Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Philosophy of natural Religion'

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1

Stewart, William. "Kierkegaard & Natural Religion." TopSCHOLAR®, 1988. https://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/2882.

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According to Kierkegaard, the knowledge of God begins with the recognition of various truths about oneself. Every individual, just by virtue of being human, has the capacity to develop an intuitive awareness of God. In this thesis, I explore the nature of this knowledge. In chapter one, I introduce a number of ideas important for understanding Kierkegaard's phenomenology of religious belief, including his distinction between objective and subjective reflection, his method (indirect communication), and his psychology. The first chapter concludes with a description of the range or domain of "natural religion." In the next chapter, I analyze the structural or formative elements of natural religion, the awakening of a God -relationship in the extremity of selfknowledge (an individual's awareness of the eternal, infinite, and possible aspects of the human "self"). In the final chapter, I explore two related peculiarities in Kierkegaard's treatment of religious knowledge: his contempt for inductive or probabilistic arguments, and his suggestion that the existence of God can become clear to a person with a different kind of certainty. I argue that although he overstates his polemic against theistic arguments, Kierkegaard is nonetheless correct in his account of the proper ground of belief in God. I conclude by juxtaposing Kierkegaard's views on belief in God with those of twentieth century probabilistic theologians and atheologians, as well as the "Reformed Epistemology" of Alvin Plantinga.
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2

Ibrahim, Bilal. "Freeing philosophy from metaphysics: Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's philosophical approach to the study of natural phenomena." Thesis, McGill University, 2013. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=116945.

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This dissertation examines the views of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210) as advanced in his two major philosophical works, al-Mabāḥith al-Mashriqiyya and al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī al-Ḥikma. It argues that Rāzī seeks to develop a philosophical programme that provides an alternative to the Aristotelian theory of scientific knowledge. The work is divided into two parts. Part I reconstructs the central components of Rāzī's logical system, including his theory of universals, his view of the role of definitions in philosophical analysis, and the alternative theory of predication that he advances in place of Aristotle's theory of predication. Part I focuses on the epistemological and logical programme that, in Rāzī's view, should precede the analysis of problems in the philosophical or post-logical part of the Mabāḥith and Mulakhkhaṣ (namely, Books I to III of both works). Part I consists of four chapters and a background discussion. The background discussion examines aspects of the Aristotelian theory of demonstrative science and Avicenna's interpretation of the Aristotelian theory, focusing on the nature of per se predication. Chapter 1 assesses the epistemological principles and views that Rāzī sets out in logic. Rāzī's discussion underscores a number of problematic epistemological assumptions in the Aristotelian theory of definition and concept acquisition, which he believes should not encroach on the logical analysis. Chapter 2 focuses on Rāzī's critique of per se predication on which demonstrative science is based and the alternative theory of predication that he advances. His alternative theory is based on the notion of "structured universals" as opposed to essences and per se properties. Chapter 3 examines Rāzī's critique of real definitions and assesses his view of nominal definitions. Rāzī advances nominal definitions as the alternative to real definitions. Chapter 4 examines how Rāzī's epistemological and logical programme informs his restructuring of philosophical discourse. I argue that the organization and order of the Mabāḥith and Mulakhkhaṣ are based on the alternative approach that he advances, which no longer preserves the standard ordering of the Aristotelian sciences. Here, metaphysics, construed as the highest science in the Aristotelian scientific system, no longer occupies a privileged position. Foundational ontological positions – such as, form-matter analysis, the theory of the four causes, or even atomism – are no longer presumed in the analysis of the nature of sensible objects, which Rāzī takes up in the lengthy Book II of the Mabāḥith and Mulakhkhaṣ. I conclude Part I with a postscript that examines aspects of the nature of Aristotelian logic, particularly in authors preceding Avicenna. Part II consists of two chapters, which examine his philosophical positions that follow, and are based on, his logical analysis, focusing primarily on views set out in Books I and II. Chapter 5 examines ontological problems relating to Avicenna's doctrine of the quiddity and Aristotelian form-matter analysis. It consists of a close textual analysis of a number of Rāzī's chapters in Book I of the Mabāḥith. I attempt to show that Rāzī read Avicenna's texts quite closely and that he sharply departs from Avicenna on central ontological questions. I argue that Rāzī's departure is informed by the philosophical programme that he advances in logic. Chapter 6 examines core elements of Rāzī's epistemology and psychology. The chapter expands on a number of epistemological problems that were only pointed out in his logical analysis, such as his rejection of the theory of mental forms. I argue that a core motivation for Rāzī's opposition to the Avicennan theory of mental forms derives from Rāzī's views on optics. Rāzī opposes the Avicennan theory of the "impression" of sensible forms (simulacra) and suggests that the perception of complex sensible forms involve processes that are more mind-dependent than allowed for by Avicenna's theory.
Cette thèse examine la pensée de Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (m. 1210) telle que déployée dans ses deux œuvres philosophiques majeures, al-Mabāḥith al-Mashriqiyya et al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī al-Ḥikma. J'y avance l'idée que Rāzī entend développer un programme philosophique offrant une alternative à la théorie aristotélicienne de la connaissance scientifique. Elle s'articule en deux parties. La première restitue les composantes centrales du système de logique de Rāzī, y compris sa théorie des universaux, ses positions sur le rôle et la nature des définitions dans l'analyse philosophique ainsi que sa propre théorie de la prédication qui se propose de remplacer son équivalent aristotélicien. Cette première partie se concentre sur les programmes épistémologique et logique qui, selon Rāzī, doivent précéder l'analyse des problèmes développés dans les parties philosophique ou post-logique des Mabāḥith et du Mulakhkhaṣ (c'est-à-dire les Livres I à III dans ces deux œuvres). Cette première partie inclut quatre chapitres précédés d'une discussion préliminaire. Le but de cette introduction est d'examiner certains aspects de la théorie aristotélicienne de la science démonstrative et son interprétation par Avicenne, particulièrement concernant la prédication per se. Le premier chapitre évalue les principes épistémologiques et les positions que Rāzī pose en logique. L'analyse avancée par Rāzī souligne un certain nombre de présupposés épistémologiques problématiques de la théorie aristotélicienne de la définition et de l'acquisition des concepts, qui, selon lui ne devraient pas s'immiscer dans l'analyse logique. Le second chapitre se concentre sur la critique razienne de la prédication per se, sur laquelle se fonde la science démonstrative, et sur la théorie de la prédication que ce dernier propose en lieu et place de cette dernière. Cette théorie alternative est fondée sur des « universaux structurés » plutôt que sur des essences et des propriétés per se. Le troisième chapitre examine la critique formulée par Rāzī contre les définitions réelles et analyse ses positions sur les définitions nominales qu'il propose comme alternatives aux premières. Le quatrième chapitre examine la manière dont le programme épistémologique et logique de Rāzī informe sa restructuration du discours philosophique. Je défends l'idée que l'organisation et l'ordre des Mabāḥith et du Mulakhkhaṣ s'appuient sur l'approche alternative qu'il propose qui ne conserve plus la hiérarchie habituelle des sciences que l'on trouve chez Aristote. La métaphysique n'occupe plus la position première et privilégiée qu'elle a dans le système scientifique aristotélicien. Des positions ontologiques fondamentales, telles que les formulations forme-matière, la théorie des quatre causes ou même l'atomisme ne sont plus présupposés dans l'analyse de la nature des objets sensibles.La seconde partie se subdivise en deux chapitres et examine les positions philosophiques de Rāzī qui découlent et sont fondées sur son analyse de la logique. Je m'y concentre principalement sur les positions avancées dans les livres I et II. Le premier de ces deux chapitres (chapitre 5 de la thèse), examine des problèmes ontologiques liés à la doctrine avicennienne de la quiddité et à l'analyse forme-matière chez Aristote. Le dernier chapitre examine des éléments au cœur de l'épistémologie et de la psychologie de Rāzī. Ce chapitre débouche sur un certain nombre de problèmes épistémologiques, tels que son rejet de la théorie des formes mentales, qui ne sont qu'évoquées rapidement dans son analyse de la logique. Je défends l'idée que l'une des motivations centrales de l'opposition de Rāzī à Avicenne découle de sa pensée sur l'optique. Rāzī s'oppose à la théorie avicennienne de l'« impression » des formes sensibles (simulacra) et avance l'idée que la perception des formes sensibles complexes implique des processus qui dépendent plus de l'esprit que ne le permet la théorie avicennienne.
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Johnson, Larissa Kate History &amp Philosophy Faculty of Arts &amp Social Sciences UNSW. "Kaleidoscopic natural theology: the dynamics of natural theological discourse in seventeenth and early eighteenth-century England." Awarded by:University of New South Wales. History & Philosophy, 2009. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/44831.

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In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, there was a close connection between natural philosophy and theology. However, this connection was neither essential nor intrinsic, but was open to discussion and negotiation, and natural theology played an important role in these negotiations. While there is already a great deal of literature concerned with natural theology from two distinct academic disciplines???history of science and history of religion???neither set of literature has adequately grasped the nature of the tradition, leading to conflicting claims about its historical origin. In addition, the close connection between natural and revealed theology evident in the works of orthodox Christians in early modern England has been frequently overlooked. This thesis, then, is a contribution to discussions of the relations between theology and natural philosophy in early modern England. Its main purpose is to develop and test a theoretical model of natural theology, designed to overcome some of the limitations of existing approaches. According to this model, a tradition of natural theology only emerged in England in the seventeenth century, due to the theological and natural philosophical turmoil of the Protestant Reformation and the Scientific Revolution, although it was not without precedents. This tradition of natural theology was apologetically focused, providing arguments in favour of religious doctrines originally derived from revelation. Natural theology was a dynamic discourse, which may be represented by the metaphor of a kaleidoscope, in which resources chosen from natural philosophy and theology were combined and refracted according to the pre-existing views of the practitioner as well as the contextual challenges to which he was responding. By employing a variety of resources from both natural philosophy and theology, natural theology could function as a kind of mediator between these two neighbouring traditions. This model will be tested against a range of historical case studies that represent the moments in the historical trajectory of natural theology at which output of the discourse became more concentrated, due to renewed upheaval within and between theology and natural philosophy.
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4

Pearse, Harry John. "Natural philosophy and theology in seventeenth-century England." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2016. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/263362.

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This thesis explores the disciplinary relationship between natural philosophy (the study of nature or body) and theology (the study of the divine) in seventeenth-century England. Early modern disciplines had two essential functions. First, they set the rules and boundaries of argument – knowledge was therefore legitimised and made intelligible within disciplinary contexts. And second, disciplines structured pedagogy, parcelling knowledge so it could be studied and taught. This dual role meant disciplines were epistemic and social structures. They were composed of various elements, and consequently, they related to one another in a variety of complex ways. As such, the contestability of early modern knowledge was reflected in contestability of disciplines – their content and boundaries. Francis Bacon, Thomas White, Henry More and John Locke are the focus of the four chapters respectively, with Joseph Glanvill, Thomas Hobbes, other Cambridge divines, and a variety of medieval scholastic authors providing context, comparison and reinforcement. These case studies offer a cross-section of seventeenth-century thought and belief; they embody different professional and institutional interests, and represent an array of philosophical, theological and religious positions. Nevertheless, each of them, in different ways, and to different effect, put the relationship between natural philosophy and theology at the heart of their intellectual endeavours. Together, they demonstrate that, in seventeenth-century England, natural philosophy and theology were in flux, and that their disciplinary relationship was complex, entailing degrees of overlap and alienation. Primarily, natural philosophy and theology investigated the nature and constitution of the world, and, together, determined the relationship between its constituent parts – natural and divine. However, they also reflected the scope of man’s cognitive faculties, establishing which bits of the world were knowable, and outlining the grounds for, and appropriate degrees of, certainty and belief. Thus, both disciplines, and their relationship with one another, contributed to broad discussions about, truth, certainty and opinion. This, in turn, established normative guidelines. To some extent, the rightness or wrongness of belief and behaviour was determined by particular definitions of, and relationship between, natural philosophy and theology. Consequently, man’s place in the world – his relationship with nature, God and his fellow man – was triangulated through these disciplines.
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Williams, Damien P. "A Description of the Natural Place of Magic in Philosophy and Religious Studies." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2008. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/37.

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The concept of magic is most often considered as a foil by scholars in the fields of philosophy and religious studies, or it is discussed as part of the investigation of “primitive” systems of belief and ritual. In this essay, magic is investigated as a system of inquiry and explanation unto itself, connected to but distinct from both philosophy and religious studies, and an argument is presented for understanding systems of magic as both natural and rational outgrowths of a particular perspective on reality.
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6

Zwez, Kimberly. "Hegel's Critique of Contingency in Kant's Principle of Teleology." FIU Digital Commons, 2014. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/1194.

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This research is a historical-exegetical analysis of Hegel’s reformulation of Kant’s regulative principle of teleology into a constitutive principle. Kant ascribes teleology to the faculty of reflective judgment where it is employed as a guide to regulate inquiry, but does not constitute actual knowledge. Hegel argues that if Kant made teleology into a constitutive principle then it would be a much more comprehensive theory capable of overcoming contingency in natural science, and hence, bridging the gap between natural science and theology. In this paper I argue that Hegel’s defense of the transition from natural science to theology is ultimately unsuccessful because it is built upon on an instinct of reason, which is the instinctive feature of human rationality to transition beyond the contingency remaining in our empirical understanding of nature, to a theological understanding of nature, in which all aspects of nature are necessarily related.
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7

Boyd, Craig. "Natural Law & Right Reason in the Moral Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas." TopSCHOLAR®, 1990. https://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/2157.

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A major problem with current discussions on the moral theory of St. Thomas Aquinas is the fact that many interpreters present Thomas's thought as a natural-law morality. While natural law is an element of Thomas's moral theory, it plays a subordinate role to the virtue of prudence. The natural law interpreters of St. Thomas's moral theory hold that (1) natural law is the dominant element, (2) natural law can be treated in isolation from Thomas's account of virtue, and (3) the principles of natural law make Thomas's moral theory abstract and deontological. These interpretations rarely consider the virtue of prudence. Natural law, in Thomas's moral theory, makes general statements about human nature and also sets the parameters for morally good human activity. However, it fails to function adequately on the level of an agent's particular moral problems. The general precepts of natural law do not function as proximate principles of human action. But the special function of moral virtue is to provide the agent with the necessary proximate principles of human action. Virtue is an acquired disposition of the soul that functions as a proximate principle of action. Holding a special place in Thomas's moral theory, prudence is primary among the moral virtues. It is defined as "right reason concerning things to be done." Prudence holds a middle place between he intellectual virtues and the moral virtues. It requires right thinking about moral matters, but it also requires the possession of a right appetite. This essay includes some discussion of human nature, as ethics is subordinated to psychology. Furthermore, we must show how the human agent engages in moral activity, and this requires discussing the psychological processes involved in human action. It is my purpose to explore the functions of natural law and virtue and to take account of the relationship between them in Thomas's moral theory. After establishing a proper understanding of Thomas's view, it will be clear that the natural-law interpreters have missed a crucial element in his ethical theory.
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Zhong, Xinzi. "A reconstruction of Zhū Xī's religious philosophy inspired by Leibniz: the natural theology of heaven." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2014. https://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_oa/112.

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This dissertation is aimed to set up a Confucian-style religious philosophy on the basis of Zhū Xī’s ideas. It seeks to articulate and highlight what has existed previously in some form in Zhū Xī’s Confucianism in a language which appears to be more precise for modern readers. Leibniz’s interpretations of Chinese philosophy and culture, as well as many resources in his own philosophy and Christian theology, serve to promote the realization of this aim. Zhū Xī’s religious philosophy in our reconstruction is a philosophy containing a theology of Heaven at its core, and this theology is certainly not a revealed one. These following issues are covered: 1) a theology of deities, 2) a metaphysics of the supreme being (Heaven), 3) an appropriate treatment of the ontology of lǐ2 and qì in relation to Heaven, and 4) a suitable interpretation of transcendence and immanence within human beings. The dissertation has three major parts. The first part is to argue that the worship of Heaven is special and superior to any reverence contained in the “polytheism” (which is finally philosophized by Zhū Xī as the reverence towards manifold pneuma) revealed in the Confucian sacrificial system. At the same time, it explores how the faith in various spirits or deities can be consistent with a belief in Heaven. The second part shows that it is fundamental to see Zhū Xī’s Heaven as a substance, so that one is able to attribute to it qualities and properties, even before there is any decision about whether or not to regard Heaven as a person. Among Heaven’s qualities, we choose its work (gōng) and virtuousness (dé) as its most prominent features to expound. In the light of Heaven’s virtuousness, a theodicy of Heaven is constructed. The third part is devoted to a discussion of the nature of human beings as well as of our fellows in the natural world, especially in relation to Heaven. Zhū Xī offers two perspectives for understanding humanness: one by studying the nature of xīn (“heart-mind”), and the other, the composite nature of hún-pò (or guǐ-shén, “souls”). We choose to plunge into the latter perspective, something comparable with Leibniz’s theories of soul. In the concluding chapter major features or facets of this reconstruction of Zhū Xī’s religious philosophy and its relevance to modern times are stated in a concise and relatively bold way.
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Evans, Marcus. "Shinto: An Experience of Being at Home in the World With Nature and With Others." TopSCHOLAR®, 2014. http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/1343.

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This study discloses Shinto’s experiential and existential significance and aims to articulate Shinto’s sacred objective. It shows that Shinto, by way of experience, communicates being in the world with nature and with others as a sacred objective. This suggests that Shinto, in communicating its objective, appeals to the emotions more so than to the intellect; and that Shinto’s sacred objective does not transcend the natural world of both nature and everyday affairs. This study pursues this goal by showing the experiential and existential dimensions of the three primary features of Shinto: it shows how kami (or kami-ness) is thought of as an awe producing quality of being/s that are mostly associated with the natural world; how Shinto shrines’ aesthetics and atmosphere are thought to evoke a feeling of the natural world’s sacredness; and how festivals are thought to be ecstatic and effervescent occasions that regenerate an affirmation of being in the world with others. Though this study does not employ a strict methodological approach—insofar as the conclusions herein are based primarily on literature review—it was motivated by an existential outlook on the study of religion and assumes that the term “religion” refers primarily to an existential phenomenon that pertains not necessarily to socio-historical institutions but to a way of being in the world.
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Sitek, Jessica Lynn. "DUALISM VS. MATERIALISM; TWO INADEQUATE PICTURES OF HUMAN NATURE." Master's thesis, Temple University Libraries, 2010. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/94023.

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Religion
M.A.
This discussion aims to demonstrate how the project of identifying the nature of humanity is ongoing. The dominant models have their own flaws to contend with, and in the end we are still left uncertain of what constitutes our nature. Of the two views vying for prominence (dualism vs. materialism) neither is indubitable, nevertheless their are faithful proponents on each side. In a debate of belief vs. theory we see these seemingly disparate realms come together in a resignation to faith that their option is an adequate representation of human nature.
Temple University--Theses
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Gioia, Lia. "William James e Carl Stumpf. Un rapporto scientifico e personale attraverso le lettere." Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Trieste, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10077/10147.

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2012/2013
William James e Carl Stumpf. Un rapporto scientifico e personale attraverso le lettere Come annuncia senza equivoci il titolo di questo lavoro, tema della nostra ricerca è il rapporto scientifico e personale che William James e Carl Stumpf hanno sviluppato nel corso degli anni, a partire dal loro primo incontro praghese, e che si è realizzato quasi solo del tutto in forma epistolare. Punto centrale è stato (anche) per questa ragione lo studio della loro corrispondenza, attraverso la quale è stato possibile tenere unita la prospettiva cronologica insieme allo sguardo sugli aspetti più rilevanti delle rispettive biografie umane e intellettuali. A questo scopo abbiamo adoperato le lettere di James a Stumpf – quasi tutte interamente pubblicate e dunque accessibili – nonchè ovviamente quelle di Stumpf a James. Essendo queste ultime tuttavia solo parzialmente pubblicate, per ovviare alla mancanza di materiale bibliografico, ci siamo serviti direttamente delle lettere manoscritte (conservate nella biblioteca dell’Università di Harvard e concesse in consultazione), qui interamente trascritte e commentate nell’appendice critica che conclude il lavoro. Si è scelto di pubblicare in questa sede tutte le lettere manoscritte di Stumpf e non solo una selezione delle stesse perché si ritiene che esse, nella loro interezza appunto, siano un luogo privilegiato per la ricostruzione e lo studio del rapporto James-Stumpf. Segue peraltro una sintesi delle risposte di James, inserita pure in appendice allo scopo di aiutare il lettore a mantenere sempre visibile il filo rosso che connota a più livelli questa relazione. Nel corso di tre capitoli si è cercato di ripercorrere rispettivamente le origini, il farsi e il mutare di forma del rapporto James-Stumpf. Il tutto in un’impostazione, la più sfaccettata possibile, capace quindi di rendere conto della varietà che lo caratterizza. Nell’impianto del lavoro si è cercato inoltre di privilegiare non tanto una prospettiva duale volta a proporre il sistema di analogie e differenze scientifiche e intellettuali, quanto piuttosto i diversi livelli di significato di cui questa relazione è portatrice, per quanto – questo sì – siano emersi tanto elementi di compatibilità e di una condivisa tendenza teoretica, quanto segnali di una conflittualità più o meno eclatante. In questo senso è opportuno precisare che se la corrispondenza è stata luogo di studio imprescindibile per la ricostruzione di questo rapporto, il passaggio per alcune delle loro opere è stato in molti casi una necessità, con la conseguenza di una pur necessaria selezione degli argomenti affrontati. Non si è trattato quindi di proporre qui integralmente l’esame del pensiero di James e/o di Stumpf, ma di nuovo di ricostruirne la relazione, passando obbligatoriamente per certi momenti di sviluppo che, anche alla luce della testimonianza delle lettere, sono risultati particolarmente emblematici e significativi.
William James e Carl Stumpf. A scientific and human relationship through the letters As mentioned clearly in the title of this dissertetion, the subject of our research is the scientific and human relationship that William James and Carl Stumpf developed over the years. Right after their meeting in Prague, they went on their communication almost entirely in epistolary form. For this reason it was also curicial to examine the chronological perspective of their communication, as well as taking the most interesting and important aspects of their humanistic and intellectual biographies into account. For this aim we used the letters of James to Stumpf - almost fully published - as well as those from Stumpf to James. Since the letters from Stumpf were only partially published, the bibliographical material had a certain scarcity. Therefore, we used the handwritten form of stumpfian letters (preserved in the library of the Harvard University, and granted in consultation), which are fully transcribed and annotated in the critical Appendix at the end of this dissertation. In this paper we preferred to publish all the handwritten form of Stumpfs letters – not only a partial selection from those – because we consider the whole correspondence as a privileged tool to study and understand the relationship between James-Stumpf. In order to help the reader to recognize the many levels of meaning arisen from this relationship, we have also integrated and included in the critical Appendix a summary of James’s responses. In this doctoral work through three chapters, where we have referred to the original papers, it can be recognized, how the relationship between James-Stumpf progressed from many different aspects through the years. Aim of this work is not only to emphasize the system of scientific and intellectual similarities and differences between James and Stumpf; on the contrary we underline and visualize different levels of meaning arisen from this relationship. However, it is possible to find these both elements in their communication: from one hand, the compatibilty and a shared theoretical trend, on the other hand the signs of a conflict, which are sometimes more, sometimes less radical. From this point of view it should be also noted that, while the correspondence is an essential and important context of study in this relationship, it was necessary in some cases to take some of their central works into account, and therefore it leaded to an unavoidable selection of the topics treated. Under these circumstances, it must be pointed out that we don’t aim a complete examination of James’s and/or Stumpf’s thoughts, but mainly a development of their relationship, starting from some emblamatic and significant issues, which can be directly found in their correspondence.
XXV Ciclo
1982
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Eriksson, Nils. "Ny teknik och gamla drömmar : En konsekvensprövning av relationen mellan människan och en artificiell intelligens." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Teologiska institutionen, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-446245.

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The purpose of this thesis is to examine how a theology regarding artificial intelligence best could be formulated in concern of consequences for a christian view of human nature. This purpose is examined by means of a comparative study of consequences derived from four different perspectives on the emergence of AI and the theoretical implications of its relation with mankind. As premise for what is considered a desired, respectively an undesired consequence, the minimum amount of human suffering is used conditioning the possibility of living a good life. In conducting the analysis, Leslie Stevensons theory of humanity in relation to God is used to interpret the christian view of human nature and a general wide theory of AI based on Cornel Du Toits definition is applied. My assessment of the researched consequences ends in a proposal for a constructive christian theology which argues for the necessity of placing a high value on a human capacity for vulnerability. This is because it enables invaluable human qualities such as empathy and compassion. Qualities that also should  lead the way and be modeled into a concern for all of creation, whether it is considered natural or artificial.
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Martell, Brad A. "Nature as Spiritual Lived Experience: How Five Christian Theologians Encounter the Spirit In and Through the Natural World." Antioch University / OhioLINK, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=antioch1468834290.

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Santos, JoÃo Batista Mulato. "GÃnero Humano, IndivÃduo e Natureza em Ludwig Feuerbach." Universidade Federal do CearÃ, 2016. http://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=17696.

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CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeiÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior
A presente pesquisa tem como ponto de partida a crÃtica filosÃfica que Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach (1804-1872) faz sobre a religiÃo, filosofia especulativa e toda forma de idealismo que fundamenta o homem a partir de abstraÃÃes vazias, negando assim sua essÃncia genÃrica ao transferi-la para um ser imaginÃrio criado por ele mesmo à sua imagem e semelhanÃa. Ao longo do texto serÃo expostos os conceitos da essÃncia verdadeira e falsa da religiÃo, da essÃncia genÃrica do homem, da natureza e da essÃncia subjetiva da religiÃo tal como Feuerbach articula em seus escritos no decorrer de vÃrios momentos de sua vida. As obras usadas como referÃncias principais sÃo A EssÃncia do Cristianismo (1841), PreleÃÃes sobre a EssÃncia da ReligiÃo (1851) e PrincÃpios da Filosofia do Futuro e outros Escritos (1843), onde sÃo expostos os principais argumentos que fundamentam sua filosofia da sensibilidade. No decorrer deste texto sÃo evidenciadas e confrontadas as perspectivas distintas, de acordo com a presente pesquisa, sobre a religiÃo e o homem no que se refere à anÃlise feita por Feuerbach para este tema em A EssÃncia do Cristianismo e nas PreleÃÃes sobre a EssÃncia da ReligiÃo. Na primeira obra à notada uma anÃlise antropolÃgica-objetiva para este tema e na segunda o filÃsofo se debruÃa em um viÃs psicolÃgico-subjetivo que tem como base a relaÃÃo entre a natureza e o homem que se encontra à mercà de seus perigos. Para Feuerbach, a religiÃo cristà à um contraponto imediato à natureza, pois ela a subjuga conforme seus caprichos tornando-a dependente de uma vontade subjetiva, a saber Deus. Mas a filosofia feuerbachiana tem como ponto de partida a experiÃncia sensÃvel e coloca a natureza como incriada, absoluta e independente, sendo ela e os meios materiais os verdadeiros responsÃveis pela origem do homem criador dos deuses. Logo, esta pesquisa se concentrarà no relacionamento do homem com a natureza e do indivÃduo com o seu gÃnero, questionando o que faz surgir, primordialmente, o sentimento religioso. Esse sentimento, de acordo com Feuerbach, à no mÃnimo essencial ou inato ao ser humano, mas à aqui analisado o que proporciona, primordialmente, o seu despertar ou desenvolve nele a capacidade de criaÃÃo de deuses? E quem à o homem criador de deuses? Qual o momento mais marcante que possibilita aos humanos criarem seus deuses? à a partir do momento em que eles reconhecem seu gÃnero, que à portador de determinaÃÃes perfeitas (as essentidades), que passa a existir a religiÃo em suas vidas, como à o caso do cristianismo, ou à a partir de sua relaÃÃo nÃo recÃproca com a natureza? O que à mais fundamental na filosofia feuerbachiana para que exista religiÃo, sÃo as perfeiÃÃes do homem enquanto gÃnero, ou as imperfeiÃÃes do homem enquanto indivÃduo em seu relacionamento insuficiente, nÃo recÃproco, com as contingÃncias do mundo material? Desta forma, na crÃtica de Feuerbach à religiÃo podemos tambÃm notar a ocorrÃncia de uma virada antropolÃgica que possibilita o surgimento de uma nova teoria Ãtica baseada na relaÃÃo Eu-Tu, isto Ã, do homem com o outro sem a mediaÃÃo de nenhum ente divino, abstrato, e essa teoria o coloca em sua integralidade no centro dessa filosofia admitindo-o como ser sensÃvel, corpÃreo que està inserido na natureza e apenas dela depende para existir.
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15

Colborn, Robert Maurice. "Manilius on the nature of the Universe : a study of the natural-philosophical teaching of the Astronomica." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:481db8c5-4a3b-42ff-b301-eafc3e2f9ad8.

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The thesis has two aims. The first is to show that a more charitable approach to Manilius, such as Lucretian scholarship has exhibited in recent decades, yields a wealth of exciting discoveries that earlier scholarship has not thought to look for. The thesis' contributions to this project centre on three aspects of the poem: (I) the sophistication of its didactic techniques, which draw and build on various predecessors in the tradition of didactic poetry; (II) its cosmological, physical and theological basis, which has no exact parallel elsewhere in either astrology or natural philosophy, and despite clear debts to various traditions, is demonstrably the invention of our poet; (III) the extent to which rationales and physical bases are offered for points of astrological theory – something unparalleled in other astrological texts until Ptolemy. The second, related aim of the thesis is to offer a more satisfying interpretation of the poem as a whole than those that have hitherto been put forward. Again the cue comes from Lucretius: though the DRN is at first sight primarily an exposition of Epicurean physics, it becomes clear that its principal concern is ethical, steering its reader away from superstition, the fear of death and other damaging thought-patterns. Likewise, the Astronomica makes the best sense when its principal message is taken to be not the set of astrological statements that make up its bulk, but the poem’s peculiar world- view, for which those statements serve as an evidential basis. It is, on this reading, just as much a poem ‘on the nature of the universe', which provides the title of my thesis. At the same time, however, it finds new truth in the conventional assumption that Manilius is first and foremost an advocate of astrology: it reveals his efforts to defend astrology at all costs, uncovers strategies for making the reader more amenable to further astrological study and practice, and contends that someone with Manilius' set of beliefs must first have been a devotee of astrology before embracing a natural- philosophical perspective such as his. The thesis is divided into prolegomena and commentaries, which pursue the aims presented above in two different but complementary ways. The prolegomena comprise five chapters, outlined below: Chapter 1 presents a comprehensive survey of the evidence for the cosmology, physics and theology of the Astronomica, and discovers that a coherent and carefully thought-out world-view underlies the poem. It suggests that this Stoicising world- view is drawn exclusively from a few philosophical works of Cicero, but is nonetheless the product of careful synthesis. Chapter 2 explores the relationship between this world-view and earlier Academic criticism of astrology and concludes that the former has been developed as a direct response to these criticisms, specifically as set out in Cicero’s De divinatione. Chapter 3 examines the later impact of Manilius’ astrological world-view, as far as it can be detected, assessing the evidence for the early reception of his poem and its role in the history of philosophical astrology. The overwhelming impression is that the work was received as a serious contribution to debate over the physical and theological underpinnings of astrology; its world-view was absorbed into the mainstream of astrological theory and directly targeted in the next wave of Academic criticism of astrology. Chapter 4 looks at the more subtle strategies of persuasion that are at work in the Astronomica. It observes, first, a number of structural devices and word- patternings that set up the poem as a model of the universe it describes. This first part of the chapter concludes by asking what didactic and/or philosophical purpose such modelling could serve. The second part examines how, by a gradual process of habituation-through-metaphor, the reader is made familiar with the conventional astrological way of thinking about the world, which might otherwise have struck him as a baffling mass of contradictions. The third part looks at the use of certain rhetorical figures, particularly paradox, to re-emphasise important physical claims and assist the process of habituation. Chapter 5 takes on the task of making sense of the Astronomica as a whole, seeking out an underlying rationale behind the choice and ordering of material, accounting as well as is possible for its apparently premature end, and asking why, if it is a serious piece of natural-philosophical teaching, it so often appears to be self- undermining. A short epilogue asks what path can have led Manilius to embark on such a work as the Astronomica. It offers a sketch of the author as an adherent (but not a practitioner) of astrology, who had developed a philosophical system first as scaffolding for an art under threat, but had then come to see more importance in that philosophical underpinning than in the activities of prediction. The lemmatised commentaries that follow cover several passages from the first book of the Astronomica. As crucial as the remaining four books are to his natural-philosophical teaching, it is in this part of the poem that Manilius concentrates the direct expositions of his world-view. Like the chapters, the commentaries' two concerns are the nature and the exposition of the work's world-view. Each of the commentaries has its own focus, but all make full use of the format to tease out the poet's teaching strategies and watch his techniques operate 'in real time' over protracted stretches of text. Finally, an appendix presents the case for the Astronomica as the earliest evidence for the use of plane-image star maps. At two points in his tour of the night sky Manilius describes the positions of constellations in a way that suggests that he is consulting a stereographic projection of each hemisphere, and that he is assuming his reader has one to hand, too. This observation casts valuable new light on the development of celestial cartography.
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16

Gittler, Bernard. "Rousseau et l'héritage de Montaigne." Thesis, Lyon, École normale supérieure, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015ENSL1013.

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Cette recherche porte sur le rôle joué par la lecture de Montaigne dans la philosophie de Rousseau.Il convenait d’abord de repérer les traces de cette lecture et les différents témoignages qu’en donnent son œuvre publiée ainsi que ses manuscrits, d’établir les éditions dans lesquelles Rousseau lit les Essais et les perspectives dans lesquelles il le fait. Il fallait établir également les médiations qui ont joué un rôle dans la réception de Montaigne par Rousseau. Les Essais sont édités et lus au XVIIIe siècle selon des perspectives auxquelles il ne cesse de se confronter. Nombre d’auteurs du XVIIe siècle sur lesquels il s’appuie dialoguent avec Montaigne. L’étude de la relation que Rousseau entretient avec lui demande donc l’examen de toute une tradition philosophique qui s’appuie elle-même sur Montaigne.Cette dimension de l’héritage conduit à trianguler les références, implicites ou explicites, que Rousseau fait à Montaigne dans son œuvre philosophique. Il lui sert de point d’appui pour dialoguer avec Diderot traducteur de Shaftesbury et pour prendre parti, dès le premier Discours, en faveur de la religion naturelle. La lecture politique des Essais qu’il produit nourrit son opposition à toute forme de domination et lui permet de critiquer la position de Montesquieu sur le luxe. Cette lecture politique se développe dans le second Discours, pour dénoncer les effets de l’intérêt particulier, qui détruit le lien politique. Rousseau s’appuie encore sur les principes de La Boétie qu’il trouve dans les Essais pour penser la dépravation de l’homme en société. Le lien social ne demande pas de suivre une morale opposée à l’intérêt, mais de poursuivre l’intérêt universel qui nous lie aux autres hommes. Montaigne occupe aussi une place déterminante dans le dialogue que Rousseau entretient avec des auteurs comme Barbeyrac, Mandeville ou Locke.Cette thèse montre ainsi que la référence à Montaigne met en jeu les principes fondamentaux de la philosophie politique et morale de Rousseau
The aim of this study is to analyze the role of Montaigne’s legacy in Rousseau’s philosophy.First, evidences and views of Rousseau’s reading of Montaigne have been examined in his published works and in his manuscripts. Editions in which Rousseau was reading Montaigne have also been identified.Then, mediations between Rousseau and Montaigne’s reception have been reviewed. Rousseau reads the Essais with the 18th century points of view. He relies on 17th century authors who judge Montaigne. Therefore, thanks to this philosophical tradition who deals with Montaigne, links between Montaigne and Rousseau are analysed.The implicit and explicit references to Montaigne in Rousseau’s work are triangulated. Rousseau quotes Montaigne to deal with Diderot, – translator of Shaftesbury, to defend natural religion as early as in his First Discourse on the Sciences and Arts.Rousseau has a political reading of the Essais. He denounces all kind of domination, and criticizes Montesquieu’s apology of luxury. The political reading of Montaigne increases in the second Discourse : the possessive individualism destroys the social link.Rousseau underlines the La Boétie’s principles in the Essais, which show the political depravation of society. The social link does not demand to follow moral rules against citizen’s interests. Humanity has to pursue a universal interest, which establishes a relationship between each human being and the whole humanity.Montaigne has a central position to understand the dialogues between Rousseau and Barbeyrac, Mandeville, and Locke. Rousseau refers to Montaigne when he defends his moral and politic fundamental principles
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Goodrich, Sarah. "Human-Nature Relationship And Faery Faith In The American Pagan Subculture." ScholarWorks @ UVM, 2015. http://scholarworks.uvm.edu/graddis/402.

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Within American religious culture, there is a small but significant and growing movement that overlaps and interacts with the environmental movement. It's known by many names, including Contemporary Paganism, Neo-Paganism, Earth Religion, and Nature Religion. A few years of observation at Starwood Festival, the largest annual Pagan gathering in North America, revealed that many individuals who identify as Pagan (or Wiccan, Druid, animist, or another of the identities that fall under the Pagan umbrella) include in their spiritual practice engagement with faeries or other nature spirits. My research employed qualitative methods including participant observation and interviews to examine the extent to which engagement with faeries and other nature spirits among Pagan festival attendees affects their relationships with nature and their behaviors in the natural world. The Pagan understanding of the Earth and all of its inhabitants and elements as animate or inspirited, as exemplified in the phenomenon of faery faith, conflates the wellbeing of the Earth and wild nature with the psychological wellbeing of each individual human, making this worldview highly compatible with the emerging field of ecopsychology. Drawing on theories of enchantment, consciousness, multiple realities, imagination, and play, my interpretations of the stories of my informants contribute additional perspective to the contemporary practice of Paganism as a small but growing countercultural movement within the dominant Western culture, particularly as it informs the human-(in)-nature relationship.
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18

Douglas, Steven Murray, and u4093670@alumni anu edu au. "Is 'green' religion the solution to the ecological crisis? A case study of mainstream religion in Australia." The Australian National University. Fenner School of Environment and Society, 2008. http://thesis.anu.edu.au./public/adt-ANU20091111.144835.

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A significant and growing number of authors and commentators have proposed that ecologically enlightened (‘greened’) religion is the solution or at least a major part of the solution to the global ecological crisis. These include Birch, 1965 p90; Brindle, 2000; Callicott, 1994; Gardner, 2002, 2003, 2006; Gore Jr., 1992; Gottlieb, 2006, 2007; Hallman, 2000; Hamilton, 2006b, a, 2007b; Hessel & Ruether, 2000b; Hitchcock, 1999; King, 2002; Lerner, 2006a; McDonagh, 1987; McFague, 2001; McKenzie, 2005; Nasr, 1996; Oelschlaeger, 1994; Palmer, 1992; Randers, 1972; Tucker & Grim, 2000; and White Jr., 1967. Proponents offer a variety of reasons for this view, including that the majority of the world’s and many nations’ people identify themselves as religious, and that there is a large amount of land and infrastructure controlled by religious organisations worldwide. However, the most important reason is that ‘religion’ is said to have one or more exceptional qualities that can drive and sustain dramatic personal and societal change. The underlying or sometimes overt suggestion is that as the ecological crisis is ultimately a moral crisis, religion is best placed to address the problem at its root. ¶ Proponents of the above views are often religious, though there are many who are not. Many proponents are from the USA and write in the context of the powerful role of religion in that country. Others write in a global context. Very few write from or about the Australian context where the role of religion in society is variously argued to be virtually non-existent, soon to be non-existent, or conversely, profound but covert. ¶ This thesis tests the proposition that religion is the solution to the ecological crisis. It does this using a case study of mainstream religion in Australia, represented by the Catholic, Anglican, and Uniting Churches. The Churches’ ecological policies and practices are analysed to determine the extent to which these denominations are fulfilling, or might be able to fulfil, the proposition. The primary research method is an Internet-based search for policy and praxis material. The methodology is Critical Human Ecology. ¶ The research finds that: the ‘greening’ of these denominations is evident; it is a recent phenomenon in the older Churches; there is a growing wealth of environmentalist sentiment and ecological policy being produced; but little institutional praxis has occurred. Despite the often-strong rhetoric, there is no evidence to suggest that ecological concerns, even linked to broader social concerns (termed ‘ecojustice’) are ‘core business’ for the Churches as institutions. Conventional institutional and anthropocentric welfare concerns remain dominant. ¶ Overall, the three Churches struggle with organisational, demographic, and cultural problems that impede their ability to convert their official ecological concerns into institutional praxis. Despite these problems, there are some outstanding examples of ecological policy and praxis in institutional and non-institutional forms that at least match those seen in mainstream secular society. ¶ I conclude that in Australia, mainstream religion is a limited part of the solution to the ecological crisis. It is not the solution to the crisis, at least not in its present institutional form. Institutional Christianity is in decline in Australia and is being replaced by non-institutional Christianity, other religions and non-religious spiritualities (Tacey, 2000, 2003; Bouma, 2006; Tacey, 2007). The ecological crisis is a moral crisis, but in Australia, morality is increasingly outside the domain of institutional religion. The growth of the non-institutional religious and the ‘spiritual but not religious’ demographic may, if ecologically informed, offer more of a contribution to addressing the ecological crisis in future. This may occur in combination with some of the more progressive movements seen at the periphery of institutional Christianity such as the ‘eco-ministry’ of Rev. Dr. Jason John in Adelaide, and the ‘Creation Spirituality’ taught, advocated and practiced by the Mercy Sisters’ Earth Link project in Queensland.
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Daniel, Dafydd Edward Mills. "Conscience and its referents : the meaning and place of conscience in the moral thought of Joseph Butler and the ethical rationalism of Samuel Clarke, John Balguy and Richard Price." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:427a4657-7701-4c68-bb05-353100ee9a73.

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Joseph Butler's moral thought and the ethical rationalism of Samuel Clarke, and his followers, John Balguy and Richard Price, are frequently distinguished, as a result of: (a) Butler’s empirical method (e.g., Kydd, Sturgeon); (b) Butler's emphasis upon self-love in the 'cool hour passage' (e.g., Prichard, McPherson); (c) Butlerian conscience, where, on a neo-Kantian reading, Butler surpassed the Clarkeans by conveying a sense of Kantian 'reflective endorsement' (e.g., Korsgaard, Darwall). The neo-Kantian criticisms of the Clarkeans in (c) are consistent with (d) Francis Hutcheson's and David Hume's criticisms of the Clarkeans; (e) modern criticisms of rational intuitionism that follow Hutcheson and Hume (e.g., Mackie, Warnock); and (f) the contention that the Clarkeans occupied an uneasy position within 'post-restoration natural law theory' (e.g., Beiser, Finnis). (d)-(e) thus underpin the distinction between Butler and the Clarkeans in (a)-(c), where the Clarkeans, unlike Butler, are criticised for representing moral truth as the passive, and self-evident, perception of potentially uninteresting facts. This study responds to (a)-(f), by arguing that Butlerian and Clarkean conscience possessed more than one referent; so that conscience meant an individual's experience of his own judgement and God’s judgement and the rational moral order. As a result of their shared theory of conscience, Butler and the Clarkeans held the same theory of moral development: moral agents mature as they move from obeying conscience according to only one of conscience's referents, to obeying conscience because to do so is to satisfy each of conscience's referents. In response to (a)-(b), this study demonstrates that the Clarkeans agreed with Butler’s method and 'cool hour': natural considerations of individual judgement and self-interest were necessary aspects of the progress towards moral maturity in both Butler and the Clarkeans. With respect to (c), it is argued that Butler and the Clarkeans shared the same understanding of practical moral reasoning as part of their shared understanding of conscience and moral development. This study places limits upon proto-Kantian readings of Butler, and neo-Kantian criticisms of the Clarkeans, while making it inconsistent to divide Butler and the Clarkeans on the basis of Butlerian conscience. In answer to (c)-(f), Clarkean conscience shows that the Clarkeans were neither complacent nor ‘externalists’. Clarkean conscience highlights how the Clarkeans positioned themselves within the tradition of Ciceronian right reason and Thomistic natural law. Consequently, in both Butler and the Clarkeans, the intuition of moral truth was not the passive perception of an 'independent realm' of normative fact, but the active encounter, in conscience, with reason qua the law of God’s nature, human nature, and the created universe.
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Marticki, Johan. "The Robotic Moment Explored : Intimations of an Anthropo-Technological Predicament." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Teologiska institutionen, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-352784.

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This paper examines the ‘robotic moment’, as defined by Sherry Turkle (2011), in the light of general theories of human-technology relations, notably the theoretical framework founded by Jacques Ellul (1954). Potential psychological, cultural, and technical consequences of human-technology interaction, especially human interaction with so-called ‘social-robots’, are explored. It is demonstrated that the ‘robotic moment’ may reasonably be understood as a result of the formation of pseudo-social anthropo-technological circuits, and as a result of cultural disintegration and an increasingly prevalent societal impulse to incorporate everything that is commonly not understood to be technological (i.e. even the biological, the social, and the spiritual) into the technological order. It is demonstrated that the category ‘social robot’ may reasonably be understood, depending on how the robot is used, as a technique humaine, as a magical practice, or as a complex hybrid practice. Assumptions concerning the nature of technologies, the extent to which technologies are useful, and the impact of technologies on society are questioned. The extent to which a society’s worldview may determine or influence how its inhabitants relate to technologies is explored. It is suggested that, as societies demystify the universe and develop mature techno-secular worldviews, means-to-ends (i.e. technologies) are being mystified; the ensuing quasi-religious techno-secular worldviews, which fail to recognise the limitations of technologies, may in turn be responsible for much of the irrational use of technologies in technological societies. The essay suggests that the ‘robotic moment’ can be explained not only in terms of vulnerabilities inherent in human nature and in terms of properties inherent in technological society, but also in terms of the notions of the sacred that prevail in technically advanced societies and a society’s practice of science, engineering, magic, and faith.
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21

Perbal, Laurence. "Gènes et comportements: au-delà de l'inné et de l'acquis." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/210350.

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Le contexte historique et épistémologique de l’émergence de la génétique des comportements en tant que discipline trouve ses racines dans différentes disciplines biologiques :la génétique, la biologie de l’évolution et la biologie moléculaire. Ces dernières font partie du paradigme néodarwinien moléculaire. De cette origine, elle a hérité deux grands domaines de recherche, la génétique quantitative et la génétique moléculaire. Ils ont chacun des objectifs et des méthodologies différents. Les études concernant l’intelligence, les comportements agressifs, les comportements addictifs et l’orientation sexuelle permettent notamment d’illustrer ces différences. Elles permettent également de faire un état des lieux des recherches menées dans ce domaine parfois hautement polémique. En fait, la génétique des comportements est marquée par deux ères épistémologiques, l’ère génomique qui a débuté dans les années 1980 et l’ère post-génomique, qui comme son nom l’indique, lui succède dès le début des années 2000. Les résultats apportés par l’ensemble de ces recherches imposent une conclusion, les approches théoriques et techniques phares de l’ère génomique sont insuffisantes à rendre compte de la complexité des phénomènes développementaux liés aux comportements. L’ère post-génomique tente donc de combler les faiblesses de l’ère précédente. Ainsi, la biologie développementale revient au premier plan et ce retour est souhaité depuis longtemps par un courant philosophique majeur né dans les années 1990, la Developmental Systems Theory. L’ère post-génomique est également caractérisée par un pluralisme pragmatique, à la fois théorique et expérimental. La nécessité de multiplier les modes d’appréhension des comportements s’impose car leur complexité intrinsèque est reconnue et tend à être assumée. Les résultats plus récents apportés par les recherches sur l’intelligence, les comportements agressifs, addictifs et l’orientation sexuelle illustrent cette évolution épistémologique. L’opposition entre inné et acquis échoue à rendre compte de la complexité et du dynamisme développemental des phénotypes comportementaux./ The historical and epistemological context of the birth of behavioral genetics as a discipline has its roots in different biological domains: genetics, evolutionary biology and molecular biology. They are parts of the molecular neo-Darwinian paradigm. From this multiple outset, behavioral genetics has inherited two major areas of research, quantitative genetics and molecular genetics. They each have different purposes and methodologies. The study of researches on IQ, aggressive behaviors, addictive behaviors and sexual orientation illustrate these differences. It also permits to make an overview of results provided in this field that is sometimes highly controversial. In fact, behavioral genetics is marked by two epistemological eras, the genomic era that began in the 1980s and the postgenomic era that began by the early 2000s. The results provided by all these researches lead to one conclusion, the theoretical and technical approaches of the genomic era is insufficient to show the complexity of developmental phenomena associated with behaviors. The postgenomic era attempts to correct the weaknesses of the previous era. Thus, developmental biology comes back in the foreground and the necessity of this return has been defended by a major philosophical theory born in 1990, the Developmental Systems Theory. The postgenomic era is also characterized by a theoretical and experimental pragmatic pluralism. The complexity of the developmental patterns of behaviors is recognized and tends to be assumed. The latest results produce by researches on IQ, aggressive behaviors, addiction and sexual orientation illustrate these epistemological changes. The opposition between nature and nurture fails to properly apprehend the developmental dynamism of behavioral phenotypes.
Doctorat en Philosophie
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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22

Bundalo, Anja. "La construction et la déconstruction des modèles de l'absolutisme éclairé dans l'Europe des Lumières." Thesis, Tours, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018TOUR2019/document.

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Les philosophes français des Lumières se sont évertués, notamment dans la deuxième moitié du XVIIIe siècle, à préciser les cas où l’inégalité et les limites de la liberté seraient conformes aux lois naturelles afin de proposer les préceptes permettant une vie sociale épanouie. Ce faisant, ils ouvrirent la voie à la formation des absolutismes éclairés qui trouvent leurs racines juridiques dans la théorie du droit naturel. Elaborée pour une large part par Voltaire qui la mettait directement en relation avec l’idéologie des absolutismes « classiques », l’idéologie des absolutismes éclairés avait pour but principal la création d’un Etat fort. Ayant accepté les propositions des philosophes les « rois philosophes » ou « monarques éclairés » fondèrent les justificatifs d’une telle politique sur la langue, la mode, et surtout sur la confiance dans un progrès que la France avait su promouvoir
The French philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment, especially in the second part of the eighteenth century, endeavoured to specify the cases in which inequality and the limitations of freedom would be in accordance with natural laws in order to propose precepts for a blossoming life. By doing so, they opened the way to the formation of enlightened absolutism, a model of government that finds its legal foundations in the Natural Law Theory Developed largely part by Voltaire, who put it in the direct relation with the ideology of “classical” absolutism, the ideology of enlightened absolutism had as its principal goal the creation of a strong state. Having embraced the philosophers’ precepts, the “enlightened monarchs” or “philosopher kings” founded the evidence of such a policy on language, fashion, and especially on the confidence in a progress that France had been able to promote
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23

Williams, M. "Natural and supernatural religion." Thesis, Swansea University, 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.636639.

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This thesis asks one fundamental question that is either implicit or explicit in each part. The underlying question is whether religious belief rests on a belief in a supernatural existence for its sense. I argue that this is not so, and that the sense of religious concepts does not presuppose any supernatural existence. In Part One I discuss the philosophical landscape that we have inherited from Hume, and how H.O. Mounce’s attempt to re-interpret Hume’s criticisms of religion, in the light of Hume’s own naturalist tendencies, still cannot reach any supernatural existence. In Part Two, I focus on two ways that seem to imply a supernatural existence ‘beyond’ us. The first concerns the concept of power; the second concerns our ethical life. Both seem to presuppose some sort of a supernatural existence. The former seems to do so through the notion of the power of God as that which is experienced entering human life from another realm; the latter, because morality seems to require that the injustices we experience in life needs correcting, if not in this life, then in a life after death. In Part Three my concern is to explore the possibility of the religious sense of the supernatural. In this respect, I challenge the assumption that the meaning of ‘the existence of God’ entails a belief in a supernatural being.
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Palmieri, Paolo. "Galileo's mathematical natural philosophy." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.396268.

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25

Kanaris, Jim. "Bernard Lonergan's philosophy of religion." Thesis, McGill University, 2000. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=36772.

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Describing Bernard Lonergan's relation to philosophy of religion is tricky business, with complications arising on different levels. To begin with, he does not use the term as it is usually understood in the field of the same name. Moreover, he addresses the same issues as philosophers of religion, but under the guise of philosophy of God or natural theology. Finally, he understands idiosyncratically the issue of religious experience, which is now a specialized category in philosophy of religion called upon to support formally rational statements for or against theistic belief. This central issue in Lonergan is further complicated by the fact that his idiosyncratic understanding of (religious) experience plays different roles in his thinking about God and religion. In this study I flesh out the dynamics of these various components, their interrelationships, and their function from early to late development.
My point of departure is a period in Lonergan's thought where he attributes more to the influence of religious experience in our thinking than at any time prior in his career. In chapter 1 I pursue some reasons that have been given for the tardiness of his response, intimating its nature and what it meant for his controversial "proof" for God's existence. Something of a detour is taken in chapter 2 since discussion of the concept of religious experience in Lonergan must grapple with what he means by experience in general. I decipher three senses to the term integral to his concept of consciousness that I distinguish from a contemporary model, that of David Chalmers. Since Lonergan is emphatic about distinguishing consciousness from its concept I trace this aspect of his philosophical claim against the background of Kant and Hegel, his main dialogue partners on the question. In chapter 3 I return to the specifically religious dimension of the notion of experience in the early Lonergan. Here I track the development of his category of religious experience as it moves from the periphery to the explanatory basis of his thought. In chapter 4 the relevant later literature in Lonergan is examined in which is seen the emergence of what is technically philosophy of religion to him. Among the distinctions I introduce is the difference between his model of religion and what he calls his philosophy of religion. Conceiving it historically, I see the former, his model of religion, as the departure point for what in his philosophy of religion he sets out to accomplish. They are related, of course, but not one and the same thing. To avoid confusion with the field of the same name, I recommend that we refer to his philosophy of religion as it is literally, as a philosophy of religious studies, distinguishing it firstly from his philosophy of God and secondly from his model of religious experience.
Besides providing an unprecedented comprehensive understanding of Lonergan's philosophy of religion, outlining the matter this way also aids in identifying precisely what are the points of contact between Lonergan's thoughts on God and religion and the issues presently discussed by philosophers of religion. The conclusion offers an example of this at the level of "philosophy of," the formal component of Lonergan's philosophy of religion in the generic sense in which I understand it. It represents steps toward a larger project, which I adumbrate in the appendix.
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Vrtiska, Josef Michael. "Natural Law: Religion and Integrity." Thesis, The University of Arizona, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/146249.

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This thesis examines the contemporary debates over the meaning of natural law. Kent Greenawalt and Ronald Dworkin weigh in on this debate and oppose the theory of natural law with some theories of law that they have developed themselves. Greenawalt argues that citizens in a liberal democracy are not to rely on their religious convictions but rather on publicly accessible reasons. The religious convictions that these citizens have are to be a secondary reliance but can be used in situations where publicly accessible reasons are absent such as abortion. Dworkin develops his theory of Integrity as Law which he explains as a "chain novel." Law is like a novel being written in which the judges must continually add chapters. The goal is integrity. Judges must treat the law that is in place as part of the novel that has already been partly written. It is a way to improve upon the existing laws and precedents. In order for a unifying acceptance of law and development of law, theories of law must be developed. Greenawalt and Dworkin each offer alternative approaches to natural law, and in this thesis, I compare how these theories apply to legal debates concerning abortion and pornography.
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Roberts, Gabriel C. B. "Historical argument in the writings of the English deists." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f4f32628-8e30-49b4-b2ab-449dc0b94b64.

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This study examines the role of history in the writings of the English deists, a group of heterodox religious controversialists who were active from the last quarter of the seventeenth century until the middle of the eighteenth century. Its main sources are the published works of the deists and their opponents, but it also draws, where possible, on manuscript sources. Not all of the deists were English (one was Irish and another was of Welsh extraction), but the term ‘English Deists’ has been used on the grounds that the majority of deists were English and that they published overwhelmingly in England and in English. It shows that the deists not only disagreed with their orthodox opponents about the content of sacred history, but also about the relationship between religious truth and historical evidence. Chapter 1 explains the entwining of theology and history in early Christianity, how the connection between them was understood by early modern Christians, and how developments in orthodox learning set the stage for the appearance of deism in the latter decades of the seventeenth century. Each of the following three chapters is devoted to a different line of argument which the deists employed against orthodox belief. Chapter 2 examines the argument that certain propositions were meaningless, and therefore neither true nor false irrespective of any historical evidence which could be marshalled in their support, as it was used by John Toland and Anthony Collins. Chapter 3 traces the argument that the actions ascribed to God in sacred history might be unworthy of his goodness, beginning with Samuel Clarke’s first set of Boyle Lectures and then progressing through the writings of Thomas Chubb, Matthew Tindal, Thomas Morgan, and William Warburton. Chapter 4 charts the decline of the category of certain knowledge in the latter half of the seventeenth century, the rise of probability theory, and the effect of these developments on the deists’ views about the reliability of historical evidence. Chapter 5 is a case-study, which reads Anthony Collins’s Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion (1724) in light of the findings of the earlier chapters. Finally, a coda provides a conspectus of the state of the debate in the middle decades of the eighteenth century, focusing on the work of four writers: Peter Annet, David Hume, Conyers Middleton, and Edward Gibbon.
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Levene, David Samuel. "Religion in Livy." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.305051.

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29

Chetelat, James Pierre. "Hegel's concept of religion." Thesis, McGill University, 2008. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=18726.

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In this dissertation I explore how Hegel conceives of the practice of religion. Religion for Hegel cannot be the relationship between humans and a transcendent being, since, as I argue, Hegel's God is not a being of the transcendent sort, but reason as Idea and spirit. Nor does Hegel primarily understand religion as feeling or immediate experience of the divine. According to Hegel, religion involves knowledge of the truth in the form of representation, and I discuss the truths that in his view are common to all religions, as well as the principle that he thinks guides the development of the various determinate religions that culminate in Christianity. But, first and foremost, religion for Hegel is cultus or practice in which a person overcomes her own particularity in a radical manner and identifies completely with the universal, objective standpoint. By overcoming her particularity, the person recognizes that her own interests lack absolute value, and she is willing to abandon them entirely for the sake of what the universal requires of her. The highest form of the cultus for Hegel is full participation in Sittlichkeit, or the social and cultural life of modern Protestant Europe. In the cultus, a person achieves freedom, the goal of religion and the highest value in Hegel's philosophy. I argue that freedom for Hegel is independence vis-à-vis the world in both an active and a passive sense. As active, freedom is the autonomy that a person possesses when she acts rationally or follows the ethical norms that are a necessary moment of being free. As passive, freedom is the independence that a person gains when she is no longer attached to her particular interests and is accepting of circumstances in which her desires are not met. But for Hegel the norms of freedom also allow and require that a person continue to engage fully in the world and actively pursue her own particular interests, since such activities play a necessary role in being free. In my
J'explore dans cette thèse la manière dont Hegel conçoit la pratique religieuse. Pour Hegel, la religion ne saurait être une relation entre un être transcendant et les humains puisque, ainsi que je le démontre, le dieu hégélien n'est pas un tel être transcendant mais plutôt la raison en tant qu'Idée et esprit. Il n'est pas non plus question pour Hegel de comprendre la religion comme le sentiment ou l'expérience immédiate du divin. Selon lui, la religion implique une connaissance de la vérité sous la forme d'une représentation. Mon propos à cet égard est de cerner les vérités qui, de son point de vue, sont communes à toutes les religions, et d'identifier le principe qui, selon lui, préside au développement des diverses religions déterminées qui culminent dans le christianisme. Mais, d'abord et avant tout, la religion est pour Hegel un culte ou une pratique par laquelle une personne surmonte de manière radicale sa propre particularité et s'identifie complètement au point de vue universel et objectif. En surmontant sa particularité, cette personne reconnaît que ses intérêts sont dépourvus de valeur absolue et accepte de les abandonner entièrement pour se soumettre aux exigences de l'universel. Selon Hegel, la forme la plus élevée du culte est une participation pleine et entière à la Sittlichkeit, ou à la vie sociale et culturelle de l'Europe protestante moderne. Le culte permet à celui qui y participe de parvenir à la liberté, but de la religion et valeur ultime dans la philosophie hégélienne. J'argumente que la liberté est pour Hegel une indépendance, tant active que passive, vis-à-vis du monde externe. En tant qu'elle est active, la liberté est l'autonomie qu'une personne possède lorsqu'elle agit rationnellement ou qu'elle se conforme aux normes éthiques qui constituent un moment nécessaire de son être-libre. En tant qu'elle est passive, la liberté est l'indépendance qu'une personne atteint lorsqu'elle s'est$
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30

Regier, Jonathan N. "Cause in Kepler's Natural Philosophy." Paris 7, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA070068.

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Cette thèse tient à fournir une analyse originale de la causalité chez Johannes Kepler (1571-1630). Elle est divisée en deux parties, selon les deux grandes catégories de causes dans la philosophie naturelle de Kepler : les causes archétypales et efficientes. 1) La première partie se concentrera donc sur les oeuvres majeures de la philosophie archétypale. Nous monterons comment cette philosophie, qui se base sur une synthèse de l'épistémologie mélanchthonienne et du néoplatonisme, a comme objectif principal l'unité de la connaissance. 2) Kepler croyait également que tout changement dans le monde était dû à une force. Il s'est donc chargé de caractériser les forces primaires de la nature, particulièrement la lumière et la force solaire (vis motrix). Ces forces, qui nous occuperont dans la deuxième partie de cette thèse, sont vitales, c'est-à-dire qu'elles sont des facultates animae. Une des conclusions de cette thèse est que sa conception de la force, ainsi que sa méthode en « physique céleste », doivent être comprises sur le fond de la médecine du XVIe siècle, dont un des traits est un hylémorphisme extrêmement syncrétique. Un autre de nos objectifs est de montrer la continuité qui existe entre la causalité archétypale et la causalité efficiente. Elles sont toutes les deux censées expliquer comment les idées géométriques sont quantifiées ou, plus précisément, incorporées. Le vitalisme de Kepler est lui-même une sorte de réflexion mathématique : les âmes sont des entités mathématiques et leurs forces peuvent être décrites comme des proportions actives et incarnées
This thesis provides an original analysis of causality in Johannes Kepler's (1571-1630) natural philosophy. It is split into two parts, according to the two kinds of cause that reign large in Kepler's investigations: the archetypal and the efficient. 1) Part one focuses on the major works of his archetypal philosophy. I will show how this philosophy, based on a synthesis of Melanchthonian epistemology and Neoplatonism, is deeply preoccupied with the unity of knowledge. 2) Kepler also believed, quite naturally, that change was the result of force, and he set himself to explicating the chief forces at work in nature, namely light and the solar vis. These forces are vital, that is, they represent facultates animae. One of my major points in this thesis is that Kepler's method for doing celestial physics, as well as his conception of force, must be understood within the context of sixteenth century medicine and its extremely syncretic brand of hylomorphism. Another will be to show the underlying continuity between archetypal and efficient causes. Both must explain how geometrical ideas are quantified, or, to be more precise, embodied. And both are implicated in the taming of matter with form, where matter is quantity and form is geometrical reason or ratio. Kepler's vitalism is itself a kind of mathematical reflection: souls are mathematical entities and their forces can be described as active and embodied proportions
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31

Merklinger, Philip M. "Philosophy, theology, and Hegel's Berlin philosophy of religion, 1821-1827." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/7593.

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32

Woolford, Thomas. "Natural theology and natural philosophy in the late Renaissance." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2012. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/242394.

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Scholars have become increasingly aware of the need to understand the religious context of early modern natural philosophy. Despite some great strides in relating certain areas of Christian doctrine to the study of the natural world, the category ‘natural theology’ has often been subject to anachronism and misunderstanding. The term itself is difficult to define; it is most fruitful to think of natural theology as the answer to the question, ‘what can be known about God and religion from the contemplation of the natural world?’ There have been several erroneous assumptions about natural theology – in particular that it only consisted of rational proofs for the existence of God, that it was ecumenical in outlook, and that it was defined as strictly separate from Scriptural revelation. These assumptions are shown to be uncharacteristic of the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth century. The study of natural theology needs to be better integrated into three contexts – the doctrinal, confessional, and chronological. Doctrinally, natural theology does not stand alone but needs to be understood within the context of the theology of revelation, justification, and the effects of the Fall. These doctrines make such a material difference that scholars always ought to delineate clearly between the threefold state of man (original innocence, state of sin, state of grace) when approaching the topic of ‘natural’ knowledge of God. Confessionally, scholars need to recognise that the doctrine of natural theology received different treatments on either side of the sectarian divide. In Catholicism, for instance, there were considerable spiritual benefits of natural theology for the non-Christian, while in Protestantism its benefits were restricted to those saved Christians who possessed Scriptural insight. Chronologically, natural theology does not remain uniform throughout the history of Christian theology but, being subject to changes occasioned by philosophical and theological faddism and development, needs to be considered within a particular locus. Research here focuses on late sixteenth-century orthodoxy as defined in confessional and catechismal literature (which has been generally understudied), and demonstrates its application in a number of case-studies. This thesis begins the work of putting natural theology into these three contexts. An improved understanding of natural theology, with more rigorous and accurate terminology and better nuanced appreciation of confessional differences, makes for a better framework in which to consider the theological context of early modern natural philosophy.
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33

Pulleyn, Simon Paul. "Prayer in Greek religion." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1993. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.239396.

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34

Hallebeek, Johannes J. "Quia natura nichil privatum : aspecten van de eigendomsvraag in het werk van Thomas van Aquino, 1225-1274 /." Nijmegen : Gerard Noodt Instituut, 1986. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37148518q.

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35

Walker, William. "Creation in Santal tribal religion and Christian faith : a study in comparative religion." Thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.241493.

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36

McCormick, Sean Eli. "Transcendence: An Ethical Analysis of Enhancement Technologies." Cleveland State University / OhioLINK, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=csu1464233924.

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37

Walmsley, Jonathan Craig. "John Locke's natural philosophy (1632-1671)." Thesis, Boston Spa, U.K. : British Library Document Supply Centre, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?did=1&uin=uk.bl.ethos.286485.

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38

Handley-Schachler, Iain-Morrison. "Achaemenid religion, 521-465 B.C." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.357523.

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39

Robert, Dominique 1950. "Humane bioethics : medicine, philosophy, religion and law." Thesis, McGill University, 2001. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=31531.

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This thesis is about the content and concerns of each of four disciplines pertaining to the field of bioethics: medicine, philosophy, religion and law. Emphasis is put on the human values each reflects in patients' lives. A last chapter is dedicated to patients' narrative in order to bring a practical perspective to the discussions of the previous chapters. The four essential human values interconnecting among the four disciplines are: the patients' need for authority, the need for protection, the existential questioning about the meaning of life, and the fear of death.
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40

Crowder, C. G. "Belief, unbelief and Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion." Thesis, Swansea University, 1993. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.636328.

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The interpretations of religious belief associated with philosophers in the Wittgensteinian tradition are widely misunderstood, as are the corresponding - but less well-known - interpretations of atheism. Instead of being a theory about autonomous 'language games', the Wittgensteinian approach is, in fact, a means of securing perspicuous representations of the relations between language and human practices; and the discourses of belief and unbelief are as rooted in our natural and cultural histories as any others. Foundationalist philosophers of religion isolate the discourses of belief and unbelief from human lives, both in describing the conflict between belief and unbelief and in attempting to arbitrate between the two. Assuming that metaphysical theism and atheism are fundamental to belief and unbelief, they advance a cognitivist and propositionalist analysis of both phenomena which is sometimes incoherent, and almost always impoverishing. Similarly, assuming that the conflict between belief and unbelief is a 'factual' one, they advocate ways of resolving it which betray a misunderstanding of the character of the conflict as it occurs in the lives of believers and atheists. The design argument, past and present, is a case in point: natural theology and natural atheology prove to be alike in misrepresenting perspectives upon the world as inferences drawn from it. Hume's Dialogues demonstrate the sheer irrelevance of the latter to the conflict between belief and unbelief, and compel us to reflect upon that conflict in different ways.
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41

Wodzinski, Phillip David. "Kant's Doctrine of Religion as Political Philosophy." Thesis, Boston College, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/987.

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Thesis advisor: Susan Shell
Through a close reading of Immanuel Kant's late book, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, the dissertation clarifies the political element in Kant's doctrine of religion and so contributes to a wider conception of his political philosophy. Kant's political philosophy of religion, in addition to extending and further animating his moral doctrine, interprets religion in such a way as to give the Christian faith a moral grounding that will make possible, and even be an agent of, the improvement of social and political life. The dissertation emphasizes the wholeness and structure of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason as a book, for the teaching of the book is not exhausted by the articulation of its doctrine but also includes both the fact and the manner of its expression: the reader learns most fully from Kant by giving attention to the structure and tone of the book as well as to its stated content and argumentation. The Religion provides the basis not only for a proposed reenvisioning of the basis of existing religious creeds and practices, but along with this a devastating critique of them in particularly moral terms. This, however, is only half of what constitutes Kant's political philosophy of religion; Kant goes beyond the philosophical analysis of the social-political context of religion and pursues, alongside this effort, a political presentation of philosophy which is intended to relieve the reader's anxieties concerning the tension between philosophy and political life that it is in the interest of the partisans of the church-faith to encourage
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Political Science
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42

Stahlberg, Benjamin B. "Spinoza's philosophy of divine order." Related electronic resource: Current Research at SU : database of SU dissertations, recent titles available full text, 2009. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/syr/main.

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43

Wellington, R. A. "The Problem of Doctrinal Decidability| Methods for Evaluating Purorted Divine Revelations." Thesis, Oklahoma State University, 2017. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10272232.

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The plethora of contrary doctrines pertaining to salvation, among the variety of religions in the world today, creates a problem for the sincere investigator who seeks to find out if there is such a thing as salvation and, if there is, how to be saved. These contrary doctrines are problematic to the degree that the sincere investigator is unable to evaluate the probability of some of these doctrines over others. In order to aid the sincere investigator with this problem, I explore methods for evaluating doctrines that purport to affect one?s salvation.

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44

Chan, Ka-wo, and 陳嘉和. "What if natural kind terms are rigid?" Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2009. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B41633878.

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45

Bediako, Gillian Mary. "The relationship between primal religion and biblical religion in the works of William Robertson Smith." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1995. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk/R?func=search-advanced-go&find_code1=WSN&request1=AAIU602310.

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This thesis examines the relationship between primal religion and biblical religion in the works of William Robertson Smith on the understanding that it was a central and persisting concern of his career as a Christian scholar and apologist. It is hoped that this work not only contributes to an understanding of Robertson Smith as one who sought to integrate faith with scientific scholarship, but that the issues raised through his perception and discussion of the subject do contribute to the phenomenological reflection on the nature of biblical and Christian faith, and the possible modes of Christian engagement with a religiously pluralist world. The study proceeds on the basis of the view that Smith's perception of primal and of biblical religion, being intimately linked with his European Christian identity and intellectual heritage, cannot be adequately understood without a consideration of two formative influences in European Christian identity and engagement with other peoples and religions-namely, Christendom and the European image of "primitive" peoples and religions. Both of these contributed significantly to a nineteenth century European intellectual and cultural consensus, having an impact upon a wide range of fields of endeavour, including biblical criticism, comparative religion and social anthropology. Their development and impact is the focus of Part I. as a background to their influence on Smith's thought and career. Part II focuses on Smith's early life and work to show the essential continuity between his evangelical and intellectual upbringing and his later concerns. Part III considers Smith's mature works, showing how his apologetic purpose is revealed in the approach and content of each. The Conclusion highlights two key internal difficulties arising from the developmental interpretation of Israelite religion for Smith's understanding of the affinity of biblical religion with primal religion- namely, the location of the Decalogue in Israel's religious development, and the significance of Christ's death as sacrifice. These difficulties suggest that these problems remained unresolved in Smith's writings and indicate an ultimate failure to account for the relationship between primal religion and biblical religion on the basis of a developmental schema. It is a moot point how Smith would have dealt with these problems, had late twentieth century insights into the nature of primal religion and its persisting historical relationship to Christian faith, been available to him.
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46

Partridge, Christopher Hugh. "Revelation, religion, and Christian uniqueness : an appreciative critique of H.H. Farmer's theological interpretation of religion." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1995. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk/R?func=search-advanced-go&find_code1=WSN&request1=AAIU076884.

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The dissertation is an examination and appreciative critique of H.H. Farmer's theology of religions as this arises out of his writings, particularly his Gifford lectures, Revelation and Religion and Reconciliation and Religion. Not only is this the first comprehensive study of Farmer's theological interpretation of religion and religions, but it is the first study and explication of his unpublished second series of Gifford lectures. The thesis has three broad aims, namely, to explicate and assess: (a) Farmer's theological interpretation of religion: and (b) the arguments he uses for establishing Christian uniqueness in the history of religions. Finally, (c) the overall aim of the study is to demonstrate that Farmer's personalist thought still has much to offer to contemporary theologians and philosophers of religion. Hence, throughout there is dialogue with both those who influenced Farmer, and more recent studies in the theology and history of religions. The first chapter deals primarily with his theology of personal relationships and epistemology. The second chapter examines the nature of religion and the role of reason in his thought. Chapter three turns to his christology and soteriology. Chapter four is a discussion of the seven elements of normative religion which he identifies in Christian worship of God as Trinity. In the fifth chapter his analysis of religious types is explicated and examined. Chapter six is an outline and study of his unpublished second series of Gifford lectures. Finally, in chapter seven various lines of thought are drawn together, critiqued in the light of contemporary discussion, and suggestions are offered as to how Farmer's thought might be developed into a personalist theology of religions.
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47

Corrigan, Daniel Patrick. "Wittgenstein and Religion." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2006. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/13.

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This thesis considers the implications of Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophy for the issue of religious belief, as well as the relation of religion to Wittgenstein’s thought. In the first chapter I provide an overview of the Tractatus and discuss the place of religion within the Tractarian framework. I then provide an overview of Philosophical Investigations. In the second chapter I consider interpretations by Norman Malcolm and Peter Winch of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy in relation to religion, as well as Kai Nielsen’s famous critique of ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism.’ The third and final chapter takes up the issue of construing religious belief as a distinctive language-game. I consider arguments from D. Z. Phillips and criticisms of Phillips from Mark Addis and Gareth Moore.
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48

Rochard, Michelle A. "Kant's philosophy of religion : the relationship between Ecclesiastical faith and reasoned religion." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape15/PQDD_0005/MQ39436.pdf.

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49

Hurl, Ronald H. "The philosophy of the new evangelization and Etienne Gilson's notion of Christian philosophy." Online full text .pdf document, available to Fuller patrons only, 2004.

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50

Cox-Rubien, Rowen. "Pursuing Natural Unity, Consciousness Included." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2019. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/1357.

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An ontological exploration of consciousness and how it is related to the body and other aspects of physical reality. Framed by David Chalmers' conception of "The Hard Problem", we begin from a physicalist perspective to discuss the problem of mental causation, which is the inquiry of how the mind communicates and interacts with the body. From here we examine the employment of identity reduction to functionalize and therefore physically explain mentality. We find that reductionist methods, the backbone of scientific investigation, do not work to explain conscious experience, because conscious experience is not quantifiable--it is qualitative. Thus we are left with looking for alternatives to our physicalist world-view in order to explain consciousness's place in reality. Perhaps a major conceptual revolution of how we see and understand the world is on the horizon that will allow us to finally explain consciousness.
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