Journal articles: 'Parabolic law of Fuller'

1

Powers, William, and Robert Summers. "Lon L. Fuller." Duke Law Journal 1985, no. 1 (February 1985): 221. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1372440.

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Craswell, Richard. "Against Fuller and Perdue." University of Chicago Law Review 67, no. 1 (2000): 99. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1600327.

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3

LeBel, Paul A., and Robert S. Summers. "Blame This Messenger: Summers on Fuller." Michigan Law Review 83, no. 4 (February 1985): 717. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1288769.

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4

Gómez, Juan Vega. "The Hart-Fuller Debate Re-Revisited." Jurisprudence 2, no. 1 (June 2011): 261–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.5235/204033211796290209.

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5

Walton, Kevin. "Lon L. Fuller on Political Obligation." American Journal of Jurisprudence 63, no. 2 (September 24, 2018): 175–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajj/auy011.

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6

Peña Freire, Antonio Manuel. "La filiación filosófica de Lon Fuller: iuspositivismo normativo (ni iusnaturalismo ni principialismo)." Cuadernos Electrónicos de Filosofía del Derecho, no. 46 (June 6, 2022): 152. http://dx.doi.org/10.7203/cefd.46.21902.

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En este trabajo expondré el que considero el sentido apropiado de las tesis de Fuller sobre la moral interna del derecho. Tras argumentar que la tesis de la moral interna no dice mucho sobre la conexión entre el derecho y la moral en el sentido en que normalmente se discute sobre esta cuestión en los debates entre los partidarios del positivismo jurídico y sus críticos, explicaré en qué sentido el derecho es, para Fuller, un fenómeno moral. Esto me permitirá pronunciarme sobre la cuestionada filiación iusfilosófica del autor: sostendré que la filosofía del derecho de Fuller está en las antípodas de una concepción iusnaturalista o de una concepción principialista no-positivista del derecho y que si hay una filosofía del derecho con la que Fuller puede ser asociado es con el iuspositivismo normativo o ético.

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Peña Freire, Antonio Manuel. "La filiación filosófica de Lon Fuller: iuspositivismo normativo (ni iusnaturalismo ni principialismo)." Cuadernos Electrónicos de Filosofía del Derecho, no. 46 (June 6, 2022): 152. http://dx.doi.org/10.7203/cefd.46.21902.

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En este trabajo expondré el que considero el sentido apropiado de las tesis de Fuller sobre la moral interna del derecho. Tras argumentar que la tesis de la moral interna no dice mucho sobre la conexión entre el derecho y la moral en el sentido en que normalmente se discute sobre esta cuestión en los debates entre los partidarios del positivismo jurídico y sus críticos, explicaré en qué sentido el derecho es, para Fuller, un fenómeno moral. Esto me permitirá pronunciarme sobre la cuestionada filiación iusfilosófica del autor: sostendré que la filosofía del derecho de Fuller está en las antípodas de una concepción iusnaturalista o de una concepción principialista no-positivista del derecho y que si hay una filosofía del derecho con la que Fuller puede ser asociado es con el iuspositivismo normativo o ético.

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8

Hovenkamp, Herbert, and Owen M. Fiss. "The Cultural Crises of the Fuller Court." Yale Law Journal 104, no. 8 (June 1995): 2309. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/797002.

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9

Quinn, Michael. "Fuller on legal fictions: a Benthamic perspective." International Journal of Law in Context 9, no. 4 (December 2013): 466–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744552313000256.

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AbstractThis paper attempts first to explain Bentham's distinction between a fiction and the name of a fictitious entity, and to relate that distinction to his rationale for the critique of legal fictions. A second goal of the paper is to investigate the tensions involved in Bentham's ontology and epistemology, and more specifically the tension between the objectivist and subjectivist Bentham. It is argued that Bentham's objections to legal fictions were traceable to their use in deceptive or fallacious argument, whilst his logic provided a means of rehabilitating the use of the names of those fictitious entities which could be explicated through his technique of paraphrasis (that is, explained in terms of real entities), in relation to which both meaning and truth might be exchanged. This realist perspective differs markedly from that of Fuller, who, following Vaihinger, rejects the attempt to replace fiction with truth. There are significant areas of agreement between Bentham and Fuller, on the figurative nature of much language, and even, in certain contexts, on the utility of the self-conscious deployment of fictions. However, in the context of law and morality, it appears that his development of a route to truth through paraphrasis makes Bentham the enemy of fictions, since, in this field at least, truth and utility stand or fall together.

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Urbina, Francisco J., and Fernando Contreras. "Derecho y ordenamiento de la conducta." Jurídicas 16, no. 2 (July 1, 2019): 108–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.17151/jurid.2019.16.2.8.

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En este artículo se explora la forma en que el derecho ordena la conducta humana. El argumento se construye sobre el supuesto elemental según el cual el derecho aspira a ordenar la conducta de las personas, y se inserta en la teorización de Lon Fuller sobre los desiderata del Estado de Derecho. El objetivo del artículo es presentar, justificar y analizar la tesis de que el derecho ordena la conducta de manera principalmente directa, es decir, no mediante manipulación o estímulos sino significando un orden deseado. Siguiendo la metodología de Fuller, consistente en identificar las condiciones para que el derecho genere orden, se concluye que la ordenación directa de la conducta es más eficaz y, además, consistente con la dignidad moral de aquellos sujetos al derecho. Así, se propone un desideratum adicional a la articulación de Fuller: que el derecho ordene la conducta humana de manera directa.

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Urbina, Francisco J., and Fernando Contreras. "Derecho y ordenamiento de la conducta." Jurídicas 16, no. 2 (July 1, 2019): 108–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.17151/jurid.2019.16.2.8.

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En este artículo se explora la forma en que el derecho ordena la conducta humana. El argumento se construye sobre el supuesto elemental según el cual el derecho aspira a ordenar la conducta de las personas, y se inserta en la teorización de Lon Fuller sobre los desiderata del Estado de Derecho. El objetivo del artículo es presentar, justificar y analizar la tesis de que el derecho ordena la conducta de manera principalmente directa, es decir, no mediante manipulación o estímulos sino significando un orden deseado. Siguiendo la metodología de Fuller, consistente en identificar las condiciones para que el derecho genere orden, se concluye que la ordenación directa de la conducta es más eficaz y, además, consistente con la dignidad moral de aquellos sujetos al derecho. Así, se propone un desideratum adicional a la articulación de Fuller: que el derecho ordene la conducta humana de manera directa.

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12

Urbina, Francisco J., and Fernando Contreras. "Derecho y ordenamiento de la conducta." Jurídicas 16, no. 2 (July 1, 2019): 108–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.17151/jurid.2019.16.2.8.

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En este artículo se explora la forma en que el derecho ordena la conducta humana. El argumento se construye sobre el supuesto elemental según el cual el derecho aspira a ordenar la conducta de las personas, y se inserta en la teorización de Lon Fuller sobre los desiderata del Estado de Derecho. El objetivo del artículo es presentar, justificar y analizar la tesis de que el derecho ordena la conducta de manera principalmente directa, es decir, no mediante manipulación o estímulos sino significando un orden deseado. Siguiendo la metodología de Fuller, consistente en identificar las condiciones para que el derecho genere orden, se concluye que la ordenación directa de la conducta es más eficaz y, además, consistente con la dignidad moral de aquellos sujetos al derecho. Así, se propone un desideratum adicional a la articulación de Fuller: que el derecho ordene la conducta humana de manera directa.

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13

Cassels, Jamie, and Robert S. Summers. "Lon Fuller: Liberalism and the Limits of Law." University of Toronto Law Journal 36, no. 3 (1986): 318. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/825577.

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14

张, 凌云. "Relationship between Law and Morality Research—Fuller “The Morality of Law”." Open Journal of Legal Science 10, no. 05 (2022): 850–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.12677/ojls.2022.105109.

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15

Luban, David. "Natural Law as Professional Ethics: A Reading of Fuller." Social Philosophy and Policy 18, no. 1 (2001): 176–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500002831.

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In Plato'sLaws, the Athenian Stranger claims that the gods will smile only on a city where the law “is despot over the rulers and the rulers are slaves of the law.” This passage is the origin of the slogan “the rule of law not of men,” an abbreviation of which forms our phrase “the rule of law.” From Plato and Aristotle, through John Adams and John Marshall, down to us, no idea has proven more central to Western political and legal culture. Yet the slogan turns on a very dubious metaphor. Laws do not rule, and the “rule of law not of men” is actually a specific form of rule by men (including, nowadays, a few women). These rulers are not slaves to anything. Furthermore, the construction of the slogan—rule of law andnotof men—has unfortunate connotations. It suggests that the personal qualities of the human rulers required to secure the rule of law are nothing more than forbearance and disinterestedness—a resolution to stay out of law's way.

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16

Luban, David. "NATURAL LAW AS PROFESSIONAL ETHICS: A READING OF FULLER." Social Philosophy and Policy 18, no. 1 (January 2001): 176–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052501181070.

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17

Nadler, Jennifer. "Hart, Fuller and the Connection Between Law and Justice." Law and Philosophy 27, no. 1 (June 29, 2007): 1–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10982-007-9010-x.

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18

Rusydi, Muhammad. "HUKUM DAN MORAL: MENGULIK ULANG PERDEBATAN POSITIVISME HUKUM DAN TEORI HUKUM KODRAT H.L.A HART & LON F. FULLER." AL WASATH Jurnal Ilmu Hukum 2, no. 1 (April 21, 2021): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.47776/alwasath.v2i1.134.

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ABSTRACT This paper explores the theoretical exchange between two influential legal thinkers, H.L.A. Hart and Lon F. Fuller. The first mentioned represent the school of legal positivism while the later known as the defender of natural law theory. This paper refers to their early works of Hart’s “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” and Fuller’s “Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart” which both published in 1958. Keywords: Legal Positivism, Natural Law Theory, H.L.A. Hart, Lon F. Fuller.

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19

Petroski, Karen. "Legal fictions and the limits of legal language." International Journal of Law in Context 9, no. 4 (December 2013): 485–505. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744552313000268.

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AbstractSince Lon Fuller published his 1930 trilogy of essays on the topic, students of the legal fiction have focused on identifying additional examples of fictions or challenging Fuller's classic taxonomy. But Fuller did more in these essays than propose a definition and a classification system; he also argued that legal fictions are examples of a more general phenomenon found in many systems of specialised language usage. Drawing on work done in the intervening decades on related issues outside the law, this paper develops this insight in new directions, seeking to understand in more detail one of Fuller's principal concerns: the points at which legal language stops communicating, points that may shift over time but will never completely disappear. The analysis indicates that the currently prevailing understanding of legal fictions as, in essence, consciously counterfactual propositions is historically contingent and incomplete; that legal writers have generally used the ‘legal fiction’ label to signal those writers' sense of the futility of further justification to a non-legal audience (even when they are using the term in a justification likely to be read only by a legal audience); and, contrary to the assumptions of many post-Fuller theorists, that the boundaries of the legal vocabularies recognised as self-justifying may have become less distinct over the past century.

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20

Tinture, M. K. "Concept and Purpose in Legal Theory: How to "Reclaim" Fuller." American Journal of Jurisprudence 58, no. 1 (May 23, 2013): 75–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajj/aut005.

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21

MAY, LARRY. "Habeas Corpus and the Normative Jurisprudence of International Law." Leiden Journal of International Law 23, no. 2 (April 27, 2010): 291–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156510000038.

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AbstractIn this article I am interested in seeing what the normative jurisprudential support is for a minimalist version of habeas corpus in international law. I investigate what Fuller called ‘procedural natural law’ in contemporary international criminal law. In the first two sections I rehearse some of Hart's and Fuller's views as they pertain to the subject of international law and also to the inner morality of law. In the third section I set out some of my views on these matters, drawing on both Hart and Fuller, concerning the value of fundamental procedural rights. In the fourth section I discuss the right of habeas corpus as a good test case of how to think about these issues. In the final sections I expand on these remarks and argue that procedural rights need to be protected better in international law, if the latter is to have a claim to legitimacy as a mature legal system.

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22

Epstein, Richard A., and James W. Ely. "The Chief Justiceship of Melville W. Fuller 1888-1910." American Journal of Legal History 40, no. 1 (January 1996): 109. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/845465.

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23

Paulson, Stanley L. "Lon L. Fuller, Gustav Radbruch, and the "Positivist" Theses." Law and Philosophy 13, no. 3 (August 1994): 313. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3504918.

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24

Paulson, Stanley L. "Lon L. Fuller, Gustav Radbruch, and the ?positivist? theses." Law and Philosophy 13, no. 3 (August 1994): 313–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01001678.

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25

van der Burg, Wibren. "Essentially Ambiguous Concepts and the Fuller-Hart-Dworkin Debate." Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 95, no. 3 (2009): 305–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2009-0023.

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26

Biswas, Anjan. "Stochastic Perturbation of Parabolic Law Optical Solitons." PIERS Online 2, no. 6 (2006): 576–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.2529/piers060817200007.

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Biswas, A., S. Konar, and E. Zerrad. "Soliton-soliton Interaction with Parabolic Law Nonlinearity." Journal of Electromagnetic Waves and Applications 20, no. 7 (January 2006): 927–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156939306776149833.

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28

Biswas, A. "Stochastic Perturbation of Parabolic Law Optical Solutions." Journal of Electromagnetic Waves and Applications 21, no. 11 (January 1, 2007): 1479–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156939307782000262.

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29

Waldron, Jeremy. "HOW LAW PROTECTS DIGNITY." Cambridge Law Journal 71, no. 1 (March 2012): 200–222. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197312000256.

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AbstractOne way in which law protects dignity is by enforcing human rights provisions that explicitly prohibit degradation. But, as Lon Fuller and others have observed, law's connection with dignity is also deeper and more pervasive than this. In the way that its requirements are presented, in its procedures, in its sponsorship of argumentation, in treating people as equals, even in the distinctive way in which it makes use of coercion, law treats humans as dignified agents, capable of self-control, with a good sense of their own interests, and an ability to respond intelligently to its demands.

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30

Sevel, Michael. "What the Sovereign Can’t Do." Hobbes Studies 27, no. 2 (September 8, 2014): 191–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18750257-02702009.

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One of the central claims of Larry May’s Limiting Leviathan (Oxford University Press, 2013) is that Hobbes’s theory of law is best understood as a kind of “procedural natural law” theory akin to the one developed by Lon Fuller in the mid-twentieth century. May’s interpretation of Hobbes suggests at least two different views of the role of equity as a constraint on legal validity; neither of them bears any important affinities with Fuller’s theory. May however makes a stronger case that Hobbes and Fuller share broadly similar views about how and why citizens have an obligation to obey the law; the affinities between the two are therefore found in their theories of political obligation rather than in their theories of law.

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31

Kramer, M. "Scrupulousness without scruples: a critique of Lon Fuller and his defenders." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 18, no. 2 (June 1, 1998): 235–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/18.2.235.

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32

Qadir, Hemin Ibrahim, and Najmadeen Ahmed Muhamad. "Legal Morality in Fullerian Jurisprudence." Journal of University of Raparin 8, no. 3 (September 29, 2021): 151–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.26750/vol(8).no(3).paper8.

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The American legal philosopher Lon L. Fuller profoundly advanced a sophisticated morality conception of law through his argument for thesis of Legal Morality (LM). In particular, he adumbrated a novelist idea of “ internal morality of law” that would enable the transformation of the sophisticated morality conception of law into a conception idea of law and morality connection while simultaneously providing an explanation of the new and fresh thesis of legal morality. Contrary to the common (and mostly legal positivism) view, Fuller argues that it is not only the case that the (external) morality determines what the level of any connection between law and morality, rather it is also the idea of law in itself regenerates the idea of morality (internally). However, it is argued that in spite of the fact that Fuller suggested a sophisticated account of interconnection between law and morality, he fails to develop the complexities of the (morality) connection to the law in systemic way. What does he miss in his argument of the connection between law and morality? This study will advance the view that there are more than one way to make a connection between law and morality. Some of these connections can be named here: the morality of duty, the morality of legal subject, the morality of legal official, the morality of legal end, the morality of legal content and the internal and external morality of law. This study argues that each type of these connections between law and morality importantly has many effective outcomes in term of conception and implication of law, which Fuller did not tell us. In Fuller’s work, one can grasp the soundness of this connection in a variety levels. Yet, surprisingly to Fuller’s own works, this study will show that Fuller’s thesis of legal molarity must be expanded and justified on the different ground. In doing so, this study argues not only to make sense of Fuller’s legal morality, but it also redirects the systemic way to bring all pieces of Fuller’s claim of legal morality together and to seek the rationality beyond the legal.

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33

Bennett, Mark. "Leaving the Hart-Fuller Debate and Reclaiming Fuller: Form, Agency, and Morality in Kristen Rundle's Forms Liberate." Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 44, no. 3/4 (November 1, 2013): 461. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v44i3/4.4990.

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Kristen Rundle's Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller provides an excellent analysis and re-interpretation of Fuller's legal theory. Its particular strengths are its comprehensive contextualisation of Fuller's famous arguments about the 'internal morality of law' within a wider project of 'eunomics' – the inquiry in the principles of good social order – and its reorientation of our view of Fuller's thought through his key idea of human agency. This review article sets out Rundle's main claims, and then challenges the argument that HLA Hart's responses to Fuller make him primarily responsible for the neglect and misunderstanding of Fuller's wider project in contemporary legal philosophy.

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34

ARMSTRONG, DAVID. "Evolving conceptions of justice in international law." Review of International Studies 37, no. 5 (November 9, 2011): 2121–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210511000350.

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AbstractThe article examines the argument that international law is already beginning to reflect cosmopolitanism. It does so by briefly reviewing the history of the ways in which concepts of justice have been represented in international law and then considering the case that cosmopolitanism is present in various forms in contemporary international law. While dismissing some of the stronger cosmopolitan claims it argues that the fuller picture has complexities that International Relations Realists and legal Positivists tend to ignore.

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35

Allison, J. W. F. "Fuller's Analysis of Polycentric Disputes and the Limits of Adjudication." Cambridge Law Journal 53, no. 2 (July 1994): 367–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197300099098.

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Fuller made a leading contribution to the understanding of the adversary system and the process of adjudication. He did not officially publish his paper, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication”, but distributed it widely and discussed it in his correspondence with prominent academics. His analysis of the limits of adjudication has been influential in both England and North America.

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rahmatollahi, hosein, and fatemeh yazdizadeh Alborz. "The internal Morality of Law in the view of Lon Fuller." Journal of Law Research 22, no. 86 (July 1, 2019): 147–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.29252/lawresearch.22.86.147.

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37

Murphy, Colleen. "Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law." Law and Philosophy 24, no. 3 (May 2005): 239–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10982-004-7990-3.

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Grant, Claire. "Promulgation and the law." International Journal of Law in Context 2, no. 3 (September 2006): 321–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744552306003089.

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This is a paper about promulgation, and whether it is a sine qua non of law. The promulgation question has been treated occasionally in the jurisprudential literature, although typically only as a subordinate theorem. This paper does not attempt a thorough conspectus, seeking rather to serve as an introductory to what is a longstanding problem of general interest and concern. An argument for the proposition that laws are things that can be known will be distinguished from two other ways of responding to the promulgation question, which may be attributed respectively to the late H. L. A. Hart and Lon Fuller. The paper defends this proposition about artefactuality and access, and deals with a number of awkward consequences that appear to ensue from its acceptance.

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Biswas, Anjan. "Quasi-stationary optical solitons with parabolic law nonlinearity." Optics Communications 216, no. 4-6 (February 2003): 427–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0030-4018(02)02309-x.

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40

Li, Wen-He, and Yong Wang. "Optical propagation patterns in nonlocal parabolic law medium." Modern Physics Letters B 33, no. 35 (December 16, 2019): 1950445. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217984919504451.

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The model of optical propagation in nonlocal parabolic law medium is described by nonlinear Schrödinger equation with high-order nonlinear terms. Exact optical propagation patterns are constructed by proposing a general complex trial equation method. These results show rich optical propagation patterns of the model.

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41

Konar, Swapan, and Anjan Biswas. "Intra-channel collision of parabolic law optical solitons." Optical and Quantum Electronics 36, no. 15 (December 2004): 1291–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11082-005-0404-4.

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42

Omuraliev, A. S., E. D. Abylaeva, and P. Esengul kyzy. "Parabolic Problem with a Power-Law Boundary Layer." Differential Equations 57, no. 1 (January 2021): 75–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1134/s0012266121010067.

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43

VanDrunen, David. "Further Reforming a Reformed Theology of Law." Journal of Reformed Theology 15, no. 4 (December 7, 2021): 281–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15697312-bja10021.

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Abstract Early Reformed theology of law was very similar to Thomas Aquinas’s, although it also dissented from aspects of his work. This early Reformed thinking about law came to influential expression in the Marrow of Modern Divinity. The Marrow’s theology of law focused on concerns of Reformed soteriology while continuing to resemble much of Thomas’s scheme. This revised Reformed approach was generally helpful, yet did not give enough attention to the movement of redemptive history. Therefore, this article proposes a theology of law that incorporates earlier Reformed developments but also seeks to reform them further by taking redemptive-historical considerations into fuller account.

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44

Moore, Michael. "Hart's Concluding Scientific Postscript." Legal Theory 4, no. 3 (September 1998): 301–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s135232520000104x.

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It has often and correctly been remarked that the Hart-Fuller debate of 1956–1969 set the agenda for Anglo-American jurisprudence in the last half of the twentieth century. The nature of law, of legal obligation, of legal authority, and of law's relation to morality were the questions that debate made central to jurisprudence as we have since practiced it.

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45

Tjon Soei Len, Lyn K. L. "Progress towards what? On the need for an intersectional paradigm shift in European private law." European Law Open 1, no. 2 (June 2022): 363–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/elo.2022.25.

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AbstractHesselink proposes a progressive code of European private law as a radical response to Pistor’s The Code of Capital, which exposes private law’s complicity in staggering wealth inequality and social injustice. In this contribution, I argue that the proposal for a progressive code is insufficiently radical, because it is not fully equipped to address root problems of socially unjust private law. I suggest that a fuller accounting of root problems is necessary as a precondition for a ‘radical’ response: a more fundamental rethinking of private law based in more inclusive theorising of its role in social injustice. I sketch some of the ways in which intersectional approaches can assist in a fuller accounting of root problems by elevating and highlighting how mutually constructing systems of privilege and oppression give rise to social injustices that shape people’s lives. Notably, accounting of private law’s complicity in social injustice should engage private law’s coding of capital as entangled with race and gender. I argue that intersectionality is needed to enable the sort of paradigm shift, progressive visions and radical responses Hesselink aspires.

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46

Savescu, Michelle, Sadah A. Alkhateeb, M. A. Banaja, A. A. Alshaery, E. M. Hilal, Daniela Milovic, and Anjan Biswas. "Thirring Solitons in Optical Fibers with Parabolic Law Nonlinearity." Journal of Computational and Theoretical Nanoscience 13, no. 7 (July 1, 2016): 4656–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1166/jctn.2016.5332.

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Zayed, Elsayed M. E., Mohamed E. M. Alngar, Mahmoud M. El–Horbaty, Anjan Biswas, Padmaja Guggilla, Mehmet Ekici, Abdullah Kamis Alzahrani, and Milivoj R. Belic. "Solitons in magneto–optic waveguides with parabolic law nonlinearity." Optik 222 (November 2020): 165314. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijleo.2020.165314.

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Canton, Rob. "Probation and the philosophy of punishment." Probation Journal 65, no. 3 (May 15, 2018): 252–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0264550518776768.

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With the important exception of critiques of rehabilitation, philosophers of punishment do not often have probation as their focus. This (relative) neglect is mutual: when probation policymakers, scholars and practitioners reflect upon their own work, practices and values, the insights of the philosophy of punishment are rarely among their chosen resources. This paper attempts to make some connections and to point to some ways in which a fuller engagement might shed a different light on some familiar questions in the philosophy of punishment and enrich thinking about the work of probation.

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Zhou, Qin. "Optical solitons for Biswas–Milovic model with Kerr law and parabolic law nonlinearities." Nonlinear Dynamics 84, no. 2 (November 26, 2015): 677–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11071-015-2516-0.

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Altamimi, Abdulmalik M. "An Interactional World Trade Law." International Community Law Review 18, no. 3-4 (October 6, 2016): 317–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18719732-12341329.

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This article undertakes an innovative analysis of the theoretical and practical bases of world trade law by employing the interactional international law theory developed by Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, and the jurisprudence of Lon L. Fuller. There are two main reasons for choosing an interactional approach. Firstly, through the constructivist notion of shared understandings, it offers a suitable framework for identifying the social foundations of world trade in terms of economic and legal inputs into the system. Secondly, Fuller’s contributions are acutely relevant to world trade law because of the economics foundation of his morality of law thesis, and his insightful reflections on fidelity to law, legality, and adjudication. Fuller’s jurisprudence pays close attention to the limits of adjudicating institutional rules that apply to the allocation of economic resources. This makes it useful for discussing the procedural challenges facing the World Trade Organization compliance regime.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Parabolic law of Fuller'

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