Relevant bibliographies by topics / Paul Horwich

Academic literature on the topic 'Paul Horwich'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 20 February 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Paul Horwich"

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Field, Hartry. "Truth. Paul Horwich." Philosophy of Science 59, no. 2 (June 1992): 321–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/289671.

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Carmo, Juliano Santos do. "Paul Horwich: Significado como Uso/Paul Horwich: Meaning as Use." Pensando - Revista de Filosofia 3, no. 5 (August 16, 2012): 172. http://dx.doi.org/10.26694/pensando.v3i5.664.

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Este artigo tem por objetivo geral destacar alguns aspectos fundamentais para o entendimento adequado do significado linguístico centrado na ideia de “uso”. A noção de uso enquanto determinante do significado foi proposta pela primeira vez por Wittgenstein nas Investigações Filosóficas (1953). Desde então, surgiram muitas tentativas de compatibilizar a noção de uso com as demais perspectivas oferecidas pelo filósofo naquela obra, não obstante, a questão ainda permanece distante de atingir um consenso. Recentemente, a teoria do significado como uso proposta por Paul Horwich, reacendeu o debate a respeito das noções de uso, significado e naturalismo semântico. A abordagem inspiradora de Horwich tem se revelado uma excelente estratégia tanto no que se refere a evidenciar a pertinência da proposta wittgensteiniana, como no sentido de oferecer soluções eficazes às objeções recorrentes que ela enfrenta. O objetivo específico deste trabalho é mostrar o modo como Horwich pretende resolver algumas daquelas objeções.
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Fine, Kit. "Response to Paul Horwich." dialectica 61, no. 1 (March 2007): 17–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01093.x.

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Gustafsson, M. "Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy, by Paul Horwich." Mind 123, no. 492 (October 1, 2014): 1195–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzu156.

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Schulte, Joachim. "Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy, by Paul Horwich." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92, no. 1 (December 20, 2013): 194–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2013.862555.

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OMS, SERGI. "Conceivability, Minimalism and the Generalization Problem." Dialogue 58, no. 2 (June 5, 2018): 287–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217318000288.

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One of the main problems that Paul Horwich’s Minimalist theory of truth must face is the generalization problem, which shows that Minimalism is too weak to have the fundamental explanatory role Horwich claims it has. In this paper, I defend Horwich’s response to the generalization problem from an objection raised by Bradley Armour-Garb. I also argue that, given my response to Armour-Garb, Horwich’s proposal to cope with the generalization problem can be simplified.
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Hill, C. S. "Truth -- Meaning -- Reality, by Paul Horwich." Mind 120, no. 480 (October 1, 2011): 1262–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzr085.

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García Zárate, Óscar Augusto. "Análisis crítico del minimalismo de Paul Horwich." Escritura y Pensamiento 20, no. 42 (December 28, 2021): 175–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.15381/escrypensam.v20i42.21489.

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El minimalismo de Paul Horwich es la teoría que pretende ser la de mayores alcances epistemológicos dentro del deflacionismo. Su creador lo presenta como la última palabra sobre el concepto de verdad, declarando imposible un estudio más detallado y profundo sobre el tema, apoyándose en el conocido esquema de equivalencia, cuyos orígenes se pueden rastrear en los escritos seminales de Alfred Tarski. Sin embargo, llevando hasta sus extremos el poder explicatorio de la teoría mínima de Paul Horwich, resulta prácticamente nulo. Aunque su teoría de la verdad pueda justificarse, su semántica no puede sostenerse.
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WHYTE, J. T. "PAUL HORWICH, Truth. Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1990, pp 136." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43, no. 2 (June 1, 1992): 279–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/43.2.279.

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everett, anthony. "From a Deflationary Point of View - by Paul Horwich." Philosophical Books 48, no. 3 (July 2007): 277–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2007.00449_7.x.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Paul Horwich"

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Hou, Richard Wei Tzu. "Between Quine's Disquotationalism and Horwich's Minimalism." University of Sydney, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/1131.

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Doctor of Philosophy
Many criticisms of the prevalent deflationary theories of truth stem from some misunderstanding. Clarification can be found from considering Quine's reasoning on the disquotational feature of the truth predicate. Quine's disquotationalism and Horwich's minimalism are similar theses with respect to the concept of truth, though the difference between the choices of the primary truth bearers and the divergence in their accounts of meaning and reference are striking. Chapter Two is devoted to making plain Quine's reasoning regarding the disquotational concept of truth, and to constructing a disquotational theory of truth. Also in this chapter, the topic of how to enhance the deductive power of this theory is discussed. The following chapter aims to square Quine's theses of inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity, with an account of the disquotational schema of reference. Whether or not a disquotational schema of reference and all its instances can be seen as providing a genuine reference scheme, as claimed by Horwich and most deflationists, is also discussed. In Chapter Four, after an introduction of Horwich's minimalist conception of truth, there are a number of issues considered, in particular Horwich’s use-theoretic account of meaning and compositionality, along with the divergence between his account of meaning and Quine's. The final chapter, Chapter Five, provides a thorough analysis of three important factors regarding the disquotational theory and the minimal theory of truth. Among them, the first factor discussed is what sort of equivalence relation occurs within each instance of the disquotational schema or each axiom of the equivalence schema. Following this, there is an analysis of in what way the disquotationalist and the minimalist can explain all general facts involving truth. The last factor involves considering the proper ascription of the disquotational or the minimal truth predicate. Along with the analysis of these three factors, the issue regarding which theory of truth is preferable is elaborated.
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Hou, Richard Wei Tzu. "Between Quine's Disquotationalism and Horwich's Minimalism." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/1131.

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Many criticisms of the prevalent deflationary theories of truth stem from some misunderstanding. Clarification can be found from considering Quine's reasoning on the disquotational feature of the truth predicate. Quine's disquotationalism and Horwich's minimalism are similar theses with respect to the concept of truth, though the difference between the choices of the primary truth bearers and the divergence in their accounts of meaning and reference are striking. Chapter Two is devoted to making plain Quine's reasoning regarding the disquotational concept of truth, and to constructing a disquotational theory of truth. Also in this chapter, the topic of how to enhance the deductive power of this theory is discussed. The following chapter aims to square Quine's theses of inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity, with an account of the disquotational schema of reference. Whether or not a disquotational schema of reference and all its instances can be seen as providing a genuine reference scheme, as claimed by Horwich and most deflationists, is also discussed. In Chapter Four, after an introduction of Horwich's minimalist conception of truth, there are a number of issues considered, in particular Horwich’s use-theoretic account of meaning and compositionality, along with the divergence between his account of meaning and Quine's. The final chapter, Chapter Five, provides a thorough analysis of three important factors regarding the disquotational theory and the minimal theory of truth. Among them, the first factor discussed is what sort of equivalence relation occurs within each instance of the disquotational schema or each axiom of the equivalence schema. Following this, there is an analysis of in what way the disquotationalist and the minimalist can explain all general facts involving truth. The last factor involves considering the proper ascription of the disquotational or the minimal truth predicate. Along with the analysis of these three factors, the issue regarding which theory of truth is preferable is elaborated.
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Horvath, Alexander Georg [Verfasser], Roland [Akademischer Betreuer] [Gutachter] Pail, Martin [Gutachter] Horwath, and Nico [Gutachter] Sneeuw. "Retrieving geophysical signals from current and future satellite gravity missions / Alexander Georg Horvath ; Gutachter: Roland Pail, Martin Horwath, Nico Sneeuw ; Betreuer: Roland Pail." München : Universitätsbibliothek der TU München, 2017. http://d-nb.info/1133261965/34.

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Books on the topic "Paul Horwich"

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Wasserman, Ryan. Paradoxes of Freedom II. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198793335.003.0004.

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Chapter 4 examines David Lewis’s contextualist solution to the grandfather paradox. Section 1 introduces the basic elements of Lewis’s view and explains how they are supposed to help solve the various paradoxes of freedom. Section 2 examines a famous objection to Lewis’s view that is put forward by Kadri Vihvelin. Section 3 addresses a very different kind of worry, due to Paul Horwich. (According to Horwich, grandfather-style paradoxes do not show that time travel is impossible, but they do give us reason to think it is unlikely.) Section 4 then concludes by surveying various “mechanical” paradoxes in which self-defeating acts seem to arise without any operation of free will.
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Book chapters on the topic "Paul Horwich"

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Rey, Georges. "Linguo-Semantics." In Representation of Language, 336–62. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198855637.003.0010.

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Intentionality figures in a semantics both of natural language (a linguo-semantics), to be discussed in this chapter, and of mental states(a psycho-semantics), to be discussed in the next. Both forms have been thought to be challenged by Quine’s attacks on the analytic/synthetic distinction. I argue that these attacks are not as serious as has been supposed; only the explanatory one deserves careful attention, and it is addressed by a proposal Jerry Fodor raised against a challenge of his own, the “disjunction problem.” This chapter defends a modest version of Fodor’s proposal and a related one of Paul Horwich’s, called here “BasicAsymmetries,” and show how it offers a promising strategy for replying to all that is genuinely worrisome in Quine’s and Fodor’s challenges, especially in the context of Chomskyan proposals about a linguo-semantics. The chapter concludes with further resistance to an anti-realism that Chomsky associates with his semantics.
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Lawson, Gary, and Guy I. Seidman. "Other Views of the Cathedral." In Deference, 113–58. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190273408.003.0004.

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Many other authors have attempted to define deference, though none of those definitions were grounded in a full description of the practices of US federal courts. Many of those other efforts were overtly normative, aimed at deriving an ideal structure for deference that can be used to criticize actual practices. Nonetheless, some of those efforts offer valuable insights even for a purely descriptive project. We reject efforts to limit the definition of deference only to instances in which the deferring body changes its decision in some way; mere consideration of another’s decision is sufficient to constitute deference. From Paul Horwitz we take the idea that deferees must be attentive to their role in a system of deference, and from Aileen Kavanaugh we take the idea that deference can sometimes be justified on prudential, or strategic, grounds. But consideration of others’ views does not change our basic definition of deference as: “The giving by a legal actor of some measure of consideration or weight to the decision of another actor in exercising the deferring actor’s function.”
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