To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Pay-performance sensitivity.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Pay-performance sensitivity'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 dissertations / theses for your research on the topic 'Pay-performance sensitivity.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse dissertations / theses on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Koskelo, E. (Eerik). "CEO compensation and pay-for-performance sensitivity." Master's thesis, University of Oulu, 2014. http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:oulu-201403131171.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis determines the state of recent developments in CEO compensation in the spirit of corresponding literature. Besides the literature review, empirical study provides further evidence on CEO pay-for-performance sensitivities in the US listed companies during 2007–2011 and containing Compustat Execucomp data of more than 33,000 CEOs from more than 3,000 companies. I build the regression similar to methods in a groundbreaking paper from Jensen and Murphy (1990a) and expecting positive and significant relationship between the change in CEO total compensation and shareholder wealth. My estimate of the pay-for-performance relation for chief executive officers indicates CEO wealth changes by $4.93 per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. Role of the value of CEO stock holdings plays the most important role determining pay-for-performance sensitivity a $4.7 change in CEO wealth per 1,000 change in shareholder wealth. I also report CEO total mean compensation during 2007–2011 is $5,968,000 a year. The mean value of option awards have declined by 18% and median stockholdings have increased during the same period by 130%. Relatively high value of pay-for-performance sensitivity and CEO stockholdings may help other shareholders to solve the differing interests of their and CEOs. Besides stock rewards, other compensation methods are needed to minimize the effect of systematic risk. Relative performance evaluation RPE, could be used together with equity-based incentives but they are not widely used in US listed companies. However, further research is needed to determine how equity-based compensation affects on CEOs excessive risk taking.
2
Nellkrans, Gabriel, and Seyfi Dogan. "Pay-performance sensitivity during financial distress : Did the financial crisis change payperformance sensitivity?" Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-255729.
Full textAbstract:
This study examines the existence of pay-performance sensitivity in total compensation and bonus during the financial crisis, using data between 2007-2010 from Swedish 196 listed firms. We perform panel data regression analysis of CEO compensation on financial performance measured as stock returns. Our results indicate that there is, although not significant, a weak positive relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance during 2007-2010. However during 2009-2010 in a market state defined as post-crisis we find weak negative pay-performance sensitivity at a significance level of 10 %. Nevertheless, as regards to the bonus paid to executives there was a significantly positive relationship relative bonus % and firm performance. These results contribute to our understanding of the pay-performance sensitivity in times of financial disturbance, highly relevant to the existing debate considering CEO compensation.
3
Ko, Hin-Cheung Annie. "Product market competition, corporate governance and pay-performance sensitivity." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2009. http://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_ra/1063.
Full text
4
Shaw, Paul Anthony. "CEO pay-performance sensitivity in South African financial services companies." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/27027.
Full textAbstract:
Orientation: CEO remuneration has attracted attention over the past two decades, with significant renewed interest in light of the role it is said to have played in contributing to the global financial crisis. At the heart of the issue is the perceived weak relationship between corporate performance and CEO remuneration.Research purpose: The purpose of this study was to describe the relationship between corporate performance and CEO remuneration within the South African financial services industry.Motivation for the study: The motivation for the study was to develop a deeper understanding of the relationship within the South African context, as South African banks have remained stable and profitable through the financial crisis.Research design approach and method: The research was a quantitative, archival study, conducted over a six year time period. The primary statistical techniques used in the study included: bivariate regression analysis, multiple regression analysis, and analysis of variance.Main findings/results: The primary finding was that the relationship between corporate performance and CEO remuneration is favourable (moderate to strong), but has experienced a decline. This finding emphasises the impact that macroeconomic trends have on the relationship and the role of managerial power during periods of economic uncertainty.The research further describes the structural changes in CEO remuneration with a shift away from variable pay.Practical managerial implications: The results suggest that the use of discretion and the growing impact of managerial power will be key challenges that iii remuneration committees will face in maintaining a favourable relationship between the two constructs in the future.Contribution/value add: The study provides context to CEO remuneration within a South African framework. It further provides provides a key insight that the relationship between corporate performance and CEO pay is highly dependent on the macroeconomic environment, and that CEO pay in the South African financial services is experiencing structural changes.Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2012.
Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)
unrestricted
5
Gomes, Paula Florência Almeida de Amorim. "A relação entre Conservadorismo Contábil e Pay-Performance Sensitivity: evidências do mercado brasileiro." Faculdade de Ciências Contábeis, 2018. http://repositorio.ufba.br/ri/handle/ri/25809.
Full textAbstract:
Submitted by Paula Florência Almeida de Amorim Gomes (contabilista.paula@gmail.com) on 2018-04-25T02:19:04Z
No. of bitstreams: 2
A RELAÇÃO ENTRE CONSERVADORISMO CONTÁBIL E PAY-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY EVIDÊNCIAS DO MERCADO BRASILEIRO.PAULA AMORIM GOMES.pdf: 1699379 bytes, checksum: 7fbe80fd1e732bf3cac807e0f2b55c8d (MD5)
A RELAÇÃO ENTRE CONSERVADORISMO CONTÁBIL E PAY-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY EVIDÊNCIAS DO MERCADO BRASILEIRO.PAULA AMORIM GOMES.pdf: 1699379 bytes, checksum: 7fbe80fd1e732bf3cac807e0f2b55c8d (MD5)Approved for entry into archive by Marivalda Araujo (masilva@ufba.br) on 2018-04-25T14:34:51Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 A RELAÇÃO ENTRE CONSERVADORISMO CONTÁBIL E PAY-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY EVIDÊNCIAS DO MERCADO BRASILEIRO.PAULA AMORIM GOMES.pdf: 1699379 bytes, checksum: 7fbe80fd1e732bf3cac807e0f2b55c8d (MD5) A RELAÇÃO ENTRE CONSERVADORISMO CONTÁBIL E PAY-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY EVIDÊNCIAS DO MERCADO BRASILEIRO.PAULA AMORIM GOMES.pdf: 1699379 bytes, checksum: 7fbe80fd1e732bf3cac807e0f2b55c8d (MD5)
Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-25T14:34:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 A RELAÇÃO ENTRE CONSERVADORISMO CONTÁBIL E PAY-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY EVIDÊNCIAS DO MERCADO BRASILEIRO.PAULA AMORIM GOMES.pdf: 1699379 bytes, checksum: 7fbe80fd1e732bf3cac807e0f2b55c8d (MD5) A RELAÇÃO ENTRE CONSERVADORISMO CONTÁBIL E PAY-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY EVIDÊNCIAS DO MERCADO BRASILEIRO.PAULA AMORIM GOMES.pdf: 1699379 bytes, checksum: 7fbe80fd1e732bf3cac807e0f2b55c8d (MD5)
Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado da Bahia - FAPESB
Um conjunto de estudos recentes aponta a relevância do conservadorismo contábil na formulação de contratos de incentivo aos executivos. As evidências de fortes correlações entre conservadorismo contábil e os indicadores de pay-performance sensitivity corroboram com a ideia de que o conservadorismo contábil é demandado pelas empresas como um meio de lidar com problemas de conflitos de agência, tais como como a miopia gerencial e o gerenciamento de resultados. Neste sentido, o presente estudo investiga a correlação entre o conservadorismo contábil condicional e a pay-performance sensitivity nas empresas que vinculam formalmente a remuneração variável de seus executivos ao desempenho contábil. A amostra contém 474 observações referentes a 131 empresas listadas na BMF&Bovespa, no período de 2011 a 2016. Para atingir o objetivo proposto, foi empregada uma regressão com dados em painel por meio de um modelo empírico que captura a relação entre o conservadorismo contábil e a pay-performance sensitivity. As variáveis do estudo foram extraídas dos dados da remuneração de executivos e das demonstrações contábeis destas empresas que são divulgados no Formulário de Referência e no Economática®, respectivamente. Os resultados da pesquisa indicam que as empresas brasileiras que fornecem incentivos de curto prazo aos seus executivos não apresentam relação entre o conservadorismo contábil condicional e a pay-performance sensitivity. Complementarmente, foram realizados testes adicionais empregando-se outras medidas de desempenho contábil no modelo de regressão, uma análise da pay-performance sensitivity por meio do modelo de Jensen e Murphy (1990) e uma análise do conservadorismo condicional da amostra, através do modelo de Basu (1997). Os resultados são robustos para diferentes indicadores de desempenho contábil, como retorno sobre os ativos – ROA e retorno sobre o patrimônio líquido - ROE, mesmo submetendo-os a diversas variáveis de controle. Com a análise da pay-performance sensitivity das empresas pode-se verificar que a remuneração dos executivos não apresentou sensibilidade tanto em relação às medidas de desempenho contábil, quanto ao retorno das ações. Os resultados mostram que quanto maiores os índices de MTB (market-to-book) maior é a remuneração dos executivos. No entanto, a remuneração mostrou uma relação inversa com a alavancagem financeira e governança corporativa. Também não foi detectado nível de conservadorismo contábil que indique sua presença nas demonstrações contábeis da amostra, o que sustenta os resultados encontrados para a hipótese do estudo. Portanto, pode-se perceber que mesmo com o uso generalizado de pagamento de bônus e participações e das evidências de gerenciamento de resultados, as empresas brasileiras não apresentam o conservadorismo contábil como mecanismo de monitoramento de seus contratos de incentivo, expondo-as aos riscos de oportunismo gerencial, contabilidade agressiva, e redução da qualidade da informação dos relatórios financeiros. Diante deste ambiente institucional, estas evidências podem indicar um alerta para os órgãos reguladores de normas contábeis e para as empresas do mercado brasileiro com relação à necessidade de se implantar mecanismos de eficiência contratual, como o conservadorismo contábil, no desenho de contratos de incentivo mais eficientes e equilibrados.
A number of recent studies point to the relevance of accounting conservatism in the formulation of incentive contracts to executives. Evidence of strong correlations between accounting conservatism and pay-performance sensitivity indicators corroborates the idea that accounting conservatism is demanded by firms as a means of dealing with problems of agency conflicts such as ex post settling up problem and management earnings. In this sense, the present study investigates the correlation between conditional accounting conservatism and pay-performance sensitivity for companies that formally based variable remuneration of their executives to accounting performance. The sample contains 474 observations referring to 131 companies listed on the BMF & Bovespa between 2011 and 2016. To achieve the proposed objective, a regression with panel data was employed through an empirical model that captures the relationship between accounting conservatism and pay-performance sensitivity. The study variables were extracted from the executive compensation data and the financial statements of these companies that are disclosed in the Form 20F and Economática®, respectively. The results of the research indicate that Brazilian companies that provide short-term incentives plans to their executives have no relation between conditional accounting conservatism and pay-performance sensitivity. In addition, additional tests were performed using other measures of accounting performance in the regression model, a performance-based pay-sensitivity analysis using the model of Jensen and Murphy (1990) and an analysis of conditional conservatism of the sample, using the model of Basu (1997). The results are robust for different accounting performance indicators, such as return on assets - ROA and return on equity - ROE, even by subjecting them to several control variables. With the analysis of the pay-performance sensitivity of the companies, it can be verified that the executives' compensation was not sensitive both to the measures of accounting performance and to the return of shares. The results show that the higher the MTB (market-to-book) indices the higher the executive compensation. However, the remuneration showed an inverse relationship with financial leverage and corporate governance. We also did not detect degrees of accounting conservatism that indicate its presence in the financial statements of the sample, which supports the results found for the hypothesis of the study. Therefore, it can be seen that, even with the generalized use of bonuses and participations and evidence of results management, Brazilian companies do not present accounting conservatism as a mechanism for monitoring their incentive contracts, exposing them to risks managerial opportunism, aggressive accounting, and reduced quality of financial reporting. In view of this institutional environment, this evidence may indicate an alert for accounting standards regulators and companies in the Brazilian market, regarding the need to implement contractual efficiency mechanisms, such as accounting conservatism, for the design of incentive contracts more efficient and balanced.
6
Tian, Shu Banking & Finance Australian School of Business UNSW. "Executive compensation and firm performance." Awarded by:University of New South Wales. Banking and Finance, 2005. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/22417.
Full textAbstract:
This study considers the determination of the ex ante pay-performance relationship. A single-period partial equilibrium model is used to show that the executive income can be expressed as a function of the firm's return expressed in dollar terms. The executive income is jointly determined by the opening firm size and current return, which function as a managerial talent proxy and self-selection mechanism respectively. Comparing to Jensen and Murphy (1990) wealth-based Pay-Performance Sensitivity (PPS), this research presents an income-based PPS. The alternative PPS not only overcomes a misleading misspecification in Jensen and Murphy (1990), but also corrects Rosen's (1992) argument for only including return in the pay performance relationship. This research finds empirically that both the opening firm size and stock return play a significant role in determining executive income. This study provides supplementary evidence to Murphy's (1986) Learning Model. However, shareholder income may not be an ideal performance measure in capturing the multi-period pay-performance relationship.
7
Swatdikun, Trairong. "Executive pay-performance sensitivity and its consequences : empirical evidence on the role of ownership in Thailand." Thesis, University of Southampton, 2013. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/348683/.
Full textAbstract:
Executive compensation has been extensively studied in market orientation economy; consequently the conflict of interest between the Principal and the Agent is clearly defined in a widely-held firm. A concentration-owned firm that dominates Asian capital markets have not such a conflict between the shareholders and the managers, but groups of shareholders in conflict are a concern. Since only one group of owner dominates the decision, executive compensation is hardly believed to be well established. Using a unique Thai listed company’s data between 2002 and 2008 as a sample, this study presents empirical evidence on Agency theory outside the Anglo-Saxon setting. Ordinary least square method, fixed effects, two-stages least squares, generalised method of moments are deployed to test the hypotheses. In addition to all executive receives base pay, it reveals that bonus is the most common incentive while fewer than 10% of listed companies provide stock option to their executive. The econometric results reveal positive pay-performance sensitivity in Thai listed companies. However, ownership structure does play a vital role in the sensitivity. In a widely-held firm, the positive influence of firm performance on executive compensation is found. The evidence supports that widely-held firms have well established their executive compensation package. In the foreign-owned firm, the positive sensitivity reveals that foreign ownership actively take part in the compensation policy to serve the firm interests. Furthermore; Managerial power suggests that in the imbalance of power between groups of shareholder, there is no pay-performance sensitivity in neither family-owned nor corporate-owned firms. Further evidences indicate that operation cash flow and stock return are the consequence of executive bonus pay.
8
Safa, Mohammad Faisal As. "Essays on Commercial Bank Risk, Regulation and Governance." ScholarWorks@UNO, 2013. http://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/1703.
Full textAbstract:
I analyze the effect of various risks faced by commercial banks on the executive compensation in banking industry. Commercial bank executives are risk averse due to the regulatory pressure in addition to board governance mechanism. Commercial banks face various risks because of the regulatory mechanism and unique asset structure of the firm. So, it is expected that they should associate their own pay and pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) with the risks their banks face.
I find that bank executives associate their performance based pay with both idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk. But they associate their fixed pay only with systematic risk. The risk based PPS is also affected by the idiosyncratic risk but not by the systematic risk. Both asset return risk and insolvency risk have significant positive effect on PPS.
Bank executives put significantly higher emphasis on the fixed compensation in terms of salary and bonus, and significantly lower emphasis on the performance based compensation. They also put minimum emphasis on the risk based PPS although they put significant emphasis on return based PPS. These indicate the risk-averse nature of the bank executives due to the regulatory pressure in addition to board governance mechanism.
9
Steyn, Gideon Francois. "The relationship between CEO compensation and future share returns in South Africa." Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/5272.
Full textAbstract:
Magister Commercii - MComAs a result of high economic inequality, widespread discontent with excessive chief executive officer (CEO) compensation levels is acute in South Africa (SA). Some commentators argue that instead of high levels of CEO pay causing inequality, it may be part of the solution if higher levels of CEO compensation translate into better company performance, so reducing unemployment. International studies investigating the relationship between CEO short-term cash compensation and current company performance generally report a weak or no relationship where accounting based measures of performance are used. Developments in the international literature reflect a stronger relationship when long-term incentive compensation (LIC) is included and total shareholder return (TSR) used to measure company performance. However, a concerning negative association between the highest paid CEOs in terms of excess LIC and future abnormal TSR is reported. In contrast, SA pay-performance research is largely not reflective of the developments in the international literature, with local studies mostly finding no pay-performance relationship, except where size-related accounting measures are used. As a result of the strong correlation between CEO pay and company size reported in the international literature, and local studies not adequately controlling for company size, the accuracy of the conclusions drawn in prior studies on the pay-performance sensitivity relationship in SA are brought into question. This study addresses the gaps in the SA literature by investigating the relationship between the size-adjusted excess CEO compensation and future abnormal TSR for the top 100 SA companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange for the period 2011 to 2013. A positive relationship is found between future abnormal TSR and short-term cash compensation, but not LIC. The levels and structure of CEO compensation in SA is also described.
10
JIN, Man. "An analysis of the effects of the probability of informed trading (pin) on corporate diversification discount and CEO pay-performance sensitivity : evidence from China." Digital Commons @ Lingnan University, 2011. https://commons.ln.edu.hk/fin_etd/2.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis includes estimating the probability of informed trading, PIN, developed by Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1996, 1997a, 1997b), for a large sample of listed firms in China from 2002 to 2008, and I use PIN to explore two independent research questions in corporate finance.
First, the probability of informed trading is applied to explain the discount in value for firms with diversified business operations. Although aiming to increase firm value, the corporate diversification decision usually results in a firm value discount, for a variety of reasons, one of which is the transparency problem. My study directly tests the relation between the information asymmetry revealed from the stock market and the firm value discount due to diversification decision. The results show that the corporate diversification decisions result in a lower firm value in China, mainly because the diversified firms suffer from a higher level of information asymmetry or a lower level of transparency. After controlling for the measure of information asymmetry, the strategy of diversification itself does not reduce firm value.
Second, the probability of informed trading is applied to explain the payperformance sensitivity of CEO compensation in Chinese listed firms. The payperformance sensitivity measures the change in managerial compensation based on the change in shareholder wealth. A higher information asymmetry helps and encourages shareholders to spend more on incentivizing the management team. My results show that higher level information asymmetry is associated with higher payperformance sensitivity of CEOs in China. The result also holds if information asymmetry is approximated by analysts’ forecast errors.
According to the estimates of PIN in this thesis, Chinese firms are shown to exhibit a higher level of information asymmetry than what has been found in the U.S. market. The thesis ends with a brief discussion of the results and what future research could follow.
11
Forst, Arno. "Insider Entrenchment and CEO Compensation in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Empirical Investigation." VCU Scholars Compass, 2009. http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/1714.
Full textAbstract:
This study investigates the effects of insider entrenchment on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation in firms conducting an initial public offering (IPO). The sample comprises 220 US firms that went public between 1996 and 2002. Corporate governance choices regarding entrenchment are captured by six provisions in the corporate charter and bylaws, as well as five anti-takeover statutes, which may or may not be in effect in the state of incorporation. Firm-level items are supermajority requirements for charter amendments, bylaws amendments, and merger approvals, along with the presence or absence of a staggered board of directors, poison pills, and golden parachute agreements. The anti-takeover laws examined are Business Combination, Control Share Acquisition, Fair Price, Poison Pill Endorsement, and Constituencies Statutes. A factor analysis reveals three distinct components of entrenchment: firm- and state-level external entrenchment and firm-level internal entrenchment. External entrenchment is related to market control over management by means of corporate takeovers; internal entrenchment relates to shareholder control over management by means of their voting power. Evidence is found for a positive association between entrenchment at IPO and subsequent CEO cash and total compensation. These relationships are driven by firm-level external entrenchment. Firm-level external entrenchment is also significantly and positively associated with CEO stock-based compensation. The positive effects of entrenchment at IPO on CEO compensation appear not to be transitory and remain constant for at least five years post-IPO. Furthermore, entrenchment at IPO is shown to affect CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity. On balance, entrenchment reduces the sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock returns and returns on assets. The results of this study underscore the crucial importance of insiders' governance decisions made at the time of the IPO. Little support is found for a re-balancing of components of the CEO's compensation contract in response to entrenchment as predicted under the optimal contracting theory of compensation contracts. The findings of this study are almost entirely consistent with the managerial power theory, according to which entrenchment at IPO causes a permanent shift in bargaining power, which enables CEOs to influence compensation contracts in their favor.
12
Singal, Manisha. "Corporate Governance and Strategic Behavior: A Study of Acquisitions and CEO Compensation Practices of Publicly-Owned and Family-Controlled Firms in S&P 500." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/77369.
Full textAbstract:
Recent research has suggested that interest alignment, i.e., the degree to which members of an organization are motivated to behave in line with organizational goals, is a source of competitive advantage that can generate rents for the firm (Gottschlag and Zollo, 2007). Drawing on agency theory, this dissertation tests whether the interest alignment premise manifests itself differently in the strategic behavior of family-controlled firms when compared to their nonfamily peers. In particular, for firms in the S&P 500, I evaluate the results of two important strategic policies; mergers and acquisitions, as well as CEO compensation practices.
In studying acquisitions made by family and nonfamily firms in the S&P 500 index from 1992-2006, I find that family firms are more careful when embarking on actions leading to mergers than non-family firms, as evidenced by their selection of smaller targets and targets who are in related businesses. I also find that there is a preponderance of cash purchases by family firms that does not vary with market movements and that completion times for merger transactions are shorter than for non family firms. The care and concern with which family-controlled firms choose their "mates" translates into higher stock returns when compared with non-family firms. Overall, I believe that family-controlled firms derive value from their merger and acquisition strategy.
With regard to CEO compensation practices, I find that family firms provide strong incentives to the CEO for superior performance but pay significantly lower than nonfamily firms in terms of both salary and stock-based pay. The pay-for-performance sensitivity between annual stock returns and total compensation is significantly greater for family firms in general, and for family CEOs when compared with compensation of CEOs in nonfamily firms. The pay-for-performance sensitivity is in turn positively related to firm performance, suggesting that firms with greater pay-for-performance sensitivity (family controlled firms) also perform better.
The analyses in my thesis thus illustrate that family-controlled firms and non-family firms in the S&P 500 differ in their strategic decision-making. It would be fair to say that family firms have longer investment horizons and give deliberate thought to expending resources whether for acquisitions or for CEO pay, and may suffer lower agency costs than nonfamily firms due to family governance (and public monitoring) which may lead to their relative superior performance. This dissertation finds that each acquisition made by a family controlled firm generates an extra return of 0.50% when compared with a nonfamily firm, and family controlled firms earn 0.50% every year directly attributable to pay-for-performance sensitivity.
The study thus underlines and reiterates the importance of instilling the long-term view in the management of all firms, lowering agency costs, and aligning the interests of managers with those of stockholders for superior financial performancePh. D.
13
CAROSI, ANDREA. "Il Consiglio di Amministrazione nelle Società Quotate: Teoria ed Evidenza." Doctoral thesis, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10280/462.
Full textAbstract:
Il presente contributo esamina il consiglio d’amministrazione delle società aventi azioni quotate in Borsa Italiana, e le retribuzioni destinate ai suoi membri, alla luce delle numerose innovazioni dell’ordinamento giuridico italiano e seguendo quella linea di analisi recentemente proposta dalla letteratura avente alla propria base l’idea che gli amministratori possono influenzare a proprio vantaggio i termini del pay-package loro corrisposto.
A tal fine l’elaborato presenta una struttura articolata in due parti, nella prima delle quali viene fornita una visione organica dell’assetto istituzionale in cui l’analisi empirica, prodotta nella seconda, trova il proprio presupposto. Più specificatamente, la prima parte della tesi fornisce un’analisi giuridico-finanziaria della figura dell’amministratore (Capitolo 1) e del consiglio d’amministrazione (Capitolo 2), che risulta, oltre che assente in letteratura, quantomai attuale alla luce delle numerose e recenti riforme normative introdotte in materia. La normativa primaria, costituita dagli articoli del codice civile riguardanti gli amministratori ed i sistemi d’amministrazione e controllo (libro V, sezione VI bis, del Codice Civile) e dalle disposizioni contenute nel T.U.F., va oggi infatti completata con le nuove disposizioni contabili derivanti dall’applicazione degli IAS, ed in particolare dell’IFRS2, con le novità introdotte dalla cosiddetta Nuova Legge sul Risparmio (D. L. n. 262/2006), con le linee di comportamento descritte nella terza versione del Codice di Autodisciplina (Best Practice Code, 2006), con le prescrizioni di tipo previdenziale e fiscale contenute nelle Leggi "Finanziaria" del 2006 e del 2007, nonché con le novità in materia di governance bancaria volute da Mario Draghi (emanate a Marzo di quest’anno ma da recepire entro il 30 Giugno 2009). La seconda parte dell’elaborato, prendendo spunto dai diversi approcci utilizzati in letteratura (Capitolo 3), e con riferimento al contesto italiano, fornisce invece un’analisi empirica del sistema di compenso applicato agli amministratori. Dapprima è tracciata, relativamente al periodo indagato (1999-2006), la dinamica temporale della ricchezza distribuita ai propri amministratori dalle società italiane. Successivamente viene fornita una stima dell’intensità degli incentivi impliciti nei directors’ pay-packages (i.e. pay-performance sensitivity), unitamente ad una analisi delle determinanti che ne sono alla base. L’ipotesi che guida tale parte del lavoro è che in un contesto caratterizzato da proprietà concentrata, a causa della capacità dell’azionista di maggioranza di estrarre risorse dalla società, è ragionevole presumere che gli amministratori risultino destinatari di una remunerazione meno sensibile alle performances dell’impresa e tendenzialmente più elevata. Più semplicemente la questione che viene posta è se gli amministratori scontano la possibilità d’espropriazione, componendo convenientemente il proprio pacchetto di compenso.
I risultati ottenuti confermano la validità dell’impianto d’ipotesi proposto ed evidenziano che la qualità della corporate governance è la variabile chiave. Le imprese dotate di un efficace ed efficiente governo societario riescono a controllare il processo di formazione delle remuneration policies impedendone manipolazioni opportunistiche. Le imprese caratterizzate da weak corporate governance risultano invece non solo incapaci di attuare politiche retributive volte alla massimizzazione del valore d’impresa, ma anche esposte all’estrazione di risorse da parte dei propri amministratori.What the largest corporation pay their top managers is one of the most analyzed topics in corporate finance since Jensen and Murphy, 1990. As they noted (Jensen and Murphy 2004), a well-designed remuneration package for executives attracts the right executives at the lowest cost; retains them at the lowest cost (i.e. encourage the right executives to leave the firm at the appropriate time); and motivates executives to take actions that create long-run shareholder value and avoid actions that destroy value. However, several recent studies have shown that the characteristics of real world compensation contracts rarely meet their counterparts in compensation contracting theory because of the executives’ capability to influence the terms of their compensation package to their personal advantage. For example, Yermack (1997) provides evidence that executives influence timing of their stock option awards, receiving at-the money options just prior to releasing news that increases company stock prices. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) argue that the practice of granting options at-the-money (rather than out-of-the-money or with exercise prices indexed to market movements) reflects the influence of rent-seeking managers trying to maximize their compensation in ways that are largely camouflaged to investors and the public. Going ahead, others empirical research give proofs that the executives’ power to influence their pay package is stronger when shareholders are diffuse and more passive (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001), and when the corporate governance is weaker (Garvey and Milbourn, 2006; Harford and Li, 2007). At the same time, the expropriation literature shown that dominant shareholders, especially in firms with poor corporate governance (Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell, 2008) and in countries with weak legal protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2002; Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang, 2002; Durnev and Kim, 2005), are able to divert resources from others shareholders to himself for personal consumption. Since expropriation implies fewer resources assignable to marginal shareholder, the firms which are ex ante more likely to be expropriated, trade at discounted valuations. Despite the considerable empirical evidence on the costs bore both by the dominant shareholder and by the minorities in case of expropriation, the literature doesn’t provide evidence of the cost supported by directors. Expropriation, in fact, represents, ex ante, a cost also for directors. First, it’s a direct cost which negatively affects the expected overall compensation rewarded, when directors have part of their remuneration which is tied to company’s performances. Since expropriation is a net loss for the company, which leads to a correspondent fall in the company market valuation, the closer is the alignment of directors’ interests with those of shareholders, the bigger is this cost. Second, since directors have to perceive the maximization of shareholders’ wealth (i.e. avoid loss of it), expropriation should affect negatively the director’s reputation capital. This work examines the director’s compensation in firms which are more likely to be expropriated by their dominant shareholders. In essence, the question I address is whether directors discount the expropriation’s possibility, setting up conveniently their compensation’s contract. I explore this issue using a sample of directors’ compensation data of Italian Listed firms made up over the period 1999-2006. The case of Italian Listed companies is of particular interest for several concomitant reasons. First, Italian firms have been historically more prone to choosing a closely-held ownership structure characterized by a wide separation between ownership and control (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer, 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Volpin, 2002; and Barontini and Caprio, 2006; Mengoli, Pazzaglia, and Sapienza, 2006). Second, Italy is a country where the low protection of minority shareholders allows controlling shareholder to extract a considerable amount of private benefits (Bigelli and Mengoli, 2004; McCahery and Vermeulen, 2004; and Bigelli, Merhotra and Rau, 2006). Finally, Italy is a country where the high dominant shareholder’s capability to replace directors and where the low efficiency of the job-market of directors, provide narrowed incentives to directors in order to effective monitoring dominant shareholder’s actions (Barontini and Caprio, 2002; Volpin, 2002). Overall, results confirm the testable hypotheses, and provide evidence of the key-role exerted by corporate governance. Firms with strong corporate governance are able to monitor the compensation policies creation process avoiding opportunistic manipulation. On the opposite, firms with weak system of corporate governance seem unable to implement compensation policies directed at the firm value maximization, and, going ahead, seem to be expropriated also by theirs directors.
14
CAROSI, ANDREA. "Il Consiglio di Amministrazione nelle Società Quotate: Teoria ed Evidenza." Doctoral thesis, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10280/462.
Full textAbstract:
Il presente contributo esamina il consiglio d’amministrazione delle società aventi azioni quotate in Borsa Italiana, e le retribuzioni destinate ai suoi membri, alla luce delle numerose innovazioni dell’ordinamento giuridico italiano e seguendo quella linea di analisi recentemente proposta dalla letteratura avente alla propria base l’idea che gli amministratori possono influenzare a proprio vantaggio i termini del pay-package loro corrisposto.
A tal fine l’elaborato presenta una struttura articolata in due parti, nella prima delle quali viene fornita una visione organica dell’assetto istituzionale in cui l’analisi empirica, prodotta nella seconda, trova il proprio presupposto. Più specificatamente, la prima parte della tesi fornisce un’analisi giuridico-finanziaria della figura dell’amministratore (Capitolo 1) e del consiglio d’amministrazione (Capitolo 2), che risulta, oltre che assente in letteratura, quantomai attuale alla luce delle numerose e recenti riforme normative introdotte in materia. La normativa primaria, costituita dagli articoli del codice civile riguardanti gli amministratori ed i sistemi d’amministrazione e controllo (libro V, sezione VI bis, del Codice Civile) e dalle disposizioni contenute nel T.U.F., va oggi infatti completata con le nuove disposizioni contabili derivanti dall’applicazione degli IAS, ed in particolare dell’IFRS2, con le novità introdotte dalla cosiddetta Nuova Legge sul Risparmio (D. L. n. 262/2006), con le linee di comportamento descritte nella terza versione del Codice di Autodisciplina (Best Practice Code, 2006), con le prescrizioni di tipo previdenziale e fiscale contenute nelle Leggi "Finanziaria" del 2006 e del 2007, nonché con le novità in materia di governance bancaria volute da Mario Draghi (emanate a Marzo di quest’anno ma da recepire entro il 30 Giugno 2009). La seconda parte dell’elaborato, prendendo spunto dai diversi approcci utilizzati in letteratura (Capitolo 3), e con riferimento al contesto italiano, fornisce invece un’analisi empirica del sistema di compenso applicato agli amministratori. Dapprima è tracciata, relativamente al periodo indagato (1999-2006), la dinamica temporale della ricchezza distribuita ai propri amministratori dalle società italiane. Successivamente viene fornita una stima dell’intensità degli incentivi impliciti nei directors’ pay-packages (i.e. pay-performance sensitivity), unitamente ad una analisi delle determinanti che ne sono alla base. L’ipotesi che guida tale parte del lavoro è che in un contesto caratterizzato da proprietà concentrata, a causa della capacità dell’azionista di maggioranza di estrarre risorse dalla società, è ragionevole presumere che gli amministratori risultino destinatari di una remunerazione meno sensibile alle performances dell’impresa e tendenzialmente più elevata. Più semplicemente la questione che viene posta è se gli amministratori scontano la possibilità d’espropriazione, componendo convenientemente il proprio pacchetto di compenso.
I risultati ottenuti confermano la validità dell’impianto d’ipotesi proposto ed evidenziano che la qualità della corporate governance è la variabile chiave. Le imprese dotate di un efficace ed efficiente governo societario riescono a controllare il processo di formazione delle remuneration policies impedendone manipolazioni opportunistiche. Le imprese caratterizzate da weak corporate governance risultano invece non solo incapaci di attuare politiche retributive volte alla massimizzazione del valore d’impresa, ma anche esposte all’estrazione di risorse da parte dei propri amministratori.What the largest corporation pay their top managers is one of the most analyzed topics in corporate finance since Jensen and Murphy, 1990. As they noted (Jensen and Murphy 2004), a well-designed remuneration package for executives attracts the right executives at the lowest cost; retains them at the lowest cost (i.e. encourage the right executives to leave the firm at the appropriate time); and motivates executives to take actions that create long-run shareholder value and avoid actions that destroy value. However, several recent studies have shown that the characteristics of real world compensation contracts rarely meet their counterparts in compensation contracting theory because of the executives’ capability to influence the terms of their compensation package to their personal advantage. For example, Yermack (1997) provides evidence that executives influence timing of their stock option awards, receiving at-the money options just prior to releasing news that increases company stock prices. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) argue that the practice of granting options at-the-money (rather than out-of-the-money or with exercise prices indexed to market movements) reflects the influence of rent-seeking managers trying to maximize their compensation in ways that are largely camouflaged to investors and the public. Going ahead, others empirical research give proofs that the executives’ power to influence their pay package is stronger when shareholders are diffuse and more passive (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001), and when the corporate governance is weaker (Garvey and Milbourn, 2006; Harford and Li, 2007). At the same time, the expropriation literature shown that dominant shareholders, especially in firms with poor corporate governance (Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell, 2008) and in countries with weak legal protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2002; Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang, 2002; Durnev and Kim, 2005), are able to divert resources from others shareholders to himself for personal consumption. Since expropriation implies fewer resources assignable to marginal shareholder, the firms which are ex ante more likely to be expropriated, trade at discounted valuations. Despite the considerable empirical evidence on the costs bore both by the dominant shareholder and by the minorities in case of expropriation, the literature doesn’t provide evidence of the cost supported by directors. Expropriation, in fact, represents, ex ante, a cost also for directors. First, it’s a direct cost which negatively affects the expected overall compensation rewarded, when directors have part of their remuneration which is tied to company’s performances. Since expropriation is a net loss for the company, which leads to a correspondent fall in the company market valuation, the closer is the alignment of directors’ interests with those of shareholders, the bigger is this cost. Second, since directors have to perceive the maximization of shareholders’ wealth (i.e. avoid loss of it), expropriation should affect negatively the director’s reputation capital. This work examines the director’s compensation in firms which are more likely to be expropriated by their dominant shareholders. In essence, the question I address is whether directors discount the expropriation’s possibility, setting up conveniently their compensation’s contract. I explore this issue using a sample of directors’ compensation data of Italian Listed firms made up over the period 1999-2006. The case of Italian Listed companies is of particular interest for several concomitant reasons. First, Italian firms have been historically more prone to choosing a closely-held ownership structure characterized by a wide separation between ownership and control (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer, 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Volpin, 2002; and Barontini and Caprio, 2006; Mengoli, Pazzaglia, and Sapienza, 2006). Second, Italy is a country where the low protection of minority shareholders allows controlling shareholder to extract a considerable amount of private benefits (Bigelli and Mengoli, 2004; McCahery and Vermeulen, 2004; and Bigelli, Merhotra and Rau, 2006). Finally, Italy is a country where the high dominant shareholder’s capability to replace directors and where the low efficiency of the job-market of directors, provide narrowed incentives to directors in order to effective monitoring dominant shareholder’s actions (Barontini and Caprio, 2002; Volpin, 2002). Overall, results confirm the testable hypotheses, and provide evidence of the key-role exerted by corporate governance. Firms with strong corporate governance are able to monitor the compensation policies creation process avoiding opportunistic manipulation. On the opposite, firms with weak system of corporate governance seem unable to implement compensation policies directed at the firm value maximization, and, going ahead, seem to be expropriated also by theirs directors.
15
Ching-HuaChu and 朱鏡樺. "Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Earnings Quality." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/59547873937065425754.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立成功大學
會計學系
102
In 2004, the modified Regulations Governing Information to be Published in Annual Reports of Public Companiesof Taiwan requires public companies to disclose the interval of CEO compensation in annual reports. Further the amended Securities and Exchange Act requires that companies whose stock listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) or Over-the-counter (OTC) markets to set up the compensation committee. The purpose of these newly announced regulations is to improve the efficiency of CEO compensation. The main objective of this study is to investigate whether higher CEO pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) may provide CEO’s stronger incentive to manage earnings, and how the earnings management motivated by PPS affects the value-relevance of accounting information. I collect the listed firms from 2007 to 2012. The empirical results show that the association between PPS and discretionary accruals is positive significantly. The findings suggests that the higher the correlations between CEO compensation and reported income, the more likely for CEO to manage earnings. Further, I find that companies with high PPS have lower earnings response coefficients than those with low PPS. This result suggests that higher discretionary accruals do not significantly enhance the value relevance of earnings.
16
陳靜儀. "Agency Problems and Pay-Performance Sensitivity." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/35902048301125986299.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立彰化師範大學
財務金融技術學系
102
The purpose of this study is to investigate the correlation between agency problem and pay-performance sensitivity. There are many traditional agency problems and core agency problems with regard to Taiwan’s companies. This study obtains sample companies from 2005 to 2012, and understands how agency problems influence pay-performance sensitivity. The evidence suggests that regardless of a company exists that agency problems will lead to executives receive higher pay, in addition, when the company there are core agency problems, executives’ pay-performance sensitivity is more obvious.
17
CHEN, HSUEH LING, and 陳雪玲. "Can Compensation Committee Increase Pay-Performance Sensitivity?" Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/82210081627118750059.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺北商業技術學院
會計財稅研究所
101
Section 14-6 of Securities Exchange Act is amended in November 24, 2010 to stipulate that corporations shall set up compensation committees. This research explores whether the mandatory compensation committee can increase pay-performance sensitivity and to provide the Board the specification establishment of compensation committee and operation model of compensation committee. The subject of this research is publicly listed companies from 2007, 2010 and 2011. The empirical results show that pay-performance sensitivity of the companies with compensation committees does not significantly differ from companies without compensation committees. In addition, the effectiveness of board is negative and significantly associated with association of pay-performance sensitivity and existence of compensation committees.
18
Liu, Lichi, and 劉力綺. "Corporate Governance and CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/49966797804158597635.
Full textAbstract:
碩士中國文化大學
會計學系
99
The Board is responsible for determining CEO compensation, board oversight on the ability of the past studies have shown that the company performance and CEO compensation have an effect. Therefore, the study of ownership structure and board of directors as the research variables, and the performance sensitivity of CEO compensation as the dependent variable, investigate how the ownership structure and board of directors affect the performance sensitivity of CEO compensation to reduce conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers.
19
Yi-Jiun, Chen, and 陳怡君. "Financial Statement Restatements and Pay-Performance Sensitivity." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/39722333816642205721.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立彰化師範大學
財務金融技術學系
102
The purpose of the study is to investigate the effects of pay-performance sensitivity on the company’s financial statement restatements. Since the quality of financial statement restatemets will be questioned. To avoid executive compensation relying too much on the earnings of report, the company will redesign the compensation structure and also reduce the associativity between compensation and performance. This research takes Listed companies and OTC companies in Taiwan as examples which financial statement restates are in the period of 2006-2012. Furthermore, the firms which have similar size (that did not restate) in the same industry from the same period are chosen as the control firms. The empirical results indicate that compared to matched control firms, restated firms have lower pay-performance sensitivity. Moreover, the situation is more obvious in which pay-performance sensitivity of decrease is belonging to government regulators have expressed great concern over financial statement restatements.
20
Yeh, Chen-Yu, and 葉晨昱. "The Pay Performance Sensitivity Before and After Say on Pay Regulation." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/52749893116068454794.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺灣大學
會計學研究所
104
Say on Pay (SOP) is a term used for a rule in corporate law whereby a firm''s shareholders have the right to vote on the emuneration of executives. SOP potentially increases scrutiny over top management’s compensation and therefore, this study investigates how SOP affects the pay-performance sensitivity of US firms. Based on ExecuComp data from 2007 to 2014 (and excluding the years 2010 and 2011), the results show that pay-performance sensitivity increased significantly after SOP became effective. When further decomposing executive pay into its cash-based and equity-based components, this study finds evidence of an increase in the link between performance and these executive compensation components as well. Further, using pre-SOP data, even though Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016) find that ownership by passive fund increases several corporate governance of a firm, they did not find that ownership by passive fund increases the sensitivity of pay to stock price movements. Their results suggest that passive fund ownership’s ability to influence pay structures is limited before SOP became effective. However, this study finds that the increase in pay-performance sensitivity after SOP is larger in firms with higher passive fund ownership relative to firms with lower passive fund ownership. The results suggest that SOP do increase the executive compensation monitoring ability for investors who care about the long-term value of a firm but who are lack of the ability to influence executive compensation structure before SOP. Thus, in contrast to most prior studies on the impact of SOP on executive incentives and compensation, the evidence shown in this study is consistent with SOP improves rather than weakens the alignment of managerial wealth and shareholder interests.
21
Chen, Kuan-Pei, and 陳冠蓓. "Corporate Governance, Pay-Performance Sensitivity, and the Incentive Pay: Evidence from China." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/16236102368033468831.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
金融與國際企業學系金融碩士班
102
This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on two types of managerial compensation, cash compensation and incentive compensation. Our analysis is based on managerial compensation in China’s public traded firms from 2003 to 2012.We also use matched sample on 198 company which using stock incentive pay from 2006 to 2012. We find that the excess control right is positively related to both types of managerial compensation, and is negatively related to the pay-performance sensitivity. Moreover, managerial compensation is positively correlated to accounting performance in state controlled company, while managerial compensation is positively correlated to market performance in non-state controlled company. This paper also prove that managerial compensation is positively correlated to accounting performance before the split share structure reform while correlated to market performance after the split share structure reform.
22
Juan, Wei-Lin, and 阮唯林. "IFRSs Earnings Reconciliations and Executives Pay-Performance Sensitivity." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/64w38j.
Full textAbstract:
碩士中原大學
會計研究所
102
The Financial Supervisory Commission(FSC) announced that Taiwan listed firms mandatory adoption the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) prepare financial reports from year 2013 and disclose the reconciliations of accounting change between ROC GAAP and IFRSs of year 2012 in their consolidated financial reports. This research examines whether IFRSs earnings reconciliations influences executives’ compensation in year 2012. Further, this study also distinguishes IFRSs earnings reconciliations into positive reconciliations and negative reconciliations and examines the asymmetric sensitivity of executives’ compensation to IFRSs earnings reconciliations. Finally, we divide listed firms into profit and loss firms to examine whether IFRSs earnings reconciliations have different effect on compensation. Empirical results indicate that IFRSs earnings reconciliations have positive impact on executives’ compensation. This result shows that IFRSs earnings reconciliations positively affect executives’ compensation. Moreover, executives’ compensation will increase with positive reconciliations, but not with negative reconciliations. This result shows that positive reconciliations and negative reconciliations have asymmetric impact on compensation. Finally, there is no significant difference between IFRSs earnings reconciliations and executives’ compensation in profit firms. But there is a significant positive difference between IFRSs earnings reconciliations and executives’ compensation in loss firms. This result shows that the high relevance between compensation and accounting earnings lead executives to increase their compensation by using IFRSs earnings reconciliations.
23
Shang-MingHuang and 黃上銘. "Stock Repurchase, Pay-Performance Sensitivity and CEO Ownership." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/32596416859476354376.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立成功大學
會計學系
102
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship of stock repurchase, pay-performance sensitivity and CEO ownership. We try to answer three important repurchase questions: First, whether firms with greater pay-for-performance sensitivity tend to repurchase more. Second, whether firms with higher CEO ownership tend to buy back more. Finally, how pay-performance sensitivity and ownership together affect repurchase. We test sample comprising all TSE and over-the-counter (OTC) firms in Taiwan from 1998 to 2011 with empirical research. I find that pay-performance sensitivity does not significantly affect the stock repurchase. However, I do find a strong positive association between CEO ownership and stock repurchase. In addition, if we consider the effect of pay-performance sensitivity and CEO ownership simultaneously, the findings reveal a positive effect for pay-performance sensitivity, but a negative effect for CEO holding, suggesting a substitution effect.
24
Chen, Pei-Chi, and 陳珮綺. "Executive Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Corporate Monitoring Mechanism." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/37072890861818537743.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
102
Owing that there is an increasing number of studies integrating executive pay-performance sensitivity yet with few using samples from Taiwan, this dissertation employs a data set of Taiwan listed firms from 2007 to 2012 to examine the association between pay-performance sensitivity and monitoring mechanisms from shareholders and the board. The main contribution of this study is to further divide executive compensation into cash compensation and equity compensation and explore the impacts of the monitoring mechanisms on these two types of pay-performance sensitivities. The empirical results suggest that pay-to-performance is less sensitive when board size is large and when many executives are in the board. As for the shareholder monitoring mechanism, pay-performance sensitivities under total and cash compensation is increased when blockholders monitoring is added, while equity pay-performance sensitivity shows the opposite relation. These results implicate that under the circumstances of firms connecting executive compensation and firm performance to mitigate the gap between managers’ and shareholders’ interests, corporate monitoring mechanisms may perform add-on effects or serve as substitutes.
25
Lin, En-Hung, and 林恩弘. "How Do Foreign Investors Influence Pay-Performance Sensitivity." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/79106073676965706885.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立中興大學
財務金融學系所
103
The objective of this study is to examine whether the relation between foreign in-vestors and pay-performance sensitivity. The extant literature has less examined the im-pact of foreign investors on pay-performance sensitivity. Our sample from Taiwan stock market from 2005 to 2013.We found that higher foreign investors reveal significant pay-performance sensitivity , however, lower foreign ownership do not. Our study infer that foreign investors is an important factor to monitor company. In addition, our study control self-selection model that foreign investors may only invest in firms that have exhibited good governance practices. Our results shows that foreign shareholders can improved corporate governance.
26
Meng-TingLiu and 劉孟婷. "The Relation between IFRS adoption and Pay-Performance Sensitivity." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/yw6up7.
Full text
27
Liu, Chia-Wei, and 劉嘉惟. "CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity, Inside Debt, and Firm Innovation." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/92qjz9.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立彰化師範大學
會計學系
105
This paper is to examine whether CEO pay-performance sensitivities and inside debt affect firm innovation. According to agency theory, managers may damage shareholders’ wealth for maximizing their self-interest. Previous literatures have document that CEO compensation scheme is the way for fixing this agency problem. However, different CEO compensation schemes would lead CEOs to have different risk preferences. We try to argue that high CEO pay-performance sensitivity to option would motive CEO to take high risky projects, saying in-house R&D. In other way, granting CEO more inside-debt would motive CEO to avoid risky projects, in terms of in-house R&D. By investigating S&P 500 firms from 2006-2015, we find that that if firms have high CEO pay-performance sensitivity to option, they are willing to take downside risk from the innovation activities. Furthermore, firms with high CEOs’ inside debt have less risky projects, in terms of external patent acquisition. This paper tries to contribute the literatures to provide competent evidences for the influences of debt-like and equity-like compensations on innovation activities.
28
Wu, Shing-Jen, and 吳幸蓁. "Pay-Performance Sensitivity, Performance Threshold and Discretionary Accounting Choices--An Empirical Study." Thesis, 2001. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/27056478082478715958.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立中正大學
會計學研究所
89
This study investigates whether increases in CEO pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) affect the CEO’s discretionary accounting choices, by examining the relation between PPS and discretionary accruals (DA), where DA are proxies for the aggregate effect of accounting choices on income. We argue that one benefit of increasing accounting income is the consequent increase in pay. Therefore, the higher the correlations between pay and reported income (higher PPS), the more income-increasing accounting choices CEO should make, hence the higher discretionary accruals. After controlling the economic determinants of the PPS and the endogeneity between PPS and DA, we find that the association between CEO pay and reported income has positive and significant influences on discretionary accruals. Two circumstances are identified where positive discretionary accruals are used to achieve certain performance thresholds. These performance thresholds are defined as (1) zero earnings, when income before discretionary accruals is less than zero; and (2) prior year reported income, when income before discretionary accruals is less than prior year reported income. We find that greater positive discretionary accruals are used to avoid earnings decreases and losses when income before discretionary accruals is less than zero or prior year reported income. Finally, we argue that CEO has greater incentive to adopt income-increasing discretionary accruals when higher PPS is coupled with losses (or earnings decreases). Our analyses show that only when higher PPS is coupled with earnings decreases can we find positive discretionary accruals becomes significantly greater. In contrast, the discretionary accruals do not demonstrate significant increases when higher PPS is coupled with losses. In our opinion, CEO may prefer to take a bath when higher PPS is coupled with losses.
29
Hou, Pei-Xiu, and 侯佩秀. "The Influence of CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity on Voluntary Disclosures." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/96997093875939865961.
Full text
30
Tseng, Yu-Ting, and 曾郁婷. "China Compensation Committee, Pay-Performance Sensitivity, and Financial Report's Quality." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/38743564735872977998.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
會計學系碩士班
101
This paper focuses on how the features of China compensation committee affect pay-performance sensitivity and the quality of financial statement. The timeframe of this paper is from 2003 to 2011 and the target of the research is A-share listed company in China. This paper first discusses if pay-performance sensitivity could be raised after the listed company establishes compensation committee. This study analyzes whether the scale of the committee, the participation of managers, and the portion of independent director in compensation committee could affect the pay-performance sensitivity. Finally, this paper hypothesizes if the three features could restrain companies from using discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings, so as to affect the quality of financial statement. As a result, according to Hypothesis 1, the compensation of top executive management increases significantly and the pay-performance sensitivity becomes much higher after the establishment of compensation committee. For Hypothesis 2, the result indicates that the larger scale of compensation committee would lead to higher pay-performance sensitivity: more diverse and professional advices would be provided if the compensation committee contains more members, and the higher participation of managers would lead to lower pay-performance sensitivity. When top executive management takes part in compensation determination, the independence of compensation committee would become vulnerable, and the higher portion of independent directors would lead to higher pay-performance sensitivity, which proves that the participation of independent directors could raise the independence of compensation committee. Finally, for Hypothesis 3, the results show that the smaller scale of compensation committee and the higher portion of independent directors would cause smaller discretionary accruals, but the impact is not significant. Regarding that higher portion of independent directors could be able to restrain companies from using discretionary accruals to manipulate financial statement for better financial performance.
31
Lyu, Yunru, and 呂昀儒. "The Relationship between Blockholder Monitoring and CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/38482483493703844616.
Full textAbstract:
碩士東海大學
企業管理學系碩士班
99
This study investigated the effect of blockholder monitoring the impact of CEO pay performance sensitivity.For this study, the performance indicators to measure by stock returns, and performance is divided into the external environment performance and internal capabilities performance. This study added a blockholder monitoring, blockholder ratio can strengthen the monitoring effect, and rate of change in blockholder can weaken the monitoring effect, observations CEO pay performance sensitivity will be affected. Divide the concept of performance into the external environment performance and internal capabilities performance and continue to observe the blockholder monitoring and CEO compensation and performance of the external environment, the performance sensitivity of the relationship between internal capabilities. In this study, the total CEO compensation, dividends into equity compensation and cash compensation, empirical results show that both the overall performance analysis only, or the performance down into external and internal environmental performance capability performance, performance on CEO pay has a positive relationship. Shows the overall performance of both the external and internal environmental performance capability performance, performance pay has highly pay performance sensitivity. The study also found that Taiwan's companies to blockholder ratio of positive results is not obvious, because there may be among Taiwan companies as blockholder holding interaction, resulting in weak oversight role; but Taiwan's blockholder turnover of listed companies weaken monitoring results are obvious, the more frequent changes in blockholder, monitoring results weaker, due to more frequent changes in blockholder, the CEO of the company's business there is the problem of asymmetric information, can not suppress the external environmental performance and CEO compensation connectivity; in the above results, CEO total compensation and CEO equity have similar results, but the result of CEO cash is difference, because CEO equity has more incentive effect and more flexible. In the performance divide, should strengthen the internal capacity of the link performance and CEO pay, reduce external environmental performance, so that it can highlight the CEO in the management of the importance of capacity; and changes in blockholder significantly larger, thus reducing the change in major shareholders to increase shareholder ownership rate compared to more efficient and be able to monitor blockholder have positive effects.
32
Lee, Yuen-Ting, and 李婉婷. "Auditor Industry Specialization and Pay-Performance Sensitivity of Executive Compensation." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/71620818135979916427.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺灣大學
會計學研究所
100
This study examines whether firms have higher pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation when audited by an industry specialist. Using a sample of publicly-traded Taiwanese companies during 2005-2010, this study finds that there is a significantly positive association between auditor industry specialization and pay-sensitivity of accounting performance. The results hold for both firm-level industry specialist and partner-level industry specialist. The findings are consistent with the optimal contracting theory that the board of directors increases the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation when the accounting-based measure is of higher quality due to higher auditor industry expertise.
33
Hsiu-FenLi and 李秀芬. "The effect of XBRL adoption on the pay-performance sensitivity." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/mms6kc.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立成功大學
會計學系
107
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of the XBRL mandate on pay-performance sensitivity. I posit that XBRL improves external monitoring and in turn strengthens the link between pay and performance. Irrespective of market-based or accounting-based performance measures, the empirical results reveal that pay-performance sensitivity increases after XBRL adoption. Moreover, I find that firm is likely to give more equity-based compensation after XBRL mandate. I also provide evidence that XBRL reporting improves the monitoring environment to a greater extent for small firms. In dynamic analysis, the result provide evidence to support the causal inferences about the relationship between XBRL implement and compensation contract design.
34
Lee, Wei, and 李濰. "The Relationship Between Executive Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity–Evidence from China." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/16411356941795118752.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
金融與國際企業學系金融碩士班
103
In this study we investigate the relation between pay-performance sensitivity and investment-cash flow Sensitivity of 2,408 listed firms in China during 2005-2014. We also examine the differences in such relationship betweenState-owned and Non- State-owned enterprises. The proxies for pay-performance sensitivity are salary pay-performance Sensitivity and incentive pay-performance sensitivity. Incentive pay includes stock and stock options that company's CEO received by the end of each year. We find that pay-performance sensitivityattenuate the relationship between investment and cash flow sensitivity under the condition that company's free cash flow greater than 0. Such relation is more significant in non-state-owned firms than in State-owned firms, implying that the latter are more poorly governed than the former.
35
Pei-HsuanChiang and 江沛璇. "The Effect of Mandatory XBRL Adoption on CEO Pay-performance Sensitivity." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/5x859e.
Full text
36
Chien, Hung-Ling, and 簡宏凌. "The Impact of Remuneration Committee Composition on pay-performance sensitivity of executives." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/w5s4va.
Full textAbstract:
碩士中原大學
會計研究所
103
This study explores the impact of the compensation committee on pay-performance sensitivity of executives. In addition, this research explores the above effects by classify the compensation of executives into two definitions: total compensation and dividend rewards only (including cash dividends and stock dividends). As for total compensation, I found that when the chairman serves in the compensation committee, it decreases pay-performance sensitivity of the executives. Meanwhile, when the chairman also plays the CEO role, it has negative effect on pay-performance sensitivity of the executives. In other words, these findings reflect when the chairman participates in the compensation committee, the self-benefit behavior is easily occurred. And this leads to the decrease pay-performance sensitivity of the executives. Finally for the dividend reward, I find out that the larger the ratio of independent director in the compensation committee, the higher pay-performance sensitivity of executives is.
37
李易庭. "The Effects of Compensation/Audit Committee Overlap, Pay-Performance Sensitivity and IFRSs." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/94814328379842132611.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立彰化師範大學
財務金融技術學系
104
This study examines how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and the director overlapping (defined as overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees) affects the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) on listed companies in Taiwan. Using 2826 firm-year observations over the period 2011-2014, we find that when IFRSs implemented, companies will increase the PPS. However, when take into account the influence of the director overlapping, we find that there will not affect the implementation of IFRSs on the PPS .But without director overlapping, the implementation of IFRSs will enhance the PPS. This findings indicate that the compensation committee which has members involve in the audit committee will increase the doubts and prudence of the financial statements information on compensation decisions. And the design of compensation will be less susceptible by the impact of changes in accounting standards.
38
Chen, Siang-Fong, and 陳祥鳳. "The Effect of Controlling Owners and Compensation Committee on Pay-Performance Sensitivity." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/65684075545569246744.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立彰化師範大學
會計學系
104
Previous researches indicated that companies in Taiwan have controlling owners generally, and these controlling owners have effect on management and operation of companies. In 2010, the Financial Supervisory Commission required that TWSE-listed, GTSM-listed and emerging-stock Companies must establish compensation committee after 2011. Therefore, this study is to explore whether ultimate owners’ cash flow rights, the directors affiliated with controlling owners, and the divergence between ultimate owners’ board seat and cash flow rights affect the establishing effect of compensation committee. The empirical results indicate that the increasing of the directors affiliated with controlling owners would weaken pay-performance sensitivity in director compensation and accounting performance after compensation committee establishing. However, there is no evidence found that the higher ratio of cash flow rights and the greater divergence between the ultimate owners’ board seat and cash flow rights have positive and negative moderating effect upon pay-performance sensitivity.
39
Hong, Shu-Li, and 洪淑莉. "The relationships among CEO''s pay-performance sensitivity, corporate governance and earning management." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/66290378281595105827.
Full textAbstract:
碩士雲林科技大學
財務金融系碩士班
96
This study investigates the relationship between the CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) and the CEO’s behavior of earnings management. The CEO’s behavior of manipulating accounting earnings by discretionary accruals (DA) may be related to the effective superintendence on the board of directors. Generally speaking, the board of directors designs the compensation scheme according to CEO’s achievements, and it will decrease the CEO’s behavior of manipulating accounting earning if the corporate governance mechanism works. On the contrary, it will increase the CEO’s behavior of manipulating accounting earning if the corporate governance mechanism doesn’t work. We find that the association between CEO pay and reported income has positive influences on discretionary accruals, and the corporate governance index has negative influences on discretionary accruals.
40
Wu, Si-Xuan, and 吳思萱. "The impact of the credit risk and Pay-Performance Sensitivity on CEO turnover." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/2c744z.
Full textAbstract:
碩士中原大學
會計研究所
103
The credit rating is the score which evaluates company’s future operational condition rated by professional institution. It also reflects the company’s credit risk and solvency. Therefore, the credit rating can also be considered an indicator of executives’ performance. Except for financial industry companies, I use companies listing in Taiwan stock exchange during 2009 to 2013 to conduct this research. And I use the score of credit rating as the level of credit risk. First, I investigate whether the credit risk will have impact on CEO turnover rate. Then I tend to find out whether high Pay-Performance Sensitivity will moderate the relationship between credit risk and CEO turnover. Finally, I try to learn whether the compensation committee will moderate the relationship between credit risk and CEO turnover. Empirical results show that the credit risk has a positive effect on CEO turnover. Moreover, I find Pay-Performance Sensitivity negatively moderate the relationship between credit risk and CEO turnover. However, it seems that the compensation committee could not moderate the relationship between credit risk and CEO turnover.
41
Hui-WenChang and 張惠雯. "The Effect of Compensation Committee on the Pay-Performance Sensitivity―Evidence from Taiwan." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/69726851791455601162.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立成功大學
會計學系碩博士班
101
Previous research indicated that effective compensation contracts can improve the incentive effect for agents, prompting agents to make their best effort to increase shareholder wealth. The Compensation Committee plays an important role in corporate governance mechanism. Prior studies have shown that the establishment of the Compensation Committee can enhance the compensation’s oversight of directors, supervisors and managerial officers, thereby increasing the sensitivity between pay and performance, strengthening the effects of pay contract, and reducing information asymmetry caused by agency problems. In 2010, Taiwan modified the Securities Exchange Act, requiring companies whose stock is listed in the Taiwan stock exchange (TSE) or traded over-the-counter (OTC) shall set up a Compensation Committee. This study uses samples companies in Taiwan from 2008 to 2011 to investigate the influence of Compensation Committee establishment on the pay-performance sensitivity. The empirical results show that after Compensation Committee is established, the accounting-based performance measures (i.e. EPS) has a negative incremental impact on the average director and supervisor compensation. By contrast, the association between market-based performance measures (i.e. RET) and the average director and supervisor compensation enhances significantly after the implementation of Compensation Committee. The results indicated that the establishment of Compensation Committee strengthens the link between the director and supervisor compensation and company performance as evident by the higher degree of pay-performance sensitivity.
42
Lin, Hsinping, and 林欣屏. "A Study on the Impact of Legislation on the Director Pay-Performance Sensitivity." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/87843602674309367555.
Full textAbstract:
碩士東海大學
財務金融學系碩士在職專班
99
This empirical research investigates how regulations regarding individual disclosure of directors’ compensation, rating of information disclosure, directors’ ownership , and establishment of independent directors (hereinafter referred to as “regulations”) affect directors’ pay-performance sensitivity. We use ROE, ROA, and RET, three proxy variables measuring firms’ performance, as explanatory variables to estimate directors’ compensation and excess compensation. Furthermore, we use a set of interactions of “regulations” dummies and firms’ performance in the model to evaluate the relationship among board directors’ compensation and these factors. As can be seen in the result, the adoption of individual disclosure of directors’ compensation may enhance the sensitivity of directors’ compensation to ROE. Nevertheless, no evidence shows the interaction of adopting individual disclosure and firms’ performance is statistically significant with excess compensation-performance sensitivity. We also find that, due to the higher level of information transparency, directors’ compensation and excess compensation both become more sensitive to ROE, and vice versa. Furthermore, while directors’ ownership has positive impact on the sensitivity of directors’ compensation to performance, unexpectedly, it has opposite effect on the sensitivity of excess compensation to the interactions of directors’ ownership, ROA and RET. At last, the sensitivity of directors’ compensation to performance would be intensified with the establishment of independent directors, and the similar result is obtained as the interaction of excess compensation and ROE being the measurement of performance.
43
吳亭儀. "Does Socially Responsible Firm Has Greater Pay-Performance Sensitivity on Director/Top Management?" Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/54v7dx.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立彰化師範大學
財務金融技術學系
105
Based on the data of 1,484 nonfinancial listed-companies on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) and Gre-Tai Securities Market (GTSM) over the period from 2005 to 2015, this paper examines the linkage between firm’s engagement in Corporate Social Responsibility and the compensation on director/top management that is measured by pay-for-performance sensitivity. In recent years, the firm has paid more and more attention on Corporate Social Responsibility. Existing studied has mentioned that the relationship between the social responsibility and operational performance, but how social responsibility affects corporate governance such as the greater importance of stakeholder interests, thereby affecting the director/top management, the study of the rationality of compensation is relatively lacking. As a result of the literature that the company appears to be weaker pay-for-performance sensitivity is considered to be a form of agency problems, indicate the company may appear poor governance situation. Generally, the better company's social responsibility on behalf of corporate governance is also better, the pay-for-performance sensitivity will be greater. For this reason, this thesis suggests that the linkage between compensation and performance of corporate managers and directors will be likely to be affected by corporate social responsibility. Empirical result shows that the company's investment in social responsibility activities is more, the higher the linkage between the top managers and directors, the higher the rationality of the compensation.
44
Chen, Yi-Han, and 陳奕翰. "The Impact of the Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility Report on CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/bg6adv.
Full textAbstract:
碩士中原大學
會計研究所
105
This study examines the impact of mandatory disclosing corporate social responsibility (CSR) report on CEO''s pay-performance sensitivity. Firms are divided into two groups. One has better social responsibility (award firms), which is based on the Excellence in Corporate Social Responsibility conducted by CommonWealth Mangazine. Another is the firm that had issued CSR reports but did not get the award (non-award firms). Since the mandatory disclosure is implemented from 2014, the data of Taiwan listed companies from 2012 to 2015 are collected. The result shows that before the mandatory disclosure, the CEO''s pay-performance sensitivity does not have significant change for the award firms before and after mandatory disclosure. Finally, the CEO''s pay-performance sensitivity has increased for the non-award firms after mandatory disclosure, comparing before the mandatory disclosure. This research enhances the understanding of the relation of CEO''s pay-performance sensitivity and disclosure regulatory changes.
45
Jhou, Shen-Hao, and 周伸豪. "The Associations between Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Accounting-based Pay-performance Sensitivity: Evidence from Taiwan." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/5bfgn7.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立東華大學
會計與財務碩士學位學程
104
This study examines whether and how mandatory IFRS adoption in Taiwan affects the contractual usefulness of earnings information in executive compensation, as measured in pay-performance sensitivity (PPS). Extant studies indicate that the decision to use accounting performance measures in the executive compensation depends on how informative it is about the manger’s action. We posit that the transition from ROC GAAP to IFRS improves the quality of earnings, which in turn facilitates executive compensation contracting. The empirical results indicate an increase in accounting-based PPS during post-IFRS periods. We also find that the changes in executive contracts are mainly attributed to firms which experience greater increase in earnings quality during post-IFRS periods. Additionally, the increase in accounting-based PPS post to mandatory IFRS adoption is positively associated with the ratio of foreign boards.
46
Li, Kaimou, and 李凱貿. "The Relationship Between Monitoring Mechanism And Incentive Pay Performance Sensitivity- The US Bank Holding Company." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/79775585015039232492.
Full textAbstract:
碩士靜宜大學
財務金融學系
100
The agency problem between shareholders and management may be mitigated through the linkage of the executive compensation to firm performance. However, the executives have been found to be over-paid even though the firm performance is poor. Especially, the financial crisis of 2008 had highlighted the problems of “fat cat”. Therefore, to strengthen the corporate governance mechanism has been proposed to curb this phenomenon. Therefore, this study uses a sample of 172 U.S. bank holding companies during period 1996 to 2008 to examine the relationship between governance mechanism and the sensitivity of CEO incentive pay to bank performance. The duality of CEO also serving as the president of the board and subordinated debt are respectively used as proxies for internal and external monitoring mechanism in this study. The empirical results find that CEO stock option pay will increase and the sensitivity of CEO stock option pay to bank performance will be weakened when the CEO also serves as the president of the board. This result confirms the substitution relationship between internal governance mechanism and incentive pay mechanism. Moreover, we also evidence that the sensitivity of CEO stock option pay to bank performance will be strengthened when bank do issue subordinate debt.
47
Liang, Shu-Wei, and 梁書瑋. "The Effect of Establishment of Compensation Committee and Its Quality on CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/59672458556770517236.
Full textAbstract:
碩士東吳大學
會計學系
102
This study examine whether establishment of compensation committee (hereafter, CC) and its quality can improve the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting performance (i.e., the pay-performance sensitivity, PPS). Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms over the period spanning 2009-2012, the empirical results can support our argument that CC establishment have a positive effect on PPS. However, we do find that the higher CC quality, the positive association between CEO compensation and accounting earnings is more pronounced while we focus on the period of CC establishment. Overall, our findings indicate several compensation committee characteristics (e.g., meetings attendance, members’ directorship and tenure) have significant benefits in improving corporate governance mechanism of monitoring CEO compensation. Therefore, CC quality is dominated by its members’ attributes, that is, whether CC play a role of improving PPS depends on the characteristics of its committee members.
48
FU, YI-PING, and 傅怡萍. "The Association Among Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity,Corporate Governance and The Type of Earnings Management." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/34504621780851946522.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立高雄應用科技大學
會計系
104
The purpose of the study is to investigate the association between pay-performance sensitivity and the types of earnings management using companies, publicly listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange or Taipei Exchange during the period from year 2006 to 2014, as a sample. The empirical results show: (1) The manager within a company with high pay-performance sensitivity will prefer using real activities earnings management rather than accrual-base earnings management; (2) Comparing with low managerial ownership, high managerial ownership is more likely to mitigate the positive relationship between pay-for-performance sensitivities and earnings management; and finally (3) Comparing with low institutional investor’s stockholding, high institutional investor’s stockholding is more likely to mitigate the positive relationship between pay-for-performance sensitivities and earnings management.
49
Chen, Hui-Wen, and 陳惠文. "The Impact of Overlapping Financial Experts on CEO Compensation, Pay-Performance Sensitivity, and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/64283019449907256627.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺灣大學
會計學研究所
101
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of overlapping financial experts on CEO compensation, pay-performance sensitivity, and earnings management. The results support Chang et al. (2012) that financial experts sitting on both compensation and audit committees have an association with discretionary accruals and take conservative action by awarding CEO less equity-based compensation to reduce monitoring cost. Furthermore, the results show that the number of outside directorships held by overlapping directors has a positive relation with incentive-based compensation and earnings quality. The results present that financial experts are more experienced and knowledgeable if they hold more outside appointments. However, the negative impact caused by overlapping board structure on earnings management does not reduced even though financial experts are experienced and knowledgeable. Consist with Chang et al. (2012), this study finds no significant association between overlapping financial experts and pay-performance sensitivity.
50
Park, Jinhong. "Say on Pay, CEO Pay Sensitivities, Firm Risk and Agency Costs of Debt." Thesis, 2022. https://hdl.handle.net/2440/136414.
Full textAbstract:
I examine how Say on Pay affects firms’ agency costs of debt. Using a sample of US listed firms and employing a difference-in-differences framework, I find some evidence that higher CEO delta leads to a decrease in stock return volatilities and lower agency costs of debt, consistent with Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010). Further, I find some evidence that this decrease in agency costs of debt is concentrated in firms with long CEO tenures and high institutional ownership, within firms that show greater responsiveness to Say on Pay, implying that Say on Pay improves corporate governance in poorly governed firms and strengthens shareholder power. My findings are consistent with Correa and Lel (2016) and Cai and Walking (2011) and suggest that Say on Pay is an effective substitute for a corporate governance mechanism.Thesis (MPhil) -- University of Adelaide, Business School, 2022