Journal articles on the topic 'Online auctions'
To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Online auctions.
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Online auctions.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Kokila, S., J. AbalinLuther, and T. Marivijayakumar. "Online Auction System." International Journal on Cybernetics & Informatics 10, no. 2 (May 31, 2021): 289–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5121/ijci.2021.100232.
Full textAbstract:
Online auctions are now an immensely popular component of the electronic marketplace.Online Auction management system is a web based application which will help users to buy or sell item.This application will allow users to post their products for auction; bidder can register and can bid for any available product around their location.It is developed with the objective of making the system reliable, easier and fast and to sell or order the products on the website from our house.The online auction system is based on the concept where a product is valued for the highest price.In most online auctions, the products listed for an auction are located away from the bidders location.In our auction system, the bidders or buyers can view the products in auction process which is located around his surroundings.So that the bidder or buyer can participate in auction for his nearby products.
2
Li, Xiaohui, and Hongbin Dong. "A Transaction Trade-Off Utility Function Approach for Predicting the End-Price of Online Auctions in IoT." Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 2021 (February 2, 2021): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6656421.
Full textAbstract:
To stimulate large-scale users to participate in the big data construction of IoT (internet of things), auction mechanisms based on game theory are used to select participants and calculate the corresponding reward in the process of crowdsensing data collection from IoT. In online auctions, bidders bid many times and increase their bid price. All the bidders want to maximize their utility in auctions. An effective incentive mechanism can maximize social welfare in online auctions. It is complicated for auction platforms to calculate social welfare and the utility of each bidder’s bidding items in online auctions. In this paper, a transaction trade-off utility incentive mechanism is introduced. Based on the transaction trade-off utility incentive mechanism, it can make the forecasting process consistent with bidding behaviors. Furthermore, an end-price dynamic forecasting agent is proposed for predicting end prices of online auctions. The agent develops a novel trade-off methodology for classifying online auctions by using the transaction trade-off utility function to measure the distance of auction items in KNN. Then, it predicts the end prices of online auctions by regression. The experimental results demonstrate that an online auction process considering the transaction utility is more consistent with the behaviors of bidders, and the proposed prediction algorithm can obtain higher prediction accuracy.
3
Leung, Timothy L. Y., and William J. Knottenbelt. "Consumer-to-Consumer Internet Auction Models." International Journal of Online Marketing 1, no. 3 (July 2011): 17–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijom.2011070102.
Full textAbstract:
Internet auctions have become an increasingly common method for exchanging goods and services across the world both among consumers themselves, as well as between businesses and consumers. These Internet auction mechanisms have the scope of incorporating procedures of much greater complexity and variety, and they exhibit characteristics and properties that are quite distinct from conventional auctions. In this paper, the authors provide an experimental study of the performance characteristics and operational behaviour of a number of online auction models, including the fixed time forward auctions, the Vickrey auctions, and models with soft close variable auction times. These online auction models are studied through systematic simulation experiments, based on a series of operational assumptions, which characterize the arrival rate of bids, as well as the distribution from which the private values of buyers are sampled. Suggestions for efficient online auction design and procedures for improving auction performance are given, and the behaviour of the average auction income and average auction duration are quantified and compared.
4
Cypryjański, Jacek, and Aleksandra Grzesiuk. "The Role of Signals in Online Auction Purchase Decisions." Folia Oeconomica Stetinensia 15, no. 1 (June 1, 2015): 53–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/foli-2015-0019.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract There is a growing interest in behavioural economics contradicting the empirical prediction of rational choice theory once applied to online auctions. The issue is of particular relevance due to the large use of online auctions and the anticipated growth in the future. Online auctions combine the conventional auction model with information technology. However, information asymmetry within such auctions causes risks and uncertainties that influence consumer purchase intentions. The research investigates online consumers’ behaviour. The Authors suggest that due to the high perceived risk of the online buying process consumers are prompted to use cues of seller’ reputation. In a series of six experiments conducted via the auction site Allegro.pl in Poland a number of signals from auction web pages has been manipulated to influence purchase intention. The results suggest that several signals can be used to stimulate online customers’ behaviour. The results of these experiments indicate that buyers are more susceptible to the influence of “visual” signals than signals that require greater involvement of the buyer (to read information). The conducted experiments contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of online auction users’ behaviour. And finally it provides some managerial implications to increase online auction effectiveness from the seller’s perspective.
5
Rathi, Nikhil, Prajwal Ghonmode, Piyush Chikte, Vishal Kalambe, Rushikesh Wanve, and Shailesh Kurzadkar. "Online Auction System." International Journal of Computer Science and Mobile Computing 11, no. 3 (March 30, 2022): 17–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.47760/ijcsmc.2022.v11i03.002.
Full textAbstract:
Aims: In today’s world everything is going online which effects market that are offline. Auction of any rare products are bid offline, but it’s time to push this auction system online so that more buyer’s will connect online and more bid options will available for them. Online auctions are the most influential e-commerce business applications. Although there have been considerable efforts in setting up market places, online trading still lays in its early stages. Online auction system is the best way to bid such a products who are rare and can’t find easily anywhere. This is mostly work for archaeological old products that are rare. Methods: The most impressing concept of online auction system is you don’t need to anywhere offline. It’s the system where you can bid online without investing your time and bid for particular products. Results: Using this system buyers, sellers come online and connect on web-portal using this system. Conclusion: In this system using this web- portal registered user can propose or bid for new auctions, purchase and place bid product in order to buy that item.
6
Salim, Vina Putri, and Bambang Sugeng Ariadi Subagyono. "Keabsahan Lelang Non Eksekusi Sukarela Secara Online Tanpa Pejabat Lelang." Notaire 5, no. 1 (February 24, 2022): 155. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/ntr.v5i1.33641.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractAuction basically adopts the characteristics of a sale and purchase agreement (1457 BW), where the elements of price and goods are important elements. The difference is that auctions require the presence of an Auction Officer, especially for execution auctions and mandatory non-execution auctions. The auction has special regulations (Lex Specialis) namely Vendu Reglement, Vendu Instructie, and PMK 213/PMK.06/2020 concerning Auction Implementation Guidelines. The implementation of online auctions is carried out through the e-Marketplace Auction Platform where the implementation is usually carried out without an auction officer, for example auctions on eBay. The purpose of this study was to determine the validity of voluntary non-execution auctions conducted online without auction officer and protection for parties who suffered losses due to default. This research is a legal research with a statute approach, conceptual approach, and case approach. The results of the research are the validity of online voluntary non-execution auctions in the absence of an auction officer is valid by adopting the characteristics of a sale and purchase agreement. And for the legal protection, parties can take legal remedies for dispute resolution by choosing a settlement either through courts, arbitration or other alternative dispute resolution (conventionally/ online) in accordance with the provisions of the legislation.Keywords: Online Auction; Default; Auction Officer.AbstrakLelang pada dasarnya mengadopsi karakteristik dari perjanjian jual beli (1457 BW), dimana unsur harga dan barang merupakan unsur penting. Perbedaannya adalah pada lelang mengharuskan kehadiran seorang Pejabat Lelang, terutama untuk lelang eksekusi dan lelang non eksekusi wajib. Lelang memiliki peraturan khusus (Lex Specialis) yaitu Vendu Reglement dan Vendu Instructie sebagai peraturan lelang yang masih berlaku hingga saat ini. Selain itu pelaksanaan lelang juga diatur dalam PMK 213/PMK.06/2020 tentang Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Lelang. Pelaksanaan lelang secara online dilakukan melalui Platform e-Marketplace Auction dimana pelaksanaannya biasa dilakukan tanpa pejabat lelang, contohnya lelang di eBay. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui keabsahan lelang non eksekusi sukarela yang dilakukan secara online tanpa pejabat lelang dan bagaimana perlindungan bagi para pihak yang mengalami kerugian akibat wanprestasi. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian hukum dengan pendekatan perundang-undangan, pendekatan konseptual, dan pendekatan kasus. Hasil penelitian yang didapatkan adalah keabsahan lelang non eksekusi sukarela secara online tanpa adanya pejabat lelang adalah sah dengan mengadopsi karakteristik perjanjian jual beli. Dan perlindungan bagi para pihak adalah dengan melakukan upaya hukum penyelesaian sengketa dengan memilih penyelesaian baik melalui pengadilan, arbitrase ataupun lembaga penyelesaian sengketa alternatif lainnya (secara konvensional/ online dispute resolution) sesuai dengan ketentuan Peraturan Perundang-undangan. Kata Kunci: Lelang Online; Wanprestasi; Pejabat Lelang.
7
Bourron, Christine. "How Has COVID-19 Affected the Public Auction Market?" Arts 10, no. 4 (November 1, 2021): 74. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/arts10040074.
Full textAbstract:
The day of the last live auction at Sotheby’s in the spring of 2020 was on 19 March 2020 as multiple coronavirus lockdowns forced auction rooms to close worldwide. In the following months, hundreds of live auctions were cancelled or postponed, and combined revenue at Christie’s, Sotheby’s, and Phillips for the second Quarter 2020 plummeted 79% year on year from USD 4.4 bn in Q2 2019 to USD 0.9 bn in Q2 2020. This article focuses on public auctions at Christie’s, Sotheby’s, and Phillips and uses primary research to demonstrate how leading auction houses responded to the unprecedented challenges posed by the COVID-19 crisis. Leveraging Pi-eX’s public auction results database and its 12-month-rolling methodology, our analysis shows (1) the surge of online only auctions while the number of live auctions plummeted; (2) the limitations of online only auctions and the rise of new opportunities; and (3) a comparison of the COVID-19 crisis with previous art market crisis in the past 15 years.
8
Emiliani, M. L., and D. J. Stec. "Wood pallet suppliers' reaction to online reverse auctions." Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 10, no. 4 (September 1, 2005): 278–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/13598540510612758.
Full textAbstract:
PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to quantitatively assess wood pallet suppliers' reaction to online reverse auctions and its impact on their business policies and practices.Design/methodology/approachSurvey method was used to determine how pallet suppliers react to online reverse auctions.FindingsDetermines that pallet suppliers do not realize the benefits claimed by online reverse auction service providers. Identifies new sources of costs which accrue to buyers and are not accounted for in so‐called “total cost” request for quotes including: retaliatory pricing practices, less cooperative relationships, and sourcing work back to the original supplier. The qualitative benefits identified for suppliers by third‐party online reverse auction service providers are overstated or false.Research limitations/implicationsThe present work can be extended to other commodity categories to identify similarities and differences in how suppliers react to online reverse auctions, understand the domain of successful and unsuccessful application of the online reverse auction tool, and provide further insight into the evolution of buyer‐seller relationships, including embedded organizational routines such as power‐based bargaining.Practical implicationsFindings mirror the results found in a previous study that examined aerospace parts suppliers' reaction to online reverse auctions, and indicates that market makers have consistently overstated the benefits of online reverse auctions to both sellers and buyers, and the use of this tool will typically result in unfavorable outcomes for both buyers and sellers.Originality/valueThis paper will be of interest to buyers, sellers, and market makers, as it identifies important problems with online reverse auctions, and suggests questions that buyers should ask market makers to ensure better sourcing decisions.
9
Saprykina, V. Yu, and V. F. Milvanov. "The auction trade in Russia." Scientific bulletin of the Southern Institute of Management, no. 1 (April 27, 2019): 81–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.31775/2305-3100-2019-1-81-86.
Full textAbstract:
Auction trading is a form of market relations, it is a specially organized operating market in which transactions of purchase and sale are carried out by price competition between buyers. The auction is an open auction of various valuable items: collectible and antique items, precious products, coffee, tea, fur, other raw materials and various finished goods.Conclusion auction trade to a new level contributed to the rapid development of the Internet. Every year the number of online auctions and the number of their participants is growing. Online auctions are one of the most important and promising business models in the world economy. The importance of online auctions is determined by the fact that they are a cost-effective tool in the modern mechanism of market economy, and their implementation contributes to a significant increase in the effectiveness of foreign economic activity of enterprises, the formation of conditions for the development of modern infrastructure of foreign trade.To date, the share of online auctions in the turnover of e-Commerce is up to 25% in theUSand up to 40% inGermany. Despite the fact that the auction is widespread in the world, inRussiatheir conduct for a long time was extremely limited. The reform of the Russian economy has caused the rapid development of auction activities in all its forms.
10
Han, Jidong, Chun Qiu, and Peter Popkowski Leszczyc. "The effects of competitive reserve prices in online auctions." European Journal of Marketing 52, no. 7/8 (July 9, 2018): 1439–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ejm-10-2017-0684.
Full textAbstract:
PurposeThis paper aims to investigate how competition among online auction sellers influences the setting of both open and secret reserve prices, thereby affecting auction outcome.Design/methodology/approachUsing a data set collected from eBay consisting of 787 identical product auctions, three empirical models have been proposed. Model 1 simultaneously estimates the effects of auction competition on a seller’s own open and secret reserve price strategies; Model 2 estimates the effects of auction competition on bidder participation; and Model 3 estimates the direct and indirect effects of auction competition on selling price.FindingsCompetition among sellers is central to shaping sellers’ reserve price strategies. When there are more concurrent auctions for identical items, sellers tend to specify a low open reserve and are less likely to set a secret reserve. Sellers are strongly influenced by competitors’ reserve price strategies, and tend to follow competition. Finally, auction competition and competitive reserve price strategies influence both bidder entry and selling prices.Practical implicationsThis study has important implications for both sellers and bidders. It highlights the importance for sellers to adapt their reserve price strategies in light of their competitors’ reserve price strategies and offers implications for bidders regarding auction selection. An auction with low starting bid does not necessarily lead to a lower selling price as it attracts more bidders.Originality/valueThis paper focuses on competition among auction sellers, whereas previous literature has focused on competition among bidders. This paper is the first to study the impact of competing reserve prices in auctions.
11
Kasavana, Michael L., and A. J. Singh. "Online Auctions." Journal of Hospitality & Leisure Marketing 9, no. 3-4 (June 2001): 127–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/j150v09n03_09.
Full text
12
Huhns, M. N., and J. M. Vidal. "Online auctions." IEEE Internet Computing 3, no. 3 (1999): 103–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/4236.769429.
Full text
13
Huang, Yeu-Shiang, Min-Sheng Yang, and Jyh-Wen Ho. "Bundling Decisions for Selling Multiple Items in Online Auctions." Decision Analysis 19, no. 1 (March 2022): 44–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/deca.2021.0440.
Full textAbstract:
Fueled by the widespread use of the internet, more and more ordinary people have now become merchandise sellers who sell their own possessions, such as antique collections and limited souvenirs, to buyers who are interested in such goods via online auctions. This study examines the decision making related to the bidding strategies used in online auctions by both sellers and buyers. When selling goods for which there is a limited supply, sellers consider whether to sell the single homogenous items in multiple, simultaneous auctions or all the items in a single auction. Moreover, when selling heterogeneous but associated goods, sellers may decide to bundle the items for sale or not with an aim of increasing the potential buyers’ willingness to make a purchase. We investigate the effects that various factors related to the bidding strategies used in online auctions, such as the base price and duration of the auction determined by the seller and the bidding price decided by the buyer, have on the seller’s profit, and the utilities of both parties are considered to derive the equilibrium solutions. This study contributes to the literature by proposing an online auction framework that focuses more on individual sellers selling a limited quantity of items with an aim to establish a favorable online auction for both sellers and buyers and earn more profits for sellers. The results show that the base prices and direct purchase prices should be unestablished to achieve the most attractive characteristics of online auctions, which would encourage more buyers to freely place bids. As a result, the bidding items would have more chances to be eventually obtained by the buyer who places the highest bid, which, thus, maximizes the seller’s profit.
14
Azevedo, Eduardo M., David M. Pennock, Bo Waggoner, and E. Glen Weyl. "Channel Auctions." Management Science 66, no. 5 (May 2020): 2075–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3487.
Full textAbstract:
Standard auction formats feature either an upper bound on the equilibrium price that descends over time (as in the Dutch auction) or a lower bound on the equilibrium price that ascends over time (as in the English auction). We show that in some settings with costly information acquisition, auctions featuring both (viz., a narrowing channel of prices) outperform the standard formats. This Channel auction preserves some of benefits of both the English (truthful revelation) and Dutch (security for necessary information acquisition) auctions. Natural applications include housing, online auction sites like eBay, recording transactions on blockchains, and spectrum rights. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
15
Watts, Alison. "Generalized Second Price Auctions over a Network." Games 9, no. 3 (September 8, 2018): 67. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9030067.
Full textAbstract:
We consider the problem of how to apply a generalized second price (GSP) auction to a buyer–seller network. GSP auctions are often used to sell online ads where buyers care about the position or placement of the ad. GSP auctions can also be applied to wireless data transmissions with congestion where buyers care about the speed of data transmission; however, such an auction would take place over a network as a buyer could only purchase from a seller (or cell tower) that he was linked to (or was close to). Two GSP auctions over a network are considered: separate GSP auctions, and integrated GSP auctions with pauses. The efficiency of these auctions is examined with efficiency favoring the integrated auction with pauses.
16
Chakraborty, Soumyakanti, Anup Kumar Sen, and Amitava Bagchi. "Experimenting with Proxy Agents in Online Combinatorial Auctions." International Journal of Intelligent Information Technologies 10, no. 2 (April 2014): 56–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijiit.2014040104.
Full textAbstract:
To promote online eBay-like combinatorial auctions, the authors experiment with a distributive agent based mechanism PRACA which attempts to address two research issues. First, the scheme uses an algorithm CompDL to incrementally solve the Winner Determination Problem under limited memory for any package that the bidder may be interested to bid at any time. This helps the bidder to bid effectively knowing the current state of the auction. CompDL thereby allows a large number of items to be put on auction. Second, PRACA supplies an autonomous proxy agent to each bidder who logs in to an ongoing auction; this agent bids on the bidder's behalf and relays data on requested packages to the bidder. Therefore, PRACA helps in reducing operational overheads of seller and bidder in online combinatorial auctions. Both schemes have been implemented and the efficacy of the approach is demonstrated by experiments.
17
Bozman, Carl S., Matthew Q. McPherson, Daniel Friesner, and Ching-I. Teng. "Brand Equity Effects on Bidding Strategies in an Online Environment." International Journal of E-Business Research 10, no. 2 (April 2014): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijebr.2014040101.
Full textAbstract:
Internet auction bidders seldom have all the information resources upon which they have learned to comfortably rely. This raises the possibility that internet auction participants depend more on brand related knowledge and employ bidding strategies consistent with heightened valuations of brand related information. This study empirically examines how differences in brand equity affect consumer online auction behavior on eBay. Branded products with objective values (certified coins) are examined for differences in bidding behavior across auctions. The results indicate auction participants employ incremental bidding strategies for preferred brands that have higher prices except when those brands were for coins of the highest quality. Auctions that had sellers who were not power sellers or which did not take Paypal are more prone to attract late or last minute bidders.
18
A. Majid, Kashef, Andrew Bryant, and Pradeep A. Rau. "“Name your price” – online auctions and reference prices." Journal of Product & Brand Management 23, no. 6 (September 9, 2014): 420–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jpbm-06-2014-0626.
Full textAbstract:
Purpose – This paper aims to investigate the presence of varying price points on the impact of product valuations in both English and reverse auctions on potential bidders, that is, those not yet engaged in the auction. Internet auctions, both English style and reverse, constitute one of the success stories of digital commerce. Design/methodology/approach – As its method of research, this paper uses an experimental approach to explore the effects of multiple reference prices. Findings – While previous research has done well to show that a lower initial price decreases barriers to entry and can lead to a higher final price in English-style auctions, this research shows that such a strategy may harm potential bidders’ product perceptions due to multiple reference prices. The authors explore situations of multiple reference prices in the context of reverse auctions, where both higher and lower reference prices are shown to be able to increase product valuations. Research limitations/implications – Additional research of a variety of products and using a representative sample would enhance the findings of this paper. Practical implications – The findings show that reference prices have differing impacts, which are dependent upon the goal of either maximizing or minimizing the distance between the initial price and the price consumers are willing to pay in an online auction. Originality/value – The investigation links differing goals created by the type of auction to the potential impact of the reference price. In addition, we explore the effects of multiple reference prices on consumer valuations.
19
ZHOU, MING, WILLIAM Y. JIANG, and MENGLIN CAO. "PRICING IN ONLINE AUCTION PROCUREMENT A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL METHODS AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDINGS." International Journal of Innovation and Technology Management 09, no. 03 (August 2012): 1250017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219877012500174.
Full textAbstract:
The online auction has become an important channel for procurement and sourcing management. As firms often expect lower procurement prices through online auctions, how the prices are determined in online auctions should be of major interest to procurement managers and supply chain researchers. Despite the abundant empirical studies on online auction prices, an aggregated view is still absent. This study fills this gap with a review of extant studies. More specifically, this study provides summaries of all major theories behind online auction pricing, defines and analyzes often encountered econometric issues, and discusses how the treatments of these issues have been operationalized. Towards the end, existing findings on determinants of online auction prices are integrated and examined. The purpose of this study is to provide a convenient and precise package of current studies for researchers and professionals.
20
Mora Cortez, Roberto, and Wesley J. Johnston. "How to recover B2B relationships after a failed online reverse auction." Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing 35, no. 3 (June 3, 2019): 551–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jbim-02-2019-0095.
Full textAbstract:
Purpose This paper aims to explore the possible scenarios after a failed reverse auction to continue a current buyer–seller relationship. Design/methodology/approach The authors developed a further understanding of reverse auctions through the examination of a longitudinal case study in the mining industry based on grounded theory. Findings The study indicates that losing a reverse auction is not a death sentence for the current supplier. Four factors influence the potential scenarios: buyer factors, supplier factors, buyer–seller factors and contextual factors. If the overall evaluation favors the current buyer–seller relationship, the supplier can continue the business interaction by full renegotiation or discrete step-by-step reconsideration. Conversely, the buyer–seller relationship would reach a state of dissolution. Originality/value This manuscript contributes to the understanding of reverse auction, an under-researched theme in organizational buying behavior theory. This paper is the first attempt to link buyer–seller relationship dissolution and reverse auctions. The authors suggest that more academic endeavors are needed to study online reverse auctions.
21
Malmendier, Ulrike, and Young Han Lee. "The Bidder's Curse." American Economic Review 101, no. 2 (April 1, 2011): 749–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.749.
Full textAbstract:
We employ a novel approach to identify overbidding in auctions. We compare online auction prices to fixed prices for the same item on the same webpage. In detailed data on auctions of a board game, 42 percent of auctions exceed the simultaneous fixed price. The result replicates in a broad cross-section of auctions (48 percent overbidding). A small fraction of overbidders, 17 percent of bidders, suf fices to generate the large fraction of auctions with overbidding. We show that the observed behavior is inconsistent with rational behavior, even allowing for uncertainty about prices and switching costs, since the expected auction price also exceeds the fixed price. Limited attention best explains our results. (JEL D12, D44)
22
Novita, Dila, Ita Mariyatul Qibthiah, and Abdul Muis. "IMPLEMENTATION OF ONLINE AUCTION SERVICES (E-AUCTION) AT KANTOR PELAYANAN KEKAYAAN NEGARA DAN LELANG (KPKNL) BEKASI CITY." KYBERNAN: Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Pemerintahan 13, no. 1 (July 25, 2022): 47–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.33558/kybernan.v13i1.4529.
Full textAbstract:
Electronic government and electronic government, namely a change in the manual system of government to an electronic one, one example is the Online auction (E-auction), which is an auction site and procurement of goods based on electronics/online through applications or websites and can be used for executable auctions, non-auction mandatory execution, as well as voluntary non-execution auctions. In addition, they can bid online via the internet on their cell phones without having to be present at the auction venue or auction office, accessible whenever and wherever they are because it is more efficient in time, accommodation and transportation to the auction place. This online auction is conducted via e-mail so that auction participants can bid repeatedly without interference from outside parties outside the auction, unlike conventional auctions where other people can interfere or participate in bidding on the auction price until the time specified. set out. This study aims to implement the e-auction and analyze the obstacles that occur and the efforts to overcome obstacles at the Bekasi City State Wealth and Auction Service Office (KPKNL). The research paradigm is Constructivism, a case study research design. Using the purposive sampling technique, qualitative research methods with data collection techniques using observation and in-depth interviews. The results of the study indicate that the implementation of the online auction system (e-auction) in Bekasi has been used since 2015 until now, with the implementation of the system running quite well due to annual human resource training, more complete facilities and infrastructure, and fast service. responsive. However, deficiencies such as a lack of socialization about the website and the auction sales target are still not achieved.
23
DONG, FEI, SOL M. SHATZ, and HAIPING XU. "REASONING UNDER UNCERTAINTY FOR SHILL DETECTION IN ONLINE AUCTIONS USING DEMPSTER–SHAFER THEORY." International Journal of Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering 20, no. 07 (November 2010): 943–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218194010005018.
Full textAbstract:
This paper describes the design of a decision support system for shill detection in online auctions. To assist decision making, each bidder is associated with a type of certification, namely shill, shill suspect, or trusted bidder, at the end of each auction's bidding cycle. The certification level is determined on the basis of a bidder's bidding behaviors including shilling behaviors and normal bidding behaviors, and thus fraudulent bidders can be identified. In this paper, we focus on representing knowledge about bidders from different aspects in online auctions, and reasoning on bidders' trustworthiness under uncertainties using Dempster–Shafer theory of evidence. To demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, we provide a case study using real auction data from eBay. The analysis results show that our approach can be used to detect shills effectively and efficiently. By applying Dempster–Shafer theory to combine multiple sources of evidence for shill detection, the proposed approach can significantly reduce the number of false positive results in comparison to approaches using a single source of evidence.
24
Watts, Alison. "Fairness and Efficiency in Online Advertising Mechanisms." Games 12, no. 2 (April 15, 2021): 36. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12020036.
Full textAbstract:
Online advertising often involves targeting ads to certain types of consumers where ads are commonly sold by generalized second price auctions. However, such an auction or mechanism could be considered unfair if similar consumers are consistently shown different ads or consistently receive different payoffs. Results show that such ascending bid auctions may result in unfair treatment and additionally that uncertainty regarding an ad’s value can result in inefficiency. An alternative way to assign ads to consumers is presented called the random assignment mechanism. Results show that the random assignment can improve fairness while improving efficiency in some circumstances.
25
Chung, Yu-Fang, Tzer-Long Chen, Tzer-Shyong Chen, Dai-Lun Chiang, and Yu-Ting Chen. "An Agent-Based Auction Protocol on Mobile Devices." Journal of Applied Mathematics 2014 (2014): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/314180.
Full textAbstract:
This paper proposes an English auction protocol to preserve a secure, fair, and effective online auction environment, where the operations are integrated with mobile agent technology for bidders participating in online auctions. The protocol consists of four participants, namely, registration manager, agent house, auction house, and bidder.
26
Jap, Sandy D., and Ernan Haruvy. "Interorganizational Relationships and Bidding Behavior in Industrial Online Reverse Auctions." Journal of Marketing Research 45, no. 5 (October 2008): 550–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.45.5.550.
Full textAbstract:
The authors model (1) the impact of the supplier's relationship propensity before the auction on the supplier's bidding aggressiveness in the auction (in terms of the number of bids it submits, the rate at which the bids are submitted, and the price concessions offered) and (2) the impact of bidding behaviors in the auction on the buyer–supplier relationship after auction through longitudinal survey data from 12 online reverse auctions across various product categories. The results suggest that incumbency, many bidders, and a willingness to make specific investments lead to less aggressive bidding, whereas the total number of bids from competing suppliers increases aggressiveness. In turn, aggressive bidding behavior reduces suppliers' disposition toward developing a relationship with the buyer and sours incumbent satisfaction with the relationship. Finally, auctions that are longer in duration can improve the relationship but may risk bidding competition. Collectively, the results suggest that pricing and relationships are intertwined and traded off against each other in complex ways and that the auction does not operate in isolation of key organizational variables.
27
Lim, Deborah, Patricia Anthony, and Chong Mun Ho. "The Performance of Grey System Agent and ANN Agent in Predicting Closing Prices for Online Auctions." International Journal of Agent Technologies and Systems 3, no. 4 (October 2011): 37–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijats.2011100103.
Full textAbstract:
The introduction of online auction has resulted in a rich collection of problems and issues especially in the bidding process. During the bidding process, bidders have to monitor multiple auction houses, pick from the many auctions to participate in and make the right bid. If bidders are able to predict the closing price for each auction, then they are able to make a better decision making on the time, place and the amount they can bid for an item. However, predicting closing price for an auction is not easy since it is dependent on many factors such as the behavior of each bidder, the number of the bidders participating in that auction as well as each bidder’s reservation price. This paper reports on the development of a predictor agent that utilizes Grey System Theory GM (1, 1) to predict the online auction closing price in order to maximize the bidder’s profit. The performance of this agent is compared with an Artificial Neural Network Predictor Agent (using Feed-Forward Back-Propagation Prediction Model). The effectiveness of these two agents is evaluated in a simulated auction environment as well as using real eBay auction’s data.
28
Shmueli, Galit, and Wolfgang Jank. "Visualizing Online Auctions." Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics 14, no. 2 (June 2005): 299–319. http://dx.doi.org/10.1198/106186005x48236.
Full text
29
Varian, Hal R. "Online Ad Auctions." American Economic Review 99, no. 2 (April 1, 2009): 430–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.2.430.
Full text
30
Niemann, Jan-Malte. "ONLINE AUCTIONS — GERMANY." Computer Law & Security Review 17, no. 2 (March 2001): 114–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0267-3649(01)00208-4.
Full text
31
Niemann, Jan-Malte. "ONLINE AUCTIONS — GERMANY." Computer Law & Security Review 17, no. 6 (November 2001): 403–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0267-3649(01)01111-6.
Full text
32
Tung, Y. A., R. D. Gopal, and A. B. Whinston. "Multiple online auctions." Computer 36, no. 2 (February 2003): 100–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/mc.2003.1178057.
Full text
33
Ghasemkhani, Hossein, Paulo Goes, and Arvind Tripathi. "Effect of Market Information on Bidder Attrition in Online Auction Markets." MIS Quarterly 46, no. 2 (May 25, 2022): 1009–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.25300/misq/2022/15136.
Full textAbstract:
Information generated in online markets can affect both buyers’ and sellers’ expectations and therefore their choices. In this research, we investigate the effect of market information, generated in online auction markets, on buyers’ expectations and choices. To clear large inventories, sellers often conduct many auctions selling identical items over time, which creates an online auction market where competition dynamics spill over from one to auction to another. In these markets, bidders can participate in many auctions over a period of time, observe market information (supply, demand, and competition), and gain experience to increase their payoffs. We observe that despite having an opportunity to compete and win in future auctions, many bidders stop participating in these auction markets. We argue that observed market information affects their choices. We explore how bidders form expectations about market supply, demand, and competition based on information from two sources—market design parameters and behavior of market participants. By employing a hierarchical Bayesian latent attrition model, we empirically detect and investigate the effect of bidders’ expected market supply, demand, and competition on their attrition in these markets. Our study shows that the effect of market information on attrition is nuanced by bidders’ value heterogeneity. Through the lenses of behavioral economics theories, we show that the attrition behavior of high-value bidders is completely opposite that of low-value bidders. We discuss the practical implications of our findings.
34
Blum, Avrim, Vijay Kumar, Atri Rudra, and Felix Wu. "Online learning in online auctions." Theoretical Computer Science 324, no. 2-3 (September 2004): 137–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2004.05.012.
Full text
35
Dass, Mayukh, Lynne Seymour, and Srinivas K. Reddy. "An Investigation of Value Updating Bidders in Simultaneous Online Art Auctions." Journal of Probability and Statistics 2010 (2010): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2010/539763.
Full textAbstract:
Simultaneous online auctions, in which the auction of all items being sold starts at the same time and ends at the same time, are becoming popular especially in selling items such as collectables and art pieces. In this paper, we analyze the characteristics of bidders (Reactors) in simultaneous auctions who update their preauction value of an item in the presence of influencing bidders (Influencers). We represent an auction as a network of bidders where the nodes represent the bidders participating in the auction and the ties between them represent anInfluencer-Reactorrelationship. We further develop a random effects bilinear model that is capable of handling covariates of both bidder types at the same time and account for higher-order dependence among the bidders during the auction. Using the model and data from a Modern Indian Art auction, we find thatReactorstend to update their values on items that have high preauction estimates, bid on items created by high investment risk artists, bid selectively only on certain items, and are more active in the second half of the auction. Implications for the auction house managers are discussed.
36
T. Elias, Raghda, and Auday H. AL-Wattar. "Design And Implementation of online Auction System." NTU Journal of Pure Sciences 1, no. 2 (May 31, 2022): 29–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.56286/ntujps.v1i2.206.
Full textAbstract:
Online auction sites are a great way for people to buy and sell goods without the hassle of haggling prices or advertising items. it's also a good place for small businesses to advertise their products because they can attract more buyers with even small advertising budgets.Online auction system that enables people to buy and sell items to each other. It's similar to eBay but is more focused on buying and selling locally instead of internationally. Mosul University and some of its affiliated institutions, especially warehouses, lack the presence of an electronic auction that facilitates the operations of conducting auctions, as the current auction system is a traditional manual system with many difficulties and slow work, in addition to the complexity of the procedures for offer and sale operations. This research paper includes scheming and executing an online auction web application for Mosul University. This application will have a major role in supporting the electronic auctions conducted by the University of Mosul in terms of facilitating the display of items to be sold and speeding up and documenting sales processes and making the procedures more flexible and accurate. It is possible to make this application public to many public and private organizations. The manual system used for the auction at the University of Mosul was analyzed and on the basis of which the electronic system was designed, applied and tested. The application experiences showed flexibility in use and success in implementation
37
Johnson, Benjamin K., Mao H. Vang, and Brandon Van Der Heide. "Show Me The Goods." Journal of Media Psychology 27, no. 1 (January 1, 2015): 3–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1864-1105/a000126.
Full textAbstract:
Consumers using online auction websites face the challenge of appraising products at a distance. Sellers and buyers in online auctions navigate this challenge by displaying and evaluating various cues, a critical one being use of photographs. Warranting theory predicts that cues less subject to control and manipulation by the presenter will be more influential in impression formation. Therefore, user-generated photographs which display the actual item should be more effective in generating successful auctions, more bidders, more bids, and higher prices, compared with stock photographs. A field experiment tested this prediction by systematically manipulating photographs for eBay auctions. User-generated photographs were found to have a positive effect on likelihood of selling and the number of auction bidders. Findings indicate that attracting more bidders is a possible mechanism for higher sale prices and also show a moderating role of bidder experience.
38
Li, Chu Fen. "Characteristics of Bid Processes in Online Auctions." Advanced Materials Research 403-408 (November 2011): 5199–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.403-408.5199.
Full textAbstract:
Characteristics of online auctions in E-commerce are very critical for the system design in modern Internet E-Business. This study collected data traces in a famous commercial auction site. The collected data traces are examined by statistics and time correlations. Furthermore, more sophistical inspections, such as Hurst parameter and long-range dependence, are performed to probe the characteristics of the data traces. We found that brand name handbags and smart phones have a strong degree of self-similarity. The results are useful to further study the possible reasons for the presented self-similarity.
39
Beranek, Ladislav. "Uncertain Reasoning for Detection of Selling Stolen Goods in Online Auctions Using Contextual Information." Advances in Decision Sciences 2014 (November 25, 2014): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/891954.
Full textAbstract:
This work describes the design of a decision support system for detection of fraudulent behavior of selling stolen goods in online auctions. In this system, each seller is associated with a type of certification, namely “proper seller,” “suspect seller,” and “selling stolen goods.” The certification level is determined on the basis of a seller’s behaviors and especially on the basis of contextual information whose origin is outside online auctions portals. In this paper, we focus on representing knowledge about sellers in online auctions, the influence of additional information available from other Internet source, and reasoning on bidders’ trustworthiness under uncertainties using Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. To demonstrate the practicability of our approach, we performed a case study using real auction data from Czech auction portal Aukro. The analysis results show that our approach can be used to detect selling stolen goods. By applying Dempster-Shafer theory to combine multiple sources of evidence for the detection of this fraudulent behavior, the proposed approach can reduce the number of false positive results in comparison to approaches using a single source of evidence.
40
Kalbermatten, Syra, and Christoph Rausch. "Bidding Better Online in Belgium: The Value of Auction House Expertise during the COVID-19 Pandemic." Arts 10, no. 4 (November 5, 2021): 75. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/arts10040075.
Full textAbstract:
In this article, we present our analysis of how one of Belgium’s largest auction houses has creatively dealt with the forced transition to online auctions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on in-depth qualitative interviews and participant observation conducted at Bernaerts Auctioneers in Antwerp over a period of three months between February and April 2021, we show how the auction house has succeeded at maintaining relations with its clients and the public while exclusively moving its sales online. Our specific focus was on the mediation of expertise. Drawing on recent publications from the fields of economic sociology and anthropology, we analyzed how expert narratives of origin, authenticity, and uniqueness are communicated online to affect an object’s auction value. Based on our empirical research, which also includes narrative analyses of Bernaerts Auctioneers’ internet publication Prelude, as well as content shared online via social media, we argue that expert knowledge and practices of expertise are resilient and—contrary to what neoclassical economic theory might suggest—that they continue to be central to negotiations of value, as well as in online auctions.
41
Arnosti, Nick, Marissa Beck, and Paul Milgrom. "Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising." American Economic Review 106, no. 10 (October 1, 2016): 2852–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141198.
Full textAbstract:
We model an online display advertising environment in which “performance” advertisers can measure the value of individual impressions, whereas “brand” advertisers cannot. If advertiser values for ad opportunities are positively correlated, second-price auctions for impressions can be inefficient and expose brand advertisers to adverse selection. Bayesian-optimal auctions have other drawbacks: they are complex, introduce incentives for false-name bidding, and do not resolve adverse selection. We introduce “modified second bid” auctions as the unique auctions that overcome these disadvantages. When advertiser match values are drawn independently from heavy-tailed distributions, a modified second bid auction captures at least 94.8 percent of the first-best expected value. In that setting and similar ones, the benefits of switching from an ordinary second-price auction to the modified second bid auction may be large, and the cost of defending against shill bidding and adverse selection may be low. (JEL D44, D82, L86, M37)
42
Kibler, Michelle L., and Jada M. Thompson. "Price Determinants of Stock-Type Horses Sold at Public Online Auctions." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 52, no. 4 (October 5, 2020): 596–612. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/aae.2020.20.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThere is a shift in livestock auction sales in consolidation of live markets and movement toward virtual marketplaces. We examine buyer preferences for nonracing stock-type horses sold through virtual auctions to better understand how animals are sold and their valuation. A shift towards online sales of equine has impacted the number of potential buyers through increased exposure to sale horses. Using data collected from online auctions, we estimate factors influencing propensity to sell as well as price determinants in this market platform. We find many factors contribute to the likelihood of a horse selling and to the final sale price.
43
BHARGAVA, BHARAT, MAMATA JENAMANI, and YUHUI ZHONG. "COUNTERACTING SHILL BIDDING IN ONLINE ENGLISH AUCTION." International Journal of Cooperative Information Systems 14, no. 02n03 (June 2005): 245–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218843005001158.
Full textAbstract:
The popularity of online auctions and the associated frauds have led to many auction sites preferring English auction over other auction mechanisms. The ease of adopting multiple fake identities over the Internet nourishes shill bidding by fraudulent sellers in English auction. In this paper, we derive an equilibrium bidding strategy to counteract shill bidding in an online English auction. An algorithm based on this strategy is developed. We conduct experiments to evaluate the strategy in a simulated eBay like auction environment. Five popular bidding strategies are compared with the proposed one. In the simulation, bidders compete to buy a product in the presence of a shill. Each bidder is randomly assigned a bidding strategy. She draws her valuation from a uniform distribution. The experiments show hat the average expected utility of agents with proposed strategy is the highest when the auction continues for a longer duration.
44
Coey, Dominic, Bradley J. Larsen, Kane Sweeney, and Caio Waisman. "Scalable Optimal Online Auctions." Marketing Science 40, no. 4 (July 2021): 593–618. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2021.1283.
Full text
45
Anderson, Jamie, and Mark Frohlich. "FreeMarkets and Online Auctions." Business Strategy Review 12, no. 2 (June 2001): 59–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8616.00175.
Full text
46
Babaioff, Moshe, Liad Blumrosen, and Aaron Roth. "Auctions with online supply." Games and Economic Behavior 90 (March 2015): 227–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.01.004.
Full text
47
Decarolis, Francesco, Maris Goldmanis, and Antonio Penta. "Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions." Management Science 66, no. 10 (October 2020): 4433–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3457.
Full textAbstract:
The transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions that are used to sell ad space on the web. We analyze how collusive bidding can emerge from bid delegation to a common marketing agency and how this can undermine the revenues and allocative efficiency of both the generalized second-price auction (GSP, used by Google, Microsoft Bing, and Yahoo!) and the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism (used by Facebook). We find that despite its well-known susceptibility to collusion, the VCG mechanism outperforms the GSP auction in terms of both revenues and efficiency. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics.
48
Xia, Xiao Ling, and Lu Chen. "Research and Implementation of Automatic Online Auction Using Selenium." Applied Mechanics and Materials 347-350 (August 2013): 3364–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.347-350.3364.
Full textAbstract:
As the Internet grows rapidly, traditional transaction mechanisms like auctions have been imported into the online-shopping world. Selenium web browser automation is for automating web applications for testing purpose, but is certainly not limited to just that. In this paper, well introduce you a way how to use Selenium to create scripts to implement automatic online auction.
49
Tu, Yanbin. "Online Auctions of New Product Before and After Its Official Launch." International Journal of Online Marketing 9, no. 4 (October 2019): 64–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijom.2019100105.
Full textAbstract:
This study investigates the online auction market of Xbox 360 consoles before and after its official launch. Among nine measures of online auctions, all except for one are significantly differed between online auctions before and after the official launch. The principal component analysis further visualizes the differences. By using auto-regression to analyze the relationship among success count, success rate, and winning price in time series, we find that success count and success rate can be predicted with its own past values in (t-1) and (t-2) periods. The winning price can be predicted with its own past value in (t-1) period. We find that the preannouncement and launch events do affect the stock price, trading volume, daily price range, price change, and market volatility. We also investigate the correlation coefficients between the online auction market and the stock market. We find various significant correlation coefficients among the measures of both markets in the concurrent and one-time lag scenarios. The managerial implications of the findings are also discussed.
50
Niazadeh, Rad, Jason Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Reza Khani, and Brendan Lucier. "Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions." Operations Research 70, no. 1 (January 2022): 223–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2104.
Full textAbstract:
Standard ad auction formats do not immediately extend to settings where multiple size configurations and layouts are available to advertisers. In these settings, the sale of web advertising space increasingly resembles a combinatorial auction with complementarities, where truthful auctions such as the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction can yield unacceptably low revenue. In “Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions,” Niazadeh, Hartline, Immorlica, Khani, and Lucier study and suggest core-selecting auctions, which boost revenue by setting payments so that no group of agents, including the auctioneer, can jointly improve their utilities by switching to a different outcome. Their main result is a combinatorial algorithm that finds an approximate bidder-optimal core point with an almost linear number of calls to the welfare-maximization oracle. This algorithm is faster than previously proposed heuristics in the literature and has theoretical guarantees. By accompanying the theoretical study with an experimental study based on Microsoft Bing Ad Auction data, the authors conclude that core pricing is implementable even for very time-sensitive practical use cases such as real-time online advertising and can yield more revenue than the VCG or generalized second price auction.