Academic literature on the topic 'Pakistan. Army. Armoured Corps'

As the Queen Alexandra’s Royal Army Nursing Corps celebrates its 70th Anniversary, army nursing continues to advance patient care delivery to new levels. Advanced level nursing practice has moved from the relatively ‘calm’ confines of the NHS to the austere desert of Oman. This article will provide a personal account of the first deployment of a military nurse practitioner since it was formally introduced in 2012 to frontline medicine, leading an armoured prehospital treatment team.

This essay interrogates popular beliefs about Islamization of the Pakistan Army officer corps and the polity from which the army recruits. It first assembles and synthesizes the extant secondary literature on Islamization of Pakistan generally, and the army in particular. As access to the Pakistan Army diminished after 1990 when numerous US sanctions on Pakistan limited defense cooperation and other forms of bilateral engagements, this secondary literature is generally truncated to 1990. To expand what is known about the Pakistan Army, this essay next presents the results of an ongoing quantitative analysis of district-level officer recruitment (and retirement) data. This ecological study finds that, as recently as 2002, districts that produce army officers are actually more socially liberal and urban than is commonly believed. This essay discusses the implications of the changes in the officer corps and concludes with a call for a robust research agenda on the Pakistan Army.

Before the beginning of the aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslavia had created, organized and armed a powerful military structure within the 2nd military area of the Yugoslav People’s Army, which was renamed into the Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in May of 1992. It had also never ceased to fill the ranks, arm, supply, train, equip and finance the Serb army which it had created in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Apart from that, abundant undeniable evidence exists which confirms the direct involvement of the Yugoslav Army as well as the special detachments of the Ministry of internal affairs of Serbia in the acts aimed against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for the whole duration of the war and in different parts of the country. In this work we shall present the motives, intentions, chronology and consequences of the participation of special detachments of the Yugoslav Army and the State Security Agency of Serbia in the attacks on Sarajevo during December 1993 and January 1994. On the eve of the conclusion of the Geneva peace talks on the basis of the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, the Serb political and military leadership, expecting further pressure directed towards the signing of the peace treaty and withdrawal from the territory that the Serb forces had taken, reached a decision to strenghen their positions during December 1993. As for the whole duration of the war, Sarajevo was considered to be the strategically most important area, so a military operation “PANCIR-2” was devised, prepared and executed with the aim of taking the key objects of Sarajevo’s defence, which would force the opposition to accept a partition of the city. The forces of the Sarajevo-Romanija corps, and a brigade each from the Hercegovački and 1st Krajiški corps of the Army of the Republic of Srpska were engaged in this operation. From the composition of the Yugoslav Army, parts of the Special detachment corps were involved, with the support of charge and transport helicopters. The operation was planned in two stages, whereby the first had the aim to establish control over the following objects: Žuč, Orlić, Hum and Mojmilo, while the second stage had to result with established control over Hrasnica and Butmir. Units from the composition of the Special detachment corps of the Yugoslav Army initiated the execution of their task from Belgrade on 16 December 1993. The striking part was made up from members of the 72nd Special Brigade, with parts of other special detachments: Guards Motorized Brigade, Armoured Brigade and 63. Paratroops Brigade from Niš. The combined composition of the special detachments of the Yugoslav Army of 320 men represented the core of the fighting group from the composition of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, numbering a total of 3,000 fighters, and representing the main part of the Serb forces within the “PANCIR-2” operation. Colonel Milorad Stupar, the commander of the 72nd Special Brigade of the Yugoslav Army, was named as commander of the fighting group. The attacks of Serb forces, with the participation of Special detachments of the Yugoslav Army and State Security Agency of Serbia, in their first phase lasted from 21 to 27 December 1993, when the 72nd Special Brigade suffered a heavy defeat in the battles on Betanija and Orahov Brijeg. Due to the suffered losses, this detachment was incapable of further military action and it was ordered to retreat to Belgrade. Instead of it, parts of the Guards Motorized Brigade were directed into Vogošća. During January, these units were engaged in battle activities of somewhat diminished intensity on the lines of Sarajevo’s defence, because in the meantime the focus of the fighting was again shifted towards the Olovo-Vareš battlefield. Active participation of the units of the Yugoslav Army in the “PANCIR-2” operation was discontinued by the end of January 1994. Their return to Belgrade was executed on 28 and 29 January in three marching columns with 45 vehicles, 3 tanks, 2 armoured vehicles, 2 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns PRAGA and one engineering machine.

The cavalry of the Workers ’and Peasants ’Red Army was an important component, meant mostly for offensive purposes. As a result, for the whole period from the end of Russian Civil War to the outbreak of German-Soviet war in June 1941 work was being done on the development of its large units, like brigades, divisions and corps – and even mounted armies. Ways to use them on a modern battlefield were searched for, in order to for them to cooperate with modern mechanized and armoured formations. That is why the author, based on archival sources and plentiful subject literaturemainly Russian, presented its state of organization and size, as well as the changes which occurred in the second half of the 1930’s and on the eve of the Great Patriotic War from 1941–1945.

This article dwells on the role of armoured vehicles obtained under the Lend-Lease agreement in the Byelorussian offensive operation (Bagration) in the summer of 1944. The author examines the use of foreign armoured vehicles in combat operations as part of tank, mechanized, and cavalry units of the Red Army and evaluates their quantity and quality. The Lend-Lease armoured vehicles participated in combat operations on all four fronts involved in Operation Bagration. Primarily, these were British Valentine Mk III and American M4A2 Sherman tanks. However, a significant contribution was also made by the SU-57 and M10 self-propelled artillery, as well as by the M3A1 Scout Car. In addition, the troops continued to use a certain number of M3 Medium and M3 Light tanks left over from the previous periods of the war. In 1944, they were no longer supplied. Foreign vehicles showed a good performance both in terms of reliability and combat qualities, in particular manoeuvrability, armour protection and firepower. Importantly, it was in the units advancing in the main direction that the number of Lend-Lease tanks was the largest (in the 1st Mechanized (100 %) and 3rd Guards Mechanized (91 %), in the 3rd Guards Cavalry (82.5 %) and in the 8th Guards Tank (59 %) Corps). In smaller numbers, foreign tanks were also available in the line units of all fronts involved in the operation (1st, 2nd and 3rd Byelorussian and 1st Baltic Fronts). In total, foreign tanks accounted for about 1/3 of the entire Soviet tank fleet in the Byelorussian offensive operation.

India’s recent connectivity projects in the East, like the USD 484 million Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Project, stem from a compulsion imposed by the sub-continent’s post-Partition geography. Pakistan lost its eastern wing in a bloody civil war in 1971 because it was logistically impossible for its army to hold on to an alienated province with millions of Bengalis up in arms and their insurrection fully backed by India. India did not lose its restive ‘Seven Sisters’ in the Northeast, but a spate of violent insurgencies by battling ethnicities (Naga, Mizo, Manipuri, Assamese, Bodos and other tribes) challenged Delhi’s control over the remote region. That has compelled post-colonial India to seek alternate trans-national connectivity to the region to get round the limitations imposed by the 21 km wide ‘Siliguri Corridor’, the only land link connecting the Indian mainland to the Northeast. A combined armoured-infantry-airborne thrust by China through the Zompheri Ridge down the Chumbi Valley and Jaldhaka, cutting off this Siliguri Corridor – this is the worst nightmare scenario for India’s military planners.

Rivers play an essential role to humans and ecosystems, but they also burst their banks during floods, often causing extensive damage to crop, property, and loss of lives. This paper characterizes the 2014 flood of the Indus River in Pakistan using the US Army Corps of Engineers Hydrologic Engineering Centre River Analysis System (HEC-RAS) model, integrated into a geographic information system (GIS) and satellite images from Landsat-8. The model is used to estimate the spatial extent of the flood and assess the damage that it caused by examining changes to the different land-use/land-cover (LULC) types of the river basin. Extreme flows for different return periods were estimated using a flood frequency analysis using a log-Pearson III distribution, which the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test identified as the best distribution to characterize the flow regime of the Indus River at Taunsa Barrage. The output of the flood frequency analysis was then incorporated into the HEC-RAS model to determine the spatial extent of the 2014 flood, with the accuracy of this modelling approach assessed using images from the Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS). The results show that a supervised classification of the Landsat images was able to identify the LULC types of the study region with a high degree of accuracy, and that the most affected LULC was crop/agricultural land, of which 50% was affected by the 2014 flood. Finally, the hydraulic simulation of extent of the 2014 flood was found to visually compare very well with the MODIS image, and the surface area of floods of different return periods was calculated. This paper provides further evidence of the benefit of using a hydrological model and satellite images for flood mapping and for flood damage assessment to inform the development of risk mitigation strategies.

It is an established fact that Pakistan is prone to disasters and damage caused by these disasters is immeasurable and varies with the geographical location, climate, and type of earth surface, geology and degree of vulnerability. The paper focus on underpinnings of flood response, however, emphasis will be on role of Corps of Engineers (Army), Civil-Military coordination in 2010 Floods and prolonged employment of Army on such tasks. The main focus of this paper is on the existing role of military, their relationship with the civil set-up and the expectations of both the group from each other. Moreover, this paper also reviews about the existing frameworks and mechanisms of coordination between the two groups. The paper may help managers, policy makers and army engineers and government authorities to realistically evolve flood response, and decentralized mode of operation should be adapted from national to regional level in order to follow an integrated framework for bringing all stakeholders and victims together for developing an organized response system. However, the prolonged employment of Army on mitigation of disasters must be avoided.

This paper assesses the validity of S.E. Finer’s “five conditions of military intervention in politics” in the context of the 1999 military coup in Pakistan. According to Finer, the professionalization of the officer corps, the rise of nationalism and the nation-state, popular sovereignty, the emergence of an “insurrectionary army” and the creation of “new, independent states” contribute to a military’s decision to supplant the civilian authority and intervene in the governance of a country. The findings of this paper confirm that while not all of Finer’s conditions are necessarily fully applicable to Pakistan, his overall framework nonetheless accounts for the major drivers of the 1999 coup.

Studies on Canadian Army military intelligence remain sparse in Canadian military historiography. This study is unique in that it focuses on the development, doctrine, and influence of intelligence within the I Canadian Corps throughout the Liri Valley battles during the Italian Campaign. It will be argued that I Canadian Corps intelligence achieved notable overall success in helping to break the Hitler Line by providing comprehensive and relatively up-to-date information on enemy dispositions and strengths which helped commanders and staff planners properly prepare for the operation. This success was attributable to three main factors: excellent intelligence personnel selection and training; the successful mentorship of I Canadian Corps intelligence by Eighth Army's intelligence cadre; and the overall effectiveness of 1st Canadian Infantry Division's intelligence organization which had been in the Mediterranean theatre since July 1943. Notwithstanding these successes, a number of faults within the Canadian Corps intelligence system must also be explained, including the poor performance of 5th Canadian Armoured Division's intelligence organization during the pursuit up the Liri–Sacco Valleys, and the mediocre execution of Corps counter-battery and counter-mortar operations. This study will demonstrate how an effective intelligence organization must augment existing army doctrine and how it can mitigate, though not completely eliminate, battlefield uncertainty. Further, it will also demonstrate that a comprehensive lessons-learned process must be undertaken to continually refine existing intelligence doctrine and procedures, with frequent training programs inculcating personnel in this doctrine. Taken as a whole, this study is unique as it is one of only several studies devoted solely to developing a greater understanding of a little-understood, and often forgotten, staff function within the Canadian Army during the Second World War.

Abstract The future of the British army is currently more uncertain than at any time since the end of the Second World War. Under the Options For Change policy first announced by the British government in July 1990, and confirmed in the Defence White Paper of July 1992, the numbers of both the regular and Territorial Army are to be reduced considerably. The stated intention is to create a ‘smaller but better’ army more suited to the new international situation. Today’s army is made up of over 200,000 men and women; at the time of writing there are 145,000 in the regular army, and 70,000 in the Territorials. By the mid-1990s it is planned that the regular army should number 116,000 and the Territorial Army about 60,000. This target will be achieved largely by natural wastage but there will be some redundancies: most units will be affected, but the proposed cuts in the Teeth Arms are especially notable. By April 1995the Household Cavalry and Royal Armoured Corps will have declined from twenty to twelve regiments, the Royal Artillery from fourteen to nine, the Royal Engineers from fifteen to ten, and the Royal Signals from fifteen to ten. By April 1998 the number of infantry battalions is also likely to have diminished from fifty-five to thirty-eight. Only the Army Air Corps will keep the same number of regiments (six). The Teeth Arms will retain the regimental system, but with the amalgamations of many units and with some being put into suspended animation. The cuts in the supporting services, however, are accompanied by a major reorganization which moves in a less traditional direction. To quote the 1992 defence White Paper: ‘radical restructuring of the support organization and systems is well in hand. The logistical functions of service support and equipment support will be grouped into two larger corps’.