Dissertations / Theses: 'Philosophy of the person'

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Rocha, Samuel D. "Education, Study, and the Person." The Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1280945814.

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王云萍 and Yunping Wang. "The Confucian conception of a moral person." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2000. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31241165.

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Wang, Yunping. "The Confucian conception of a moral person /." Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 2000. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B22189440.

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Harcourt, Edward. "Sense and the first person : Frege and Wittgenstein." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.295782.

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Bailey, Jeannine Marie. "An argument against the person-affecting view of wrongness." Thesis, University of Colorado at Boulder, 2014. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=1565266.

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An act is usually thought of as wrong only if it harms someone and to harm someone is, roughly speaking, to make her worse off. However, the view that an act is wrong only if it harms some particular individual restricts us to a person-affecting view about wrongness. If an act is wrong that does not make any individual worse off, this wrongness cannot be explained in terms of person-affecting consequences. I want to propose that an action can be wrong even if no particular individual is harmed by that act. It is the goal of this paper to show that not only is this a plausible view about wrongness, but it is the correct view. On this view, there can be wrongness in the harm caused by diminishing the overall value in the world or by making the world a worse place than it otherwise would have been.

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Bamford, Desmond Nicholas. "Person, deification and re-cognition : a comparative study of person in the Byzantine and Pratyabhijna traditions." Thesis, University of Chichester, 2010. http://eprints.chi.ac.uk/810/.

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This thesis will construct a model of person through a comparison of ideas relating to a concept of person in the Byzantine and Pratyabhijnii traditions. Questions will be asked, such as, whether a concept of person can be constructed within these two traditions, and how can ideas developed from these traditions be utilised to construct a model of person? This thesis will provide an in depth examination of terms and concepts that will be related to a concept of person within the two traditions, examining the ontological and existential implications of those terms. This work will also develop, from a subsequent convergence of the theologies of the two traditions, a model of person that is inter-religious and dialogical. Though this work is analytical in nature, in its deconstructing philosophical and theological models relating to person, it is also constructive, taking what is useful from the Byzantine and Pratyabhijnii traditions so as to construct a new model of person through the development of the term, Atman-hypostasis which looks to understanding human personhood in the fullest mystical state (deification) within the human condition. A comparison of the two traditions has not been attempted before in relation to the theological discourse of person; neither has such an extensive examination and deconstruction of the concept person in Byzantine and Pratyabhijnii traditions been undertaken in relation to contemporary studies; neither has a construction of this type of model of person been undertaken. This work, in constructing a new term Atmanhypostasis, which emerged from this research as an outcome of the comparison of terms and ideas relating to a concept of person in both traditions, will contribute to the academic theological field of personhood and this thesis will also contribute to the field of inter-religious dialogue in developing an anthropological model that aims to overcome the barriers that separate and divide.

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Duffey, Maura. "The Non-Identity Problem: Finding a Narrow-Person-Affecting Solution to a Narrow-Person-Affecting Problem." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/879.

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The non-identity problem attempts to explain the moral permissibility of certain procreative acts that determine a future individual’s existence. If we accept that this individual’s life is worth living, than we must also accept that these procreative acts are permissible. However, this is not the case. In this paper, I will argue against the permissibility of these acts and explain why our intuition, that these acts are morally wrong, is in fact correct. Because the non-identity problem affects particular persons, those whose existence is brought about, I argue in favor of a solution that explains that moral impermissibility in terms of the wrong done to this particular person. I do so by demonstrating why solutions offered by Derek Parfit, Elizabeth Harman, and Justin McBrayer have failed, whereas solutions offered by James Woodward and Gregory Kavka successfully explain moral impermissibility of non-identity acts in terms of wronging future individuals.

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McCall, Catherine C. "Concepts of person : an analysis of concepts of person, self and human being, and their relevance to theories of personal identity." Thesis, University of Manchester, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.254873.

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Di, Blasio Lina. "Rogers' concept of the fully functioning person: An adequate portrayal of human freedom?" Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/7637.

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Carl Rogers, a leading figure in the Third Force Psychology, was keenly aware of the inadequacies of scientific psychology. He accurately observed that the main problem with psychology as a natural science is its approach, or philosophical presuppositions regarding the nature of the human being. For scientific psychology, persons are predetermined objects and human behaviour is nothing but causally determined reactions to external stimuli. In Persons or science: A philosophical question (1955) Rogers attempts to develop psychology into a human science. This science adopts a new approach, one which recognizes human freedom. From this new approach emerges his alternative view of the optimal human being, the fully functioning person. The purpose of this research is to explore the extent to which the Rogerian view of human freedom, as it is expressed in the concept of the fully functioning person, adequately establishes the specific difference between persons as free subjects and the determined objects of the natural sciences. The method adopted for this study is philosophical analysis. We will first situate Rogers in the historical and philosophical context in which he was trained and educated and which led him to oppose scientific psychology (chapter I). Next, the analysis (chapter II) will focus on the distinctive features of Rogers' fully functioning person. The evaluation (chapter III) will confront Rogers' attempt to develop a science of persons with the work of researchers known for their contribution in making psychology into a human science. These researchers are: Giorgi (1970), Luijpen (1962), and Strasser (1963). (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

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Blower, Nathanial Shannon. "Expressivist theories of first-person privilege." Diss., University of Iowa, 2010. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/783.

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This dissertation scrutinizes expressivist theories of first-person privilege with the aim of arriving at, first, a handful of suggestions about how a `best version' of expressivism about privilege will have to look, and second, a critical understanding of what such an approach's strengths and weaknesses will be. Roughly, expressivist approaches to the problem of privilege are characterized, first, by their emphasis on the likenesses between privileged mental state self-ascriptions and natural behavioral expressions of mentality, and second, by their insistence that an acknowledgment of these likenesses is required in order properly to understand the characteristically singular privilege with which one speaks of one's own mental states. The dissertation proceeds in five chapters whose individual tasks are as follows: The first chapter sets out the definition of the phenomena of "first-person privilege" in use throughout the dissertation and defends the claim that those phenomena are indeed real and so the philosophical problem of accounting for them is indeed serious. However, there is no presupposition made against the possibility of an expressivist account of the phenomena of first-person privilege. The second chapter sets out the basic motivations informing expressivist approaches to the problem of first-person privilege. Four immediate and significant questions for the expressivist approach are set out. The chapter also considers one `simple' way of responding to those questions and set outs the most pressing difficulties for a `simple expressivism'. The third chapter sets out my view of Wittgenstein as a methodically non-theorizing philosopher, criticizes rival views and, finally, sets out my view of the Wittgensteinian responses to the four questions set out in chapter two, given my view of him as a philosophical non-theorizer. Many of the later suggestions about a `best version' of expressivism draw directly on my best understanding of Wittgenstein's own approach to the problem of first-person privilege. The fourth chapter sets out David Finkelstein's, Peter Hacker's and Dorit Bar-On's responses to the quartet of questions for expressivists about first-person privilege, while flagging a number concerns for each author's approach. The final chapter condenses and reviews the concerns already raised for the expressivist approaches already canvassed and makes a number of suggestions about the most viable expressivist options for dealing with them. With that in place, the last chapter proceeds to comment on the overall plausibility of the sketch of a `best-version' of expressivism that emerges. Also, concerns to do with the relationship between expressivism about first-person privilege, epistemological foundationalism, content externalism and the mind-body problem are discussed.

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Eguchi, Sumiko. "Being a Person: the Ethics of Watsuji Tetsurō and Immanuel Kant." The Ohio State University, 2009. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1245306862.

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Salazar, Jose. "The Demandingness of Morality: The Person Confined." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2017. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1498.

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Losing ownership and control over the development of and connection to our own person detaches us from the most innate embodiment of ourselves, our person. Without being able to develop and connect to our person, we become detached from expressing our identity, exercising our autonomy, and formulating our own values, the most intrinsic features our person encapsulates. While we yearn to act on our own projects to express our identity, exercise our autonomy, and formulate our own values the way we want, morality imposes huge demands on our person that restrain us from doing so. Morality’s major requirement to always act on morally significant projects to produce the overall good puts us at risk of forfeiting our identity, autonomy, and values. Despite these features being the most innate embodiment of ourselves, morality neglects them so that we always participate in its domain of beneficence to further the interests of others who are in need. Even though great benefits result from always acting on morally significant projects to produce the overall good, we are at odds with moral beneficence because of the demands it imposes on our person. In this thesis, it is argued what makes a moral theory too demanding. Arguments by Bernard Williams, Samuel Scheffler, Liam B. Murphy, and Richard W. Miller are evaluated to construct views of what makes a moral theory too demanding for them. Afterwards, differences and commonalities are drawn from their views to frame the final view of what makes a moral theory too demanding that is argued here. All of the philosophers’ views contribute to the claim that we are entitled to our lives outside of morality’s domain of beneficence. Afterwards, it is explained why we are entitled to our lives outside of morality’s domain of beneficence. The most compelling explanation is that the potential development of our own person entitles us to do so outside of morality’s domain of beneficence. By developing our person to its fullest height on our own terms and conditions, we can connect to it in the best way possible. Nonetheless, because we are forced to always participate in morality’s domain of beneficence, we lack the ownership and control over the development of and connection to our own person. The demandingness of morality holds the reins over this relation between the development of and connection to our person when in fact we should.

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Schleifer, Aliah. "A modified phenomenological approach to the concept and person of Maryam in Islam." Thesis, University of Exeter, 1991. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.292956.

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Zezulkova, Marketa. "Whole person hermeneutic media learning in the primary classroom : an intercultural grounded philosophy." Thesis, Bournemouth University, 2015. http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/24520/.

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Media education and media literacy research and practice arguably incline towards reductionism by being focused on a single medium (e.g. film) or a group of media (e.g. digital) and by being predominantly preoccupied with learners’ reasoning and critical thinking. Moreover, whilst literacy theory and practice is no longer seen as a causal factor but rather an enabling one (as equally discovered by this research), the direct correlation between critical and creative media literacy and individuals’ as well as society’s wellbeing seems to dominate academic, public, policy, and educational debates. Much research has therefore aimed at adapting media literacy education, which had mostly been developed at the secondary level, to younger children and primary classrooms whilst neglecting education as a staged progress and the multidimensional developmental as well as sociocultural changes novice learners arguably undergo within the first years of compulsory education. There indeed are many valuable studies about media literacy education at primary level that address these issues, yet they are often country specific and conducted in one school or one classroom. This interdisciplinary and intercultural classroom research was instead interested in the current and potential ‘media learning’ – defined as intentional and naturally occurring learning about any media with, from, in, or even without the physical presence of, any media source – and was carried out in two Czech and two US public primary (lower elementary) schools across the first three grades with six to nine/ten year olds and their teachers. The research explored media’s role in the child’s in- and outof- school collective and individual thoughts, actions, feelings, and relationships, whilst asking how the child learnt, and could learn, about media within these processes and how the teacher facilitated, and could facilitate, such media learning. ‘Grounded philosophy’ was developed as a philosophy-led, flexible and responsive research methodology suitable for intercultural inductive research that, although being grounded in participants’ individual and collective sociocultural-historical context, is capable of arriving to transferrable and holistic conceptual understanding – or ‘a grounded philosophy’ that asks ‘what is’ as well as ‘what could be’. The methodology itself represents an original contribution to knowledge. In total, twelve classrooms were observed of which the twentyfour teachers together with specialised and managerial staff were interviewed, and sixty-five children (thirty-three girls and thirty-two boys) were involved in photo-elicitation group and individual interviews. The research discovered that, firstly, the teachers aimed to holistically address the whole learner, which was believed to be achievable only through acknowledging and drawing upon the child’s unique historicity. Secondly, the child’s media life was situated within his or her holistic system in which every experience was interconnected and dialogic – their past, present and future whole being and becoming, individual and collective media experience, classroom and media learning, as well as the diverse media platforms, texts, and practices – and thus hermeneutic. Such hermeneutic experience was an unfinalisable learning experience of which long-term value is arguably difficult to immediately evaluate, and thus instead of the adult judging the child’s media life from reductionist and cause-and-effect perspectives while teaching objective truths about media, the learner shall be guided by the teacher through learning to reflect on his or her own individual and collective media experience. The original argument therefore is for replacing reductionist media-centric with holistic and hermeneutic experience-centric research and educational approach to the primary school child’s learning that blends classroom and media experiences into one continuous and dialogic whole person learning. Honouring formal education as a staged process and primary education as a foundation of lifelong learning, the proposed (media and classroom) learning proceeds critical and creative media literacy education by building a foundation for lifelong learning about media.

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Nicolaus, Georg. "The understanding of the person in C.G. Jung's psychology and N. Berdyaev's philosophy." Thesis, University of Essex, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.486577.

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This thesis attempts a hermeneutic, historical-comparative study of the understanding of the person in Jung's psychology and Berdyaev's philosophy. Its focus- although it is not theological in the strict sense of the term- is on the Christian understanding of the person as imago dei, not on the current psychological co~cept of personality. The , person as imago dei is interpreted as corresponding to the Self in Jungian psychology. The thesis identifies in the concept of personality a point of convergence between the psychological and philosophical-anthropological point of view, based on the hypothesis that personality, if it exists, is as much a psychological as a spiritual reality. It sees the inevitable transgression of Jung's psychology into the fields of philosophy and theology (which in Berdyaev's case coalesce into 'theosophy') as a consequence of his attempt to develop a holistic view of psychic process centred in the concept of the person.

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Gibson, Alice. "Can a good manager be a good person?" Thesis, Linköping University, Centre for Applied Ethics, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-6970.

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In this paper I explore the question ‘can a good manager be a good person?’ the answer is yes, no, or to a greater or lesser degree. Ultimately it depends on the ends at which the business, in which the manager works, aims towards. For these ends underpin what is ‘rational’ for how a manager should behalf. If a business’ end goal is purely profit maximisation then there is no room for a manager to take moral considerations into account, and therefore be a good person. If a business sees itself as a ‘practice’, consciously aiming to promote the social good the answer is yes, a good manager can be a good person. There are those businesses, and their managers, that fall somewhere in between these two ideal-types.

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Fust, Jens. "Förstapersonsbeskrivningar och förstapersonsmetoder i Francisco Varelas neurofenomenologiska forskningsprogram." Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Institutionen för kultur och lärande, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-33582.

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The present paper critically examines the epistemic status of first-person accounts and first-person methods in Francisco Varela’s research program neurophenomenology, which integrates a phenomenological perspective in cognitive science. The paper also questions Varela’s description of neurophenomenology as an ontological recategorization of nature and a solution to the hard problem of consciousness.

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Monk, Ryan W. "W. Norris Clarke's Thomistic metaphysics of the human person." Online full text .pdf document, available to Fuller patrons only, 2003. http://www.tren.com.

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Spitz, Roland. "Subject and person : an essay on self-reference and personal identity." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:52fc98df-408e-4c2e-b3b1-43edaa37cfd3.

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Sharam, Earle Scott. "Person and community : the corporate identity of Christ in the theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Wolfhart Pannenberg." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.296255.

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King, Owen Christopher. "Three Kinds of Goodness for a Person." The Ohio State University, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1461257876.

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Powell, Rhonda L. "Security and the right to security of person." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2008. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:26e81a46-54d5-44f5-a3cd-c74a5798ea0d.

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This thesis inquires into the meaning of the right to security of person. This right is found in many international, regional and domestic human rights instruments. However, academic discourse reveals disagreement about the meaning of the right. The thesis first considers case law from the European Convention on Human Rights, the South African Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter. The analysis shows that courts too disagree about the meaning of the right to security of person. The thesis then takes a theoretical approach to understanding the meaning of the right. It is argued that the concept of ‘security’ establishes that the right imposes both positive and negative duties but that ‘security’ does not determine which interests are protected by the right. For this, we need consider the meaning of the ‘person’. The notion of personhood as understood in the ‘capabilities approach’ of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum is then introduced. It is suggested that this theory could be used to identify the interests protected by the right. Next, the theoretical developments are applied to the legal context in order to illustrate the variety of interests the right to security of person would protect and the type of duties it would impose. As a result, it is argued that the idea of ‘security of person’ is too broad to form the subject matter of an individual legal right. This raises a question over the relationship between security of person and human rights law. It is proposed that instead of recognising an individual legal right to security of person, human rights law as a whole could be seen as a mechanism to secure the person, the capabilities approach determining what it takes to fulfil a right and thereby secure the person.

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Souillac, Geneviève. "Universal human rights: philosophy of the person and social vision in the work of two contemporary Frenchintellectuals." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2000. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31240975.

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Bärring, Philip. "The Engineering Person : Arendt and an Anthropology of Engineering Ethics." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för kulturantropologi och etnologi, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-432432.

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In this thesis Hannah Arendt’s theories of science and technology are applied in an ethnographic study of engineering ethics. Seeking to gain further understanding of Arendt’s thoughts, her concepts of The Archimedean Point and Earth Alienation is applied in interviews with engineering students in Sweden’s Uppsala University. The purpose directing this study is thus twofold, it is an attempt to anthropologize Arendt’s thoughts of science and technology, and to further understand engineering’s ethical engagement. The study identifies a dynamic where engineering students create dichotomous mentalities. One mentality is engineering’s demand of a desubjectified instrumental rationality in inherent contradiction to an ethical consciousness, this mentality can be identified as Arendt’s Archimedean Point. In conflict to this mentality lies the intersubjectivity of a socio-politically engaged student concerned with engineering’s ability to create evil. This study makes the claim that Uppsala University’s student traditions and culture encourage the second mentality and forms an important resource for ethical engagement among students.

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Kim, Chae Young. "A comparative study of psyche and person in the works of C. G. Jung and W. C. Smith." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/7748.

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Ndlovu, Sanelisiwe Primrose. "A critical exploration of the ideas of person and community in traditional Zulu thought." University of the Western Cape, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/8346.

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Magister Artium - MA
The issue of personhood has long been of concern to many philosophers. The primary concern has been about determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for an entity to be a person at a particular point in time. The most common answer in Western terms is that to be a person at a time is to have certain special mental properties such as psychological connectedness. On the other hand, others argue that we can only ever understand the ascription of mental characteristics as part of a necessarily joint set of physically instantiated properties. Most recent contributions to the topic have however cast doubt on these earlier attempts to understand personhood solely in terms of bodily and psychological features. Not only do they suggest a model of personhood that is individualistic, they also fail to make reference to communal and social elements. In particular, many non-Western, specifically African, cultures foreground these communal and social aspects. This is true of the Akan, Yoruba and Igbo cultures. As Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye; Dismas Masolo; Segun Gbadegesin; and Ifeanyi Menkiti have shown respectively. However, there is a lack of comparable philosophical inquiry in the Southern African context. The primary aim of this study is to critically explore the metaphysical, cultural, linguistic and normative resources of the Zulu people in understanding what it means to be a person. The approach is predominantly conceptual and analytic, but it also draws on some empirical data with a view to extending the results of the literature-based study. Not only does this extend the field of cultural inquiry to personhood, it also opens up new opportunities to tackle old problems in the debate, including the question of what should be the proper relationship between the individual and the community. Specifically, I argue that rather than focus attention on the priority of the individual or community in relation to each other, consideration of the notion of personhood in Zulu culture reveals that notwithstanding significant communal constraints forms of agency are available to individuals. http://

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Price, Daniel John. "Karl Barth's anthropology in light of modern thought : the dynamic concept of the person in Trinitarian theology and object relations psychology." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1990. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=128445.

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This study exposits Karl Barth's theological anthropology, and asks some leading questions regarding the relation of Barth's doctrine of the human person to the human sciences. Specific comparisons are drawn between Barth's doctrine of the person and the anthropology of British object relations psychology --especially as it has been articulated by the Scottish psychoanalyst, W. Ronald D. Fairburn. After a historical survey of the problems with which Barth dealt in formulating his doctrine of humanity, I show why it is important to focus upon Barth's mature anthropology. An accurate assessment of Barth's anthropology and its relation to the human sciences can only be undertaken after one acknowledges the extent to which Barth has made some significant modifications of his earlier dialectical theology. In Barth's more mature anthropology contained in volume III/2 of the Dogmatics he formulates his anthropology upon his understanding of God as triune. Barth achieves a very 'dynamic' understanding of the human person, based upon the idea that the human person reflects the dynamic nature of the triune God. Therefore, rather than stressing bodily and soulish substances, or innately endowed faculties, Barth emphasises that 'real man' is composed of certain vital relations to God, self and others. A leading question for this study is this: does a trinitarian theology such as Barth's necessarily exclude any dialogue between itself and other sciences? Based upon the evidence that Barth's mature theology shows an increasing amount of dialogue with the human sciences, I begin to question the attacks upon Barth's so-called 'positivity of revelation'. Furthermore, I build a case for the position that the dynamic anthropology which Barth espouses bears certain intriguing analogies to the dynamic anthropology of modern object relations psychology. Based upon these analogies, the relation between Barth's theology and the human sciences does not need to be seen as one of alienation or hostility. To the contrary, Barth's dynamic anthropology could open up the possibility of increased dialogue betwen theological anthropology and the findings of human science. This is because both indicate the importance of interpersonal relationships in the formulation of any adequate concept of the person. The parallels between Barth and object relations psychology build a case for a 'dynamic' understanding of the human person, demonstrating how the person is shaped at the deepest level by certain primary interpersonal relations. Both Barth's anthropology, and object relations psychology indicate, within their respective fields of study, how the human essence is social in origin. The faculties which differentiate human persons from all other creatures arise only within the shared experience of interpersonal relations. Barth discovered the relational character of human personhood by probing the nature of the triune God and expositing its implications for Christian anthropology. Object relations has discovered the same truth in an altogether different plane by examining the ways in which human behaviour develops--especially in the earliest stages of life. I propose that there exists an analogous relation between the two: each on its own level testifies to the fact that human personhood develops only as a shared experience between God, self and others.

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Milne, Douglas J. W., and res cand@acu edu au. "A Religious, Ethical and Philosophical Study of the Human Person in the Context of Biomedical Practices." Australian Catholic University. School of Philosophy, 2006. http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/digitaltheses/public/adt-acuvp148.26072007.

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From the book of Genesis the human person is presented as divine image-bearer, a Godlike status that is further explained in terms of the dual constitution of matter and spirit. Natural Law provides a person-centred ethic that draws on a number of human goods that emanate naturally from the human person and lead in practice to human flourishing. This theory empowers towards making ethical decisions in the interest of human persons. Aristotle explained the human being as a substantially existing entity with rational powers. By means of his form-matter scheme he handed on, by way of Boethius, to Aquinas, a ready model for the Christian belief in the dual nature of the human person as an ensouled body or embodied soul. Applying the new scientific method to the question of the human self David Hume concluded that he could neither prove nor disprove her existence. By so reasoning Hume indirectly pointed to the need for other disciplines than empirical science to explain the human person. Emmanuel Levinas has drawn on the metaphysical tradition to draw attention to the social and ethical nature of the human person as she leaves the trace of her passing through the face of the other person who is encountered with an ethical gravitas of absolute demand. The genesis of the human person most naturally begins at conception at which point and onwards the human embryo grows continuously through an internal, animating principle towards a full-grown adult person. The main conclusion is that biblical anthropology and metaphysical philosophy provide the needed structures and concepts to explain adequately the full meaning of the human person and to establish the moral right of the human person at every stage to respect and protection.

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Assy, Rabeea. "The right to litigate in person." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:718698cd-9177-49fb-8fbb-336d809aa0ad.

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Litigation in person is a widespread phenomenon in common law jurisdictions. A right to litigate in person is treated as a fundamental right, regardless of whether the litigant has the financial means to hire a lawyer or the capacity to conduct litigation effectively. Due to the high numbers of litigants in person and the various burdens placed on judicial resources by their lack of legal knowledge, they pose a serious challenge to the effective and efficient administration of justice. This thesis assesses the theoretical value of a right to self-representation, and challenges the position that courts should not impose legal representation on a litigant nor require him to obtain such representation as a condition for litigation. It argues that a litigant who lacks the professional knowledge and skills to present his case effectively cannot legitimately insist upon representing himself if in doing so he is likely to inflict disproportionate costs on his opponent and on the administration of justice. This thesis advances the case for mandatory representation in civil proceedings on three main fronts: a comparison with the criminal context, an assessment of the value of self-representation in terms of outcome, and an examination of its possible intrinsic justifications.

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McIntosh, Esther. "The concept of the person as holistic and relational : a study of the religious philosophy of John Macmurray." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.310644.

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The overall aim of this thesis is to critically assess the concept of the person in Macmurray's philosophy. This exploration requires a general examination of Macmurray's published and unpublished writings owing to the lack of any full length study of his ideas. In particular, this thesis is broadly sympathetic to Macmurray's thought and seeks to reveal the relevance of its for today. Whilst certain details of his theory are contentious and inadequate, they are not beyond redemption. Religion is important for Macmurray, but he is primarily a philosopher, and the content of this thesis reflects this. In the first chapter, Macmurray's antagonism towards traditional mind-body dualism is discussed in connection with his definition of the Self as an embodied agent. It is in this sense that his concept of the person represents an holistic account of the individual. Whilst speculation surrounds Macmurray's influences, some comparisons are drawn and the ensuing criticisms are examined. As a direct result of the postulation of the Self as agent, the existence of the Other is both confirmed and deemed necessary. Chapter two explores the interaction between the Self and the Other from the perspective of the human infant. It asserts the importance of relationships for the growth of the individual. Then, with reference to the ethical implications of the related agent, chapter three examine the composition of societies, paying particular attention to Marxist analysis, and seeking to extricate Macmurray's transferable ideas from those conditioned by his era. Finally, chapter four claims that communities are necessary for the full expression of the person, whilst criticising Macmurray's dubious employment of religious terminology in this respect. In essence, this thesis argues that the insights of Macmurray's theory have been needlessly neglected, and that the person must be understood from the perspective of agency and relationships.

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Souillac, Geneviève. "Universal human rights : philosophy of the person and social vision in the work of two contemporary French intellectuals /." Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 2000. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B22142708.

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Bexten, Raphael E. [Verfasser]. "Exposé: Untersuchung zur ontologischen Wahrheit der menschlichen Person: Gutsein als Berufung der menschlichen Person / Raphael E. Bexten." Rheda-Wiedenbrück : Raphael E. Bexten, 2012. http://d-nb.info/1018665439/34.

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Sheffler, Daniel T. "The Metaphysics of Personhood in Plato's Dialogues." UKnowledge, 2017. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/16.

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While most scholars know, or think they know, what Plato says about the soul, there is less certainty regarding what he says about the self. Some scholars even assert that the ancient Greeks did not possess the concepts of self or person. This dissertation sets out to examine those passages throughout Plato's dialogues that most clearly require some notion of the self or the person, and by doing so to clarify the logical lineaments of these concepts as they existed in fourth century Athens. Because Plato wrote dialogues, I restrict myself to analyzing the concepts of self and person as they appear in the mouths of various Platonic characters and refrain from speculating whether Plato himself endorses what his characters say. In spite of this restriction, I find a number of striking ideas that set the stage for further philosophical development. After an introductory chapter, in Chapters 2 and 3 I argue that the identification of the person with the soul and the identification of the human being with the composite of soul and body make possible a conceptual split between person and human being. In Chapter 4, I argue that the tripartite account of the soul suggests an ideal identification of the person with the rational aspect of the soul rather than the lower aspects of one's psychology. Finally, in Chapter 5 I argue that the analogical link between rationality in us and the rational order of the cosmos leads to the conclusion that the true self is, in some sense, divine.

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Boczek, Macon W. "The Methodology of Phenomenological Realism in The Acting Person by Karol Wojtyla." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1353964294.

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Mingo, Alicia de. "Vivir en público y paideía privada en las Cartas a Lucilio de L.A. Séneca." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2011. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112959.

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Living in Public and Private Paideía in Seneca’s Epistulae morales adLucilium”. It is difficult to conceive both moral life and communitarian life withoutthe tension between the Others and the self. On the one hand, due to the cohesionof society and the individual’s search for its communitarian dimension, a sort oftransparent life, without secrets, as long as it is honest, is needed. However, onthe other hand, when the social surrounding is morally reproachable, a privatepaideía, which allows the moral orientation of the individual, is indispensable,even if this produces in him solitude and brings the incomprehension from hisfellow citizens, resulting in the construction of a private space.
Es difícil pensar tanto la vida moral como la vida comunitaria fuera dela tensión entre los Otros y el sí-mismo. Por una parte, de cara a la cohesión dela sociedad y a que la persona singular encuentre su dimensión comunitaria, sehace necesaria una suerte de vida transparente, sin secretos, a fuer de honesta.Sin embargo, por otra parte, cuando el entorno social es moralmente cuestionable,se hace imprescindible una paideía privada que permita la orientación moral delsujeto personal, por más que ello le reporte soledad e incomprensión por parte desus conciudadanos, debiendo, entonces, construir un espacio de privacidad.

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Bexten, Raphael E. [Verfasser]. "Exposé: Untersuchung zur ontologischen Wahrheit der menschlichen Person: Gutsein als Berufung der menschlichen Person / Raphael E. Bexten. Universität Wien - Institut für Philosophie." Rheda-Wiedenbrück : Raphael E. Bexten, 2012. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0288-2011042787.

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Purves, James G. M. "An examination of the person and function of the Holy Spirit within a Trinitarian framework with special reference to developments in theology and the reception of the Charismatic movement within the Scottish context." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1993. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk/R?func=search-advanced-go&find_code1=WSN&request1=AAIU059923.

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In looking to the Charismatic Movement, as it came to find expression in the Scottish context, this study sets out to review the manner in which we view and relate to the Triune Being of God. We seek to examine in what way the issues raised by the Charismatic Movement, as it developed in the Scottish context, call upon on us to reappraise the manner in which we perceive our relationship to and understanding of God. More specifically, in examining the way in which the Holy Spirit has been viewed within Patristic and Scottish theology, we pursue the thesis that traditional perspectives on the Trinity, arising out of a model of the Trinity that has been held as axiomatic in the Western tradition of the church, are not necessarily the most helpful in facilitating an understanding of the Person and function of the Holy Spirit. Through tracing an understanding of the Person and function of the Holy Spirit as it appears in the theology of John Calvin and the developing, Scottish Reformed tradition, we observe how an understanding of the Spirit developed which emphasised particular functions of the Spirit; but which did not fully address the nature of our communion with the Person, or Being, of the Spirit. Consequently, we seek to develop an understanding of the Spirit, set within a Trinitarian framework, which offers an alternative way of viewing our communion with the Spirit and the Holy Trinity. By seeking to reestablish the priority of a model of the Trinity which is descriptive of the divine economy, we attempt to point the way towards a means of reconciling the Charismatic Movement within the mainstream of Scottish, Reformed theology and to consolidate the insights of both traditions to the greater glory of God in His church.

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Теліженко, Людмила Вікторівна, Людмила Викторовна Телиженко, Liudmyla Viktorivna Telizhenko, and Н. С. Андрійченко. "Людина як предмет і основа філософії права." Thesis, Сумський державний університет, 2016. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/45907.

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Для філософії права людина є вузловою проблемою, яка визначає саму сутність та специфіку цієї особливої сфери людського пізнання. Адже формуючи розуміння права, людина в цьому процесі відображає саму себе, свою власну сутність та власне розуміння. Про такий взаємозв’язок людини і права писав один із перших вітчизняних дослідників сучасного етапу розвитку філософії права В.В. Шкода. На його думку, людина є вузловим предметом філософії права, утвореної її культурною діяльністю, через яку вона сама себе осмислює та пізнає. «Правова філософія покликана зрозуміти підвалини права, що кореняться в глибинах культури. А в широкому розумінні – зрозуміти людину завдяки розумінню права».

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Zwonlinski, Matt. "The separateness of persons." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/298730.

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One of the distinctive ideas of contemporary liberal political philosophy is that the separateness of persons is somehow normatively momentous. A proper respect for separateness is supposed to lead us not only to reject aggregative theories such as utilitarianism, but to embrace some particular positive theory about the sorts of obligations and claims we have amongst each other. Typically, philosophers have focused on the way in which the separateness of persons is important to matters of distribution. Given the intuitively unjust distributions often sanctioned by utilitarianism, such a focus makes sense. Much of the contribution of my dissertation, however, is to argue that separateness is relevant not just as a fact about persons as beneficiaries, but perhaps even more fundamentally, as agents. Chapter one explores the connection between respect for the separateness of persons and liberal theory, with reference to the cases of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Chapter two defends the reasonableness of respect for separateness against the metaphysical critique of Derek Parfit. Chapters three and four spell out the main idea of respect for separateness as agents. Chapter five examines applies this analysis to free markets, and argues that while separateness provides some grounds for criticizing markets, it also provides some interesting, non-efficiency based grounds for praising them.

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Lucas, Robert H. "The whole Christ for the whole person : a comparative and critical study of the doctrine of personhood in Hans Urs von Balthasar and the doctrine of sanctification in T.F. Torrance in light of their Trinitarian theology." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1997. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk/R?func=search-advanced-go&find_code1=WSN&request1=AAIU093068.

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This thesis is a comparative study of the nature of personhood according to Hans Urs von Balthasar and the nature of sanctification according to Professor Thomas F. Torrance. We argue that both von Balthasar and Torrance develop Christological and Trinitarian anthropologies which centre on our participation in the obedience of the Son. Participation in Christ is understood differently given their anthropological assumptions. In chapter one we examine von Balthasar's anthropological assumptions regarding the distinction between the individual and the "theological person", the searching nature of man, and the various tensions of our existence, and death which prevents any solution for man's transcendent nature. In chapter two we explore Torrance's idea of the image of God, his understanding of man's contingency, the notion of the person, and the effects of the fall on man. In chapter three, we discuss von Balthasar's Christology of mission which overcomes the anthropological tensions and death by liberating our freedom for participation in the Trinitarian life. Through participation in the Son's mission, we become persons, acquire a uniqueness, a form, our true identity and name. In chapter four we examine Torrance's emphasis upon the vicarious nature of sanctification, first looking at the context in Israel and the extent in terms of the whole man assumed by Christ. We discuss the notion of fallen humanity, as well as the dynamic nature and Trinitarian dimensions of sanctification. In the final chapter we compare and contrast their Christological and Trinitarian approaches to anthropology given their underlying presuppositions. We mention various influences and experiences which shape to some degree Torrance's and von Balthasar's approach to their themes as well as important complementary contributions to a fuller and richer theological anthropology.

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Williams, Graham Andrew. "Persons, property and morality : a defence of political libertarianism." Doctoral thesis, University of Cape Town, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/17058.

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Bibliography: p.191-197.
This dissertation adopts as its starting point the beliefs that moral truths can be known and that political philosophy is a branch of ethics. The author identifies three variants of libertarianism on the basis of their different treatments of the right to private property, which all three consider to be the cornerstone of political libertarianism. The author evaluates the arguments of Robert Nozick, Murray Rothbard, John Hospers and Ayn Rand for the moral foundations of libertarianism and finds them to be methodologically inadequate. None is able to furnish libertarianism with the moral foundations it requires. Following the example of Jan Narveson in his recent defence of the libertarian idea, the author adopts as the correct metaphysic of morality the method of hypothetical contract. The contractarian method is capable of determining both the nature and the extent of moral obligation. From application of the method of hypothetical contract, the author concurs with the above-mentioned authors that morality is a system of rights and duties, i.e. deontological in character, and that persons are indeed bearers of moral, non-conventional rights. One of these rights is the negative right to equal social liberty. The author differs, however, in finding that contractarianism favours also a positive right to basic, standard welfare. Recognition of this latter right commits the author to a form of moderate or Lockean libertarianism that endorses the in-principle justice of coercive redistribution to meet persons' basic welfare. Consequently, the orthodox libertarianism advocated by Nozick, Rothbard, Hospers, Rand and Narveson which recognises only negative moral rights is rejected by the author. All of the libertarians cited accept in one form or another John Locke's labour theory of appropriation. However, the author eschews the standard reading of Locke they are wedded to. The standard reading premises the labour theory on a person's ownership of himself. This reading is rejected on the grounds that the idea of self-ownership is insufficiently determinate to act as a sure basis for establishing property rights in things one has mixed one's labour with. A reconstructed defence of the moral right to private property through labouring which avoids this difficulty is given. That defence is premised not on self-ownership but on the right to equal social liberty. Save for the requirement to meet basic welfare there are no limits to the extent of acquisition. The author argues that, despite his avowals to the contrary, Nozick in fact endorses a positive right to welfare, and that this positive right is one that is co-extensive with the right to basic welfare established by the method of hypothetical contract. Two arguments are given. The first argument draws on Nozick's Lockean proviso that an act of appropriation not worsen the position of others. The second is based upon the application to an envisaged society of libertarian-rights bearers of Nozick's clause that permits the violation of rights in order to avoid catastrophic moral horror. This latter argument the author believes to be successful against any libertarianism that is wedded to absolute property rights. Redistribution to meet the demands of basic welfare necessitates taxation. Taxation is to be levied proportionately and not progressively, and is to be coupled with a system of private social insurance. None of the three variants of libertarianism identified, and which the author maintains sustain redistribution as a matter of justice, is ostensibly committed to redistribution more extensive than required to meet persons' basic welfare~ Ernest Loevinsohn's argument to the effect that libertarians are - by the very principle they defend as libertarians - committed to more far-reaching welfare and redistribution is examined and rejected. Because Loevinsohn's argument is directed against a consequentialist defence of libertarianism and not a deontological version it is misplaced. Furthermore, it fails to establish the conclusion Loevinsohn supposes it.

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DOLCE, CHIARA. "Principi di una antropologia della persona nell'opera di Ernesto De Martino." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Cagliari, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/11584/266691.

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It is well known that among cultural anthropologists and philosophers there is always a historical gap and a difference of interests, language and method, which often causes a rivalry between the two disciplines that ends to stiffen anthropology in a collection of descriptions without universal principles and philosophy in a reflection of noble ambitions but unable to consider the individual human cases. The main aim of this thesis is to read the complete works of the philosopher and anthropologist Ernesto de Martino (Naples 1908 - Rome 1965) as a point of union, isolated and sui generis, between anthropology and philosophy. The goal is to obtain, from the reading of his works, a true anthropology of the person who somehow bring order to his unsystematic work, searching in it a common thread: the person, based on the overcoming of life in value , synthesis of necessity and freedom, of transcendental truths and cultural variety. Therefore our aim is not to reconstruct philologically the work and the figure of de Martino or investigate from a historical point of view on the originality of the sources present in it. De Martino is not here treated as an end but as an instrument of knowledge of the human person in its essential aspects, moral and ethical. Thus, the aim of this work is theoretical and moral, that is: with the attempt to restore unity to the work of de Martino, we consider the ultimate and overarching meaning of his anthropology, rather than those moments of dialogue between ethnology, politics and philosophy in his work certainly present; then we wonder not so much who was de Martino as a scholar (problem still treated in this work) but what kind of scientific-philosophical proposal is his and if this proposal, given its ethical and epistemological complexity, can become the foundation for an organic human study that so far neither ethnology nor philosophy can, independently of each other, to ensure.

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Gallagher, Christine Marie. "Consciousness and the Demands of Personhood: Intersubjectivity and Second-Person Ethics." University of Toledo / OhioLINK, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=toledo1333695927.

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Winges-Yanez, Nick. "A Foucaultian Discourse Analysis of Person-Centered Practice Using a Genealogical Framework of Intellectual Disability." PDXScholar, 2018. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/4505.

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A genealogical framework highlights the important role sexuality has played in constructing the current label of intellectual disability (ID). The genealogical framework is meant to replace the social, medical, and/or rights-based model(s) that have dominated social work and social services working in the disability field. With this framework, or perspective, I use a Foucaultian discourse analysis to read through seminal texts regarding person-centered practice. Person-centered practice is the foremost intervention used in social work, and other disciplines, to work with people labeled with intellectual disability. My research questions focus on what is revealed about ID in PCP through a genealogical framework and what implications do these discoveries hold for sexuality education and social services, including social workers? Predetermined concepts taken from the genealogical framework are used in the Foucaultian discourse analysis. These concepts (subject, government, biopower, and normalization) provide insight into how ID has been constructed and maintained through the practice of person-centered processes. Paradoxes emerge throughout the analysis, providing space for productive resistance by professionals working in sexuality education and social services to improve equity for people labeled with intellectual disability, specifically regarding their sexuality and healthy expression of it.

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Sander, Angelika. "Mensch - Subjekt - Person : die Dezentrierung des Subjekts in der Philosophie Max Schelers /." Bonn : Bouvier Verl, 1996. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37183733s.

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Reichel, Hanna. "Personlig identitet och moraliskt ansvar : Psykologisk kontinuitet eller äganderelation, vilket är nödvändigt för att kunna hålla en person moraliskt ansvarig för sina tidigare handlingar?" Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-358350.

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Forcher, Gerd. "Bedingungen der Personalität Daniel C. Dennett und sein naturalistischer Personenbegriff." Taunusstein Driesen, 2004. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2922510&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.

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Saldarriaga, Madrigal Andrés Eduardo. "Person und Gerechtigkeit der systematische Zusammenhang von Personenkonzeption und Gerechtigkeitsphilosophie." Frankfurt, M. Berlin Bern Bruxelles New York, NY Oxford Wien Lang, 2008. http://d-nb.info/997662964/04.

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Préfontaine, Nicolas Vinot. "Metaphysik der Innerlichkeit die innere Einheit des Menschen nach der Philosophie Edith Steins." St. Ottilien EOS, 2007. http://d-nb.info/98823078X/04.

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Podobryaev, Alexander. "Persons, imposters, and monsters." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87498.

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Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2014.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 115-120).
This dissertation is about person features, their representation and interpretation in natural language. I will argue that there are several ways in which person features can be represented and interpreted. Most importantly, I will provide evidence for a kind of person features that are parts of referential indices of pronouns, constraining possible values that the assignment function maps the indices to (cf. Minor 2011, Sudo 2012). It is this particular way of representing person features that allows to postulate operators that manipulate the assignment in way that all pronouns with certain person features are affected. Such operators, as I will demonstrate, do exist. They come in at least two varieties, imposter operators and monster operators. Imposter operators manipulate the assignment by making all free 1st person indices (or all 2nd person indices) undefined in their scope, and when 1st or 2nd person indices are undefined 3rd person indices can be used instead. Building on the observations from Collins and Postal 2012, I will argue that we can interpret the 3rd person pronoun in sentences like Yours truly's dissertation wasfiled a week before his birthday as referring to the speaker because there is a silent imposter operator that suppresses 1st person indices in the domain that includes the imposter yours truly and the pronoun. Furthermore, it is due to the presence of the same operator that the 1st person pronoun and the 3rd person pronoun in sentences like Yours truly filed his dissertation before my birthday cannot be understood as coreferential. Another likely candidate for a person-sensitive assignment-manipulating operator is the monster operator in Mishar Tatar (strictly speaking, it is not a Kaplanian monster, but I will use the term anyway). This operator is responsible for the fact that a subclass of indexical pronouns in this language may shift to denote the coordinates of the context embedded under an attitude predicate. Thus, the dissertation contains two case studies: one on imposters in English (Chapter 1) and one on indexical shifting in Mishar Tatar (Chapter 2). The overall hope is to build a case in which possible interpretations of person pronouns can inform us about their syntactic representation.
by Alexander Podobryaev.
Ph. D.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Philosophy of the person'

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