse opposant, sur la question de l'être, Platon et Aristote, aux principaux représentants de la sophistique : Protagoras d'Abdère et Gorgias de Léontium. Quelles sont les conditions de possibilité d'un logos sur l'être i. E. De l'ontologie ? Face à une critique sophistique se réclamant de la lettre du Poème (où se dévoile, pour la première fois, le projet d'une ontologie), prenant prétexte des insuffisances de ce dernier pour récuser toute possibilité d'une ontologie, Platon et Aristote n'ont d'autre choix que d'engager le combat contre le sophiste. En réponse à une phénoménologie protagoréenne pour laquelle il n'y a de science que du phénomène et à une logologie gorgienne qui veut que le seul objet du logos ce soit ce logos lui-même, l'Athénien et le Stagirite entendent bien réhabiliter le projet parménidien i. E. Garantir, contre la fidélité perverse du sophiste, la possibilité même de l'ontologie.

Accordant avec Kant que "l'homme ne peut devenir homme que par l'éducation",nous nous sommes interrogés sur les conditions de possibilité requises par tout projet éducatif. Quelle est la nature d'un être docile ? Quel usage fait-il de sa liberté s'il se plie,même pour son bien,à la liberté de l'éducateur ? Parce que l'homme semble adaptable à tout,l'éducateur croit tout d'abord l'émanciper en niant qu'il ait une nature. Conçue sociologiquement,la pédagogie n'a pas d'autre fin que d'adapter l'homme au meilleur régime,la démocratie. Telles sont les seules perspectives de Protagoras et d'Helvétius. Or,ce refus de la nature n'est-il pas une révocation de la liberté puisqu'il conditionne l'homme à son milieu et à sa situation ? N'est-ce pas plutôt le principe de nature qui garantit la liberté de l'homme ? Comment éduquer l'homme à l'idéal civique sans l'aliéner aux fausses vertus sociales ? Tel est le souci de Rousseau. Mais l'homme peut-il jamais s'accomplir parfaitement ? L'homme n'est-il pas alors cet être contradictoire dont la nature est contrainte de se hausser au dessus d'elle-même pour accéder à sa vérité ? Telle est la leçon du platonisme. L'homme n'est-il pas plutôt l'être du possible et l'éducateur ne doit-il pas veiller à n'empêcher aucun de ces possibles ? Telle est la leçon de la pédagogie kantienne et notre conclusion.

This thesis argues that the most prominent account of Protagoras in contemporary rhetorical scholarship, Edward Schiappa's Protagoras and Logos, loses critical historiographical objectivity in Platonic overdetermination of surviving historical artifacts. In the first chapter, I examine scholarship from the past thirty years to set a baseline for historiographical thought and argue that John Muckelbauer's conception of productive reading offers the best solution to the intellectual and discursive impasse in which contemporary Protagorean rhetorical theory currently resides. The second chapter explains the pitfalls of Platonic overdetermination and the ways in which Plato himself was inextricably situated within an ideological blinder, from which fair treatment of competing philosophical ideology becomes impossible. Finally, I argue for a historical Protagoras free of Platonic overdetermination by looking to Mario Untersteiner's 1954 Sophists. Untersteiner looks to Plato not for an accurate historical account, but for insight into why the great philosopher found the sophists to be such great perturbations. Rediscovering Protagoras through a Sophistic paradigm, I hope to open space for new, productive discourse on the first Sophist.

This thesis examines the role appearances play, with notable continuity, in the psychology and ethics of Plato's Protagoras, Gorgias, and Republic. Common to these dialogues is the claim that evaluative appearances are almost invariably false: what appears to be good or bad is typically not in fact so and what is good or bad typically does not appear so. I argue that this disparity between apparent and real value forms the basis of Plato's diagnoses of a wide range of practical errors: psychological phenomena like akrasia, mistaken conceptions of the good like hedonism, and the influence of cultural sources of corruption like oratory, sophistry, and poetry. It also, relatedly, forms the basis of his account of lower passions like appetite, anger, or fear. Such passions are especially prone to lead us astray because their objects -- appetitive pleasures like food, drink, or sex, for example -- present especially deceptive appearances. One of the principal aims of this thesis is to show that this presents a significant point of agreement between the psychologies of the Protagoras, Gorgias, and Republic. In all three dialogues, I argue, motivational errors result from a specific kind of cognitive error: the uncritical acceptance of appearances. Plato's early and middle psychologies differ in their account of the subject of this error -- in the Protagoras and Gorgias, the whole person; in the Republic, the appetitive or spirited part of a person's soul -- but not in their basic theory of how our passions arise or, crucially, why they are liable to motivate us towards harmful ends.

The goal of this thesis is ultimately to answer the two questions raised and left unresolved in Plato’s Protagoras: What is virtue? Is virtue teachable? Following the dramatic order of Plato’s dialogues as outlined by Catherine Zuckert, I intend to show that the Meno returns to the issues raised and left unresolved in the Protagoras, but now with the idea of recollection. My intention is to look at how the idea of recollection, developed and associated with eros in the intervening dialogues, can help explain the nature of virtue and its teachability. I believe that we can come to answer both questions, “What is virtue?” and “Is virtue teachable?” posed in the Protagoras and the Meno by drawing on the ideas of anamnesis and eros as they appear in the Meno, Phaedrus, and Symposium.

Do conjunto dos chamados primeiros diálogos de Platão, o Protágoras destaca-se como a obra em que é apresentada mais sistematicamente a doutrina conhecida como intelectualismo ético. Grosso modo, trata-se de compreender os temas éticos, como as virtudes ou excelências morais (justiça, piedade, sabedoria, temperança e coragem), exclusivamente como resultado de um processo cognitivo; em outros termos, trata-se de afirmar que os assuntos éticos para uma correta apreciação exigem a consideração de um tipo de conhecimento, que, sob esse diapasão, mostrar-se-á como o conhecimento do bem. O final do Protágoras apresenta esse ponto com clareza. Ali, as virtudes discutidas ao longo do diálogo são, a rigor, uma só coisa, a saber, conhecimento. A doutrina ética intelectualista conduz a consequências que não deixaram de ser exploradas por Platão nos primeiros diálogos, notadamente no Protágoras. Primeiramente, reduz-se com isso a multiplicidade das manifestações da excelência humana à posse de um conhecimento, problema que deixará sua herança à literatura antiga e que chega aos estudos eruditos contemporâneos como a questão da unidade das virtudes; em segundo lugar, o papel destacado do conhecimento na compreensão da vida ética requer a compreensão da relação deste com outros elementos fundamentais e reconhecidos, igualmente decisivos para a alma humana e para determinação das ações, como os apetites e as paixões. Este último ponto surge devido à constatação abundante nos diálogos da primeira fase de Platão, corroborada exemplarmente pelo Protágoras, de que o conhecimento é condição não apenas necessária, mas também suficiente para a obtenção e o exercício das virtudes, de modo que nenhum elemento extracognitivo (como o são paixões e apetites) é capaz de desviar a rota de ação indicada pelo conhecimento. Sendo o conhecimento do bem que caracteriza a virtude, hegemônico quando presente na alma humana, qual papel, portanto, seria reservado para paixões e apetites na ética dos primeiros diálogos? Uma doutrina que articula esses dois pontos é avançada no Protágoras, sendo este o diálogo que sistematiza e aprofunda as teorias socráticas presentes nos demais diálogos do conjunto. Nesse sentido, proponho um exame da relação entre virtude e conhecimento no Protágoras, dividido em duas partes: a primeira parte lidando mais diretamente com o problema da unidade das virtudes, enquanto a segunda investigará o sentido do intelectualismo ético segundo a relação entre conhecimento e elementos não cognitivos, parte na qual o exame de uma virtude particular receberá destaque: a coragem.
Among Platos first dialogues, the Protagoras stands out as the work in which the so called ethical intellectualism is exposed in the most systematic manner. Roughly, in ethical intellectualism, ethical themes such as virtues or moral excellences (justice, piety, wisdom, temperance and courage) are defined exclusively as the result of a cognitive process; in other terms, for ethical matters to be correctly understood, a certain knowledge must be considered; in this case, knowledge of the good. This point is made clear at the end of the Protagoras: all virtues discussed throughout the dialogue are strictly one thing, namely knowledge. The consequences of the intellectualist ethical doctrine were also explored by Plato in his first dialogues, especially in the Protagoras. First, the multiplicity of different manifestations of human excellence are thus reduced to the possession of a knowledge, a problem that was thoroughly explored in ancient literature and resulted, contemporarily, in the question of the unity of virtue. Secondly, the central role of knowledge in the comprehension of the ethical life requires the comprehension of the relation between knowledge and other admittedly fundamental aspects such as appetites and passions that are decisive to the human soul and crucial to determine ones actions. This latter point arises from the abundant observation in Platos first dialogues, especially in the Protagoras, that knowledge is not only a necessary condition but also a sufficient condition to obtain and exercise virtue in such a way that no extracognitive element (such as passions and appetites) is able to interfere in the path of action indicated by knowledge. If knowledge of the good is what defines virtue and if it is hegemonic when present in the human soul, what role is left to passions and appetites in the ethics of the first dialogues? These two points are articulated in the doctrine that is exposed in the Protagoras, a dialogue that deepens and systematizes Socrates theories discussed in the other dialogues from this period. Therefore, I intend to examine the relation between virtue and knowledge in the Protagoras. This work is divided in two parts: in the first, I deal with the problem of the unity of virtues; in the second part, I investigate the meaning of ethical intellectualism in view of the relation between knowledge and non-cognitive elements, and one particular virtue shall be examined: courage.

A presente pesquisa tem por finalidade o estudo da Ode a Escopas de Simônides no Protágoras de Platão. Ao longo do diálogo a distinção entre o discurso sofístico e filosófico é destacada por Sócrates. Seções dialéticas, cujo objeto de estudo é a areté, são intercaladas com seções retóricas, nas quais a areté política é abordada. Enquanto nas primeiras há a investigação da excelência humana, nas seções sofísticas, a investigação recai sobre o nómos cívico. O poema de Simônides louva o homem são, que age de acordo com o nómos, em oposição ao homem moralmente irrepreensível. Por meio da análise que Sócrates faz do poema, o discurso poético é equiparado ao retórico. Conclui-se que o discurso dialético é o único método por meio do qual é possível chegar à verdadeira areté.
The present research has the aim of studying Simonides Ode to Scopas in Platos Protagoras. Throughout the dialogue the difference between sophistic and philosophic discourse is highlighted by Socrates. Dialectic sections which study the areté, are intermingled with rhetorical sections in which political areté is approached. While in the former, human excellence is examined, in the sophistic sections the investigation is upon civic nómos. Simonides poem praises the healthy man that acts according to the nómos, as opposed to the morally irreprehensible man. Through Socrates analysis of the poem, poetic discourse is compared to the rhetorical one. It can be concluded that dialectic discourse is the only method through which it is possible to reach the truth of areté.

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The present text will address the theme about the unity of virtue in Plato's Protagoras dialogue. The question that will be analyzed is limited to understanding the argumentative paths used by Socrates for the refutation of the sophist Protagoras with his perspective of unity of virtue. Another point that will be approached as a reflection of this analysis will be the understanding of the unity thesis between the virtues - justice, piety, courage, wisdom and wisdom - that the philosopher establishes.
O presente texto abordará a temática sobre a unidade da virtude no diálogo Protágoras de Platão. A questão que será analisada se limita a compreender os caminhos argumentativos utilizados por Sócrates para a refutação do sofista Protágoras com sua perspectiva de unidade de virtude. Outro ponto que será abordado, como reflexo dessa análise, será o entendimento da tese da unidade entre as virtudes – justiça, piedade, coragem, sabedoria e sensatez – que o filósofo estabelece.

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The present work intends to study the change in the platonic doctrine from the Young Dialogues to the Average Dialogues, concerning the Theory of the Cardinal Virtues (Justice, Moderation, Courage and Wisdom). We will analyze the unicity of the Virtues in Protagoras, as well as the possibility of their dissociation in The Republic. Still in The Republic, we shall explore how Justice is constructed in the idealistic platonic city. Finally, we will approach the possibility of the conflict between the soul and the acrasia
O presente trabalho predispõe-se a estudar a mudança da doutrina platônica, dos Diálogos Jovens para os Diálogos Médios, no que diz respeito à Teoria das Virtudes Cardinais (Justiça, Temperança, Coragem e Sabedoria). Analisaremos a unicidade das virtudes na obra Protágoras, bem como a possibilidade de sua separabilidade na obra A República. Ainda em A República, será estudado como se constrói a Justiça na cidade ideal platônica. Por fim, abordaremos a possibilidade do conflito da alma com a acrasia

This thesis is a context-sensitive study of key epistemological commitments and concerns presented in Philo’s two series of exegetical writings. The major conclusion advanced in this thesis is that two theological epistemologies, distinct yet related, can be detected among these writings. The first epistemology is specific to the Allegorical Commentary. The second epistemology is specific to the ‘Exposition of the Law.’ The epistemology of the Allegorical Commentary reflects a threefold conviction: the sovereignty of God, the creaturely contingency of the human mind and its inescapable limitations. In conversation with key epistemological notions of his day, Philo develops this threefold conviction in exegetical discourses that are grounded in Pentateuchal texts portraying the God of Moses as both possessing epistemic authority and aiding the aspiring mind to gain purification and perfection in the knowledge of God. Guided by this threefold conviction, Philo enlists key metaphors of his day – initiation into divine mysteries and divine inspiration, among others –in order to capture something of the essence of Moses’ twofold way of ascending to the divine, an approach which requires at times the enhancement of human reason and at other times the eviction of human reason. The epistemology of the ‘Exposition’ reflects Philo’s understanding of the Pentateuch as a perfect whole partitioned into three distinct yet inseverable parts. Philo’s knowledge discourses in the ‘creation’ part of the ‘Exposition’ reflect two primary movements of thought. The first is heavily invested with a Platonic reading of Genesis 1.27 while the second invests Genesis 2.7 with a mixture of Platonic and Stoic notions of human transformation and well-being. Philo’s discourses in the ‘patriarchs’ segment reflect an interest in portraying the three great patriarchs as exemplars of the virtues of instruction (Abraham), nature (Isaac), and practice (Jacob) which featured prominently in Greek models of education. In the ‘Moses’ segment of the ‘Exposition,’ many of Philo’s discourses on knowledge are marked by an interest in presenting Moses as the ideal king, lawgiver, prophet and priest who surpasses Plato’s paradigm of the philosopher-king. In keeping with this view, Philo insists that the written laws of Moses represent the perfect counterpart to the unwritten law of nature. The life and laws of Moses serve as the paradigm for Philo to understand his own experiences of noetic ascent and exhort readers to cultivate similar aspirational notions and practices.

In keeping with Socrates’ advice that it is “a better thing to accomplish a little well than a lot inadequately” (Theaetetus, 187d), this master’s report provides a detailed study of a few relatively short sections of Plato’s Theaetetus. After an analysis of the beginning of the work and its opening themes, I examine the Protagorean thesis as it is first revealed in Theaetetus’ second endeavor to say what knowledge is. Rather than follow the entire course of Socrates’ account of Protagoras’ position, I bring out a few of the essential features of this initial presentation and attempt to gain some clarity as to the possible meaning and purpose behind Protagoras’ enigmatic declaration that man is the measure of all things. The final section of my paper entails a close analysis of the dialogue’s last definition of knowledge: true opinion with speech. Although this account does not answer all of the questions posed by the Protagorean thesis, we find within it the most promising approach to answering the question of the dialogue: “What is knowledge?” While the Theaetetus comes to a close with this final attempt and ultimate failure to answer the question with which it began, I show that Socrates’ spurious arguments often serve more as pointers toward the truth than as refutations of the “truths” proposed.
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In both the Meno and the Protagoras, Plato investigates the unity, acquisition and nature of virtue (ἀρετή). Although these dialogues appear to reach opposing conclusions—the Protagoras that virtue is knowledge and the Meno that virtue is divinely dispensed true opinion—in fact they both articulate the same moral principle. Both dialogues argue that virtue is knowledge of the good. I investigate these two dialogues independently and on their own respective terms, dedicating Chapter 2 to the Protagoras and Chapter 3 to the Meno. Although both dialogues argue that virtue is knowledge of the good, neither offers an account of the good. This is because each dialogue is but a single part of a larger argument which culminates in the Republic, wherein we find a more complete explanation of knowledge of the good in the description of the philosopher-king.

Socrates and Theaetetus consider and reject three different definitions of knowledge in the Theaetetus. The first of these is the thesis that knowledge is perception. According to the received reading Plato's consideration of the thesis that knowledge is perception is limited to the consideration of the naive and implausible thesis that immediate sense-perception is knowledge and there is no knowledge apart from immediate sense-perception. This reading, which limits the philosophic interest of Platos consideration of the thesis that knowledge is perception, follows from a widespread misunderstanding of Socrates' reasons for introducing Protagoras and Heraclitus which circumscribes their role in the dialogue to supplying two theses, epistemological relativism and metaphysical flux, which are sufficient or perhaps necessary conditions for the thesis that knowledge is perception. I will show that Socrates introduces Protagoras and Heraclitus, not simply because they provide the epistemological or metaphysical framework within which Theaetetus' definition holds good, but because each man is committed to the thesis that knowledge is perception. Protagoras' sophistic expertise will be classed as a kind of empirical knowledge which bases itself on past and present perceptions and makes educated predictions of future perceptions. While Heraclitus' theory of flux will lead to a radical skepticism which rejects the possibility that there should be any knowledge of the world apart from perception. Socrates will give arguments against both of these ways of understanding the thesis that knowledge is perception. Plato thus articulates, develops, and ultimately rejects three different ways of understanding Theaetetus' initial definition of knowledge.
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Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI)
The history of Western civilisation is generally demarcated into three broad epochs: ancient, Christian and modern. These eras are usually defined in political terms, but they may also be differentiated in terms of fundamental differences in the nature of the organisations that constitute civil society in each age, how they defined the public good, and even what they consider philanthropic. In the nineteenth century, for instance, 'Scientific philanthropy' displaced 'Christian charity' as the dominant model for charitable giving; a development accompanied by a number of other secularising trends in Western civil society, generally understood as a broad cultural shift in conceptions of public good, from religious to scientific. From the fourth to the sixth century CE, by comparison, another broad cultural shift, from paganism to Christianity, also led to fundamental changes in the nature and composition of ancient civil society. A central premise of this dissertation is that fundamental historical transformations in Western civilisation – from pagan to Christian, to modern, to post-modern – may be traced to the influence of some of the most important philosophers in the Western philosophical tradition, among them: Protagoras, Socrates, Plato, Francis Bacon and Friedrich Nietzsche. Each of these philosophers may be seen to have promulgated their teachings in a consciously Promethean manner; as gifts of fire, understood as philosophical teachings intended to be promulgated for the wider benefit of humankind. In Greek myth, Prometheus, whose name is traditionally thought to have literally meant 'forethought', is the one who steals fire from the gods and gives it to humans. Prometheus is also the first figure in history to be described as "philanthropic" (Prometheus Bound, 11 & 28). Plato, Bacon and Nietzsche all employ significant variants of the Promethean mũthos in their philosophical works, and may be seen to personally identify with the figure of Prometheus, as an allegorical figure depicting the situation of the wise, particularly in relation to political power. This dissertation thus closely analyses the Promethean mũthos in order to cast light on the philosophical philanthrôpía and Promethean ambitions of Protagoras, Socrates and Plato, and to provide the basis for consideration of the same in Bacon and Nietzsche.

Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics examines the Platonic theory of craft and shows its application to different ethical problems in medicine, both ancient and modern. I begin by elucidating the Platonic use of the term “craft” or “technē”, using especially the paradigmatic craft of medicine, and explicate a number of important principles inherent in his use of the term. I then show how Plato’s framework of crafts can be applied to two ancient debates. First, I show how Plato’s understanding of crafts is used in discussing the definition of medicine, and how he deals with the issue of “bivalence”, that medicine seems to be capable of generating disease as well as curing it. I follow this discussion into Aristotle, who, though he has a different interpretation of bivalence, has a solution in many ways similar to Plato’s. Second, I discuss the relevance of knowledge to persuasion and freedom. Rhetors like Gorgias challenge the traditional connections of persuasion to freedom and force to slavery by characterizing persuasion as a type of force. Plato addresses this be dividing persuasion between sorcerous and didactic persuasion, and sets knowledge as the new criterion for freedom. Finally, I discuss three modern issues in medical ethics using a Platonic understanding of crafts: paternalism, conclusions in meta-analyses and therapeutic misconceptions in research ethics. In discussing paternalism, I argue that tools with multiple excellences, like the body, should not be evaluated independently of the uses to which the patient intends to put them. In discussing meta-analyses, I show how the division of crafts into goal-oriented and causal parts in the Phaedrus exposes the confusion inherent in saying that practical conclusions can follow directly from statistical results. Finally, I argue that authors like Franklin G. Miller and Howard Brody fail to recognize the hierarchical relationship between medical research and medicine when they argue that medical research ethics should be autonomous from medical ethics per se.

American jurisprudence currently applies two incompatible validity standards to determine which laws are enforceable. The natural law tradition evaluates validity by an uncertain standard of divine law, and its methodology relies on contradictory views of human reason. Legal positivism, on the other hand, relies on a methodology that commits the analytic fallacy, separates law from its application, and produces an incomplete model of law. These incompatible standards have created a schism in American jurisprudence that impairs the delivery of justice. This dissertation therefore formulates a new standard for legal validity. This new standard rejects the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent in natural law theory. It also rejects the narrow linguistic methodology of legal positivism. In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard for legal validity based on actual legal experience. This approach focuses on the operations of law and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the social consequences they produce. Because legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential feature of this method. This new validity standard contains three principles. The principle of reason requires legal systems to respect every subject as a rational creature with a free will. The principle of reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority. Legal systems that respect their subjects' status as rational creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The principle of reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior. The principle of consent recognizes that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent. The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield supremacy over political rulers, and political rulers must be subject to the same laws as other citizens. Political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will. Legal history demonstrates that, in the absence of a validity standard based on these principles, legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves. They will inevitably treat their subjects as mere means to other ends. Once laws do this, men have no rest from evil.