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Journal articles on the topic 'Philosophy of the person'

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Published: 10 March 2023

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1

Misik, Maria. "Person – Disability – (Auto)biography:." Biografistyka Pedagogiczna 5, no. 2 (December 15, 2020): 77–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.36578/bp.2020.05.06.

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From the biographical perspective, Wojciech Chudy appears as a philosopher, ethicist and educator, who wonders who a person experiencing disability is. Based on his personal biographical experience, he wants to ‘think and tell the truth’ about the situation of people with disabilities. From the perspective of biographical analysis, it is clear how Chudy’s personalistic philosophy of human disability complements the philosophy of reflection and the disclosure of hypocrisy.

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2

Roccanova, Janet. "In-person Philosophy." Symposium 3, no. 2 (1999): 233–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/symposium19993220.

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3

Serebryakov, F. F. "Educated Person and Philosophy (Does Education Make a Person Educated?)." Uchenye Zapiski Kazanskogo Universiteta. Seriya Gumanitarnye Nauki 163, no. 4–5 (2021): 238–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.26907/2541-7738.2021.4-5.238-254.

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The article discusses the question of who counts as an educated person. The general concept of an educated person seems to be too broad, abstract, and meaningless. This concept is inadequate for sociological, anthropological, and cultural analysis, because it specifies no clear measure or criterion of an educated person. If the general definition is turned into a more concrete and historically based one, it will be more productive and efficient in terms of research. When education becomes a subject of “historical philosophizing”, it evolves from “gaining systematized knowledge and skills” to “upbringing an educatee’s personality”, which is a socio-philosophical matter. The article discusses various meanings of the latter definition. Starting from G.W.F. Hegel’s ideas about education, the exact meaning of the concept of an educated person and the features distinguishing them from an uneducated person are analyzed. The conclusion is drawn about the place of philosophy in the process of education (obviously, its role is decisive).

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4

Chung Yong Hwan. "Virtuous Person in Mengzi's Moral Philosophy." Journal of Eastern Philosophy ll, no. 77 (February 2014): 163–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.17299/tsep..77.201402.163.

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5

Guðmundsson, Ólafur. "The philosophy of the crazy person." DRAMA – Nordisk dramapedagogisk tidsskrift 1, no. 01 (June 18, 2018): 48–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.18261/issn.2535-4310-2018-01-11.

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6

Child, William. "Solipsism and First Person/Third Person Asymmetries." European Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 2 (August 1996): 137–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.1996.tb00071.x.

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7

Stump, Eleonore. "Theology and the Knowledge of Persons." Roczniki Filozoficzne 69, no. 3 (September 24, 2021): 9–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/rf21693-1.

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The aim of the paper is to discern between philosophy and theology. A philosopher is looking after impersonal wisdom, a theologian searches for a personal God. This differentiation is fundamental because knowledge of persons differs from knowledge that. The author shows how taking into account the fact that theology is based on the second-person knowledge changes the way one should approach the hiddenness argument. * The paper was originally published in: Fiona Ellis (ed.), New Models of Religious Understanding (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 172–90. Reprinted by the permission of the Author.

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8

Seemann, Axel. "Person perception." Philosophical Explorations 11, no. 3 (September 2008): 245–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869790802239201.

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9

CORNMAN, JAMES W. "Strawson's “Person”." Theoria 30, no. 3 (February 11, 2008): 145–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1964.tb01085.x.

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10

EFFINGHAM, NIKK. "The philosophy of filioque." Religious Studies 54, no. 3 (May 9, 2018): 297–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412518000264.

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AbstractThis article offers a model of the Trinity dealing with various objections to the filioque clause. I deal with three worries: the problem of double procession; the problem of the Father's omnipotence; worries about the Spirit's subordination. The model has two main commitments: (i) relations like proceeding, begetting, generation, etc. are causal relations; (ii) each Divine Person is caused by the other two Divine Persons. The model also allows for the Father's elevation over and above the Spirit and the Son. I end by discussing some problems for this revisionary scheme.1

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11

Nandimath, Priya T. "Person-centred care in dementia: Philosophy and challenges in implementation." Annals of Geriatric Education and Medical Sciences 8, no. 1 (July 15, 2021): 3–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.18231/j.agems.2021.003.

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Health care concept is increasingly moving away from medical, task oriented and professional driven model towards a holistic model of health care which values the needs of the persons and centred on the needs of the patients. This shift is described as person centred care. Despite the wide availability of literature, philosophy and evidence on the outcomes of the person centred care, barely it is an ideal in reality. This present article throws light on the philosophy and challenges of person centred care and tries to raise the awareness and understanding about person centred care for people with dementia and explores on the challenges underpinning person-centred care in dementia.Person centred care means, being “respectful of and responsive to individual patient preferences, needs, and values and ensuring that patient values guide all clinical decisions”. Each individual has unique history, personality, values, right to dignity, respect and right to participation. PCC framework emphasises on the assumptions made about the people with dementia, care givers attitude, models and care practices, factors at organisational level, cultural factors as well as structural elements such as lighting and flooring. It is a holistic philosophy across the continuum of services which takes into account the specific needs of each person. The philosophy of person centred care focuses on “the abilities and strength of the person than the losses” and on “the person than on the condition”.Lack of clarity in understanding person centred care in dementia, lack of research evidence, not valuing the views and needs of people with dementia, organisational culture, task centred care culture, lack of resources. : To improve quality of life of people with dementia and for the better functioning of the people with dementia there is a need for greater implementation of person centred care. However the challenges in the implementation of person centred care are masking the achievements and positive aspects of the person centred care approach. The challenge ahead for dementia experts is to advocate and raise the awareness and understanding and to provide evidence based solutions in practically implementing person centred care and making it more real in practice than keeping it ideal in literature.

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12

Chapman, Dean. "The Individual and Social Self in a New Communitarianism." Philosophia Africana 19, no. 1 (February 2020): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/philafri.19.1.0001.

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ABSTRACT Some communitarians about personhood hold that human communities are metaphysically antecedent to individual persons, and that personhood comes in degrees, and that one becomes a person through ethical maturation within a community. I offer a new communitarianism that also endorses those claims. It is based partly on certain African accounts of the person—primarily Menkiti’s account—and partly on Mark Johnston’s extraordinary argument that extremely good persons are literally at one with the human community itself. The theory’s concept of the person is a novel understanding of the social self. I argue that the account helps to solve three puzzles to do with communitarian conceptions of personhood. One puzzle is about understanding the individual person as an individual. Another relates to the alleged metaphysical priority of communities over persons. And a third is a problem for the view that personhood is graded.

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13

Descombes, Vincent. "A Philosophy of the First-Person Singular." Communication Theory 17, no. 1 (February 2007): 4–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2007.00284.x.

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14

Lolordo, Antonia. "Person, Substance, Mode and ‘the moral Man’ in Locke's Philosophy." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40, no. 4 (December 2010): 643–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2010.10716738.

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In 1769, the English bishop and theologian Edmund Law published a Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion concerning Personal Identity. In this work, Law attempted to ‘explain and vindicate Mr. Locke's hypothesis’ (301) by offering a new account of Lockean persons. Law's account centers around three key claims. First, persons are modes — very roughly, properties — rather than substances. Second, the relevant properties are those that make moral evaluation appropriate, thus taking seriously Locke's insistence that ‘person’ is a forensic term. And third, the fact that persons are modes is what makes a demonstrative science of morality possible.I am not convinced that Law's interpretation actually vindicates Locke, though it does make his theory come out rather better than is typically imagined. I am, however, convinced that Law's interpretation provides the best available account of Lockean persons.

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15

Mangini, Michele. "Is the Reasonable Person a Person of Virtue?" Res Publica 26, no. 2 (April 16, 2019): 157–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11158-019-09432-5.

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16

Ross, James F., and David Braine. "The Human Person." Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 177 (October 1994): 536. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2220254.

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17

McCool, Gerald A. "Person and Being." International Philosophical Quarterly 34, no. 1 (1994): 121–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq199434168.

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18

Clarke, W. Norris. "The Human Person." International Philosophical Quarterly 34, no. 3 (1994): 376–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq199434330.

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19

McCool, Gerald A. "Person and Community." International Philosophical Quarterly 35, no. 1 (1995): 97–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq199535162.

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20

Clark, Mary T. "The Augustinian Person." International Philosophical Quarterly 46, no. 4 (2006): 509–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq200646447.

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21

Engelland, Chad. "Unmasking the Person." International Philosophical Quarterly 50, no. 4 (2010): 447–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq201050432.

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22

Tropper, Sarah. "Person oder Mensch?" Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 69, no. 3 (June 1, 2021): 469–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2021-0040.

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23

Tullius, William. "Person and Spirit." International Philosophical Quarterly 61, no. 1 (2021): 61–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq202131166.

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Much of Edith Stein’s work on personhood is influenced by Max Scheler’s ethically focused Christian personalism. But Stein’s own treatment of the ethical implications of personalism is not yet well studied. While the ethical theme is visible early on, it is not until the 1930s that the implicitly Christian dimension of her personalism became explicit. Stein mined her Christian personalism for its ethical and pedagogical implications on the topic of self-formation. This paper reviews the lines of development of Stein’s Christian personalism and examines its centrality for a concept of ethical education.

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24

O’Hara, Mary L. "The Vanishing Person." International Studies in Philosophy 27, no. 2 (1995): 101–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil199527299.

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25

Coliva, Annalisa. "The First Person." Journal of Philosophy 100, no. 8 (2003): 416–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil2003100825.

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26

La Plante, Harry. "Person and Thomism." Modern Schoolman 63, no. 3 (1986): 193–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/schoolman198663332.

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27

Rudder Baker, Lynne. "First-Person Externalism." Modern Schoolman 84, no. 2 (2007): 155–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/schoolman2007842/39.

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28

Davidson, Donald. "The Second Person." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1992): 255–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1992.tb00154.x.

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29

Noller, Jörg. "Mensch oder Person?" Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67, no. 5 (December 2, 2019): 905–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2019-0067.

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30

Olson*, Eric T., and Karsten Witt. "Against Person Essentialism." Mind 129, no. 515 (June 29, 2020): 715–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaa016.

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Abstract It is widely held that every person is a person essentially, where being a person is having special mental properties such as intelligence and self-consciousness. It follows that nothing can acquire or lose these properties. The paper argues that this rules out all familiar psychological-continuity views of personal identity over time. It also faces grave difficulties in accounting for the mental powers of human beings who are not intelligent and self-conscious, such as foetuses and those with dementia.

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31

Smith, Steven G. "The First Person." Idealistic Studies 16, no. 3 (1986): 271–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies198616349.

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32

Feldman, Susan. "Second-Person Scepticism." Philosophical Quarterly 47, no. 186 (January 1997): 80–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00048.

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33

Verheggen, Claudine. "Davidson's Second Person." Philosophical Quarterly 47, no. 188 (July 1997): 361–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00065.

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34

Adams, E. M. "THECONCEPTOF A PERSON." Southern Journal of Philosophy 23, no. 4 (December 1985): 403–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1985.tb00411.x.

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35

Morgan, Daniel, and Léa Salje. "First-Person Thought." Analysis 80, no. 1 (December 23, 2019): 148–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz089.

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36

Thomas, Laurence. "Justice, Happiness, And Self-Knowledge." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 1 (March 1986): 63–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1986.10717107.

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No man can, for any considerable time, wear one face to himself and another to the multitude without finally getting bewildered as to which is the true one- Nathaniel HawthorneThe Platonic view that every just person is, in virtue of being such, happier than any unjust person, since all among the latter are unhappy, strikes a most responsive chord in the hearts of a great many persons. But it would seem that this idea has less of a foothold in reality than it does in our hearts. It is far too difficult to deny that there are unjust persons who are happy. Indeed, some even seem to be happier than many a just person.So I shall lower my sights. Rather than attempting to defend as sound the Platonic view, I shall argue that the just person is favored to be happier than a certain kind of unjust person whom I shall simply call a masquerader - this is, an individual who is frequently concerned to masquerade as a deeply caring person.

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37

McClure, Joyce Kloc. "The Contingency of Solidarity: A Pragmatic Critique of Richard Rorty's Philosophy." Horizons 28, no. 1 (2001): 30–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0360966900008914.

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ABSTRACTPragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty articulates a view of the human person that is deeply at odds with a central assertion of Christianity: that human persons are deeply but not finally vulnerable to the conditions of their existence, and thus not wholly contingent beings. Because key elements of a Christian view of the human person, including a sharp appreciation of human vulnerability and the concept of freedom, as well as grounds for an overriding commitment to the well-being of all human persons are at stake, the author stresses the importance of addressing Rorty's pragmatist views. The author's argument is that Rorty's presentation of solidarity as the public response to human contingency fails on pragmatic grounds and she suggests an alternative view of contingency that can account for the creation of solidarity.

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38

Christie, Tim. "Natural Separateness: Why Parfit's Reductionist Account of Persons Fails to Support Consequentialism." Journal of Moral Philosophy 6, no. 2 (2009): 178–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/174552409x402340.

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AbstractMy goal in this essay will be to show, contra Parfit, that the separateness of human persons—although metaphysically shallow—has a moral significance that should not be overlooked. Parfit holds that his reductionist view of personal identity lends support to consequentialism; I reject this claim because it rests on the assumption that the separateness of human persons has an arbitrariness that renders it morally insignificant. This assumption is flawed because this separateness is grounded in our 'person practices', which reflect some of the morally relevant aspects of our nature: if we imagine a species of person whose members are not naturally separate from each other, it is reasonable to suppose that the morality of this different species of person would be drastically different from human morality. Thus, if consequentialists aim to offer a human moral theory, they overlook the separateness of human persons with peril.

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39

LUDWIG, KIRK. "The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31, no. 1 (September 2007): 128–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00160.x.

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40

Choifer, Alla. "A New Understanding of the First-Person and Third-Person Perspectives." Philosophical Papers 47, no. 3 (September 2, 2018): 333–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2018.1450160.

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41

Volek, Peter. "Teaching Philosophy Online?" Journal of Didactics of Philosophy 5, no. 2 (October 31, 2021): 62–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.46586/jdph.2021.9598.

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The article deals with the issue of the appropriateness of online philosophy teaching at the level of secondary schools. The author presents a thesis that online teaching of philosophy as an acceptable substitute for in-person classes should be used only as an exception under special circumstances, e.g. an endemic. Under normal circumstances, online teaching should preferably be used as avaluable supplement to in-person teaching. The thesis is elaborated through an analysis of several fundamental concepts (philosophy, the role of philosophy in the educational process, online teaching). Subsequently, the thesis is also supported by a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of online teaching of philosophy. The disadvantages of online philosophy teaching, as e.g. limited possibility to use dramatization, reading, play, and non-verbal communication will prove to outweigh the advantages.

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42

Denn, Harrison. "Karol Wojtyla’s Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person and Act." National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 18, no. 3 (2018): 543–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ncbq201818354.

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43

Pawlikowski, John T. "Karol Wojtyła’s Personalist Philosophy: Understanding “Person and Act”." Polish Review 66, no. 1 (April 1, 2021): 104–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/polishreview.66.1.0104.

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44

Gabardi, Wayne, Michael Carrithers, Steven Collins, and Steven Lukes. "The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History." Political Psychology 8, no. 4 (December 1987): 681. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3790930.

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45

Hargaden, Helena. "Book Review: Person-Centred Therapy: A Clinical Philosophy." Transactional Analysis Journal 37, no. 1 (January 2007): 80–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/036215370703700110.

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46

Gellner, Ernest, and Michael Carrithers. "The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History." Man 21, no. 3 (September 1986): 558. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2803125.

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47

Mosko, Mark S., Michael Carrithers, Steven Collins, and Steven Lukes. "The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History." Ethnohistory 34, no. 1 (1987): 110. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/482271.

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48

Tahmasbi, Mohammad Reza. "On the Nature of Persons; Persons as Constituted Events." Metaphysica 22, no. 1 (March 12, 2021): 45–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0005.

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Abstract The diachronic question of persons deals with personal identity over time: “In virtue of what conditions is a person, P 1, at t 1, the same person, P 2, at t 2?” To answer the question, I suggest expanding the constitution theory from a static definition to a dynamic definition. ‘Life’ is an event and the stream of consciousness is an event too. Reflective self-consciousness—which I take to be definitive of persons—is an event. Persons are irreducible constituted events who remain the same through time while they undergo change. This idea faces neither the problem of substance dualism nor the fission problem.

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49

Craig, William Lane. "Talbott's Universalism." Religious Studies 27, no. 3 (September 1991): 297–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500020990.

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In a pair of recently published articles, Thomas Talbott has presented a carefully constructed case for universalism. He contends that from the principle(P3) Necessarily, God loves a person S (with a perfect form of love) at a time t only if God's intention at t and every moment subsequent to t is to do everything within his power to promote supremely worthwhile happiness in S, provided that the actions taken are consistent with his promoting the same kind of happiness in all others whom he also lovesand the propositions1. God exists2. God is both omniscient and omnipotent3. God loves every created person4. God will irrevocably reject some persons and subject those persons to ever-lasting punishmenta contradiction may be deduced. For given (P3), (3) entails5. For any created person S and time t subsequent to the creation of S, God's intention at t is to do all that he properly can to promote supremely worthwhile happiness in S.

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50

Lemna, Keith. "Phenomenology of the Person." International Philosophical Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2010): 383–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq201050354.

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