Journal articles: 'Paul Horwich'

1

Field, Hartry. "Truth. Paul Horwich." Philosophy of Science 59, no. 2 (June 1992): 321–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/289671.

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Carmo, Juliano Santos do. "Paul Horwich: Significado como Uso/Paul Horwich: Meaning as Use." Pensando - Revista de Filosofia 3, no. 5 (August 16, 2012): 172. http://dx.doi.org/10.26694/pensando.v3i5.664.

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Este artigo tem por objetivo geral destacar alguns aspectos fundamentais para o entendimento adequado do significado linguístico centrado na ideia de “uso”. A noção de uso enquanto determinante do significado foi proposta pela primeira vez por Wittgenstein nas Investigações Filosóficas (1953). Desde então, surgiram muitas tentativas de compatibilizar a noção de uso com as demais perspectivas oferecidas pelo filósofo naquela obra, não obstante, a questão ainda permanece distante de atingir um consenso. Recentemente, a teoria do significado como uso proposta por Paul Horwich, reacendeu o debate a respeito das noções de uso, significado e naturalismo semântico. A abordagem inspiradora de Horwich tem se revelado uma excelente estratégia tanto no que se refere a evidenciar a pertinência da proposta wittgensteiniana, como no sentido de oferecer soluções eficazes às objeções recorrentes que ela enfrenta. O objetivo específico deste trabalho é mostrar o modo como Horwich pretende resolver algumas daquelas objeções.

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Fine, Kit. "Response to Paul Horwich." dialectica 61, no. 1 (March 2007): 17–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01093.x.

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Gustafsson, M. "Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy, by Paul Horwich." Mind 123, no. 492 (October 1, 2014): 1195–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzu156.

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Schulte, Joachim. "Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy, by Paul Horwich." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92, no. 1 (December 20, 2013): 194–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2013.862555.

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OMS, SERGI. "Conceivability, Minimalism and the Generalization Problem." Dialogue 58, no. 2 (June 5, 2018): 287–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217318000288.

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One of the main problems that Paul Horwich’s Minimalist theory of truth must face is the generalization problem, which shows that Minimalism is too weak to have the fundamental explanatory role Horwich claims it has. In this paper, I defend Horwich’s response to the generalization problem from an objection raised by Bradley Armour-Garb. I also argue that, given my response to Armour-Garb, Horwich’s proposal to cope with the generalization problem can be simplified.

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Hill, C. S. "Truth -- Meaning -- Reality, by Paul Horwich." Mind 120, no. 480 (October 1, 2011): 1262–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzr085.

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García Zárate, Óscar Augusto. "Análisis crítico del minimalismo de Paul Horwich." Escritura y Pensamiento 20, no. 42 (December 28, 2021): 175–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.15381/escrypensam.v20i42.21489.

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El minimalismo de Paul Horwich es la teoría que pretende ser la de mayores alcances epistemológicos dentro del deflacionismo. Su creador lo presenta como la última palabra sobre el concepto de verdad, declarando imposible un estudio más detallado y profundo sobre el tema, apoyándose en el conocido esquema de equivalencia, cuyos orígenes se pueden rastrear en los escritos seminales de Alfred Tarski. Sin embargo, llevando hasta sus extremos el poder explicatorio de la teoría mínima de Paul Horwich, resulta prácticamente nulo. Aunque su teoría de la verdad pueda justificarse, su semántica no puede sostenerse.

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WHYTE, J. T. "PAUL HORWICH, Truth. Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1990, pp 136." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43, no. 2 (June 1, 1992): 279–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/43.2.279.

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everett, anthony. "From a Deflationary Point of View - by Paul Horwich." Philosophical Books 48, no. 3 (July 2007): 277–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2007.00449_7.x.

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Carvalho, Marcondes Rocha. "Wittgenstein e a verdade." Investigação Filosófica 11, no. 1 (March 26, 2020): 19. http://dx.doi.org/10.18468/if.2020v11n1.p19-30.

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Este trabalho investiga a questão da verdade em Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Buscar-se-á analisar o artigo Wittgenstein on Truth (2016) de Paul Horwich, confrontando-o com o de Hans-Johann Glock, intitulado Truth in the Tractatus (2006), tendo como objetivo compreender os pressupostos filosóficos centrais das teorias correspondencialista e deflacionária da verdade. Para tanto, na primeira parte, faremos uma caracterização geral dos elementos centrais das teorias substancialista e não-substancialista da verdade; na segunda parte, comentaremos as dificuldades apontadas por Horwich (2016) e Glock (2006) na identificação da concepção de verdade do Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) enquanto correspondencialista e caracterizaremos, conforme Horwich (2016), os três defeitos da teoria da verdade do primeiro Wittgenstein; na terceira parte, mostraremos que Horwich também se baseia no que Glock denomina de teoria da verdade oficial do Tractatus, bem como as razões pelas quais Horwich (2016) considera ilegítima a introdução no deflacionismo no Tractatus como tentativa de salvar a teoria da verdade tractatiana; na quarta parte, faremos uma breve caracterização da concepção de verdade nas Philosophical Investigations - PI (1953), apontando a sua centralidade na reorientação do pensamento wittgensteiniano. E, por fim, como considerações finais, mostraremos as diferentes conclusões de Horwich (2016) e Glock (2006), assinalando também um aspecto positivo e outro negativo do deflacionismo.

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12

Newhard, Jay. "Disquotationalism, Minimalism, and the Finite Minimal Theory." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34, no. 1 (March 2004): 61–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2004.10716559.

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Recently, Paul Horwich has developed the minimalist theory of truth, according to which the truth predicate does not express a Substantive property, though it may be used as a grammatical expedient. Minimalism shares these Claims with Quine's disquotationalism; it differs from disquotationalism primarily in holding that truth-bearers are propositions, rather than sentences. Despite potential ontological worries, allowing that propositions bear truth gives Horwich a prima facie response to several important objections to disquotationalism. In section I of this paper, disquotationalism is given a careful exegesis, in which seven known objections are traced to the disquotational Schema, and two new objections are raised. A version of disquotationalism which avoids two of the seven known objections is recommended. In section II, an examination of minimalism shows that it faces eight of the nine objections facing disquotationalism, plus a new objection.

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Chappell, Timothy. "Paul Horwich, Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy (Oxford University Press, 2012). 225 pp., price £46.00." Philosophical Investigations 37, no. 3 (May 28, 2014): 258–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phin.12051.

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Dell'Utri, Massimo. "Alethic Deflationism and Normativity: A Critique." Veritas (Porto Alegre) 63, no. 1 (April 23, 2018): 292. http://dx.doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2018.1.29278.

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The paper starts by highlighting that virtually nobody would object to claims such as “to regard an assertion or a belief or a thought as true or false is to regard it as being right or wrong”—a claim that shows that truth is intrinsically normative. It is well known that alethic deflationists deny this. Paul Horwich, for instance, maintains that nothing shows that TRUTH is a normative concept in the way that OUGHT is. By relying on a distinction among dimensions of normativity I will try to pinpoint the weakness of Horwich’s argument in the fact that he works with a strong, uncalled-for, interpretation of normativity, whereas a weaker interpretation is more than enough. However, the impression might persist that a different understanding of the normativity of truth on the part of deflationists could eventually show the compatibility between alethic deflationism and normativity. The remaining part of the paper is devoted to contend that this is a wrong impression. Accordingly, it is stated that the normativity exerted by truth is ascribable in the final analysis to the world, and the provocative claim is defended that alethic deflationism lacks the conceptual resources to account for the relation between language and the world.***Deflacionismo Alético e Normatividade: Uma Crítica***O artigo começa destacando que praticamente ninguém se opõe a reivindicações como "considerar uma afirmação, uma crença ou um pensamento como verdadeiro ou falso é considerá-lo como correto ou errado" - uma afirmação que mostra que a verdade é intrinsecamente normativa. Sabe-se que os deflacionistas aléticos negam isso. Paul Horwich, por exemplo, sustenta que nada mostra que a verdade é um conceito normativo da maneira que deveria ser. Ao confiar em uma distinção entre as dimensões da normatividade, tentarei identificar a fraqueza do argumento de Horwich no fato de que ele trabalha com uma interpretação de normatividade forte, desnecessária, quando uma interpretação mais fraca seria mais do que suficiente. No entanto, a impressão pode persistir de que uma compreensão diferente da normatividade da verdade por parte dos deflacionistas poderia eventualmente mostrar a compatibilidade entre o deflacionismo e a normatividade alética. A parte restante do artigo dedica-se a afirmar que esta é uma impressão errada. Por conseguinte, afirma-se que a normatividade exercida pela verdade é imputável, em última análise, ao mundo, e a reivindicação provocativa é defendida de que o deflacionismo alético não possui os recursos conceituais para explicar a relação entre a linguagem e o mundo.

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Krempela, Raquel Albieri. "Resenha do livro Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy, de Paul Horwich, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012." Discurso 46, no. 2 (December 5, 2016): 335–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-8863.discurso.2016.123680.

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16

Moad, Edward. "Can Minimalism Account for the Value of Truth?" Disputatio 2, no. 24 (May 1, 2008): 271–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2008-0001.

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Abstract Michael Dummett, in ‘Truth,’ mounted an objection to the redundancy theory of truth on the grounds that it neglects to account for the normative features he claimed are part of the concept of truth. Paul Horwich, in ‘The Minimalist Conception of Truth’, notes that the same objection could be leveled against minimalism. He defends minimalism against Dummett’s objection by offering a sketch of an instrumental account of the desirability of truth that is compatible with the minimalist thesis. In this paper, I will review Dummett’s objection and Horwich’s response, identifying some concerns with the account as it stands. I will modify the account to address those concerns, and so that it successfully explains the desirability of having all true beliefs in a way that is compatible with minimalism. I then mount an argument that truth is also intrinsically valuable. The question regarding the adequacy of the minimalist account of truth, then, hinges on whether the account is compatible with the fact of truth’s intrinsic value, along with the question of whether that fact entails its also being essentially valuable.

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Daniel, Steven G. "Logic, Vagueness, and the Use Theory." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33, no. 2 (June 2003): 259–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2003.10716543.

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In numerous essays over the years, and most recently in his Meaning, Paul Horwich has worked to articulate and defend a version of the use theory of meaning. At the heart of his project is the idea that the meaning of a word is constituted by a regularity in speakers’ use of it — i.e., by a regularity in speakers’ dispositions to accept as true, to reject as false, or neither to accept nor to reject sentences containing it. A ‘use regularity,’ thus construed, is a dispositional acceptance property distinctive of a particular word and, derivatively, of sentences containing the word.

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Read, Rupert, and Timur Uçan. "Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy. By Paul Horwich. Oxford University Press, 2012, xv+225pp, £16.99. ISBN-10: 019966112X; ISBN-13: 978-0199661121." Philosophy 89, no. 2 (November 7, 2013): 362–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819113000776.

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Williamson, Timothy. "Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy, by Paul Horwich. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012, xv + 225 pp. ISBN 978-0-1996-6112-1 pb £16.99." European Journal of Philosophy 21 (June 2013): e7-e10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12036.

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20

Carroll, John W. "Self Visitation, Traveler Time, and Compatible Properties." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41, no. 3 (September 2011): 359–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2011.0025.

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IntroductionTed Sider aptly and concisely states the self-visitation paradox thus: ‘Suppose I travel back in time and stand in a room with my sitting 10-year-old self. I seem to be both sitting and standing, but how can that be?’ (2001, 101). I will explore a relativist resolution of this paradox offered by, or on behalf of, endurantists. It maintains that the sitting and the standing are relative to the personal time or proper time of the time traveler and is intended to yield the result that Ted is sitting at a certain initial personal/proper time but is not standing relative to that time. Similarly, it is also supposed to yield that Ted is standing relative to a later personal/proper time, but not sitting relative to that time. Such a traveler-time relativism has been offered by Paul Horwich (1975, 433-5; 1987, 114-15) and also by Simon Keller and Michael Nelson (2001, 344). I will show that this relativist approach is a non-starter. It is so because Ted is sitting and standing at both the initial and the later personal/proper time.

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Savitt, Steven F. "Paul Horwich Asymmetries in Time: Problems in the Philosophy of Science. Cambridge, MA and London, England: The MIT Press1987. Pp. xiii + 218." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21, no. 3 (September 1991): 399–417. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1991.10717254.

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Schroeder, Severin, and John Preston. "Explication, Description and Enlightenment." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 22, no. 1 (April 5, 2019): 106–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-02201007.

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In the first chapter of his book Logical Foundations of Probability, Rudolf Carnap introduced and endorsed a philosophical methodology which he called the method of ‘explication’. P.F. Strawson took issue with this methodology, but it is currently undergoing a revival. In a series of articles, Patrick Maher has recently argued that explication is an appropriate method for ‘formal epistemology’, has defended it against Strawson’s objection, and has himself put it to work in the philosophy of science in further clarification of the very concepts on which Carnap originally used it (degree of confirmation, and probability), as well as some concepts to which Carnap did not apply it (such as justified degree of belief). We shall outline Carnap’s original idea, plus Maher’s recent application of such a methodology, and then seek to show that the problem Strawson raised for it has not been dealt with. The method is indeed, we argue, problematic and therefore not obviously superior to the ‘descriptive’ method associated with Strawson. Our targets will not only be Carnapians, though, for what we shall say also bears negatively on a project that Paul Horwich has pursued under the name ‘therapeutic’, or ‘Wittgensteinian’ Bayesianism. Finally, explication, as we shall suggest and as Carnap recognised, is not the only route to philosophical enlightenment.

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Marconi, Diego. "Grounds of Semantic Normativity." Philosophical Topics 50, no. 1 (2022): 161–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20225018.

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There are two prevalent accounts of semantic normativity: the prescriptive account, which can be found in some of Wittgenstein’s remarks, and the regularity account, which may have been Sellars’s view and is nowadays defended by some antinormativists. On the former account, meanings are norms that govern the use of words; on the latter, they are regularities of use which, in themselves, do not engender any prescriptions. I argue that only the prescriptive view can account for certain platitudes about meaning, which motivate the very idea of semantic normativity. After some preliminary clarifications about the form that alleged semantic norms should take in order to be prima facie plausible, I argue—against some antinormativists—that whatever normativity is involved in the meaning of words cannot be brought back to a general norm of truth as distinct from specifically semantic norms, for semantic norms already involve a norm of truth (or truthfulness, depending on how they are phrased). Next, I examine what I take to be the strongest objection to semantic normativity, namely the identification of meaning with use: as use is just a bunch of facts, it cannot be attributed any normative import. Nowadays, this view has been defended by Paul Horwich. After criticizing Horwich’s claim that meaning, though not normative in itself, has unmediated normative implications, I propose a different view of the relation between use and meaning, on which meaning is not quite identical with use but (in most cases) is grounded on use. I propose as a model the idea of a hyperconformist social system: a system in which customs, and only customs, generate norms. I suggest that language is such a system, and describe two reasons why it is plausible for language to work like that. Finally, I analyze statements of meaning (“w means such-and-such”) on the model of Ruth Millikan “pushmi-pullyu” representations, i.e. as having both descriptive and normative import. I point out that, however, there are exceptions to meaning’s being grounded on use, as there are cases in which semantic norms are dictated by authorities of several kinds. Lastly, I briefly discuss the suggestion that meaning supervenes on use, showing that, aside from its inherent difficulties, it does not explain why meaning would supervene on use.

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Grover, Dorothy. "Paul Horwich. Truth. Basil Blackwell, Oxford and Cambridge, Mass., 1990, xiii + 136 pp. - Marian David. Correspondence and disquotation. An essay on the nature of truth. Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford1994, x + 206 pp." Journal of Symbolic Logic 62, no. 1 (March 1997): 326–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2275748.

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Psillos, Stathis. "Paul Horwich (Ed.), World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993, pp. 356, £40.50. Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1993, (trans. A. Levin), pp. xx + 310, £30.50/$43.75 cloth, £12.75/$18.25 paper." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45, no. 3 (September 1, 1994): 923–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/45.3.923.

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Novit Evans, Bette. "First Amendment Institutions. By Paul Horwitz." Journal of Church and State 61, no. 4 (July 2, 2014): 738–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jcs/csu050.

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Shepard, Jason M. "Book Review: First Amendment Institutions, by Paul Horwitz." Journalism & Mass Communication Educator 69, no. 3 (August 29, 2014): 333–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077695814542877.

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DEVITT, MICHAEL. "Minimalist Truth: A Critical Notice of Paul Horwich's Truth." Mind & Language 6, no. 3 (September 1991): 273–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1991.tb00192.x.

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Hill, B. Jessie. "First Amendment Institutions. By Paul Horwitz. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013. Pp. 384. $49.95 (cloth). ISBN: 9780674055414." Journal of Law and Religion 30, no. 3 (October 2015): 530–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2015.36.

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Morris, R. M. "The Agnostic Age: Law, Religion, and the Constitution. Paul Horwitz. Oxford University Press, New York, 2011, 352 pp (hardback $69.95) ISBN: 978-0-1997-3772-7." Ecclesiastical Law Journal 16, no. 2 (April 15, 2014): 236–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0956618x14000210.

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Schindler, Thomas, and Julian J. Schlöder. "THE PROPER FORMULATION OF THE MINIMALIST THEORY OF TRUTH." Philosophical Quarterly, August 19, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqab048.

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Abstract Minimalism about truth is one of the main contenders for our best theory of truth, but minimalists face the charge of being unable to properly state their theory. Donald Davidson incisively pointed out that minimalists must generalize over occurrences of the same expression placed in two different contexts, which is futile. In order to meet the challenge, Paul Horwich argues that one can nevertheless characterize the axioms of the minimalist theory. Sten Lindström and Tim Button have independently argued that Horwich’s attempt to formulate minimalism remains unsuccessful. We show how to properly state Horwich’s axioms by appealing to propositional functions that are given by definite descriptions. Both Lindström and Button discuss proposals similar to ours and conclude that they are unsuccessful. Our new suggestion avoids these objections.

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Vignolo, Massimiliano. "Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism." Studia Philosophica Estonica, August 14, 2008, 84–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/spe.2008.1.1.05.

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I will argue that the standard formulation of non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness is consistent with a version of deflationsim. My line of argument assumes the use conception of meaning. This brings out an interesting consequence since mostly the philosophers who endorse the use conception of meaning, e.g. Paul Horwich, hold that deflationism is inconsistent with the strategy of implementing non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness and thereby urge a reformulation of non-factualism.

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Kangilaski, Jaan. "A Modest Minimalism?" Studia Philosophica Estonica, August 14, 2008, 169–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/spe.2008.1.2.02.

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My aim in this paper is to present and evaluate one version of the deflationary attitude to truth, namely the Modest Account, propounded by Wolfgang Künne in his Conceptions of Truth (2003). I introduce the deflationary theories of truth in the first part of my paper and present briefly the views of a more familiar deflationist, Paul Horwich, as a "stepping-stone" to Künne’s account. In the second part of the paper I give an overview of Künne's theory and in the final part I present a dilemma that his account faces: either it is not modest after all or it is incomprehensible.

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Ulatowski, Joseph. "Horwich’s Epistemological Fundamentality and Folk Commitment." Axiomathes, May 2, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10516-022-09619-1.

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AbstractThere are many variants of deflationism about truth, but one of them, Paul Horwich’s minimalism, stands out because it accepts as axiomatic practical variants of the equivalence schema: 〈p〉 is true if and only if p. The equivalence schema is epistemologically fundamental. In this paper, I call upon empirical studies to show that practical variants of the equivalence schema are widely accepted by non-philosophers. While in the empirical data there is variation in how non-philosophers and philosophers talk about truth and how they judge that a proposition is true, a significant amount of data collected over the years reveal that the ordinary or folk view of truth is compatible with the epistemological fundamentality of alethic minimalism. This, I take it, suggests that people share in the same intuitions that form the bedrock of Horwich’s minimalism.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Paul Horwich'

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