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Journal articles on the topic 'Philosophy of Mind (excl. Cognition)'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 28 January 2023

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1

Dayer, Alex, and Carolyn Dicey Jennings. "Attention in Skilled Behavior: an Argument for Pluralism." Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12, no. 3 (March 16, 2021): 615–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00529-6.

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AbstractPeak human performance—whether of Olympic athletes, Nobel prize winners, or you cooking the best dish you’ve ever made—depends on skill. Skill is at the heart of what it means to excel. Yet, the fixity of skilled behavior can sometimes make it seem a lower-level activity, more akin to the movements of an invertebrate or a machine. Peak performance in elite athletes is often described, for example, as “automatic” by those athletes: “The most frequent response from participants (eight athletes and one coach) when describing the execution of a peak performance was the automatic execution of performance” (Anderson et al. 2014). While the automaticity of skilled behavior is widely acknowledged, some worry that too much automaticity in skill would challenge its ability to exhibit human excellence. And so two camps have developed: those who focus on the automaticity of skilled behavior, the “habitualists,” and those who focus on the higher-level cognition behind peak performance, the “intellectualists.” We take a different tack. We argue that skilled behavior weaves together automaticity and higher-level cognition, which we call “pluralism.” That is, we argue that automaticity and higher-level cognition are both normal features of skilled behavior that benefit skilled behavior. This view is hinted at in other quotes about automaticity in skill—while expert gamers describe themselves as “playing with” automaticity (Taylor and Elam 2018), expert musicians are said to balance automaticity with creativity through performance cues: “Performance cues allow the musician to attend to some aspects of the performance while allowing others to be executed automatically” (Chaffin and Logan 2006). We describe in this paper three ways that higher-level cognition and automaticity are woven together. The first two, level pluralism and synchronic pluralism, are described in other papers, albeit under different cover. We take our contribution to be both distinguishing the three forms and contributing the third, diachronic pluralism. In fact, we find that diachronic pluralism presents the strongest case against habitualism and intellectualism, especially when considered through the example of strategic automaticity. In each case of pluralism, we use research on the presence or absence of attention (e.g., in mind wandering) to explore the presence or absence of higher-level cognition in skilled behavior.

2

Cling, Andrew D. "Mind and Cognition." Teaching Philosophy 15, no. 2 (1992): 196–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil199215226.

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Levine, J. "Review: Consciousness and Cognition." Mind 113, no. 451 (July 1, 2004): 596–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/113.451.596.

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Frings, M., M. Maschke, and D. Timmann. "Cerebellum and cognition - viewed from philosophy of mind." Cerebellum 6, no. 4 (2007): 328–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14734220701200063.

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Chokr, Nader N. "Mind, consciousness, and cognition: Phenomenology vs. cognitive science." Husserl Studies 9, no. 3 (1992): 179–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00142815.

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Jago, M. "Review: Jonathan A. Waskan: Models and Cognition." Mind 118, no. 469 (January 1, 2009): 220–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzp012.

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Oberst, Michael. "Kant, Epistemic Phenomenalism, and the Refutation of Idealism." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 100, no. 2 (June 5, 2018): 172–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/agph-2018-2003.

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Abstract: This paper takes issue with the widespread view that Kant rejects epistemic phenomenalism. According to epistemic phenomenalism, only cognition of states of one’s own mind can be certain, while cognition of outer objects is necessarily uncertain. I argue that Kant does not reject this view, but accepts a modified version of it. For, in contrast to traditional skeptics, he distinguishes between two kinds of outer objects and holds that we have direct access to outer appearances in our mind; but he still considers objects outside our mind unknowable. This sheds new light on Kant’s refutation of idealism.

8

Madzia, Roman. "Root-Brains: The Frontiers of Cognition in the Light of John Dewey’s Philosophy of Nature." Contemporary Pragmatism 14, no. 1 (May 30, 2017): 93–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01401006.

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This article endeavors to interpret certain facets of Dewey’s philosophy in light of an underinvestigated research program in contemporary situated cognition, namely, plant cognition. I argue that Dewey’s views on situated cognition go substantially further than most philosophers of embodied mind are ready to admit. Building on the background of current research in plant cognition, and adding conceptual help of Dewey, I contend that plants can be seen as full-blown cognitive organisms, although they do not have what one would normally call “a body.” Through this line of inquiry, I identify what are among the most pressing problems in current theories of the embodied mind and subsequently try to overcome them by means of Dewey’s metaphysics of the psychical.

9

Weiskopf, D. A. "Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbounded, by Richard Menary." Mind 119, no. 474 (April 1, 2010): 515–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzq038.

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Van Eyghen, Hans. "What Cognitive Science of Religion Can Learn from John Dewey." Contemporary Pragmatism 15, no. 3 (August 31, 2018): 387–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01503007.

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I use three ideas from philosopher John Dewey that are of service for Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). I discuss how Dewey’s ideas on embodied cognition, embedded cognition can be put to work to get a fuller understanding of religious cognition. I also use his ideas to criticize CSR’s reliance on the modularity of mind thesis

11

Sutton, John. "Introduction: Memory, Embodied Cognition, and the Extended Mind." Philosophical Psychology 19, no. 3 (June 2006): 281–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080600702550.

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12

Yu, Ning. "Heart and Cognition in Ancient Chinese Philosophy." Journal of Cognition and Culture 7, no. 1-2 (2007): 27–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853707x171801.

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AbstractFollowing the theory of conceptual metaphor in cognitive linguistics, this paper studies a predominant conceptual metaphor in the understanding of the heart in ancient Chinese philosophy: THE HEART IS THE RULER OF THE BODY. The most important conceptual mapping of this metaphor consists in the perceived correspondence between the mental power of the heart and the political power of the ruler. The Chinese heart is traditionally regarded as the organ of thinking and reasoning, as well as feeling. As such, it is conceptualized as the central faculty of cognition. This cultural conceptualization differs fundamentally from the Western dualism that upholds the reason-emotion dichotomy, as represented by the binary contrast between mind and heart in particular, and mind and body in general. It is found that the HEART AS RULER metaphor has a mirror image, namely THE RULER IS THE HEART OF THE COUNTRY. The ruler as the "heart" of the country leads his nation while guided by his own heart as the "ruler" of his body. It is argued that the two-way metaphorical mappings are based on the overarching beliefs of ancient Chinese philosophy in the unity and correspondence between the microcosm of man and the macrocosm of universe. It is suggested that the conceptualization of the heart in ancient Chinese philosophy, which is basically metaphorical in nature, is still spread widely across Chinese culture today.

13

Potter, Jonathan, and Derek Edwards. "Rethinking Cognition: On Coulter on Discourse and Mind." Human Studies 26, no. 2 (June 2003): 165–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1024008104438.

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Clark, Andy. "Review: Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition." Mind 114, no. 455 (July 1, 2005): 777–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzi777.

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Rietveld, Erik. "Situated Normativity: The Normative Aspect of Embodied Cognition in Unreflective Action." Mind 117, no. 468 (October 1, 2008): 973–1001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzn050.

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Gerken, Mikkel. "How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition, by Shannon Spaulding." Mind 129, no. 513 (March 16, 2019): 268–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzz005.

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Allen-Hermanson, Sean. "Superdupersizing the mind: extended cognition and the persistence of cognitive bloat." Philosophical Studies 164, no. 3 (March 31, 2012): 791–806. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9914-7.

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Shapiro, L. "Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology, by Gary Hatfield." Mind 119, no. 475 (July 1, 2010): 789–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzq047.

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Clark, Andy. "Embodiment and the Philosophy of Mind." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 (March 1998): 35–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s135824610000429x.

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Cognitive science is in some sense the science of the mind. But an increasingly influential theme, in recent years, has been the role of the physical body, and of the local environment, in promoting adaptive success. No right-minded cognitive scientist, to be sure, ever claimed that body and world were completely irrelevant to the understanding of mind. But there was, nonetheless, an unmistakeable tendency to marginalize such factors: to dwell on inner complexity whilst simplifying or ignoring the complex inner-outer interplays that characterize the bulk of basic biological problem-solving. This tendency was expressed in, for example, the development of planning algorithms that treated real-world action as merely a way of implementing solutions arrived at by pure cognition (more recent work, by contrast, allows such actions to play important computational and problem-solving roles). It also surfaced in David Marr's depiction of the task of vision as the construction of a detailed threedimensional image of the visual scene. For possession of such a rich inner model effectively allows the system to ‘throw away’ the world and to focus subsequent computational activity on the inner model alone.

20

Hwang, Joseph. "Perceiving Ideas." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 100, no. 3 (September 5, 2018): 286–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/agph-2018-3002.

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Abstract At the heart of Descartes’s theory of cognition is the act of perceiving an idea. However, it remains unclear what precisely an idea is, what the act of perceiving ideas amounts to, and how that act contributes to the formation of cognition under Descartes’s view. In this paper, I provide an account of perceiving ideas that clarifies Descartes’s notion of an idea and explains the fundamental role that the perceiving of ideas occupies in his theory of cognition. At the end of the paper, I will address an issue that arises regarding the objective reality of ideas and the unity of mind.

21

Purshouse, L. "Review: Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics: Promise of Enrichment, Threat of Destruction." Mind 113, no. 449 (January 1, 2004): 139–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/113.449.139.

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Westerhoff, J. "Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy, by Christian Coseru." Mind 122, no. 488 (October 1, 2013): 1069–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzt096.

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23

Friedman, Robert. "Higher Cognition: A Mechanical Perspective." Encyclopedia 2, no. 3 (August 22, 2022): 1503–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/encyclopedia2030102.

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Cognition is the acquisition of knowledge by the mechanical process of information flow in a system. In cognition, input is received by the sensory modalities and the output may occur as a motor or other response. The sensory information is internally transformed to a set of representations, which is the basis for downstream cognitive processing. This is in contrast to the traditional definition based on mental processes, a phenomenon of the mind that originates in past ideas of philosophy.

24

Stockwell, Peter. "Mind-modelling literary personas." Journal of Literary Semantics 51, no. 2 (September 29, 2022): 131–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jls-2022-2056.

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Abstract This article takes its cue from David Miall’s influential 2011 paper, ‘Enacting the other: towards an aesthetics of feeling in literary reading’, in Elisabeth Schellekens and Peter Goldie (eds) The Aesthetic Mind: Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 285–298. There, Miall considers the workings of readerly empathy with fictional people. He draws on work from philosophy, psychology, cognitive poetics, and both empirical and textual analysis to explore the complexities of how real readerly minds interact with fictional minds and the minds of real but remote authors. In this article, I revisit these arguments with the benefit of recent insights into the cognition of fictional minds. The key mechanism underlying characterisation, empathy, hostility, and engagement, I argue, is mind-modelling. With its origins in Theory of Mind, but extrapolated far from that simple phenomenon, mind-modelling captures the aesthetic and ethical relationships between minds both fictional and natural. I consider literary reading as a broader ecosystem: the reading mind as being embodied, enacted, and extended to include the imagined authorial mind. In recognition of Miall’s literary critical work, I will present a particular example from the poem ‘Ode on a Grecian Urn’ by John Keats – not only for the analytical demonstration but also in order to show the echoes between Romantic notions of holistic engagement with nature and recent work in cognition and literature. The analysis suggests a solution to a literary critical debate around its ending. An approach situated in mind-modelling offers a principled exploration of both fictional, poetic minds as well as authorial positioning.

25

Zhang, Wen-Ran. "A Logical Path From Neural Ensemble Formation to Cognition With Mind-Light-Matter Unification." International Journal of Cognitive Informatics and Natural Intelligence 12, no. 4 (October 2018): 20–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijcini.2018100102.

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Based on a geometrical and logical unification of mind, light, and matter, a revision of Laozi is proposed and a logical path is identified from neural ensemble formation to cognition. Mind-matter or mind-body unification has been a longstanding impasse in philosophy and science hindering the advancement of biophysics, quantum biology, neuroscience, human level AI, and cognitive informatics. However, this article shows that such a unification can be reached logically. To achieve the goal, the eternal Dao is told as the Being of revealing with a formal YinYang logic. It is illustrated with computer simulation that neural ensembles can form a causal network for cognition with information conservation. It is suggested that if the theory is confirmed, the search for mind-body unification will reach a major milestone on the eternal Dao toward a better understanding of the nature of human intelligence and mental health. This work leads to a number of predictions in science philosophy.

26

Losonsky, Michael. "Passionate thought." Pragmatics and Cognition 1, no. 2 (January 1, 1993): 245–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.1.2.03los.

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According to a computational view of mind, thinking is identified with the manipulation of internal mental representations and intelligent behavior is the output of these computations. Although Thomas Hobbes's philosophy of mind is taken by many to be a precursor of this brand of cognitivism, this is not the case. For Hobbes, not all thinking is the manipulation of language-like symbols, and intelligent behavior is partly constitutive of cognition. Cognition requires a 'passionate thought', and this Hobbsian synthesis of inner thought and outer behavior suggests a resolution to the contemporary conflict between cognitive theories of mind that make KNOWING THAT primary and pragmatic theories that make KNOWING HOW primary.

27

Vold, Karina. "Can Consciousness Extend?" Philosophical Topics 48, no. 1 (2020): 243–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics202048112.

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The extended mind thesis prompted philosophers to think about the different shapes our minds can take as they reach beyond our brains and stretch into new technologies. Some of us rely heavily on the environment to scaffold our cognition, reorganizing our homes into rich cognitive niches, for example, or using our smartphones as swiss-army knives for cognition. But the thesis also prompts us to think about other varieties of minds and the unique forms they take. What are we to make of the exotic distributed nervous systems we see in octopuses, for example, or the complex collectives of bees? In this paper, I will argue for a robust version of the extended mind thesis that includes the possibility of extended consciousness. This thesis will open up new ways of understanding the different forms that conscious minds can take, whether human or nonhuman. The thesis will also challenge the popular belief that consciousness exists exclusively in the brain. Furthermore, despite the attention that the extended mind thesis has received, there has been relatively less written about the possibility of extended consciousness. A number of prominent defenders of the extended mind thesis have even called the idea of extended consciousness implausible. I will argue, however, that extended consciousness is a viable theory and it follows from the same ‘parity argument’ that Clark and Chalmers (1998) first advanced to support the extended mind thesis. What is more, it may even provide us with a valuable paradigm for how we understand some otherwise puzzling behaviors in certain neurologically abnormal patients as well as in some nonhuman animals.

28

Kempson, Ruth M. "Logical form: the grammar cognition interface." Journal of Linguistics 24, no. 2 (September 1988): 393–431. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022226700011841.

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Over the course of the last twenty-five years, linguistic theory has established itself as providing one of the major routes towards an understanding of the human mind. With increasing precision we have been able to address the problem of articulating in detail the structured capacities the human mind brings to the problem of language acquisition. Along the way there have been doubters, much of the doubt having arisen because of the apparently unbridgeable gap the theory demands between the language user's capacity and the interaction of this capacity with more general cognitive skills. Such doubters as there were received little reassurance from looking at work on performance or language use, for there has been little more than speculative philosophy on the one hand (most notably by Paul Grice, 1975) and articulation of detailed processing mechanisms on the other (e.g. Fodor, 1978; Frazier, 1979; Frazier & Fodor, 1978), without any overall theory. J. A. Fodor (1982, 1983) has led the field in cognitive psychology with his representational theory of mind. But we have till now had no theory of the central cognitive mechanism. Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986) provides us with a contender. It makes specific claims about the central cognitive mechanism and about the relation of natural language to that central mechanism. Against this framework, we are at last able to formulate precise proposals about the grammar-cognition interface, and in so doing provide answers to the psychological reality questions which have gone unanswered for so long: What is the relation of grammars to utterance–interpretation? What is the nature of the link between grammars and the central cognitive mechanism? What is the relation between a speaker's knowledge of his language and his general knowledge?

29

Bach, Theodore. "Analogical Cognition: Applications in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Mind and Language." Philosophy Compass 7, no. 5 (May 2012): 348–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00480.x.

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Afeltowicz, Łukasz, and Witold Wachowski. "How Far we Can Go Without Looking Under the Skin: The Bounds of Cognitive Science." Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 40, no. 1 (March 1, 2015): 91–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/slgr-2015-0005.

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Abstract The aim of this paper is to discuss the concept of distributed cognition (DCog) in the context of classic questions posed by mainstream cognitive science. We support our remarks by appealing to empirical evidence from the fields of cognitive science and ethnography. Particular attention is paid to the structure and functioning of a cognitive system, as well as its external representations. We analyze the problem of how far we can push the study of human cognition without taking into account what is underneath an individual’s skin. In light of our discussion, a distinction between DCog and the extended mind becomes important.

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Shevchenko, Sergei Yu. "Extended Mind and Epistemic Responsibility in a Digital Society." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 58, no. 4 (2021): 209–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202158470.

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The article deals with the problem of compatibility of the extended mind thesis with the concept of epistemic responsibility. This compatibility problem lies at the intersection of two current trends in Virtue Epistemology (VE): the study of extended cognition, and the return of VE to the topic of epistemic responsibility. I give objections to two seemingly independent positions; their acceptance makes it difficult or even impossible to make the concept of epistemic responsibility applicable to the agents of digital society whose cognition is extended. The core of both positions can be illustrated by the following thesis: “Since the subject cannot voluntarily change his/her beliefs, we cannot ascribe to him/her either epistemic responsibility or intellectual virtues that allow him/her to take responsibility”. The counter-arguments to this thesis are based on the distinction between the causal (responsibility-in) and normative (responsibility-for) components of responsibility. The absence of the former allows us to characterize the subject as not responsible, the absence of the latter as irresponsible. I propose two conceptual foundations that can make possible the consistent talk about the epistemic responsibility of an extended subject. 1) The subject may not be responsible for the beliefs taken from the epistemic environment, but the subject bears significant responsibility for what environment he finds himself in. 2) Being epistemically responsible means deliberately reducing the number of possible causal excuses – excuses based on agent’s unresponsibiity due to his causal dependence on his epistemic environment (‘cognitive extensions’).

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Sterelny, Kim. "Connectionism Rules, OK?" Dialogue 32, no. 3 (1993): 545–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300012312.

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Those familiar with Paul Churchland's earlier work will expect A Neuro-computational Perspective to be lively, provocative and interesting. They will not be disappointed. Churchland is best known for his sceptical view of belief-desire psychology. He suspects this theory is hopelessly false. This welcome collection of his essays includes this work but also his papers on the subjective aspects of the mind and his more recent adventures in philosophy of science. Three themes unify the collection: an anti-sententialist view of cognition, an emphasis on the plasticity of the human mind and a strong endorsement of connectionist models of human cognitive processes.

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Fraissler, Hannes. "A private language argument to elucidate the relation between mind and language." Filosofia Unisinos 22, no. 1 (March 15, 2021): 48–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.221.06.

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I will defend the claim that we need to differentiate between thinking and reasoning in order to make progress in understanding the intricate relation between language and mind. The distinction between thinking and reasoning will allow us to apply a structural equivalent of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument to the domain of mind and language. This argumentative strategy enables us to show that and how a certain subcategory of cognitive processes, namely reasoning, is constitutively dependent on language. The final outcome and claim of this paper can be summarized as follows: We can think without language, but we cannot reason without language. While this still leaves several questions about the relation between mind and language unanswered, I hold that the insights defended in this paper provide the basis and proper framework for further investigation about the relationship between language and the mind.Keywords: Private language argument, Wittgenstein, thought/mind and language, reasoning, linguistic relativity, non-linguistic cognition.

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Trybulec, Marcin. "Bridging the gap between writing and cognition." Pragmatics and Cognition 21, no. 3 (December 31, 2013): 469–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.21.3.03try.

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The claim that the invention of literacy has cognitive consequences, so-called Literacy Theory, is subject to the criticism that it implies a form of technological determinism. This criticism, however, assumes an outdated Cartesian model of mind, a mind independent of the body and the external world. Such an internalistic framework leaves unexplored the cognitive consequences of the material dimension of writing. Therefore, in order to dismiss the accusations of technological determinism, the Cartesian model of mind and cognition needs to be reconsidered. The paper demonstrates how the framework of situated cognition helps to account for the cognitive consequences of written artifacts themselves. Material characteristics of written vehicles such as spatial and temporal stability of the content, fixity of information with reference to page boundaries, lightness and small size of paper sheets, and spatial layout of documents make up the most relevant material factors enabling the distribution of cognitive work.

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Silva, José Filipe, and Christina Thomsen Thörnqvist. "Introduction: Assimilation and Representation in Medieval Theories of Cognition." Vivarium 57, no. 3-4 (August 15, 2019): 223–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685349-12341371.

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AbstractThe articles in this issue are a selection of the papers presented at the conference Knowledge as Assimilation, held at the University of Helsinki on 9-11 June 2017. The conference was the result of a collaboration between two research groups that have been established in Finland and Sweden from 2013 onwards: the research project Rationality in Perception: Transformations of Mind and Cognition 1250-1550, funded by the European Research Council (2015-2020) and hosted by the University of Helsinki, and the research programme Representation and Reality: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on the Aristotelian Tradition, funded by the Riksbankens jubileumsfond (2013-2019) and located at the University of Gothenburg.

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Gallagher, Shaun. "Social cognition and social robots." Mechanicism and Autonomy: What Can Robotics Teach Us About Human Cognition and Action? 15, no. 3 (December 13, 2007): 435–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.15.3.05gal.

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Social robots are robots designed to interact with humans or with each other in ways that approximate human social interaction. It seems clear that one question relevant to the project of designing such robots concerns how humans themselves interact to achieve social understanding. If we turn to psychology, philosophy, or the cognitive sciences in general, we find two models of social cognition vying for dominance under the heading of theory of mind: theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST). It is therefore natural and interesting to ask how a TT design for a social robot would differ from the ST version. I think that a much more critical question is whether either TT or ST provide an adequate explanation of social cognition. There is a growing although still minority consensus that, despite their dominance in the debate about social cognition, neither TT nor ST, nor some hybrid version of these theories, offers an acceptable account of how we encounter and interact with one another. In this paper I will give a brief review of the theory of mind debate, outline an alternative theory of social cognition based on an embodied interactive approach, and then try to draw out a few implications about social robotics.

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SAITO, AKIKO. "Social Origins of Cognition: Bartlett, Evolutionary Perspective and Embodied Mind Approach." Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 26, no. 4 (December 1996): 399–421. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5914.1996.tb00299.x.

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Merritt, Michele. "Kristin Andrews: The animal mind: an introduction to the philosophy of animal cognition." Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15, no. 3 (September 24, 2015): 475–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-015-9442-y.

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Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle. "Wittgenstein Today." Wittgenstein-Studien 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/witt-2016-0103.

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AbstractIn this paper,¹ I briefly take stock of Wittgenstein’s contribution to philosophy and some other disciplines. Surveying some of the ways in which he emphasizes the primacy of action, together with the superfluity - in basic cases - of propositions and cognition, in his account of mind, language and action, I suggest that, far from being a maverick philosopher, Wittgenstein’s pioneering ’enactivism’ puts him in the mainstream of philosophy today. I mention the importance of his thought for the philosophy of mind and epistemology, as also for psychology and the cognitive sciences, and conclude that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is still spearheading the fight against physicalism and reductionism.

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Aydin, Ciano. "The artifactual mind: overcoming the ‘inside–outside’ dualism in the extended mind thesis and recognizing the technological dimension of cognition." Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14, no. 1 (May 30, 2013): 73–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-013-9319-x.

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Dominik Perler. "Mind, Cognition and Representation: The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima (review)." Journal of the History of Philosophy 46, no. 4 (2008): 637–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.0.0075.

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Vierkant, T. "Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context, edited by Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid, and G. Lynn Stephens." Mind 118, no. 471 (July 1, 2009): 870–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzp092.

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Kopper, Margit. "Gegenständliche Erkenntnis und transzendentale Einsicht. Zum Kantverständnis Joachim Koppers." Kant-Studien 113, no. 1 (March 12, 2022): 112–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kant-2022-2004.

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Abstract:

Abstract This article provides a short survey of Joachim Kopper’s understanding of Kant’s theory of cognition in CPR. Kant’s critical thought is developed via a dogmatic method but marks a transition to transcendental thought delivered from dogmatic assertions. The assertion that cognition emerges from the relation between mind and objects is made at the beginning of CPR. Kopper holds that transcendental reflection starts not on the basis of this distinction but on the impossibility of logical assertion about existence as it is reached in antinomic. The fact of experience must thus be explained otherwise than by dogmatic assertions of relations between objects or between objects and thought. Reflection on necessity, affirmed by the law of causality, enables transcendental inspection to understand experience and human life in one unrelational meaning.

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Erkan, Ekin. "Modeling the Theory-Form: Beyond the Elements of Observational Postulation." Contemporary Pragmatism 18, no. 2 (August 9, 2021): 154–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10010.

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Abstract We formalize a theory of the subject by sketching a pragmatic functional hierarchy of sapient cognition. Our expanded framework attempts to articulate a normative understanding of discursive cognition by demarcating its functional propriety within a naturalist rejoinder, seeing in the functional development of cognition from pre-discursive to discursive abilities an increase and refinement in representational competence found in non-intentional systems. We therein explain how sapient cognitive systems not only engage in patterns of material and formal inference to map intensional relations between phenomena in nature through theoretical and practical reasonings, but also engage in practices of theoretical construction and systematic integration through techniques of formalization that make the unity of nature and thought progressively intelligible. We trace the development of mind in its representational function from barren discriminatory capacities, shared with inanimate objects, to complex theory-forming systematizing conceptual abilities enabling agents to theoretically map and intervene upon the world of which they are part, and to embed the informational indexes they register from the environment that makes globally explicit the objective modal structure of the world.

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Charlow, Nate. "Grading Modal Judgement." Mind 129, no. 515 (November 14, 2019): 769–807. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzz028.

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Abstract This paper proposes a new model of graded modal judgement. It begins by problematizing the phenomenon: given plausible constraints on the logic of epistemic modality, it is impossible to model graded attitudes toward modal claims as judgements of probability targeting epistemically modal propositions. This paper considers two alternative models, on which modal operators are non-proposition-forming: (1) Moss (2015), in which graded attitudes toward modal claims are represented as judgements of probability targeting a ‘proxy’ proposition, belief in which would underwrite belief in the modal claim; (2) a model on which graded attitudes toward modal claims are represented as judgements of credence taking as their objects (non-propositional) modal representations (rather than proxy propositions). The second model, like Moss’s model, is shown to be semantically and mathematically tractable. The second model, however, can be straightforwardly integrated into a plausible model of the role of graded attitudes toward modal claims in cognition and normative epistemology.

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Pace Giannotta, Andrea. "Embodied artificial intelligence in science fiction." Prometeica - Revista de Filosofía y Ciencias, Especial (August 11, 2022): 21–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2022.especial.13633.

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In this paper, I explore the fruitful relationship between science fiction and philosophy regarding the topic of artificial intelligence. I establish a connection between certain paradigms in the philosophy of mind and consciousness and the imagination of possible future scenarios in sci-fi, especially focusing on the different ways of conceiving the role of corporeality in constituting consciousness and cognition. Then, I establish a parallelism between these different conceptions of corporeality in the philosophy of mind and certain representations of AI in sci-fi: from computers to robots and androids. I conclude by stressing the value of exchanging ideas between sci-fi and philosophy to foreshadow and evaluate some scenarios of high ethical relevance.

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Asma, Stephen. "Adaptive Imagination: Toward a Mythopoetic Cognitive Science." Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture 5, no. 2 (December 1, 2021): 1–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.26613/esic.5.2.236.

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Abstract A mythopoetic paradigm or perspective sees the world primarily as a dramatic story of competing personal intentions, rather than a system of objective impersonal laws. Asma (2017) argued that our contemporary imaginative cognition is evolutionarily conserved-it has structural and functional similarities to premodern Homo sapiens’s cognition. This article will (i) outline the essential features of mythopoetic cognition or adaptive imagination, (ii) delineate the adaptive sociocultural advantages of mythopoetic cognition, (iii) explain the phylogenetic and ontogenetic mechanisms that give rise to human mythopoetic mind (i.e., genetically endowed simulation and associational systems that underwrite diverse symbolic systems), (iv) show how mythopoetic cognition challenges contemporary trends in cognitive science and philosophy, and (v) recognize and outline empirical approaches for a new cognitive science of the imagination.

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Cross, Richard. "Some Varieties of Semantic Externalism in Duns Scotus's Cognitive Psychology." Vivarium 46, no. 3 (2008): 275–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853408x360920.

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AbstractAccording to Scotus, an intelligible species with universal content, inherent in the mind, is a partial cause of an occurrent cognition whose immediate object is the self-same species. I attempt to explain how Scotus defends the possibility of this causal activity. Scotus claims, generally, that forms are causes, and that inherence makes no difference to the capacity of a form to cause an effect. He illustrates this by examining a case in which an accident is an instrument of a substance in the production of a certain sort of effect. All that is required is that the accident is relevantly joined to the substance, whether or not it inheres in the substance. Since intelligible species are bearers of semantic content, it follows that non-inherent objects of thought can also be the bearers of such content. Such objects are included in the mind without inherence, and the boundary between the mind and external reality is to this extent broken down.

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Dunér, David. "Human Mind in Space and Time: Prolegomena to a Cognitive History." ISTORIYA 12, no. 8 (106) (2021): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s207987840016836-8.

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The last decades have seen a noticeable increase in cognitive science studies that have changed the understanding of human thinking. Its relevance for historical research cannot be overlooked any more. Cognitive history could be explained as the study of how humans in history used their cognitive abilities in order to understand the world around them and to orient themselves in it, but also how the world outside their bodies affected their way of thinking. In focus for this introductory chapter is the relationship between history and cognition, the human mind’s interaction with the environment in time and space. The chapter discusses certain cognitive abilities in interaction with the environment, which can be studied in historical sources, namely: embodied mind, situated cognition, perception, distributed cognition, conceptual metaphors, categorization, intersubjectivity, and communication. These cognitive theories can give deeper understanding of how — and not only what — humans thought, and about the interaction between the human mind and the surrounding world. The most ambitious aim of such a cognitive history could be to inform the research on the cognitive evolution of the human mind.

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Rimkus, Edvardas. "KANTIŠKOJI PATYRIMO SAMPRATA IR PAŽINIMO RIBŲ PROBLEMA." Problemos 83 (January 1, 2013): 35–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2013.0.835.

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Straipsnyje nagrinėjama Kanto teorinėje filosofijoje išdėstyta patyrimo samprata ir iš jos kylanti pažinimo ribų problema. Įrodinėjama, kad kantiškasis patyrimas kaip juslinės medžiagos ir apriorinių formų sintezė yra reiškinių santykių pažinimas. Patyrimo teorijoje Kantas atsiriboja nuo transcendentinės metafizikos – neigia transempirinio pažinimo galimybę ir nusako imanentinį proto taikymą. Teigiama, kad transcendentalinė patyrimo teorija leidžia suprasti kantiškąjį apriorizmą kaip pažinimo formų arba modelių kūrybą ir paaiškina „noumeno“ idėją kaip įsteigiančią tam tikras empirinio ir metafizinio pažinimo ribas.Kantian Conception of Experience and the Problem of the Limits of CognitionEdvardas Rimkus SummaryThe article examines Kant’s conception of experience and its theoretical implication for the limits of cognition. It is argued that Kantian experience as a synthesis of sensory material and a priori forms is a cognition of phenomenal relations. Kant distances himself from transcendental metaphysics, he denies the possibility of transempirical knowledge and describes how the mind works in the immanent area. Kant’s transcendental theory of experience allows us to understand the epistemological apriorism as a creation of forms and models of cognition and explains the idea of a “thing-in-itself” as establishing the limits of empirical and metaphysical knowledge.