Books on the topic 'Opponent model'

Agreeableness is a summary label for individual differences in the motivation to maintain positive relations with others. Agreeableness is one of the major dimensions in the Big Five structural model of personality. It is also a major domain in the Five Factor Model of personality. This chapter provides an overview of the considerable body of research concerning the conceptualization, assessment, and etiology of Agreeableness with a focus on its six facets. It concludes with a discussion of alternative theoretical explanations for Agreeableness. In particular, an opponent process model that involves two competing motive systems is applied to the processes underlying Agreeableness.

This chapter attempts to develop more realistic and interesting models in which the set of competing parties is a completely endogenous output of the process of party competition. It also seeks to model party competition when different party leaders use different decision rules in the same setting by building on an approach pioneered in a different context by Robert Axelrod. This involves long-running computer “tournaments” that allow investigation of the performance and “robustness” of decision rules in an environment where any politician using any rule may encounter an opponent using either the same decision rule or some quite different rule. The chapter is most interested in how a decision rule performs against anything the competitive environment might throw against it, including agents using decision rules that are difficult to anticipate and/or comprehend.

Although service-learning programs can have diverse theoretical roots, faculty who engage their students in service-learning may not be be cognizant of alternatives to the one they adopt. This book presents not only a historical perspective, but it also debates the theories and issues surrounding the conflicts inherent in those theories. One theory, based on a philanthropic model, engages students in a commitment to serve others from a sense of gratitude for their own good fortunes or from a desire to give back to communities from which they have benefited. Typically, service-learning programs based on the philanthropic or communitarian models deal with the overt needs of community members. In contrast, the civic model requires deeper analysis of the various political and social issues that may be the cause of social conditions that require the help of the more fortunate. Opponents of the civic theory fear that proponents see the classroom as a forum for advancing particular political agendas, conceivably indoctrinating students to a particular view of social injustices. This book presents the theories and critiques their merits and liabilities, providing insight into the widely divergent curricular applications. It also examines the reasons professors should consider service-learning components in their classes and provides resources for further investigation of both theory and practice.

Montaigne and the Tolerance of Politics provides a new interpretation of Michel de Montaigne’s Essais in the context of his activity as a political negotiator between combatant parties during the French Wars of Religion. At the heart of the Essais lies a political conception of tolerance that is rarely considered today. Tolerance is usually conceived as an individual ethical disposition or a moral principle of public law. For Montaigne, tolerance is instead a political capacity: the power and ability to negotiate relationships of basic trust and civil peace with one’s opponents in political conflict. Contemporary thinkers often argue that what matters most for tolerance is how one talks to one’s political opponents: with respect, reasonableness, and civility. For Montaigne, what matters most is not how, but rather that opponents talk to each other across lines of disagreement. Using his own experience negotiating between Catholic and Huguenot parties as a model, Montaigne investigates and prescribes a set of skills and capacities that might help his readers become the kinds of people who can initiate and sustain dialogue with the “other side” to achieve public goods—even when respect, reasonableness, and civility are not yet assured. Montaigne and the Tolerance of Politics argues that this dimension of tolerance is worth recovering and reconsidering in contemporary democratic societies, in which partisan “sorting” and multidimensional polarization have evidently rendered political leaders and ordinary citizens less and less able to talk to each other to resolve political conflicts and to work for shared public goods.

This chapter investigates Michel de Montaigne’s engagement with the Italian humanist conception of “civil conversation” as an exercise for training effective political counselors and ambassadors. Using himself as a model, Montaigne prescribes a more confrontational, uncivil form of conversation as a means to train his readers into a high tolerance for political negotiation with the widest possible range of interlocutors and opinions. Following the conventions of the humanist literature on political education, Montaigne argues that the best way to practice political negotiation and other forms of conversation with political opponents is to go out and do it. The chapter then compares this theme of the Essais with Rainer Forst’s conception of tolerance as a form of civil public reason.

Party competition for votes in free and fair elections involves complex interactions by multiple actors in political landscapes that are continuously evolving, yet classical theoretical approaches to the subject leave many important questions unanswered. This book offers the first comprehensive treatment of party competition using the computational techniques of agent-based modeling. This exciting new technology enables researchers to model competition between several different political parties for the support of voters with widely varying preferences on many different issues. The book models party competition as a true dynamic process in which political parties rise and fall, a process where different politicians attack the same political problem in very different ways, and where today's political actors, lacking perfect information about the potential consequences of their choices, must constantly adapt their behavior to yesterday's political outcomes. This book shows how agent-based modeling can be used to accurately reflect how political systems really work. It demonstrates that politicians who are satisfied with relatively modest vote shares often do better at winning votes than rivals who search ceaselessly for higher shares of the vote. It reveals that politicians who pay close attention to their personal preferences when setting party policy often have more success than opponents who focus solely on the preferences of voters, that some politicians have idiosyncratic “valence” advantages that enhance their electability—and much more.

Since the late eighteenth century, writers and thinkers have used the idea of love—often unrequited or impossible love—to comment on the changing cultural, social, and political position of Jews in the German-speaking countries. This book asks what it means for literature (and philosophy) to use love between individuals as a metaphor for group relations. This question is of renewed interest today, when theorists of multiculturalism turn toward love in their search for new models of particularity and universality. The book is structured around two transformative moments in German Jewish culture and history that produced particularly rich clusters of interfaith love stories. Around 1800, literature promoted the rise of the Romantic love ideal and the shift from prearranged to love-based marriages. In the German-speaking countries, this change in the theory and practice of love coincided with the beginnings of Jewish emancipation, and both its supporters and opponents linked their arguments to tropes of love. The book explores the generative powers of such tropes in Moses Mendelssohn, G. E. Lessing, Friedrich Schlegel, Dorothea Veit, and Achim von Arnim. Around 1900, the rise of racial antisemitism had called into question the promises of emancipation and led to a crisis of German Jewish identity. At the same time, Jewish-Christian intermarriage prompted public debates that were tied up with racial discourses and concerns about procreation, heredity, and the mutability and immutability of the Jewish body. The text shows how modern German Jewish writers such as Arthur Schnitzler, Else Lasker-Schüler, and Franz Rosenzweig wrestle with this idea of love away from biologist thought and reinstate it as a model of sociopolitical relations. It concludes by tracing the relevance of this model in post-Holocaust works by Gershom Scholem, Hannah Arendt, and Barbara Honigmann.

Why do states frequently reject coercive threats from more powerful opponents? This introductory chapter begins by outlining the explanations in the existing literature for failures of coercive diplomacy. It suggests that these accounts generally share a cognitivist perspective that neglects the role of emotion in target leaders’ decision-making. To capture the social, physiological, and dynamic nature of emotion, it is necessary to introduce an additional action model besides the traditional rationalist and constructivist paradigms. The chapter provides a summary of this logic of affect, or emotional choice theory, which includes a series of propositions specifying the emotional conditions under which target leaders are likely to accept or reject a coercer’s demands. Next, it justifies the selection of the case studies and the book’s focus on political leaders. The chapter ends with a brief outline of the rest of the study.

The ‘Introduction’ provides an overview of psychoanalysis, its history, and its development. Psychoanalysis is an original method of therapy that is a form of inquiry, a theory of mind, and a mode of treatment concerned, above all, with the unconscious mind. Founded by Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), it became a movement and set of institutions, inspiring many, but also galvanizing numerous opponents. Freud’s method of free association involves allowing the patient to discuss anything that comes into their mind. The analyst is tasked with attending to possible unconscious meaning in what the patient brings. Critique of psychoanalysis has taken many forms. Sometimes disagreements spurred new ideas and modified techniques within the mainstream tradition.

Modality played a central role in Christian Wolff’s philosophy. In his extensive writings on the topic, he was unusually explicit about the definitions of modal notions and what sort of principles they satisfy. His alleged endorsement of fatalism prompted his expulsion from Prussia in 1723, an event that caused a major stir among Europe’s intellectual circles. This chapter examines whether Wolff was indeed committed to fatalism, despite his protestations to the contrary. It is argued that Wolff’s theory of propositions allows him to avoid the letter of view: there are truths that are not necessary. However, Wolff fails to make room for the kind of contingency in which his opponents were interested. On the interpretation proposed, Wolff’s view is in the spirit of fatalism.

Prophets and priests are often seen as opponents, but this is far from true. Prophets might well criticize what they see as priestly corruption, while in a similar vein priests might denounce prophets whom they think are false. Yet although each category of office has certain unique characteristics, their activities and functions often overlap with one another. Both act as intermediaries between humans and the divine, and both provide various means for seeking and obtaining a message from the deity. Some prophets came from priestly families, and there seem to have been cultic prophets connected with the temple. A variety of prophets and models of prophets are found in the Hebrew Bible, including female prophets, “sons/bands of the prophets,” and shaman-like figures.

This book claims that John Calvin developed "Greek" doctrines of the interim state of souls, resurrection, and beatific vision through his reading of ancient Christian sources like Irenaeus of Lyons. “Greek” had been a technical term in western theology since at least the twelfth century to denote heterodox eschatology. Thomas Aquinas had employed it in that sense, and early modern Catholics like Robert Bellarmine and Pierre Coton in turn applied it to Calvin. The book demonstrates that, in this respect at least, Calvin's opponents were correct: he was a “Greek.” However, it questions whether that fact should lead modern theologians to dismiss him as a resource for contemporary reflection. Calvin's deep respect for and continuity with early Christian voices may serve as a positive model for theologians today, particularly in the Reformed tradition. By the same token, Reformed thinkers who seek inspiration from medieval scholasticism may find their relationship to Calvin complicated by the case presented here.

Ideas of self-sovereignty and self-sacrifice drew American and French revolutionaries to Roman virtuous exemplars—and into errors of reception, according to prominent contemporaries. Focusing on Benjamin Constant’s and Edmund Burke’s critique of the excited pleasure revolutionaries take in imitating Roman models, this chapter asks what insight into the mechanisms of political change we may gain by studying the revolutionary desire for Rome and the rage felt by the opponents of revolution against that desire. Constant and Burke, insofar as they discuss how the liberal free autonomous self rules itself and relates to others, and how modern thought relates to the past, take up problems still essential to the political thought of modernity. By considering the rhetorical extremes of both liberal and conservative thinkers in their reactions to Roman tradition, we understand better how such critiques of pleasure, desire, and imitation determine the transmission of political ideals over time.

In coercive diplomacy, states threaten military action to persuade opponents to change their behavior. The goal is to achieve a target’s compliance without incurring the cost in blood and treasure of military intervention. Coercers typically employ this strategy toward weaker actors, but targets often refuse to submit and the parties enter into war. To explain these puzzling failures of coercive diplomacy, existing accounts generally refer to coercers’ perceived lack of resolve or targets’ social norms and identities. What these approaches either neglect or do not examine systematically is the role that emotions play in these encounters. The present book contends that target leaders’ affective experience can shape their decision-making in significant ways. Drawing on research in psychology and sociology, the study introduces an additional, emotion-based action model besides the traditional logics of consequences and appropriateness. This logic of affect, or emotional choice theory, posits that target leaders’ choice behavior is influenced by the dynamic interplay between their norms, identities, and five key emotions, namely fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation. The core of the action model consists of a series of propositions that specify the emotional conditions under which target leaders are likely to accept or reject a coercer’s demands. The book applies the logic of affect to Nikita Khrushchev’s decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and Saddam Hussein’s choice behavior in the Gulf conflict in 1990–91, offering a novel explanation for why coercive diplomacy succeeded in one case but not in the other.

One of the most serious problems of modern navigation is the accident rate that occurs due to inept or belated maneuvering of ships. As a result of accidents in the world, more than 200 ships die every year and every fourth receives significant damage. Full-scale tests show that the stopping distance of large-tonnage ships turn out to be much less permissible, and shipbuilders are able to significantly reduce the astern power of such ships, making them cheaper at the expense of safety. The low accuracy of inertial-braking characteristics is mainly due to unqualified field tests. Analysis of graphs and tables based on the results of such tests show that the spread in the values of inertial-braking characteristics for ships of the same type reaches 30%, and in some cases even more. In many tables and graphs, inertial-braking characteristics are expressed in relative values and are not suitable for direct use when maneuvering a ship. Finally, even when graphical and/or tabular maneuvering information is available on the navigating bridge, it is difficult to use it when maneuvering a ship at night. The research carried out by the author results in: - creation of an alternative computational method for determining the inertial-braking characteristics of the ship, suitable for use on any on-board computer; - development of an improved methodology for calculating the path and time of acceleration and braking of the ship in various ahead motion modes; - development of a methodology for taking into account the influence of a passing and opponent current on the length of the stopping distance of the ship; - development of methods for solving applied problems, ensuring a decrease in the accident rate of ships during maneuvering. The obtained methods include the development of theoretical foundations, mathematical models and comparison of the calculated inertial-braking characteristics of ships with the data of a full-scale experiment. For the first time, to derive the calculated formulas for the time and stopping distance, theorems are used on the change in the momentum and kinetic energy during accelerated and decelerated motion of the ship. In the course of the study, the problems of calculating and formalizing the inertial-braking characteristics of the ship are being comprehensively solved. For the first time, the hypothesis that the nature of the change in the thrust force of the propeller during reverse can be approximated by linear equations has been substantiated and confirmed. The general results are used to calculate the inertial-braking characteristics of specific ships.

This book explores William Wordsworth’s pervasive influence on the tourist landscapes of the Lake District throughout the age of transport revolutions, popular tourism, and the Great 1914-18 War. It reveals how Wordsworth’s response to railways was not a straightforward matter of opposition and protest; his ideas were taken up by advocates and opponents of railways, and through their controversies had a surprising impact on the earliest motorists as they sought a language to describe the liberty and independence of their new mode of travel. Once the age of motoring was underway, the outbreak of the First World War encouraged British people to connect Wordsworth’s patriotic passion with his wish to protect the Lake District as a national heritage—a transition that would have momentous effects in the interwar period when the popularisation of motoring paradoxically brought a vogue for open-air activities and a renewal of Romantic pedestrianism. With the arrival of global tourism, preservation of the cultural landscape of the Lake District became an urgent national and international concern. By revealing how Romantic ideas of nature, travel, liberty and self-reliance were re-interpreted and utilized in discourses on landscape, transport, accessibility, preservation, war and cultural heritage, this book portrays multiple Wordsworthian legacies in modern ways of perceiving and valuing the nature and culture of the Lake District.

This book explores the idea that people in Western Europe changed the way they thought about time over the early modern period; and it does so by examining their reactions to the 1688–9 revolution in England. It examines how those who lived through the extraordinary collapse of James II’s regime perceived this event as it unfolded and how they set it within their understanding of history. It questions whether a new understanding of chronology—one which allowed fundamental and human-directed change—had been widely adopted by this point in the past; and whether this might have allowed witnesses of the revolution to see it as the start of a new era or as an opportunity to shape a novel, ‘modern’, future for England. It argues that, with important exceptions, the people of the era rejected dynamic views of time to retain a ‘static’ chronology that failed to fully conceptualize evolution in history. Bewildered by the rapid events of the revolution itself, people forced these into familiar scripts. Interpreting 1688–9 later, they saw it as a reiteration of timeless principles of politics, or as a stage in an eternal and predetermined struggle for true religion. Only slowly did they see come to see it as part of an evolving and modernizing process—and then mainly in response to opponents of the revolution, who had theorized change in order to oppose it. The book thus argues for a far more complex and ambiguous model of changes in chronological conception than many accounts have suggested and questions whether 1688–9 could be the leap toward modernity that recent interpretations have argued.

This book offers an engaging and historically informed account of the moral challenge of radically asymmetric violence—warfare conducted by one party in the near-complete absence of physical risk, across the full scope of a conflict zone. What role does physical risk and material threat play in the justifications for killing in war? And crucially, is there a point at which battlefield violence becomes so one-directional as to undermine the moral basis for its use? In order to answers these questions, Asymmetric Killing delves into the morally contested terrain of the warrior ethos and Just War Tradition, locating the historical and contemporary role of reciprocal risk within both. This book also engages two historical episodes of battlefield asymmetry, military sniping and manned aerial bombing. Both modes of violence generated an imbalance of risk between opponents so profound as to call into question their permissibility. These now-resolved controversies will then be contrasted with the UAV-exclusive violence of the United States, robotic killing conducted in the absence of a significant military ground presence in conflict theatres such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. As will be revealed, the radical asymmetry of this latter case is distinct, undermining reciprocal risk at the structural level of war. Beyond its more resolvable tension with the warrior ethos, UAV-exclusive violence represents a fundamental challenge to the very coherence of the moral justifications for killing in war.

This book argues that current self-described antifascists are not struggling against a reappearance of interwar fascism, and that the Left that claims to be opposing fascism has little in common with any earlier Left, except for some overlap with critical theorists of the Frankfurt School. The book looks at antifascism from its roots in early twentieth-century Europe to its American manifestation in the present. The pivotal development for defining the present political spectrum, the book suggests, has been the replacement of a recognizably Marxist Left by an intersectional one. Political and ideological struggles have been configured around this new Left, which has become a dominant force throughout the Western world. The book discusses the major changes undergone by antifascist ideology since the 1960s, fascist and antifascist models of the state and assumptions about human nature, nationalism versus globalism, the antifascism of the American conservative establishment, and Antifa in the United States. Also included is an excursus on the theory of knowledge presented by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan. The book concludes that promoting a fear of fascism today serves the interests of the powerful—in particular, those in positions of political, journalistic, and educational power who want to bully and isolate political opponents. It points out the generous support given to the intersectional Left by multinational capitalists and examines the movement of the white working class in Europe—including former members of Communist parties—toward the populist Right, suggesting this shows a political dynamic that is different from the older dialectic between Marxists and anti-Marxists.

While the gambling industry is indisputably large and powerful, it has received little attention from political scientists. Utilizing a variety of perspectives and techniques, von Herrmann analyzes gambling's recent expansion, finding public attitudes have been shaped both by government policies and the industry's attempts to create a family-friendly image. Von Herrmann examines the politics of state and federal gambling policy, particularly policies relating to casinos and state lotteries. She considers gambling policy from a variety of perspectives, including the politics of adoption, the state and federal governments' role in policy formation and implementation, and the broad economic and social impact questions related to gambling. The inclusion of several state case studies provides insight into the largely successful reshaping of Americans' image of gambling—from seedy, sinful, and corrupt behavior to a benign, pleasurable entertainment experience—which ultimately has led to widespread availability. While many have asserted that gambling policy fits well within the political models of morality politics, von Herrmann challenges this notion. Noting that true consensus has not been achieved in the area of gambling policy, she shows how supporters' economic arguments and opponents' moral concerns have effectively bifurcated the current debates on gambling policy; gambling is now viewed by many in two distinct and separate bodies of thought. As she observes, the challenge for the future of gambling policy is to find ways to bridge the gap. Of particular interest to scholars, students, and other researchers involved with public policy, particularly that relating to gambling.

The war in Iraq, Afghanistan, continual conflict in the Middle East, and the global war on terrorism, are all intertwined in a greater battle of global conflict: World War III. However, the fogs that have been created to hide these conflicts from public opinion are obstructing a clear view of reality. Fogs prevent the public from accurately seeing this war unfold and from taking action in the government to help prevent, this now, inevitable conflict. This work unveils that the media and government are two thickening fogs that continue to obscure the reality of what is occurring. Media does little to help develop an in-depth understanding of the world. In turn this creates limited interest in reporting of foreign affairs among the market sectors they strive to reach. The government has focused on winning the hearts and minds of the American people in order to drive the cause of the war on terrorism. Yet, this war has unleashed greater struggles, which citizens have covertly been blinded to. While these global conflicts are seemingly isolated, the authors illustrate that they are, in fact, closely linked with similar underlying causes. The fogs of war and peace need to lessen so the American people can be accurately informed and global leaders are able to strive for better policies in order to bring World War III to an end. Seemingly unrelated conflicts raging in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East, and other global areas, are in fact, closely linked, as part of a greater battle, World War III. In the midst of conflict, this work delves into factors of World War III, and claims that we have already begun this new war. However, in an age where the average American citizen is uninformed on international foreign policy and conflict, the two fogs of government and media, are only contributing to this miseducation. These fogs have never been thicker in obscuring the reality of what is occurring. The fog that is media, explains what is occurring in cryptic sound bites by funneling certain information to the American people. Government, the second fog, affects citizens by either withholding or distorting information and opponents, and expands a great effort to deceive and distort current events. In turn it tries to win the hearts of the people by explaining that this is the only way to obtain the idea of peace. This work explains that through the distorted reality of the fogs, we are now in a stage of disinformation, misinformation, and noninformation, which block the view of citizens from what is truly happening and how to deal with it. It is the first analytical model that clearly examines the fogs of war and peace and how new perspectives must been found. The authors offer a model to help inform readers to better understand World War III, while illuminating the causes, nature, and dynamics of the global concern. In turn, they offer new policy directions for political leaders in America, Israel, and Europe and hope to bring to light these fogs of destruction.

Nationalism: Past as Prologue began as a single volume being compiled by Ad Akande, a scholar from South Africa, who proposed it to me as co-author about two years ago. The original idea was to examine how the damaging roots of nationalism have been corroding political systems around the world, and creating dangerous obstacles for necessary international cooperation. Since I (Bruce E. Johansen) has written profusely about climate change (global warming, a.k.a. infrared forcing), I suggested a concerted effort in that direction. This is a worldwide existential threat that affects every living thing on Earth. It often compounds upon itself, so delays in reducing emissions of fossil fuels are shortening the amount of time remaining to eliminate the use of fossil fuels to preserve a livable planet. Nationalism often impedes solutions to this problem (among many others), as nations place their singular needs above the common good. Our initial proposal got around, and abstracts on many subjects arrived. Within a few weeks, we had enough good material for a 100,000-word book. The book then fattened to two moderate volumes and then to four two very hefty tomes. We tried several different titles as good submissions swelled. We also discovered that our best contributors were experts in their fields, which ranged the world. We settled on three stand-alone books:” 1/ nationalism and racial justice. Our first volume grew as the growth of Black Lives Matter following the brutal killing of George Floyd ignited protests over police brutality and other issues during 2020, following the police assassination of Floyd in Minneapolis. It is estimated that more people took part in protests of police brutality during the summer of 2020 than any other series of marches in United States history. This includes upheavals during the 1960s over racial issues and against the war in Southeast Asia (notably Vietnam). We choose a volume on racism because it is one of nationalism’s main motive forces. This volume provides a worldwide array of work on nationalism’s growth in various countries, usually by authors residing in them, or in the United States with ethnic ties to the nation being examined, often recent immigrants to the United States from them. Our roster of contributors comprises a small United Nations of insightful, well-written research and commentary from Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia, China, India, South Africa, France, Portugal, Estonia, Hungary, Russia, Poland, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the United States. Volume 2 (this one) describes and analyzes nationalism, by country, around the world, except for the United States; and 3/material directly related to President Donald Trump, and the United States. The first volume is under consideration at the Texas A & M University Press. The other two are under contract to Nova Science Publishers (which includes social sciences). These three volumes may be used individually or as a set. Environmental material is taken up in appropriate places in each of the three books. * * * * * What became the United States of America has been strongly nationalist since the English of present-day Massachusetts and Jamestown first hit North America’s eastern shores. The country propelled itself across North America with the self-serving ideology of “manifest destiny” for four centuries before Donald Trump came along. Anyone who believes that a Trumpian affection for deportation of “illegals” is a new thing ought to take a look at immigration and deportation statistics in Adam Goodman’s The Deportation Machine: America’s Long History of Deporting Immigrants (Princeton University Press, 2020). Between 1920 and 2018, the United States deported 56.3 million people, compared with 51.7 million who were granted legal immigration status during the same dates. Nearly nine of ten deportees were Mexican (Nolan, 2020, 83). This kind of nationalism, has become an assassin of democracy as well as an impediment to solving global problems. Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times (2019:A-25): that “In their 2018 book, How Democracies Die, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt documented how this process has played out in many countries, from Vladimir Putin’s Russia, to Recep Erdogan’s Turkey, to Viktor Orban’s Hungary. Add to these India’s Narendra Modi, China’s Xi Jinping, and the United States’ Donald Trump, among others. Bit by bit, the guardrails of democracy have been torn down, as institutions meant to serve the public became tools of ruling parties and self-serving ideologies, weaponized to punish and intimidate opposition parties’ opponents. On paper, these countries are still democracies; in practice, they have become one-party regimes….And it’s happening here [the United States] as we speak. If you are not worried about the future of American democracy, you aren’t paying attention” (Krugmam, 2019, A-25). We are reminded continuously that the late Carl Sagan, one of our most insightful scientific public intellectuals, had an interesting theory about highly developed civilizations. Given the number of stars and planets that must exist in the vast reaches of the universe, he said, there must be other highly developed and organized forms of life. Distance may keep us from making physical contact, but Sagan said that another reason we may never be on speaking terms with another intelligent race is (judging from our own example) could be their penchant for destroying themselves in relatively short order after reaching technological complexity. This book’s chapters, introduction, and conclusion examine the worldwide rise of partisan nationalism and the damage it has wrought on the worldwide pursuit of solutions for issues requiring worldwide scope, such scientific co-operation public health and others, mixing analysis of both. We use both historical description and analysis. This analysis concludes with a description of why we must avoid the isolating nature of nationalism that isolates people and encourages separation if we are to deal with issues of world-wide concern, and to maintain a sustainable, survivable Earth, placing the dominant political movement of our time against the Earth’s existential crises. Our contributors, all experts in their fields, each have assumed responsibility for a country, or two if they are related. This work entwines themes of worldwide concern with the political growth of nationalism because leaders with such a worldview are disinclined to co-operate internationally at a time when nations must find ways to solve common problems, such as the climate crisis. Inability to cooperate at this stage may doom everyone, eventually, to an overheated, stormy future plagued by droughts and deluges portending shortages of food and other essential commodities, meanwhile destroying large coastal urban areas because of rising sea levels. Future historians may look back at our time and wonder why as well as how our world succumbed to isolating nationalism at a time when time was so short for cooperative intervention which is crucial for survival of a sustainable earth. Pride in language and culture is salubrious to individuals’ sense of history and identity. Excess nationalism that prevents international co-operation on harmful worldwide maladies is quite another. As Pope Francis has pointed out: For all of our connectivity due to expansion of social media, ability to communicate can breed contempt as well as mutual trust. “For all our hyper-connectivity,” said Francis, “We witnessed a fragmentation that made it more difficult to resolve problems that affect us all” (Horowitz, 2020, A-12). The pope’s encyclical, titled “Brothers All,” also said: “The forces of myopic, extremist, resentful, and aggressive nationalism are on the rise.” The pope’s document also advocates support for migrants, as well as resistance to nationalist and tribal populism. Francis broadened his critique to the role of market capitalism, as well as nationalism has failed the peoples of the world when they need co-operation and solidarity in the face of the world-wide corona virus pandemic. Humankind needs to unite into “a new sense of the human family [Fratelli Tutti, “Brothers All”], that rejects war at all costs” (Pope, 2020, 6-A). Our journey takes us first to Russia, with the able eye and honed expertise of Richard D. Anderson, Jr. who teaches as UCLA and publishes on the subject of his chapter: “Putin, Russian identity, and Russia’s conduct at home and abroad.” Readers should find Dr. Anderson’s analysis fascinating because Vladimir Putin, the singular leader of Russian foreign and domestic policy these days (and perhaps for the rest of his life, given how malleable Russia’s Constitution has become) may be a short man physically, but has high ambitions. One of these involves restoring the old Russian (and Soviet) empire, which would involve re-subjugating a number of nations that broke off as the old order dissolved about 30 years ago. President (shall we say czar?) Putin also has international ambitions, notably by destabilizing the United States, where election meddling has become a specialty. The sight of Putin and U.S. president Donald Trump, two very rich men (Putin $70-$200 billion; Trump $2.5 billion), nuzzling in friendship would probably set Thomas Jefferson and Vladimir Lenin spinning in their graves. The road of history can take some unanticipated twists and turns. Consider Poland, from which we have an expert native analysis in chapter 2, Bartosz Hlebowicz, who is a Polish anthropologist and journalist. His piece is titled “Lawless and Unjust: How to Quickly Make Your Own Country a Puppet State Run by a Group of Hoodlums – the Hopeless Case of Poland (2015–2020).” When I visited Poland to teach and lecture twice between 2006 and 2008, most people seemed to be walking on air induced by freedom to conduct their own affairs to an unusual degree for a state usually squeezed between nationalists in Germany and Russia. What did the Poles then do in a couple of decades? Read Hlebowicz’ chapter and decide. It certainly isn’t soft-bellied liberalism. In Chapter 3, with Bruce E. Johansen, we visit China’s western provinces, the lands of Tibet as well as the Uighurs and other Muslims in the Xinjiang region, who would most assuredly resent being characterized as being possessed by the Chinese of the Han to the east. As a student of Native American history, I had never before thought of the Tibetans and Uighurs as Native peoples struggling against the Independence-minded peoples of a land that is called an adjunct of China on most of our maps. The random act of sitting next to a young woman on an Air India flight out of Hyderabad, bound for New Delhi taught me that the Tibetans had something to share with the Lakota, the Iroquois, and hundreds of other Native American states and nations in North America. Active resistance to Chinese rule lasted into the mid-nineteenth century, and continues today in a subversive manner, even in song, as I learned in 2018 when I acted as a foreign adjudicator on a Ph.D. dissertation by a Tibetan student at the University of Madras (in what is now in a city called Chennai), in southwestern India on resistance in song during Tibet’s recent history. Tibet is one of very few places on Earth where a young dissident can get shot to death for singing a song that troubles China’s Quest for Lebensraum. The situation in Xinjiang region, where close to a million Muslims have been interned in “reeducation” camps surrounded with brick walls and barbed wire. They sing, too. Come with us and hear the music. Back to Europe now, in Chapter 4, to Portugal and Spain, we find a break in the general pattern of nationalism. Portugal has been more progressive governmentally than most. Spain varies from a liberal majority to military coups, a pattern which has been exported to Latin America. A situation such as this can make use of the term “populism” problematic, because general usage in our time usually ties the word into a right-wing connotative straightjacket. “Populism” can be used to describe progressive (left-wing) insurgencies as well. José Pinto, who is native to Portugal and also researches and writes in Spanish as well as English, in “Populism in Portugal and Spain: a Real Neighbourhood?” provides insight into these historical paradoxes. Hungary shares some historical inclinations with Poland (above). Both emerged from Soviet dominance in an air of developing freedom and multicultural diversity after the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. Then, gradually at first, right wing-forces began to tighten up, stripping structures supporting popular freedom, from the courts, mass media, and other institutions. In Chapter 5, Bernard Tamas, in “From Youth Movement to Right-Liberal Wing Authoritarianism: The Rise of Fidesz and the Decline of Hungarian Democracy” puts the renewed growth of political and social repression into a context of worldwide nationalism. Tamas, an associate professor of political science at Valdosta State University, has been a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University and a Fulbright scholar at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. His books include From Dissident to Party Politics: The Struggle for Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary (2007). Bear in mind that not everyone shares Orbán’s vision of what will make this nation great, again. On graffiti-covered walls in Budapest, Runes (traditional Hungarian script) has been found that read “Orbán is a motherfucker” (Mikanowski, 2019, 58). Also in Europe, in Chapter 6, Professor Ronan Le Coadic, of the University of Rennes, Rennes, France, in “Is There a Revival of French Nationalism?” Stating this title in the form of a question is quite appropriate because France’s nationalistic shift has built and ebbed several times during the last few decades. For a time after 2000, it came close to assuming the role of a substantial minority, only to ebb after that. In 2017, the candidate of the National Front reached the second round of the French presidential election. This was the second time this nationalist party reached the second round of the presidential election in the history of the Fifth Republic. In 2002, however, Jean-Marie Le Pen had only obtained 17.79% of the votes, while fifteen years later his daughter, Marine Le Pen, almost doubled her father's record, reaching 33.90% of the votes cast. Moreover, in the 2019 European elections, re-named Rassemblement National obtained the largest number of votes of all French political formations and can therefore boast of being "the leading party in France.” The brutality of oppressive nationalism may be expressed in personal relationships, such as child abuse. While Indonesia and Aotearoa [the Maoris’ name for New Zealand] hold very different ranks in the United Nations Human Development Programme assessments, where Indonesia is classified as a medium development country and Aotearoa New Zealand as a very high development country. In Chapter 7, “Domestic Violence Against Women in Indonesia and Aotearoa New Zealand: Making Sense of Differences and Similarities” co-authors, in Chapter 8, Mandy Morgan and Dr. Elli N. Hayati, from New Zealand and Indonesia respectively, found that despite their socio-economic differences, one in three women in each country experience physical or sexual intimate partner violence over their lifetime. In this chapter ther authors aim to deepen understandings of domestic violence through discussion of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of theit countries to address domestic violence alongside studies of women’s attitudes to gender norms and experiences of intimate partner violence. One of the most surprising and upsetting scholarly journeys that a North American student may take involves Adolf Hitler’s comments on oppression of American Indians and Blacks as he imagined the construction of the Nazi state, a genesis of nationalism that is all but unknown in the United States of America, traced in this volume (Chapter 8) by co-editor Johansen. Beginning in Mein Kampf, during the 1920s, Hitler explicitly used the westward expansion of the United States across North America as a model and justification for Nazi conquest and anticipated colonization by Germans of what the Nazis called the “wild East” – the Slavic nations of Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Russia, most of which were under control of the Soviet Union. The Volga River (in Russia) was styled by Hitler as the Germans’ Mississippi, and covered wagons were readied for the German “manifest destiny” of imprisoning, eradicating, and replacing peoples the Nazis deemed inferior, all with direct references to events in North America during the previous century. At the same time, with no sense of contradiction, the Nazis partook of a long-standing German romanticism of Native Americans. One of Goebbels’ less propitious schemes was to confer honorary Aryan status on Native American tribes, in the hope that they would rise up against their oppressors. U.S. racial attitudes were “evidence [to the Nazis] that America was evolving in the right direction, despite its specious rhetoric about equality.” Ming Xie, originally from Beijing, in the People’s Republic of China, in Chapter 9, “News Coverage and Public Perceptions of the Social Credit System in China,” writes that The State Council of China in 2014 announced “that a nationwide social credit system would be established” in China. “Under this system, individuals, private companies, social organizations, and governmental agencies are assigned a score which will be calculated based on their trustworthiness and daily actions such as transaction history, professional conduct, obedience to law, corruption, tax evasion, and academic plagiarism.” The “nationalism” in this case is that of the state over the individual. China has 1.4 billion people; this system takes their measure for the purpose of state control. Once fully operational, control will be more subtle. People who are subject to it, through modern technology (most often smart phones) will prompt many people to self-censor. Orwell, modernized, might write: “Your smart phone is watching you.” Ming Xie holds two Ph.Ds, one in Public Administration from University of Nebraska at Omaha and another in Cultural Anthropology from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, where she also worked for more than 10 years at a national think tank in the same institution. While there she summarized news from non-Chinese sources for senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. Ming is presently an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice, West Texas A&M University. In Chapter 10, analyzing native peoples and nationhood, Barbara Alice Mann, Professor of Honours at the University of Toledo, in “Divide, et Impera: The Self-Genocide Game” details ways in which European-American invaders deprive the conquered of their sense of nationhood as part of a subjugation system that amounts to genocide, rubbing out their languages and cultures -- and ultimately forcing the native peoples to assimilate on their own, for survival in a culture that is foreign to them. Mann is one of Native American Studies’ most acute critics of conquests’ contradictions, and an author who retrieves Native history with a powerful sense of voice and purpose, having authored roughly a dozen books and numerous book chapters, among many other works, who has traveled around the world lecturing and publishing on many subjects. Nalanda Roy and S. Mae Pedron in Chapter 11, “Understanding the Face of Humanity: The Rohingya Genocide.” describe one of the largest forced migrations in the history of the human race, the removal of 700,000 to 800,000 Muslims from Buddhist Myanmar to Bangladesh, which itself is already one of the most crowded and impoverished nations on Earth. With about 150 million people packed into an area the size of Nebraska and Iowa (population less than a tenth that of Bangladesh, a country that is losing land steadily to rising sea levels and erosion of the Ganges river delta. The Rohingyas’ refugee camp has been squeezed onto a gigantic, eroding, muddy slope that contains nearly no vegetation. However, Bangladesh is majority Muslim, so while the Rohingya may starve, they won’t be shot to death by marauding armies. Both authors of this exquisite (and excruciating) account teach at Georgia Southern University in Savannah, Georgia, Roy as an associate professor of International Studies and Asian politics, and Pedron as a graduate student; Roy originally hails from very eastern India, close to both Myanmar and Bangladesh, so he has special insight into the context of one of the most brutal genocides of our time, or any other. This is our case describing the problems that nationalism has and will pose for the sustainability of the Earth as our little blue-and-green orb becomes more crowded over time. The old ways, in which national arguments often end in devastating wars, are obsolete, given that the Earth and all the people, plants, and other animals that it sustains are faced with the existential threat of a climate crisis that within two centuries, more or less, will flood large parts of coastal cities, and endanger many species of plants and animals. To survive, we must listen to the Earth, and observe her travails, because they are increasingly our own.