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1
Held, Dirk tomDieck, Plato, G. M. A. Grube, and C. D. C. Reeve. "Plato: "Republic"." Classical World 88, no. 3 (1995): 216. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4351692.
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Dean-Jones, David E., Plato, and S. Halliwell. "Plato: "Republic" 5." Classical World 88, no. 3 (1995): 224. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4351704.
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Cesarz, Gary L. "Plato and the Republic." Ancient Philosophy 16, no. 2 (1996): 471–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil199616252.
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Annas, Julia. "Plato, Republic V–VII." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (March 1986): 3–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100003970.
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The long section on knowledge and the philosopher in books V–VII of the Republic is undoubtedly the most famous passage in Plato's work. So it is perhaps a good idea to begin by stressing how very peculiar, and in many ways elusive, it is. It is exciting, and stimulating, but extremely hard to understand.
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Ferrari, G. R. F. "Plato, Republic 9.585c–d." Classical Quarterly 52, no. 1 (July 2002): 383–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cq/52.1.383.
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Kraut, Richard. "Plato Beyond the Republic." Classical Review 55, no. 1 (March 2005): 57–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/clrevj/bni034.
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Annas, Julia. "Plato, Republic V–VII." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (March 1986): 3–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00003977.
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The long section on knowledge and the philosopher in books V–VII of the Republic is undoubtedly the most famous passage in Plato's work. So it is perhaps a good idea to begin by stressing how very peculiar, and in many ways elusive, it is. It is exciting, and stimulating, but extremely hard to understand.
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Sansone, David. "Plato, Republic 2.359d7-e2." Mnemosyne 69, no. 6 (November 18, 2016): 1029–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568525x-12342130.
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Altman, William Henry Furness. "In Defense of Plato's Intermediates." PLATO JOURNAL 20 (August 4, 2020): 151–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_20_11.
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Once we realize that the indivisible and infinitely repeatable One of the arithmetic lesson in Republic7 is generated by διάνοια at Parmenides 143a6-9, it becomes possible to revisit the Divided Line’s Second Part and see that Aristotle’s error was not to claim that Plato placed Intermediates between the Ideas and sensible things but to restrict that class to the mathematical objects Socrates used to explain it. All of the One-Over-Many Forms of Republic10 that Aristotle, following Plato, attacked with the Third Man, are equally dependent on Images and above all on the Hypothesis of the One (Republic 510b4-8).
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Culp, Jonathan. "Who’s Happy in Plato’s Republic?" Polis 31, no. 2 (August 15, 2014): 288–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340018.
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Plato’s Republic suggests that everyone is better off being just than unjust, yet scholars have disputed whether Plato actually proves it. It is especially unclear whether the Republic shows that non-philosophers are better off being just. I argue that, despite appearances to the contrary, Plato knowingly offers no convincing proof of this, though it is reasonable to infer from the text that Plato genuinely believes it. Thus, the Republic comes to light as a complex piece of protreptic rhetoric: offering an exhortation (‘Be just!’) while withholding the rational basis for that exhortation – thus provoking philosophic inquiry rather than concluding it.
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Cacoullos, Ann R. "Democracy in Republic: Plato’s Contestation." Synthesis: an Anglophone Journal of Comparative Literary Studies, no. 9 (May 1, 2016): 35. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/syn.16223.
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Plato has been read as a virulent opponent of democracy, a common interpretation that, among other things, either ignores or dismisses his perceptive account of the ways democracy can be a mistaken political culture. In Books 8-9 where he designs other cities that are less than his ideal city, Plato tries to show how the whole manner of living and esteeming of a ruling class pervert the preferences and decision-making of everyone living in the city. Attention to this account can reveal Plato not so much rejecting but contesting the democracy he designs-in-theory. In the city he models, freedom and equality are misdirected, its own political culture ultimately betrays itself. I argue that, for Plato, democracy’s failure is due largely though not exclusively to a remnant of oligarchy that remains within it —the underhanded and excessive pursuit of money— which undermine the freedom and equality that define its political culture.
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Stokes, Michael C. "SOME PLEASURES OF PLATO, REPUBLIC IX." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 9, no. 1 (1990): 2–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000350.
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Jackson, Michael, and Damian Grace. "Commensality, Politics, and Plato." Gastronomica 17, no. 2 (2017): 51–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/gfc.2017.17.2.51.
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Plato recommended common meals, syssitia, in both the Republic and the Laws, one of the few consistencies between the two books separated by the many years of his life. Though he changed much else in his portrait of a perfected city set out in the Republic, he retained the syssitia in the Laws. Why? Moreover, Plato says the practice is so amazing and frightening that a person might be reluctant to mention it. What made the meals so extraordinary? What made common meals so important that even at the end of his life, Plato clung to this one feature first outlined in the Republic when so much else changed? To anticipate the conclusion: syssitia offered a foundation for the whole of civil society, including women. The meals brought citizens together in public, and tempered egotism and greed. They provided a daily lesson in comportment and civility. On these foundations, the meals schooled participants in unity. Common meals had political purposes that were instrumental, educational, and moral. While the Laws abandoned the thoroughgoing communism of property and family of the Republic, commensality remained as the foundation of community in what Plato called the second-best state.
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Dutmer, Evan. "Scipio’s Rome and Critias’ Athens: Utopian Mythmaking in Cicero’s De Republica and Plato’s Timaeus." New England Classical Journal 48, no. 1 (May 14, 2021): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.52284/necj/48.1/article/dutmer.
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Scholarly debate on the relationship between Cicero’s De republica (On the Republic) and De Legibus (On the Laws) and the thought of Plato tends to focus on the supposed congruities or incongruities of the De republica and De legibus with Plato’s own Republic and Laws. Still, Plato’s discussion of ideal constitutions is not constrained to the Republic and Laws. In this essay I propose that we look to another of Plato’s dialogues for fruitful comparison: the Timaeus-Critias duology. In this essay I bring these two texts into substantive dialogue to illuminate mysterious features of both. Sketched in these complementary passages, I think, is an outline for a particular kind of approach to political theory, one proposed as novel by Cicero’s Laelius, but, as this essay hopes to show, with an interesting forerunner in Plato. I’ve called this approach ‘retrospective ideal political philosophy’ (RIPP). I end my essay with a few prospective theoretical notes on how this approach binds these two texts together.
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Conque, João Gabriel. "A fisiologia do prazer no livro IX da República e os seus problemas." ΠΗΓΗ/FONS 2, no. 1 (December 14, 2017): 137. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/fons.2017.3856.
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Resumo: Este artigo tem o objetivo de apontar alguns dos problemas decorrentes da concepção fisiológica do prazer apresentada por Platão no livro IX da República. Inicialmente, apresentarei como Platão lida com o tema do prazer no Górgias, destacando o papel de uma certa fisiologia nutricional em tal contexto. Em seguida, veremos que Platão lida com o tema do prazer no penúltimo livro da República de um modo mais amplo, uma vez que este diálogo fornece exemplos além da esfera nutricional. Apesar da abrangente discussão sobre o prazer na República mencionar os prazeres intelectuais, não encontramos uma acurada descrição dos mesmos nesse diálogo. Um dos obstáculos para a compreensão de tais tipos de prazeres diz respeito à controversa concepção fisiológica do prazer psíquico como um processo de preenchimento. Assim, chamaremos atenção na última seção para a frequente analogia entre corpo e alma no pensamento de Platão com o intuito de contribuir para as discussões sobre o prazer na República.Palavras-chave: Platão, prazer, Górgias, República, fisiologiaAbstract: This article intends to point out some problems arising from the physiological conception of pleasure presented by Plato in Republic Book IX. Initially, I will show how Plato addresses the theme of pleasure in the Gorgias, highlighting the role of a kind of nutritional physiology in such context. Next, we will see Plato returns to the theme of pleasure in the penultimate book of the Republic in a more comprehensive way since this dialogue provides examples beyond nutritional sphere. Although the extensive discussion on pleasure in the Republic mentions intellectual pleasures, it does not provide us an accurate description of them. One of problems for the correct under-standing of such types of pleasures concerns the controversial conception of psychic pleasures as a process of replenishment. Thus, in the last section, I will draw attention to frequent analogy body/soul in Plato’s thought in order to contribute to the discussions on pleasure in the Republic.Keywords: Plato, pleasure, Gorgias, Republic, physiology
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Baima, Nicholas R. "On the Value of Drunkenness in the Laws." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 20, no. 1 (April 5, 2017): 65–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-02001005.
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Plato’s attitude towards drunkenness (µέθη) is surprisingly positive in the Laws, especially as compared to his negative treatment of intoxication in the Republic. In the Republic, Plato maintains that intoxication causes cowardice and intemperance (3.398e–399e, 3.403e, and 9.571c–573b), while in the Laws, Plato holds that it can produce courage and temperance (1.635b, 1.645d–650a, and 2.665c–672d). This raises the question: Did Plato change his mind, and if he did, why? Ultimately, this paper answers affirmatively and argues that this marks a substantive shift in Plato’s attitude towards anti-rational desires. More precisely, this paper argues that in the Republic, Plato holds that anti-rational desires are always detrimental to health and virtue, while in the Laws, Plato maintains that anti-rational desires can be instrumental to health and virtue.
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Pawłowski, Kazimierz. "CATHARSIS IN PHAEDO AND REPUBLIC OF PLATO." Studia Humanistyczne AGH 18, no. 3 (2019): 67–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.7494/human.2019.18.3.67.
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The article takes up the topic of mystical motif of catharsis present in Plato’s dialogues Phaedo and Republic as well as their links with the mysticism of the Ancient Greek mysteries. The philosophical catharsis is a result of touching the divine, transcendent Truth.
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Johnstone, Mark A. "Plato on the Enslavement of Reason." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50, no. 3 (January 22, 2020): 382–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/can.2019.53.
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AbstractIn Republic 8–9, Socrates describes four main kinds of vicious people, all of whose souls are “ruled” by an element other than reason, and in some of whom reason is said to be “enslaved.” What role does reason play in such souls? In this paper, I argue, based on Republic 8–9 and related passages, and in contrast to some common alternative views, that for Plato the “enslavement” of reason consists in this: instead of determining for itself what is good, reason is forced to desire and pursue as good a goal determined by the soul’s ruler.
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SASAKI, Takeshi. "Plato and "Republic" in the 20th Century Politics." TRENDS IN THE SCIENCES 16, no. 1 (2011): 46–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.5363/tits.16.1_46.
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Annas, Julia. "Plato." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (March 1986): 1–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00003965.
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Plato (c. 427-347 BC) was born into a wealthy and aristocratic Athenian family. He cherished the ambition of entering politics when he came of age, but was disillusioned first by the injustices of the oligarchic government in which his relatives Charmides and Critias were involved, and later by the action of the democracy which succeeded it, particularly the trial and execution of Socrates in 399 BC. In his best-known dialogue, The Republic, he sought to provide a theoretical foundation for a government which would embody the justice he had found to be lacking in the actual governments of his day. His only active intervention in politics, in the intended role of adviser, was an unsuccessful one in Syracuse, Sicily. Details of it are given in his Seventh Letter. Some time before his second visit to Sicily, in 367 BC, he founded the school known as ‘the Academy’. His career as a writer of dialogues may have begun before this. In his early dialogues, he memorialized Socrates and his method of philosophizing by making him chief participant and questioner. His teaching in the Academy was interrupted for a third visit to Sicily in 361-360 BC, when he was nearly seventy. He survived an illness caused by the hardships of the journey, and died aged about eighty-one.
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Knoll, Manuel. "La giustizia distributiva tra Platone e Aristotele = Distributive Justice in Plato and Aristotle." ΠΗΓΗ/FONS 3, no. 1 (June 7, 2019): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/fons.2019.4550.
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Riassunto: Secondo l’opinione prevalente tra gli studiosi di lingua tedesca, bisogna considerare Aristotele come colui che ha “scoperto” la giustizia particolare. Questo articolo dimostra che quest’opinione è errata, innanzitutto perché Platone aveva già precedentemente sviluppato, nella Repubblica e nelle Leggi, la dottrina della giustizia distributiva e il suo principio di uguaglianza geometrica o proporzionale. In un primo momento, l’articolo interpreta la dottrina della giustizia distributiva esposta da Aristotele nell’Etica Nicomachea e nella Politica. In un secondo momento, si mostra che i principali elementi di questa dottrina erano già stati sviluppati da Platone nelle Leggi. Infine, l’articolo offre un’interpretazione innovativa del concetto di giustizia presentato da Platone nella Repubblica.Parole chiave: Platone, Aristotele, giustizia distributiva, Repubblica, Leggi.Abstract: According to the prevailing opinion in German-speaking research, Aristotle is to be understood as the “discoverer” of particular justice. This article demonstrates that this view is incorrect, especially as Plato developed the doctrine of distributive justice and its principle of geometrical or proportional equality already previously in the Republic and the Laws. In a first step, this article interprets the doctrine of distributive justice that Aristotle lays out in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. In a second step, it shows that the main elements of this doctrine have already been developed by Plato in the Laws. In a final step the article offers an innovative interpretation of the concept of justice that Plato presents in the Republic.Keywords: Plato, Aristotle, Distributive justice, Republic, Laws.
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Perine, Marcelo. "O DIALÉTICO E A DEFINIÇÃO DO BEM EM PLATÃO." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 35, no. 112 (April 13, 2010): 211. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v35n112p211-220/2008.
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Em República, VII, 534 B-D, Platão apresenta uma definição do dialético, que se aplica também ao Bem. O texto levanta dois problemas: 1) Como pensar a ascensão dialética para alcançar a Idéia do Bem? 2) A passagem exigir uma definição do Bem que, contudo, não é dada. Considerando que as “doutrinas não escritas” giravam em torno do problema do Bem, e que os cursos orais ministrados por Platão tinham o título “Sobre o Bem” (Perì tagathoû), a presente reflexão pretende mostrar, na perspectiva da Escola platônica de Tübingen-Milão, os nexos entre o ensinamento oral de Platão e o conteúdo desta passagem do livro VII da República, que contém o que de mais pormenorizado Platão confiou aos escritos a respeito da essência do Bem.Abstract: In Republic, VII, 534 B-D, Plato presents a definition of the dialectician which also applies to the good. The text raises two problems: 1) How can the Idea of the Good be reached through dialectical thinking ? 2) The passage requires a definition of the Good which, however, is not given. Considering that the “unwritten doctrines” revolved around the issue of the Good and that Plato’s oral lectures were entitled “On the Good” (Perì tagathoû), the present reflection, following the Milan-Tübingen-School of Plato interpretation, intends to show the links between Plato’s oral teaching and the contents of Republic, VII, 534 B-D which reveal in great detail what Plato had to say about the essence of the Good.
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Wisnewski, J. Jeremy. "Ergon and Logistikon in Republic." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 25, no. 2 (2008): 261–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000134.
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This paper explores the tension between two views attributed to Plato: 1) that every person in a just society must fulfil his function, and 2) justice requires philosophical wisdom. It is argued that (2) is not Plato’s view in Republic, and that this can be seen as early as Book II.
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Tarrant, H. A. S. "Myth as a Tool of Persuasion in Plato." Antichthon 24 (1990): 19–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0066477400000514.
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Much is said in the text-books about Plato’s hankering after answers to moral questions which would offer scientific accuracy and absolute truth. It is to dialectic it seems that Plato turns in the hope of finding such accuracy. The Republic values Platonic dialectic rather higher than mathematical procedures, if only because the mathematician fails to explain the ultimate terms through which he conducts his inquiry. But the epistemologica! status of mathematics is at least as high as that of physical inquiry, whereas it is certainly higher than that of all this-worldly images. The images of the imitative artist were criticised for their distance from Platonic reality in Book X of the Republic, and it is not at all clear that they differ in this respect from the stories which Plato believes should be used at the commencement of his city’s education programme in Republic II (376e ff.). If myths are images, and images are low in epistemological status in the Republic and related middle period dialogues, then why does Plato use myths so prominently in precisely these dialogues?
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Dombrowski, Daniel A. "On the Alleged Truth About Lies in Plato’s Republic." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 21, no. 1-2 (2004): 93–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000062.
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The purpose of the present article is to explicate and criticize the most detailed philosophical appreciation of the ‘noble’ and other lies in Plato on a Straussian basis: Carl Page’s instructive 1991 article titled ‘The Truth about Lies in Plato’s Republic’. I carefully summarize and criticize Page’s sober, scholarly approach to the subject matter in question. Ultimately I reject his attempt to justify the ‘noble’ and other lies told by both Plato and contemporary government leaders.
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Smith, Nicholas. "Unclarity and the Intermediates in Plato’s Discussions of Clarity in the Republic." PLATO JOURNAL 18 (December 22, 2018): 97–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_18_8.
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In this paper, I argue that the two versions of divided line (the first in Book VI and the recalled version in Book VII) create problems that cannot be solved — with or without the hypothesis that the objects belonging to the level of διάνοια on the divided line are intermediates. I also argue that the discussion of arithmetic and calculation does not fit Aristotle’s attribution of intermediates to Plato and provides no support for the claim that Plato had such intermediates in mind when he talked about διάνοια in the Republic. The upshot of my argument is negative: even if Aristotle’s report about Plato and intermediates is correct, there is no evidence for such objects provided in the passages I review from the Republic. If they are to be found in Plato, it will have to be elsewhere that they are found.
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Bazaluk, Oleg. "The Genesis of the Philosophical Tradition in Education." ΣΧΟΛΗ. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition 15, no. 2 (2021): 911–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/1995-4328-2021-15-2-911-925.
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The article reveals the genesis of the philosophical tradition in education. The emphasis was placed on the study of the Plato’s work. In “The Republic” Plato wrote, “…when you meet encomiasts of Homer who tell us that this poet has been the educator (πεπαίδευκεν) of Hellas, and that for the conduct and refinement of human life he is worthy of our study and devotion, and that we should order our entire lives by the guidance of this poet we must love and salute them” (Plato, Republic 10.606e). The author took Plato’s instructions literally, emphasizing the importance of Plato in the creation of the philosophical tradition.
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Zoller, Coleen Patricia. "Plato and Equality for Women across Social Class." Journal of Ancient Philosophy 15, no. 1 (May 21, 2021): 35–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v15i1p35-62.
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This essay will marshal evidence for Plato’s extension of equal education and professional opportunity to all women, including artisan women who are not his ideal city’s philosopher-queens. I examine the explicit commentary in the Republic, Timaeus, and Laws about women in artisan professions, and I link it together with the three of the core principles advanced in the Republic, particularly (1) the principle of specialization (R. 369b-370c), (2) the principle of irrelevant reproductive differences (R. 454b-e, 456b), and (3) the principle of children’s potential (R. 415a-c, 423c-d) that arises from the myth of metals. Plato uses his Socrates and the Athenian to argue against gender discrimination because it violates these principles. Plato offering a theory of equal opportunity for women across all classes ought to be highlighted as one of the central achievements of the Republic.
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Shields, Christopher. "FORCING GOODNESS IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC." Social Philosophy and Policy 24, no. 2 (May 29, 2007): 21–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026505250707015x.
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Among the instances of apparent illiberality in Plato's Republic, one stands out as especially curious. Long before making a forced return to the cave, and irrespective of the kinds of compulsion operative in such a homecoming, the philosopher-king has been compelled to apprehend the Good (Rep. VII.519c5-d2, 540a3-7). Why should compulsion be necessary or appropriate in this situation? Schooled intensively through the decades for an eventual grasping of the Good, beginning already with precognitive training in music and art calculated to equip the guardian with a natural affinity towards the good and beautiful (Rep. III.401d3-402a4), the fully mature guardian might be expected to leap towards the Good when it is first opportune. For the Good is, according to Plato, the greatest thing to be learned (megiston mathêma; Rep. VI.504e4-5, 505a2). Reflection on these questions permits us to develop a richer appreciation of the forms of necessitation and compulsion Plato envisages for his guardians, which turn out to be primarily merely hypothetical instances of nomic necessitation. It follows that many of Plato's appeals to compulsion are neither coercive nor objectionably authoritarian.
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Knezevic, Visnja. "Plato’s notion of hypothesis in dialogues Meno, Phaedo and The Republic." Theoria, Beograd 60, no. 2 (2017): 120–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1702120k.
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The author analyses Plato?s use of the hypothesis notion in connection with his hypotheses method, as it was articulated in Meno and Phaedo, and later criticized in The Republic. It is shown that, at first, Plato?s use of this notion was identical to its use in ancient Greek mathematics, and that the same stands in regards with his method of inquiry - this, too, was at first modeled after ancient Greek mathematical methods of analysis and diorismos. Later, as he developed the metaphysical theory of forms, Plato distanced himself from ideal of building philosophy on the model of ancient Greek deductive science and established it as auto reflexive, critical thinking instead, with dialectics as method in its own right.
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Abbate, Michele. "La Repubblica di Platone nell’esegesi simbolica, e metafisico-teologica di Proclo." ΠΗΓΗ/FONS 2, no. 1 (December 14, 2017): 153. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/fons.2017.3853.
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Riassunto: Delle diverse tematiche affrontate da Proclo nella sua articolata interpretazione della Repubblica di Platone, il saggio propone una disamina di alcune fra quelle che appaiono particolarmente significative per comprendere in quale direzione proceda complessivamente l’esegesi procliana del dialogo platonico: lo σκοπός (ossia l’argomento principale) e l’impianto simbolico della Repubblica (dissertazione I); la natura, la funzione e il ruolo della giustizia secondo l’esegesi procliana (dissertazioni III e VII-VIII); l’esame e la critica delle obiezioni mosse da Aristotele alla Repubblica di Platone (dissertazione XVII).Parole chiave: Proclo, Platone, Aristotele, Repubblica, skopós, giustiziaAbstract: Among the various themes faced by Proclus in his articulated interpretation of Plato’s Republic, this essay offers an examination of some of those that appear particularly significant in order to understand what direction Proclus’ exegesis of this dialogue takes: the σκοπός (the main argument) and the symbolic system of the Republic (dissertation I); the nature, function and role of justice according to Proclus’ exegesis (dissertations III and VII-VIII); the examination and criticism of the objections raised by Aristotle to Plato’s Republic (dissertation XVII).Keywords: Proclus, Plato, Aristotle, Republic, skopós, justice
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Green, Jerry. "The First City and First Soul in Plato’s Republic." Rhizomata 9, no. 1 (September 1, 2021): 50–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2021-0003.
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Abstract One puzzling feature of Plato’s Republic is the First City or ‘city of pigs’. Socrates praises the First City as a “true”, “healthy” city, yet Plato abandons it with little explanation. I argue that the problem is not a political failing, as most previous readings have proposed: the First City is a viable political arrangement, where one can live a deeply Socratic lifestyle. But the First City has a psychological corollary, that the soul is simple rather than tripartite. Plato sees this ‘First Soul’ as an inaccurate model of moral psychology, and so rejects it, along with its political analogue.
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Lycos, Kimon. "Making Things with Words Plato on Mimesis in Republic." Philosophical Inquiry 18, no. 3 (1996): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philinquiry1996183/41.
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Skedzielewski, Sean. "Justice and the Supposed Fallacy of Irrelevance in Plato’s Republic." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought 37, no. 2 (May 11, 2020): 317–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340277.
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Abstract Previous commentators on Plato’s Republic have relied on mistaken assumptions about the requirements for Plato’s theory of justice: that Plato establishes a bi-conditional between proper psychic rule and the performance of conventionally just acts. They believe that if Plato does not establish this bi-conditional, then his theory of justice as a virtue will succumb to the fallacy of irrelevance. I claim Plato need not meet that requirement. A novel interpretation of the arguments of Book IV concerning justice in the soul suffices to dispense with one aspect of the bi-conditional – that conventional justice must imply justice as psychic harmony. Then, situating the theory of justice as psychic harmony in the context of the divided line, and in the dialectical ascent in the education of the philosopher-rulers, I show that the other conditional requirement – that justice in the soul must imply the performance of conventionally just actions – is also mistaken.
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Calvert, Brian. "Slavery in Plato's Republic." Classical Quarterly 37, no. 2 (December 1987): 367–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838800030561.
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For a number of years, in the not too distant past, there was a lively debate between Plato's defenders and critics over the question of whether his Republic contained slaves. However, since the appearance of an article by Gregory Vlastos1 some twenty years ago, it seems to have been generally felt that the issue has been resolved, and the controversy has died down. Vlastos argued that the evidence admits of no doubt - Plato included slaves in his ideal state. In this paper, I wish to have the case reopened, and to revive interest in what I believe should continue to be a matter of debate. In opposition to what has become the standard view, I am inclined to think, on balance, that his Republic could not contain slaves. Vlastos begins by reminding us that, on those occasions when Plato wants to propose a radical change from existing institutions, he argues for such a change. If he had intended to abolish slavery from his ideal society, this would have been a radical change, and we should have expected him to indicate clearly such an intention, and to justify it. Since no justification is forthcoming, we may presume that no change is envisaged. This line of argument I shall call the presumptive argument. One version of it is mentioned by R. B. Levinson,2 namely that the rough and dirty work, carried on behind the scene by slaves, will take place as usual, and the continuance of slavery is assumed without question.
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Lynch, Tosca. "The Symphony of Temperance in Republic 4." Greek and Roman Musical Studies 5, no. 1 (February 23, 2017): 18–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22129758-12341287.
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This paper calls into question a long-lasting but ill-founded tenet of Platonic scholarship, namely that Plato was not interested in, or aware of, the technical implications of the musical concepts he employed in the dialogues. Conversely, I will show how Plato exploited the technical and practical features of the concept ofsymphōnía dià pasôn, and of choral singing more generally, to highlight the unique role played by temperance (sōphrosýnē) in the ideal city. More precisely I contend that Plato’s musical images, far from being decorative or purely metaphoric devices, enrich our understanding of this ethical notion precisely by means of their technical and performative implications, which were very familiar to the original readers of theRepublic. Hence musical theory and practice, in addition to being central elements of the cultural context in which Plato’s reflections must be interpreted, represent also a repertoire of concepts that significantly informed his philosophical theories.
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Panagopoulos, Nic. "Utopian/Dystopian Visions: Plato, Huxley, Orwell." International Journal of Comparative Literature and Translation Studies 8, no. 2 (March 30, 2019): 22. http://dx.doi.org/10.7575/aiac.ijclts.v.8n.2p.22.
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This paper attempts to theorize two twentieth-century fictional dystopias, Brave New World (2013) and Nineteen Eighty-Four (1984), using Plato’s political dialogues. It explores not only how these three authors’ utopian/dystopian visions compare as types of narrative, but also how possible, desirable, and useful their imagined societies may be, and for whom. By examining where the Republic, Brave New World, and Nineteen Eighty-Four stand on such issues as social engineering, censorship, cultural and sexual politics, the paper allows them to inform and critique each other, hoping to reveal in the process what may or may not have changed in utopian thinking since Plato wrote his seminal work. It appears that the social import of speculative fiction is ambivalent, for not only may it lend itself to totalitarian appropriation and application—as seems to have been the case with The Republic—but it may also constitute a means of critiquing the existing status quo by conceptualizing different ways of thinking and being, thereby allowing for the possibility of change.
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Veltman, Andrea. "The Justice of the Ordinary Citizen in Platos Republic." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 22, no. 1 (2005): 45–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000069.
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On the surface, it is not clear whether the ordinary citizen in Platos Republic possesses the virtue of justice defended in the dialogue. In order to resolve a tension in Platos treatment of the ordinary citizen, this paper presents a distinction between the civic justice of the ordinary citizen and the platonic justice of the philosopher. Whereas the justice possessed by the philosopher requires knowledge of the good as well as a reason-governed soul, civic justice requires only true beliefs about justice and a habit or practice of just action.
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Adluri, Vishwa. "Plato’s Saving Mūthos: The Language of Salvation in the Republic." International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 8, no. 1 (February 10, 2014): 3–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18725473-12341272.
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Abstract This article discusses the Homeric background of the Republic with the aim of elucidating Plato’s critique of Homeric nostos. It argues that the Republic unfolds as a nostos voyage, with Socrates striving to steer the soul home. Even though Segal has already argued for seeing the Republic as an Odyssean voyage, this article suggests that Plato does more than simply borrow the idea of a voyage as a metaphor for the wanderings of the soul. Rather, there is an implicit critique of Homer as the “poet of Becoming” in the dialogue. Thus, reading the Republic in the context of other Platonic dialogues such as the Cratylus and Theaetetus where Socrates identifies Homer as the source of the view that Ocean is the origin of all things (Crat. 402b, Theaet. 180d) and that everything is in flux (Theaet. 180d) allows us to better appreciate Socrates’ critique of poets in the Republic. At stake in this critique is ultimately the question of the soul’s true nostos, which Plato identifies with a vertical ascent (Rep. 521c, 532b) to Being rather than with a temporary homecoming within Becoming. This article contributes to the elucidation of the Homeric and pre-Socratic background of Platonic philosophy. It undertakes a literary reading of the Republic against the background of the hero’s journey motif. Specifically, it argues that Plato critiques and emends the Odyssean nostos in order to make space for Parmenidean ontology, thus forging a new understanding of salvation.
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Yu-Jung, Sun. "Lies in Plato’s Republic: poems, myth, and noble lie." ΠΗΓΗ/FONS 2, no. 1 (December 14, 2017): 87. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/fons.2017.3860.
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Abstract: In this paper, I argue that 1) the ostensible inconsistency between the judgments of value on different kinds of lying, like poetry, fabricated story, myth and noble lies, is not a veritable one, and 2) Plato does not hold a utilitarian position on the question of lying, or making up something false to be more precise, and lies do not turn into noble lies once they are told to be in the service of some superior purpose. Plato does state in Book II of the Republic that the veritable lie (ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος) is what all gods and all man hate (382a), and poets must be punished for deceiving people by linking the Supreme Being to its contrary. But Plato also discusses the useful lie, especially the one lie that is necessary for the unity and stability of the polis: the Noble Lie. Neither useful lies nor noble lies can be acceptable just because we can make a use out of it, and it does not hold either that the greater the use we can make out of a lie, the nobler a lie is. A true lie (ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος) for Plato is the kind of lie leading people to believe that the hierarchy of the forms can be reordered in any way, and we can make random associations between the forms, like forming the relation between gods and the action of war. On the other hand, useful lies and the noble lies are in fact a duplicate of the order of the forms. This order, which articulates forms, is what makes thinking of truth possible, and we can later find this idea of the order of the forms which allows us to think truth and falsity in both the Theaetetus and the Sophist.Keywords: Lie, imitation, dialectic, falsehood
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MURR, DIMITRI EL. "WHY THE GOOD? APPEARANCE, REALITY AND THE DESIRE FOR THE GOOD IN REPUBLIC, VI, 504B-506D." Méthexis 27, no. 1 (March 30, 2014): 47–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24680974-90000632.
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What arguments does Plato offer to explain the pre-eminence he confers to the idea of the Good in Republic, 6? Considering in detail the short but key section of the Republic (504b-506d) that precedes the analogy between the Good and the Sun, this paper argues that it is what Plato claims to be the universal recognition that the Good exists independently of any opinion that makes it so important for human thought. Nothing less than the concept that can make everything else intelligible, as the sun makes everything in the sensible world visible.
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Nilsen, Fredrik. "Kvinnens overflødighet hos Platon." Nordlit, no. 33 (November 16, 2014): 99. http://dx.doi.org/10.7557/13.3182.
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<em>The Superfluity of Women in Plato. </em>In her article «Plato’s problematic women» Kristin Sampson argues that Plato has two different views on women in the <em>Republic</em> and the <em>Timaeus </em>respectively. In the <em>Republic</em> Plato operates with some sort of equality of status between the two genders, at least in the leaders’ and the soldiers’ classes, whereas in the mythology of the <em>Timaeus</em> women are depicted as reincarnations of men who earlier had lived an unmoral and bad life. According to my interpretation, these two views must be seen as two aspects of one common Greek thought or, as Vigdis Songe-Møller puts it, one common Greek dream, «the dream of the women’s superfluity». In the <em>Republic</em> Plato tries to rule out differences between genders by making the women as similar to men as possible, while in the <em>Timaeus</em> he describes them as something completely different from the norm, the man, and actually as a punishment to men with bad moral behaviour, something that society ideally should do without.
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Andrade Maronna, Helena. "A mimesis nos Livros III e X da República de Platão." CODEX – Revista de Estudos Clássicos 2, no. 1 (July 5, 2010): 22. http://dx.doi.org/10.25187/codex.v2i1.2818.
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<div class="page" title="Page 22"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"><p><span>O presente estudo tem como objetivo investigar a questão da <em>mimesis</em> na <em>República</em> de Platão; que o leva a banir a poesia de sua cidade ideal e o porquê deste ataque. No início da <em>República</em> Platão aparenta assumir uma posição branda em relação à poesia imitativa, mas ao longo da obra a sua censura vai tornando-se cada vez mais violenta até culminar com o banimento do poeta de sua cidade ideal. Quando Platão desvela o seu maior ataque à poesia no Livro X, muita discussão já foi feita acerca da educação da cidade ideal e do cidadão ideal; paralelo entre o todo e a parte que Platão estabelece durante toda a exposição de sua doutrina. Apoiando-nos na crítica moderna sobre tal problemática pretendemos obter uma visão mais abrangente sobre os estudos da mimesis retratada nos Livros III e X da <em>República</em> de Platão.</span></p><p><span><br /></span></p><div class="page" title="Page 1"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"><p><strong>Mimesis in Book 3 and 10 of Plato’s Republic </strong></p><p><strong>Abstract </strong></p><p><span>The present study aims to investigate the question of the mimesis </span><span>in Plato’s </span><span>Republic, what motivates him to banish the poetry of its ideal city and the reasons of this attack. At the beginning of the Republic, Plato seems to assume a lenient position on the imitative poetry, but throughout the dialogue his censorship becomes increasingly violent until culminating with the banishment of the poet from its ideal city. When Plato evinces his major attack against the poetry in Book X, much discussion had already been made concerning the ideal </span><span>city’s education and the ideal citizen by the parallel between the whole and the part that </span><span>Plato establishes during the entire exposition of his doctrines. With the support of the modern critics about such problematic, we intend to get a more including understanding of the studies of mimesis </span><span>in Books III and X of Plato’s </span><span>Republic. </span></p><p><span><strong>Keywords:</strong> Ancient Philosophy, Plato, Republic, mimesis. </span></p></div></div></div><p><span><br /></span></p></div></div></div>
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Valiquette Moreau, Nina. "Musical Mimesis and Political Ethos in Plato’s Republic." Political Theory 45, no. 2 (August 3, 2016): 192–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0090591715591587.
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This essay argues that Plato’s Republic includes a widely overlooked meditation on the affective dimension of political judgment. This meditation occurs in the passages on music. In music, Plato identifies the possibility of an extra-rational aesthetic activity that prepares the soul for reasoned judgment: he makes musical mimesis the precondition to logos (speech, reasoned account) because of its ability to actualize in the soul the very ethos required of sound judgment. Music is able to do this because it is not imagistic; music does not produce mediated representations but rather produces alterations in the condition of the soul itself. These alterations are made possible because the soul itself is structured musically. If music actualizes the conditions of the soul, so too does the soul instantiate the conditions of music. In his treatment of musical mimesis, Plato thereby makes disposition, or affect, the defining feature of sound judgment.
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Holowchak, M. Andrew. "Jefferson’s Platonic Republicanism." Polis 31, no. 2 (August 15, 2014): 369–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340021.
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That Jefferson execrated Plato in an 1814 letter to friend John Adams. In it, he expresses an unsympathetic, hostile view of Plato’s Republic, and the reasons are several. Nonetheless, Plato’s views on what makes government fundamentally sound are, at base, remarkably similar to Jefferson’s both in substance and sentiment, so much so that it is inconceivable to think that Plato’s Republic had little effect on Jefferson’s political thinking. That makes his execration of Plato difficult to understand. This paper is an attempt to show that Jefferson, despite the tenor of his letter to Adams, had much more than a dilettante’s grasp of the political content of Plato’s major work. Jefferson was very likely quite familiar with the work, since his own political philosophy assimilates key substratal Platonic political principles of good, stable governing. His disavowal of the work and execration of Plato, then, is due to a constellation of other factors: Adams’s feelings toward Plato, Jefferson’s views on the corruptions of Jesus’s teachings, his deep-dyed detestation of metempiricism, his view that Plato was an unoriginal thinker, and strong disagreement with Plato’s means to instantiate substratal political principles.
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Vogt, Katja Maria. "Plato on Hunger and Thirst." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 20, no. 1 (April 5, 2017): 103–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-02001007.
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I argue that Plato’s account of hunger and thirst in Republic IV, 437d–439a uncovers a general feature of desire: desire has an unqualified and a qualified dimension. This proposal, which I call Two Dimensions, captures recognizable motivational phenomena: being hungry and aiming to determine what one is hungry for, or wanting to study and still figuring out what field it is that one wants to study. Two Dimensions is a fundamental contribution to the theory of desire. It is compatible, I argue, with the better known premise that desire is for the good, because the objects of paradigmatic desires are inherently valuable.
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Pitari, Paolo. "The Problem of Literary Truth in Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Poetics." Literature 1, no. 1 (August 5, 2021): 14–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/literature1010003.
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In contemporary literary theory, Plato is often cited as the original repudiator of literary truth, and Aristotle as he who set down that literature is “imitation,” thus himself involuntarily banning literature from truth. This essay argues that these interpretations adulterate the original arguments of Plato and Aristotle, who both believed in literary truth. We—literary theorists and philosophers of literature—should recognize this and rethink our interpretation of these ancient texts. This will, in turn, lead us to ask better questions about the nature of literary truth and value.
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Saxonhouse, Arlene W. "Democracy, Equality, and Eidê: A Radical View from Book 8 of Plato's Republic." American Political Science Review 92, no. 2 (June 1998): 273–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2585663.
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A Plato opposed to democracy fills the literature, and while some scholars question whether Plato adequately captures Socrates' possibly favorable views of democracy, Plato himself remains a paragon of elitism. I argue that Plato's response to democracy is far more theoretically interesting than simple disdain for the unenlightened masses. Rather, in Book 8 of the Republic he explores the fundamental tensions of a regime identified with freedom and equality, which he presents as characterized by formlessness, and the epistemological and theoretical problems posed by the absence of forms (eidê). Eidê give structure and identity to regimes and to their citizens; they are necessary for intellection and philosophy, but they are also the grounds for compulsion. Plato's analysis of democracy thus becomes a more serious challenge for democratic theorists than previously recognized.
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Kandic, Aleksandar. "Plato and modern natural sciences." Theoria, Beograd 62, no. 3 (2019): 17–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1903017k.
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There are almost irreconcilable differences between Plato?s notion of science (episteme) and the modern notion, but also certain similarities. In the late dialogues such as The Theaetetus, The Philebus, and The Timaeus, Plato redefines his own notion of knowledge developed in The Republic to some extent. Genuine knowledge does not refer solely to the unchangeable aspects of reality. Plato?s characterization of cosmology as an eikos logos (?likely story?) in The Timaeus is an anticipation of the concept of falsifiability that dominates modern philosophy of science. Experience and observation, as well as mathematical, psychological and biological concepts, occupy a significant, indispensable place within the structure of Timaeus? cosmological model.
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Morris, Michael. "Akrasia in the Protagoras and the Republic." Phronesis 51, no. 3 (2006): 195–229. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852806778134072.
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AbstractAlthough it is a commonplace that the Protagoras and the Republic present diffent views of akrasia, the nature of the difference is not well understood. I argue that the logic of the famous argument in the Protagoras turns just on two crucial assumptions: that desiring is having evaluative beliefs (or that valuing is desiring), and that no one can have contradictory preferences at the same time; hedonism is not essential to the logic of the argument. And the logic of the argument for the division of the soul in the Republic requires the rejection of just the second of these assumptions, but not the evaluative conception of desire. I also maintain that Plato was aware, at the time of composition, of these features of the argumentation of his dialogues. Finally, I argue that there is reason to think that, even at the time of the Protagoras, Plato held the conception of the soul expressed in the Republic, and not anything like that expressed in the famous argument of the Protagoras. The Protagoras view, even without hedonism, is a poor expression of the thesis that virtue is knowledge.