Journal articles: 'PERCEPTUAL LOOS'

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Cohen, Stewart. "Suppositional Reasoning and Perceptual Justification." Logos & Episteme 7, no. 2 (2016): 215–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20167220.

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Quarona, D., M. Raffuzzi, M. Costantini, and C. Sinigaglia. "Preventing action slows down performance in perceptual judgment." Experimental Brain Research 238, no. 12 (October 13, 2020): 2857–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00221-020-05948-y.

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Abstract Action and vision are known to be tightly coupled with each other. In a previous study, we found that repeatedly grasping an object without any visual feedback might result in a perceptual aftereffect when the object was visually presented in the context of a perceptual judgement task. In this study, we explored whether and how such an effect could be modulated by presenting the object behind a transparent barrier. Our conjecture was that if perceptual judgment relies, in part at least, on the same processes and representations as those involved in action, then one should expect to find a slowdown in judgment performance when the target object looks to be out of reach. And this was what we actually found. This indicates that not only acting upon an object but also being prevented from acting upon it can affect how the object is perceptually judged.

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Yi, Do-Joon, Nicholas B. Turk-Browne, Marvin M. Chun, and Marcia K. Johnson. "When a Thought Equals a Look: Refreshing Enhances Perceptual Memory." Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 20, no. 8 (August 2008): 1371–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2008.20094.

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Cognition constantly involves retrieving and maintaining information that is not perceptually available in the current environment. Studies on visual imagery and working memory suggest that such high-level cognition might, in part, be mediated by the revival of perceptual representations in the inferior temporal cortex. Here, we provide new support for this hypothesis, showing that reflectively accessed information can have similar consequences for subsequent perception as actual perceptual input. Participants were presented with pairs of frames in which a scene could appear, and were required to make a category judgment on the second frame. In the critical condition, a scene was presented in the first frame, but the second frame was blank. Thus, it was necessary to refresh the scene from the first frame in order to make the category judgment. Scenes were then repeated in subsequent trials to measure the effect of refreshing on functional magnetic resonance imaging repetition attenuation—a neural index of memory—in a scene-selective region of the visual cortex. Surprisingly, the refreshed scenes produced equal attenuation as scenes that had been presented twice during encoding, and more attenuation than scenes that had been presented once during encoding, but that were not refreshed. Thus, the top-down revival of a percept had a similar effect on memory as actually seeing the stimulus again. These findings indicate that high-level cognition can activate stimulus-specific representations in the ventral visual cortex, and that such top-down activation, like that from sensory stimulation, produces memorial changes that affect perceptual processing during a later encounter with the stimulus.

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McGrath, Matthew. "Looks and Perceptual Justification." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96, no. 1 (April 1, 2016): 110–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12289.

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Peebles, Graham. "Looks Indexing." Grazer Philosophische Studien 94, no. 1-2 (June 14, 2017): 138–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000006.

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Charles Travis influentially argued in “The Silence of the Senses” that the representational theory of perceptual experience is false. According to Travis, the way that things look cannot index the content of experience as the subject of the experience cannot read the content off from the way things look. This looks indexing is a central commitment of representationalism. The main thrust of Travis’ argument is that the way things look is fundamentally comparative, and this prevents the subject from reading a single content off from the way things look. If content were looks indexed, the subject would be able to do this. I argue that Travis’ argument rests on an illicit transition from an argument about the way objects look in themselves—i.e. an argument about the visible properties that they have—to a conclusion about the way that objects look to subjects in experience.

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Andersh, Jonathan, and Bérénice Mettler. "Modeling the Human Visuo-Motor System to Support Remote-Control Operation." Sensors 18, no. 9 (September 6, 2018): 2979. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s18092979.

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The working hypothesis in this project is that gaze interactions play a central role in structuring the joint control and guidance strategy of the human operator performing spatial tasks. Perceptual guidance and control is the idea that the visual and motor systems form a unified perceptuo-motor system where necessary information is naturally extracted by the visual system. As a consequence, the response of this system is constrained by the visual and motor mechanisms and these effects should manifest in the behavioral data. Modeling the perceptual processes of the human operator provides the foundation necessary for a systems-based approach to the design of control and display systems used by remotely operated vehicles. This paper investigates this hypothesis using flight tasks conducted with remotely controlled miniature rotorcraft, taking place in indoor settings that provide rich environments to investigate the key processes supporting spatial interactions. This work also applies to spatial control tasks in a range of application domains that include tele-operation, gaming, and virtual reality. The human-in-the-loop system combines the dynamics of the vehicle, environment, and human perception–action with the response of the overall system emerging from the interplay of perception and action. The main questions to be answered in this work are as follows: (i) what is the general control and guidance strategy of the human operator, and (ii) how is information about the vehicle and environment extracted visually by the operator. The general approach uses gaze as the primary sensory mechanism by decoding the gaze patterns of the pilot to provide information for estimation, control, and guidance. This work differs from existing research by taking what have largely been conceptual ideas on action–perception and structuring them to be implemented for a real-world problem. The paper proposes a system model that captures the human pilot’s perception–action loop; the loop that delineates the main components of the pilot’s perceptuo-motor system, including estimation of the vehicle state and task elements based on operator gaze patterns, trajectory planning, and tracking control. The identified human visuo-motor model is then exploited to demonstrate how the perceptual and control functions system can be augmented to reduce the operator workload.

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Lyons, Jack. "Perceptual Belief and Nonexperiential Looks." Philosophical Perspectives 19, no. 1 (December 2005): 237–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00061.x.

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Ghijsen, Harmen. "Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?" Philosophical Issues 30, no. 1 (September 16, 2020): 132–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phis.12176.

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Irvin, Sherri. "Forgery and the Corruption of Aesthetic Understanding." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37, no. 2 (June 2007): 283–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2007.0016.

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In 1968, Nelson Goodman made an observation about artistic forgery that has never been fully appreciated, though his discussion of forgery has received plenty of philosophical attention. Goodman describes the case in which you, the viewer, are confronted with an original work and a forgery that is, for you, perceptually indistinguishable from it. On the basis of lab tests, you know which of the works is forged, but you can see no difference between them. Nonetheless, Goodman says, the knowledge that one of them is forged makes for an aesthetic difference between the works, for you, now. One reason is that this knowledge changes the way you look at the works, and the way you should look at them; it alters the sorts of scrutiny it is appropriate to apply. In fact, knowledge that one of the works is forged ‘assigns the present looking a role as training toward … perceptual discrimination’ (Goodman, 1976,105).

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Prieto, Adolfo G. "From conceptual to perceptual reality: trust in digital repositories." Library Review 58, no. 8 (September 4, 2009): 593–606. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/00242530910987082.

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PurposeDigital repositories offer a great benefit to people in a variety of settings, especially since an ever‐increasing amount of information is being gathered, transmitted, and preserved through various technologies. The purpose of this paper is to underscore trust as a critical element in the infrastructure of digital repositories and to look more closely at trusted digital repositories from the perspective of the user communities for which they are designed.Design/methodology/approachThe paper looks to the literature in reviewing the concept of trust and its role in an online environment. Attention is then paid to trusted digital repositories, with close examination of the user communities’ perceptions of trust and the impact of these perceptions. Special attention is given to users within the academic community.FindingsWhile digital repositories may be trustworthy because of adherence to technological standards, accepted practices, and mechanisms for authenticating the authorship and accuracy of their content, it is ultimately their respective stakeholders – both those who deposit and use content – whose perceptions play a central role in ensuring a digital repository's trustworthiness.Research limitations/implicationsA future empirical study would be beneficial in order to measure perceptions of trust as contributing factors to the trustworthiness of digital repositories.Practical implicationsThis paper provides a useful resource for persons wishing to review the topic of trusted digital repositories or increase their awareness in this area.Originality/valueThis paper offers a focused look at various levels of trust as they relate to the dissemination of scholarly communication in the academic world, particularly through institutional repositories.

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Millar, Alan. "The Scope of Perceptual Knowledge." Philosophy 75, no. 1 (January 2000): 73–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100000061.

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Plausibly perceptual knowledge satisfies the following: (1) It is knowledge about things from the way they appear. (2) It can embrace more than the way things appear. (3) It is phenomenologically immediate and thus, in one sense, non-inferential. (2) and (3) place a significant constraint on adequate elucidations of (1). Knowledge about an object, from the way it looks, which embraces more than the way it looks, should not turn out to be inferential in the relevant sense. The paper shows how this constraint can be met, drawing upon a conception of a discriminative capacity. The discussion touches on literature dealing with observation in science, knowledge of other minds, and the possibility of moral knowledge.

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Hamilton, Duncan. "Mitigating perceptual error with ‘look, listen, feel’." British Journal of Nursing 26, no. 9 (May 11, 2017): 507. http://dx.doi.org/10.12968/bjon.2017.26.9.507.

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Friston, Karl J. "Hallucinations and perceptual inference." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28, no. 6 (December 2005): 764–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x05290131.

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This commentary takes a closer look at how “constructive models of subjective perception,” referred to by Collerton et al. (sect. 2), might contribute to the Perception and Attention Deficit (PAD) model. It focuses on the neuronal mechanisms that could mediate hallucinations, or false inference – in particular, the role of cholinergic systems in encoding uncertainty in the context of hierarchical Bayesian models of perceptual inference (Friston 2002b; Yu & Dayan 2002).

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Goltstein, Pieter M. "Visual neuroscience: A shrewd look at perceptual learning." Current Biology 32, no. 15 (August 2022): R839—R841. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2022.07.002.

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Brogaard, Berit. "The Phenomenal Use of ‘Look’ and Perceptual Representation." Philosophy Compass 9, no. 7 (July 2014): 455–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12136.

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Brill, Michael H. "Perceptual Constancy: Why Things Look As They Do." Color Research & Application 24, no. 4 (August 1999): 300–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1520-6378(199908)24:4<300::aid-col13>3.0.co;2-5.

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Fodor, Jerry A. "Précis of The Modularity of Mind." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8, no. 1 (March 1985): 1–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x0001921x.

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AbstractThe Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the “New Look” or “interaetionist” view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, that they are arbitrarily sensitive to the organism's beliefs and desires. In fact, according to modularity theory, perceptual processes are computationally isolated from much of the background knowledge to which cognitive processes have access. The postulation of autonomous, domain-specific psychological mechanisms underlying perceptual integration connects modularity theory with the tradition of faculty psychology, in particular, with the work of Franz Joseph Call. Some of these historical affinities, and some of the relations between faculty psychology and Cartesianism, are discussed in the book.

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Meese, Tim S., and Mark A. Georgeson. "Spatial Filter Combination in Human Pattern Vision: Channel Interactions Revealed by Adaptation." Perception 25, no. 3 (March 1996): 255–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/p250255.

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Above threshold, two superimposed sinusoidal gratings of the same spatial frequency (eg 1 cycle deg−1), of equal moderate contrast (eg C1 = C2 = 6%), and with orientations of ±45°, usually look like a compound structure containing vertical and horizontal edges (ie a blurred checkerboard). These feature orientations are very different from the dominant filter orientations in a wavelet-type (eg simple-cell) transform of the stimulus, and so present a serious challenge to conventional models of orientation coding based on labelled linear filters. Previous experiments on perceived structure in static plaids have led to the view that the outputs of tuned spatial filters are combined in a stimulus-dependent way, before features such as edges are extracted. Here an adaptation paradigm was used to investigate the cross-channel interactions that appear to underlie the spatial-filter-combination process. Reported are two aftereffects of selective adaptation: (i) adaptation to a 1 cycle deg−1 plaid whose component orientations are intermediate to those in a 1 cycle deg−1 test plaid ‘breaks’ perceptual combination of the components in the test plaid; (ii) adapting to a 3 cycles deg−1 plaid whose component orientations match those in a 1 cycle deg−1 test plaid facilitates perceptual combination of the components in the test plaid. The results are taken as evidence that spatial channels remote from those most responsive to a test plaid play a crucial role in determining whether the test plaid segments or coheres perceptually.

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Chen, Mengyuan, and Wenchao Hu. "Research on BatSLAM Algorithm for UAV Based on Audio Perceptual Hash Closed-Loop Detection." International Journal of Pattern Recognition and Artificial Intelligence 33, no. 01 (October 11, 2018): 1959002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021800141959002x.

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This research is aimed at the optimization of a two-dimensional (2D) empirical graph under a certain height and dark conditions for a UAV, using the bionic sonar system to replace the visual sensor’s BatSLAM mode and audio perceptual hash closed-loop detection. The BatSLAM model uses Sum of Absolute Difference (SAD) image processing methods to update the bionic sonar template. This method only judges whether the appearance of the two cochlear images is consistent and does not have geometric processing and feature extraction. Because the cochlear images produce various noises during the acquisition and transmission, there are some differences in cochlear maps obtained at the same position, which can lead to the distortion of the constructed empirical map. In this research, an audio perceptual hash closed-loop detection algorithm is developed to extract features of cochlea. It considers both the appearance and the energy difference between adjacent bands to improve the accuracy of closed-loop detection, thus solving the distortion problem and improving the experience map. The simulation experiment shows that the improved BatSLAM model based on the audio perceptual hash closed-loop detection can improve the 2D experience map for UAV under certain height and dark conditions, through improving the accuracy of the closed-loop detection to solve the distortion problem and thus implementing the optimization of the experience graph.

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van Tonder, Gert. "Perceptual Aspects of Visual Stylization." Art & Perception 3, no. 3 (2015): 221–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134913-00002039.

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Visual style is instantly recognized as that which sets the qualitative tone of what we look at. For all its intuitive immediacy, verbal articulation of the fundamental visual characteristics of style can be elusive. This paper conceptually analyses the perceptual dimensions of style, suggesting at least eight general properties applicable to visual stylization. These characteristics not only embody the essential dimensions of perceptual experience of a given style, but can also be thought of as a generative grammar of stylistic expression. Together they can be utilized as an early attempt to more clearly conceptualize experimental inquiries regarding the effect of visual stylization in perceptual experience.

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Schönbaumsfeld, Genia. "How Threatening are Local Sceptical Scenarios?" Wittgenstein-Studien 10, no. 1 (January 16, 2019): 261–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/witt-2019-0016.

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AbstractIn this paper I distinguish between ‘local’ and ‘global’ forms of ‘envatment’. I show that recent envatment arguments (the ‘local’ variety) work similarly to arguments from perceptual illusion and that neither of them are able, by themselves, to get us ‘global’ scepticism. Consequently, motivating the radical sceptical idea that all of our perceptual beliefs might be false is harder than it looks.

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Block, Ned. "If perception is probabilistic, why does it not seem probabilistic?" Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 373, no. 1755 (July 30, 2018): 20170341. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0341.

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The success of the Bayesian perspective in explaining perceptual phenomena has motivated the view that perceptual representation is probabilistic. But if perceptual representation is probabilistic, why does normal conscious perception not reflect the full probability functions that the probabilistic point of view endorses? For example, neurons in cortical area MT that respond to the direction of motion are broadly tuned: a patch of cortex that is tuned to vertical motion also responds to horizontal motion, but when we see vertical motion, foveally, in good conditions, it does not look at all horizontal. The standard solution in terms of sampling runs into the problem that sampling is an account of perceptual decision rather than perception. This paper argues that the best Bayesian approach to this problem does not require probabilistic representation. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

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Spratt, Christopher G., and Timothy A. Carey. "Can a control model approach assist case formulation in psychotherapy?" Cognitive Behaviour Therapist 2, no. 3 (June 9, 2009): 197–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1754470x0900021x.

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AbstractThis paper looks at issues regarding case formulation in psychotherapy. Case formulation is well recognized as being helpful in the conceptualizing of psychological problems and as a useful tool in the practice of cognitive therapy. Control, as opposed to behaviour, is increasingly being seen as that human process most relevant to psychopathology. We look at the diagnosis and treatment of a small number of people, treated in a naturalistic setting, who were selected without any specific criteria other than being people whose problems were treated using the Method of Levels, a form of cognitive therapy based on the principles of Perceptual Control Theory, and who completed both pre- and post-treatment questionnaires. We then consider how the problems these people presented with, and their treatment, might be formulated as a result of taking this approach.

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Viviani, Paolo, and Natale Stucchi. "Biological movements look uniform: Evidence of motor-perceptual interactions." Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 18, no. 3 (1992): 603–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.18.3.603.

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Buford, Christopher T. "Stranded Runners." Logos & Episteme 12, no. 2 (2021): 145–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202112210.

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Those who endorse a knowledge-first program in epistemology claim that rather than attempting to understand knowledge in terms of more fundamental notions or relations such as belief and justification, we should instead understand knowledge as being in some sense prior to such concepts and/or relations. If we suppose that this is the correct approach to theorizing about knowledge, we are left with a residual question about the nature of those concepts or relations, such as justification, that were thought to be first but are now second. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa has recently proposed that we understand justification in terms of potential knowledge. Ichikawa combines his view of knowledge and justification with what initially seems to be a natural complement, epistemological disjunctivism. While Ichikawa focuses on hallucination, I shift the focus to illusion. I argue that the combination of justification as potential knowledge and epistemological disjunctivism entails that perceptual beliefs that arise from illusions are not justified.

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Mole, Callum D., Otto Lappi, Oscar Giles, Gustav Markkula, Franck Mars, and Richard M. Wilkie. "Getting Back Into the Loop: The Perceptual-Motor Determinants of Successful Transitions out of Automated Driving." Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 61, no. 7 (March 6, 2019): 1037–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0018720819829594.

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Objective: To present a structured, narrative review highlighting research into human perceptual-motor coordination that can be applied to automated vehicle (AV)–human transitions. Background: Manual control of vehicles is made possible by the coordination of perceptual-motor behaviors (gaze and steering actions), where active feedback loops enable drivers to respond rapidly to ever-changing environments. AVs will change the nature of driving to periods of monitoring followed by the human driver taking over manual control. The impact of this change is currently poorly understood. Method: We outline an explanatory framework for understanding control transitions based on models of human steering control. This framework can be summarized as a perceptual-motor loop that requires (a) calibration and (b) gaze and steering coordination. A review of the current experimental literature on transitions is presented in the light of this framework. Results: The success of transitions are often measured using reaction times, however, the perceptual-motor mechanisms underpinning steering quality remain relatively unexplored. Conclusion: Modeling the coordination of gaze and steering and the calibration of perceptual-motor control will be crucial to ensure safe and successful transitions out of automated driving. Application: This conclusion poses a challenge for future research on AV-human transitions. Future studies need to provide an understanding of human behavior that will be sufficient to capture the essential characteristics of drivers reengaging control of their vehicle. The proposed framework can provide a guide for investigating specific components of human control of steering and potential routes to improving manual control recovery.

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Landers, Casey. "Specialized Visual Experiences." Philosophical Quarterly 71, no. 1 (April 20, 2020): 74–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa018.

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Abstract Through extensive training, experts acquire specialized knowledge and abilities. In this paper, I argue that experts also acquire specialized visual experiences. Specifically, I articulate and defend the account that experts enjoy visual experiences that represent gestalt properties through perceptual learning. I survey an array of empirical studies on face perception and perceptual expertise that support this account. I also look at studies on perceptual adaptation that some might argue present a problem for my account. I show how the data are subject to an interpretation that is friendly to it. Last, I address two theoretical objections to the claim that visual experiences represent gestalt properties.

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Davidson, Lisa, and Jason Shaw. "A closer look at perceptual epenthesis in cross‐language perception." Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 125, no. 4 (April 2009): 2752. http://dx.doi.org/10.1121/1.4784609.

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Wilson, Samantha, Frederick Aardema, and Kieron O’Connor. "What do I look like? Perceptual confidence in bulimia nervosa." Eating and Weight Disorders - Studies on Anorexia, Bulimia and Obesity 25, no. 1 (July 17, 2018): 177–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40519-018-0542-x.

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Greene, Ciara M., Gillian Murphy, and Julia Januszewski. "Under High Perceptual Load, Observers Look but Do Not See." Applied Cognitive Psychology 31, no. 4 (May 29, 2017): 431–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/acp.3335.

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Levelt, Willem J. M. "The perceptual loop theory not disconfirmed: A reply to MacKay." Consciousness and Cognition 1, no. 3 (September 1992): 226–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/1053-8100(92)90062-f.

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Patil, Rohit A., and Maxim W. Derhak. "Improving Perceptual Uniformity of Sampling in Color Look-up Tables." Color and Imaging Conference 18, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 238–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.2352/cic.2010.18.1.art00042.

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Martin, M. G. F. "Particular Thoughts & Singular Thought." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51 (March 2002): 173–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100008134.

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A long-standing theme in discussion of perception and thought has been that our primary cognitive contact with individual objects and events in the world derives from our perceptual contact with them. When I look at a duck in front of me, I am not merely presented with the fact that there is at least one duck in the area, rather I seem to be presented with this thing (as one might put it from my perspective) in front of me, which looks to me to be a duck. Furthermore, such a perception would seem to put me in a position not merely to make the existential judgment that there is some duck or other present, but rather to make a singular, demonstrative judgment, that that is a duck. My grounds for an existential judgment in this case derives from my apprehension of the demonstrative thought and not vice versa.

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Starkey, Charles. "Perceptual Emotions and Emotional Virtue." Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 3, no. 1 (September 30, 2021): 10–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.33497/2021.summer.3.

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In this essay I focus on two areas discussed in Michael Brady’s Emotion: The Basics, namely perceptual models of emotion and the relation between emotion and virtue. Brady raises two concerns about perceptual theories: that they arguably collapse into feeling or cognitive theories of emotion; and that the analogy between emotion and perception is questionable at best, and is thus not an adequate way of characterizing emotion. I argue that a close look at perception and emotional experience reveals a structure of emotion that avoids these problems. I then explore other ways in which emotions can be operative in virtuous acts and virtue traits outside of their relation to motivation. The patterns of emotional response that we have can affect virtue because they affect the way in which we see and take-in information about the world, and the gravity that such perceptions have for us. In addition, emotions are critical to virtue because they maintain the level of importance that values have for us, and in doing so forestall axiological entropy, namely the fading of the importance that values have for us, and thus the virtues that are dependent on those values.

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Spence, Charles. "Searching for perceptual similarity within, and between, the (chemical) senses." i-Perception 13, no. 5 (September 2022): 204166952211241. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/20416695221124154.

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In this narrative historical review, I want to take a closer look at the concept of perceptual similarity both as it applies within, and between, the chemical senses (specifically taste and smell). The discussion is linked to issues of affective similarity and connotative meaning. The relation between intramodal and crossmodal judgments of perceptual similarity, and the putatively special status of those odorants that happen to take on taste qualities will also be discussed. An important distinction is drawn between the interrelated, though sometimes distinct, notions of perceptual similarity and crossmodal congruency, specifically as they relate to the comparison of chemosensory stimuli. Such phenomena are often referred to as crossmodal correspondences, or by others (incorrectly in my view), as a kind of ubiquitous synesthesia.

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Allen, Keith. "Being Coloured and Looking Coloured." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, no. 4 (December 2009): 647–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0065.

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Intuitively, there is an intimate connection between being coloured and looking coloured. As Strawson memorably remarked, it is natural to assume that ‘colours are visibilia or they are nothing’ (1979, 109). But what exactly is the nature of this relationship?A traditionally popular view of the relationship between being coloured and looking coloured starts from the common place that the character of our perceptual experience changes as the conditions in which an object is perceived vary. For instance, our experience changes when we view an object under different illuminants, as when we move from artificial illumination indoors to natural daylight outside. It changes under one and the same illuminant, depending on whether the object is directly or indirectly illuminated. And it varies independently of this, as the background against which the object is perceived varies. Placing a lot of weight on the idea that objects look or appear different as the perceptual conditions vary, proponents of this approach suggest that we can understand what it is for something to be coloured in terms of what it is for something to look coloured in specific perceptual conditions.

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Maxwell, Jonathan P., Richard S. W. Masters, and John van der Kamp. "Taking a conscious look at the body schema." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30, no. 2 (April 2007): 216–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x07001550.

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AbstractDijkerman & de Haan (D&dH) propose a somatosensory perceptual pathway that informs a consciously accessible body image, and an action pathway that provides information to a body schema, which is not consciously accessible. We argue that the body schema may become accessible to consciousness in some circumstances, possibly resulting from cross talk, but that this may be detrimental to skilled movement production.

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Dannemiller, James L., and William Epstein. "Constraining the use of constraints." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, no. 3 (June 1999): 373–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x99302028.

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Pylyshyn uses constraints to solve many of the problems associated with the inverse problem in vision. We are sympathetic to such an approach, and indeed, we think that in many cases constraints allow tract-able solutions to otherwise insoluble problems. We argue, however, that Pylyshyn has been too quick to assume that certain perceptual phenomena can be explained by appealing to constraints embodied in the visual machinery. For several more complex perceptual phenomena it is not clear how one proceeds to look for constraints once simple constraints like rigidity have been abandoned.

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Spektor, Mikhail S., David Kellen, and Jared M. Hotaling. "When the Good Looks Bad: An Experimental Exploration of the Repulsion Effect." Psychological Science 29, no. 8 (May 24, 2018): 1309–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797618779041.

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When people are choosing among different options, context seems to play a vital role. For instance, adding a third option can increase the probability of choosing a similar dominating option. This attraction effect is one of the most widely studied phenomena in decision-making research. Its prevalence, however, has been challenged recently by the tainting hypothesis, according to which the inferior option contaminates the attribute space in which it is located, leading to a repulsion effect. In an attempt to test the tainting hypothesis and explore the conditions under which dominated options make dominating options look bad, we conducted four preregistered perceptual decision-making studies with a total of 301 participants. We identified two factors influencing individuals’ behavior: stimulus display and stimulus design. Our results contribute to a growing body of literature showing how presentation format influences behavior in preferential and perceptual decision-making tasks.

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Hope, Vincent. "Object Perception, Perceptual Recognition, and That-Perception Introduction." Philosophy 84, no. 4 (September 16, 2009): 515–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003181910999009x.

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AbstractThe philosophy of perception currently considers how perception relates to action. Some distinctions may help, distinguishing object perception from perceptual recognition, and both from that-perception. Examples are seeing a man, recognising a man, and seeing that there is a man. Perceiving an object controls self-location by its recognising an object, which depends on memory of how it looks, controls looking for it and interacting with it, or not, and that-perceiving controls saying that an object exists. Perception controls action. Milner and Goodale, Jacob and Jeannerod, and Noë are considered.

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Markovic, Slobodan. "Objective constraints of figural goodness." Psihologija 35, no. 3-4 (2002): 245–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/psi0203245m.

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The effects of uniformity, compactness and symmetry on pattern goodness estimates were evaluated in three experiments. Ss were asked to choose the pattern which looks the best in respect to other patterns from given set. Patterns within sets differed from each other in uniformity (Experiment 1), compactness (Experiment 2) and symmetry (Experiment 3). Regression analyses indicated that symmetry was a single good predictor of the frequency of good pattern choice. This result is connected with Koffka's concept of perceptual economy: uniformity and compactness have perceptual advantages in the restricted situations (low energy disposal), while symmetry prevails in unrestricted conditions (high energy disposal).

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Kiverstein, Julian. "Making Sense of Phenomenal Unity: An Intentionalist Account of Temporal Experience." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67 (July 7, 2010): 155–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246110000081.

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AbstractOur perceptual experiences stretch across time to present us with movement, persistence and change. How is this possible given that perceptual experiences take place in the present that has no duration? In this paper I argue that this problem is one and the same as the problem of accounting for how our experiences occurring at different times can be phenomenally unified over time so that events occurring at different times can be experienced together. Any adequate account of temporal experience must also account for phenomenal unity. I look to Edmund Husserl's writings on time consciousness for such an account.

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GREEN, ADAM. "Reading the mind of God (without Hebrew lessons): Alston, shared attention, and mystical experience." Religious Studies 45, no. 4 (October 23, 2009): 455–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412509990175.

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AbstractAlston's perceptual account of mystical experience fails to show how it is that the sort of predicates that are used to describe God in these experiences could be derived from perception, even though the ascription of matched predicates in the natural order are not derived in the manner Alston has in mind. In contrast, if one looks to research on shared attention between individuals as mediated by mirror neurons, then one can give a perceptual account of mystical experience which draws a tighter connection between what is reported in mystical reports and the most similar reports in the natural order.

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Luo, Yu, Darko Odic, and Jiaying Zhao. "Decreases loom larger than increases: A perceptual account for loss aversion." Journal of Vision 21, no. 9 (September 27, 2021): 2920. http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/jov.21.9.2920.

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Fincher, Katrina M. "Social antecedents and perceptual consequences of how we look at others." Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 148, no. 1 (January 2019): 143–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000506.

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Harrison, S. J., and J. Feldman. "Perceptual comparison of features within and between objects: A new look." Vision Research 49, no. 23 (November 2009): 2790–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2009.08.014.

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Nam, Hosung, Christine Mooshammer, Khalil Iskarous, and D. H. Whalen. "Hearing tongue loops: Perceptual sensitivity to acoustic signatures of articulatory dynamics." Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 134, no. 5 (November 2013): 3808–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1121/1.4824161.

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Waszak, Florian, and Andrei Gorea. "A new look at the relationship between perceptual and motor responses." Visual Cognition 11, no. 8 (November 2004): 947–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13506280444000003.

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Ponte, Filomena. "COGNITIVE STYLE (FDI-Field Dependence-Independence): a motivational support for learning." Neuroscience and Neurological Surgery 7, no. 1 (October 28, 2020): 01–02. http://dx.doi.org/10.31579/2578-8868/144.

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The concept of cognitive style has its origins in the movement "New Look" emerging research proposed by Klein and Schlesinger, in an article titled “Where is the perceiver in perceptual theory?” an inappropriate assumption for psychologists of the time claiming the intelligibility and its evidence.

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Walker, Peter, Brian J. Francis, and Leanne Walker. "The Brightness-Weight Illusion." Experimental Psychology 57, no. 6 (January 1, 2010): 462–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169/a000057.

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Bigger objects look heavier than smaller but otherwise identical objects. When hefted as well as seen, however, bigger objects feel lighter (the size-weight illusion), confirming that the association between visual size and weight has a perceptual component. Darker objects also look heavier than brighter but otherwise identical objects. It is uncertain, however, if this association also has a perceptual element, or if it simply reflects the fact that, in English at least, the same verbal label (light) is applied to both surface brightness and weight. To address this, we looked for a brightness equivalent of the size-weight illusion. Paired-comparison judgments of weight were obtained for balls differing only in color. Based on vision alone, darker objects were judged to be heavier. When the balls were hefted as well as seen, this association was reversed (i.e., a brightness-weight illusion), consistent with it having a perceptual component. To gauge the strength of the illusion (in grams), a white and a black ball (both 129 g) were each compared against a set of mid-gray balls varying in weight. When the balls were hefted as well as seen, the white ball felt approximately 8 g heavier than the black ball, a difference corresponding to 6.2% of their actual weight. Possible environmental origins of the association between surface lightness and weight are considered.

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Journal articles on the topic 'PERCEPTUAL LOOS'

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