Journal articles on the topic 'Pamela Ruth'

Abstract Informal caregivers often help manage medications for people with ADRD. Caregiver-assisted medication management has the potential to optimize outcomes for caregivers and people with ADRD, but is often associated with suboptimal outcomes. We used the user-centered design persona method to represent the needs of ADRD caregivers who manage medications for people with ADRD to guide future design decisions for technology interventions. Data were collected through virtual contextual inquiry in which caregivers (Nf24) sent daily multimedia text messages depicting medication management activities for seven days each, followed by an interview that used the messages as prompts to understand medication management needs. We applied the persona development method to the data to identify distinct caregiver personas, i.e., evidence-derived groups of prospective users of a future intervention. We used team-based affinity diagramming to organize information about participants based on intragroup (dis)similarities, to create meaningful clusters representing intervention-relevant attributes. We then used group consensus discussion to create personas based on attribute clusters. The six identified attributes differentiating personas were: 1. medication acquisition, 2. medication organization, 3. medication administration, 4. monitoring symptoms, 5. care network, 6. technology preferences. Three personas were identified based on differences on those attributes: Regimented Ruth (independent, proactive, tech savvy, controls all medications), Intuitive Ian (collaborative, uses own judgment, some technology, provides some medication autonomy), Passive Pamela (reactive, easy going, technology novice, provides full medication autonomy). These personas can be used to guide technology intervention design by evaluating how well intervention designs support each of them.

Öz aşkınlık V. Frankl ile psikoloji terminolojisinde yer almıştır. Çeşitli disiplinler tarafından ele alınan öz aşkınlık kavramı özellikle hemşire kuramcılar tarafından incelenmiştir. Öz aşkınlık kuramı Pamela G. Reed tarafından tümdengelim yaklaşımı kullanılarak geliştirilen bir hemşirelik kuramıdır. Bu kuramın amacı, bireylerin ve ailelerin kayıp veya yaşamı sınırlandıran bir hastalık gibi zorlu yaşam durumları ile karşı karşıya kaldığı zamanlarda, iyilik halinin sağlanması ve sürdürülmesine ilişkin uygulama ve araştırma için bir çerçeve sağlamaktır. Bütüncül, hümanistik bir bakım bilimi olan hemşirelik, öz aşkınlığın insanla bir bütün olarak nasıl ilişkilendirileceği ile ilgilenmektedir. Öz aşkınlık ile ilgili yapılan teorik ve ampirik araştırmalar öz aşkınlığın pek çok ruh sağlığı göstergesi ile ilişkili olduğunu göstermektedir. Öz aşkınlık; bireysel ve kişilerarası sınırların aşılması ile sağlık ile ilişkilidir. Hemşireler öz aşkınlık bilgisi ile hastalarının iyilik halini destekleyen çeşitli uygulamalarda kullanabilirler. Bu derlemenin amacı öz aşkınlık kuramının kavramsal çerçevesinin incelenmesidir.

Durante las últimas décadas, en la región chaqueña se han implementado una serie de políticas y proyectos de desarrollo ejecutadas por organismos nacionales y financiadas por agencias de crédito internacional que buscaban, según sus propios objetivos aumentar la productividad, competitividad y comercialización regional de manera sostenible. En la localidad de Pampa del Indio, provincia del Chaco una de estas políticas fue el de pavimentación y rehabilitación de la Ruta Provincial N.° 3 a partir de la ejecución del proyecto de Infraestructura Vial del Desarrollo Norte Grande 7991AR, en la cual confluyeron una heterogeneidad de actores entre los que se destacaron el Banco Mundial, el Ministerio de Planificación de la Nación, fundaciones, pueblos indígenas, entre otros. Por ello, este artículo se propone analizar ciertas prácticas y acciones implementadas por los actores que confluyeron en la ejecución de este proyecto de desarrollo sostenible. El presente trabajo se enmarca en la investigación realizada durante la formación posdoctoral en la zona que comenzó en la formación de grado (2011) y continua hasta la actualidad, por ello a lo largo de las páginas retomaremos fragmentos de entrevistas realizadas en el trabajo de campo, además de analizar documentos y materiales teóricos referidos a la problemática aquí presentada.

<p>En este primer número del año 2018 presentamos veinte artículos originales que se suman los ya disponibles en la Revista en formato de acceso abierto. Nueve de ellos corresponden a la Sección Arqueología; cinco corresponden al área de la Antropología Biológica, dos a la Sección Museología; y cuatro a Antropología Social.</p><p>En el primer trabajo de la Sección Arqueología Ramiro Barberena, Augusto Tessone, María Nella Quiroga, Florencia Gordón, Carina Llano, Alejandra Gasco, Jimena Paiva y Andrew Ugan presentan los primeros resultados de ecología isotópica regional para el extremo norte de la provincia del Neuquén (Argentina), información clave para la reconstrucción de cambios ecológicos y paleodietas humanas a través del tiempo. Continúa María Paula Barros quien presenta el análisis y la discusión acerca de la producción de módulos laminares sobre dos rocas ampliamente utilizadas en la subregión pampa húmeda, como son la ortocuarcita del Grupo Sierras Bayas y la ftanita. Con ello se busca indagar acerca de cuáles fueron los criterios técnicos tenidos en cuenta, tanto para la preparación de los núcleos, como para su explotación. Emiliano Mange, Maitén Irma Di Lorenzo y Lucio González Venanzi presenta el análisis de los materiales faunísticos del sitio Tembrao, ubicado en un pequeño valle al pie de la meseta de Somuncurá (sur de la provincia de Río Negro) con cronologías asignables al Holoceno tardío. Lorena Grana realiza una revisión crítica de la evolución y estado actual de los análisis diatomológicos en cuestiones arqueológicas, principalmente incluyendo los estudios latinoamericanos. Anne Gustavsson discute y pone en dialogo las prácticas y la trayectoria científica del arqueólogo Eric Boman (1867-1924) y los modos que ha sido recordado por la historia disciplinar. Brenda Irene Oxman y Rodolphe Hoguin exploran la relación entre los cambios ambientales producidos en la Puna Seca Argentina durante el periodo 12 000- 4000 años AP y su incidencia en la variabilidad observada en las estrategias adaptativas desarrolladas por los grupos humanos en la tecnología lítica. Norma Ratto, Alejandro Rodríguez González, Mara Basile, Francisco J. Pérez Torrado y José L. Fernández Turiel presentan un primer modelo de cálculos volumétricos para estimar la tasa de incisión en función del desalojo del material piroclástico de la quebrada de Las Papas a lo largo de 4200 años, y estimar cuándo estuvieron ciertos bloques disponibles para su intervención como soporte de arte rupestre en el área. Ariadna Svoboda y Eduardo Julián Moreno presentan los resultados obtenidos a partir del análisis zooarqueológico de tres sondeos en relación a la explotación de recursos dulceacuícolas (peces, coipos y anátidos) y recursos terrestres (dasipódidos y guanaco) para el área del lago Colhué Huapi, Chubut. Cerrando la Sección, Melisa Rodríguez Oviedo da cuenta de los trabajos realizadas en el sitio La Rinconada Arriba ubicado en el Valle de Ambato, Catamarca, Argentina. Con esto vemos representada la arqueología regional de gran parte de la Argentina.</p><p>La Sección de Antropología Biológica presenta cinco trabajos. Rodrigo Zúñiga Thayer, Jorge Suby, Gustavo Flensborg y Leandro Luna analizan la variabilidad de la osteocondritis disecante en un conjunto de restos humanos de 26 individuos adultos pertenecientes a sociedades de cazadores-recolectores de Patagonia austral durante el Holoceno medio-tardío y su posible relación con la edad, el sexo, la dieta, la cronología y la procedencia geográfica. Tamara Giselle Navarro, Marcos Jannello, Marcos Jannello, Ignacio A. Cerda, Ignacio A. Cerda, Marien Béguelin, Marien Béguelin, Romina Vázquez y Romina Vázquez presenta un protocolo alternativo para la obtención de cortes delgados de muestras óseas humanas de sitios arqueológicos con el objetivo de aplicarlo al análisis microestructural. Pamela García Laborde, María Eugenia Conforti y Ricardo Anibal Guichón pretenden contribuir a la discusión sobre posibles estrategias que amplíen las prácticas profesionales de bioantropólogos y arqueólogos públicos promoviendo nuevas tramas de relaciones que articulen y reconfiguren a ambos enfoques en nuestro país. Daniela Alit Mansegosa, Pablo Sebastián Giannotti y Horacio Daniel Chiavazza presentan los resultados del análisis de indicadores de salud oral en una muestra de cráneos y mandíbulas recuperados en entierros secundarios de las Ruinas Jesuíticas de San Francisco, ubicadas en el Sitio Área Fundacional de la Ciudad de Mendoza. Cerrando la Sección Manuel Domingo D’Angelo del Campo, Pamela García Laborde, Luciano O. Valenzuela, Josefina M. B. Motti, Marilina Martucci, Patricia I. Palacio y Ricardo Aníbal Guichón reflexionan acerca de los avances técnicos de las últimas décadas y como estos han “incidido en el ámbito científico conllevando un aumento en la generación de nuevos conocimientos. Estos han permitido mejorar las comunicaciones y el acceso a la información. En estas condiciones, aparece una corriente global, el data sharing, que aboga por la libre puesta en disposición de los datos producto de las investigaciones científica”.</p><p>En la Sección de Museología, Pamela Esther Degele, María Gabriela Chaparro, María Luz Endere presentan un trabajo que tiene como fin contrastar la normativa marco aplicable a las reservas naturales de la provincia de Buenos Aires con los usos sociales de los que es objeto el paisaje y patrimonio protegido por parte de diferentes grupos de interés. Por último para esta sección Julieta Barada analiza las transformaciones experimentadas en la iglesia del pueblo de Coranzulí (Puna de Jujuy) a través del estudio de las acciones realizadas por los pobladores sobre esta a lo largo del siglo XX desde un enfoque histórico y patrimonial.</p><p>Cerrando este número presentamos los trabajos incluidos en la Sección Antropología Social. Maria Carman analiza críticamente los postulados de la corriente de pensamiento que ha servido de sustento a la militancia a favor del derecho animal: el antiespecismo. Paola Monkevicius analiza los sentidos públicos que se producen, transmiten y disputan acerca de la muerte (entendida como crimen racista) del activista senegalés Massar Ba por parte del colectivo conformado por inmigrantes africanos y afrodescendientes en Argentina. Adrián Koberwein reflexiona en torno al rol del conocimiento científico en el marco de los conflictos ambientales contemporáneos. En concreto, acerca de un conflicto reciente en torno a la reforma de la ley de bosques de la Provincia de Córdoba, Argentina. Sin duda tema ce interés central a la sociedad cordobesa contemporánea. Por último Milena Annecchiarico propone un análisis de la trayectoria del programa UNESCO “Ruta del Esclavo” en Argentina, que promueve la investigación sobre la esclavitud y la trata transatlántica de africanos esclavizados, las formas de resistencia y la valorización de los sitios de memoria y de las manifestaciones culturales de las comunidades afrodescendientes actuales.</p><p>Analizando sintéticamente lo relatado más arriba podemos aseverar que este primer número del año 2018 muestra una gran diversidad de temáticas en todas las secciones del mismo. Esperando que esto sea de interés y como siempre los invitamos a leer esta producción y nos despedimos hasta el próximo número.</p><p>Córdoba, 01 de Julio de 2018</p>

The following papers were presented to the Canadian Society of Church History in 2008, but were not made available for publication: Julia Rady-Shaw, “Church Front: The Case of Bloor Street United Church’s War Effort, 1939-1945″; Gordon Heath, “When Friends and Neighbors Become Enemies: Canadian Baptists and the War of 1812″; Wolfgang Breul, “Martin Luther’s Development as a Reformer in Light of His own Statement from 1518: New Light on an Old Question”; Douglas H. Shantz, “Pietist Autobiography and the Rise of Secular Individualism”; Sarah Bruer, “Unselfish Devotion: Deaconess Zaidee Stoddard and the Social Gospel”; Kristin Burnett, “Acknowledging the ‘Unacknowledged Quarantine’: Religion, Faith, and Nursing at the Blood Hospital, 1893-1930s”; Renee Lafferty, “The ‘Spirits’ of Religion: Evangelicals and Medical Care for Toronto’s Dipsomaniacs, 1860-1890″; James Robertson, “‘T.T. Shields and the Des Moines Affair’: The Attempted Establishment and Subsequent Collapse of a Fundamentalist University in Des Moines, 1927-1929″; Ian Hesketh, “The Victorian Bible: Ecce Homo and the Manufacturing of a Literary Sensation”; Todd Webb, “‘Popery is Evidently Nodding to its Fall’: Methodism and Anti-Catholicism in British North America, 1837-1860.” Papers from a joint session with the Canadian Historical Association not made available for publication include: Marguerite Van Die, “Practising Medicine and Spiritualism in the 1860s: The Encounters Between Drs. Moses Colby and Susan Kilborn as Problem and Possibility in the Writing of Religious History”; Pamela E. Klassen, “The Holistic Trinity: Body, Mind, and Spirit among Twentieth-Century Protestants”; and Ruth Compton Brouwer, “When Missions Became Development: The Churches and CUSO in the 1960s – Linkages and Tensions.”

<p><strong>UIC RESEARCH JOURNAL</strong><br />International Edition<br />Volume 18, Number 1, April 2012<br /><br /><strong>Editor in Chief</strong><br />Renan P. Limjuco<br /><br /><strong>Managing Editor</strong><br />Emma V. Sagarino<br /><br /><strong>Staff</strong><br />Francis Kenneth D. Canono<br /><br /><strong>Research Committee</strong><br />Dr. Adorico M. Aya-ay<br />Prof. Exander T. Barrios<br />Dr. Alvin O. Cayogyog <br />S. Ma. Luz O. de la Cruz, RVM <br />Prof. Eric John G. Emberda<br />Dr. Elsa B. Faceronda S. <br />Dr. Ma. Teresa M. Gravino<br />Engr. Noel V. Laud<br />Dr. Renan P. Limjuco<br />Dr. Lucila T. Lupo<br />Prof. Emma V. Sagarino<br />Dr. Ma. Eva C. San Juan<br />Ma. Marissa R. Viri, RVM</p><p> </p><p><strong>Filipino Scholar Reviewers</strong><br />Dr. Hope M. Bandal <br />Engr. Ruth P. Barluado<br />Dr. Marleonie M. Bauyot <br />Prof. Kari Ann V. Bitgue<br />Dr. Pamela R. Castrillo <br />Dr. Felix C. Chavez, Jr. <br />Dr. Christine S. Diaz <br />Dr. Bonifacio G. Gabales Jr.<br />Prof. Luzviminda L. Gonzales <br />Prof. Melodie Claire W. Juico <br />Prof. Alma R. Lamparas<br />Prof. Ivan Anthony C. Lapuz<br />Dr. Victoria T. Lupase<br />Dr. Lucila T. Lupo<br />Dr. Elizabeth M. Malonzo<br />Dr. Norlan B. Martinez<br />Prof . Maricar Gay Panda<br />Prof. Genevieve A. Pilongo<br />Dr. Elsie A. Tee<br />Dr. Agnes S. Togon</p><p><strong>International Reviewers</strong><br />Dr. Celine Arat-Cabading<br />University of Guam <br />Guam, USA <br /><br />Dr. Stamatis Kalogerakos<br />Cranfield University<br />United Kingdom</p><p>Dr. Djuwari Djuwari <br />STIE Perbanas <br />Indonesia <br /><br />Dr. Kathryn Holmes <br />University of Newcastle <br />Australia <br /><br />Dr. Ana Joy P. Mendez<br />University of Guam<br />Guam, USA<br /><br />Dr. Alejandro F. Tongco<br />Oklahoma State University<br />USA</p>

<p><strong>UIC RESEARCH JOURNAL</strong></p><p><strong>International Edition</strong></p><p>Volume 18, Number 2, October 2012</p><p> </p><p><strong>Editor in Chief</strong></p><p>Renan P. Limjuco</p><p> </p><p><strong>Associate Editor</strong></p><p>Emma V. Sagarino</p><p> </p><p><strong>Managing Editor</strong></p><p>Francis Kenneth D. Canono</p><p> </p><p><strong>Research Committee</strong></p><p>Dr. Adorico M. Aya-ay</p><p>Engr. Noel V. Laud</p><p>Prof. Exander T. Barrios</p><p>Dr. Renan P. Limjuco</p><p>Dr. Alvin O. Cayogyog</p><p>Dr. Lucila T. Lupo</p><p>S. Ma. Luz O. de la Cruz, RVM</p><p>Dr. Cyril Cliffredson C. Mamocod</p><p>Prof. Eric John G. Emberda</p><p>Prof. Emma V. Sagarino</p><p>Dr. Elsa B. Faceronda</p><p>Dr. Ma. Eva C. San Juan</p><p>Dr. Ma. Teresa M. Gravino</p><p>S. Ma. Marissa R. Viri, RVM</p><p> </p><p><strong>Filipino Scholar Reviewers</strong></p><p>Engr. Ruth P. Barluado</p><p>Prof. Alma R. Lamparas</p><p>Dr. Marleonie M. Bauyot</p><p>Prof. Ivan Anthony C. Lapuz</p><p>Prof. Kari Ann V. Bitgue</p><p>Dr. Victoria T. Lupase</p><p>Dr. Pamela R. Castrillo</p><p>Dr. Lucila T. Lupo</p><p>Dr. Felix C. Chavez, Jr.</p><p>Dr. Norlan B. Martinez</p><p>Prof. Apolinar Henry Fernandez</p><p>Prof. Maricar Gay V. Panda</p><p>Dr. Bonifacio G. Gabales, Jr.</p><p>Prof. Genevieve A. Pilongo</p><p>Prof. Luzviminda L. Gonzales</p><p>Dr. Elsie A. Tee</p><p>Prof. Melodie Claire W. Juico</p><p>Dr. Macario D. Tiu</p><p> </p><p><strong>International Reviewers</strong></p><p><strong>Dr. Celine Arat-Cabading</strong></p><p>University of Guam</p><p>Guam, USA</p><p> </p><p><strong>Dr. Stamatis Kalogerakos</strong></p><p>Cranfield University</p><p>United Kingdom</p><p> </p><p><strong>Dr. Djuwari Djuwari</strong></p><p>STIE Perbanas</p><p>Indonisia</p><p> </p><p><strong>Dr. Ana Joy P. Mendez</strong></p><p>University of Guam</p><p>Guam, USA</p><p> </p><p><strong>Dr. Kathryn Holmes </strong></p><p>University of Newcastle</p><p>Australia</p><p> </p><p><strong>Dr. Alejandro F. Tongco</strong></p><p>Oklahoma State University</p><p>USA</p>

In Feminist theory: from margin to center, bell hooks puts into question the works by reformist feminists who happens to be mostly white, privileged women. She insists that these reformists do not address the plight of other oppressed women who were subjugated not only by their sex alone but by other factors such as race and class. Consequently, she proposes a cultural criticism that investigates the systems of domination in place through a disruption and deconstruction of cultural productions. This paper aims to critically evaluate hooks’ radical feminism and cultural criticism, and show its philosophical heritage through an engagement with the key ideas of critical theory and postmodernism. References Ackerly, Brooke A. Political theory and feminist social criticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Adorno, Theodor W., and Anson G. Rabinbach. “Culture industry reconsidered.” New German Critique 6 (1975): 12-19. Ahmed, Sara. Differences that matter: Feminist theory and postmodernism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Anderson, Pamela Sue. “Feminism and philosophy.” In Gamble, Sarah, ed. The Routledge companion to feminism and postfeminism. London: Routledge, 2006, 117-124. Berger, Arthur Asa. Cultural criticism: a primer of key concepts. California: Sage Publications, 1995. Brezina, Corona. Sojourner Truth’s “ain't I a woman?” speech: A primary source investigation. New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2005. Bronner, Stephen Eric, and Douglas Kellner, eds. Critical theory and society: A reader. New York: Psychology Press, 1989. Brooks, Ann. Postfeminisms: feminism, cultural theory and cultural forms. London: Routledge, 1997. Cavallaro, Dani. Critical and cultural theory. London: The Athlone Press, 2001. Cott, Nancy F. The grounding of modern feminism. Boston, Mass.: Yale University Press, 1987. del Guadalupe Davidson, Maria, and George Yancy, eds. Critical perspectives on bell hooks. London: Routledge, 2009. Devereux, Cecily. “New woman, new world: maternal feminism and the new imperialism in the white settler colonies.” In Women's studies international forum, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 175-184. Pergamon, 1999. Dicker, Rory, and Alison Piepmeier, eds. Catching a wave: Reclaiming feminism for the 21st century. Northeastern University Press, 2016. Foucault, Michel. The history of sexuality: An introduction. Vintage, 1990. Friedan, Betty. The feminine mystique. New York: WW Norton & Company, 2010. Gamble, Sarah, ed. The Routledge companion to feminism and postfeminism. London: Routledge, 2006. Genz, Stéphanie and Benjamin Brabon. Postfeminism: cultural texts and theories. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. Geuss, Raymond. The idea of a critical theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. hooks, bell. Outlaw culture: resisting representations. London: Routledge, 2006. __________. Salvation: Black people and love. New York: Harper Perennial, 2001. __________. Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics. Boston, Mass.: South and Press, 1990. __________. Feminist theory: from margin to center. Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1984. __________. Ain't I a woman: Black women and feminism. Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1981. Horkheimer, Max. Between philosophy and social science: selected early writings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995. Leitch, Vincent B., and William E. Cain, eds. The Norton anthology of theory and criticism. New York: WW Norton & Company, 2010. McLaren, Peter, and Nathalia E. Jaramillo. “Borderlines: bell hooks and the Pedagogy of Revolutionary Change.” In Critical Perspectives on bell hooks, pp. 31-47. Routledge, 2009. Kellner, Douglas. Baudrillard: A critical reader. Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1995. May, Tim, and Jason Powell. Situating social theory. London: McGraw-Hill Education, 2008. Nussbaum, Martha C. “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism.” Political Theory 20, no. 2 (1992): 202-46. Rush, Fred, ed. The Cambridge companion to critical theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Guy-Sheftall, Beverly. "Forty Years of Women’s Studies." Ms. Magazine online. Spring Issue. http://www. msmagazine. com/womensstudies/FourtyYears.asp (2009). Walters, Suzanna Danuta. Material girls: Making sense of feminist cultural theory. California: University of California Press, 1995. Watkins, S. Craig, and Rana A. Emerson. “Feminist media criticism and feminist media practices.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 571, no. 1 (2000): 151-166. Wolf, Naomi. The beauty myth: How images of beauty are used against women. New York: Random House, 1991.

Crailsheim, Eberhard / Maria D. Elizalde (Hrsg.), The Representation of External Threats. From the Middle Ages to the Modern World (History of Warfare, 123), Leiden / Boston 2019, Brill, XV u. 466 S., € 127,00. (Wolfgang Reinhard, Freiburg i. Br.) Höfele, Andreas / Beate Kellner (Hrsg.), Natur in politischen Ordnungsentwürfen der Vormoderne. Unter Mitwirkung von Christian Kaiser, Paderborn 2018, Fink, 224 S., € 59,00. (Stefano Saracino, Erfurt / München) Jütte, Robert / Romedio Schmitz-Esser (Hrsg.), Handgebrauch. Geschichten von der Hand aus dem Mittelalter und der Frühen Neuzeit, Paderborn 2019, Fink, 320 S. / Abb., € 44,90. (Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, Berlin / Münster) Tomaini, Thea (Hrsg.), Dealing with the Dead. Mortality and Community in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Explorations in Medieval Culture, 5), Leiden / Boston 2018, Brill, XI u. 449 S. / Abb., € 135,00. (Ralf-Peter Fuchs, Essen) Lahtinen, Anu / Mia Korpiola (Hrsg.), Dying Prepared in Medieval and Early Modern Northern Europe (The Northern World, 82), Leiden / Boston 2018, Brill, IX u. 211 S. / Abb., € 85,00. (Ralf-Peter Fuchs, Essen) Dyer, Christopher / Erik Thoen / Tom Williamson (Hrsg.), Peasants and Their Fields. The Rationale of Open-Field Agriculture, c. 700 - 1800 (CORN Publication Series, 16), Turnhout 2018, Brepols, X u. 275 S. / Abb., € 84,00. (Werner Troßbach, Fulda) Andermann, Kurt / Nina Gallion (Hrsg.), Weg und Steg. Aspekte des Verkehrswesens von der Spätantike bis zum Ende des Alten Reiches (Kraichtaler Kolloquien, 11), Ostfildern 2018, Thorbecke, 262 S. / Abb., € 29,00. (Sascha Bütow, Magdeburg) Jaspert, Nikolas / Christian A. Neumann / Marco di Branco (Hrsg.), Ein Meer und seine Heiligen. Hagiographie im mittelalterlichen Mediterraneum (Mittelmeerstudien, 18), Paderborn 2018, Fink / Schöningh, 405 S. / Abb., € 148,00. (Michael North, Greifswald) Müller, Harald (Hrsg.), Der Verlust der Eindeutigkeit. Zur Krise päpstlicher Autorität im Kampf um die Cathedra Petri (Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, Kolloquien 95), Berlin / Boston 2017, de Gruyter Oldenbourg, X u. 244 S. / graph. Darst., € 69,95. (Thomas Wetzstein, Eichstätt) Ehrensperger, Alfred, Geschichte des Gottesdienstes in Zürich Stadt und Land im Spätmittelalter und in der frühen Reformation bis 1531 (Geschichte des Gottesdienstes in den evangelisch-reformierten Kirchen der Deutschschweiz, 5), Zürich 2019, Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 814 S., € 76,00. (Andreas Odenthal, Bonn) Demurger, Alain, Die Verfolgung der Templer. Chronik einer Vernichtung. 1307 - 1314. Aus dem Französischen v. Anne Leube / Wolf H. Leube, München 2017, Beck, 408 S. / Karten, € 26,95. (Jochen Burgtorf, Fullerton) Caudrey, Philip J., Military Society and the Court of Chivalry in the Age of the Hundred Years War (Warfare in History), Woodbridge / Rochester 2019, The Boydell Press, XII u. 227 S., £ 60,00. (Stefan G. Holz, Heidelberg) Hesse, Christian / Regula Schmid / Roland Gerber (Hrsg.), Eroberung und Inbesitznahme. Die Eroberung des Aargaus 1415 im europäischen Vergleich / Conquest and Occupation. The 1415 Seizure of the Aargau in European Perspective, Ostfildern 2017, Thorbecke, VII u. 320 S. / Abb., € 45,00. (Rainer Hugener, Zürich) Krafft, Otfried, Landgraf Ludwig I. von Hessen (1402 - 1458). Politik und historiographische Rezeption (Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission für Hessen, 88), Marburg 2018, Historische Kommission für Hessen, XII u. 880 S. / Abb., € 48,00. (Uwe Schirmer, Jena) Neustadt, Cornelia, Kommunikation im Konflikt. König Erik VII. von Dänemark und die Städte im südlichen Ostseeraum (1423 - 1435) (Europa im Mittelalter, 32), Berlin / Boston 2018, de Gruyter, XV u. 540 S. / Abb., € 109,05. (Carsten Jahnke, Kopenhagen) Kekewich, Margaret, Sir John Fortescue and the Governance of England, Woodbridge / Rochester 2018, The Boydell Press, XXIII u. 367 S. / Abb., £ 60,00. (Maree Shirota, Heidelberg) MacGregor, Arthur, Naturalists in the Field. Collecting, Recording and Preserving the Natural World from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century (Emergence of Natural History, 2), Leiden / London 2018, Brill, XXIX u. 999 S. / Abb., € 270,00. (Bettina Dietz, Hongkong) Jones, Pamela M. / Barbara Wisch / Simon Ditchfield (Hrsg.), A Companion to Early Modern Rome, 1492 - 1692 (Brill’s Companions to European History, 17), Leiden / Boston 2019, Brill, XXIII u. 629 S., € 171,00. (Wolfgang Reinhard, Freiburg i. Br.) Frömmer, Judith, Italien im Heiligen Land. 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(Tobias Schenk, Wien) Haag, Norbert, Dynastie, Region, Konfession. Die Hochstifte des Heiligen Römischen Reiches Deutscher Nation zwischen Dynastisierung und Konfessionalisierung (1448 - 1648), 3 Bde. (Reformationsgeschichtliche Studien und Texte, 166), Münster 2018, Aschendorff, XXV u. 2170 S., € 239,00. (Kurt Andermann, Karlsruhe / Freiburg i. Br.) Steinfels, Marc / Helmut Meyer, Vom Scharfrichteramt ins Zürcher Bürgertum. Die Familie Volmar-Steinfels und der Schweizer Strafvollzug, Zürich 2018, Chronos, 335 S. / Abb., € 58,00. (Francisca Loetz, Zürich) Kohnle, Armin (Hrsg.), Luthers Tod. Ereignis und Wirkung (Schriften der Stiftung Luthergedenkstätten in Sachsen-Anhalt, 23), Leipzig 2019, Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 386 S. / Abb., € 48,00. (Eike Wolgast, Heidelberg) Zwierlein, Cornel / Vincenzo Lavenia (Hrsg.), Fruits of Migration. Heterodox Italian Migrants and Central European Culture 1550 - 1620 (Intersections, 57), Leiden / Boston 2018, Brill, XII u. 402 S., € 127,00. (Stephan Steiner, Wien) „Inquisitionis Hispanicae Artes“: The Arts of the Spanish Inquisition. Reginaldus Gonsalvius Montanus. A Critical Edition of the „Sanctae Inquisitionis Hispanicae Artes aliquot“ (1567) with a Modern English Translation, hrsg. v. Marcos J. Herráiz Pareja / Ignacio J. García Pinilla / Jonathan L. Nelson (Heterodoxia Iberica 2), Leiden / Boston 2018, Brill, VII u. 515 S., € 187,00. (Wolfram Drews, Münster) Lattmann, Christopher, Der Teufel, die Hexe und der Rechtsgelehrte. Crimen magiae und Hexenprozess in Jean Bodins „De la Démonomanie des Sorciers“ (Studien zur europäischen Rechtsgeschichte, 318), Frankfurt a. M. 2019, Klostermann, XVI u. 390 S., € 69,00. (Andreas Flurschütz da Cruz, Bamberg) Gorrochategui Santos, Luis, The English Armada. The Greatest Naval Disaster in English History, übers. v. Peter J. Gold, London / New York 2018, VIII u. 323 S. / Abb., £ 26,99. 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Trade Networks, Foreign Powers and the State, übers. v. Daniel Duffield, London [u. a.] 2017, Bloomsbury Academic, XXI u. 331 S., £ 26,09. (Hanna Sonkajärvi, Rio de Janeiro) Alimento, Antonella / Koen Stapelbroek (Hrsg.), The Politics of Commercial Treaties in the Eighteenth Century. Balance of Power, Balance of Trade, Cham 2017, Palgrave Macmillan, XI u. 472 S., € 103,99. (Justus Nipperdey, Saarbrücken) McDowell, Paula, The Invention of the Oral. Print Commerce and Fugitive Voices in Eighteenth-Century Britain, Chicago / London 2017, University of Chicago Press, XIII u. 353 S. / Abb., $ 45,00. (Markus Friedrich, Hamburg) Bernhard, Jan-Andrea / Judith Engeler (Hrsg.), „Dass das Blut der heiligen Wunden mich durchgehet alle Stunden“. Frauen und ihre Lektüre im Pietismus, Zürich 2019, Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 161 S. /Abb., € 21,90. (Helga Meise, Reims) Hammer-Luza, Elke, Im Arrest. 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Neil Jordan’s Breakfast on Pluto (2005) reconceives transience and domesticity together. This queer Irish road film collapses opposition between mobility and home by uncoupling them from heteronormative structures of gender, desire, and space—male/female, public/private. The film’s protagonist, Patrick “Kitten” Braden (Cillian Murphy), wanders in search of a loved one without whom she does not feel at home. Along the way, the film exposes and exploits the doubleness of both “mobility” and “home” in the traditional road narrative, queering the conventions of the road film to convey the desire and possibilities for an alternative domesticity. In its rerouting of the traditional road plot, Breakfast on Pluto does not follow a hero escaping the obligations of home and family to find autonomy on the road. Instead, the film charts Kitten’s quest to realise a sense of home through trans-domesticity—that is, to find shelter in non-heteronormative, mutual care while in both transient and public spaces.I affix “trans-” to “domesticity” to signal both the queerness and mobility that transform understandings of domestic spaces and practices in Breakfast on Pluto. To clarify, trans-domesticity is not queer assimilation to heteronormative domesticity, nor is it a relegation of queer culture to privatised and demobilised spaces. Rather, trans-domesticity challenges the assumption that all forms of domesticity are inherently normalising and demobilising. In other words, trans-domesticity uncovers tensions and violence swept under the rugs of hegemonic domesticity. Moreover, this alternative domesticity moves between and beyond the terms of gender and spatial oppositions that delimit the normative home.Specifically, “trans-domesticity” names non-normative homemaking practices that arise out of the “desire to feel at home”, a desire that Anne-Marie Fortier identifies in queer diasporic narratives (1890-90). Accordingly, “trans-domesticity” also registers the affective processes that foster the connectedness and belonging of “home” away from private domestic spaces and places of origin, a “rethinking of the concept of home”, which Ed Madden traces in lesbian and gay migrant narratives (175-77). Building on the assumption of queer diaspora theorists “that not only can one be at home in movement, but that movement can be one’s very own home” (Rapport and Dawson 27), trans-domesticity focuses critical attention on the everyday practices and emotional labour that create a home in transience.As Breakfast on Pluto tracks its transgender protagonist’s movement between a small Irish border town, Northern Ireland, and London, the film invokes both a specifically Irish migration and the broader queer diaspora of which it is a part. While trans-domesticity is a recurring theme across a wide range of queer diasporic narratives, in Breakfast on Pluto it also simultaneously drives the plot and functions as a narrative frame. The film begins and ends with Kitten telling her story as she wanders through the streets of Soho and cares for a member of her made family, her friend Charlie’s baby.Although I am concerned with the film adaptation, Patrick McCabe’s “Prelude” to his novel, Breakfast on Pluto (1998), offers a useful point of departure: Patrick “Pussy” Braden’s dream, “as he negotiates the minefields of this world”, is “ending, once and for all, this ugly state of perpetual limbo” and “finding a map which might lead to that place called home” (McCabe x). In such a place, McCabe’s hero might lay “his head beneath a flower-bordered print that bears the words at last ‘You’re home’”(McCabe xi). By contrast, the film posits that “home” is never a “place” apart from “the minefields of this world”, and that while being in transit and in limbo might be a perpetual state, it is not necessarily an ugly one.Jordan’s film thus addresses the same questions as does Susan Fraiman in her book Extreme Domesticity: “But what about those for whom dislocation is not back story but main event? Those who, having pulled themselves apart, realize no timely arrival at a place of their own, so that being not-unpacked is an ongoing condition?” (155). Through her trans-domestic shelter-making and caregiving practices, Kitten enacts “home” in motion and in public spaces, and thereby realises the elision in the flower-bordered print in McCabe’s “Prelude” (xi), which does not assure “You are at home” but, rather, “You are home”.From Housed to Trans-Domestic SubjectivitySelf and home are equated in the dominant cultural narratives of Western modernity, but “home” in such formulations is assumed to be a self-owned, self-contained space. Psychoanalytic theorist Carl Jung describes this Ur-house as “a concretization of the individuation process, […] a symbol of psychic wholeness” (225). Philosopher Gaston Bachelard sees in the home “the topography of our intimate being”, a structure that “concentrates being within limits that protect” (xxxii). However, as historian Carolyn Steedman suggests, the mythic house that has become “the stuff of our ‘cultural psychology,’ the system of everyday metaphors by which we see ourselves”, is far from universal; rather, it reflects “the topography of the houses” of those who stand “in a central relationship to the dominant culture” (75, 17).For others, the lack of such housing correlates with political marginalisation, as the house functions as both a metaphor and material marker for culturally-recognised selfhood. As cultural geographer John Agnew argues, in capitalist societies the self-owned home is both a sign of autonomous individuality and a prerequisite for full political subjectivity (60). Philosopher Rosi Braidotti asserts that this figuration of subjectivity in “the phallo-Eurocentric master code” treats as “disposable” the “bodies of women, youth, and others who are racialised or marked off by age, gender, sexuality, and income” (6). These bodies are “reduced to marginality” and subsequently “experience dispossession of their embodied and embedded selves, in a political economy of repeated and structurally enforced eviction” (Braidotti 6).To shift the meaning of “home” and the intimately-linked “self” from a privately-owned, autonomous structure to trans-domesticity, to an ethos of care enacted even, and especially in, transient and public spaces, is not to romanticise homelessness or to deny the urgent necessity of material shelter. Breakfast on Pluto certainly does not allow viewers to do either. Rather, the figure of a trans-domestic self, like Braidotti’s “nomadic subject”, has the potential to challenge and transform the terms of power relations. Those now on the margins might then be seen as equally-embodied selves and full political subjects with the right to shelter and care.Such a political project also entails recognising and revaluing—without appropriating and demobilising—existing trans-domesticity. As Fraiman argues, “domesticity” must be “map[ped] from the margins” in order to include the homemaking practices of gender rebels and the precariously housed, of castaways and outcasts (4-5). This alternative map would allow “outsiders to normative domesticity” to “claim domesticity while wrenching it away from such things as compulsory heterosexuality […] and the illusion of a safely barricaded life” (Fraiman 4-5). Breakfast on Pluto shares in this re-mapping work by exposing the violence embedded in heteronormative domestic structures, and by charting the radical political potential of trans-domesticity.Unsettling HousesIn the traditional road narrative, “home” tends to be a static, confining structure from which the protagonist escapes, a space that then functions as “a structuring absence” on the road (Robertson 271). Bachelard describes this normative structure as a “dream house” that constitutes “a body of images that give mankind proofs or illusions of stability” (17); the house functions, Henri Lefebvre argues, as “the epitome of immobility” (92). Whether the dream is to escape and/or to return, “to write of houses”, as Adam Hanna asserts, “is to raise ideas of shelters that are fixed and secure” (113).Breakfast on Pluto quickly gives lie to those expectations. Kitten is adopted by Ma Braden (Ruth McCabe), a single woman who raises Kitten and her adopted sister in domestic space that is connected to, and part of, a public house. That spatial contiguity undermines any illusion of privacy and security, as is evident in the scene in which a school-aged Kitten, who thought herself safely home alone and thus able to dress in her mother’s and sister’s clothes, is discovered in the act by her mother and sister from the pub’s street entrance. Further, the film lays bare the built-in mechanisms of surveillance and violence that reinforce heteronormative, patriarchal structures. After discovering Kitten in women’s clothes, Ma Braden violently scrubs her clean and whacks her with a brush until Kitten says, “I’m a boy, not a girl”. The public/house space facilitates Ma Braden’s close monitoring of Kitten thereafter.As a young writer in secondary school, Kitten satirises the violence within the hegemonic home by narrating the story of the rape of her biological mother, Eily Bergin (Eva Birthistle), by Kitten’s father, Father Liam (Liam Neeson) in a scene of hyper-domesticity set in the rectory kitchen. As Patrick Mullen notes, “the rendition of the event follows the bubble-gum logic and tone of 1950s Hollywood culture” (130). The relationship between the ideal domesticity thereby invoked and the rape then depicted exposes the sexual violence for what it is: not an external violation of the double sanctity of church and home space, but rather an internal and even intrinsic violence that reinforces and is shielded by the power structures from which normative domesticity is never separate.The only sense of home that seems to bind Kitten to her place of origin is based in her affective bonds to friends Charlie (Ruth Negga) and Lawrence (Seamus Reilly). When Lawrence is killed by a bomb, Kitten is no longer at home, and she leaves town to search for the “phantom” mother she never knew. The impetus for Kitten’s wandering, then, is connection rather than autonomy, and neither the home she leaves, nor the sense of home she seeks, are fixed structures.Mobile Homes and Queering of the Western RoadBreakfast on Pluto tracks how the oppositions that seem to structure traditional road films—such as that between home and mobility, and between domestic and open spaces—continually collapse. The film invokes the “cowboy and Indian” mythology from which the Western road narrative descends (Boyle 19), but to different ends: to capture a desire for non-heteronormative affective bonds rather than “lone ranger” autonomy, and to convey a longing for domesticity on the trail, for a home that is both mobile and open. Across the past century of Irish fiction and film, “cowboy and Indian” mythology has often intersected with queer wandering, from James Joyce’s Dubliners story “An Encounter” (1914) to Lenny Abrahamson’s film Adam & Paul (2004). In this tradition, Breakfast on Pluto queers “cowboy and Indian” iconography to convey an alternative conception of domesticity and home. The prevailing ethos in the film’s queered Western scenes is of trans-domesticity—of inclusion and care during transience and in open spaces. After bar bouncers exclude Kitten and friends because of her transgenderism and Lawrence’s Down syndrome, “The Border Knights” (hippie-bikers-cum-cowboys) ride to their rescue and bring them to their temporary home under the stars. Once settled around the campfire, the first biker shares his philosophy with a cuddled-up Kitten: “When I’m riding my hog, you think I’m riding the road? No way, man. I’m travelling from the past into the future with a druid at my back”. “Druid man or woman?” Kitten asks. “That doesn’t matter”, the biker clarifies, “What matters is the journey”. What matters is not place as fixed destination or gender as static difference, but rather the practice of travelling with open relationships to space, to time, and to others. The bikers welcome all to their fire and include both Kitten and Lawrence in their sharing of jokes and joints. The only exclusion is of reference to political violence, which Charlie’s boyfriend, Irwin (Laurence Kinlan), tries to bring into the conversation.Further, Kitten uses domesticity to try to establish a place for herself while on the road with “Billy Hatchett and The Mohawks”, the touring band that picks her up when she leaves Ma Braden’s. As Mullen notes, “Kitten literally works herself into the band by hand sewing a ‘squaw’ outfit to complement the group’s glam-rock Native American image” (Mullen 141). The duet that Kitten performs with Billy (Gavin Friday), a song about a woman inviting “a wandering man” to share the temporary shelter of her campfire, invokes trans-domesticity. But the film intercuts their performance with scenes of violent border-policing: first, by British soldiers at a checkpoint who threaten the group and boast about the “13 less to deal with” in Derry, and then by members of the Republican Prisoners Welfare Association, who throw cans at the group and yell them off stage. A number of critics have noted the postcolonial implications of Breakfast on Pluto’s use of Native American iconography, which in these intercut scenes clearly raises the national stakes of constructions of domestic belonging (see, for instance, Winston 153-71). In complementary ways, the film queers “cowboy and Indian” mythology to reimagine “mobility” and “home” together.After Kitten is forced out by the rest of the band, Billy sets her up in a caravan, a mobile home left to him by his mother. Though Billy “wouldn’t exactly call it a house”, Kitten sees in it her first chance at a Bachelardian “dream house”: she calls it a “house of dreams and longing” and cries, “Oh, to have a little house, to own the hearth, stool, and all”. Kitten ecstatically begins to tidy the place, performing what Fraiman terms a “hyper-investment in homemaking” that functions “as compensation for domestic deprivation” (20).Aisling Cormack suggests that Kitten’s hyper-investment in homemaking signals the film’s “radical disengagement with politics” to a “femininity that is inherently apolitical” (169-70). But that reading holds only if viewers assume a gendered, spatial divide between public and private, and between the political and the domestic. As Fraiman asserts, “the political meaning of fixating on domestic arrangements is more complex […] For the poor or transgendered person, the placeless immigrant or the woman on her own, aspiring to a safe, affirming home doesn’t reinforce hierarchical social relations but is pitched, precisely, against them” (20).Trans-Domesticity as Political ActEven as Kitten invokes the idea of a Bachelardian dream house, she performs a trans-domesticity that exposes the falseness of the gendered, spatial oppositions assumed to structure the normative home. Her domesticity is not an apolitical retreat; rather, it is pitched, precisely, against the violence that public/private and political/domestic oppositions enable within the house, as well as beyond it. As she cleans, Kitten discovers that violence is literally embedded in her caravan home when she finds a cache of Irish Republican Army (IRA) guns under the floor. After a bomb kills Lawrence, Kitten throws the guns into a reservoir, a defiant act that she describes to the IRA paramilitaries who come looking for the guns as “spring cleaning”. Cormack asserts that Kitten “describing her perilous destruction of the guns in terms of domestic labor” strips it “of all political significance” (179). I argue instead that it demonstrates the radical potential of trans-domesticity, of an ethos of care-taking and shelter-making asserted in public and political spaces. Kitten’s act is not apolitical, though it is decidedly anti-violence.From the beginning of Breakfast on Pluto, Kitten’s trans-domesticity exposes the violence structurally embedded in heteronormative domestic ideology. Additionally, the film’s regular juxtaposition of scenes of Kitten’s homemaking practices with scenes of political violence demonstrates that no form of domesticity functions as a private, apolitical retreat from “the minefields of this world” (McCabe x). This latter counterpoint throws into relief the political significance of Kitten’s trans-domesticity. Her domestic practices are her means of resisting and transforming the structural violence that poses an existential threat to marginalised and dispossessed people.After Kitten is accused of being responsible for an IRA bombing in London, the ruthless, violent interrogation of Kitten by British police officers begins to break down her sense of self. Throughout this brutal scene, Kitten compulsively straightens the chairs and tidies the room, and she responds to her interrogators with kindness and even affection. Fraiman’s theorisation of “extreme domesticity” helps to articulate how Kitten’s homemaking in carceral space—she calls it “My Sweet Little Cell”—is an “urgent” act that, “in the wake of dislocation”, can mean “safety, sanity, and self-expression; survival in the most basic sense” (25). Cormack reads Kitten’s reactions in this scene as “masochistic” and the male police officers’ nurturing response as of a piece with the film’s “more-feminine-than-feminine disengagement from political realities” (185-89). However, I disagree: Kitten’s trans-domesticity is a political act that both sustains her within structures that would erase her and converts officers of the state to an ethos of care and shelter. Inspector Routledge, for example, gently carries Kitten back to her cell, and after her release, PC Wallis ensures that she is safely (if not privately) housed with a cooperatively-run peep show, the address at which an atoning Father Liam locates her in London.After Kitten and a pregnant Charlie are burned out of the refuge that they temporarily find with Father Liam, Kitten and Charlie return to London, where Charlie’s baby is born soon after into the trans-domesticity that opens the film. Rejoining the story’s frame, Breakfast on Pluto ends close to where it begins: Kitten and the baby meet Charlie outside a London hospital, where Kitten sees Eily Bergin with her new son, Patrick. Instead of meeting where their paths intersect, the two families pass each other and turn in opposite directions. Kitten now knows that hers is both a different road and a different kind of home. “Home”, then, is not a place gained once and for all. Rather, home is a perpetual practice that does not separate one from the world, but can create the shelter of mutual care as one wanders through it.The Radical Potential and Structural Limits of Trans-DomesticityBreakfast on Pluto demonstrates the agency that trans-domesticity can afford in the lives of marginalised and dispossessed individuals, as well as the power of the structures that militate against its broader realisation. The radical political potential of trans-domesticity manifests in the transformation in the two police officers’ relational practices. Kitten’s trans-domesticity also inspires a reformation in Father Liam, the film’s representative of the Catholic Church and a man whose relationship to others transmutes from sexual violence and repressive secrecy to mutual nurturance and inclusive love. Although these individual conversions do not signify changes in structures of power, they do allow viewers to imagine the possibility of a state and a church that cherish, shelter, and care for all people equally. The film’s ending conveys this sense of fairy-tale-like possibility through its Disney-esque chattering birds and the bubble-gum pop song, “Sugar Baby Love”.In the end, the sense of hopefulness that closes Breakfast on Pluto coexists with the reality that dominant power structures will not recognise Kitten’s trans-domestic subjectivity and family, and that those structures will work to contain any perceived threat, just as the Catholic Church banishes the converted Father Liam to Kilburn Parish. That Kitten and Charlie nevertheless realise a clear contentment in themselves and in their made family demonstrates the vital importance of trans-domesticity and other forms of “extreme domesticity” in the lives of those who wander.ReferencesAgnew, John. “Home Ownership and Identity in Capitalist Societies.” Housing and Identity: Cross Cultural Perspectives. Ed. James S. Duncan. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982. 60–97.Bachelard, Gaston. The Poetics of Space. 1957. Trans. Maria Jolas. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.Boyle, Kevin Jon, ed. Rear View Mirror: Automobile Images and American Identities. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.Braidotti, Rosi. Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory. 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.Breakfast on Pluto. Dir. Neil Jordan. Pathé Pictures International, 2005.Cormack, Aisling B. “Toward a ‘Post-Troubles’ Cinema? The Troubled Intersection of Political Violence and Gender in Neil Jordan’s The Crying Game and Breakfast on Pluto.” Éire-Ireland 49.1–2 (2014): 164–92.Fortier, Anne-Marie. “Queer Diaspora.” Handbook of Lesbian and Gay Studies. Eds. Diane Richardson and Steven Seidman. London: Sage Publishing, 2002. 183–97.Fraiman, Susan. Extreme Domesticity: A View from the Margins. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017.Hanna, Adam. Northern Irish Poetry and Domestic Space. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Jung, Carl. Memories, Dreams, Reflections. 1957. Ed. Aniela Jaffe. Trans. Clara Winston and Richard Winston. New York: Vintage Books, 1989.Lefebvre, Henri. The Production of Social Space. Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.Madden, Ed. “Queering the Irish Diaspora: David Rees and Padraig Rooney.” Éire-Ireland 47.1–2 (2012): 172–200.McCabe, Patrick. Breakfast on Pluto. London: Picador, 1998.Mullen, Patrick R. The Poor Bugger’s Tool: Irish Modernism, Queer Labor, and Postcolonial History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.Rapport, Nigel, and Andrew Dawson. Migrants of Identity: Perceptions of ‘Home’ in a World of Movement. Oxford: Berg, 1998.Robertson, Pamela. “Home and Away: Friends of Dorothy on the Road in Oz.” The Road Movie Book. Eds. Steven Cohen and Ina Rae Hark. London: Routledge, 1997. 271–306.Steedman, Carolyn. Landscape for a Good Woman: A Story of Two Lives. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987.Winston, Greg. “‘Reluctant Indians’: Irish Identity and Racial Masquerade.” Irish Modernism and the Global Primitive. Eds. Maria McGarrity and Claire A. Culleton. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 153–71.

In recent years, the US television landscape has been flooded with reboots, remakes, and revivals of “classic” nineties television series, such as Full/er House (1987-1995, 2016-present), Will & Grace (1998-2006, 2017-present), Roseanne (1988-1977, 2018), and Charmed (1998-2006, 2018-present). The term “reboot” is often used as a catchall for different kinds of revivals and remakes. “Remakes” are derivations or reimaginings of known properties with new characters, cast, and stories (Loock; Lavigne). “Revivals” bring back an existing property in the form of a continuation with the same cast and/or setting. “Revivals” and “remakes” both seek to capitalise on nostalgia for a specific notion of the past and access the (presumed) existing audience of the earlier series (Mittell; Rebecca Williams; Johnson).Reboots operate around two key pleasures. First, there is the pleasure of revisiting and/or reimagining characters that are “known” to audiences. Whether continuations or remakes, reboots are invested in the audience’s desire to see familiar characters. Second, there is the desire to “fix” and/or recuperate an earlier series. Some reboots, such as the Charmed remake attempt to recuperate the whiteness of the original series, whereas others such as Gilmore Girls: A Life in the Year (2017) set out to fix the ending of the original series by giving audiences a new “official” conclusion.The Roseanne reboot is invested in both these pleasures. It reunites the original cast for a short-lived, but impactful nine-episode tenth season. There is pleasure in seeing Roseanne (Roseanne Barr), Dan (John Goodman), Jackie (Laurie Metcalf), Becky (Lecy Goranson [seasons one to six, ten], Sarah Chalke [seasons six to nine]), Darlene (Sara Gilbert), and DJ (Michael Fishman) back in the Conner house with the same well-worn couch and afghan. The (attempted) recuperation is of author-star Barr, whose recent politics are in stark contrast to the working-class second-wave feminist politics of her nineties’ persona. This article is particularly interested in the second pleasure, because both the original series and the reboot situate the voice of Barr as central to the series’ narrative and politics.Despite achieving the highest ratings of any US sitcom in the past three years (O’Connell), on 29 May 2018, ABC announced that it was cancelling the Roseanne reboot. This decision came about in the wake of a racist tweet, where Barr compared a black woman (high-ranking Obama aide Valerie Jarrett) to an ape. Barr’s tweet and the cancellation of Roseanne, highlight the limits of nostalgia and Roseanne/Barr’s particular brand of white feminism. While whiteness and a lack of racial awareness are (and always have been) at the centre of Barr’s performance of feminism, the political landscape has shifted since the 1990s, with the rise of third and fourth-wave feminisms and intersectional activism. As such in the contemporary landscape, there is the expectation that white feminist figures take on and endorse anti-racist stances.This article argues that the reboot’s attempt to capitalise on nineties nostalgia exposes the limits of Roseanne/Barr’s feminism, as well as the limits of nostalgia. The feminist legacy of nineties-era Roseanne cannot and does not recuperate Barr’s star-persona. Also, the reboot and its subsequent cancellation highlight how the feminism of the series is embodied by Barr and her whiteness. This article will situate Roseanne and Barr within a feminist tradition on US television, before exploring how the reboot operates and circulates differently to the original series.From Roseanne (1988-1997) to Roseanne (2018)In its original form, Roseanne holds the distinction of being one of the most highly discussed and canonised feminist-leaning television series of all time, alongside The Mary Tyler Moore Show (1970-1977), Cagney and Lacey (1981-1988), and Buffy the Vampire Slayer (1997-2004). Roseanne also enabled and informed many popular feminist-leaning contemporary series, including Girls (2012-2017), Mom (2013-present), Better Things (2016-present), and Dietland (2018). Although it may seem anachronistic today, Roseanne and Barr helped define what it means to be a feminist and speak feminist politics on US television.Roseanne depicts the lives of the Conner family, headed by parents Roseanne and Dan. They live in the fictional blue-collar town of Lanford, Illinois with their three children Becky, Darlene, and DJ. Both Roseanne and Dan experience precarious employment and embark on numerous (mostly failed) business ventures throughout the series’ run. The reboot catches up with the Conner family in 2018, after Roseanne has experienced a health scare and single mom Darlene has moved into her parents’ house with her two children Harris (Emma Kenney) and Mark (Ames McNamara). In the new season, Roseanne and Dan’s children are experiencing similar working conditions to their parents in the 1990s. Becky works at a Mexican restaurant and is eager to act as surrogate mother to earn $50,000, Darlene is recently unemployed and looking for work, and DJ has just returned from military service.A stated objective of reviving Roseanne was to address the contentious US political landscape after the election of President Donald J. Trump (VanDerWerff). Barr is a vocal supporter of President Trump, as is her character in the reboot. The election plays a key role in the new season’s premise. The first episode of season 10 establishes that the titular Roseanne has not spoken to her sister Jackie (who is a Hillary Clinton supporter) in over a year. In both its nineties and 2018 incarnations, Roseanne makes apparent the extent to which feminist politics are indebted to and spoken through the author-star. The series is based on a character that Barr created and is grounded in her life experience. Barr and her character Roseanne are icons of nineties televisual feminism. While the other members of the Conner family are richly drawn and compelling, Roseanne is the centre of the series. It is her voice and perspective that drives the series and gives it its political resonance. Roseanne’s power in the text is authorised by Barr’s stardom. As Melissa Williams writes: “For nearly a decade, Barr was one of the most powerful women in Hollywood” (180).In the late 1980s and into the 1990s, Roseanne (and Barr) represented a new kind of feminist voice on US television, which at that stage (and still today) was dominated by middle-class women. Unlike Mary Richards (Mary Tyler Moore), Claire Huxtable (Phylicia Rashad), or Murphy Brown (Candice Bergen), Roseanne did not have a stable job and her family’s economic situation was often precarious. Roseanne/Barr adopted and used a feminism of personality popularised on television by Mary Tyler Moore and Lucille Ball. Unlike her foremothers, though, Roseanne/Barr was not slender, feminine, or interested in being likeable to men. Roseanne did not choose to work outside of the home, which marked her as different from many of US television’s other second-wave feminists and/or mothers. As Rachael Horowitz writes: “Roseanne’s feminism was for women who have to work because bills must get paid, who assert their role as head of the house despite the degrading work they often do during the day to pay for their kids’ food and clothes” (9).According to Kathleen Rowe, Barr is part of a long line of “female grotesques” whose defining features are excess and looseness (2-3). Rowe links Barr’s fatness or physical excess with her refusal to shut up and subversive speech. The feminism of Roseanne is contained within and expressed through Barr’s unruly white body (and voice). Barr’s unruliness and her unwillingness to follow the social conventions of politeness and decorum are tied to her (perceived) feminist politics.Understandings of Barr’s stardom, however, have shifted considerably in the years since the publication of Rowe’s analysis. While Barr is still “unruly,” her unruliness is no longer located in her body (which has been transformed to meet more conventional standards of western beauty), but rather in her Twitter presence, which is pro-Israel, pro-Trump, and anti-immigration. As Roxane Gay writes of the reboot: “Whatever charm and intelligence she [Barr] brought to the first nine seasons of her show, a show I very much loved, are absolutely absent in her current persona, particularly as it manifests on Twitter.”Feminist Voice and Stardom on US TVRoseanne performs what Julie D’Acci calls “explicit general feminism,” which is defined by “dialogue and scenes that straightforwardly addressed discrimination against women in both public and private spheres, stories structured around topical feminist causes, and the use of unequivocal feminist language and slogans” (147). However, the feminist politics of Roseanne and Barr are (and never were) straightforward or uncomplicated.Studies of feminism on US television have primarily focused on comedies that feature female television stars who function as advocates for feminism and women’s issues (Spigel; Rabinovitz; D’Acci). Much of the critical discussion of feminist voice in US female-led television identifies the feminist intervention as taking place at the level of performance (Dow; Spigel; Spangler). Comedic series such as I Love Lucy (1951-1957), Murphy Brown (1988-1998, 2018-present), and Grace Under Fire (1993-1998), and dramatic series’, such as Cagney and Lacey and Buffy the Vampire Slayer, privilege the articulation of feminist ideas through performance and character.Roseanne is not a series that derives its comedy from a clash of different perspectives or a series where politics are debated and explored in a nuanced a complex way. Roseanne promotes a distinct singular perspective – that of Roseanne Barr. In seasons one to nine, the character Roseanne is rarely persuaded to think differently about an issue or situation or depicted as “wrong.” The series centres Roseanne’s pain and distress when Becky elopes with Mark (Glenn Quinn), or when Jackie is abused by her boyfriend Fisher (Matt Roth), or when Darlene accidently gets pregnant. Although those storylines are about other characters, Roseanne’s emotions are central. Roseanne/Barr’s perspective (as fictional character and media personality) informs the narrative, sensibility, and tone. Roseanne is not designed to contain multiple perspectives.Roseanne is acutely aware of its place in the history of feminist voice and representations of women on US television. Television is central to the series’ articulation of feminism and feminist voice. In season seven episode “All About Rosey,” the series breaks the fourth wall (as it does many times throughout its run), taking the audience behind the scenes where some of US television’s most well-known (and traditional) mothers are cleaning the Conner’s kitchen. June Cleaver (Barbara Billingsley) from Leave It to Beaver (1957-1963), Joan Nash (Pat Crowley) from Please Don’t Eat the Daisies (1965-1967), Ruth Martin (June Lockhart) from Lassie (1958-1964), Norma Arnold (Alley Mills) from The Wonder Years (1988-1993), and Louise Jefferson (Isabel Sanford) from The Jeffersons (1975-1985) at first sit in judgment of Barr and her character Roseanne, claiming she presents “wrong image” for a TV mother. However, Roseanne/Barr eventually wins over the TV mothers, declaring “the important thing is on my show, I’m the boss and father knows squat” (7.19). It is in contrast to more traditional television mothers that Roseanne/Barr’s feminist voice comes into focus.In the ninth and final season of Roseanne’s initial run, the series (arguably) becomes a parody of its former self. By this point in the series, “Barr was seen as the sole cause of the show’s demise, as a woman who was ‘imploding,’ ‘losing the plot,’ or ‘out of control’” (White 234). White argues that depicting the working-class Conners’ social and economic ascension to upper-class diminishes the distinction between Barr and her character (243). White writes that in the series’ finale, the “line between performer and character is irrevocably blurred; it is unclear whether the voice we are hearing is that of Roseanne Conner or Roseanne Barr” (244). This blurring between Roseanne and Barr becomes particularly contentious in season 10.Rebooting Roseanne: Season 10Season 10 redacts and erases most of the events of season nine, which itself was a fantasy, as revealed in the season nine finale. As such, the reboot is not a simple continuation, because in the season nine finale it is revealed that Dan suffered a fatal heart attack a year earlier. The final monologue (delivered in voice-over by Barr) “reveals” that Roseanne has been writing and editing her experiences into a digestible story. The “Conners winning the lottery” storyline that dominated season nine was imagined by Roseanne as an elaborate coping strategy after Dan’s death. Yet in the season 10 reboot, Dan is revealed to be alive, as is Darlene and David’s (Johnny Galecki) daughter Harris, who was born during the events of season nine.The limits of Roseanne/Barr’s feminism within the contemporary political landscape come into focus around issues of race. This is partly because the incident that incited ABC to cancel the reboot of Roseanne was racially motivated, and partly because Roseanne/Barr’s feminism has always relied on whiteness. Between 1997 and 2018, Barr’s unruliness has become less associated with empowering working-class women and more with railing against minorities and immigrants. In redacting and erasing the events of season nine, the reboot attempts to step back the conflation between Roseanne and Barr with little success.In the first episode of season 10, “Twenty Years to Life”, Roseanne is positioned as the loud-mouthed victim of circumstance and systemic inequality – similar to her nineties-persona. Yet in 2018, Roseanne mocks same things that nineties’ Roseanne took seriously, including collective action, community building, and labour conditions. Roseanne claims: “It is not my fault that I just happen to be a charismatic person that’s right about everything” (10.01). Here, the series attempts to make light of a now-outdated understanding of Barr’s persona, but it comes off as tone-deaf and lacking self-awareness.Roseanne has bigoted tendencies in both the 1990s and in 2018, but the political resonance of those tendencies and their relationships to feminisms and nostalgia differs greatly from the original series to the reboot. This is best illustrated by comparing season seven episode “White Men Can’t Kiss” and season 10 episode “Go Cubs.” In the former, Roseanne is appalled that she may have raised a racist son and insists DJ must kiss his black classmate Geena (Rae’Ven Larrymore Kelly) in the school play. Towards the end of this episode, Geena’s father comes by the restaurant where Roseanne and Jackie are closing up. When the tall black man knocks on the locked door, Roseanne refuses to let him inside. She appears visibly afraid. Once Roseanne knows he is Geena’s father, she lets him in and he confronts her about her racist attitude. Roseanne (and the audience) is forced to sit in the discomfort of having her bigotry exposed. While there are no material consequences for Roseanne or DJ’s racism, within the context of the less intersectional 1990s, this interaction does not call into question Roseanne or Barr’s feminist credentials.In season 10, Roseanne tackles similar issues around race, ignorance, and bigotry, but it plays out very differently. In the reboot’s seventh episode, Roseanne suspects her Muslim refugee neighbours Fatima (Anne Bedian) and Samir (Alain Washnevky) are terrorists. Although Roseanne is proven wrong, she is not forced to reckon with her bigotry. Instead, she is positioned as a “hero” later in the episode, when she berates a supermarket cashier for her racist treatment of Fatima. Given what audiences know about Barr’s off-screen politics, this does not counteract the impression of racism, but compounds it. It also highlights the whiteness of the politics embodied by Roseanne/Barr both on-screen and off. Although these are two very different racial configurations (anti-blackness and Islamophobia), these episodes underline the shifting reception and resonance of the feminism Roseanne/Barr embodies.ConclusionIn June 2018, shortly after the cancellation of the Roseanne reboot, ABC announced that it was developing a spin-off without Barr called The Conners (2018-present). In the spin-off Roseanne is dead and her family is dealing with life after Roseanne/Roseanne (Crucchiola). Here, Roseanne suffers the same fate as Dan in season nine (she dies off-screen), but now it is Barr who is fictionally buried. While The Conners attempts to rewrite the story of the Conner family by rejecting Barr’s racist views and removing her financial and creative stake in their stories, Barr cannot be erased or redacted from Roseanne or the story of the Conner family, because it is her story.The reboot and its cancellation illuminate how Barr and Roseanne’s feminist voice has not evolved past its white second-wave roots. The feminism of Roseanne is embodied by Barr in all her unruliness and whiteness. Roseanne/Barr/Roseanne has not taken on the third and fourth-wave critiques of second-wave feminisms, which emphasise the limits of white feminisms. The failure of the Roseanne reboot reveals that the pleasure and nostalgia of seeing the Conner family back together is not enough. Ultimately, Roseanne is without intersectionality, and thus cannot (and should not) be recognised as feminist in the contemporary political landscape.ReferencesBetter Things. Cr. Pamela Adlon and Louis C.K. 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Introduction The highly contagious COVID-19 virus has presented particularly difficult public policy challenges. The relatively late emergence of an effective treatments and vaccines, the structural stresses on health care systems, the lockdowns and the economic dislocations, the evident structural inequalities in effected societies, as well as the difficulty of prevention have tested social and political cohesion. Moreover, the intrusive nature of many prophylactic measures have led to individual liberty and human rights concerns. As noted by the Victorian (Australia) Ombudsman Report on the COVID-19 lockdown in Melbourne, we may be tempted, during a crisis, to view human rights as expendable in the pursuit of saving human lives. This thinking can lead to dangerous territory. It is not unlawful to curtail fundamental rights and freedoms when there are compelling reasons for doing so; human rights are inherently and inseparably a consideration of human lives. (5) These difficulties have raised issues about the importance of social or community capital in fighting the pandemic. This article discusses the impacts of social and community capital and other factors on the governmental efforts to combat the spread of infectious disease through the maintenance of social distancing and household ‘bubbles’. It argues that the beneficial effects of social and community capital towards fighting the pandemic, such as mutual respect and empathy, which underpins such public health measures as social distancing, the use of personal protective equipment, and lockdowns in the USA, have been undermined as preventive measures because they have been transmogrified to become a salient aspect of the “culture wars” (Peters). In contrast, states that have relatively lower social capital such a China have been able to more effectively arrest transmission of the disease because the government was been able to generate and personify a nationalist response to the virus and thus generate a more robust social consensus regarding the efforts to combat the disease. Social Capital and Culture Wars The response to COVID-19 required individuals, families, communities, and other types of groups to refrain from extensive interaction – to stay in their bubble. In these situations, especially given the asymptomatic nature of many COVID-19 infections and the serious imposition lockdowns and social distancing and isolation, the temptation for individuals to breach public health rules in high. From the perspective of policymakers, the response to fighting COVID-19 is a collective action problem. In studying collective action problems, scholars have paid much attention on the role of social and community capital (Ostrom and Ahn 17-35). Ostrom and Ahn comment that social capital “provides a synthesizing approach to how cultural, social, and institutional aspects of communities of various sizes jointly affect their capacity of dealing with collective-action problems” (24). Social capital is regarded as an evolving social type of cultural trait (Fukuyama; Guiso et al.). Adger argues that social capital “captures the nature of social relations” and “provides an explanation for how individuals use their relationships to other actors in societies for their own and for the collective good” (387). The most frequently used definition of social capital is the one proffered by Putnam who regards it as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, “Bowling Alone” 65). All these studies suggest that social and community capital has at least two elements: “objective associations” and subjective ties among individuals. Objective associations, or social networks, refer to both formal and informal associations that are formed and engaged in on a voluntary basis by individuals and social groups. Subjective ties or norms, on the other hand, primarily stand for trust and reciprocity (Paxton). High levels of social capital have generally been associated with democratic politics and civil societies whose institutional performance benefits from the coordinated actions and civic culture that has been facilitated by high levels of social capital (Putnam, Democracy 167-9). Alternatively, a “good and fair” state and impartial institutions are important factors in generating and preserving high levels of social capital (Offe 42-87). Yet social capital is not limited to democratic civil societies and research is mixed on whether rising social capital manifests itself in a more vigorous civil society that in turn leads to democratising impulses. Castillo argues that various trust levels for institutions that reinforce submission, hierarchy, and cultural conservatism can be high in authoritarian governments, indicating that high levels of social capital do not necessarily lead to democratic civic societies (Castillo et al.). Roßteutscher concludes after a survey of social capita indicators in authoritarian states that social capital has little effect of democratisation and may in fact reinforce authoritarian rule: in nondemocratic contexts, however, it appears to throw a spanner in the works of democratization. Trust increases the stability of nondemocratic leaderships by generating popular support, by suppressing regime threatening forms of protest activity, and by nourishing undemocratic ideals concerning governance (752). In China, there has been ongoing debate concerning the presence of civil society and the level of social capital found across Chinese society. If one defines civil society as an intermediate associational realm between the state and the family, populated by autonomous organisations which are separate from the state that are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values, it is arguable that the PRC had a significant civil society or social capital in the first few decades after its establishment (White). However, most scholars agree that nascent civil society as well as a more salient social and community capital has emerged in China’s reform era. This was evident after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, where the government welcomed community organising and community-driven donation campaigns for a limited period of time, giving the NGO sector and bottom-up social activism a boost, as evidenced in various policy areas such as disaster relief and rural community development (F. Wu 126; Xu 9). Nevertheless, the CCP and the Chinese state have been effective in maintaining significant control over civil society and autonomous groups without attempting to completely eliminate their autonomy or existence. The dramatic economic and social changes that have occurred since the 1978 Opening have unsurprisingly engendered numerous conflicts across the society. In response, the CCP and State have adjusted political economic policies to meet the changing demands of workers, migrants, the unemployed, minorities, farmers, local artisans, entrepreneurs, and the growing middle class. Often the demands arising from these groups have resulted in policy changes, including compensation. In other circumstances, where these groups remain dissatisfied, the government will tolerate them (ignore them but allow them to continue in the advocacy), or, when the need arises, supress the disaffected groups (F. Wu 2). At the same time, social organisations and other groups in civil society have often “refrained from open and broad contestation against the regime”, thereby gaining the space and autonomy to achieve the objectives (F. Wu 2). Studies of Chinese social or community capital suggest that a form of modern social capital has gradually emerged as Chinese society has become increasingly modernised and liberalised (despite being non-democratic), and that this social capital has begun to play an important role in shaping social and economic lives at the local level. However, this more modern form of social capital, arising from developmental and social changes, competes with traditional social values and social capital, which stresses parochial and particularistic feelings among known individuals while modern social capital emphasises general trust and reciprocal feelings among both known and unknown individuals. The objective element of these traditional values are those government-sanctioned, formal mass organisations such as Communist Youth and the All-China Federation of Women's Associations, where members are obliged to obey the organisation leadership. The predominant subjective values are parochial and particularistic feelings among individuals who know one another, such as guanxi and zongzu (Chen and Lu, 426). The concept of social capital emphasises that the underlying cooperative values found in individuals and groups within a culture are an important factor in solving collective problems. In contrast, the notion of “culture war” focusses on those values and differences that divide social and cultural groups. Barry defines culture wars as increases in volatility, expansion of polarisation, and conflict between those who are passionate about religiously motivated politics, traditional morality, and anti-intellectualism, and…those who embrace progressive politics, cultural openness, and scientific and modernist orientations. (90) The contemporary culture wars across the world manifest opposition by various groups in society who hold divergent worldviews and ideological positions. Proponents of culture war understand various issues as part of a broader set of religious, political, and moral/normative positions invoked in opposition to “elite”, “liberal”, or “left” ideologies. Within this Manichean universe opposition to such issues as climate change, Black Lives Matter, same sex rights, prison reform, gun control, and immigration becomes framed in binary terms, and infused with a moral sensibility (Chapman 8-10). In many disputes, the culture war often devolves into an epistemological dispute about the efficacy of scientific knowledge and authority, or a dispute between “practical” and theoretical knowledge. In this environment, even facts can become partisan narratives. For these “cultural” disputes are often how electoral prospects (generally right-wing) are advanced; “not through policies or promises of a better life, but by fostering a sense of threat, a fantasy that something profoundly pure … is constantly at risk of extinction” (Malik). This “zero-sum” social and policy environment that makes it difficult to compromise and has serious consequences for social stability or government policy, especially in a liberal democratic society. Of course, from the perspective of cultural materialism such a reductionist approach to culture and political and social values is not unexpected. “Culture” is one of the many arenas in which dominant social groups seek to express and reproduce their interests and preferences. “Culture” from this sense is “material” and is ultimately connected to the distribution of power, wealth, and resources in society. As such, the various policy areas that are understood as part of the “culture wars” are another domain where various dominant and subordinate groups and interests engaged in conflict express their values and goals. Yet it is unexpected that despite the pervasiveness of information available to individuals the pool of information consumed by individuals who view the “culture wars” as a touchstone for political behaviour and a narrative to categorise events and facts is relatively closed. This lack of balance has been magnified by social media algorithms, conspiracy-laced talk radio, and a media ecosystem that frames and discusses issues in a manner that elides into an easily understood “culture war” narrative. From this perspective, the groups (generally right-wing or traditionalist) exist within an information bubble that reinforces political, social, and cultural predilections. American and Chinese Reponses to COVID-19 The COVID-19 pandemic first broke out in Wuhan in December 2019. Initially unprepared and unwilling to accept the seriousness of the infection, the Chinese government regrouped from early mistakes and essentially controlled transmission in about three months. This positive outcome has been messaged as an exposition of the superiority of the Chinese governmental system and society both domestically and internationally; a positive, even heroic performance that evidences the populist credentials of the Chinese political leadership and demonstrates national excellence. The recently published White Paper entitled “Fighting COVID-19: China in Action” also summarises China’s “strategic achievement” in the simple language of numbers: in a month, the rising spread was contained; in two months, the daily case increase fell to single digits; and in three months, a “decisive victory” was secured in Wuhan City and Hubei Province (Xinhua). This clear articulation of the positive results has rallied political support. Indeed, a recent survey shows that 89 percent of citizens are satisfied with the government’s information dissemination during the pandemic (C Wu). As part of the effort, the government extensively promoted the provision of “political goods”, such as law and order, national unity and pride, and shared values. For example, severe publishments were introduced for violence against medical professionals and police, producing and selling counterfeit medications, raising commodity prices, spreading ‘rumours’, and being uncooperative with quarantine measures (Xu). Additionally, as an extension the popular anti-corruption campaign, many local political leaders were disciplined or received criminal charges for inappropriate behaviour, abuse of power, and corruption during the pandemic (People.cn, 2 Feb. 2020). Chinese state media also described fighting the virus as a global “competition”. In this competition a nation’s “material power” as well as “mental strength”, that calls for the highest level of nation unity and patriotism, is put to the test. This discourse recalled the global competition in light of the national mythology related to the formation of Chinese nation, the historical “hardship”, and the “heroic Chinese people” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). Moreover, as the threat of infection receded, it was emphasised that China “won this competition” and the Chinese people have demonstrated the “great spirit of China” to the world: a result built upon the “heroism of the whole Party, Army, and Chinese people from all ethnic groups” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). In contrast to the Chinese approach of emphasising national public goods as a justification for fighting the virus, the U.S. Trump Administration used nationalism, deflection, and “culture war” discourse to undermine health responses — an unprecedented response in American public health policy. The seriousness of the disease as well as the statistical evidence of its course through the American population was disputed. The President and various supporters raged against the COVID-19 “hoax”, social distancing, and lockdowns, disparaged public health institutions and advice, and encouraged protesters to “liberate” locked-down states (Russonello). “Our federal overlords say ‘no singing’ and ‘no shouting’ on Thanksgiving”, Representative Paul Gosar, a Republican of Arizona, wrote as he retweeted a Centers for Disease Control list of Thanksgiving safety tips (Weiner). People were encouraged, by way of the White House and Republican leadership, to ignore health regulations and not to comply with social distancing measures and the wearing of masks (Tracy). This encouragement led to threats against proponents of face masks such as Dr Anthony Fauci, one of the nation’s foremost experts on infectious diseases, who required bodyguards because of the many threats on his life. Fauci’s critics — including President Trump — countered Fauci’s promotion of mask wearing by stating accusingly that he once said mask-wearing was not necessary for ordinary people (Kelly). Conspiracy theories as to the safety of vaccinations also grew across the course of the year. As the 2020 election approached, the Administration ramped up efforts to downplay the serious of the virus by identifying it with “the media” and illegitimate “partisan” efforts to undermine the Trump presidency. It also ramped up its criticism of China as the source of the infection. This political self-centeredness undermined state and federal efforts to slow transmission (Shear et al.). At the same time, Trump chided health officials for moving too slowly on vaccine approvals, repeated charges that high infection rates were due to increased testing, and argued that COVID-19 deaths were exaggerated by medical providers for political and financial reasons. These claims were amplified by various conservative media personalities such as Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity and Laura Ingraham of Fox News. The result of this “COVID-19 Denialism” and the alternative narrative of COVID-19 policy told through the lens of culture war has resulted in the United States having the highest number of COVID-19 cases, and the highest number of COVID-19 deaths. At the same time, the underlying social consensus and social capital that have historically assisted in generating positive public health outcomes has been significantly eroded. According to the Pew Research Center, the share of U.S. adults who say public health officials such as those at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are doing an excellent or good job responding to the outbreak decreased from 79% in March to 63% in August, with an especially sharp decrease among Republicans (Pew Research Center 2020). Social Capital and COVID-19 From the perspective of social or community capital, it could be expected that the American response to the Pandemic would be more effective than the Chinese response. Historically, the United States has had high levels of social capital, a highly developed public health system, and strong governmental capacity. In contrast, China has a relatively high level of governmental and public health capacity, but the level of social capital has been lower and there is a significant presence of traditional values which emphasise parochial and particularistic values. Moreover, the antecedent institutions of social capital, such as weak and inefficient formal institutions (Batjargal et al.), environmental turbulence and resource scarcity along with the transactional nature of guanxi (gift-giving and information exchange and relationship dependence) militate against finding a more effective social and community response to the public health emergency. Yet China’s response has been significantly more successful than the Unites States’. Paradoxically, the American response under the Trump Administration and the Chinese response both relied on an externalisation of the both the threat and the justifications for their particular response. In the American case, President Trump, while downplaying the seriousness of the virus, consistently called it the “China virus” in an effort to deflect responsibly as well as a means to avert attention away from the public health impacts. As recently as 3 January 2021, Trump tweeted that the number of “China Virus” cases and deaths in the U.S. were “far exaggerated”, while critically citing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's methodology: “When in doubt, call it COVID-19. Fake News!” (Bacon). The Chinese Government, meanwhile, has pursued a more aggressive foreign policy across the South China Sea, on the frontier in the Indian sub-continent, and against states such as Australia who have criticised the initial Chinese response to COVID-19. To this international criticism, the government reiterated its sovereign rights and emphasised its “victimhood” in the face of “anti-China” foreign forces. Chinese state media also highlighted China as “victim” of the coronavirus, but also as a target of Western “political manoeuvres” when investigating the beginning stages of the pandemic. The major difference, however, is that public health policy in the United States was superimposed on other more fundamental political and cultural cleavages, and part of this externalisation process included the assignation of “otherness” and demonisation of internal political opponents or characterising political opponents as bent on destroying the United States. This assignation of “otherness” to various internal groups is a crucial element in the culture wars. While this may have been inevitable given the increasingly frayed nature of American society post-2008, such a characterisation has been activity pushed by local, state, and national leadership in the Republican Party and the Trump Administration (Vogel et al.). In such circumstances, minimising health risks and highlighting civil rights concerns due to public health measures, along with assigning blame to the democratic opposition and foreign states such as China, can have a major impact of public health responses. The result has been that social trust beyond the bubble of one’s immediate circle or those who share similar beliefs is seriously compromised — and the collective action problem presented by COVID-19 remains unsolved. Daniel Aldrich’s study of disasters in Japan, India, and US demonstrates that pre-existing high levels of social capital would lead to stronger resilience and better recovery (Aldrich). Social capital helps coordinate resources and facilitate the reconstruction collectively and therefore would lead to better recovery (Alesch et al.). Yet there has not been much research on how the pool of social capital first came about and how a disaster may affect the creation and store of social capital. Rebecca Solnit has examined five major disasters and describes that after these events, survivors would reach out and work together to confront the challenges they face, therefore increasing the social capital in the community (Solnit). However, there are studies that have concluded that major disasters can damage the social fabric in local communities (Peacock et al.). The COVID-19 epidemic does not have the intensity and suddenness of other disasters but has had significant knock-on effects in increasing or decreasing social capital, depending on the institutional and social responses to the pandemic. In China, it appears that the positive social capital effects have been partially subsumed into a more generalised patriotic or nationalist affirmation of the government’s policy response. Unlike civil society responses to earlier crises, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, there is less evidence of widespread community organisation and response to combat the epidemic at its initial stages. This suggests better institutional responses to the crisis by the government, but also a high degree of porosity between civil society and a national “imagined community” represented by the national state. The result has been an increased legitimacy for the Chinese government. Alternatively, in the United States the transformation of COVID-19 public health policy into a culture war issue has seriously impeded efforts to combat the epidemic in the short term by undermining the social consensus and social capital necessary to fight such a pandemic. Trust in American institutions is historically low, and President Trump’s untrue contention that President Biden’s election was due to “fraud” has further undermined the legitimacy of the American government, as evidenced by the attacks directed at Congress in the U.S. capital on 6 January 2021. As such, the lingering effects the pandemic will have on social, economic, and political institutions will likely reinforce the deep cultural and political cleavages and weaken interpersonal networks in American society. Conclusion The COVID-19 pandemic has devastated global public health and impacted deeply on the world economy. Unsurprisingly, given the serious economic, social, and political consequences, different government responses have been highly politicised. Various quarantine and infection case tracking methods have caused concern over state power intruding into private spheres. The usage of face masks, social distancing rules, and intra-state travel restrictions have aroused passionate debate over public health restrictions, individual liberty, and human rights. Yet underlying public health responses grounded in higher levels of social capital enhance the effectiveness of public health measures. In China, a country that has generally been associated with lower social capital, it is likely that the relatively strong policy response to COVID-19 will both enhance feelings of nationalism and Chinese exceptionalism and help create and increase the store of social capital. 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