Journal articles: 'Organism (Philosophy)'

1

Nelson, Ralph. "On the Philosophy of Organism." Études maritainiennes / Maritain Studies 18 (2002): 45–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/maritain20021819.

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Wiggins, David. "Activity, Process, Continuant, Substance, Organism." Philosophy 91, no. 2 (January 26, 2016): 269–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819115000637.

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AbstractThis paper is a response to the suggestion that processes provide a better framework for interpreting science, biological science especially, than do substances. The philosopher of substance is ill-prepared, it has been suggested, for the question ‘how a combination of processes can maintain the appearance of stability and persistence in an entity that is fundamentally only a temporary eddy in a flux of change’. In response, I defend a plural ontology of process, activity, event and continuant, and show how a sortalist philosophy of substance that makes Hilary Putnam's distinction of ‘realism’ from ‘metaphysical realism’ can treat disputed questions concerning the identity and individuation of colonial siphonophores, slime moulds and plant-colonies.

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Futch, Michael. "Life and organism in Leibniz’s philosophy." Metascience 22, no. 2 (October 11, 2012): 335–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11016-012-9730-x.

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4

Bogaard, Paul A. "From a Philosophy of Evolution to a Philosophy of Organism." Process Studies 52, no. 2 (November 1, 2023): 201–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/21543682.52.2.04.

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Abstract In this article, Whitehead's transition from a Philosophy of Evolution to a Philosophy of Organism is studied primarily on the basis of the evidence provided by the first two volumes of The Harvard Lectures of Alfred North Whitehead, especially the second volume that deals with the period 1925–1927 and that is subtitled General Metaphysical Problems of Science.

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CHEUNG, TOBIAS. "From the organism of a body to the body of an organism: occurrence and meaning of the word ‘organism’ from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries." British Journal for the History of Science 39, no. 3 (August 23, 2006): 319–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007087406007953.

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This paper retraces the occurrence of the word ‘organism’ in writings of different authors from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. It seeks to clarify chronological and conceptual shifts in the usage and meaning of the word. After earlier uses of the word in medieval sources, the Latin word organismus appeared in 1684 in Stahl's medico-physiological writings. Around 1700 it can be found in French (organisme), English (organism), Italian (organismo) and later also in German (Organismus). During the eighteenth century the word ‘organism’ generally referred to a specific principle or form of order that could be applied to plants, animals or the entire world. At the end of the eighteenth century the term became a generic name for individual living entities. From around 1830 the word ‘organism’ replaced the expressions ‘organic’ or ‘organized body’ as a recurrent technical term in the emerging biological disciplines.

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Tjaya, Thomas Hidya. "Creativity and God In Whitehead's Process Philosophy." DISKURSUS - JURNAL FILSAFAT DAN TEOLOGI STF DRIYARKARA 11, no. 2 (October 15, 2012): 141–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.36383/diskursus.v11i2.133.

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Abstract: The category of creativity unquestionably occupies a central position in Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. Its employment is hardly surprising given his project to establish a speculative philosophy that is compatible with modern science. This article examines the use of such a category in this project and argues that the separation between creativity and God causes several problems, including the absence of an ontological principle that may ground the interaction of the various elements in this metaphysical scheme. A more fundamental question is also raised concerning the nature of this project, which walks a fine line between philosophy and science. Keywords: Whitehead, creativity, the Category of the Ultimate, metaphysics, Aristotle, organism, God. Abstrak: Kategori kreativitas jelas memperoleh tempat sentral dalam filsafat organisme Alfred North Whitehead. Kehadiran kategori ini tidaklah mengherankan mengingat usahanya untuk membangun sebuah filsafat spekulatif yang selaras dengan sains modern. Artikel ini hendak mengevaluasi penggunaan kategori ini dan menyampaikan argumen bahwa pemisahan antara kreativitas dan Tuhan memuat sejumlah masalah, termasuk ketiadaan sebuah prinsip ontologis yang dapat menyatukan interaksi berbagai unsur dalam skema metafisika ini. Sebuah pertanyaan lebih mendasar juga diajukan terkait dengan hakikat proyek ini sendiri yang memperlihatkan tipisnya batas antara filsafat dan sains. Kata-kata Kunci: Whitehead, kreativitas, Kategori Pokok, metafisika, Aristoteles, organisme, Tuhan.

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Natochin, Juri V. "Philosophy of Physiology." Voprosy Filosofii, no. 12 (2022): 17–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2022-12-17-27.

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The article deals with the key issues of philosophy in physiology, one of the basic sciences of natural science. The problem of the particular and the general is discussed using the example of the ratio of individual cells, organs in the formation of the functions of an integral organism; the relevance of the individual is especially significant in the current trend towards the analysis of huge data sets (big data). The criterion of complexity is analyzed by comparing individuals performing physiological functions, from unicellular organisms to huge animals. The similarity of the morpho-functional organization of objects in physiology, linguistics, computer science, technical systems has been revealed. In the evolution of living organisms, an internal environment was formed in which cells live. Physiological systems provide homeostasis – the constancy of the physical and chemical parameters of the fluids of the internal environment, which requires a philosophical understanding of the standard in living organisms in comparison with the physical constants of the surrounding world. The question of personal freedom in its physiological understanding is discussed. The philosophical problem is analyzed, why everything happens the way it is and not otherwise. The conclusion is devoted to the relationship between reason and feelings in their philosophical and physiological senses.

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8

李, 彩云. "Social Organism Research in “Poverty of Philosophy”." Advances in Social Sciences 11, no. 08 (2022): 3469–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.12677/ass.2022.118474.

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9

Marcum, James A. "Whitehead’s Philosophy of Organism and Systems Biology." chromatikon 4 (2008): 143–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/chromatikon2008413.

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Marcum, James A., and Geert M. N. Verschuuren. "Hemostatic regulation and Whitehead's philosophy of organism." Acta Biotheoretica 35, no. 1-2 (1986): 123–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00118370.

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11

Levanon, Tamar. "Organism and Harmony." Leibniz Review 28 (2018): 67–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/leibniz2018285.

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12

Kolb, Vera M. "On the applicability of dialetheism and philosophy of identity to the definition of life." International Journal of Astrobiology 9, no. 2 (January 29, 2010): 131–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1473550410000017.

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AbstractWe have found that the principles of dialetheism, which state that some contradictions (typically at the limits of a system) may be true, and which amply demonstrate the limits of thought and conception, can be valuable in sorting out and clarifying some astrobiological problems that impede our ability to define life. The examples include the classification of viruses as alive or not alive, and the description of the transition zone for the abiotic-to-biotic transition. Dialetheism gives us the philosophical tool to state that the viruses may be both alive and not alive, and that chemical systems may exist that are both abiotic and biotic.We have extracted some philosophical principles of the identity and have applied them to the identity of living organisms and their life forms. The first and most important idea is that we should define an individual organism via its numerical identity. For each organism its identity will be in relation to itself. As the organism undergoes various changes during its development, and as it transitions from one to the next of its life forms, one can observe numerous qualitative differences between these life forms. Although the life forms change and the organism is in a flux, what remains constant is the numerical identity of the organism. If the organism reproduces, for example by a fission mode, then the daughter cells will have their own numerical identity. We can state that the life of an organism is a sum of all its life forms over the period of time of the existence of the organism. Reproduction, particularly by fission, represents an identity dilemma, but it can be resolved by Gallois' occasional identities theory.

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13

Holm, Sune. "Organism and artifact: Proper functions in Paley organisms." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44, no. 4 (December 2013): 706–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2013.05.018.

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14

GLADDEN, MATTHEW E. "REVISITING INGARDEN’S THEORETICAL BIOLOGICAL ACCOUNTOF THE LITERARY WORK OF ART: IS THE COMPUTER GAME AN “ORGANISM”?" HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES 9, no. 2 (2020): 640–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2020-9-2-640-661.

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From his earliest published writings to his last, Roman Ingarden displayed an interest in theoretical biology and its efforts to clarify what distinguishes living organisms from other types of entities. However, many of his explorations of such issues are easily overlooked, because they don’t appear in works that are primarily ontological, metaphysical, or anthropological in nature but are “hidden” within his works on literary aesthetics, where Ingarden sought to define the nature of living organisms in order to compare literary works to such entities. This article undertakes a historical textual analysis that traces the evolution of Ingarden’s thought regarding the nature of the literary work of art as an organism-like entity and uncovers its links with the simultaneous development of his systems theory and its central concept of the “relatively isolated system”: for Ingarden, a literary work and an organism are each a systematically transforming, “living,” functional-structural whole that comprises a system of hierarchically arranged and partially isolated (yet interdependent) elements whose harmonious interaction allows the literary work or organism to fulfill its chief function. Having completed that historical analysis, we test Ingarden’s assessment of works of art as organism-like entities in a novel context by investigating the organism-like qualities of the contemporary computer game; insofar as their AI-driven behavior displays a form of agency, such games might appear to be even more “alive” than traditional works of art. We show that Ingarden’s conceptual framework provides a useful tool for understanding the “organicity” of such games as works of art, despite the fact that they differ qualitatively from those art forms with which Ingarden was directly familiar.

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15

Brunson, Daniel J. "Pragmatism’s Evolution: Organism and Environment in American Philosophy." History: Reviews of New Books 49, no. 4 (July 4, 2021): 92–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03612759.2021.1935799.

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16

Beasley, Brandon. "Pragmatism’s Evolution: Organism and Environment in American Philosophy." International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30, no. 1 (January 1, 2022): 105–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2021.2022409.

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17

Keller, Mary L. "Pragmatism's Evolution: Organism and Environment in American Philosophy." American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 43, no. 2-3 (September 1, 2022): 191–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/21564795.43.2.3.24.

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18

Hershenov, David B. "Problems with a Constitution Account of Persons." Dialogue 48, no. 2 (June 2009): 291–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s001221730909026x.

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ABSTRACT: There are some problems with Lynne Baker’s constitution account of personal identity that become evident when we consider brain transplant thought experiments and two kinds of rare cases of conjoined twins — the first appears to be one organism but two persons and the second seems to involve two organisms associated with one person. To handle the problems arising from brain transplants, the constitution theorist must admit an additional level of constitution between the organism and the person. To resolve the problems posed by the two kinds of conjoined twins, the constitution theorist must accept that constitution is not always a one-to-one relationship.

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19

Liu, Yu. "From Christian Platonism to Organism." International Philosophical Quarterly 41, no. 4 (2001): 439–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq200141437.

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20

Martynova, Svetlana A. "Organ and Machinery Projections in Florensky’s Philosophy and Vertov’s Cinematography." Voprosy Filosofii, no. 6 (2021): 85–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2021-6-85-96.

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My article is dedicated to the Kapp’s theory of organ projections in the first half of the XX century in Russia. I research that the philosopher P. Florensky and the filmmaker Dziga Vertov made the changes to this theory and linked it with the definition of machinery projections purposes and limits. Florensky’s has a goal to analyze new sides of life in an organism by machinery projections. The method of it is the made by a man transference of the functions and contours of technology to an organism. A man thinks about the specificity of an organism and does not allow thinking about it as only less qualitatively working mechanism. Vertov has a goal to observe disadvantages of a human organism and reject them via creating of a new man by machinery projections. According to Vertov’s purpose the technology presents an organism as a mechanism via the algorithm of observing and designing. I explain how these conceptions may be useful for researching in the field of bioinformatics and biomedical engineering.

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21

Richardson, Robert C. "The Organism in Development." Philosophy of Science 67 (September 2000): S312—S321. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/392828.

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22

Khalil, Elias L. "Organism and Organization." Biology & Philosophy 12, no. 1 (December 1996): 119–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf03039616.

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23

Hadot, Pierre, and Andrew Irvine. "Epistrophe and Metanoia in the History of Philosophy." Philosophy Today 65, no. 1 (2021): 201–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday2021225391.

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Crucial in Pierre Hadot’s account of ancient philosophy as a way of life is the phenomenon of conversion. Well before he encountered some of the decisive influences upon his understanding of philosophy, Hadot already understood ancient philosophy and its long legacy in later thinkers of the West as much more than a formal discourse. Philosophy is an experience, or at least the exploration and articulation of a potential for experience. The energy of this potential originates in a polar tension between epistrophe (return) and metanoia (rebirth). The two poles, which are grounded in primal experiences of the living organism, motivate and model the conversion which must be lived by the philosopher. The genius of Western philosophical experience lies in the effort to synthesize return and rebirth, and thereby recover the self as an ontological point of identification with and origin of the cosmos.

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24

Nyhart, Lynn K. "The Political Organism." Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 47, no. 5 (November 1, 2017): 602–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/hsns.2017.47.5.602.

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How do the discourses of biology and politics interact? This article uses the case of Carl Vogt (1817–1895), the notorious German “radical materialist” zoologist and political revolutionary, to analyze the traffic across these discourses before, during, and after the revolutions of 1848. Arguing that metaphors of the organism and the state did different work in the discourse communities of German political theorists and biologists through the 1840s, it then traces Vogt’s life and work to show how politics and biology came together in his biography. It draws on Vogt’s political rhetoric, his satirical post-1849 writings, and his scientific studies to examine the parallels he drew between animal organization and human social and political organization in the 1840s and ’50s. Broadening back out, I suggest that the discourses of organismal and state organization, both somewhat transformed, would align more closely over the 1850s and thereafter—yet asymmetrically. Although the state metaphor became more attractive for biologists, the organism as state did not harden into a dominant concept in biology. On the political side, a new wave of political theorizing increasingly viewed the state as resembling a biological organism. These shifts, I speculate, brought the discourses closer together in the post-revolutionary era, and may be seen as contributing to a new configuration of mutual legitimation between science and the state. This essay is part of a special issue entitled REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS AND BIOLOGICAL ORGANIZATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE AND GERMANY edited by Lynn K. Nyhart and Florence Vienne.

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Miller, Gordon L. "The Intervening Touch of Mentality: Food Seeking in Frogs and Whitehead’s Philosophy of Organism." Process Studies 50, no. 2 (October 1, 2021): 155–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/processstudies.50.2.0155.

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Abstract Prey-catching behavior (PCB) in frogs and toads has been the focus of intense neuroethological research from the mid-twentieth century to the present and epitomizes some major themes in science and philosophy during this period. It reflects the movement from simple reflexology to more complex views of instinctive behavior, but it also displays a neural reductionism that denies subjectivity and individual agency. The present article engages contemporary PCB research but provides a philosophically more promising picture of it based on Whitehead’s nonreductionist “philosophy of organism,” which proposes that the flow of events from stimulus to response in organisms of all kinds is mediated by “the intervening touch of mentality.” This approach resolves some basic mind-body and mind-nature issues that have long bedeviled modern philosophy and presents an image of a postmodern frog for a constructively postmodern science.

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Peterson, Anne Siebels. "Matter in Biology." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 92, no. 2 (2018): 353–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq2018315150.

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Aristotle insists that the organic matter composing an organism depends for its being and becoming upon the living organism whose organic matter it is. An evolutionary context may at first seem to secure autonomy for an organism’s organic matter: after all, in such a context not only can organisms in divergent taxa have the same trait, but a trait can remain the same through thoroughgoing changes in its form, function, composition, and organismic context over evolutionary time. The biological homology concept attempts to capture this mysterious relationship of trait sameness. However, accounts of biological homology that have dominated the contemporary scene face compelling problems—these problems, I will argue, arise from their exclusion of the organism as an explanatory locus for the being and becoming of biological traits. An evolutionary framework in fact supports an account of homology that retains these two aspects of Aristotle’s views on organic matter.

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27

Pust, Joel. "Natural Selection Explanation and Origin Essentialism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31, no. 2 (June 2001): 201–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2001.10717565.

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Does natural selection explain why individual organisms have the traits that they do? This question has been the subject of vigorous debate in recent philosophy of biology. Sober and Walsh have defended the thesis that natural selection does not explain why any individual organism has the traits that it does. This thesis, I shall call ‘the Negative View.’ Neander and Matthen have defended the contrary thesis, which I shall call ‘the Positive View,’ according to which natural selection at least sometimes does explain why an individual organism has the traits that it does. In this paper, I will argue that recent arguments for the Positive View fail for a reason hitherto unnoticed and I will demonstrate that other recent defenses of the Negative View depend upon my own for their plausibility.I begin, in Section II, by showing that the issue is whether or not natural selection explains, of an individual, why it has the traits it does.

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Alvarado, José Tomás, and Cristóbal Unwin. "Condiciones de identidad para organismos." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 21, no. 1 (November 16, 2017): 13–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n1p13.

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In this work it is proposed that the conditions of identity for biological organisms are given by the following principle: for all organisms x and y, x = y if and only if x has been caused by the self-preserving activity of y. This principle determines both the inter-temporal identity of organisms and the identity of organism in different possible worlds. It unifies what can be supposed about conditions of identity coming from —at least— three different conceptions about the nature of biological organisms, those of RobertWilson, Thomas Pradeu and Ellen Clarke. These conceptions are presented and compared.

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29

France, Peter. "The encyclopedia as organism." European Legacy 3, no. 3 (June 1998): 62–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10848779808579889.

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30

Porrovecchio, Mark. "Trevor Pearce, "Pragmatism’s Evolution: Organism and Environment in American Philosophy"." Philosophy in Review 42, no. 1 (April 6, 2022): 39–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1088006ar.

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31

Abrams, Ellen. ":Pragmatism’s Evolution: Organism and Environment in American Philosophy." Isis 113, no. 4 (December 2, 2022): 885–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/721925.

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32

Legg, Catherine. ":Pragmatism’s Evolution: Organism and Environment in American Philosophy." HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 13, no. 2 (September 1, 2023): 557–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/726257.

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Mensch, Jennifer. "Material Unity and Natural Organism in Locke." Idealistic Studies 40, no. 1 (2010): 147–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies2010401/210.

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34

Clark, Ann. "The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, Environment (review)." Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16, no. 3 (2002): 239–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jsp.2003.0002.

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Liao, S. Matthew. "TWINNING, INORGANIC REPLACEMENT, AND THE ORGANISM VIEW." Ratio 23, no. 1 (March 2010): 59–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2009.00450.x.

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36

Shim, Seung-hwan. "The Direction of Organistic Education Based on Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism." Korean Association For Learner-Centered Curriculum And Instruction 24, no. 2 (January 31, 2024): 633–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.22251/jlcci.2024.24.2.633.

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Objectives The purpose of this study is to explore and present the direction of organic education that overcomes the real problems of Korean education, which is biased toward entrance examination and competition and culti-vates the wisdom of a vital and harmonious life by examining the basic characteristics of Whitehead's organism philosophy and education. Methods To this end Whitehead's nuclear power plant and related literature were studied to understand the basic concepts and core theories of organism philosophy, and based on this, the purpose, content, and method of or-ganic education were considered. Results Since all parts of organism philosophy are interrelated and connected as a whole, it was confirmed that education based on this should be a direction in which learning content and learner's lives are organically con-nected and life wisdom should be constructed around the relationship and interaction between educators, learning materials and fellow learners surrounding learners. Conclusions In organic education, educational content should be organically connected for the purpose of applica-tion to learners' lives, intellectual thinking and aesthetic sense are harmonized, generality and professionalism are harmonized, learners' voluntary and free intellectual search and precise and verified knowledge are harmonized, and people, objects, and nature around learners should cultivate personality that pursues symbiosis, harmony, and cooperation.

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Kingma, Elselijn. "Nine Months." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine 45, no. 3 (May 21, 2020): 371–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhaa005.

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Abstract When did we begin to exist? Barry Smith and Berit Brogaard argue that a new human organism comes into existence neither earlier nor later than the moment of gastrulation: 16 days after conception. Several critics have responded that the onset of the organism must happen earlier; closer to conception. This article makes a radically different claim: if we accept Smith and Brogaard’s ontological commitments, then human organisms start, on average, roughly nine months after conception. The main point of contention is whether the fetus is or is not part of the maternal organism. Smith and Brogaard argue that it is not; I demonstrate that it is. This claim in combination with Smith and Brogaard’s own criteria commits to the view that human organisms begin, precisely, at birth.

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Miller, Gordon L. "The Intervening Touch of Mentality." Process Studies 50, no. 2 (2021): 155–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/process202150210.

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Prey-catching behavior (PCB) in frogs and toads has been the focus of intense neuroethological research from the mid-twentieth century to the present and epitomizes some major themes in science and philosophy during this period. It reflects the movement from simple reflexology to more complex views of instinctive behavior, but it also displays a neural reductionism that denies subjectivity and individual agency The present article engages contemporary PCB research but provides a philosophically more promising picture of it based on Whitehead's nonreductionist "philosophy of organism," which proposes that the flow of events from stimulus to response in organisms of all kinds is mediated by "the intervening touch of mentality " This approach resolves some basic mind-body and mind-nature issues that have long bedeviled modern philosophy and presents an image of a postmodern frog for a constructively postmodern science.

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39

Piché, Claude. "Fichte et la première philosophie de la nature de Schelling." Dialogue 43, no. 2 (2004): 211–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300003504.

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AbstractWhen we reconstruct Fichte's philosophy of nature of the Jena period, we notice striking similarities between the conception of organism in the Doctrine of Science and Schelling's corresponding developments in his early Naturphilosophie. Even though both thinkers agree to consider organic nature within the framework of transcendental idealism, it is nevertheless possible at this stage to discover slight differences in their interpretation which announce their future disagreement on the status of a philosophy of nature. If, for instance, organism for both Fichte and Schelling can be considered as an analogon of the absolute, much depends on whether they conceive this analogy from a practical or theoretical point of view.

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Laszlo, Ervin. "Information in the Universe and in the Organism." World Futures 72, no. 3-4 (May 18, 2016): 101–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02604027.2016.1194079.

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41

Downing, L. "Spirits and Clocks: Machine and Organism in Descartes." Philosophical Review 113, no. 3 (July 1, 2004): 417–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-3-417.

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Куприянов, Виктор Александрович. "THE NOTIONS «MECHANISM» AND «ORGANISM» IN THE SOCIAL ONTOLOGY OF S.L. FRANK." Вестник Тверского государственного университета. Серия: Философия, no. 3(57) (December 10, 2021): 118–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.26456/vtphilos/2021.3.118.

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Статья посвящена анализу понятий «механизм» и «организм» в социальной философии С.Л. Франка. Социально-философская концепция Франка помещается в широкий контекст философии XIX-начала XX вв. В статье исследуются связи социальной философии Франка и органических теорий государства и общества. Автор статьи приводит обзор органических теорий: демонстрируется их генезис в немецком классическом идеализме и анализируются подходы, наиболее распространенные в XIX в. В статье обосновывается, что органические теории государства исторически связаны с телеологией И. Канта. Именно в философии Канта впервые появляется важное для философии XIX в. противопоставление организма и механизма. В статье указывается, что специфика этого подхода заключается не столько в естественнонаучной аналогии, сколько в интерпретации отношений части и целого. Автор показывает, что оппозиция механизма и организма сыграла важную роль в истории органических представлений об обществе. Русская социально-философская и политологическая мысль рассматривается в контексте общего развития социальных наук XIX в. Русские философы и обществоведы позаимствовали из западной философии идею оппозиции социального механизма и органицизма. На этой основе в России были выработаны аналогичные философско-правовые концепции, которые также можно отнести к традиции органицизма. Автор относит социально-философскую концепцию С.Л. Франка также к указанной традиции социального органицизма. В статье приводится реконструкция социальной философии Франка и отмечается, что его подход близок к идеям, получившим развитие в немецком классической идеализме. Указывается, что Франк критиковал не органическую теорию как таковую, а распространенную в его время натуралистическую концепцию, отождествлявшую общество с организмом. В этой связи автор показывает вклад Франка в историю органических представлений об обществе. The article is devoted to the analysis of the notions «mechanism» and «organism» in S.L. Frank’s social philosophy. The sociophilosophical conception of S.L. Frank is considered in the context of the philosophy of the XIXth - beginning of the XXth centuries. The article deals with the relations of S.L. Frank’s philosophy to the organic theories of society. The author gives an overview of the organic theories: their genesis in the German idealism and analysis of the widespread approaches in the XIXth century philosophy. The article shows that the organic theories were historically connected with the teleology of I. Kant. I. Kant was the first to propose the very opposition of organism and mechanism. The author points out that the speceficity of this approach consists rather in the interpretation of the relations between the part and the whole, than in the scientific analogy. The author shows that this opposition played a significant role in the organic theory of society. Russian social philosophy and political science are considered in the general context of the social sciences of the XIXth century. Russian philosophers and social sciences borrowed the idea of mechanism and organism from the western philosophy. Based on this approach they developed their own conceptions which can also be referred to the organic tradition. The author refers S.L. Frank’s social philosophy to the tradition of social organism. The article reconstructs the Frank’s social philosophy and points out that his approach is derived from the German classical idealism. It is shown that Frank did not criticized the very organic theory, his criticism was directed against naturalistic theories of his time. The author of the article shows the Frank’s contribution to the organic theory of society.

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Maritain, Jacques. "The Philosophy of the Organism: Notes on the Function of Nutrition." Nova et vetera 19, no. 2 (2021): 633–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/nov.2021.0027.

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Tae-Hong Hong. "Ecology in Laudato Si in the Lights of Philosophy of Organism." Studies in Religion(The Journal of the Korean Association for the History of Religions) 76, no. 4 (December 2016): 153–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.21457/kars.76.3.201612.153.

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Bhattacharya, Katyaynidas. "Contemporary Trends in the Philosophy of Life." Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion 25 (2020): 113–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jipr2020256.

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An issue in philosophy of life is what in nature can and what cannot be explained by physics and chemistry. The mechanical theory is the same as the physico-chemical theory and the mechanical explanation of biological phenomena amounts to the recognition of such phenomena as falling under the laws of physics and chemistry. Hobhouse points out that a living body acts in some respects as a mechanism while in other respects it appears to act differently. But where does the difference lie? One difference seems to be that a living organism, when out of order, struggles back to order and normal functioning in a structured way that a machine appears to be incapable of. Haldane asserts that a living organism can grow from within and give rise to another system of the same sort out of a tiny special itself as it happens in reproduction and that such reproduction belongs to a class qualitatively different from that of mechanical operation. The qualitative difference between life and matter is also supported in Alexander’s doctrine of emergent evolution.

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Barker, Michael. "The Right Stuff." International Philosophical Quarterly 60, no. 4 (2020): 411–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq20201120161.

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I consider Kant’s theory of matter, examine his distinction between “formal” and “material” purposiveness, review the related secondary literature, and interpret the role of the stuff of which organs consist in his conception of the special characteristics of organisms. As organisms ingest or absorb compounds, they induce chemical changes among those materials to grow and repair organs. Those organs have their functions with respect to each other in part on account of the materials of which they are composed. A Kantian biological law, I argue, is a coordinated system of lower-order chemical and mechanical regularities that an organism instantiates in the relations that its organs have to each other. I interpret Kant’s contention that organisms resist cognition as claiming that a “discursive understanding” can have no conception of why a particular biological law instantiates whichever lower-order mechanical and chemical regularities it does.

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Hershenov, David. "Countering the Appeal of the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity." Philosophy 79, no. 3 (July 2004): 447–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819104000373.

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Brain transplants and the dicephalus (an organism just like us except that it has two cerebrums) are thought to support the position that we are essentially thinking creatures, not living organisms. I try to offset the first of these intuitions by responding to thought experiments Peter Unger devised to show that identity is what matters. I then try to motivate an interpretation of the alleged conjoined twins as really just one person cut off from himself by relying upon what I take will be the reader's disagreement with Locke's conjecture that a dreaming Socrates and an awake Socrates are two distinct people.

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Ishida, Masato. "The Sense of Symmetry: Comparative Reflections on Whitehead, Nishida, and Dōgen." Process Studies 43, no. 1 (April 1, 2014): 4–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/44798091.

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Abstract In contrast to temporal asymmetry stressed in process philosophy, symmetry prevails in Mahayana Buddhism and East Asian philosophy formed under its influence. The paper clarifies the meaning of symmetry from the perspectives of Kitaro Nishida and Dogen, it explores similar or overlapping ideas in Whitehead’s philosophy of organism, and it suggests that the differences among them are much smaller than commonly believed.

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Pańpuch, Zbigniew. "The Body-Organism Difference as a Bridge between Particular Sciences and Philosophy in Understanding Human Person." Roczniki Kulturoznawcze 13, no. 1 (March 30, 2022): 41–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/rkult22131.3.

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The article copes with a plurality of sciences in general and focuses in the human-related sciences, which present different cognitive results. There is difficult to co-ordinate them because of the difference in methods, aims and formal objects of sciences, whereas the material object of various sciences - the real man exists as the only subject, with a definite and clearly determined substance. In a consequence, they produce different concepts of man. Is it possible to co-ordinate or to reconcile these various information about human being, especially these from particular sciences with the philosophical anthropology? A general understanding of the biological organism is of this kind that it is an object of science, but the notion of organism has been present in philosophy quite a long time—from the ancient times. Thus, an outline of the problem appears, namely the distinction between the organism, as an object of possible experience (fundamentally internal, but also external) and the body in the metaphysical sense, as an sub-ontic element of the human being. From the metaphysical point of view it seems (and that is my proposition or may be only a point mentioned anywhere by some authors, which I would like especially stress), that this whole—consisting of its organic parts, all unified in systemic reciprocal dependencies and various relations—is only accidental to human substance. This human substance—is a person. This specific “set of accidentals” constituting the human organism is subordinated (subjected) to the substance and exists in it and by it. Such an understanding of the organism and more precisely described distinction between it and the body can determine the field of interest of philosophy and other sciences, and simultaneously create a bridge between them. Human organism could be a good object of various research in the field of particular sciences. But the scientists should not forget about metaphysic and existential background of the human organism. From the other hand, the philosophers looking for the necessary causes of the human being have to take in consideration this necessary and specific set of accidentals (a human organism) and the particular knowledge of it provided by the scientists.

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Cassin, Barbara, and Jake Wadham. "From Organism to Picnic." Angelaki 11, no. 3 (December 2006): 21–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09697250601048481.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Organism (Philosophy)'

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