Relevant bibliographies by topics / Philosophy of liberalism

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Philosophy of liberalism'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 5 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Philosophy of liberalism"

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Curtis, William M. "Rorty as Virtue Liberal." Contemporary Pragmatism 13, no. 4 (December 1, 2016): 400–419. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01304004.

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Virtue liberalism holds that the success of liberal politics and society depends on the citizenry possessing a set of liberal virtues, including traits like open-mindedness, toleration, and individual autonomy. Virtue liberalism is thus an ethically demanding conception of liberalism that is at odds with conceptions, like Rawlsian political liberalism and modus vivendi liberalism, that attempt to minimize liberalism’s ethical impact in order to accommodate a greater range of ethical pluralism. Although he claims to be a Rawlsian political liberal, Richard Rorty’s pragmatic liberalism is best understood as a version of virtue liberalism that, in particular, recommends a controversial civic virtue of irony for good liberal citizenship. Indeed, Rorty ultimately joins Dewey in conceiving of liberal democracy as a “way of life,” rather than merely a set of political relations that have a minimal effect on our characters or on the shape of our private commitments and projects.
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Grafstein, Robert. "Missing the Archimedean Point: Liberalism's Institutional Presuppositions." American Political Science Review 84, no. 1 (March 1990): 177–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1963636.

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Though liberalism has been widely criticized for its attempt to frame a detached judgment of society based on an asocial conception of individuals, insufficient attention has been paid to the particular social and political relationships this search for an Archimedean point presupposes. Using collective choice theory, I show that liberalism has adopted two distinct kinds of Archimedean points reflecting different and unjustified presuppositions about the true institutional relation between politics and society. Liberalism's Archimedean search is not merely unsuccessful but biased in a way that is significant even for positions critical of liberalism. It is possible, I argue, to have a normative political theory that avoids an asocial conception of individuals without falling victim to liberalism's specific biases concerning institutional relations. The implications for both Rawlsian- or Nozickian-style liberalism are discussed, including the possibility of a political philosophy that avoids their “analytical extremism.“
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Alexander, Gregory S. "Can Human Flourishing Be Liberal?" Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 32, no. 1 (February 2019): 235–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2019.10.

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The renewed interest in virtue ethics raises again a persistent question, namely, the relationship between the virtue ethics theory and liberalism as a political philosophy. Virtue ethicists focus on the good—i.e., human flourishing—and debate what constitutes that good. This focus creates a problem for liberals who are rights-oriented, which is the dominant form of contemporary liberalism.The recent and timely book by Menachem Mautner, Human Flourishing, Liberal Theory, and the Arts, reminds us, however, that liberalism comes in many stripes. There is no one liberalism. Rather, there are many liberalisms. I discuss three aspects of Mautner’s remarkable and important book: first, his conception of human flourishing and its relationship to liberalism; second, his argument that a liberal political order committed to human flourishing ought to promote the arts; and third, his argument that the liberalism of flourishing is better able than neutralist liberalism to compete with religion in providing what Mautner calls “Big Meaning.”
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Vasiliauskaitė, Nida. "RACIONALUMO IR TEISINGUMO SĄJUNGOS PROBLEMA JOHNO RAWLSO „POLITINIAME LIBERALIZME”." Problemos 82 (January 1, 2012): 126–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2012.0.731.

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Straipsnyje analizuojamos Johno Rawlso pastangos sukurti „politinės, bet ne metafizinės“ tvarkos modelį, kuris tenkintų specifiškai apibrėžtus „racionalumo“ bei „teisingumo“ kriterijus, ir išryškinamas šio modelio vidinis prieštaringumas. Parodoma, kokie problemiški yra pagrindiniai „politinio liberalizmo“ konstravimo įrankiai – politikos / moralės ir protingumo / racionalumo perskyros – ir teigiama, jog koncepcijos nenuoseklumų priežastis yra principinė, ji glūdi pačiame Rawlso sumanyme susieti, bet nesutapatinti du autonomiškus ir heterogeniškus normatyvumo šaltinius; o atsisakius kurio nors vieno „politinis liberalizmas“ apskritai suirtų.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: racionalumas, teisingumas, neutralumas, politinis liberalizmas, fundamentizmas.The Problem of Combining Rationality with Justice in John Rawls’ “Political Liberalism”Nida VasiliauskaitėSummaryThe article deals with Rawlsian attempts to offer a theoretical model for universal “political, not metaphysical” order, based on the ideas of rationality and justice specifically defined. My point is to reveal the inner inconsistency in the very notion of political liberalism showing that its fundamental presuppositions – the distinctions of politics / morals and reasonable / rational – are flawed. Which means that as a project built on two distinct in kind sources of normativity trying to “make them one” without damaging their logical autonomy, political liberalism is deemed to generate inconsistencies and cannot be saved by any “cosmetic changes”.Keywords: rationality, justice, neutrality, political liberalism, fundamentism.
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Beiner, Ronald. "What Liberalism Means." Social Philosophy and Policy 13, no. 1 (1996): 190–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500001576.

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My purpose in this essay is to give an account of the kind of robust social criticism that I associate with the very enterprise of theory and to explain why the liberal philosophy that prevails in the contemporary academy is averse to this sort of social criticism. My purpose, then, is both to explore a certain conception of radical socialtheory and to defend this conception against familiar objections posed by those who represent the dominant liberal political philosophy.
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Talisse, Robert B. "Religion, respect and Eberle’s agapic pacifist." Philosophy & Social Criticism 38, no. 3 (January 9, 2012): 313–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453711430931.

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Christopher Eberle has developed a powerful critique of justificatory liberalism. According to Eberle, justificatory liberalism’s doctrine of restraint, which requires religious citizens to refrain from publicly advocating for policies that can be supported only by their religious reasons, is illiberal. In this article, I defend justificatory liberalism against Eberle’s critique.
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Song, Robert. "After Agonistic Liberalism: Milbank and Pabst’s Relentless Pursuit of Radical Anglican Thomism." Studies in Christian Ethics 32, no. 2 (January 31, 2019): 271–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0953946819826323.

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Milbank and Pabst’s account of liberalism as rooted in ontological violence picks out the secret commonalities of left-leaning rights-based and right-leaning market-based liberalisms with considerable shrewdness, and their elaboration of associationist and civil economic alternatives contains many strikingly expansive and novel elements. However, their totalising account of liberalism prevents them from engaging the strengths of the liberal era with sufficient generosity, and so impedes their efforts to articulate a way forward that is substantially and not just chronologically post-liberal.
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Kaufmann, Katharina. "Conflict in Political Liberalism: Judith Shklar’s Liberalism of Fear." Res Publica 26, no. 4 (July 24, 2020): 577–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11158-020-09475-z.

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Abstract Realists and non-ideal theorists currently criticise Rawlsian mainstream liberalism for its inability to address injustice and political conflict, as a result of the subordination of political philosophy to moral theory (Bernard Williams), as well as an idealising and abstract methodology (Charles W. Mills). Seeing that liberalism emerged as a theory for the protection of the individual from conflict and injustice, these criticisms aim at the very core of liberalism as a theory of the political and therefore deserve close analysis. I will defend Judith N. Shklar’s liberalism of fear as an answer to these challenges. I will argue that the liberalism of fear maintains realism’s conflictual and inherently political thrust while also integrating a perspective on injustice. I will defend the claim that in contrast to the two aforementioned criticisms, the liberalism of fear develops its own normative standard from which political arrangements can be assessed. It does so by replacing the idealising approach to political philosophy with a non-utopian methodology, which opens a negative perspective on what is to be avoided in the political sphere, and how to detect and deal with injustice. Due to this standard, it is a liberal theory that is uniquely able to meet the realist and non-ideal challenge.
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Rutkevich, Alexey M. "Conservative Anarchism. French Critics of the “Anthropological Mistake”." History of Philosophy 25, no. 2 (2020): 81–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2020-25-2-81-95.

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G. Orwell once called himself “anarchist tory”, the collocation “anthropological mistake” belongs to British theologian J. Milbank, characterizing so liberal thought. These expressions are used today by two French philosophers, Jean-Claude Michea and Alain de Benoist. Though they came from oppos­ing political camps, both are ready to define themselves “populists” and “conservative anarchists”. Their common enemy is contemporary liberalism. This article is a description of this polemics, espe­cially with liberal anthropology. Their difference with many critics of political or economic liberal­ism lies in their belief that liberalism is a totality, and the core of all the aspects of this doctrine (economy, law, politics) is represented by the vision of man in liberal philosophy, which have a long history. This genealogy of liberalism, proposed by French thinkers, is the main theme of the article.
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Kelbley, Charles. "Political Liberalism." International Philosophical Quarterly 36, no. 1 (1996): 97–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq199636163.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Philosophy of liberalism"

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MacLean, Jayson R. "Liberalism and the virtues." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/29360.

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This thesis argues for a new understanding of liberal morality and its relationship to liberal justice. Traditionally, theorists of liberal democracy have relegated the liberal virtues---traits such as tolerance, reasonableness, and fairness---to a secondary role within the theory and practice of liberal justice. Their reasoning for this is clear: the virtues prescribe a vision of the good life, while the aim of the liberal approach to statecraft is to limit government authority over citizens' conceptions of the good. Thus, to give the liberal virtues primacy of place within the theory of justice---and, specifically, within the justification for this theory---would stand in contravention of this basic liberal tenet. The argument of this thesis is that liberal theorists have misrepresented the virtues and that this has caused the neglect of the foundational role which the ideal of civic virtue plays within both the theory and practice of liberal democracy. This argument is advanced through an explication of the theories put forward by contemporary liberal theorists who focus on the import of liberal virtue. Their approaches to virtue are shown to consistently rest on a justification of liberal virtue as an instrumental good for the liberal polity. The claim of this thesis, however, is that the virtues are rightly justified as intrinsic liberal goods. This claim is supported through appeal to insights produced in another branch of philosophy, virtue theory. Similar to their predicament within the political theory of the modern era, the virtues have been downplayed in the field of ethics as well, and only within the past few decades have philosophers begun to reinvestigate the virtues for their distinctive strengths and weaknesses. This thesis argues that the fruits of these investigations prove relevant to liberal theory in that they not only help make a case for the appropriateness of the declaration that the liberal virtues are, in fact, intrinsic goods but also they point to a new approach to liberal morality and, hence, to a new dialogue on the issues of liberal citizenship and liberal civic education.
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Nussbaum, Martha C. "The Future of Feminist Liberalism." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113101.

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Feminists have sometimes argued that philosophical theories of justice deriving from the liberal tradition cannot deal adequately with the concerns of women. I argue that in many ways this contention is mistaken: the best liberal theories of justice provide a very strong basis for thinking about what respect for human dignity requires. There are, however, two areas pertinent to sex equality in which even the strongest liberal theories have grave difficulty. First is the area of need and dependency. All theories of justice and morality deriving from the European social contract tradition fail to build into the basic social structure concern for care in times of asymmetrical dependency. The second problem I investigate is the problem of just distribution within the family. Focusing on the theory of John Rawls, I argue that his liberal commitment to seeing the family as a sphere of protected personal choice is in tension with his admission that the family is part of the basic structure of society. Moreover, the family does not exist by nature: it is always a construct of state action. The state should therefore make sure that this constructing is done well, compatibly with justice for women and children.
Los feministas han sostenido algunas veces que las teorías filosóficas de la justicia que provienen de la tradición liberal no pueden tratar adecuadamente las preocupaciones de las mujeres. Yo sostengo que de muchas maneras este argumento está errado: las mejores teorías liberales de la justicia proporcionan una base muy fuerte para pensar acerca de lo que requiere el respeto por la dignidad humana. Sin embargo, hay dos áreas pertinentes a la igualdad sexual en las cuales incluso las teorías liberales más fuertes hallan graves dificultades. La primera es el área de la necesidad y la dependencia. Ninguna de las teorías de la justicia y la moralidad que provienen de la tradición europea del contrato social logra introducir en la estructura social básica la preocupación por el cuidado en tiempos de dependencia asimétrica. El segundo problema que investigo es aquél de la distribución justa al interior de la familia. Centrándome en la teoría de John Rawls, sostengo que suc ompromiso liberal de ver a la familia como una esfera de elección personal protegida se halla en tensión con su afirmación de que la familia es parte de la estructura básica de la sociedad. Asimismo, la familia no existe por naturaleza, es siempre algo construido por la acción estatal. El Estado debería, por ende, asegurar que esta construcción se haga bien, de modo compatible con la justicia para mujeres y niños.
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Hsu, Hahn. "Liberalism, political pluralism, and international justice /." The Ohio State University, 1998. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1487949150070925.

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Wilkinson, T. M. "Liberalism, socialism and occupational choice." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.334836.

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Colby, Mark. "Liberalism and the politics of reason." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.244155.

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Scalet, Steven Paul. "Justice, liberalism, and responsibility." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/288997.

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This dissertation addresses the importance of conceptions of responsibility for contemporary theories of justice. I criticize recent defenses of liberalism which try to proceed without conceptions of responsibility. I argue that a conception of neutrality does not provide adequate support for defending a liberal theory of justice. I defend this claim by examining Brian Barry's recent defense of neutrality liberalism. His idea of neutrality reduces to an indefensible skeptical argument about conceptions of the good. I next examine John Rawls's account of political liberalism. I argue that his approach fails to appropriately address the persons and traditions that would be sacrificed within a Rawlsian liberal order. Rawls's notion of reasonableness and his argument from the burdens of judgment are insufficient bases to develop a liberal theory of justice. I then examine the idea of equality and its relationship with responsibility. Egalitarians describe the ideal of equality as the most fundamental notion for a theory of justice. They also interpret other traditions--such as the contractarian approaches of Barry and Rawls--in terms of this commitment to moral equality. Through a discussion of Ronald Dworkin's liberal egalitarianism, I argue that any plausible interpretation of moral equality must rely on an account of personal responsibility. Claims about responsibility, I argue, must be at the core of any theory of theory of justice. In the last chapter, I consider what a theory of justice should be about. I argue that the common assumption that justice is about devising principles to regulate institutions distorts how we should organize concerns of justice. Justice is about people treating each other with the respect and dignity that they are due. Problems about institutional design must be responsive to an account of individual responsibilities of justice, rather than the contemporary liberal approach of devising institutional principles prior to and with regulative primacy.
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Wellman, Christopher Heath. "Liberalism, self-determination, and secession." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/186640.

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This dissertation provides a systematic analysis of when an individual or group has a right to secede that is grounded in self-determination. Since the primary question in a secessionist conflict concerns the territory being contested, any analysis of the right to secede must provide an account of what grounds the existing state's claim to political jurisdiction over its territory. With this in mind, I examine consent and teleological justifications for the state and find both inadequate. The consent account posits that a political state is justified just in case it has the consent of its citizens. I reject the consent approach for its unacceptable implication that unlimited secession is permissible from all existing states. I then suggest that our disinclination to allow unlimited secession is instructive since it indicates not only that we believe a consentual justification is morally unnecessary, but also that a state is justified in virtue of the peace it secures and the rights it protects. This teleological justification ultimately proves inadequate as well, however, because it both restricts secessionist movements that seem permissible and allows coercive annexations that appear clearly unjustified. As an alternative to these extremes, I propose a hybrid model of political legitimacy. According to my theory, while individuals and small groups may not secede, a larger group may, provided it is of sufficient size to satisfactorily perform the functions that are necessary for a state to ground its claim to territory. Thus I conclude a political state should limit political liberty in a manner analogous to the way it legitimately limits the liberty to drive a car. Specifically, since many people would be harmed if there were no legal restrictions on who could drive, states institute age and health requirements limiting who may drive. Citizens not eliminated by these standards must also demonstrate a minimum threshold of competence by passing tests. In similar fashion, a state may initially restrict the right to secede to groups of a specific size, and then further require that interested parties demonstrate their ability and willingness to govern in a stable, efficient, and liberal manner.
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Coval, Simon. "Liberalism v. perfectionism : the personal ethics debate." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.334088.

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Manyeli, Louis. "Distribution of wealth: A critique of Rawlsian liberalism." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/9345.

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Can we distribute resources such that nearly all people can carry out their life plans? By sheer luck, some people happen to be naturally endowed, and their talents make them well off. Others, by brute bad luck, find themselves being naturally disadvantaged or less talented, and these conditions make them worst off. How can the frustrating and devastating situation of the latter group be remedied? John Rawls, a prominent contemporary liberal egalitarian, thinks that a fair distribution of wealth can be achieved if people choose his two principles of justice. With the two principles in operation, Rawls maintains, people can retain their basic liberties while committing themselves to social duties, duties that require them to assist the least fortunate members of a well-ordered society. Rawls thinks that liberty and equality are reconcilable in his theory. I trace the background to Rawls in Rousseau and Kant, and show how liberty and equality must be understood and significantly interconnected. The present work is primarily a critique of Rawls' theory of justice in regard to its position on the distribution of wealth, that is, Rawls' principle of distributive justice. My purpose is to show that Rawls' principle does not go far enough in the needed direction of redistribution, to provide what disadvantaged people genuinely require as a matter of fairness and actual opportunity; and further that this limitation in Rawls' position on economic distribution works to undermine Rawls' principle of equal liberty, as it applies in the real world. I also show that Rawls' critics, such as Nielsen, Sandel, Nozick, van Parijs, Dworkin and Kymlicka fail to provide a preferable solution to the problem of the distribution of wealth. I make a case for a commitment to the extensive redistributive tax measures needed to insure truly universal education as the condition of equal opportunity. I argue that this proposal is, in fact, consistent with egalitarians' aim to achieve equality, and consistent with Rawls' equal opportunity principle. Although Hegel has hardly figured as a model for egalitarians in the history of political philosophy, I argue that he is a model for egalitarians, and that he offers a preferable solution to the antinomies of contemporary thought. This means that he is a potential interlocutor in these contemporary debates. The central claim which I try to establish is that the Hegelian concern to reconcile individual freedom with new forms of community is germane to his vindication of economic rights. To put my point another way, I argue that contrary to the liberals' formalistic preoccupation with rights, interests, and rational preferences, Hegel correctly urges us to return to the sort of full-bodied philosophical anthropology that can specify the fundamental moral, economic, and political needs of human beings.
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Tufan, Ege. "A theory of dystopian liberalism." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2017. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b732e4f1-1f0d-4d3c-8335-8529bc6b6d68.

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This dissertation aspires to revive the dystopian liberalism which identifies the avoidance of the worst as the fundamental aim of politics. The theory I present consists of three elements overall: The first element is what I call the Priority Claim, stating that the most important aim of social institutions should, morally speaking, be to avoid cruelty qua worst evil (Part I). The second element is the identification of the informal structure, the set of social norms within a population, as an important site to realize this ideal (Part II). The third element is the application of the principle that cruelty be avoided to the in-formal structure (Part III). This leads to an account of desirable social norms and in turn to a concrete answer to the question how individuals can in their everyday lives do their part to create a world that is overall less cruel and more humane.
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Books on the topic "Philosophy of liberalism"

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Autonomy and liberalism. New York: Routledge, 2010.

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Colburn, Ben. Autonomy and liberalism. London: Routledge, 2010.

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Nedelsky, Jennifer. Law and liberalism. Toronto, Ont.]: Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 1986.

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Nedelsky, Jennifer. Law and liberalism. [Toronto, Ont.]: Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 1986.

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John, Gray. Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy. London: Routledge, 1989.

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Nedelsky, Jennifer. Law and liberalism II. Toronto, Ont: Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 1988.

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Nedelsky, Jennifer. Law and liberalism II. [Toronto, Ont: Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 1988.

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Nedelsky, Jennifer. Law and liberalism II. Toronto, Ont: Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 1985.

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Nedelsky, Jennifer. Law and liberalism II. [Toronto, Ont: Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 1985.

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Liberalism without perfection. Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2011.

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Book chapters on the topic "Philosophy of liberalism"

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Ryan, Alan. "Liberalism." In A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, 360–82. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781405177245.ch14.

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Ward, Ian. "Postmodern Bourgeois Liberalism." In Law and Philosophy Library, 78–112. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8830-0_5.

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Enslin, Penny. "Liberalism and Education." In Leaders in Philosophy of Education, 89–102. Rotterdam: SensePublishers, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6209-758-2_7.

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Chambers, Clare. "Feminism and Liberalism." In The Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy, 652–64. 1 [edition]. | New York : Routledge, 2017. | Series: Routledge philosophy companions: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315758152-53.

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Adair-Toteff, Christopher. "Carl Schmitt’s Philosophy." In Carl Schmitt on Law and Liberalism, 1–7. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57118-4_1.

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Callan, Eamonn, and John White. "Liberalism and Communitarianism." In The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education, 93–109. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470996294.ch6.

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Kara-Murza, Alexey, and Olga Zhukova. "The Political Philosophy of Russian Liberalism." In Dimensions and Challenges of Russian Liberalism, 3–14. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05784-8_1.

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Ungureanu, Camil, and Paolo Monti. "Political liberalism, public reason, and religion." In Contemporary Political Philosophy and Religion, 21–50. New York: Routledge, 2018.: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351391757-1.

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Christman, John. "Toleration, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Liberalism." In Social and Political Philosophy, 111–37. 2nd Edition. | New York : Routledge, 2017. |: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315693323-5.

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McIntyre, Kenneth B. "Practical Reason and Teleology: MacIntyre’s Critique of Modern Moral Philosophy." In Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism, 279–94. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42599-9_19.

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Conference papers on the topic "Philosophy of liberalism"

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Sombra, Laurenio. "Democracy in the presence of liberalism and its enemies: the history of a concept." In XXVI World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Initia Via, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.17931/ivr2013_wg126_04.

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Rodrigues Pereira, Rafael. "Liberals, Communitarians, Republicans and the intervention of the State in the private sphere." In XXVI World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Initia Via, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.17931/ivr2013_sws69_04.

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Reports on the topic "Philosophy of liberalism"

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Mandaville, Peter. Worlding the Inward Dimensions of Islam. IIIT, October 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.47816/01.003.20.

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Muqtedar Khan’s Islam and Good Governance: A Political Philosophy of Ihsan is, above all, an expression of faith.[1] This does not mean that we should engage it as a confessional text — although it certainly is one at some level — or that it necessitates or assumes a particular faith positionality on the part of its reader. Rather, Khan seeks here to build a vision and conception of Islamic governance that does not depend on compliance with or fidelity to some outward standard — whether that be European political liberalism or madhhabi requirements. Instead, he draws on concepts, values, and virtues commonly associated with Islam’s more inward dimensions to propose a strikingly original political philosophy: one that makes worldly that which has traditionally been kept apart from the world. More specifically, Khan locates the basis of a new kind of Islamic politics within the Qur’anic and Prophetic injunction of ihsan, which implies beautification, excellence, or perfection — conventionally understood as primarily spiritual in nature. However, this is not a politics that concerns itself with domination (the pursuit, retention, and maximization of power); it is neither narrowly focused on building governmental structures that supposedly correspond with divine diktat nor understood as contestation or competition. This is, as the book’s subtitle suggests, a pathway to a philosophy of the political which defines the latter in terms of searching for the Good.
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