Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Philosophy and explanation'

We have yet to develop a theory of explanation that will account for all of consciousness. Recent debate on this topic has been impaired because it has in large part proceeded without any explicit attention to the nature of explanation. On the one hand, the lack of commitment to any well-specified theory of explanation leads to imprecision and vagueness. On the other hand, much of the optimism concerning the possibility of explaining all aspects of consciousness stems from an attachment to the only developed theory of psychological phenomena at our disposal and the belief that all of consciousness can be captured by such a theory. Some of the inadequacy in the literature on consciousness is due to a conflation between consciousness construed as mode of presentation , that is, the way content is presented to the agent, and consciousness construed as subjective or qualitative feel. Once the two objects of concern are distinguished, we have a much clearer vision of what needs to be explained, and we can turn our focus on the proper way to do so. I argue that subjective feel is an important aspect of consciousness in need of explanation, and that an explanation of this phenomenon is distinct from an explanation of mode of presentation or representation. Furthermore, while there are well-articulated methods of explanation that properly address mode of presentation and representation, this is not the case for subjective feel. I delineate several genera of scientific explanation in an attempt to exhaust the possible methods by which we may be capable of explaining subjective feel. This involves the taxonomizing of types of phenomena that are the targets of our explanatory methods. While one type of explanatory strategy may be adequate when the target explanandum is a property, the same strategy may fall short in explaining a single event, event type, or regularity. Subjective feel is best construed as a property. However, while the method employed by cognitive science to explain mental properties may be adequate for explaining much cognitive phenomena, I argue that it is incapable of explaining subjective feel.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2005.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 155-163).
My thesis consists of three papers on truth and explanations in science. Broadly, the question I ask is semantic. Should the best account of certain bits of our scientific practice focus on the concept of truth? More specifically, should the crucial distinctions between good and bad aspects of that practice be drawn in terms of truth? My thesis consists of three case studies: ceteris paribus laws in the special sciences, appeals to idealizations in the application of theories, and the analysis of explanations quite generally, exemplified in the asymmetry of explanation. In each case, prominent philosophers have argued that a proper treatment does not focus on truth. In each case, I argue that truth should play a central role. And in each case, the issue turns, at least in part, on the connection between the scientific practice in question and explanations.
by Bernhard Nickel.
Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2000.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 96).
Three topics are discussed concerning the application probability and explanation to the confirmation of theories. The first concerns the debate over prediction versus accommodation. I argue that we typically have reason to be more confident of a theory given that it was constructed independently of the knowledge of certain data than if it was designed to accommodate those data. The second concerns the puzzle of the apparent 'fine-tuning' of the universe for life. I argue that the fact that our universe meets the extremely improbable yet necessary conditions for life provides no evidence for the thesis that there are, or have been, very many universes. The third chapter concerns the need to explain the existence of life. I argue that if life's existence needs an explanation at all, the place to look is in a teleological explanation. If this option is rejected, we should be content to see the origin of life as an extremely improbable fluke.
by Roger White.
Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D. in Philosophy)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2012.
"June 2012." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 97-101).
This thesis is about the philosophical and scientific significance of chance. Specifically, I ask whether there is a single notion of chance that both plays a well-defined scientific role and proves useful for various philosophical projects. I argue that there is, but that this notion of chance is importantly different from the one that we usually come across in the philosophical literature. In the first chapter, "Chance, Indeterminacy, and Explanation", I argue against the common and influential view that chances are those probabilities that arise when the fundamental laws are indeterministic. The problem with this view, I claim, is not that it conflicts with some antecedently plausible metaphysics of chance, but rather that it renders the distinction between chance and other sorts of probability incapable of playing any scientifically significant role. I suggest an alternative view, according to which chances are the probabilities that play a certain explanatory role-they are probabilities that explain associated frequencies. In the second chapter, "Chance, Explanation, and Measure", I build on the view that chances are the probabilities that play a certain explanatory role by developing an account of non-fundamental chances-chances that arise when the fundamental laws are deterministic. On this account, non-fundamental chances are objective measures over relevant classes of alternative possibilities. In the third chapter, "Chance and Counterfactuals", I show how the sort of chances I have argued for can play an important role in a very different sort of philosophical project. According to a number of recent arguments, one consequence of our current scientific theories is that most ordinary counterfactuals are not true. I argue that the best response to these arguments makes use of the non-fundamental chances that I have argued for in the first two chapters of the dissertation.
by Nina R. Emery.
Ph.D.in Philosophy

Mental causation has been a concern in the philosophy of mind since Descartes. Intuitively, thoughts are causes of behavior, and they are causes of behavior in virtue of their mental properties. The computational theory of mind views thoughts as symbol tokenings, and thus as causes. However, if the computational theory of mind is correct, the causal efficacy of mental properties is problematic. A representation tokening causes further representation tokenings or behaviors in virtue of local computational properties of the representation. Mental properties could explain mental causation as well, if they could be identified with, or they supervened upon, causally relevant computational properties of representations. But on plausible construals of the nature of mental properties, they do not. If mental properties are assigned relevance in our mental lives, the result is a picture in which the effects of mental events are overdetermined by their mental and physical properties. Since such overdetermination is implausible, the causal efficacy of mental properties should be denied. A number of philosophers have proposed sufficient conditions for causal relevance and argued that mental properties meet those conditions. The role of mental properties in laws or counterfactuals is taken to be pivotal. But there are serious problems with each of the proposed accounts. A property can play an explanatory role, even if it does not play a causal-explanatory role. The point of assigning mental properties to representations is to account for a system's information processing capacities. Mental properties can play this explanatory role without accounting for cause-effect relationships. The causal efficacy of mental properties can be denied, while an explanatory role for mental properties is maintained.

Ever since Hempel and Oppenheim's development of the Deductive Nomological model of scientific explanation in 1948, a great deal of philosophical energy has been dedicated to constructing a viable model of explanation that concurs both with our intuitions and with the general project of science. Here I critically examine the developments in this field of study over the last half century, and conclude that Humphreys' aleatory model is superior to its competitors. There are, however, some problems with Humphreys' account of the relative quality of an explanation, so in the end I develop and defend a modified version of the aleatory account.

Understanding how scientists explain has been one of the major goals of the philosophy of science. Given that explaining is one of the most important tasks that scientists aim at and given the high specialization that currently affects all scientific disciplines, we encounter what might at first glance appear to us as many different types of explanations and very different ways of explaining natural phenomena. This suggests a pluralist picture regarding scientific explanation, particularly in biology, namely the existence of different accounts of explanation that do not share an interesting common core. However, the main goal of the traditional analysis of scientific explanation was to elaborate a monist theory of explanation according to which all scientific explanations share a common core that makes them what they are - i.e. that they can be identified by a commonly shared set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. The monist accounts mainly draw on examples from physics to illustrate how this is supposed to work, leaving examples from the special science, like biology, aside. In the last twenty years, nonetheless, the rise of the New Mechanism philosophy, with its notion of mechanistic explanation, has become the dominant and widely accepted account among the philosophers of science to analyze scientific explanation in biology, challenging the pluralist view. The New mechanist account of scientific explanation is essentially monist since their defenders claim that mechanisms are all what really matters to explanation. According to mechanistic explanation, in order to explain a biological phenomenon, we have to discover the mechanism that is responsible for it. Further, we have to decompose this mechanism in order to identify its component parts and identify the causal story that connects the components with the phenomenon. Mechanistic explanations are thus considered causal explanations. The New Mechanism philosophy has arguably been very successful in analyzing how explanation works in a huge diversity of models in biology, suggesting that their account of mechanistic explanation is the only legitimate of in biology. Furthermore, New Mechanism philosophy provides a new framework that contributed to tackle traditional problems of the philosophy of science related to notions such as laws of nature, function, causation, etc. Although mechanistic explanation has proved very successful in analyzing the explanatory force of many biological models, its scope in biology is still under discussion. In the last few years, there has been voices limiting the extension of this account. On the one hand, there has been philosophers claiming that in some biological models, mathematics plays not only a representational role but an explanatory role, suggesting that those models provide explanations that rather than identifying a mechanism with its components and causal story, identify mathematical properties that are explanatory of some phenomenon. They claim that in those explanations, the system under analysis has a mathematical structure whose mathematical properties are explanatory of a particular range of explananda. On the other hand, and despite the claim widely accepted that there are no laws in biology, some philosophers claim we can still consider that some biological models explain by appeal to laws of nature, suggesting covering law accounts of scientific explanation. The present thesis dissertation is a contribution to the aforementioned debate. It provides examples of biological models whose explanatory power does not lie in its identification of mechanisms with its parts and causal story, even if the models look somehow mechanistic. I claim they provide non-mechanistic (and non-causal) explanations, in so far as the models, even if they could identify a mechanism, do not explain by pinpointing information about its causal story.

Thesis (Ph. D.) -- University of Maryland, College Park, 2009.
Thesis research directed by: Dept. of Philosophy. Title from t.p. of PDF. Includes bibliographical references. Published by UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, Mich. Also available in paper.

To date, there is no universal and coherent theory concerning the nature or the function of time. Furthermore, important and unresolved controversies raging within both philosophy and the natural sciences apparently indicate that there is little hope of constructing a single, unified theory. Even so-called "folk" theories of time, embedded within different cultural traditions, show no common elements, and therefore can not provide a pre-theoretical description of time, towards which an explanatory framework could be constructed. This lack of consensus indicates that the concept as it is currently being used is ill defined, and, at the very least, needs to be considerably revised. The conceptual disarray surrounding time has aided and abetted the arguments of certain thinkers, especially Ricoeur, working within the phenomenological tradition who make de principe claims that there can not be a single theory of time. My intention is not to try and to produce a concept of time that was capable of unifying all these different elements. Rather, Ricoeur's arguments and those of others working in the phenomenological tradition dissatisfied me. I believed that their arguments were informed by a myopic, muddled and positively 19th Century understanding of the scientific project. Hence, my aim is to show that Ricoeur's claim will not stand up to scrutiny, and that there are no principled arguments against the possibility of a unified theory of time. We examine the major arguments against unification in general, and also with particular reference to theories of time, such as Husserlian phenomenology, conventionalism, instrumentalism, anti-reductive positions in general, as well as the specific problem of reducing subjective experience to objective description. We demonstrate that none of these objections constitutes a watertight a priori argument against a unified theory of time. Furthermore, we demonstrate that recent developments in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mind have made such a unified theory a plausible goal. We argue that post-positivist philosophy of science, with its emphasis on research programmes, the co-evolution of theories and super-empirical rational support, opens the way for new types of evidence to be brought to bear on questions about time. Also, recent developments in the brain sciences mean that a neurologically plausible and fully naturalised analysis of our experience of time is being developed. Although much work in this direction has begun, we argue that it is fragmented, partly through the limitations of our current knowledge, but more particularly through an inadequate background of coherent philosophical thought. This has lead both philosophers and scientists to attempt grand metaphysical answers to muddled philosophical questions which threaten the progress which natural science and the philosophy of science have offered in the second half of the twentieth century.

A different analytical approach to that of the standard causal theory to the explanation of action is proposed. It is argued that the most basic kind of explanation of action is teleological explanation in terms of external reasons. what this amounts to is that an action is the result of a causal process which adapts its results to whatever is objectively practically rational. Explanation in terms of psychological states depends on being able to make this externalist sort of explanation. Central to this account is a theory of causal explanation which depends on the notion of a causal process. A causal process is a real entity distinct from an event. A phenomenon is causally explained when a description of the phenomenon is determined by a theoretical structure which represents how a process which results in the phenomenon works. In teleological explanation, the theoretical structure is that of practical rationality. It is argued that this must be regarded as objective practical rationality. Only purposeful activity can be explained in this way. An account of evolutionary function is provided to show why. it differs from this. This account of teleological explanation, because it does not involve internal mental states, may be used to show how we attribute such states. An agent is essentially a teleological machine. Accounts of perception, beliefs and intentions are provided based on this.

In recent years, much attention has been given to the question of whether content externalism is compatible with an account of self-knowledge maintaining that we have an epistemically privileged access to the content of our propositional mental states. Philosophers who maintain the two are incompatible (incompatibilists) have put forward two majors types of challenge, which I call - following Martin Davies - the Achievement and Consequence Problems, which aim to demonstrate that self-knowledge cannot be reconciled with externalism. These challenges have spawned a great deal of literature, and a diverse range of arguments and positions have emerged in response. In this dissertation, I intend to focus on examples of these different avenues of response, and show how none of them are adequate. In the first chapter, I lay the groundwork for the debate, setting up how externalism and self-knowledge are to be understood, and outlining both the incompatibilist challenges as well as the available responses to them. In the second chapter I examine these responses in more detail, concluding finally that the best available response is Tyler Burge's. Burge has two arguments that together establish his compatibilist position. First, he shows that even if externalism is true, our judgements about our occurrent thoughts are immunejrom error. This establishes that our judgements about our thoughts must be true. Second, he offers a transcendental argument for self-knowledge, arguing that our access to our mental states must be not only true, but non-accidentally true, in a way sufficient for genuine knowledge. This establishes that we possess the correct epistemic entitlement to our thoughts. In the third chapter, I argue Burge's arguments do not, in fact, give us good reason to suppose externalism and self-knowledge to be compatible. This, I argue, is because B urge relies upon a transcendental argument, which, in this context, cannot establish that we have self-knowledge if externalism is true. All it establishes, I argue, is that we do possess self-knowledge. And this is insufficient to establish that externalism and self-knowledge are compatible.
KMBT_363
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Methodological physicalism is the thesis that causal-explanatory notions appearing in true explanations must be physicalistically reducible. The thesis of methodological physicalism has figured prominently, if tacitly, in much recent work on folk psychology. The thesis serves as a premise in the arguments of both realists and eliminativists. In chapter 1 I discuss seven arguments which argue for the truth of methodological physicalism. A principal thesis of this work is that methodological physicalism is false. I argue in chapter 2 that propositional-attitude notions are irreducible but play a causal-explanatory role in true explanations of actions. My account of folk-psychological explanations of actions employs Garfinkel's (1981) notion of explanatory relativity. On Garfinkel's account, an explanandum consists of an event or state of affairs embedded in a contrast space of possible events or states of affairs. By being embedded in different contrast spaces one and the same event or state of affairs can be a constituent of distinct explananda. My account distinguishes between the explanation of an action and the explanation of the bodily movement which realizes that action, on the grounds that they embed the same bodily movement in distinct contrast spaces. One consequence of this view is that the causal-explanatory notions of explanations of actions, viz., propositional attitudes, are not reducible to the causal-explanatory notions of physical explanations of bodily movements. In chapter 3 I critically examine the teleological theory of Millikan, and in chapter 4 my concern is with Fodor's theory of asymmetric dependence. The upshot of my discussion in these chapters is that neither of these proposals is capable of achieving its reductionist aims. The topic of chapter 5 is a view which I dub 'the deflationary theory of meaning.' I argue that the deflationary theory is untenable in the face of Quinean arguments for the indeterminacy of translation. In the final chapter I reexamine the arguments for methodological physicalism cited in chapter 1. One result to emerge from this discussion is the admission that folk-psychological generalizations cannot be explained in terms of more basic physicalistic generalizations.

While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to 'what is scientific explanation?', while Railton was focused on a question more similar to 'what is scientific explanation?' In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other.
Master of Arts

One of the main goals of John Locke's Second Treatise Of Government, is to explain when it is morally permissible for someone to resist their government with force. I call this "John Locke's Theory of Justified Resistance." How Locke derived this theory was be weaving together his thoughts about the nature of God, the law of nature, human nature, human understanding, natural rights, human history, and government. The result is what I think to be and what I hope to prove is a comprehensive and internally coherent moral theory. The theory provides for us the conditions and circumstances in which someone is morally justified to resist their government. Although Locke's theory has been very influential it has not been without its critics. Some of the criticisms have been answered and some have not. In my dissertation I provide answers to the critics. How I answer the critics is by either explaining the theory or by explaining the relevant aspects of Locke's thought that come into play in a given situation. The best way to do those two things is to appeal most often to Locke's own words. Locke is his best defender. Besides explaining the theory and providing answers to the critics, I also examine hypothetical and historical cases studies and apply Locke's theory to them. These case studies test Locke's theory and they allow us to see both the strength and the relevance of the theory, while also helping us gain a deeper understanding of the theory. In the end I offer my own disagreement and criticism of the theory, but I think without undermining Locke's great achievement of giving us an invaluable theory of justified resistance.

This thesis is concerned with two kinds of 'singular' psychological phenomena. The first is the commonsense psychological explanation of action directed upon particular things and stuffs. The second is the nature of (visual) perceptual demonstrative thought. The two topics are brought together in an account of psychological explanation I call 'de re psychological explanation'. The primary aim of the thesis is to articulate and defend this account. The main thesis I seek to establish is that an adequate psychological explanation of an agent's action upon an object requires a relational or de re ascription of thought that (1) relates the agent to the object and (2) makes reference to a perceptual demonstrative mode of presentation of the object. This thesis is defended in two stages. In the first chapter I argue for the first half of the thesis, that relational ascriptions are necessary in any explanation of an action involving an object. In the fourth chapter I argue for the second half, that it is necessary that these relational ascriptions make reference to a perceptual demonstrative mode of presentation of the object acted on. The second half of the thesis involves the notion of a perceptual demonstrative mode of presentation. This necessitates an account of the nature of perceptual demonstrative thoughts, which is undertaken in chapters two and three. In the second chapter I explore two prominent theories of perceptual demonstrative thought. In the third chapter I sketch a new account 'property-dependent externalism' and argue that it is more adequate than the others. In chapter four, I return to de re explanation and develop it further into a covering-law account of psychological explanation. The rest of the thesis is given over to defending the elaborated covering-law account against two objections. I draw the claws of the first objection in the second half of the fourth chapter and answer the second objection in the final chapter.

The view that large-scale, long-range social theories cannot be predictive other than "in principle" is sufficiently widespread as to be considered the orthodox view. It is widely held that, lacking this predictive quality, social theories are cut off from a crucial form of vindication enjoyed by the experimental sciences. Thus many would agree with Ryan's assessment that while with regard to large-scale social changes "long-range prediction is not in principle impossible," nonetheless as a matter of practical methodology such a goal is of "dubious value." The reason commonly proffered as to why social theories cannot be predictive is the causal complexity of social life. Because of this feature, it is held, while we may be able to unearth interesting social generalizations, we will not be able to predict the many initial conditions together with which they predict. Alternately, due to this complexity we are able to achieve no better than tendency laws which do not permit predictions of sufficient precision to allow for predictive testing. This has been held to be true for other causally complex fields as well. Thus, Scriven has argued that Darwin was "the paradigm of the explanatory but non-predictive scientist" due to the constraints imposed on his methodology by the causal complexity of the biosphere. As a result of both an uncritical acceptance of the orthodox view and an inadequate analysis of Marx's methodology, Daniel Little has argued that Marxian theory is non-predictive. However, a thorough analysis of Marx's labour process theory shows it to be both clearly predictive and subject to justification by predictive assessment. Moreover, a formalization of the theory indicates that available data confirm it as regards both its central hypothesis and the matrix of social causation it exhibits. Little's position in regard to Marxian theory is strongly similar to Scriven's in regard to Darwinian theory. In both cases, faulty theoretical presuppositions combine with inadequate analysis to buttress false conclusions as to the asymmetry of explanation and prediction. Adequate analysis dispels Little's and Scriven's conclusions and exhibits important methodological parallels between Marx and Darwin.
Arts, Faculty of
Philosophy, Department of
Graduate

Ce travail concerne principalement la notion de modularité hiérarchique et son utilisation pour expliquer la structure et le comportement dynamique des systèmes complexes au moyen de modèles modulaires hiérarchiques, ainsi qu'un concept de ma proposition, l’antimodularité, relié à la possibilité de la détection algorithmique de la modularité hiérarchique. Plus précisément, je mets en évidence la portée pragmatique de la modularité hiérarchique sur la possibilité de l’explication scientifique des systèmes complexes, c’est-à-dire, systèmes qui, selon une description de base choisie par l’observateur, peuvent être considérés comme composés de parties élémentaires discrètes interdépendantes. Je souligne que la modularité hiérarchique est essentielle même au cours de l’expérimentation visée à découvrir la structure de ces systèmes. Mais la détection algorithmique de la modularité hiérarchique se révèle être une tâche affectée par la démontrée intraitabilité computationnelle de la recherche de la meilleure description modulaire hiérarchique, et par l’excessive cherté computationnelle même des méthodes de détection approximatives de la modularité. L’antimodularité consiste en le manque d’une description modulaire appropriée aux exigences de l’observateur, manque dû ou à l’absence de modularité dans la description basique choisie du système, ou à l’impossibilité de produire algorithmiquement une description hiérarchique valide, en raison des dimensions excessives du système à évaluer en relation à la cherté computationnelle des méthodes algorithmiques. Je souligne, de plus, que la modularité et l’antimodularité dépendent du choix pragmatique d’une spécifique description de base du système, choix fait par l’observateur sur la base de ses objectifs explicatifs. Je montre comment l’antimodularité entrave la possibilité d’appliquer au moins trois types bien connus d’explication: mécanique, déductive-nomologique et computationnelle. Un quatrième type, l’explication topologique, reste par contre indemne. Ensuite j’évalue la présence de modularité dans les systèmes biologiques, avec ses possibles conséquences, et l’éventualité d’encourir dans l’antimodularité en biologie et en autres sciences: éventualité assez probable, au moins dans la biologie des systèmes. Je me permet enfin quelques spéculations métaphysiques et historiques plutôt libres. D’un point de vue métaphysique, l’antimodularité semble suggérer une position possible, selon laquelle les espèces naturelles sont modules qui ont été détectés et, en raison de l’intraitabilité computationnelle de la détection de la meilleure description modulaire hiérarchique, il est improbable qu’ils constituent la meilleure façon possible de décrire le monde, parce que la modularité des espèces naturelles assez probablement ne reflète pas la meilleure modularité possible du monde. D’un point de vue historique, l’utilisation croissante des méthodes computationnels pour la détection de la modularité ou pour la simulation de systèmes complexes, en particulier dans certains domaines de la recherche scientifique, suggère la possibilité d’imaginer une multiplicité de disciplines scientifiques émergentes, guidées par une production croissante et auto-alimentante d’explications potentiellement inintelligibles pour les capacités cognitives humaines. Cela, à mon avis, constituerait un changement historique dans la science, qui, s’il n’a pas déjà eu lieu, pourrait bien être sur le point de se produire
This work is mainly concerned with the notion of hierarchical modularity and its use in explaining structure and dynamical behavior of complex systems by means of hierarchical modular models, as well as with a concept of my proposal, antimodularity, tied to the possibility of the algorithmic detection of hierarchical modularity. Specifically, I highlight the pragmatic bearing of hierarchical modularity on the possibility of scientific explanation of complex systems, that is, systems which, according to a chosen basic description, can be considered as composed of elementary, discrete, interrelated parts. I stress that hierarchical modularity is also required by the experimentation aimed to discover the structure of such systems. Algorithmic detection of hierarchical modularity turns out to be a task plagued by the demonstrated computational intractability of the search for the best hierarchical modular description, and by the high computational expensiveness of even approximated detection methods. Antimodularity consists in the lack of a modular description fitting the needs of the observer, a lack due either to absence of modularity in the system’s chosen basic description, or to the impossibility, due to the excessive size of the system under assessment in relation to the computational cost of algorithmic methods, to algorithmically produce a valid hierarchical description. I stress that modularity and antimodularity depend on the pragmatic choice of a given basic description of the system, a choice made by the observer based on explanatory goals. I show how antimodularity hinders the possibility of applying at least three well-known types of explanation: mechanistic, deductive-nomological and computational. A fourth type, topological explanation, remains unaffected. I then assess the presence of modularity in biological systems, and evaluate the possible consequences, and the likelihood, of incurring in antimodularity in biology and other sciences, concluding that this eventuality is quite likely, at least in systems biology. I finally indulge in some metaphysical and historical speculations: metaphysically, antimodularity seems to suggest a possible position according to which natural kinds are detected modules, and as such, due to the computational hardness of the detection of the best hierarchical modular description, they are unlikely to be the best possible way to describe the world, because the modularity of natural kinds quite probably does not reflect the best possible modularity of the world. From an historical point of view, the growing use of computational methods for modularity detection or simulation of complex systems, especially in certain areas of scientific research, hints at the envisioning of a multiplicity of emerging scientific disciplines guided by a self- sustained, growing production of possibly human-unintelligible explanations. This, I suggest, would constitute an historical change in science, which, if has not already occurred, could well be on the verge of happening
Questo lavoro riguarda principalmente il concetto di modularità gerarchica e il suo impiego nello spiegare la struttura e il comportamento dinamico di sistemi complessi mediante modelli modulari gerarchici, nonché un concetto di mia proposta, l’antimodularità, legato alla possibilità del rilevamento algoritmico di modularità gerarchica. Nello specifico, evidenzio la portata pragmatica della modularità gerarchica sulla possibilità di spiegazione scientifica dei sistemi complessi, cioè sistemi che, secondo una descrizione di base scelta dall’osservatore, possono essere considerati come composti da parti elementari discrete interrelate. Sottolineo che la modularità gerarchica è essenziale anche nel corso della sperimentazione volta a scoprire la struttura di tali sistemi. Il rilevamento algoritmico della modularità gerarchica si rivela essere un compito affetto dalla dimostrata intrattabilità computazionale della ricerca della migliore descrizione modulare gerarchica, e affetto dal comunque elevato costo computazionale anche dei metodi di rilevamento approssimati della modularità. L’antimodularità consiste nella mancanza di una descrizione modulare adatta alle esigenze dell’osservatore, mancanza dovuta o all’assenza di modularità nella descrizione di base del sistema scelta dall’osservatore, o all’impossibilità di produrre algoritmicamente una sua descrizione gerarchica valida, per le dimensioni eccessive del sistema da valutare in rapporto al costo computazionale dei metodi algoritmici. Sottolineo che modularità e antimodularità dipendono dalla scelta pragmatica di una certa descrizione di base del sistema, scelta fatta dall’osservatore sulla base di obiettivi esplicativi. Mostro poi come l’antimodularità ostacoli la possibilità di applicare almeno tre tipi noti di spiegazione: meccanicistica, deduttivo- nomologica e computazionale. Un quarto tipo di spiegazione, la spiegazione topologica, rimane sostanzialmente immune dalle conseguenze dell’antimodularità. Valuto quindi la presenza di modularità nei sistemi biologici, e le sue possibili conseguenze, nonché l’eventualità di incorrere nell’antimodularità in biologia e in altre scienze, concludendo che questa eventualità è abbastanza probabile, almeno in biologia dei sistemi. Infine, mi permetto alcune speculazioni metafisiche e storiche piuttosto libere. Dal punto di vista metafisico, l’antimodularità sembra suggerire una posizione possibile secondo cui i generi naturali sono moduli che sono stati rilevati, e in quanto tali, a causa dell’intrattabilità computazionale del rilevamento della migliore descrizione modulare gerarchica, è improbabile che essi siano il miglior modo possibile per descrivere il mondo, perché la modularità dei generi naturali molto probabilmente non rispecchia la migliore modularità possibile del mondo. Da un punto di vista storico, il crescente utilizzo di metodi computazionali per il rilevamento della modularità o per la simulazione di sistemi complessi, in particolare in alcuni settori della ricerca scientifica, suggerisce la possibilità di immaginare una molteplicità di discipline scientifiche emergenti, guidate dalla produzione di spiegazioni potenzialmente inintelligibili dal punto di vista cognitivo umano, produzione che potrebbe iniziare ad autoalimentarsi, portando potenzialmente ad una crescita inarrestabile. Suggerisco che questo scenario cos- tituirebbe un cambiamento epocale nel campo della scienza, che, se non è già avvenuto, potrebbe benissimo essere sul punto di realizzarsi

Propositional attitudes, states like believing, desiring, intending, etc., have played a central role in the articulation of many of our major theories, both in philosophy and the social sciences. Until relatively recently, psychology was a prominent entry on the list of social sciences in which propositional attitudes occupied center stage. In this century, though, behaviorists began to make a self-conscious effort to expunge "mentalistic" notions from their theorizing. Behaviorism has failed. Psychology therefore is again experiencing "formative years," and two themes have caught the interest of philosophers. The first is that psychological theories evidently must exploit a vast array of relations obtaining among internal states. The second is that the use of mentalistic idioms seems to be explicit again in much of current theorizing. These two observations have led philosophers to wonder about the probable as well as the proper role of propositional attitudes in future psychological theories. Some philosophers wonder, in particular, about the role of the contents of propositional attitudes in the forthcoming theories. Their strategy is in part to discern what sorts of theory psychologists now will want to construct, and then discern what role propositional attitude contents might play in theories of those sorts. I consider here two sorts of theory, what I call minimal functional theories and what is known as propositional attitude psychology. I outline these two kinds of theory, and show how each defines a role for contents. Contents are ultimately eliminable in minimal functional theories. Although they play an apparently ineliminable role in propositional attitude psychology, they do so at an apparent cost. Propositional attitude psychology does not seem to accommodate a certain methodological principle, a principle of individualism in psychology, which is endorsed even by some of the philosophers most enamored of the approach. Such philosophers have two options: they can attempt to show that the conflict between the approach and the principle is not genuine, or they can reject the principle. I argue that the conflict is real, and recommend a qualified rejections of the principle.

The Explanation Hypothesis is a psychological hypothesis about how people attribute moral responsibility. The hypothesis makes general claims about everyday thinking of moral responsibility and is also said to have important consequences for related philosophical issues. Since arguments in favor of the hypothesis are largely based on a number of intuitive cases, there is need to investigate whether it is supported by empirical evidence. In this study, the hypothesis was tested by means of quantitative experimental methods. The data were collected by conducting online surveys in which participants were introduced to a number of different scenarios. For each scenario, questions about moral responsibility were asked. Results provide general support for the Explanation Hypothesis and there are therefore more reasons to take its proposed consequences seriously.

The modern sciences are characterised by a methodological atheism. Even though religions offer what appear to be explanations of various facts about the world, such proposed explanations are not taken seriously within the sciences. Even if no natural explanation were available, it would be assumed that one exists. Is this merely a sign of atheistic prejudice, as some critics suggest? Or are there good reasons to exclude from science explanations that invoke a supernatural agent? My answer to this question has two parts. On the one hand, I concede the bare possibility that talk of divine action could constitute a potential explanation of some state of affairs, while noting that the conditions under which this would be true are unlikely ever to be fulfilled. On the other hand, I argue that a proposed explanation of this kind would rate poorly, when measured against our usual standards of explanatory virtue. Even if it were the only proposed explanation on offer, we would have good reason to seek an alternative.

Humans build theories out of the data we observe, and out of those theories arise wonders. The most powerful theories are causal theories, which organise data into actionable structures. Causal theories make explicit claims about the structure of the world: what entities and processes exist in it, which of these relate to one another and in what form those relations consist. We can use causal theories to induce new generalisations about the world (in the form of particular models or other causal theories) and to explain particular occurrences. This allows rapidly disseminating causal information throughout our cognitive communities. Causal theories and the explanations derived from them guide decisions we make, including where and when to look for more data, completing the cycle.

Causal theories play a ubiquitous and potent role in everyday life, in formal pursuit of them in the sciences, and through their applications in medicine, technology and industry. Given this, the rarity of analyses that attempt to characterise causal theories and their uses in general, computational terms is surprising. Only in recent years has there been a substantial refinement of our models of causal induction due to work by computational cognitive scientists — the interdisciplinary tradition out of which which this dissertation originates. And even so, many issues related to causal theories have been left unattended; three features in particular merit much greater attention from a computational perspective: generating and evaluating explanation, the role of simplicity in explanation choice, and continuous-time causal induction. I aim to redress this situation with this dissertation.

In Chapter 0, I introduce the primary paradigms from computational cognitive science – computational level analysis and rational analysis – that govern my research. In Chapter 1, I study formal theories of causal explanation in Bayesian networks by comparing the explanations the generate and evaluate to human judgements about the same systems. No one model of causal explanation captures the pattern of human judgements, though the intuitive hypothesis, that the most probable a posteriori explanation is the best performs worst of the models evaluated. I conclude that the premise of finding model for all of human causal explanation (even in this limited domain) is flawed; the research programme should be refined to consider the features of formal models and how well they capture our explanatory practices as they vary between individuals and circumstances. One feature not expressed in these models explicitly but that has been shown to matter for human explanation is simplicity. Chapter 2 considers the problem of simplicity in human causal explanation choice in a series of four experiments. I study what makes an explanation simple (whether it is the number of causes invoked in or the number of assumptions made by an explanation), how simplicity concerns are traded off against data-fit, which cognitive consequences arise from choosing simpler explanations when the data does not fit, and why people prefer simpler explanations.

In Chapter 3, I change the focus from studying causal explanation to causal induction — in particular, I develop a framework for continuous time causal theories (

CTCTS

). A

CTCT

defines a generative probabilistic framework for other generative probabilistic models of causal systems, where the data in those systems expressed in terms of continuous time. Chapter 3 is the most interdisciplinary piece of my dissertation, accordingly it begins by reviewing a number of topics: the history of theories of causal induction within philosophy, statistics and medicine; empirical work on causal induction in cognitive science, focusing on issues related to causal induction with temporal data; conceptual issues surrounding the formal definition of time, data, and causal models; and probabilistic graphical models, causal theories, and stochastic processes. I then introduce the desiderata for the

CTCT

framework and how those criteria are met. I then demonstrate the power of

CTCTS

by using them to analyse five sets of experiments (some new and some derived from the literature) on human causal induction with temporal data. Bookending each experiment and the model applied to it is are case from medical history that illustrate a real-world instance of the variety of problem being solved in the section; the opening discussion describes the case and why it fits the problem structure of the model used to analyse the experimental results and the closing discussion illustrates aspects of the case omitted from the initial discussion that complicate the model and fit better with the model introduced in the next section. Then, I discuss ways to incorporate other advances in probabilistic programming, generative theories and stochastic processes into the

CTCT

framework, identify potential applications with specific focus on mechanisms and feedback loops, and conclude by analysing the centrality of temporal information in the study of the mind more generally.

Excepting the supporting appendices and bibliography that end the dissertation, I conclude in two parts. First, in Chapter 4, I analyse issues at the intersection of three of the main themes of my work: namely, (causal) explanation, (causal) induction and time. This proceeds by examining these topics first in pairs and then as a whole. Following that, is Chapter 5, an epilogue that clarifies the interpretations and intended meanings of the “Mind as Theory Engine” metaphor as it applies to human cognition.

In this thesis, I aim to motivate a particular philosophy of mathematics characterised by the following three claims. First, mathematical sentences are generally speaking false because mathematical objects do not exist. Second, people typically use mathematical sentences to communicate content the truth of which does not require mathematical objects to exist. Finally, in using mathematical language in this way, speakers are not doing anything out of the ordinary: they are performing straightforward assertions. In Part I, I argue that the role played by mathematics in our scientific explanations is a purely expressive one, merely allowing us to say more than we otherwise would be able to about, or yielding a greater understanding of, the physical world. Mathematical objects to not need to exist for mathematical language to play this role. This proposal puts a normative constraint on our use of mathematical language: we ought to use mathematically presented theories to express belief only in the consequences they have for non-mathematical things. In Part II, I will argue that what the normative proposal recommends is in fact what people generally do in both pure and applied mathematical contexts. I motivate this claim by showing that it is predicted by our best general means of analysing natural language. I provide a semantic theory of applied arithmetical sentences and show that they do not purport to refer to numbers, as well as a pragmatic theory for pure mathematical language use which shows that pure mathematical utterances do not typically communicate content that implies the existence of mathematical objects. In conclusion, I show the hermeneutic fictionalist position that emerges is preferable to any alternative which interprets mathematical discourse as aimed at describing a domain of independently existing abstract mathematical objects.

La ecología es una ciencia importante, tanto desde el punto de vista práctico como desde el teórico, que recientemente a comenzado a atraer la atención de los filósofos profesionales. Con todo, la investigación sobre los fundamentos filosóficos de la ecología, en particular sobre sus prácticas explicativas, está aún poco desarrollada; y ello pese a que los propios ecólogos perciben que el debate sobre la explicación ecológica es importante. En esta tesis doctoral comparo las principales tesis ontológicas y epistemológicas de tres proyectos filosóficos que ofrecen un análisis de la explicación científica en términos de mecanismos, con la descripción de dos casos de explicación en ecología basados en mecanismos, tal como los entienden los ecólogos, los mecanismos de facilitación y la competencia ecológicas. Los ejemplos que analizo aquí provienen del campo de la sucesión ecológica, aunque tanto la facilitación como la competencia son interacciones muy extendidas en todo el ámbito de la ecología. Sobre la base de mi análisis, sostengo que si bien las contribuciones epistemológicas que los proyectos filosóficos estudiados han realizado al debate de la explicación científica son importantes, pero que aún hay mucho espacio para mejorar la caracterización de la naturaleza de los mecanismos ecológicos y de la explicación mecanísmica en ecología. Basado en el trabajo previo del filósofo sistemista Mario Bunge, propongo que los mecanismos ecológicos son procesos específicos que ocurren en sistemas y que las explicaciones mecanísmicas en ecología pueden asumir diversas formas, pero que consisten en descripciones de esos procesos en el marco de la descripción más general del sistema de interés.
Ecology is a science of practical and theoretical importance that has recently begun to appeal to professional philosophers. Yet, work on the philosophical foundations of ecology, particularly on its explanatory practices, is still scarce, even though ecologists perceive the debate on ecological explanation as an important one. In this dissertation, I contrast the main theses of three different philosophical projects that attempt to account for scientific explanation in terms of mechanisms descriptions with two cases of ecological explanation based on mechanisms, as ecologists understand the term: the mechanisms of ecological facilitation and competition. The examples I study come from the subfield of ecological succession, though both facilitation and competition are widespread along the whole of ecology. Based on my analysis of those cases I argue that those projects have contributed important elements to the ontology and epistemology of scientific explanation, but that there is still room for improvement towards an adequate characterization of the precise nature of ecological mechanisms and mechanismic explanation in ecology. Following the lead of previous work by systemist philosopher Mario Bunge, I suggest that ecological mechanisms are specific processes in systems, and that, even though they may take different forms, mechanismic explanations consist in descriptions of those processes in the context of a description of the system of interest.

Master of Arts
Department of Economics
Peri da Silva
Economists use various models to explain why it is that firms are capable of pricing above marginal cost. In this paper, we will examine two of them: the Cournot and Bertrand duopoly models. Economists generally accept both models as good explanations of the phenomenon, but the two models contradict each other in various important ways. The puzzle is that two inconsistent explanations are both regarded as good explanations for the same phenomenon. This becomes especially worrisome when the two models are offering divergent policy recommendations. This report presents that puzzle by laying out how the two models contradict each other in a myriad of ways and then offers five possible solutions to that puzzle from various economists, philosophers of science, and philosophers of economics.

While the search for models and explanations of cognitive phenomena is a growing area of research, there is no consensus on what counts as a good explanation in cognitive science. This Ph.D. thesis offers a philosophical exploration of the different frameworks adopted to explain cognitive behaviour. It then builds on this systematic exploration to offer a new understanding of the explanatory standards employed in the construction and justification of models and modelling frameworks in cognitive science. Sub-goals of the project include a better understanding of some theoretical terms adopted in cognitive science and a deep analysis of the role of representation in explanations of cognitive phenomena. Results of this project can advance the debate on issues in general philosophy of cognitive science and be valuable for guiding future scientific and cognitive research. In particular, the goals of the thesis are twofold: (i) to provide some necessary desiderata that genuine explanations in cognitive science need to meet; (ii) to identify the framework that is most apt to generate such good explanations. With reference to the first goal, I claim that a good explanation needs to provide predictions and descriptions of mechanisms. With regards to the second goal, I argue that the neurocomputational framework can meet these two desiderata. In order to articulate the first claim, I discuss various possible desiderata of good explanations and I motivate why the ability to predict and to identify mechanisms are necessary features of good explanations in cognitive science. In particular, I claim that a good explanation should advance our understanding of the cognitive phenomenon under study, together with providing a clear specification of the components and their interactions that regularly bring the phenomenon about. I motivate the second claim by examining various frameworks employed to explain cognitive phenomena: the folk-psychological, the anti-representational, the solely subpersonal and the neurocomputational frameworks. I criticise the folk-psychological framework for meeting only the predictive criterion and I stress the inadequacy of its account of cause and causal explanation by engaging with James Woodward’s manipulationist theory of causation and causal explanation. By examining the anti-representational framework, I claim that the notion of representation is necessary to predict and to generalise cognitive phenomena. I reach the same conclusion by engaging with William Ramsey (2007) and Jose Luis Bermudez (2003). I then analyse the solely subpersonal framework and I argue that certain personal-level concepts are indeed required to successfully explain cognitive behaviour. Finally, I introduce the neurocomputational framework as more promising than the alternatives in explaining cognitive behaviour. I support this claim by assessing the framework’s ability to: (i) meet the two necessary criteria for good explanations; (ii) overcome some of the other frameworks’ explanatory limits. In particular, via an analysis of one of its family of models — Bayesian models — I argue that the neurocomputational framework can suggest a more adequate notion of representation, shed new light on the problem of how to bridge personal and subpersonal explanations, successfully meet the prediction criterion (it values predictions as a means to evaluate the goodness of an explanation) and can meet the mechanistic criterion (its model-based methodology opens up the possibility to study the nature of internal and unobservable components of cognitive phenomena).

The problem of historical explanation consists in how historical facts are put together. No mere collection of facts constitutes an explanation: there must be some underlying explanation for why those facts occurred in the way they did. Many competing theories of historical explanation have thus been offered, from the highly technical D-N or covering law model, to narrative-based explanations. This paper exposes the flaws in the covering law model proposed by Carl Hempel, and offers a justification for narrative-based explanations by appealing to the notion of language games as used by Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as the narrative and paradigm models of Arthur Danto and Thomas Kuhn for explaining historical events.
Master of Arts

My dissertation focuses on mathematical explanation found in proofs looked at from a historical point of view, while stressing the importance of mathematical practices. Current philosophical theories on explanatory proofs emphasize the structure and content of proofs without any regard to external factors that influence a proof’s explanatory power. As a result, the major philosophical views have been shown to be inadequate in capturing general aspects of explanation. I argue that, in addition to form and content, a proof’s explanatory power depends on its targeted audience. History is useful here, because from it, we are able to follow the transition from a first-generation proof, which is usually non-explanatory, into its explanatory version. By tracking the similarities and differences between these proofs, we are able to gain a better understanding of what makes a proof explanatory according to mathematicians who have the relevant background to evaluate it as so. My first chapter discusses why history is important for understanding mathematical practices. I describe two kinds of history: one that presents a narrative of events, which influenced developments in mathematics both directly and indirectly, and another, typically used in mathematical research, which concentrates only on technical developments. I contend that both versions of the past benefit the philosopher. History used in research gives us an idea of what mathematicians desire or find to be important, while history written by historians shows us what effects these have on mathematical practices. The next two chapters are about explanatory proofs. My second chapter examines the main theories of mathematical explanation. I argue that these theories are short-sighted as they only consider what appears in a proof without considering the proof’s purported audience or background knowledge necessary to understand the proof. In the third chapter, I propose an alternative way of analyzing explanatory proofs. Here, I suggest looking at a theorem’s history, which includes its successive proofs, as well as the mathematicians who wrote them. From this, we can better understand how and why mathematicians prove theorems in multiple ways, which depends on the purposes of these theorems. The last chapter is a case study on the computer proof of the Four Color Theorem by Appel and Haken. Here, I compare and contrast what philosophers and mathematicians have had to say about the proof. I argue that the main philosophical worry regarding the theorem—its unsurveyability—did not make a strong impact on the mathematical community and would have hindered mathematical development in computer-assisted proofs. By studying the history of the theorem, we learn that Appel and Haken relied on the strategy of Kempe’s flawed proof from the 1800s (which, obviously, did not involve a computer). Two later proofs, also aided by computer, were developed using similar methods. None of these proofs are explanatory, but not because of their massive lengths. Rather, the methods used in these proofs are a series of calculations that exhaust all possible configurations of maps.

In this dissertation I consider the problem of external world skepticism and attempts at providing an argument to the best explanation against it. In chapter one I consider several different ways of formulating the crucial skeptical argument, settling on an argument that centers on the question of whether we're justified in believing propositions about the external world. I then consider and reject several options for getting around this issue which I take to be inadequate. I finally conclude that the best option available to us at the moment is to argue that the antiskeptical view is the best explanation of our ordinary experiences In chapter two I argue that, if we hope to ground what counts as defending antiskepticism in common sense, there is an argument against the possibility of ever knowing one has succeeded in defending antiskepticism. After showing that common sense is no place to look in setting a goal for our antiskeptical project, I present the view that what will be crucial to settling on our antiskeptical goal is coming to a successful analysis of the nature of physical objects. I suggest some minimal criteria that must be met by a view in order to be antiskeptical based on our intuitions about core skeptical cases, but acknowledge that a fully successful response to external world skepticism will require the antiskeptic to engage in some much more difficult analysis. In chapter three I consider various views of the nature of explanation and conclude, tentatively, that explanation as it interests the antiskeptic is fundamentally causal. In chapter four I consider and reject some of the core views on which best explanation facts are so fundamental that a project of attempting to vindicate probabilistically the virtues which make explanations epistemically good. In this chapter I show that views which analyze justification in terms of best explanation factors fail. In chapter five I attempt to vindicate the various explanatory virtues probabilistically. In doing so I attempt to express or translate the various explanatory virtues in terms of probabilities in order to show that having those virtues makes a view at least prima facie more probable. In chapters six and seven I explain and evaluate the various arguments to the best explanation against skepticism present in current philosophical literature. I attempt to show that extant arguments fail to appreciate the virtues possessed by classical (and some new) skeptical scenarios. In chapter eight I briefly consider some options that may be open to the antiskeptic moving forward. All routes forward contain considerable obstacles, but there are some fruitful areas of research to pursue.

My dissertation studies three problems that threaten our functional explanatory practices. The first study, The Normativity Problem and Theories of Biological Function, attempts to explain how it is that biological tokens can perform their functions better or worse, and can retain their functions even when not currently performing them. Etiological theories can try to account for the normativity of functions by cumulative selection or by their contributions to fitness. I argue that neither strategy succeeds. Systemic theories hold that functions are the causal contributions of systemic components to the overall capacities of their containing systems. At first glance, systemic theories do not explain the normativity of functions either. I argue that adding a feedback condition to systemic theories can account for the normativity of functions. The second study, The Malfunction Problem and the Functional Individuation of Biological Traits, attempts to dissolve an apparent paradox about how, if biological traits are functionally individuated, it is possible for an organism to possess a biological trait that malfunctions. The malfunction problem articulates the apparent paradox: A ‘malfunctioning’ trait token seems to no longer belong to its functional type and hence cannot malfunction. I show that distinguishing between the functional type that a token instantiates and the current performance of its function dissolves the paradox. The third study, The Necessitation Problem and the Causal Relevance of Functional Properties, attempts to address a vacuity worry about causal explanation that seems to arise when a property referred to by a causal explanation is individuated by its very effects. Since functional properties are individuated by their functions, and functions are effects, it is hard to see how the ascription of functional properties can play an explanatory role. For the relevant explanations seem to be vacuous: the property that purportedly explains the effect is just the property of having that very effect. I argue that causally relevant functional properties are individuated by historical effects, whereas the effects that they causally explain are current. Since the effects individuating causally relevant properties are distinct from the effects that are causally explained, the vacuity worry does not arise.
Philosophy

In Chapter One, an historical survey will provide a history of beauty as natural theology, beginning with Plato and extending to the mid-twentieth century. This historical research should provide context critical to the development of the argument.

In Chapter Two, the contemporary argument from beauty will be surveyed, but unlike Chapter One, analysis will be through depth and not in breadth. Two contemporary arguments from beauty will be exposited and evaluated: C. S. Lewis’s argument from the aesthetic experience of longing, and the fine-tuning argument of Robin Collins, in which he argues for objective beauty in the universe, with God as the first-cause. Following the analysis of both arguments, there will be a general evaluative summary giving perspective on the combined research of chapters one and two and identifying key elements to be incorporated into the argument from beauty as it is developed.

In Chapter Three, focus will turn to structural elements of the argument. Here, the structure and rationale of abductive arguments will be explained, and the elements of an Inference to the Best Explanation will be delineated. Finally, the criteria that will determine the best explanation will be established, and an outline given that will forecast the argument to follow.

In Chapter Four, descriptive clarity will be given to the two hypotheses and the facts of beauty that require an explanation. First, the two explanatory hypotheses, theism and philosophical naturalism, will be plainly set out. In this context, the various evolutionary accounts of beauty that constitute philosophical naturalism will be explained. These include: natural selection, sexual selection, biophilia hypothesis, null theory, spandrel hypothesis, and social cohesion. Second, the facts of beauty will be identified, categorized, and adumbrated. The facts of beauty that will be explored are: cosmological facts, moral facts, existential facts, epistemological facts, and axiological facts.

In Chapter Five, the explanations of theism and philosophical naturalism will be elaborated and evaluated. This preliminary evaluation will set the stage for the final evaluation. After considering the explanations for each of the facts of beauty, the final evaluation will involve the inference to the best explanation based upon the explanatory criteria.

Chapter Six will be a review of the research, a summary of the argument, and a reiteration of theism as the best explanation for beauty. Lastly, general consideration will be given to possible directions for future research and arguments from beauty.

The main aim of my work - "Matter and Explanation. On Aristotle's Metaphysics Book Η" - is to show the argumentative unity of Book Η (VIII), which has been usually regarded as a mere collection of appendices to the previous Book Ζ. In my thesis I take on the main suggestion provided by M. Burnyeat in "A Map of Metaphysics Ζ" (2001). According to Burnyeat, Η accomplishes the enquiry of Ζ by developing Ζ17's fresh start into the analysis of sensible substances. Starting from Ζ17, Aristotle regards the notion of substance in its explanatory role as "principle and cause" and, as a consequence, he searches for "the cause by reason of which a certain matter is some definite thing". Burnyeat's suggestion has been so far followed in order to look at Η as at that place where this search is accomplished. Thus, Η would play a didactical-expository role. In my work I aim at showing how in Book Η Aristotle does not confine himself to a mere exposition of the previous outcomes. By contrast, he provides a deep revision of the status of matter's substancehood. Namely of that ontological subject whose organization must be explained. Such a revision concerns those criteria, which in Book Ζ have provided a deflationary reading of the notion of ὕλη. On the contrary, in Η matter is read as subject of physical changes and in its dispositional role within the biological wholes. Such a framework is accomplished in Η6, where Aristotle shows the explanatory primacy of his own hylomorphism over the Platonic Doctrine of Forms.

Thesis (MMus (Music))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study concerns the widespread phenomenon that music is perceived as meaningful to the listener in some sense. The study adopts a style of conceptual clarification and investigation that is current in the analytic philosophy of language, and is further informed by recent research into the fundamental biology of human musicality, which suggests that musicality and language are neurologically related. The problem of musical meaning is approached as a problem of communicative behaviour, and is hence conceptually related to the concept of meaningfulness in the various modalities of linguistic communication. ‘Communication’ is defined in terms of the intended consequences of communicative acts – that is, a communicative act is an attempt on the behalf of the utterer to cause some sort of change in the listener’s mental states. From this premise, meaning in both musical and linguistic acts is defined in terms the mental states elicited in the mind of the listener. Two classes of mental state are identified: cognitive states, which are propositional in nature; and affective states, which are essentially nonpropositional. It is proposed that meaning in both music and language (as well as in other communicative acts) can be explained in terms of the elicitation of these classes of mental states in the minds of competent listeners, and that in any linguistic or musical act, a competent listener will entertain a composite of these mental states that will be perceived as meaning. The mechanisms responsible for the elicitation of these states are discussed, and it is concluded that the causal powers of the communicative act, as it is represented in the mind, are responsible for the elicitation of these mental states. Directly causal means are responsible for affective states: there is a relationship of direct causation between relevant features of the communicative act, as represented in the mind, and affective states. Affective states are nonpropositional, in that they cannot be subjected to deductive or propositional operations in the mind. By virtue of their being non-propositional, such states are also considered to be beyond verbal explication (‘ineffable’). Cognitive states, on the other hand, are propositional in nature. The mechanisms by which they are realised are complex in terms of propositional computation: the relevant propositional features of the communicative act, as represented in the mind of the listener, undergo manipulation by mental processes (for instance, the computational system for linguistic syntax). Cognitive states are expressible in propositional terms, and are hence expressible in language. Whereas linguistic communication is efficacious for the elicitation of cognitive states, musical utterances tend to elicit affective states to a far greater degree. Furthermore, whereas the syntax of language aids communication in the facilitation of semantics, the syntactic dimension of music is principally a means of implementing affective states in the listener. Therefore, any explanation of musical meaning must take the syntactical dimension of music into account. It is also argued that there are features of performance common to both language (in its spoken modality) and musical utterances that serve to elicit affective states.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie ondersoek die verskynsel dat musiek deur die meeste luisteraars as betekenisvol ervaar word. ’n Styl van konseptuele verduideliking en ondersoek word gebruik wat eie is aan die analitiese filosofie van taal. Terselfdertyd word die jongste navorsing op die gebied van die fundamentele biologie van menslike musikaliteit in aanmerking geneem, wat suggereer dat taal en musikale vermoë neurologies met mekaar verwant is. Die probleem van betekenis in musiek word as ʼn probleem van kommunikatiewe gedrag benader, en is dus konseptueel verbind aan die konsep van betekenisvolheid in die verskeie modaliteite van kommunikasie deur middel van taal. ‘Kommunikasie’ word in terme van die geïntendeerde uitkomste van kommunikatiewe aksies/dade gedefinieer. Met ander woorde, ʼn kommunikatiewe aksie/daad is ʼn poging deur die spreker om uiteindelik ʼn verandering in die geestesgesteldheid (‘mental state’) van die luisteraar teweeg te bring. Op hierdie basis word twee tipes geestesgesteldheid onderskei: ʼn kognitiewe gesteldheid, wat proposisioneel van aard is, en ʼn affektiewe gesteldheid, wat nie-proposisioneel is. Daar word voorgestel dat betekenis in beide musiek en taal, soos ook in ander vorme van kommunikasie, verduidelik kan word as die belewenis van sodanige geestesgesteldhede aan die kant van die bedrewe luisteraar. Dit impliseer dat die betekenis van enige uiting in taal of musiek as ʼn bepaalde kombinasie van hierdie twee geestesgesteldhede deur die bedrewe luisteraar ervaar word. Die meganismes wat hierdie geestesgesteldhede ontlok word bespreek, en die gevolgtrekking word gemaak dat dit die kousale mag van die kommunikatiewe daad is, soos dit in die bewussyn (‘mind’) neerslag vind, wat hierdie twee tipes geestesgesteldheid ontlok. Daar word beweer dat ʼn proses van direkte kousaliteit verantwoordelik is vir ʼn affektiewe gesteldheid: daar is ’n oorsaaklike verhouding tussen die onderskeie kenmerke van die kommunikatiewe daad, soos dit in die bewussyn voorgestel word, en die uiteindelike affektiewe geestesgesteldheid. ʼn Affektiewe geestesgesteldheid is nie-proposisioneel omdat dit nie in terme van deduktiewe of proposisionele prosesse in die bewussyn verstaan kan word nie. Omdat dit nie-proposisioneel is word die kenmerke van hierdie affektiewe geestesgesteldheid as onsegbaar (‘ineffable’) deur die luisteraar beleef. Daarteenoor is ʼn kognitiewe geestesgesteldheid proposisioneel van aard. Die meganismes wat veroorsaak dat hierdie geestesgesteldheid gerealiseer word is kompleks: die onderskeie kenmerke van die kommunikatiewe daad, soos dit in die bewussyn van die luisteraar voorgestel word, ondergaan manipulasie deur denkprosesse wat proposisioneel van aard is (bv., die denkproses wat die sintaktiese dimensie van taal moet verwerk). ʼn Kognitiewe geestesgesteldheid kan in proposisionele terme weergegee en gevolglik in taal verwoord word. Terwyl kommunikasie deur middel van taal effektief is om ʼn kognitiewe geestesgesteldheid te ontlok, is musikale uitdrukking veel eerder geskik om ʼn affektiewe geestesgesteldheid te ontlok. Verder, terwyl die sintaksis van taal bydra tot verwesenliking van semantiese betekenis, dra die sintaktiese dimensie van musiek eerder daartoe by om ʼn affektiewe geestesgesteldheid by die luisteraar te vestig. Dus moet elke verduideliking van musikale betekenis die sintaktiese dimensie van musiek in aanmerking neem. Verder word beweer dat daar algemene kenmerke in sowel taal (in die gesproke modaliteit) as musiek voorkom wat spesifiek ʼn affektiewe geestesgesteldheid tot stand bring.

This thesis presents a defense of the view that externalism cannot be a theoretical basis of a mentalistic causal-explanatory science, even though such a theoretical basis is implicitly or explicitly adopted by many cognitive scientists. Externalism is a theory in philosophy of mind which states that mental properties are relations between the core realizers of an individual&rsquo
s mental states (such as brain states) and certain things that exist outside those realizers (such as what the content of a mental state corresponds to in the actual world.) After clarifications regarding the term &ldquo
externalism&rdquo
and reviewing the history and the various forms of the externalist theory, it is argued that the properties offered by externalist theories as mental properties have no causal influence on behavior, and therefore cannot causally explain it. The argument is largely based on a method of comparing the causal powers of entities which are identical in all respects except their mental properties (as construed by externalism), and the conclusions are supported by metaphysical reflections on causation, dispositions, relational properties and historical properties. Objections to the defended view are considered and refuted. The thesis is written in the style of modern analytic philosophy.