Academic literature on the topic 'Perception/cognition border'
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Journal articles on the topic "Perception/cognition border"
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Green, E. J. "The Perception-Cognition Border: A Case for Architectural Division." Philosophical Review 129, no. 3 (July 1, 2020): 323–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8311221.
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A venerable view holds that a border between perception and cognition is built into our cognitive architecture and that this imposes limits on the way information can flow between them. While the deliverances of perception are freely available for use in reasoning and inference, there are strict constraints on information flow in the opposite direction. Despite its plausibility, this approach to the perception-cognition border has faced criticism in recent years. This article develops an updated version of the architectural approach, which I call the dimension restriction hypothesis (DRH). According to DRH, perceptual processes are constrained to compute over a bounded range of dimensions, while cognitive processes are not. This view allows that perception is cognitively penetrable, but places strict limits on the varieties of penetration that can occur. The article argues that DRH enjoys both theoretical and empirical support, and also defends the view against several objections.
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Phillips, Ben. "The Shifting Border Between Perception and Cognition." Noûs 53, no. 2 (August 17, 2017): 316–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nous.12218.
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Gross, Steven. "Language and the Border between Perception and Cognition." Analysis 83, no. 3 (July 1, 2023): 541–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anac057.
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Jenkin, Zoe. "The Epistemic Role of Core Cognition." Philosophical Review 129, no. 2 (April 1, 2020): 251–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8012850.
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According to a traditional picture, perception and belief have starkly different epistemic roles. Beliefs have epistemic statuses as justified or unjustified, depending on how they are formed and maintained. In contrast, perceptions are “unjustified justifiers.” Core cognition is a set of mental systems that stand at the border of perception and belief, and has been extensively studied in developmental psychology. Core cognition's borderline states do not fit neatly into the traditional epistemic picture. What is the epistemic role of these states? Focusing on the core object system, the author argues that core object representations have epistemic statuses like beliefs do, despite their many prototypically perceptual features. First, the author argues that it is a sufficient condition on a mental state's having an epistemic status as justified or unjustified that the state is based on reasons. Then the author argues that core object representations are based on reasons, through an examination of both experimental results and key markers of the basing relation. The scope of mental states that are subject to epistemic evaluation as justified or unjustified is not restricted to beliefs.
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Firestone, Chaz, and Ian Phillips. "Seeing fast and thinking slow The Border Between Seeing and Thinking Ned Block Oxford University Press, 2023. 560 pp." Science 379, no. 6638 (March 24, 2023): 1196. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.adg8153.
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Ye, Hailin. "Perception of Identity, Perception of Relationship and Strategic Interaction — An Analysis on China–Indian Border Disputes from the Perspective of Game Theories." East Asian Affairs 01, no. 01 (June 2021): 2150003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2737557921500030.
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Based on the continuous observation of the ongoing China–India border conflict in recent years, the author intends to answer why China has not yielded prospective policy returns from the Indian side, even if it has been pursuing a cooperative strategy toward India after the Doklam standoff. Inspired by several doctrines of game theory under the dynamic game scenario and the application of relevant gaming tactics, this essay argues that after the Doklam standoff, China has been consistently pursuing an India policy that is risk-averse in nature, represented by its fundamental goal of persevering stability in the secondary direction of China–India border area. As a supporter of this argumentation, a diachronic investigation in terms of the evolution of China–India Relations between 2017 and 2020 was conducted, in which both countries were presumed as state actors involving in repeated gaming process with observable actions and asymmetric information sources. The investigation covers the respective actions adopted by both China and India since the Doklam standoff in 2017, along with the strategic interactions between the two sides from 2018 to 2019, till the most recent standoff in the Galwan Valley and the standoff along the Panggong Tso in 2020. The major finding of this essay is that there exists a causal-effect relationship between the expected payment structures of both sides in a gaming process and the outcome of the implementation of a certain cooperative strategy. Besides, as opponents in a gaming process, either side’s self-cognition and its evaluation on the bilateral relations will pose critical impact on its policy-making. Therefore, in the specific case of China–India border conflict, it is highly advised that China should make practical efforts to avert cognition risks of all kinds while managing its relation with India; otherwise, negative consequences may occur due to the mismatch of its strategic goals and its policy devices.
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Zhu, Wenlong, Jian Mou, and Jason F. Cohen. "A Cross-Continent Analysis of the Invariance of Product Information in Cross-Border Electronic Commerce." Journal of Global Information Management 29, no. 6 (November 2021): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jgim.289654.
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Cross-border electronic-commerce (CBEC) is growing. However, due to differences in culture, habits, history and language among other factors, consumers in different regions may have different perception towards the same product information on CBEC platforms, which may lead to differences in their cognition of the product with implications for purchase intentions. Presently, little research has attempted to understand whether there are such differences between global consumers through the examination of measurement invariance (MI) in CBEC environments. By using multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis (MG-CFA), this study explored the invariance of two product information cognitions on CBEC platforms, namely product description and product awareness, among consumers in North America, Europe, Latin America and Oceania. Data was collected from users of a popular CBEC platform in China. We find no significant differences in understandings and levels of awareness of product information across the four groups of consumers.
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Duo, Xu, Faridah Ibrahim, and Mohd Nashriq Nizam. "The Influence of Social Media on the Cognition of Chinese Students in Malaysia." World Journal of Social Science Research 11, no. 1 (December 21, 2023): p1. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/wjssr.v11n1p1.
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Malaysia is currently one of the most popular study destinations for overseas Chinese students. At the same time, due to global educational status and better media technology facilities, including social media, more Chinese students tend to live or study abroad. However, the different patterns of social media at home and abroad have created a cognitive gap among overseas Chinese students in Malaysia. Qualitative in-depth interviews and Focus group discussions with more than a dozen overseas Chinese students studying in Malaysia showed that social media use has multiple impacts and aids in structuring learning, lifestyle influences, and the relationship between social media use and cognitive formation. The findings suggest that China’s local social media has been identified as a widespread use by overseas Chinese students for cross-border daily interpersonal communication. It not only helps to construct the lifestyle of overseas Chinese students, but also helps maintain their social perception as “Chinese” by generating the image of home.
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Herrmann, Richard K., and Vaughn P. Shannon. "Defending International Norms: The Role of Obligation, Material Interest, and Perception in Decision Making." International Organization 55, no. 3 (2001): 621–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/00208180152507579.
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States defend norms in some cases but not in others. Understanding this variation sheds light on both U.S. foreign policy and the role of normative reasoning. We report the results of four experiments embedded in a survey of U.S. elites. The experiments identified the effects of felt normative obligation (that is, the logic of what is appropriate) and concern for U.S. economic and security interests (that is, the logic of utilitarian consequence) as well as the role played by individual perceptions. We find that perceptions of another actor's motivation, of conflicts as civil or cross-border wars, and of the democratic nature of victims affect decisions to defend a prescriptive norm. This finding means that theories of international relations that feature norms as structural concepts need to consider actor-level cognition when examining the operation of norms. Moreover, we find that when U.S. economic and security interests are at stake there is a much greater inclination to defend norms than when simply normative obligation is present. Most U.S. elites appear to treat the presence or absence of U.S. material interests as a legitimate criterion for deciding whether or not to defend an international prescriptive norm.
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Pitts, Michael A., Antígona Martínez, James B. Brewer, and Steven A. Hillyard. "Early Stages of Figure–Ground Segregation during Perception of the Face–Vase." Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 23, no. 4 (April 2011): 880–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2010.21438.
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The temporal sequence of neural processes supporting figure–ground perception was investigated by recording ERPs associated with subjects' perceptions of the face–vase figure. In Experiment 1, subjects continuously reported whether they perceived the face or the vase as the foreground figure by pressing one of two buttons. Each button press triggered a probe flash to the face region, the vase region, or the borders between the two. The N170/vertex positive potential (VPP) component of the ERP elicited by probes to the face region was larger when subjects perceived the faces as figure. Preceding the N170/VPP, two additional components were identified. First, when the borders were probed, ERPs differed in amplitude as early as 110 msec after probe onset depending on subjects' figure–ground perceptions. Second, when the face or vase regions were probed, ERPs were more positive (at ∼150–200 msec) when that region was perceived as figure versus background. These components likely reflect an early “border ownership” stage, and a subsequent “figure–ground segregation” stage of processing. To explore the influence of attention on these stages of processing, two additional experiments were conducted. In Experiment 2, subjects selectively attended to the face or vase region, and the same early ERP components were again produced. In Experiment 3, subjects performed an identical selective attention task, but on a display lacking distinctive figure–ground borders, and neither of the early components were produced. Results from these experiments suggest sequential stages of processing underlying figure–ground perception, each which are subject to modifications by selective attention.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Perception/cognition border"
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Coudray, Quentin. "As High as Eyes Can See : a Moderate Liberalism for the Admissible Contents of Perception." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris, EHESS, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024EHES0061.
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Une question philosophique cruciale dans la philosophie contemporaine de la perception est de déterminer quelles sont les choses que nous pouvons percevoir, par opposition aux choses auxquelles nous ne pouvons que penser. Dans cette thèse, je défends une vision "libérale" de la perception qui accepte que nous puissions percevoir certains types de contenus dits de haut niveau. Je propose un argument original basé sur la description d'un mécanisme psychologique pertinent qui confère une telle capacité de représentation que j'appelle la schématisation. La schématisation décrit un processus par lequel les systèmes perceptifs (je me concentre sur la vision) structurent de manière représentationnelle leurs entrées sensorielles, en donnant la priorité à certaines de leurs dimensions, et en activant implicitement (ou amorçant) des représentations similaires stockées dans la mémoire perceptive. La schématisation est un processus purement perceptif qui nous permet de représenter des contenus, que j’appelle les aspects, qui ne sont pas réductibles à des contenus dits de bas niveau. Les aspects représentent certaines propriétés de haut niveau des objets. Ils représentent les objets comme ayant une forme physique qui les fait appartenir à un type superficiel, tel que le type superficiel de la forme d'un chat ou d'une chaise. Il est essentiel de noter que les aspects ne peuvent pas représenter des propriétés de types naturel ou fonctionnel comme le fait d’être un chat ou d’être une chaise, car ces propriétés dépendent de caractéristiques non visibles des objets, situées sous leur surface. Je soutiens donc que des considérations empiriques minutieuses sur les capacités représentationnelles de la perception justifient un libéralisme modéré qui n'admet que ces aspects représentant des propriétés de type superficiel comme contenu de niveau supérieur de la perception. Les aspects sont aussi haut que les yeux peuvent voirA philosophically crucial question within contemporary philosophy of perception is to determine what things we can perceive, as opposed to things we can only think about. In this thesis, I defend a “liberal” view of perception which accepts that we can perceive some kinds of high-level contents. I propose an original argument based on describing a relevant psychological mechanism that grants such representational capacity that I call schematization. Schematization describes a process by which perceptual systems (I focus on vision) representationally structure their sensory inputs, prioritizing certain feature dimensions, and implicitly activate (or prime) similar representations stored in perceptual memory. Schematization is a purely perceptual process that allows us to represent contents that are not reducible to low-level contents: aspects. Aspects represent some high-level kind properties of particulars. They represent particulars as having some physical body form that makes them belong to a superficial kind, such as the superficial kind of cat-form or chair-form. Crucially, I argue that aspects cannot represent natural or functional kind properties like cat-hood or chair-hood, since such properties depend on below-surface, non-visible characteristics of objects. I thus argue that careful empirical considerations about the representational capacities of perception vindicate a moderate Liberalism that only admits aspects representing superficial kind properties as the higher-level contents of perception. Aspects are as high as eyes can see
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MacPhail, William R. "Performance Under Pressure: The Effect of Explanatory Style on Sensory-Motor Performance Under Stereotype Threat." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2011. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/166.
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Do participants with external attribution styles outperform participants with internal explanatory styles in pressure-filled situations? Explicit-monitoring theory suggests that performance becomes impaired when conscious attention is devoted to performing a task normally carried out by automatic processes. Attributing potential failure to an external source (e.g., blaming a sudden gust of wind for a poor golf shot) can decrease the negative effects of stereotype threat, a social-psychological predicament known to engender feelings of stress similar to those experienced in pressure-filled situations, by preventing explicit monitoring from taking place. The current study examined whether individual differences in attribution style, as measured by the Attributional Style Questionnaire, affects golf-putting performance under stereotype threat. The present author hypothesized that participants with external explanatory styles would perform better than participants with internal explanatory styles under stereotype threat, because external participants would be predisposed to create external sources to attribute the cause of poor performance.
Book chapters on the topic "Perception/cognition border"
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Block, Ned. "Core cognition and perceptual analogs of concepts." In The Border Between Seeing and Thinking, 404—Cchapter12.F3. Oxford University PressNew York, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0012.
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Abstract This chapter discusses whether borderline cases challenge a joint in nature, focusing on a borderline case that putatively has properties that are fundamental to both sides. In particular, the issue is discussed of whether the phenomena of “core cognition” have properties that are fundamental to both perception and cognition. Such cases would be candidates for conceptual perception which would impugn the joint in nature that this book argues for. The chapter starts with a discussion of the perception of causation, arguing that the evidence for perceptual representation of causation is now overwhelming and that “core cognition” of causation can be divided into the perceptual and the cognitive. Similar results apply to numerosity. The conclusion is that “core cognition” is a heterogeneous mixture of perception and cognition.
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Block, Ned. "Markers of the perceptual and the cognitive." In The Border Between Seeing and Thinking, 61—C2.P232. Oxford University PressNew York, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0002.
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Abstract This chapter explores indicators of the perceptual, indicators of the cognitive, and their significance. The indicators of the perceptual include adaptation, rivalry, pop-out, speed of perceptual processing, and illusory contours. The chapter discusses two kinds of adaptation, the visual hierarchy—the use of adaptation in distinguishing high-level from low-level perception—and the use of adaptation in distinguishing high-level perception from cognition. It argues that semantic satiation is perceptual, not cognitive. It discusses Weber’s Law, search efficiency, innateness, and perspectival sensitivity. The chapter ends with an argument that the indicators of perception are more a product of one function of perception than of perception’s fundamental nature.
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Block, Ned. "Perception is iconic; cognition is discursive." In The Border Between Seeing and Thinking, 215—C5.F13. Oxford University PressNew York, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0005.
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Abstract This chapter distinguishes iconic from discursive representation in the context of a discussion of format and function. It discusses the determinacy of iconic representation, analog magnitude representation, mental imagery, holism, and integral vs. separable dimensions. It rebuts dualistic views of perception that treat object perception as discursive. That discussion concerns object-file representations in perception and memory. The chapter argues that the term “object-file” is a locus of confusion since it can be used to denote nonconceptual nonpropositional perceptual representations and also conceptual propositional representations in working memory. This discussion depends on distinguishing iconic memory, fragile visual short-term memory, and working memory.
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Block, Ned. "Cognitive penetration is common but does not challenge the joint." In The Border Between Seeing and Thinking, 338—C9.F19. Oxford University PressNew York, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0009.
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Abstract The main aim of this book is to argue for a joint in nature between cognition and perception even if perception is cognitively penetrable. There are many different notions of cognitive penetration, even when one excludes notions based on the epistemology of perception and even when one focuses on issues of cognitive architecture. This chapter discusses some of the many notions of cognitive penetration, arguing that on the most central versions, there is cognitive penetration but that it does not challenge a joint between perception and cognition. The main examples of cognitive penetration involve ambiguous stimuli and feature-based attention. The chapter presents cases that would be counted as cognitive penetration by many common standards, though it will often focus on the Fodor/Pylyshyn idea of cognitive penetration as a direct influence of a cognitive state on the content of a perceptual state in virtue of the contents of both states.
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Block, Ned. "Introduction." In The Border Between Seeing and Thinking, 1–60. Oxford University PressNew York, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0001.
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Abstract This chapter introduces key concepts of perception, cognition, concept, proposition, high-level properties, low-level properties, iconic representations, nonconceptual state, nonpropositional state, associative agnosia, apperceptive agnosia, the global broadcasting approach to consciousness, the recurrent processing view of consciousness, the distinction between perception and a minimal immediate direct perceptual judgment, core cognition, the difference between intrinsic and derived intentionality, peripheral inflation, fragile visual short-term memory, working memory, slot vs. pool models of working memory, conceptual engineering, the language of thought, and the default mode network. It explains the three-layer methodology of the book: It starts with prescientific ways of thinking of perception and cognition, using them to identify apparent indicators of perception and cognition; then considers whether the indicators depend on constitutive properties of perception and cognition or mere symptoms; and then leverages those conclusions to find the constitutive features of perception and cognition. The chapter explains how work on the neural and psychological basis of consciousness can be repurposed to isolate the psychological and neural basis of perception. The chapter ends with a consideration of consequences outside philosophy of mind of the views presented.
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Block, Ned. "Nonconceptual color perception." In The Border Between Seeing and Thinking, 265—C6.N9. Oxford University PressNew York, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0006.
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Abstract This chapter argues that babies between 6 months and 11 months have color perception without color concepts. It discusses perceptual categories, color constancy, and whether adults have conceptual color perception or both nonconceptual and conceptual color perception. The chapter argues that at least some perceptual representation is nonconceptual in both infants and adults, so even if some perception is conceptual, perception is not constitutively conceptual. The argument relies on an extended example. Babies between the ages of 4–6 months and 11–12 months have near-adult level color discrimination—though perhaps without adult level color constancy—and have perceptual category representations. But they normally lack color cognition or color concepts (or even color proto-concepts), including the concept of color and the concepts of specific colors. The argument in this chapter depends on a three-way distinction among color category representations: (1) nonconceptual color category representations, which develop at 4–6 months of age; (2) color concepts, which develop starting around 11–12 months; and (3) linguistic color concepts, which develop starting around 3 years. The argument of this chapter will be used in Chapter 13 for phenomenally conscious color perception without access conscious color perception.
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Block, Ned. "Modularity." In The Border Between Seeing and Thinking, 394—C11.F2. Oxford University PressNew York, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0011.
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Abstract One approach to the perception/cognition distinction is based on the cognitive architecture of the mind, the relatively fixed structures within which perception and cognition operate. One type of architectural theory is the modularity view. Another is the dimension restriction hypothesis. But even if the mind is not modular, there are significant partial truths in modularity theses. For example, perception has significant dimensions of informational encapsulation. Jerry Fodor (1983) characterized modules in terms of a list of nine diagnostic properties that are supposed to apply to input systems but not to central cognition. Those properties are: domain specificity, mandatory operation, limited central accessibility, fast processing, informational encapsulation, “shallow” outputs, fixed neural architecture, characteristic and specific breakdown pattern, and characteristic ontogenetic pace and sequencing. Each module was supposed to have its own “database” and its own algorithms which were available to the computations of that module but not to other modules. This chapter discusses Fodor’s notion of modularity and goes through his criteria one by one, concluding that there is some truth in the modularity thesis but that it is substantially wrong.
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Block, Ned. "Neural evidence that perception is nonconceptual." In The Border Between Seeing and Thinking, 306—C7.F3. Oxford University PressNew York, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0007.
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Abstract This chapter is about experiments that aim to isolate the neural basis of conscious perception, but in line with the methodology discussed in Chapter 1, I am putting the issues of consciousness to one side, focusing on the neural basis of perception itself as contrasted with the neural basis of perceptual judgment. The chapter discusses the “no-report” paradigm not from the point of view of homing in on the neural basis of consciousness independently of report but rather from the point of view of separating perception from the cognitive processes underlying report. The global workspace and higher order theories of consciousness are implicitly committed to conscious perception being conceptual, as I will show in Chapter 13. What this chapter is about is neural evidence that perception is nonconceptual. I distinguish between phenomenal consciousness of perception, what it is like to have a perceptual experience, and access-consciousness, cognitive access to the perceptual content. Cognitive access to perceptual content is indeed conceptual but the perceptual content itself, or rather the state that has the perceptual content, is not conceptual. The chapter explains this point by noting what is by now a well known problem in identifying the neural basis of perception: Experiments typically require responses such as pressing one button rather than another, and it is difficult to see how to separate the neural basis of the perception itself from the neural basis of the cognitive processes involved in deciding on a response (Block, 1995a; 1997b). Those cognitive processes include deciding how the task set by the experimenter fits with the perception, maintaining the representation of the task and the perceptual categories in working memory and deploying those working memory representations in deciding what the response should be. This problem is especially acute when it comes to isolating the nonconceptual ground of perception, since the subjects’ cognitive processing will inevitably involve perceptual judgments and the application of concepts required for judgments. In addressing this problem, this chapter distinguishes the “no-report” paradigm from the “no-cognition” paradigm in the context of the “bored monkey” problem and the controversy over binocular rivalry and consciousness. Recent evidence showing that the “bored monkey” problem is an important factor using a mind-wandering technique will be presented.
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Block, Ned. "Evidence that is wrongly taken to show that perception is conceptual." In The Border Between Seeing and Thinking, 325—C8.F4. Oxford University PressNew York, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0008.
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Abstract The previous two chapters make the main positive case for nonconceptual perception. Chapter 6 focused on psychology and Chapter 7 focused on neuroscience. Now I turn to the negative case—that case against arguments that perception or some aspects of it are conceptual. One negative argument was made in the last chapter, the argument against the use of the concept of an object file to show that object perception is conceptual. This chapter will focus on an argument that perception must be conceptual because conceptual recognition happens so fast that there is no time for conceptual cognition to be deployed. I will argue first that a consideration of the carwash model of perception undermines the fast perception argument and second that, surprisingly, there is considerable cognitive access to mid-level vision. This point will also be mentioned in the discussion of modularity in Chapter 11.
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Block, Ned. "Top-down effects that are probably not cases of cognitive penetration." In The Border Between Seeing and Thinking, 380—C10.F9. Oxford University PressNew York, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0010.
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Abstract Although, as argued in Chapter 9, cognitive penetration occurs in the case of ambiguous stimuli especially when feature-based attention is deployed, cognitive penetration is not as common as many suppose. This chapter discusses the question of whether knowledge of what is depicted by a figure has an effect on whether it is seen as a figure or as ground, concluding that classic effects are more likely to be a product of familiarity, a non-cognitive form of memory and of standard gestalt principles than of knowledge. The only clear cases of cognitive penetration in figure/ground perception are effects of feature-based attention of the sort discussed in Chapter 9. Experiments are discussed that appear to show that knowledge of the color of fruits and vegetables affect how they look. The chapter argues that these effects, if they exist, are probably due to associations within the visual system. The chapter also discusses experiments that suggest the effects are not visual at all.
Conference papers on the topic "Perception/cognition border"
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Micó Romero, Noelia. "Problèmes de terminologie dans « Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan/ Plan d’urgence de bord contre la pollution par les hydrocarbures » sur la Méditerranée à partir d’une traduction de l’anglais vers le français." In XXV Coloquio AFUE. Palabras e imaginarios del agua. Valencia: Universitat Politècnica València, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.4995/xxvcoloquioafue.2016.3058.
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Dans notre communication nous essayons de décrire comment les langues (en l’occurrence l’anglais, le français et de forme subsidiaire l’espagnol) appréhendent une petite parcelle de la réalité : la pollution des hydrocarbures. Notre cadre conceptuel s’aligne avec la sémantique cognitive, centrée sur la perception expérientielle du sujet parlant, tout en dépassant ainsi le modèle des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes (CNS) initié par Aristote et celui de la sémantique compositionnelle du structuralisme. Par contre, la sémantique cognitive (Rosch, Putnam, Kleiber) se base sur la « Embodied Cognition Thesis », la « Thèse de la cognition incarnée », selon laquelle notre corps influe sur notre langage, notre pensée, nos concepts. Cette approche introduit la théorie du prototype où Kleiber (1990) traite la catégorisation à partir du « meilleur exemplaire » et de la notion de « ressemblance de famille ». Dans notre étude, nous analysons comment l’anglais, le français et l’espagnol catégorisent la même réalité à partir du texte « Plan d’urgence de bord contre la pollution par les hydrocarbures », traduit de l’anglais. Dans un premier temps, nous aborderons des questions générales sur les caractéristiques des textes techniques tant en anglais comme en français et dans un deuxième temps, nous commenterons les différentes traductions en les groupant par domaines ou champs sémantiques (i.e. parties du bateau, équipage,…) En somme, des termes techniques qui ne seront pas analogues et dont les différences s’expliquent non seulement par la diversité des langues (aspects morphosyntaxiques, attribution, détermination etc.) mais aussi par des questions d’ordre différent que nous essayons de justifier à travers d’exemples tirés de notre corpus.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4995/XXVColloqueAFUE.2016.3058
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Georgakopoulou, Nefeli, Makrina Viola Kosti, Sotiris Diplaris, Maurice Benayoun, Antonio Camurri, Beatrice de Gelder, Melanie Wald-Fuhrmann, et al. "ReSilence: Retune the Soundscape of future cities through art and science collaboration." In 28th International Symposium on Electronic Art. Paris: Ecole des arts decoratifs - PSL, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.69564/isea2023-58-full-georgakopoulou-et-al-resilence.
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Advances in cognitive science, sensing technologies, the arts and creative industries are paving the way for a deeper understanding of the behaviour of individuals regarding the land/soundscape they live in. Through a symbiotic relationship between artists, scientists and technology experts ReSilence explores the borders between sound and silence in a changing world by producing sound awareness in urban spaces (not only reducing the intensity of noise, but also considering it as energy producer and designing positive sounds, sounds we want to preserve and multiply). More specifically ReSilence focuses in musical experience design centred on the active participation of citizens, in the new silence of mobility, in the acoustic perception of outdoor urban soundscapes and in enhancing experiences for people with hearing and vision impairments.
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Trenor, Julie Martin, Shirley L. Yu, Ting-Ling Sha, Katherine S. Zerda, and Consuelo L. Waight. "Investigating the relations of ethnicity to female students’ perceptions and intention to major in engineering using social cognitive theory." In 2007 37th annual frontiers in education conference - global engineering: knowledge without borders, opportunities without passports. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/fie.2007.4418017.
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Bernhagen, Max, and Angelika C Bullinger. "Towards Reliable Tactile Mid-Air Interfaces: Analysis of Influencing Factors of the Perception of Tactile Mid-Air Feedback." In 8th International Conference on Human Interaction and Emerging Technologies. AHFE International, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.54941/ahfe1002760.
Full textAbstract:
Human-machine interfaces require an efficient and reliable interaction under various con-ditions. Especially under conditions with high cognitive workload which require rapid situa-tion assessment, interfaces should reliably support the human perception. Here, research addresses gesture-based interfaces as a possible interface to enable intuitive interactions based on ingrained daily routines. Using spatial commands executed by the bare hand, one can recreate real world interactions like pushing a knob, turning a controller, or using a ges-ture as an input command. In comparison to real input devices gesture-based interfaces lack haptic feedback for the user. Tactile feedback is important as it indicates for example interaction borders (e. g. edge of the mouse pad) or provides feedback of a successful in-teraction (e. g. sensation of the pushed button). This helps to increase the usability of mid-air gestural systems. For the realisation of mid-air tactile feedback two technologies can be considered. Vortex-generators and ultrasound-based feedback utilise the bare hand and need no device attached to the hand. However, they provide weak feedback which can be influenced by airflow, hand posture, clothing, workload or other factors. To achieve the aforementioned benefits, users have to reliably perceive the tactile feedback – and to do so, perception of tactile mid-air feedback needs to be researched in more detail.We present a method for the analysis of influencing factors on the perception. A driving simulator was the basis for a standardised apparatus in which tactile feedback was pre-sented via a vortex-generator. For each influencing factor, participants were asked to do a driving task (Lane Change Task - LCT) and detect tactile stimuli in parallel. By the help of the method of constant stimuli, a psychometric function for each influencing factor was derived. On this function detection, thresholds of 50%, 90%, 95% and 99% were chosen to represent the most important values in terms of human-machine interaction. In compari-son to widely used methods like staircase procedures, this approach promises to give a better insight into the effects of the influencing factors as the whole psychometric func-tion can be analysed instead of one distinct value.Two experiments (N= 80; 31) were conducted to apply the approach and analyse the influ-ence of workload by a variation of speed and secondary task type. Also, one experiment (N= 16) investigated the influence of hand temperature on the perception of the feedback. Results show that increased speed and the addition of a secondary tasks significantly in-crease the perceived workload. Regarding the perception of tactile stimuli, slight differ-ences for different workload conditions and a cut-off for high workload conditions were found. Furthermore, the effect of temperature on the perception on tactile feedback could be shown. Based on the studies, advantages and disadvantages of the proposed approach are dis-cussed. Also, the impact of workload and temperature in terms of design recommenda-tions for human-machine interaction are examined. The presented approach suggests a promising method to investigate the impact of influencing factors on specific design ele-ments for human-computer interaction. Further studies should investigate the eligibility for other modalities and applications.