Journal articles: 'Parliamentary systems'

1

Brennan, Geoffrey, and Alan Hamlin. "Rationalising parliamentary systems." Australian Journal of Political Science 28, no. 3 (November 1993): 443–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00323269308402253.

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Weaver, R. Kent. "Are Parliamentary Systems Better?" Brookings Review 3, no. 4 (1985): 16. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20079894.

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Gerring, John, Strom C. Thacker, and Carola Moreno. "Are Parliamentary Systems Better?" Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 3 (December 9, 2008): 327–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414008325573.

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The institutional differences between presidential and parliamentary rule are well known, yet the practical effects of these divergent constitutional arrangements within democratic polities have received scant attention. This article employs a global data set to test the relationship between a historical measure of parliamentary rule and 14 indicators ranging across three policy areas: political development, economic development, and human development. The study revealed a strong relationship between parliamentarism and good governance, particularly in the latter two policy areas. To the extent that these institutions influence the quality of governance, parliamentary systems may offer advantages over presidential systems of democratic rule.

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Karlsen, Rune, and Eli Skogerbø. "Candidate campaigning in parliamentary systems." Party Politics 21, no. 3 (June 7, 2013): 428–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068813487103.

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Mueller, Dennis C. "Parliamentary Systems in a Heterogeneous Society*." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 10, no. 2 (October 1, 1992): 119–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569298x15668907539482.

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Abstract Partendo dal presupposto che le politiche del governo sono una sorta di bene pubblico la cui offerta non creerebbe problemi nell’ipotesi in cui i cittadini avessero delle preferenze omogenee, l’autore affronta il tema dell’elaborazione di un insieme di istituzioni democratiche che consentano di soddisfare gli interessi dei cittadini in una società eterogenea.Dopo aver paragonato a questo fine, nei loro presupposti logici, il sistema bipartitico e quello multipartitico, il lavoro si concentra sull’individuazione di regole di voto alternative atte ad evitare i problemi connessi con le maggioranze cicliche.In particolare viene esaminata la procedura del voto attraverso il veto che, come la maggioranza semplice, tende a selezionare dei risultati che si collocano al centra della distribuzione delle proposte ma che presenta il vantaggio ulteriore di fornire a ciascun individuo l’incentivo a proporre degli esiti che tendono al centro della distribuzione dei punti ideali dell’elettore.

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Mbih, Boniface, Issofa Moyouwou, and Jérémy Picot. "Pareto violations of parliamentary voting systems." Economic Theory 34, no. 2 (January 23, 2007): 331–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0184-5.

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CHEIBUB, JOSÉ ANTONIO. "Presidentialism, Electoral Identifiability, and Budget Balances in Democratic Systems." American Political Science Review 100, no. 3 (August 2006): 353–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000305540606223x.

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This paper examines the impact of the form of government—presidential or parliamentary—on fiscal outcomes in democratic systems. Based on data for democracies in 98 countries between 1970 and 2002, it shows that the gross domestic product ratio of the central government budget balance is higher in presidential than in parliamentary democracies. It also shows that this impact is not due to the fact that presidential systems are not subject to the “costs of coalition” that allegedly afflict parliamentary democracies: the coalition and status of the government are of no consequence for budget balances in either presidential or parliamentary systems. Presidential systems matter for budget balances because they generate relatively high incentives for governments to keep budgets under control. They do so because in presidential systems, unlike in parliamentary systems, voters are by design able to identify and punish those responsible for economic policies. Presidents, however, vary in their capacity to affect budget policies. This paper demonstrates that presidential systems in which presidents are constitutionally able to dominate the budget process or to effectively veto legislation tend to have higher budget balances than those in which the budget process is dominated by the legislature or the president is unable to exercise existing veto powers.

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Warwick, Paul V. "Policy horizons in West European parliamentary systems." European Journal of Political Research 38, no. 1 (August 2000): 37–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00527.

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Smith, Alastair. "ENDOGENOUS ELECTION TIMING IN MAJORITARIAN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS." Economics & Politics 8, no. 2 (July 1996): 85–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1996.tb00123.x.

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Hahm, S. D. "The Political Economy of Deficit Spending: A Cross Comparison of Industrialized Democracies, 1955–90." Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 14, no. 2 (June 1996): 227–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/c140227.

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The postwar deficit experiences of nine industrialized democracies are analyzed. The relative importance of three of the primary influences on a country's deficit which have been suggested in the literature: (1) the state of the country's economy, (2) the ‘left – right’ ideology of the party in power, and (3) the strength of the party in power (as advanced by Roubini and Sachs) are examined. The author also introduces and tests the importance of an additional potential influence based on institutional structure in which presidential, ‘stable’ parliamentary, and ‘unstable’ parliamentary systems are seen to provide different incentives regarding the deficit for key political actors. The arguments are tested on a pooled time-series cross-sectional data set involving two presidential systems (France and the United States), four relatively stable parliamentary systems (Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom), and three relatively unstable parliamentary systems (Denmark, Italy, and the Netherlands). The findings include: (a) strong effects of the state of a nation's economy on its deficit; (b) little systematic relationship between the ideology of the party in power and its deficit; and (c) the observation that increased control of the government leads to lower deficits in unstable parliamentary systems but larger deficits in presidential systems, with stable parliamentary systems serving as an intermediate case. The findings are compared both with the author's theoretical refinement and with recent theoretical and empirical work by Roubini and Sachs.

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11

So, Florence. "More spotlight, more problems? Westminster parliamentary systems and leadership replacement in large opposition parties." Party Politics 24, no. 5 (November 21, 2016): 588–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068816678885.

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In this article, I argue that Westminster parliamentary systems encourage large opposition parties to replace their leaders between elections. Parliamentary system structures how parties compete over legislative outcomes. In Westminster systems, the government’s dominance in the legislative process promotes an adversarial government–opposition relationship. Subsequently, large opposition parties’ electoral prospects are tied to their ability to discredit the government’s policy agenda. Since this responsibility falls to party leaders, leaders of large opposition parties directly affect their parties’ electoral prospects, and parties are more motivated to replace those who are ineffective in damaging the government’s credibility. Therefore, leaders of large opposition parties in Westminster systems carry a higher risk of replacement than their counterparts in other parliamentary systems. I construct an original data set on party leadership turnover in 14 established parliamentary democracies. Results from Cox proportional hazard models support my claim and suggest that institution influences intraparty dynamics.

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Biziouras, Nikolaos. "Midshipmen Form a Coalition Government in Belgium: Lessons from a Role-Playing Simulation." PS: Political Science & Politics 46, no. 02 (March 28, 2013): 400–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049096513000115.

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AbstractUsing a role-playing simulation on government formation with pre- and posttest assessment format, I show that students developed a significantly greater capacity for precision and specificity in their answers about the process of coalition government formation in parliamentary systems; students changed their beliefs in the ability of institutional rules to causally affect the process of coalition government formation in parliamentary systems; and, finally, students, changed their views on whether office-seeking politicians are more successful than policy-seeking politicians in forming coalition governments in parliamentary systems.

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Roberts, Gwilym. "Parliamentary report." Manufacturing Engineer 68, no. 6 (1989): 8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/me:19890041.

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Roberts, Gwilym. "Parliamentary report." Manufacturing Engineer 68, no. 8 (1989): 6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/me:19890108.

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Roberts, Gwilym. "Parliamentary report." Manufacturing Engineer 68, no. 9 (1989): 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/me:19890134.

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Roberts, Gwilym. "Parliamentary report." Manufacturing Engineer 69, no. 1 (1990): 9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/me:19900009.

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17

Koryzis, Dimitris, Apostolos Dalas, Dimitris Spiliotopoulos, and Fotios Fitsilis. "ParlTech: Transformation Framework for the Digital Parliament." Big Data and Cognitive Computing 5, no. 1 (March 15, 2021): 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/bdcc5010015.

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Societies are entering the age of technological disruption, which also impacts governance institutions such as parliamentary organizations. Thus, parliaments need to adjust swiftly by incorporating innovative methods into their organizational culture and novel technologies into their working procedures. Inter-Parliamentary Union World e-Parliament Reports capture digital transformation trends towards open data production, standardized and knowledge-driven business processes, and the implementation of inclusive and participatory schemes. Nevertheless, there is still a limited consensus on how these trends will materialize into specific tools, products, and services, with added value for parliamentary and societal stakeholders. This article outlines the rapid evolution of the digital parliament from the user perspective. In doing so, it describes a transformational framework based on the evaluation of empirical data by an expert survey of parliamentarians and parliamentary administrators. Basic sets of tools and technologies that are perceived as vital for future parliamentary use by intra-parliamentary stakeholders, such as systems and processes for information and knowledge sharing, are analyzed. Moreover, boundary conditions for development and implementation of parliamentary technologies are set and highlighted. Concluding recommendations regarding the expected investments, interdisciplinary research, and cross-sector collaboration within the defined framework are presented.

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18

Maeda, Ko, and Misa Nishikawa. "Duration of Party Control in Parliamentary and Presidential Governments." Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 3 (April 2006): 352–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414005284047.

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Most of the previous work on political stability uses cabinet duration or leadership duration to measure stability. This study, however, focuses on another area of stability, namely the party control of the executive branch. This approach not only allows us to compare political durability in presidential and parliamentary systems directly, but it also, we believe, better reflects policy changes that stem from government party composition. Our analysis of longitudinal data from 65 democracies reveals that presidential and parliamentary governments create different patterns of government survival. Ruling parties in parliamentary systems encounter a declining hazard rate over time, whereas those in presidentialism face an increasing hazard rate in their survival. We explain this difference by focusing on how parliamentary and presidential systems create different incentive structures for political parties.

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FRANCHINO, FABIO, and BJØRN HØYLAND. "Legislative Involvement in Parliamentary Systems: Opportunities, Conflict, and Institutional Constraints." American Political Science Review 103, no. 4 (October 8, 2009): 607–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055409990177.

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In parliamentary systems, the need to preserve the political agreement that sustains the executive often motivates legislative involvement in policymaking. Institutional arrangements regulating executive–legislative relations and ministerial autonomy also structure parliamentary participation. However, empirical evidence of these effects remains limited to a few policies and countries. European Union legislation provides the opportunity to test expectations about legislative involvement for different types of measure across various institutional arrangements, across multiple policy areas, and across time. In this article, we investigate legislative involvement in the transposition of 724 directives in 15 member states from 1978 to 2004. Our results confirm that involvement increases as conflict between the responsible minister and her coalition partners intensifies. The discretionary scope embedded in the directive further inflates this effect. Additionally, parliamentary involvement decreases as the government's institutional advantage over the legislature increases, especially if intracoalitional conflict deepens.

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VanDusky-Allen, Julie. "Winners, losers, and protest behavior in parliamentary systems." Social Science Journal 54, no. 1 (March 1, 2017): 30–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.soscij.2016.12.003.

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21

Mezey, Michael L., Erik Damgaard, Michael Jogerst, Philip Norton, David M. Wood, Matthew Soberg Shugart, and John M. Carey. "New Perspectives on Parliamentary Systems: A Review Article." Legislative Studies Quarterly 19, no. 3 (August 1994): 429. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/440141.

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22

Moser, Robert G. "The Impact of Parliamentary Electoral Systems in Russia." Post-Soviet Affairs 13, no. 3 (July 1997): 284–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.1997.10641440.

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23

Forestiere, Carolyn. "ASSESSING PATTERNS OF EXECUTIVE REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS." Representation 43, no. 3 (September 2007): 167–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344890701464421.

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24

Verney, Douglas V. "From Executive to Legislative Federalism? The Transformation of the Political System in Canada and India." Review of Politics 51, no. 2 (1989): 241–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500048105.

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Canada and India have hybrid systems of government. Both experienced constitutional crises in the 1970's. These crises have usually been treated as sui generis. It is the hypothesis of this article that the crises raise fundamental questions regarding the very nature of such systems, which are based on “parliamentary federalism,” a political system invented in Canada to provide strong central government. This hybrid system combines two classical models: British tradition, based on parliamentary supremacy and conventions, and American principles, which require a written constitution, the separation of powers and judicial review. The two models are contradictory, since parliamentary supremacy and constitutional supremacy are incompatible.

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Baum, Jeeyang Rhee, Christian B. Jensen, and Robert J. McGrath. "Constraining a Shadowy Future: Enacting APAs in Parliamentary Systems." Legislative Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (April 25, 2016): 471–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12121.

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Goel, Rajeev K., and Michael A. Nelson. "Presidential Versus Parliamentary Systems: Where Do Female Entrepreneurs Thrive?" Social Science Quarterly 101, no. 5 (August 8, 2020): 1773–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12851.

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Kalandrakis, Tasos, and Arthur Spirling. "Radical Moderation: Recapturing Power in Two-Party Parliamentary Systems." American Journal of Political Science 56, no. 2 (December 16, 2011): 413–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00551.x.

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Blomeyer, Roland. "Parliamentary integrity systems in Europe – the personal-responsibility dimension." Journal of Legislative Studies 26, no. 4 (July 20, 2020): 558–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2020.1784528.

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Bräuninger, Thomas, Jochen Müller, and Christian Stecker. "Modeling Preferences Using Roll Call Votes in Parliamentary Systems." Political Analysis 24, no. 2 (2016): 189–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpw006.

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Models of ideal point estimation usually build on the assumption of spatial preferences. This ignores legislators' non-policy incentives and is thus likely to produce implausible results for many legislatures. We study this problem in parliamentary systems and develop a model of roll call voting that considers both thepolicyand the non-policy,tacticalincentives of legislators. We go on to show how the relative weight of these policy and tactical incentives is influenced by the identity of the mover and characteristics of the motion. Analyses of two data sets of 2174 roll call votes in German state legislatures and 3295 roll call votes in the British House of Commons result in three main findings. First, we show that tactical incentives may be more important than policy incentives, and second, that the importance of tactical incentives varies with the importance of motions. Third, there are interesting twists: backbench private members' bills may reverse tactical incentives whereas proposals from anti-system parties are virtually always rejected by moderate parties, rendering these votes uninformative. Our findings have implications for ideal point estimation in parliamentary systems, as well as for research on separation of power systems.

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Close, Caroline. "Parliamentary party loyalty and party family." Party Politics 24, no. 2 (June 21, 2016): 209–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068816655562.

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Party cohesion is a crucial aspect of parliamentary systems, and it varies across time, parties and systems. To explain these variations, scholars have set forth the influence of macro-level and individual-level factors. Although party-level factors have also been considered, the role of party family has been overlooked. This research seeks to fill this gap. To this end, I focus on one dimension of cohesion: the extent to which legislators have internalized the norm of party loyalty. The concept of party family permits to investigate the effect of party origin and party ideology beyond a policy-based approach and left-right dimension. Using attitudinal data of 829 parliamentarians elected in 14 European national assemblies, the analysis uncovers a party family effect, particularly in the green and radical right parties. The results suggest that a greater attention should be directed towards party family as a determinant factor of legislative cohesion.

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Kielmansegg, Peter Graf. "The parliamentary system and direct democracy." European Review 6, no. 1 (February 1998): 75–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1062798700003021.

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This paper considers the operation of representative democracy, with an emphasis on Germany. It analyses the implications of direct democracy (i.e. the regular use of referenda in reaching decisions on matters of public policy) for the operation of parliamentary and non-parliamentary democratic systems. The existing role of direct democracy in a number of societies is also considered.

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Tsebelis, George. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism." British Journal of Political Science 25, no. 3 (July 1995): 289–325. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400007225.

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The article compares different political systems with respect to one property: their capacity to produce policy change. I define the basic concept of the article, the ‘veto player’: veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change of the status quo. Two categories of veto players are identified in the article: institutional and partisan. Institutional veto players (president, chambers) exist in presidential systems while partisan veto players (parties) exist at least in parliamentary systems. Westminster systems, dominant party systems and single-party minority governments have only one veto player, while coalitions in parliamentary systems, presidential or federal systems have multiple veto players. The potential for policy change decreases with the number of veto players, the lack of congruence (dissimilarity of policy positions among veto players) and the cohesion (similarity of policy positions among the constituent units of each veto player) of these players. The veto player framework produces results different from existing theories in comparative politics, but congruent with existing empirical studies. In addition, it permits comparisons across different political and party systems. Finally, the veto player framework enables predictions about government instability (in parliamentary systems) or regime instability (in presidential systems); these predictions are supported by available evidence.

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Torres, Crisline G. "The Philippine Pro-Parliamentary Position and the Comparative Constitutional Design Literature." Philippine Political Science Journal 25, no. 1 (December 16, 2004): 55–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2165025x-02501003.

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This paper aims to illustrate how the comparative literature on constitutional design that is skeptical of the pro-parliamentary claims can be employed to critically review one of the central arguments of the Philippine pro-parliamentary position. This argument is the claimed superiority of parliamentary over presidential systems in promoting more efficient and harmonious executive-legislative relations and in avoiding political gridlock between the two branches. The paper argues that the counter-arguments of some comparative constitutional design scholars pose serious challenges to the validity of the Philippine pro-parliamentary position. Hopefully, this preliminary effort can serve as a template that can be used and developed by those interested in pursuing a similar comparative constitutional design literature-based criticism of the other arguments raised by Filipino parliamentary advocates.

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Yan, Huang-Ting. "Does the constitution matter? Semi-presidentialism and the origin of hegemonic personalist regimes." International Political Science Review 41, no. 3 (April 24, 2019): 365–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512119829160.

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This study examines hegemonic personalist regimes (HPRs) and argues that semi-presidential dictatorships are more likely to evolve into HPRs than parliamentary systems or presidential autocracies. In presidential autocracies, elites delegate power to dictators who control the military to eliminate threats from the opposition. In parliamentary systems, elites are more likely to build power-sharing parties through which parliamentary opposition can be defeated, often evolving into single-party regimes. In semi-presidential autocracies, elites delegate power to dictators in exchange for investments, support of their agendas, or defeat of the opposition, which can lead to personalist rule supported by a dominant party or HPR. This study verified this phenomenon using logistic regression. In addition, this study examined three possible challenges: unstable equilibrium, reverse causality and institutional variation within semi-presidentialism. In sum, the incentive structure inherent in semi-presidential systems paves the way for the rise of HPRs.

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Reniu Vilamala, Josep Mª. "Una interpretación espacial de la formación de gobiernos minoritarios en España." Przegląd Europejski, no. 4-2014 (March 22, 2015): 110–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.31338/1641-2478pe.4.14.6.

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A meeting point for scholars working on the processes of formation of coalition governments in European parliamentary systems is the analysis of the Spanish case. Since the restoration of democracy in the late 1970s parliamentary minority has not come to form any coalition government. Instead of it there have been parliamentary negotiation processes, in which stable parliamentary agreements have been reached to ensure continuous support for the government in office. One point worth noting is that, in these negotiations, the main national parties – UCD, PSOE or PP – have chosen to negotiate only with nationalist parties or non-state-wide parties. This article attempts, in the light of spatial analysis, to provide new arguments for understanding such negotiation processes.

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Wenzel, Nikolai G. "Judicial Review and Constitutional Maintenance: John Marshall, Hans Kelsen, and the Popular Will." PS: Political Science & Politics 46, no. 03 (June 21, 2013): 591–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s104909651300053x.

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AbstractConstitutional restraints on government are tricky and evanescent; government failure (a lapse into anarchy or leviathan) has historically been the norm, and constitutional success an infrequent exception. To shed light on constitutional maintenance, this article examines the concept of constitutional review by studying three competing systems: the American/Marshall system of judicial review; the Commonwealth/Westminster model of parliamentary sovereignty; and the Kelsen compromise between the two. Each system's strengths and weaknesses are assessed, as constitutional framers navigate the treacherous waters between the Scylla of parliamentary tyranny and Charybdis ofgouvernement des juges. In the end, neither extreme is perfect, but lessons are drawn from each of the three models.

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Knopek, Jacek. "Systemy parlamentarne wybranych państw arabskich i muzułmańskich w świetle notatki dla kierownictwa MSZ z 1972 r." Przegląd Politologiczny, no. 2 (June 19, 2018): 45–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pp.2013.18.2.4.

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The paper discusses the parliamentary systems of selected Arab and Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa at the turn of the 1960s.The analysis concerns a document drawn up for executives in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late 1972, with an attachment discussing the parliamentary systems of the countries of primary importance for the goals and interests of Poland. As concerns the Middle East, the parliamentary systems of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran and North and South Yemen were described. In North Africa, the analysis encompassed the Maghreb region: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Mashrek region: Egypt, Libya and Sudan.The paper concludes with a statement that the document was an accurate and faithful presentation of the parliamentary systems of representative states. Political relations in this region were developing dynamically at that time, military coups and coups d’état occurred, some states were leaning towards socialism, while maintaining their family or religious structures, while others were only just gaining their full sovereignty and independence. The situation of Israel continued to be complicated, as the state remained highly confrontational towards Arab countries. This last issue was the reason for Poland’s failing to achieve the strategic goals of its foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa. Another Israeli-Arab war in October 1973 made Polish decision makers realize how fragile the foundations of states in the region were, preventing Poland from becoming fully involved in Arab and Muslim countries.

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Alrfua, Amal Yusuf, Ahmad Hasan Abu Sabah, and Ayman Yousef Mutlaq Alrfoua. "Parliamentary Immunity in International Legislation." Asian Social Science 14, no. 6 (May 28, 2018): 71. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ass.v14n6p71.

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A Legislature is one of the most important bodies in a country, because in addition to its primary duty of passing legislations it also monitors the executive body and holds it accountable for the execution of its duties. Due to this responsibility the national legal systems have granted legal protection for members of the legislature to aid them to carry out their assigned responsibilities in accordance with the constitution, this protection is known as Parliamentary immunity.We have clarified the concept of Parliamentary immunity and its legal nature, in addition we have also discussed its types (objective and procedural) and made clear the differences between them. In addition, we pointed out the procedure of lifting the immunity, legal reasons that require it be lifted and the position of some constitutions in regard it.We have also explained and indicated whether Parliamentary immunity was successful in protecting the legislature from intimidation or strong-arming of the executive authority.

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39

Baron, David P. "A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems." American Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (March 1991): 137–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1962882.

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A theory of government formation in parliamentary systems is developed from a model incorporating policy-oriented parties with spatial preferences and a formation process in which parties are selected in sequence to attempt to form a government. A government is formed when the policy proposed by the party selected is sustained on a vote of confidence. The equilibria identify the government and the policy it will implement and depend on the configuration of preferences and on the government formation process. For example, in a political system with two large parties and one small party and in which one of the two large parties will be selected to attempt to form a government, the government will be formed by a large party with the support of the small party. The policy will reflect the preferences of the small party but will be closer to the ideal point of the large party.

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Baranzehi, Mohammad, and Mostafa Khodarahmi. "Criminal responsibility of presidents in parliamentary, presidential and communist systems." Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities 4, no. 12 (2014): 257. http://dx.doi.org/10.5958/2249-7315.2014.01079.x.

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41

KAM, CHRISTOPHER, and INDRIĐI INDRIĐASON. "The Timing of Cabinet Reshuffles in Five Westminster Parliamentary Systems." Legislative Studies Quarterly 30, no. 3 (August 2005): 327–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.3162/036298005x201581.

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42

TELATAR, FUNDA. "Political Business Cycles in the Parliamentary Systems : Evidence from Turkey." Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 39, no. 4 (July 2003): 24–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1540496x.2003.11052546.

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43

Baumann, Manuel, P. Lichtner, Nuno Boavida, Camilo Fautz, and Hanna Dura. "„Renewable Energy Systems“: Role and Use of Parliamentary Technology Assessment." TATuP - Zeitschrift für Technikfolgenabschätzung in Theorie und Praxis 21, no. 3 (November 1, 2012): 110–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.14512/tatup.21.3.110.

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Elmelund-Præstekær, Christian, and Ulrik Kjaer. "PRESIDENTIALISATION OF PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS? FRONTRUNNER CONCENTRATION IN DANISH LOCAL ELECTIONS." Representation 49, no. 2 (July 2013): 155–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2013.805698.

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Auel, Katrin, and Arthur Benz. "The politics of adaptation: The Europeanisation of national parliamentary systems." Journal of Legislative Studies 11, no. 3-4 (October 2005): 372–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13572330500273570.

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Mickler, Tim A. "Committee autonomy in parliamentary systems – coalition logic or congressional rationales?" Journal of Legislative Studies 23, no. 3 (July 3, 2017): 367–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2017.1359941.

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Denemark, David. "Partisan Pork Barrel in Parliamentary Systems: Australian Constiuency-Level Grants." Journal of Politics 62, no. 3 (August 2000): 896–915. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0022-3816.00039.

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SZYMANEK, Jarosław. "System rządów premierowskich jako nowy typ systemu rządów: casus Wielkiej Brytanii." Przegląd Politologiczny, no. 1 (November 2, 2018): 65–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pp.2011.16.1.5.

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The paper attempts to address the question of whether the prime ministerial system has already emerged as a separate system of governance that differs from classical systems, and whether it can no longer be treated as a certain sub-class in an extensive range of parliamentary systems, but rather as a new type of system in its own right. The principal issue appears to be whether the inherent properties of the prime ministerial variety of governance are sufficiently distinct, significant and different from the parliamentary system, however broadly understood, to give the former a status of a separate governance system from the methodological point of view. It should be observed that the contemporary British system, which serves as a foundation for our deliberations on the prime ministerial form of governance, has deviated from the classical or typical parliamentary system far enough to actually take the direction of a separate system of governance, namely prime ministerial governance. Firstly, this is evidenced by the removal of the monarch from the political system and establishing executive power as a virtually one-element entity concentrated in the Cabinet, and embodied by its leader. Secondly, the figure of Prime Minister is highly emphasized as he is elected ‘under the guise of common elections’ and he successfully monopolizes the work of his entire Cabinet, becoming a certain ‘trademark’ of this Cabinet, which is well supported by the principle of joint accountability of all Cabinet members, a principle that is exceptionally strictly and consistently implemented in the British system. The ongoing politological processes that tend to presidentialize and personalize politics are only accelerating these changes and making them even more apparent. The consequence in Britain is that it is the Prime Minister who accrues the power to govern and he by no means falls under the principle of classical parliamentary systems, where the government leader is only “the first among equals”. Thirdly, the House of Commons has practically lost its controlling power over the Cabinet, as primarily evidenced in the absence of a vote of no confidence, which would serve as a tool of political accountability of executive power before the legislative, the essence of any form of parliamentary governance. Fourthly, in a highly specific, deeply endemic party system which entails that various links between government and parliament typical of the parliamentary style of democracy are de facto transferred onto the internal party stage, this to an extent also explains the relevance of the division between government and opposition, a division which is neither as clear, nor as far-reaching as in the case of other parliamentary systems. All this allows us to conclude that the British system is sufficiently different to be deemed new in comparison to a typical or classical parliamentary system. The transformations that have taken place there have gone far beyond the proper, or classical, model of parliamentary governance thus forming not only a sub-class, but a separate type (or model) of governance.

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BEAN, CLIVE. "The Electoral Influence of Party Leader Images in Australia and New Zealand." Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 1 (April 1993): 111–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414093026001005.

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Although the electoral influence of voter attitudes toward American presidential candidates has never seriously been questioned, only in relatively recent times has the existence of an equivalent effect for political party leaders in parliamentary systems become well-accepted. This analysis seeks to extend the understanding of the nature of parliamentary leadership effects to encompass the types of specific leadership qualities that influence electoral choice. Data from open-ended questions in surveys conducted in Australia in 1979 and New Zealand in 1981, taken together with earlier research, indicate a broad similarity of voter responses to different political leaders, in parliamentary as well as presidential systems. In particular, the criteria voters take into account most consistently when making leadership-based electoral decisions are positive perceptions of the “performance relevant” qualities of competence and integrity. This is evidence against the argument that voting on the basis of leadership personality is in some sense “irrational.”

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Rodríguez-Teruel, Juan. "Ministerial and Parliamentary Elites in Multilevel Spain 1977–2009." Comparative Sociology 10, no. 6 (2011): 887–907. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156913311x607610.

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Abstract In decentralized European parliamentary democracies future governing elites often acquire political experience and attain top positions by passing through sub-national political institutions. In doing so, elites circumvent and reduce the importance of national parliaments. Previous research has advanced several explanations for this pattern: Europe's tradition of bureaucratic government; parties with open methods for selecting parliamentary candidates; the “presidentialization” and Europeanization of national political systems. Since its transition to democracy in 1977, Spain has had an exceptionally small proportion of former MPs in its national cabinets. I employ data for Spanish ministers between 1977–2009 demonstrating the passage of a large proportion of cabinet ministers through local and regional government levels rather than the national parliament, the Cortes Generales. I show that multilevel rather than parliamentary political careers characterize ministerial elite recruitment, and I discuss the consequences for Spain's parliamentary democracy.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Parliamentary systems'

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