Journal articles: 'Phenomenology of Perception'

1

Mooney, Timothy. "Phenomenology of Perception." International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20, no. 4 (October 2012): 589–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2012.714262.

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Montague, Michelle. "Perception and cognitive phenomenology." Philosophical Studies 174, no. 8 (September 27, 2016): 2045–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0787-z.

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Wertheimer, Michael, Michotte, Georges Thines, Alan Costall, and George Butterworth. "Michotte's Experimental Phenomenology of Perception." American Journal of Psychology 107, no. 2 (1994): 275. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1423041.

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Bermudez, Jose Luis. "The Phenomenology of Bodily Perception." Theoria et Historia Scientiarum 7, no. 1 (January 2, 2007): 43. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/ths.2003.003.

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Gallagher, Shaun. "Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception." Topoi 29, no. 2 (May 9, 2010): 183–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-010-9079-y.

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Markiewicz, Piotr. "Naturalistic Limits of Phenomenology of Perception." Dialogue and Universalism 18, no. 7 (2008): 137–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/du2008187/859.

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Summa, Michela. "Enacting perception: the relevance of phenomenology." PARADIGMI, no. 2 (October 2014): 97–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/para2014-002006.

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Weiner, Scott E. ""Inhabiting" in the Phenomenology of Perception." Philosophy Today 34, no. 4 (1990): 342–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday19903446.

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Loomis, Jack M. "Visual space perception: phenomenology and function." Arquivos Brasileiros de Oftalmologia 66, no. 5 (September 2003): 26–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0004-27492003000600004.

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Lutgens, Brian, and Richard Rojcewicz. "A Genetic (Psychological) Phenomenology of Perception." Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 27, no. 2 (1996): 117–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156916296x00078.

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AbstractThis paper focuses on the concept of the "intentional arc" in Merleau-Ponty, who maintains that perception comes into play within, and is nourished by, an already established relation between the person and the world. That obscure relation, the intentional arc, is the "genesis" of perception, and this paper argues that in it resides the proper theme of a psychological phenomenology of perception. A study of the intentional arc shows that perception is not a passive, causal, impersonal process. On the contrary, perception is active in that it requires the perceiver's free consent to the solicitations stemming from the world; it is thus only motivated or beckoned, but not caused; and it rests on a personal foundation, which is to say that it depends on the entire psychological life of the perceiver. A subsequent paper will enrich and develop the implications of this thesis by taking up the phenomenology of hallucinations.

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Houston, Christopher. "Why social scientists still need phenomenology." Thesis Eleven 168, no. 1 (December 8, 2021): 37–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/07255136211064326.

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Pierre Bourdieu famously dismissed phenomenology as offering anything useful to a critical science of society – even as he drew heavily upon its themes in his own work. This paper makes a case for why Bourdieu’s judgement should not be the last word on phenomenology. To do so it first reanimates phenomenology’s evocative language and concepts to illustrate their continuing centrality to social scientists’ ambitions to apprehend human engagement with the world. Part II shows how two crucial insights of phenomenology, its discovery of both the natural attitude and of the phenomenological epoche, allow an account of perception properly responsive to its intertwined personal and collective aspects. Contra Bourdieu, the paper’s third section asserts that phenomenology’s substantive socio-cultural analysis simultaneously entails methodological consequences for the social scientist, reversing their suspension of disbelief vis-à-vis the life-worlds of interlocutors and inaugurating the suspension of belief vis-à-vis their own natural attitudes.

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Fish, William. "Naïve realism and the phenomenology of perception and memory." Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences 43, no. 3 (March 17, 2022): e61023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4025/actascihumansoc.v43i3.61023.

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In this paper, I begin to explore what a naïve realist might say about the phenomenology of episodic memory. I start by arguing that, when it comes to accounting for the phenomenology of memory experiences, there are two primary options available to the naïve realist: to treat memory phenomenology along the same lines as perceptual phenomenology – as involving phenomenal character that is grounded in acquaintance with the external environment – or to treat memory as lacking such acquaintance-based phenomenal character, and then attempting to account for there being something it is like to remember as being somehow inherited from cases that do have phenomenal character. I then explore the prospects of providing an account of the phenomenology of episodic memory in both ways, before tentatively coming down in favour of the latter approach

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Hilaire, Ngoma Tassoulou. "Metaphysical Principles of the Science of Nature and Phenomenology in Emmanuel Kant." Journal of Advances in Education and Philosophy 6, no. 10 (October 21, 2022): 511–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.36348/jaep.2022.v06i10.002.

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This article, which shows the relationship between the metaphysical principles of natural science and phenomenology, shows precisely how Immanuel Kant, through these principles, contributed to the establishment of the phenomenology of perception. Thus, this article which first shows how Immanuel Kant was able to interpret and understand nature from its metaphysical principles, shows precisely and finally how the phenomenology of perception only became possible through the understanding of its principles. This is why the article then shows how these metaphysical principles of natural science are set up as the condition of possibility of the phenomenology of perception in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.

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Wallner, Michael. "Is Perception Essentially Perspectival?" History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 24, no. 2 (October 26, 2021): 351–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-bja10052.

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Abstract Husserl famously argues that it is essential to perception to present the perceived object in perspectives. Hence, there is no – and there cannot be – perception without perspectival givenness. Yet, it seems that there are counterexamples to this essentialist claim, for we seem to be able to imagine beings that do not perceive in perspectives. Recently, there have been some accounts in the literature that critically discuss those counterexamples and assess to what extent they succeed in challenging Husserl’s essentialist claim. In this paper I discuss three different answers to these counterexamples, all of them are found wanting. I offer a novel solution, taking into account some crucial findings of the contemporary debate about imagination and modality. I argue that this new solution is capable of fully vindicating Husserl’s essentialist claim. Finally, I reconstruct Husserl’s own way to treat such counterexamples, in order to showcase the notion of modality Husserlian phenomenology relies on. I argue for the hitherto widely underappreciated point that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology cannot appeal to strictly absolute modality but that the kind of modality in Husserlian phenomenology is conditional on the facticity that we have the transcendental structure we do in fact have.

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Fatonah, Nurul. "TEACHER'S PERCEPTION OF ENGLISH LEARNING FOR CHILDHOOD." Aulada : Jurnal Pendidikan dan Perkembangan Anak 3, no. 2 (February 1, 2022): 127–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.31538/aulada.v3i2.1752.

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This research will investigate about teacher’s perception of English learning for childhood. This research is conducted in four kindergartens in Garut with the teacher as the subject. This research aims in digging teacher’s perception of the English learning. This research will use phenomenology research with descriptive interpretation towards English learning phenomenon. In this phenomenology research, the researcher describes nature based experience. The data were collected by interview, observation, and note of the field. Then the data were analyzed through the steps of phenomenology data analysis. The result showed that English is a necessary for Indonesian society. It happens because of globalization claim. In the application, English learning that has been done in kindergarten through song, greeting, or simple instruction and environment labeling by English language.

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Moshaver, Maryam A. "Telos and Temporality: Phenomenology and the Experience of Time in Lewin's Study of Perception." Journal of the American Musicological Society 65, no. 1 (2012): 179–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jams.2012.65.1.179.

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Abstract In his 1986 essay on the intersections between music theory, phenomenology, and perception, David Lewin develops a heuristic model through which to come to terms with the constitution of multiple and heterogeneous perceptions of musical events. One of his principal vehicles for demonstrating this phenomenological turn is the well-known analysis of Schubert's “Morgengruß.” The present article considers the ramifications of Lewin's methodology, particularly with respect to the experience of time that emerges from Lewin's mobilization of the heuristic perception model, by approaching it from the perspective of Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness. This perspective reveals a superposition of temporalities as well as a superposition of languages as the underlying factors through which Lewin's analysis is produced.

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Bermúdez, José Luis. "Cognitive impenetrability, phenomenology, and nonconceptual content." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, no. 3 (June 1999): 367–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x99232025.

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This commentary discusses Pylyshyn's model of perceptual processing in the light of the philosophical distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual content of perception. Pylyshyn's processing distinction maps onto an important distinction in the phenomenology of visual perception.

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Lewin, David. "Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception." Music Perception 3, no. 4 (1986): 327–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/40285344.

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Recent years have seen an increasing influence on music theory of perceptual investigations that can be called phenomenological in the sense of Husserl, either explicitly or implicitly. The trend is problematic, particularly in what one might call its sociology, but it is also very promising. Potential or at least metaphorical links with Artificial Intelligence are especially suggestive. A formal model for "musical perceptions," incorporating some of the promising features, reveals interesting things in connection with Schubert's song Morgengruβ. The model helps to circumvent some traditional difficulties in the methodology of music analysis. But the model must be used with caution since, like other perceptual theories, it appears to make " listening" a paradigmatic musical activity. Composer/ performer/playwright/actor/director/poet can be contrasted here to listener/reader. The two genera can be compared in the usual ways, but also in some not-so-usual ways. The former genus may be held to be perceiving in the creative act, and some influential contemporary literary theories actually prefer members of this genus to those of the other as perceivers. The theories can be modified, I believe, to allow a more universal stance that also regards acts of analytic reading/listening as poetry.

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19

Low, Douglas. "Merleau-Ponty’s Criticism of Phenomenology of Perception." International Studies in Philosophy 34, no. 1 (2002): 81–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil200234157.

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Duplinskya, Yu M. "Phenomenology of Multilayered Perception: Infrapersonal and Ultrapersonal." Philosophy. Psychology. Pedagogy 17, no. 2 (2017): 146–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.18500/1819-7671-2017-17-2-146-151.

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21

Barrett, Cyril. "Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of Perception." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 21 (March 1987): 123–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100003520.

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It is over forty years since Merleau-Ponty published his first major work, Le structure de comportement (‘The Structure of Behaviour’) (1942) and a quarter of a century since he died. He belongs, therefore, with Sartre and Marcel, to the first post-War generation of French philosophers. Like his friend Sartre's, his philosophy may be regarded as dated, passé, of no interest or relevance to truly contemporary thought. In philosophical terms forty years are nothing; in terms of trends, fashions and novelties they are an eternity. But perhaps the work of Merleau-Ponty has not dated because it was never in vogue. He did not write plays and novels, or take part in political demonstrations, though he was involved in politics, or win a Nobel prize and refuse to receive it. He was very much a philosopher's philosopher, eminent in his field, well known in academic circles in France but hardly a household name. In this country he is hardly known even in philosophical circles, except by name. More is the pity, since his philosophical approach and manner of philosophizing have much in common with certain modes of British philosophizing, as I hope to show.

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Barrett, Cyril. "Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of Perception." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 21 (March 1987): 123–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00003527.

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It is over forty years since Merleau-Ponty published his first major work, Le structure de comportement (‘The Structure of Behaviour’) (1942) and a quarter of a century since he died. He belongs, therefore, with Sartre and Marcel, to the first post-War generation of French philosophers. Like his friend Sartre's, his philosophy may be regarded as dated, passé, of no interest or relevance to truly contemporary thought. In philosophical terms forty years are nothing; in terms of trends, fashions and novelties they are an eternity. But perhaps the work of Merleau-Ponty has not dated because it was never in vogue. He did not write plays and novels, or take part in political demonstrations, though he was involved in politics, or win a Nobel prize and refuse to receive it. He was very much a philosopher's philosopher, eminent in his field, well known in academic circles in France but hardly a household name. In this country he is hardly known even in philosophical circles, except by name. More is the pity, since his philosophical approach and manner of philosophizing have much in common with certain modes of British philosophizing, as I hope to show.

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Christian Coseru. "Buddhist ‘Foundationalism’ and the Phenomenology of Perception." Philosophy East and West 59, no. 4 (2009): 409–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/pew.0.0078.

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McClamrock, Ron. "Visual Consciousness and The Phenomenology of Perception." Metaphilosophy 44, no. 1-2 (January 2013): 63–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/meta.12010.

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Zhu, Kaiying. "Merleau-Ponty—The Phenomenology of Perception, Empiricism and Intellectualism." Learning & Education 9, no. 3 (December 29, 2020): 118. http://dx.doi.org/10.18282/l-e.v9i3.1595.

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Maurice Merleau-Ponty was a French philosopher—a leading figure in existentialism and phenomenology, his philosophy of phenomenology mainly focused on the relation between the body and the mind. Yet Merleau-Ponty’s theory differs from empiricism and rationalism, it is a position in between them yet he criticized both empiricism and intellectualism. Drawing from both empiricism and intellectualism, he tried to overcome the shortcomings of them. This essay explains his argument for the primacy of perception and body and identifies the differences between Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, empiricism and intellectualism.

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Dong, Le. "Unification or Differentiation?" Idealistic Studies 50, no. 2 (2020): 169–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies2020825117.

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In this article, I argue that Merleau-Ponty underpins an idea of differentiation without ultimate unification through intertwining. I trace this idea of intertwining to Phenomenology of Perception. I argue that what perception marks is already differentiation prior to any identification. For this purpose, firstly, I will introduce Merleau-Ponty’s depiction of intertwining; secondly, I will elaborate perception in Phenomenology of Perception; finally, I will discuss flesh as intertwining in The Visible and The Invisible.

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Zhang, Wie. "An introduction to Scheler’s Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity." Phänomenologische Forschungen 2017, no. 1 (2017): 117–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000107751.

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The phenomenological reflection of „deception“ and „self-deception“ occupies a central place in Max Scheler’s whole phenomenological period. In contrast with „self-givenness“, „deception“ essentially means an inappropriate way of givenness, and „self-deception“ indicates an inappropriate way of givenness of the „self“. Based on the further criticisms and reflections on F. Brentano’s and E. Husserl’s related thoughts, Scheler distinguished „self-perception“ from „inner perception“, and attributed the primordial position to the „inner perception of the other“ via criticizing the „deception of self-perception“. He then obtained an account of a truly primary way of grasping the other, namely, the primary „self-givenness“ of „the other’s person“. This contributes to the possibility of Scheler’s „phenomenology of intersubjectivity“. In this paper, I will argue that Scheler’s phenomenological criticism of „self-deception“ and his phenomenological analysis of „inner perception of the other“ function as an „introduction“ to his „phenomenology of intersubjectivity“.

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Gergel, Tania L. "Illness perception, time perception and phenomenology - an extended response to Borrett." Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 19, no. 3 (May 21, 2013): 501–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jep.12047.

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Mellor, C. S. "Delusional Perception." British Journal of Psychiatry 159, S14 (November 1991): 104–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/s0007125000296578.

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This paper reviews the phenomenology of delusional perception and discusses its differentiation from similar phenomena, its diagnostic value, and its pathogenesis. The study of delusional perception is of particular interest, because, unlike other delusions, its identification rests on form as well as content. Also, it is one of the first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia, and its mode of onset, which is an important part of the phenomenon, may help us to understand how other delusions develop.

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Richmond, Sheldon. "Manuel DeLanda. "Materialist Phenomenology: A Philosophy of Perception"." Philosophy in Review 42, no. 2 (June 9, 2022): 4–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1089696ar.

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Seth, Anil K. "Presence, objecthood, and the phenomenology of predictive perception." Cognitive Neuroscience 6, no. 2-3 (April 7, 2015): 111–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2015.1026888.

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Wadham, Jack. "The Philosophy of Perception: Phenomenology and Image Theory." British Journal of Aesthetics 56, no. 2 (April 2016): 206–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayv011.

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Lucarelli, C. "Risk Seeking or Risk aversion? Phenomenology and Perception." International Journal of Psychophysiology 131 (October 2018): S22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2018.07.070.

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Bower, Matt. "Affectively Driven Perception: Toward a Non-representational Phenomenology." Husserl Studies 30, no. 3 (May 18, 2014): 225–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10743-014-9152-2.

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35

Martell, Timothy. "Cassirer and Husserl on the Phenomenology of Perception." Studia Phaenomenologica 15 (2015): 413–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/studphaen20151521.

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36

Fritzman, J. M. "A Guide to Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception." Teaching Philosophy 32, no. 4 (2009): 409–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil200932443.

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Alihodzic, Rifat, and Nadja Kurtovic-Folic. "Phenomenology of perception and memorizing contemporary architectural forms." Facta universitatis - series: Architecture and Civil Engineering 8, no. 4 (2010): 425–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fuace1004425a.

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Perception of an architectural form is not a unilateral act which has been often and unduly identified with mechanicistic captures of a camera. In understanding architectural composition and the way it influences our perception and memory, the knowledge regarding the field of psychology of perception and the analysis of principles of its use in architecture proved to be highly important. Instinctive understanding of perceptual processes and of laws according which our visual apparatus and memory are influenced by the architectural form and space is something that cannot be avoided. These are the operating principles of the so called "ordinary" observer; and this is an important insight for architecture as a visual discipline, which has been often neglected. As a significant addition to intuition and experience, the creative work of architects is supported by the insights on perceptual and cognitive processes which have been revealed by the psychology of perception.

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Laasik, Kristjan. "Attitudes and illusions: Herbert Leyendecker’s phenomenology of perception." Continental Philosophy Review 52, no. 3 (April 29, 2019): 279–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11007-019-09468-7.

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Bruno Riccardi. "Phenomenology of perception, from stimuli to their interpretation." World Journal of Advanced Research and Reviews 16, no. 2 (November 30, 2022): 424–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.30574/wjarr.2022.16.2.1176.

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Receptors systems are our window on the world, the tools that relate us to the outside world and allow us to orient ourselves in all the activities that are fundamental for our survival. Thanks to the receptor systems we have the awareness and consciousness of human beings and have acquired the knowledge of the world in which we live. Receptors have a fundamental role to play in the birth of culture and the science of peoples. In addition to having an informative function of environmental conditions, the receptors perform an important protective and defensive activity for the living. In fact, they have the ability to make us recognize useful substances from harmful ones based on their organoleptic characteristics, color, smell, flavor, favoring the consumption of the first, preventing that of the second. They also form a second protective barrier at the level of the cell membrane by selecting the entry of unnecessary and potentially harmful substances and preventing their absorption through selective cellular channels. By means of channel proteins and ion exchange proteins (for example sodium-potassium), they maintain the optimal concentration of solutes in the cell. Finally, they guide the intra and interspecific relations between all living beings, from plants to man. We owe our existence to the reception systems. In this article we are going to examine the receptor systems describing the importance they have had in the evolution of the living and we are going to critically discuss the most recent theories proposed by quantum mechanics to explain their functioning.

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Lewis, Tyson. "Studied Perception and a Phenomenology of Bodily Gesturality." Philosophy of Education 69 (2013): 341–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.47925/2013.341.

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Feron, Olivier. "Pregnância Simbólica Versus Antepredicativo: O Diálogo Entre Merleau-Ponty E Cassirer." Phainomenon 18-19, no. 1 (October 1, 2009): 227–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2009-0013.

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Abstract A fact ignored or underestimated by most of the specialist of the work and thought of Merleau-Ponty is the debt h is phenomenology of perception has to Ernst Cassirer’s own phenomenology. The articulation of an actual dialogue between the two thinkers is here anchored in Cassirer’s _concept of symbolic pregnance; which will have further development in Merleau’s Phenomenology of Perception, especially in the chapter he dedicated to the concept of expression. The elements of a possible discussion between the two concepts are here presented as a fruitful basis to renew the reflection on the Lebenswelt problematic.

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Tamari, Tomoko. "The Phenomenology of Architecture." Body & Society 23, no. 1 (December 13, 2016): 91–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1357034x16676540.

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This piece focuses on the work of Juhani Pallasmaa who introduces phenomenological aspects of kinesthetic and multisensory perception of the human body into architecture theory. He argues that hand-drawing is a vital spatial and haptic exercise in facilitating architectural design. Through this process, architecture can emerge as the very ‘material’ existence of human embodied ‘immaterial’ emotion, feelings and wisdom. Hence, for Pallasmaa, architecture can be seen as an artistic practice, which entails multisensory and embodied thought in order to establish the sense of being in the world.

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Frers, L. "Ethnografie und Aufmerksamkeit Zur phänomenologischen Perspektivierung der Feldforschung." Geographica Helvetica 67, no. 4 (March 19, 2013): 213–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5194/gh-67-213-2012.

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Abstract. This article discusses how phenomenological procedures can be used to instruct ethnographic research. Since doing ethnography in the field builds on sensory perception, a closer inspection of relevant processes of perception is necessary. Insights into the field that is studied are dependent on the manner in which it is perceived. As Waldenfels' "phenomenology of attention'' displays, the distribution of attention is of crucial importance in this context. To get to grips with the uses of phenomenology in the field, three areas of tension are explored: proximity – distance, mixture – analysis and presence – recording. These terminological pairs relate to tensions that structure experience and the play of perceptions in the field. Based on a reflection of these relations, the article offers a methodology that is characterized by mobility, openness and a continuous highlighting of how the researcher's corporal embeddedness into the field affects the distribution of attention.

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Mellor, Clive S. "Depersonalisation and Self Perception." British Journal of Psychiatry 153, S2 (1988): 15–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/s0007125000298929.

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This paper describes the phenomenology of depersonalisation and focuses upon the relationship between depersonalisation, self-perception and body image. In discussing this relationship, the influence of certain phenomenological philosophers will be considered. Theoretical discussion of depersonalisation will be limited to those theories that are relevant to the purpose of this paper. Comprehensive reviews of the wide range of theories held to explain depersonalisation have been provided by Sedman (1970) and Oberst (1983).

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Bar, Roi. "The Forgotten Phenomenology: “Enactive Perception” in the Eyes of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty." Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 28, no. 1 (June 15, 2020): 53–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2020.928.

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Phenomenology is not dead yet, at least not from the viewpoint of the “phenomenology-friendly”approach to the mind that has recently emerged in cognitive science: the “enactive approach” or “enactivism.” This approach takes the mental capacities, such as perception, consciousness and cognition, to be the result of the interaction between the brain, the body and the environment. In this, it offers an alternative to reductionist explanations of the mental in terms of brain activities, like cognitivism, especially computationalism, while overcoming the Cartesian dualism mind-world. What makes this approach so fruitful for a renewed philosophical consideration is its ongoing reference to Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenologies. It was said to be “consistent with Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on virtually every point,” to be the “revival” of phenomenology, even a “Kuhnian revolution.” Evan Thompson argues that this approach “uses phenomenology to explicate mind science and mind science to explicate phenomenology. Concepts such as lived body, organism, bodily selfhood and autonomous agency, the intentional arc and dynamic sensorimotor dependencies, can thus become mutually illuminating rather than merely correlational concepts.” The phenomenological works seem to strike a chord with the enactive theorists. Are we witnessing the dawn of “The new Science of the Mind”?

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Soto, Francisco Conde. "La Pintura De Cézanne Y La Fenomenología De La Percepción De Merleau-Ponty Como Búsqueda De La Experiencia Originaria." Phainomenon 15, no. 1 (April 1, 2008): 9–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2008-0001.

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Abstract This paper tries to clarify the coincidence between some of the main features of the characterization of perception in the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology of Perception) and the picture technique of Cézanne. Although placed in different work areas, indeed, the reflection about the perceptive act and the process of pictorical creation, there is an inspirational shared basis: Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “original experience” goes parallel to Cézanne’s understanding of the painting as a the original appearing of the things so as they should appear to a glaze that goes beyond the objectivating categories of every daily, normal perception.

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Neely, Sol. "Unsettling Experience, Perception, and Display." Screen Bodies 4, no. 1 (June 1, 2019): 19–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/screen.2019.040103.

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This Screen Shot section includes three texts—an interview and two articles—that, together, occasion an unsettling movement in the development of an Indigenous phenomenology staged upon Screen Bodies’ concern for the critical tryptic experience, perception, and display. Such phenomenology, moreover, takes shape in the spirit of an enduring and persistent Indigenous cosmopolitanism, one organized by an appeal to a pan-tribal solidarity that is also not shy about drawing from efficacious sources of critique internal to European critical traditions. Together, these texts—and the source materials that inspire them—build rich ecumenical perspectives in the service of decolonial justice and pedagogy. And while the texts included here are composed in English, each draws from and references Indigenous languages, articulating one kind of Indigenous cosmopolitanism that makes use of English as a kind of “trade language.” To stage an Indigenous phenomenology by appeal to an Indigenous cosmopolitanism, in our contemporary political moment, thus calls for critical attention attuned to the perspectives, traditions, and imaginations of what Tlingit poet and author Ernestine Hayes describes as “Indigenous intellectual authority.” In this spirit, Indigenous cosmopolitanism occasions a decolonial-critical cosmopolitanism rooted not in the secular, Habermasian cosmopolitanism of Europe but in the modalities of consciousness, the literary genius and acumen, of Indigenous oral literary traditions. In the context of such a cosmopolitanism in which everyone is variably situated, across the spectrum that divides descendants of perpetrators and victims of settler colonialism, the critical imperative becomes a decolonial one, and non-Indigenous readers are called to shed the epistemological, ontological, and political priorities that broadly characterize European analytical and continental traditions, whatever their internal debates may be. Such an imperative forces phenomenological attention not only on the macrological instantiations of settler-colonial power but also against the “micrological textures of power” that ultimately shape the inner contours of self and, thus, what becomes phenomenologically legible to individuals situated in their cultural contexts.

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Heinbokel, Timm. "From Johann to Maurice: Science and Expression in the Philosophical Praxis of Medicine." Human Studies 44, no. 4 (October 18, 2021): 559–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10746-021-09605-3.

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AbstractPhenomenology’s return to lived experience and “to the things themselves” is often contrasted with the synthesized perspective of science and its “view from nowhere.” The extensive use of neuropsychological case reports in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, however, suggests that the relationship between phenomenology and science is more complex than a sheer opposition, and a fruitful one for the praxis of medicine. Here, I propose a new reading of how Merleau-Ponty justifies his use of Adhémar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein’s reports on Johann Schneider for his phenomenology of embodied perception. I argue that for Merleau-Ponty these neuropsychological case reports represent a coherent deformation of the intercorporeally expressed existence of Schneider that through speech fall again onto the common ground of perception, thereby allowing Merleau-Ponty to understand, in the equivalent sense delivered by language, Schneider’s total being and fundamental illness. I then discuss what Merleau-Ponty’s method implies for a phenomenological praxis of medicine, and for the role of science in this praxis.

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Zimmer, Jörg. "Differenzierungen im Begriff, Gegenwart‘ bei Husserl und Merleau-Ponty." Phänomenologische Forschungen 2017, no. 1 (2017): 39–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000107747.

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In classical philosophy of time, present time mainly has been considered in its fleetingness: it is transition, in the Platonic meaning of the sudden or in the Aristotelian sense of discreet moment and isolated intensity that escapes possible perception. Through the idea of subjective constitution of time, Husserl’s phenomenology tries to spread the moment. He transcends the idea of linear and empty time in modern philosophy. Phenomenological description of time experience analyses the filled character of the moment that can be detained in the performance of consciousness. As a consequence of the temporality of consciousness, he nevertheless remains in the temporal conception of presence. The phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, however, is able to grasp the spacial meaning of presence. In his perspective of a phenomenology of perception, presence can be understood as a space surrounding the body, as a field of present things given in perception. Merleau-Ponty recovers the ancient sense of ‘praesentia’ as a fundamental concept of being in the world.

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Benedek, Zsolt. "The phenomenology of the theatrical performance." AUC INTERPRETATIONES 10, no. 2 (July 26, 2022): 187–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.14712/24646504.2022.10.

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The purpose of this article is the phenomenological description of theatrical performance throughout the revision of some of the key-concepts of Hans Thies-Lehmann’s and Erika Fischer-Lichte’s reception theories from the perspective of Marc Richir’s thought concerning the architectonical transposition of experiencing. This revision includes the Freudian concept of “evenly hovering attention” (gleichschwebende Aufmerksamkeit) that Lehmann describes as the spectator’s optimal disposition of reception, and the concept of “perceptual multistability” which in Fischer-Lichte’s theory is meant to outline the spectator’s instability in the perception of the actor and the represented character. I will rethink the phenomenalization of the above mentioned phenomena primarily by introducing Marc Richir’s thoughts concerning the primacy of phantasia over perception and his description of the experience of the sublime. I will argue that the phenomenon of theatrical performance (in several cases) can be the ground of a collectively performed act of symbolic and aesthetic Stiftung.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Phenomenology of Perception'

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