Relevant bibliographies by topics / Philosophy of mind

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Philosophy of mind'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 31 July 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Philosophy of mind"

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Byrne, Alex, and Jaegwon Kim. "Philosophy of Mind." Philosophical Review 107, no. 1 (January 1998): 113. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2998317.

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Ivanov, Dmitry. "Philosophy of Mind." Philosophical anthropology 4, no. 2 (December 2018): 218–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2414-3715-2018-4-2-218-250.

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Eilan, Naomi. "Philosophy of Mind." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 2 (1998): 50–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm1998283.

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Sutherland, Stuart. "Philosophy of mind." Nature 313, no. 5998 (January 1985): 163. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/313163a0.

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Macpherson, Fiona. "Philosophy of Mind." Philosophical Books 45, no. 3 (July 2004): 255–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2004.00350.x.

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sandis, constantine, and komarine romdenh-romluc. "PHILOSOPHY OF MIND." Philosophical Books 46, no. 2 (April 2005): 170–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2005.00367.x.

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miller, alexander, tom stoneham, and sophie gibb. "PHILOSOPHY OF MIND." Philosophical Books 46, no. 3 (July 2005): 278–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2005.00373d.x.

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Smith, Aaron. "Brain‐mind philosophy." Inquiry 29, no. 1-4 (January 1986): 203–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00201748608602087.

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Moreland, J. P. "Philosophy of Mind." Philosophia Christi 1, no. 1 (1999): 133–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc19991113.

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Rey, Georges. "Philosophy of mind." Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 1, no. 5 (August 2, 2010): 648–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/wcs.32.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Philosophy of mind"

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Nichols, Ryan Tate. "Reid's Philosophy of Mind." Connect to this title online, 2002. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1039111436.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2002.
Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 369 p. Includes bibliographical references. Abstract available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center; full text release delayed at author's request until 2005 Dec. 5.
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Abramson, Darren. "Computability and mind." [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University, 2006. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3230538.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, 2006.
"Title from dissertation home page (viewed July 5, 2007)." Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-08, Section: A, page: 3005. Adviser: D. C. McCarty.
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Allen, Sophie Rebecca. "Causation and the mind : metaphysical presuppositions in the philosophy of mind." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.392097.

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Walters, Daniel Dewi. "Understanding other minds : an interrogation of the theory of mind debate." Thesis, University of Hull, 2014. http://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:11523.

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Uings, David John. "Mind, meaning and miscommunication." Connect to e-thesis, 2008. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/355/.

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Thesis (M.Phil.) - University of Glasgow, 2008.
M.Phil. thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Glasgow, 2008. Includes bibliographical references. Print version also available.
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Bruno, Michael George. "The Extended Conscious Mind." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/311472.

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Do minds ever extend spatially beyond the boundaries of the bodies of their subjects? I argue that they do. More precisely, I argue that some of our visual experiences are constitutively grounded by events that include parts of the world that are not parts of any subject's body. After surveying the development of externalist theories in the philosophy of mind, I present some of the motivations common to ecological, enactive, dynamic sensorimotor and two-level interdependence accounts of perception and explain how some of these accounts support the case for active vehicle externalism about consciousness. I then discuss and respond to three well-known objections. The first concerns whether the extended mind thesis implies that there extended selves, the second concerns what exactly demarcates mental events from non-mental events, and the last concerns what is required to demonstrate constitutive dependence. To address what distinguishes constitutive from nomological or causal forms of dependence, I develop an account of constitutive grounding. My account draws on recent work in analytic metaphysics on the notion of ontological dependence or grounding, where grounding is taken to be a non-causal relation of ontological priority. After showing how this notion is different than any kind of nomological dependence and how it can be constructively used to decipher the spatiotemporal extent of events, I argue positively that the grounds of visual experiences are always temporally extended and often include parts of the world external to the seeing subject's body. My argument for temporally extended vision begins by considering three different models of the temporal structure of consciousness: cinematic, retentional, and extensional. I then draw on the dynamic sensorimotor theory to object to the cinematic model and explore whether enactivists are really committed to retentionalism. I end up arguing that any account one gives of the intentional contents or phenomenal characters of individual conscious visual events will have to make reference to a briefly enduring process and not just an instantaneous event involving the subject. Lastly, I argue as follows: (P1) in the explanation of visual experience, the brain internal parts of the temporally extended events that constitutively ground visual experiences often cannot be decoupled from parts of the non-bodily world; (P2) if event A is a constitutive ground of event E and event B cannot be decoupled from A in the explanation of E, then B is also a constitutive ground of E; therefore, (C) some visual experiences are constitutively grounded by events that include parts of the non-bodily world. I call this conclusion the extended visual consciousness thesis. If my argument for it is sound, our conscious minds do, in some cases, extend beyond our bodies.
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O'Conaill, Donnchadh. "Phenomenology, philosophy of mind and the subject." Thesis, Durham University, 2010. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/338/.

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I propose to develop a phenomenologically-informed ontological model of the subject of experiences. This model will attempt to explain how it is possible for a subject to have experiences with a subjective character, which are like something for their subject. It will also address how the subject can have experiences whose subjective character plays an intentional role, making the subject aware of objects. The subjective character of experiences and their intentionality have both been widely discussed in the philosophy of mind. However, these discussions have focused on whether or not these features can be explained in naturalistic or physicalistic terms. As a result, there has been relatively little detailed description of the subjective character of experiences. In particular, complex experiential states such as those involving a combination of different kinds of experience have been neglected in the recent literature. There has also been little discussion of how we can be aware, not just of individual objects, but of situations, and indeed how our everyday awareness of objects involves an awareness of the world as the background to all our activities. In order to provide detailed descriptions of the subjective character and the intentionality of experiences, I shall turn to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Husserl developed concepts and techniques for studying the subjective character of intentional experiences independently of their non-experiential aspects. I shall use these techniques to focus on the subject qua experiencer, and on experiences as states or episodes which are like something for the subject. By studying the subject in this way, I shall provide a model of subjectivity, the ontological relation holding between a subject and its experiences. I shall argue that subjectivity can be explained by appealing to the temporality of experiences, the way they flow in a stream of consciousness. Every subject has a temporal structure which is the form of its particular stream of consciousness. What it is for a subject to have an experience is for that experience to pass through this temporal structure. I shall also examine how a subject can have experiences which are objective, that is, which make the subject aware of objects as having more than the features directly presented to the subject. One view is that to explain objectivity, we must adopt a special perspective on the world, allowing us to compare how objects appear to us with how they really are. I argue that we do not need to appeal to such a special perspective. Our everyday awareness of objects and of the world is essentially structured by a sense of objectivity. Lastly, I shall address a problem that arises for any transcendental study of the conditions for the possibility of our awareness of the world. This is the paradox of subjectivity, the problem of understanding how the one subject can be both a part of the world and that which makes sense of the entire world. I shall argue that applying phenomenological techniques can help us to understand how the one subject can answer to both of these descriptions. This thesis will thus use phenomenological methods to develop an ontological model which can explain certain key features of the subject. In doing so, it will serve both as a contribution to the philosophy of mind, and as an illustration of what can be gained by applying phenomenological methods in this area.
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Davies, Mark. "Narrow content in the philosophy of mind." Thesis, Swansea University, 2009. https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa43049.

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My thesis examines the notion of narrow content in the philosophy of mind. Narrowcontent is defined as a type of mental state that is shared between internal physicalduplicates in Twin Earth-type thought experiments. In these thought experiments,changes in the physical and/or social environments of the duplicates are usually takento have the result that the contents of certain of the duplicates’ mental states, e.g.,beliefs, etc., are different. The upshot of this is that intemalism with regards tomental content seems to be refuted, as the duplicates concerned share an identity ofinternal physical properties, then if intemalism about mental content is true, theirmental states should also be content-identical. However, despite this possibility, itseems to me that there is still a strong intuition that the duplicates in these TwinEarth-type situations do share type-identical mental states which can be individuatedby the states’ narrow content. The aim of the thesis is to examine several of the mostpopular construals of narrow content in the literature, to ascertain whether there is aconstrual that provides an adequate narrow content. To help with this task I suggestthree conditions of adequacy that a narrow content must satisfy in order to beconsidered adequate. I then choose my favoured construal and give a version of itwhich will hopefully be seen as an improvement on the other construals (by satisfyingall the adequacy conditions). It will be argued that my version of the narrow contentconstrual will provide, not just an adequate narrow content, at least in relation to asubject’s perceptual experience, but perhaps also necessary and sufficient conditionsfor a mental state, such as a perceptual belief, to have the specific content that it has.
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Botterell, Andrew (Andrew John) 1968. "Analysis in mind." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/9670.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 1998.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 111-114).
From the time of Descartes to about the 1960s, a certain epistemological idea dominated the philosophy of mind, namely the idea that theses about the relation between mind and body are, if true, a priori truths. Much of recent philosophy of mind is devoted to the question whether that idea is right. My research is largely an attempt to argue that some recent defenses of it are unsuccessful. For example, Physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that every actual psychological event, property, or process is necessitated by some actual physical event, property, or process. Many philosophers believe that Physicalism is true. Until about the 1960s, those who believed it true typically believed that statements relating mind and body were a priori truths. Let us call this thesis A Priori Physicalism. Many philosophers nowadays believe, instead, that statements relating mind and body are only a posteriori truths. Let us call this thesis A Posteriori Physicalism. A number of philosophers have argued in recent years that A Posteriori Physicalism is unacceptable; on their view, Physicalists had better be A Priori Physicalists. My thesis examines the question whether that view is correct. I begin with a discussion of two influential arguments for the conclusion that Physicalists must be A Priori Physicalists. Chapter 1 addresses itself to an argument for the conclusion that if physicalism is true, every referring psychological expression is coreferential a priori with some referring physical expression. This argument is commonly called the Property Dualism Argument against Physicalism. I argue that the Property Dualism Argument rests on an ambiguous premise: on one reading it begs the question against A Posteriori Physicalism, on the other reading the conclusion of the Property Dualism Argument does not follow. Chapter 2 addresses itself to an argument of Frank Jackson's for the conclusion that Physicalists must have an a priori story to tell about how the physical nature of the actual world makes true the psychological nature of the actual world. I distinguish two ways in which this claim might be understood, and I argue that on neither way of understanding it does Jackson have a compelling argument for A Priori Physicalism. Finally, in Chapter 3 I turn to a more general discussion of the relation between conceivability and possibility, and its bearing on the dispute between A Priori and A Posteriori Physicalists. I focus in particular on a recent argument of David Chalmers' from the conceivability of so-called zombies to the conclusion that A Posteriori Physicalism is false. I argue that this argument fails to provide compelling reasons for rejecting A Posteriori Physicalism. I argue, first, that it misconstrues the relation between conceivability and possibility, and second, that it fails to establish that zombies are conceivable in the relevant sense.
by Andrew Botterell.
Ph.D.
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Matier, Colin Paul. "The mind-independence of truth." Thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.335453.

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Books on the topic "Philosophy of mind"

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Michael, Michaelis, and John O’Leary-Hawthorne, eds. Philosophy in Mind. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1008-2.

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Heil, John. Philosophy of Mind. 4 [edition] | New York : Taylor & Francis, 2019. | Series: Routledge contemporary introductions to philosophy: Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429506994.

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John, Hawthorne, ed. Philosophy of mind. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2007.

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Ernest, Sosa, and Villanueva Enrique, eds. Philosophy of mind. Boston: Blackwell Publishers, 2004.

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Villanueva, Enrique, and Ernest Sosa. Philosophy of mind. Malden, MA: Wiley, 2010.

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1949-, Jacob Pierre, ed. Philosophy of mind. Dettelbach: J.H. Röll, 2001.

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Burwood, Stephen. Philosophy of mind. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999.

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Asoulin, Eran. Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind. [Montreal, Quebec]: Rebus Community, 2019.

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Vohra, Ashok. Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind. London: Croom Helm, 1986.

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Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Hegel's Philosophy of mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.

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Book chapters on the topic "Philosophy of mind"

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Pribram, Karl H. "Philosophy: Philosophy of mind." In Encyclopedia of psychology, Vol. 6., 175–80. Washington: American Psychological Association, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/10521-053.

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Clark, Andy. "Mind Unlimited?" In Extreme Philosophy, 123–37. New York: Routledge, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003311065-9.

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Lim, Daniel. "Mind." In Philosophy through Computer Science, 106–25. New York: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003271284-9.

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Doyon, Maxime. "Philosophy of Mind." In Husserl-Handbuch, 320–26. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05417-3_48.

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Baggini, Julian, and Gareth Southwell. "Philosophy of Mind." In Philosophy: Key Themes, 81–119. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137008879_4.

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Cuypers, Stefaan E. "Philosophy of mind." In Handbook of Pragmatics, 1–11. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/hop.14.phi3.

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Cuypers, Stefaan E. "Philosophy of mind." In Handbook of Pragmatics, 414–18. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/hop.m.phi3.

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Cuypers, Stefaan E. "Philosophy of mind." In Philosophical Perspectives for Pragmatics, 235–43. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/hoph.10.21cuy.

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Das, M. N. "Mind and Philosophy." In The Political Philosophy Of Jawaharlal Nehru, 19–44. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003312468-1.

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Cuypers, Stefaan E. "Philosophy of mind." In Handbook of Pragmatics, 1067–74. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/hop.m2.phi3.

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Conference papers on the topic "Philosophy of mind"

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Chowdhury, Rev Abhijit. "Philosophy for the Body, Food for the Mind." In 8th International Conference On Humanities, Psychology and Social Science. ACAVENT, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.33422/8hps.2018.10.111.

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ZENIL, HECTOR, and FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ-QUIROZ. "ON THE POSSIBLE COMPUTATIONAL POWER OF THE HUMAN MIND." In Worldviews, Science and Us - Philosophy and Complexity. WORLD SCIENTIFIC, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789812707420_0020.

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Zaykova, A. S. "NEUROSCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: TWO EXAMPLES OF INTERACTION." In Аналитическая философия: траектории истории и векторы развития. Новосибирск: ЗАО ИПП "Офсет", 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.47850/s.2022.1.26.

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Mnozhynska, R. V. "Grigory Skovoroda on the human mind and education." In HISTORY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGY: EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT DIRECTION. Baltija Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.30525/978-9934-26-120-6-22.

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Broks, Andris. "CHANGES ALL AROUND US AND WITHIN SCIENCE EDUCATION." In 3rd International Baltic Symposium on Science and Technology Education (BalticSTE2019). Scientia Socialis Ltd., 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.33225/balticste/2019.35.

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This work is formed as a set of thematic mind maps for presentation during authors’ speech and further discussion during symposium BalticSTE2019. Selected mind maps are large-scale philosophy and psychology- based maps for general orientation within the complex situations when we are searching for definite solutions of concrete particular problems. All mind maps present visualization of definite thoughts’ arrangement within corresponding structures, what are well-known products of systemic organization of humans’ thinking. Keywords: general science education, philosophy of Science, systems theory.
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Liptakova, Miriam, and Marian Ambrozy. "The selected connection between intentionality in the philosophy of mind and informatics." In 2015 IEEE 13th International Scientific Conference on Informatics. IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/informatics.2015.7377827.

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Li, Yang, Haiyu Zhang, and Haimei Zhang. "Analysis of the Relationship between Yangming’s “Philosophy of the Mind” and Moral Education." In 2022 3rd International Conference on Mental Health, Education and Human Development (MHEHD 2022). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.220704.078.

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Grachev, D., and S. Ermakov. "NIETZSCHE – A LIFE FULL OF SURPRISES AND CONTRADICTIONS." In Manager of the Year. FSBE Institution of Higher Education Voronezh State University of Forestry and Technologies named after G.F. Morozov, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.34220/my2021_19-23.

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Friedrich Nietzsche is fundamentally incomparable, the status of a supporter of a philosophy that placed his evolution, sharp mind and reflection on power and freedom as the most important. The real biography of the philosopher is full of controversial and very ambiguous facts. The genius of which was recognized by society and an excellent philosopher, a real “giant of thought” in the real world was a man of small stature, visually impaired, subject to constant headaches and many other diseases. Friedrich Nietzsche regularly faced ridiculous situations and on the other hand he did not look much like a great man who received worldwide fame
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Li, Hongju, and Xindi Cao. "MIND-BODY INTEGRATION IN DANCE MOVEMENT THERAPY." In International Psychological Applications Conference and Trends. inScience Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.36315/2021inpact081.

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"Mind-body integration is a key element for a successful dance movement therapy (DMT). As the connection between mind and body is reconnected, the clients can not only express but also improve their mental state through body movement. The integration of mind and body can be viewed from to aspects, namely the first-person experience and the third-person phenomenon, both of which play a crucial role in the therapeutic process of DMT. The first-person experience transcends the mind’s neurobiological phenomenon, which is relatively more important for the clients, while the third-person observation is based on the body’s reflection of mind, often adopted by the therapists. The relationship between mind and body can be validated by the mirror neuron theory, which is one of the theoretical proofs and inspirations of DMT. Unlike the notion of mind-body differentiation in western classical philosophy, ancient Chinese thoughts had not separated them. The Chinese character “shen” is considered as the whole of flesh and soul. The abundant Chinese thoughts concerning mind-body theory can be considered as a suitable route of the exploration of mind-body integration."
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Stelmakhov, D. A. "Intentionality as a cause of epistemological problems in context of the analytical philosophy of mind." In X ИНФОРМАЦИОННАЯ ШКОЛА МОЛОДОГО УЧЕНОГО Екатеринбург, 19-22сентября 2022 г. Екатеринбург: ООО "Издательство УМЦ УПИ", 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.32460/ishmu-2022-10-0033.

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Reports on the topic "Philosophy of mind"

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Papadopoulos, Yannis. Ethics Lost: The severance of the entrenched relationship between ethics and economics by contemporary neoclassical mainstream economics. Mέta | Centre for Postcapitalist Civilisation, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.55405/mwp1en.

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In this paper we examine the evolution of the relation between ethics and economics. Mainly after the financial crisis of 2008, many economists, scholars, and students felt the need to find answers that were not given by the dominant school of thought in economics. Some of these answers have been provided, since the birth of economics as an independent field, from ethics and moral philosophy. Nevertheless, since the mathematisation of economics and the departure from the field of political economy, which once held together economics, philosophy, history and political science, ethics and moral philosophy have lost their role in the economics’ discussions. Three are the main theories of morality: utilitarianism, rule-based ethics and virtue ethics. The neoclassical economic model has indeed chosen one of the three to justify itself, yet it has forgotten —deliberately or not— to involve the other two. Utilitarianism has been translated to a cost benefit analysis that fits the “homo economicus” and selfish portrait of humankind and while contemporary capitalism recognizes Adam Smith as its father it does not seem to recognize or remember not only the rest of the Scottish Enlightenment’s great minds, but also Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. In conclusion, if ethics is to play a role in the formation of a postcapitalist economic theory and help it escape the hopeless quest for a Wertfreiheit, then the one-dimensional selection and interpretation of ethics and morality by economists cannot lead to justified conclusions about the decision-making process.
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In Conversation… Philosophy of Mind. ACAMH, November 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.13056/acamh.5933.

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André Tomlin, The Mental Elf, interviews the Project PERFECT team at the University of Birmingham to find out how unusual beliefs offer philosophers of mind the opportunity to challenge mental health stigma.
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