Log in

Relevant bibliographies by topics / Philosophy and explanation / Journal articles

To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Philosophy and explanation.

Journal articles on the topic 'Philosophy and explanation'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Philosophy and explanation.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Clark, Stephen R. L. "The Limits of Explanation: Limited Explanations." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27 (March 1990): 195–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100005117.

Full text

Abstract:

When I was first approached to read a paper at the conference from which this volume takes its beginning I expected that Flint Schier, with whom I had taught a course on the Philosophy of Biology in my years at Glasgow, would be with us to comment and to criticize. I cannot let this occasion pass without expressing once again my own sense of loss. I am sure that we would all have gained by his presence, and hope that he would find things both to approve, and disapprove, in the following venture.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Schouten, Gina. "Philosophy in Schools: Can Early Exposure Help Solve Philosophy's Gender Problem?" Hypatia 31, no. 2 (2016): 275–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12232.

Full text

Abstract:

In this article, I explore a new reason in favor of precollegiate philosophy: It could help narrow the persistent gender disparity within the discipline. I catalog some of the most widely endorsed explanations for the underrepresentation of women in philosophy and argue that, on each hypothesized explanation, precollegiate philosophy instruction could help improve our discipline's gender balance. Explanations I consider include stereotype threat, gendered philosophical intuitions, inhospitable disciplinary environment, lack of same‐sex role models for women students in philosophy, and conflicting “schemas” for philosophy and femininity. I argue that, insofar as some combination of these hypothesized explanations accounts for some portion of the underrepresentation of women in philosophy, those of us concerned to make things better have reason to participate in and promote efforts to share philosophy with younger students.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

McLaughlin, P. "Mechanical philosophy and artefact explanation." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37, no. 1 (March 2006): 97–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2005.12.010.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. "[Explanation] Is Explanation Better." Philosophy of Science 64, no. 1 (March 1997): 154–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/392540.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

O’Brien, Lilian. "Action explanation and its presuppositions." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49, no. 1 (February 2019): 123–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1518629.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractIn debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states that explain an intentional action have both causal and rational features. I scrutinize the presuppositions of those who seek and offer rationalizing action explanations. This scrutiny shows, I argue, that where rational features play an explanatory role in these contexts, causal features play only a presuppositional role. But causal features would have to play an explanatory role if rationalizing action explanation were a species of causal explanation. Consequently, it is not a species of causal explanation.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Lehrer, Keith. "Ultimate Preference and Explanation." Grazer Philosophische Studien 97, no. 4 (November 24, 2020): 600–615. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000125.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract The articles by Corlett, McKenna and Waller in the present issue call for some further enlightenment on Lehrer’s defense of classical compatibilism. Ultimate explanation in terms of a power preference, which is the primary explanation for choice, is now the central feature of his defense. This includes the premise that scientific determinism may fail to explain our choices. Sylvain Bromberger (1965) showed that nomological deduction is not sufficient for explanation. A power preference, which is by definition a preference over alternatives, is the primary explanation when the power preference explains the choice without the need to appeal to anything else, including even anything that explains it. The author notes that explanation is not generally transitive. The power preference must stand alone as an ultimate explanation independent of other explanations. It is thus the ultimate preference over alternatives of choice.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Bradie, Michael. "Explanation." Teaching Philosophy 12, no. 3 (1989): 291–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil198912377.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Nelson, Alan. "Explanation and Justification in Political Philosophy." Ethics 97, no. 1 (October 1986): 154–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/292824.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Reutlinger, Alexander. "Explanation beyond causation? New directions in the philosophy of scientific explanation." Philosophy Compass 12, no. 2 (February 2017): e12395. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12395.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Castro, Eduardo. "A deductive-nomological model for mathematical scientific explanation." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 24, no. 1 (April 28, 2020): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n1p1.

Full text

Abstract:

I propose a deductive-nomological model for mathematical scientific explanation. In this regard, I modify Hempel’s deductive-nomological model and test it against some of the following recent paradigmatic examples of the mathematical explanation of empirical facts: the seven bridges of Königsberg, the North American synchronized cicadas, and Hénon-Heiles Hamiltonian systems. I argue that mathematical scientific explanations that invoke laws of nature are qualitative explanations, and ordinary scientific explanations that employ mathematics are quantitative explanations. I analyse the repercussions of this deductivenomological model on causal explanations.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Rödl, Sebastian. "Infinite Explanation." Philosophical Topics 36, no. 2 (2008): 123–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics200836222.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

Camacho, Luis A., and Robert Nozick. "Philosophical Explanation." Noûs 20, no. 3 (September 1986): 414. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2215306.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Reeder, Harry P. "Phenomenological Explanation." International Studies in Philosophy 22, no. 3 (1990): 126–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil199022346.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Sosa, David. "Meaningful Explanation." Philosophical Issues 8 (1997): 351. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1523016.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Majors, Brad. "Moral Explanation." Philosophy Compass 2, no. 1 (January 2007): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00049.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Hughes, R. I. G. "Theoretical Explanation." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1993): 132–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1993.tb00261.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Baron, Sam, and Mark Colyvan. "Explanation impossible." Philosophical Studies 178, no. 2 (April 2, 2020): 559–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01445-8.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Jenkins, C. S., and Daniel Nolan. "Backwards explanation." Philosophical Studies 140, no. 1 (April 19, 2008): 103–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9228-y.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

Cowan, Robert. "The Puzzle of Moral Memory." Journal of Moral Philosophy 17, no. 2 (April 15, 2020): 202–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20192914.

Full text

Abstract:

A largely overlooked and puzzling feature of morality is Moral Memory: apparent cases of directly memorising, remembering, and forgetting first-order moral propositions seem odd. To illustrate: consider someone apparently memorising that capital punishment is wrong, or acting as if they are remembering that euthanasia is permissible, or reporting that they have forgotten that torture is wrong. I here clarify Moral Memory and identify desiderata of good explanations. I then proceed to amend the only extant account, Bugeja’s (2016) Non-Cognitivist explanation, but show that it isn’t superior to a similar Cognitivist-friendly view, and that both explanations face a counterexample. Following this, I consider and reject a series of alternative Cognitivist-friendly explanations, suggesting that a Practicality-Character explanation that appeals to the connection between the practicality of moral attitude and character is superior. However, I conclude that support for this explanation should remain conditional and tentative.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

Saatsi, Juha, and Mark Pexton. "Reassessing Woodward’s Account of Explanation: Regularities, Counterfactuals, and Noncausal Explanations." Philosophy of Science 80, no. 5 (December 2013): 613–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/673899.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Redhead, Michael. "Explanation in Physics: Explanation." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27 (March 1990): 135–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100005087.

Full text

Abstract:

In what sense do the sciences explain? Or do they merely describe what is going on without answering why-questions at all. But cannot description at an appropriate ‘level’ provide all that we can reasonably ask of an explanation? Well, what do we mean by explanation anyway? What, if anything, gets left out when we provide a so-called scientific explanation? Are there limits of explanation in general, and scientific explanation, in particular? What are the criteria for a good explanation? Is it possible to satisfy all the desiderata simultaneously? If not, which should we regard as paramount? What is the connection between explanation and prediction? What exactly is it that statistical explanations explain? These are some of the questions that have generated a very extensive literature in the philosophy of science. In attempting to answer them, definite views will have to be taken on related matters, such as physical laws, causality, reduction, and questions of evidence and confirmation, of theory and observation, realism versus antirealism, and the objectivity and rationality of science. I will state my own views on these matters, in the course of this essay. To argue for everything in detail and to do justice to all the alternative views, would fill a book, perhaps several books. I want to lead up fairly quickly to modern physics, and review the explanatory situation there in rather more detail.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Páez, Andrés. "Artificial explanations: the epistemological interpretation of explanation in AI." Synthese 170, no. 1 (July 1, 2008): 131–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9361-3.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Stueber, Karsten, and Mark Bevir. "Empathy, Rationality, and Explanation." Journal of the Philosophy of History 5, no. 2 (2011): 147–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187226311x582293.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractThis paper describes the historical background to contemporary discussions of empathy and rationality. It looks at the philosophy of mind and its implications for action explanation and the philosophy of history. In the nineteenth century, the concept of empathy became prominent within philosophical aesthetics, from where it was extended to describe the way we grasp other minds. This idea of empathy as a way of understanding others echoed through later accounts of historical understanding as involving re-enactment, noticeably that of R. G. Collingwood. For much of the late twentieth century, philosophers of history generally neglected questions about action explanation. In the philosophy of mind, however, Donald Davidson inspired widespread discussions of the role of folk psychology and rationality in mental causation and the explanation of actions, and some philosophers of history drew on his ideas to reconsider issues related to empathy. Today, philosophers inspired by the discovery of mirror neurons and the theory of mind debate between theory theorists and simulation theorists are again making the concept of empathy central to philosophical analyses of action explanation and to historical understanding.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

Smart, J. J. C. "Explanation—Opening Address." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27 (March 1990): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100005014.

Full text

Abstract:

It is a pleasure for me to give this opening address to the Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference on ‘Explanation’ for two reasons. The first is that it is succeeded by exciting symposia and other papers concerned with various special aspects of the topic of explanation. The second is that the conference is being held in my old alma mater, the University of Glasgow, where I did my first degree. Especially due to C. A. Campbell and George Brown there was in the Logic Department a big emphasis on absolute idealism, especially F. H. Bradley. My inclinations were to oppose this line of thought and to espouse the empiricism and realism of Russell, Broad and the like. Empiricism was represented in the department by D. R. Cousin, a modest man who published relatively little, but who was of quite extraordinary philosophical acumen and lucidity, and by Miss M. J. Levett, whose translation of Plato's Theaetetus formed an important part of the philosophy syllabus.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Foss, Jeff. "The Scientific Explanation of Colour Qualia." Dialogue 48, no. 3 (September 2009): 479–512. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217309990096.

Full text

Abstract:

ABSTRACT: Qualia, the subjectively known qualities of conscious experience, are judged by many philosophers and scientists to lie beyond the domain of scientific explanation, thus making the conscious mind partly incomprehensible to the objective physical sciences. Some, like Kripke and Chalmers, employ modal logic to argue that explanations of qualia are impossible in principle. I argue that there already exist perfectly normal scientific explanations of qualia, and rebut the arguments of those who deny this possibility.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

FitzPatrick, William J. "Human altruism, evolution and moral philosophy." Royal Society Open Science 4, no. 8 (August 2017): 170441. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.170441.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper has two central aims. The first is to explore philosophical complications that arise when we move from (i) explaining the evolutionary origins of genetically influenced traits associated with human cooperation and altruism, to (ii) explaining present manifestations of human thought, feeling and behaviour involving cooperation and altruism. While the former need only appeal to causal factors accessible to scientific inquiry, the latter must engage also with a distinctive form of explanation, i.e. reason-giving explanation, which in turn raises important philosophical questions, the answers to which will affect the nature of the ultimate explanations of our moral beliefs and related actions. On one possibility I will explore, this explanatory project cannot avoid engaging with first-order ethical theory. The second aim is to apply lessons from these explanatory complications to the critique of ‘evolutionary debunking arguments’, which seek to debunk morality, or at least objective construals of it (i.e. moral realism), by appeal to allegedly scientific debunking explanations of our moral beliefs that would defeat our justification for them. The explanatory complications brought out in the first half raise difficulties for such debunking arguments. If we avoid begging central philosophical questions then such debunking arguments pose little threat of saddling us with moral scepticism or subjectivism, though they do pose an important challenge for those developing a moral realist view.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

Ratzsch, Del. "Scientific Explanation." Teaching Philosophy 15, no. 1 (1992): 104–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil199215114.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Woodward, James, and David-Hillel Ruben. "Explaining Explanation." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56, no. 2 (June 1996): 477. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2108538.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

Vineberg, Susan. "Mathematical explanation and indispensability." THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 33, no. 2 (June 20, 2018): 233. http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.17615.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper discusses Baker’s Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA) for mathematical realism on the basis of the indispensable role mathematics plays in scientific explanations of physical facts, along with various responses to it. I argue that there is an analogue of causal explanation for mathematics which, of several basic types of explanation, holds the most promise for use in the EIA. I consider a plausible case where mathematics plays an explanatory role in this sense, but argue that such use still does not support realism about mathematical objects.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Levine, Andrew. "Reason and explanation." Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 11 (1989): 667–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil1989861116.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Humphreys, Paul. "Causality and Explanation." Journal of Philosophy 97, no. 9 (2000): 523–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil200097939.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

Lang, Berel. "Uniqueness and Explanation." Journal of Philosophy 82, no. 10 (October 1985): 514. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2026357.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

Fraassen, Bas C. Van. "Salmon on Explanation." Journal of Philosophy 82, no. 11 (November 1985): 639. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2026420.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

Humphreys, Paul, and Wesley C. Salmon. "Causality and Explanation." Journal of Philosophy 97, no. 9 (September 2000): 523. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2678490.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Murphy, Dominic. "Explanation in Psychiatry." Philosophy Compass 5, no. 7 (June 27, 2010): 602–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00304.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

Nottelmann, Nikolaj. "Belief-Desire Explanation." Philosophy Compass 6, no. 12 (December 2011): 912–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00446.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Sklar, Lawrence. "Idealization and Explanation." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1993): 258–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1993.tb00267.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

Boersema, David. "Peirce on Explanation." Journal of Speculative Philosophy 17, no. 3 (2003): 224–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jsp.2003.0038.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Greco, Daniel. "Safety, Explanation, Iteration." Philosophical Issues 26, no. 1 (October 2016): 187–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phis.12067.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Jenkins, C. S. "Knowledge and Explanation." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36, no. 2 (June 2006): 137–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2006.0009.

Full text

Abstract:

Craig (1990) casts doubt upon the project of trying to give the traditional sort of necessary and sufficient conditions for A knows that p. He interprets the inadequacy of existing analyses of knowledge as evidence that our concept of knowledge is complex and diffuse, and concludes that we should aim to understand it by thinking about the rôle the concept plays in our lives, rather than by trying to find necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of knowledge ascriptions.There is surely something right about Craig's view: we are unlikely to succeed in any attempt to analyse away the intricacies in our concept of knowledge. We cannot realistically hope to uncover a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for A knows that p which are in all cases either clearly satisfied or clearly not satisfied. Nor, I suspect, is it possible to offer necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge which are widely accepted as being more securely understood than knowledge itself.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

Friebe, Cord. "Psychoanalytic action explanation." Philosophical Explorations 18, no. 1 (February 17, 2014): 34–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2014.885991.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

DURAN, JANE. "EXPLANATION AND REFERENCE." Metaphilosophy 27, no. 3 (July 1996): 302–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.1996.tb00209.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Baron, Sam. "Explaining Mathematical Explanation." Philosophical Quarterly 66, no. 264 (January 11, 2016): 458–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv123.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Kment, Boris. "Counterfactuals and Explanation." Mind 115, no. 458 (April 1, 2006): 261–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzl261.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

Egré, Paul. "Explanation in Linguistics." Philosophy Compass 10, no. 7 (July 2015): 451–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12225.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Braun, David. "Russellianism and Explanation." Nous 35, s15 (October 2001): 253–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.35.s15.13.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

OWENS, DAVID. "Levels of Explanation." Mind XCVIII, no. 389 (1989): 59–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/xcviii.389.59.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

Hubbs, Graham. "Alief and Explanation." Metaphilosophy 44, no. 5 (October 2013): 604–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/meta.12056.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

Miller, Elizabeth. "Humean scientific explanation." Philosophical Studies 172, no. 5 (July 8, 2014): 1311–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0351-7.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

KANTOROVICH, AHARON. "Philosophy of Science: From Justification to Explanation." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39, no. 4 (December 1, 1988): 469–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/39.4.469.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!