Relevant bibliographies by topics / Online auctions

Academic literature on the topic 'Online auctions'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 20 February 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Online auctions"

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Kokila, S., J. AbalinLuther, and T. Marivijayakumar. "Online Auction System." International Journal on Cybernetics & Informatics 10, no. 2 (May 31, 2021): 289–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5121/ijci.2021.100232.

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Online auctions are now an immensely popular component of the electronic marketplace.Online Auction management system is a web based application which will help users to buy or sell item.This application will allow users to post their products for auction; bidder can register and can bid for any available product around their location.It is developed with the objective of making the system reliable, easier and fast and to sell or order the products on the website from our house.The online auction system is based on the concept where a product is valued for the highest price.In most online auctions, the products listed for an auction are located away from the bidders location.In our auction system, the bidders or buyers can view the products in auction process which is located around his surroundings.So that the bidder or buyer can participate in auction for his nearby products.
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Li, Xiaohui, and Hongbin Dong. "A Transaction Trade-Off Utility Function Approach for Predicting the End-Price of Online Auctions in IoT." Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 2021 (February 2, 2021): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6656421.

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To stimulate large-scale users to participate in the big data construction of IoT (internet of things), auction mechanisms based on game theory are used to select participants and calculate the corresponding reward in the process of crowdsensing data collection from IoT. In online auctions, bidders bid many times and increase their bid price. All the bidders want to maximize their utility in auctions. An effective incentive mechanism can maximize social welfare in online auctions. It is complicated for auction platforms to calculate social welfare and the utility of each bidder’s bidding items in online auctions. In this paper, a transaction trade-off utility incentive mechanism is introduced. Based on the transaction trade-off utility incentive mechanism, it can make the forecasting process consistent with bidding behaviors. Furthermore, an end-price dynamic forecasting agent is proposed for predicting end prices of online auctions. The agent develops a novel trade-off methodology for classifying online auctions by using the transaction trade-off utility function to measure the distance of auction items in KNN. Then, it predicts the end prices of online auctions by regression. The experimental results demonstrate that an online auction process considering the transaction utility is more consistent with the behaviors of bidders, and the proposed prediction algorithm can obtain higher prediction accuracy.
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Leung, Timothy L. Y., and William J. Knottenbelt. "Consumer-to-Consumer Internet Auction Models." International Journal of Online Marketing 1, no. 3 (July 2011): 17–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijom.2011070102.

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Internet auctions have become an increasingly common method for exchanging goods and services across the world both among consumers themselves, as well as between businesses and consumers. These Internet auction mechanisms have the scope of incorporating procedures of much greater complexity and variety, and they exhibit characteristics and properties that are quite distinct from conventional auctions. In this paper, the authors provide an experimental study of the performance characteristics and operational behaviour of a number of online auction models, including the fixed time forward auctions, the Vickrey auctions, and models with soft close variable auction times. These online auction models are studied through systematic simulation experiments, based on a series of operational assumptions, which characterize the arrival rate of bids, as well as the distribution from which the private values of buyers are sampled. Suggestions for efficient online auction design and procedures for improving auction performance are given, and the behaviour of the average auction income and average auction duration are quantified and compared.
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Cypryjański, Jacek, and Aleksandra Grzesiuk. "The Role of Signals in Online Auction Purchase Decisions." Folia Oeconomica Stetinensia 15, no. 1 (June 1, 2015): 53–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/foli-2015-0019.

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Abstract There is a growing interest in behavioural economics contradicting the empirical prediction of rational choice theory once applied to online auctions. The issue is of particular relevance due to the large use of online auctions and the anticipated growth in the future. Online auctions combine the conventional auction model with information technology. However, information asymmetry within such auctions causes risks and uncertainties that influence consumer purchase intentions. The research investigates online consumers’ behaviour. The Authors suggest that due to the high perceived risk of the online buying process consumers are prompted to use cues of seller’ reputation. In a series of six experiments conducted via the auction site Allegro.pl in Poland a number of signals from auction web pages has been manipulated to influence purchase intention. The results suggest that several signals can be used to stimulate online customers’ behaviour. The results of these experiments indicate that buyers are more susceptible to the influence of “visual” signals than signals that require greater involvement of the buyer (to read information). The conducted experiments contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of online auction users’ behaviour. And finally it provides some managerial implications to increase online auction effectiveness from the seller’s perspective.
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Rathi, Nikhil, Prajwal Ghonmode, Piyush Chikte, Vishal Kalambe, Rushikesh Wanve, and Shailesh Kurzadkar. "Online Auction System." International Journal of Computer Science and Mobile Computing 11, no. 3 (March 30, 2022): 17–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.47760/ijcsmc.2022.v11i03.002.

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Aims: In today’s world everything is going online which effects market that are offline. Auction of any rare products are bid offline, but it’s time to push this auction system online so that more buyer’s will connect online and more bid options will available for them. Online auctions are the most influential e-commerce business applications. Although there have been considerable efforts in setting up market places, online trading still lays in its early stages. Online auction system is the best way to bid such a products who are rare and can’t find easily anywhere. This is mostly work for archaeological old products that are rare. Methods: The most impressing concept of online auction system is you don’t need to anywhere offline. It’s the system where you can bid online without investing your time and bid for particular products. Results: Using this system buyers, sellers come online and connect on web-portal using this system. Conclusion: In this system using this web- portal registered user can propose or bid for new auctions, purchase and place bid product in order to buy that item.
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Salim, Vina Putri, and Bambang Sugeng Ariadi Subagyono. "Keabsahan Lelang Non Eksekusi Sukarela Secara Online Tanpa Pejabat Lelang." Notaire 5, no. 1 (February 24, 2022): 155. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/ntr.v5i1.33641.

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AbstractAuction basically adopts the characteristics of a sale and purchase agreement (1457 BW), where the elements of price and goods are important elements. The difference is that auctions require the presence of an Auction Officer, especially for execution auctions and mandatory non-execution auctions. The auction has special regulations (Lex Specialis) namely Vendu Reglement, Vendu Instructie, and PMK 213/PMK.06/2020 concerning Auction Implementation Guidelines. The implementation of online auctions is carried out through the e-Marketplace Auction Platform where the implementation is usually carried out without an auction officer, for example auctions on eBay. The purpose of this study was to determine the validity of voluntary non-execution auctions conducted online without auction officer and protection for parties who suffered losses due to default. This research is a legal research with a statute approach, conceptual approach, and case approach. The results of the research are the validity of online voluntary non-execution auctions in the absence of an auction officer is valid by adopting the characteristics of a sale and purchase agreement. And for the legal protection, parties can take legal remedies for dispute resolution by choosing a settlement either through courts, arbitration or other alternative dispute resolution (conventionally/ online) in accordance with the provisions of the legislation.Keywords: Online Auction; Default; Auction Officer.AbstrakLelang pada dasarnya mengadopsi karakteristik dari perjanjian jual beli (1457 BW), dimana unsur harga dan barang merupakan unsur penting. Perbedaannya adalah pada lelang mengharuskan kehadiran seorang Pejabat Lelang, terutama untuk lelang eksekusi dan lelang non eksekusi wajib. Lelang memiliki peraturan khusus (Lex Specialis) yaitu Vendu Reglement dan Vendu Instructie sebagai peraturan lelang yang masih berlaku hingga saat ini. Selain itu pelaksanaan lelang juga diatur dalam PMK 213/PMK.06/2020 tentang Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Lelang. Pelaksanaan lelang secara online dilakukan melalui Platform e-Marketplace Auction dimana pelaksanaannya biasa dilakukan tanpa pejabat lelang, contohnya lelang di eBay. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui keabsahan lelang non eksekusi sukarela yang dilakukan secara online tanpa pejabat lelang dan bagaimana perlindungan bagi para pihak yang mengalami kerugian akibat wanprestasi. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian hukum dengan pendekatan perundang-undangan, pendekatan konseptual, dan pendekatan kasus. Hasil penelitian yang didapatkan adalah keabsahan lelang non eksekusi sukarela secara online tanpa adanya pejabat lelang adalah sah dengan mengadopsi karakteristik perjanjian jual beli. Dan perlindungan bagi para pihak adalah dengan melakukan upaya hukum penyelesaian sengketa dengan memilih penyelesaian baik melalui pengadilan, arbitrase ataupun lembaga penyelesaian sengketa alternatif lainnya (secara konvensional/ online dispute resolution) sesuai dengan ketentuan Peraturan Perundang-undangan. Kata Kunci: Lelang Online; Wanprestasi; Pejabat Lelang.
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Bourron, Christine. "How Has COVID-19 Affected the Public Auction Market?" Arts 10, no. 4 (November 1, 2021): 74. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/arts10040074.

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The day of the last live auction at Sotheby’s in the spring of 2020 was on 19 March 2020 as multiple coronavirus lockdowns forced auction rooms to close worldwide. In the following months, hundreds of live auctions were cancelled or postponed, and combined revenue at Christie’s, Sotheby’s, and Phillips for the second Quarter 2020 plummeted 79% year on year from USD 4.4 bn in Q2 2019 to USD 0.9 bn in Q2 2020. This article focuses on public auctions at Christie’s, Sotheby’s, and Phillips and uses primary research to demonstrate how leading auction houses responded to the unprecedented challenges posed by the COVID-19 crisis. Leveraging Pi-eX’s public auction results database and its 12-month-rolling methodology, our analysis shows (1) the surge of online only auctions while the number of live auctions plummeted; (2) the limitations of online only auctions and the rise of new opportunities; and (3) a comparison of the COVID-19 crisis with previous art market crisis in the past 15 years.
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Emiliani, M. L., and D. J. Stec. "Wood pallet suppliers' reaction to online reverse auctions." Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 10, no. 4 (September 1, 2005): 278–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/13598540510612758.

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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to quantitatively assess wood pallet suppliers' reaction to online reverse auctions and its impact on their business policies and practices.Design/methodology/approachSurvey method was used to determine how pallet suppliers react to online reverse auctions.FindingsDetermines that pallet suppliers do not realize the benefits claimed by online reverse auction service providers. Identifies new sources of costs which accrue to buyers and are not accounted for in so‐called “total cost” request for quotes including: retaliatory pricing practices, less cooperative relationships, and sourcing work back to the original supplier. The qualitative benefits identified for suppliers by third‐party online reverse auction service providers are overstated or false.Research limitations/implicationsThe present work can be extended to other commodity categories to identify similarities and differences in how suppliers react to online reverse auctions, understand the domain of successful and unsuccessful application of the online reverse auction tool, and provide further insight into the evolution of buyer‐seller relationships, including embedded organizational routines such as power‐based bargaining.Practical implicationsFindings mirror the results found in a previous study that examined aerospace parts suppliers' reaction to online reverse auctions, and indicates that market makers have consistently overstated the benefits of online reverse auctions to both sellers and buyers, and the use of this tool will typically result in unfavorable outcomes for both buyers and sellers.Originality/valueThis paper will be of interest to buyers, sellers, and market makers, as it identifies important problems with online reverse auctions, and suggests questions that buyers should ask market makers to ensure better sourcing decisions.
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Saprykina, V. Yu, and V. F. Milvanov. "The auction trade in Russia." Scientific bulletin of the Southern Institute of Management, no. 1 (April 27, 2019): 81–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.31775/2305-3100-2019-1-81-86.

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Auction trading is a form of market relations, it is a specially organized operating market in which transactions of purchase and sale are carried out by price competition between buyers. The auction is an open auction of various valuable items: collectible and antique items, precious products, coffee, tea, fur, other raw materials and various finished goods.Conclusion auction trade to a new level contributed to the rapid development of the Internet. Every year the number of online auctions and the number of their participants is growing. Online auctions are one of the most important and promising business models in the world economy. The importance of online auctions is determined by the fact that they are a cost-effective tool in the modern mechanism of market economy, and their implementation contributes to a significant increase in the effectiveness of foreign economic activity of enterprises, the formation of conditions for the development of modern infrastructure of foreign trade.To date, the share of online auctions in the turnover of e-Commerce is up to 25% in theUSand up to 40% inGermany. Despite the fact that the auction is widespread in the world, inRussiatheir conduct for a long time was extremely limited. The reform of the Russian economy has caused the rapid development of auction activities in all its forms.
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Han, Jidong, Chun Qiu, and Peter Popkowski Leszczyc. "The effects of competitive reserve prices in online auctions." European Journal of Marketing 52, no. 7/8 (July 9, 2018): 1439–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ejm-10-2017-0684.

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PurposeThis paper aims to investigate how competition among online auction sellers influences the setting of both open and secret reserve prices, thereby affecting auction outcome.Design/methodology/approachUsing a data set collected from eBay consisting of 787 identical product auctions, three empirical models have been proposed. Model 1 simultaneously estimates the effects of auction competition on a seller’s own open and secret reserve price strategies; Model 2 estimates the effects of auction competition on bidder participation; and Model 3 estimates the direct and indirect effects of auction competition on selling price.FindingsCompetition among sellers is central to shaping sellers’ reserve price strategies. When there are more concurrent auctions for identical items, sellers tend to specify a low open reserve and are less likely to set a secret reserve. Sellers are strongly influenced by competitors’ reserve price strategies, and tend to follow competition. Finally, auction competition and competitive reserve price strategies influence both bidder entry and selling prices.Practical implicationsThis study has important implications for both sellers and bidders. It highlights the importance for sellers to adapt their reserve price strategies in light of their competitors’ reserve price strategies and offers implications for bidders regarding auction selection. An auction with low starting bid does not necessarily lead to a lower selling price as it attracts more bidders.Originality/valueThis paper focuses on competition among auction sellers, whereas previous literature has focused on competition among bidders. This paper is the first to study the impact of competing reserve prices in auctions.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Online auctions"

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Beil, Damian. "Two topics in online auctions." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/17578.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, Operations Research Center, 2003.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-85).
This thesis studies two operations management topics in online auctions, and is divided into two parts. Motivated by the increasing use of ShopBots to scan Internet auctions, the first part of the thesis analytically examines whether or not two competing auctioneers selling the same commodity should share, or pool, some or all of their bidders. Under pooling, the bidding population is represented by three compartments: bidders dedicated to auction 1, bidders dedicated to auction 2, and pooled bidders participating in both auctions simultaneously. Under a bidder strategy shown to induce a Bayesian equilibrium, a closed form expression for the auctioneers' expected revenue under pooling is found, and pooling is recommended where it produces a greater expected revenue than no pooling (i.e., our objective is revenue maximization). Pooling is generally found to be beneficial as long as the two auctions are not too asymmetric and the underlying valuation distribution has certain concavity characteristics. Asymptotic order statistic arguments are used where explicit characterizations are intractable. The second part of the thesis considers a manufacturer who uses a reverse, or procurement, auction to determine which supplier will be awarded a contract. Each bid consists of a price and a set of non-price attributes (e.g., quality, lead time). The manufacturer is assumed to know the suppliers' cost functions (in terms of the non-price attributes). We analyze how the manufacturer chooses a scoring rule (i.e., a function that ranks the bids in terms of the price and non-price attributes) that attempts to maximize his own utility. Under the assumption that suppliers submit their myopic best-response bids (i.e., they choose their minimum-cost bid to achieve any given score), our proposed scoring rule indeed maximizes the manufacturer's utility within the open-ascending format.
(cont.) The analysis reveals connections between the manufacturer's utility maximization problem and various geometric aspects of the manufacturer's utility and the suppliers' cost functions.
by Damian Ronald Beil.
Ph.D.
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Gupta, Shobhit. "Buyout prices in online auctions." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/36223.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, Operations Research Center, 2006.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 149-154).
Buyout options allow bidders to instantly purchase at a specified price an item listed for sale through an online auction. A temporary buyout option disappears once a regular bid above the reserve price is made, while a permanent option remains available until it is exercised or the auction ends. Buyout options are widely used in online auctions and have significant economic importance: nearly half of the auctions today are listed with a buyout price and the option is exercised in nearly one fourth of them. We formulate a game-theoretic model featuring time-sensitive bidders with independent private valuations and Poisson arrivals but endogenous bidding times in order to answer the following questions: How should buyout prices be set in order to maximize the seller's discounted revenue? What are the relative benefits of using each type of buyout option? While all existing buyout options we are aware of currently rely on a static buyout price (i.e. with a constant value), what is the potential benefit associated with using instead a dynamic buyout price that varies as the auction progresses?
(cont.) For all buyout option types we exhibit a Nash equilibrium in bidder strategies, argue that this equilibrium constitutes a plausible outcome prediction, and study the problem of maximizing the corresponding seller revenue. In particular, the equilibrium strategy in all cases is such that a bidder exercises the buyout option provided it is still available and his valuation is above a time-dependent threshold. Our numerical experiments suggest that a seller may significantly increase his utility by introducing a buyout option when any of the participants are time-sensitive. Furthermore, while permanent buyout options yield higher predicted revenue than temporary options, they also provide additional incentives for late bidding and may therefore not be always more desirable. The numerical results also imply that the increase in seller's utility (over a fixed buyout price auction) enabled by a dynamic buyout price is small and does not seem to justify the corresponding increase in complexity.
by Shobhit Gupta.
Ph.D.
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Peterson, Madeleine. "New Technology, Old Ways? The Gender Price Discount in Online Contemporary Art Auctions." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2019. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/1265.

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There is evidence there is a global gender price gap in traditional global art auctions. Taking into account recent technological advances in the secondary art market, this study examines if there is a gender gap for the sale prices of female artists’ work in the contemporary, online art auction market. The analysis uses a unique data set of art works sold in Christie’s Online-Only Auctions for the year of 2018. We regress measures of price on gender and controls for various characteristics of the art work and artist. We find that while there is discount in prices of 17% for artwork created by female artists, further analysis indicates the difference is not necessarily the result of bidder’s biased prices, but rather rooted in the pre-sale estimates given by the auction houses.
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Parker, Thomas Glenn. "ONLINE-REVERSE-AUCTIONS AND THE BUYER-SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIP: THE EFFECTS OF ONLINE-REVERSE-AUCTION DESIGN ON SUPPLIER COMMITMENT AND SUPPLIER TRUST." OpenSIUC, 2010. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/192.

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Industrial online-reverse-auctions have become a common procurement strategy used by many firms to reduce the cost of purchased goods and services. The advantages of online-reverse-auctions include significant price reductions, increased purchasing and selling efficiencies, and access to new supply and purchasing markets. Despite these benefits, practitioners and academics alike have raised concerns with respect to the impact of online-reverse-auctions on the buyer-supplier relationship. Previous research suggests that the parameters and characteristics of an online-reverse-auction can influence the perceptions of online-reverse-auction participants. This dissertation investigates this phenomenon by examining how the design of an online-reverse-auction influences the supplier's perception of the buyer-supplier relationship. Specifically, this research considers the effects of online-reverse-auction design in terms of the independent variables of auction control, auction bid visibility, and auction award rules and the dependent variables of supplier commitment to the buyer and supplier trust in the buyer. Using a 2 x 2 x 2 quasi-experimental design and the statistical technique of MANCOVA, this study tests hypotheses related to how different online-reverse-auction design characteristics influence supplier commitment to the buyer and supplier trust in the buyer. The results of the study suggest that the type of online-reverse-auctions buyers utilize can have an impact on supplier perceptions of the buyer supplier relationship. Overall, the result suggest that supplier trust is influenced by the type of auction design buyers utilize, however, supplier commitment is not. Auctions utilizing third party auction providers, partial bid visibility, and post auction negotiations tended to result in higher levels of trust on the part of suppliers. This study makes a contribution to the literature in the following areas. First, this study is one of only a handful of empirical studies examining the effects of online-reverse-auction designs on the buyer-supplier relationship. While a considerable debate exists within the literature concerning the pros and cons of online-reverse-auctions, little empirical work exists. This study makes a contribution by providing insight with respect to how online-reverse-auction designs influence supplier perceptions of the buyer-supplier relationships. Secondly, this analysis considers the buyer-supplier relationship in terms of commitment and trust. Previous studies have largely neglected these constructs despite their prominence in the buyer-supplier relationship literature. Finally, given that the use of online-reverse-auctions seems well entrenched in the purchasing strategies of many buying organizations; this study provides guidance for the design of online-reverse-auctions such that buyers can potentially reduce the negative aspects of the process.
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Namazi, Alireza. "Emergent behavior and criticality in online auctions." [S.l.] : [s.n.], 2005. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=976716739.

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Ødegaard, Fredrik. "Analytical and empirical models of online auctions." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/1615.

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This thesis provides a discussion on some analytical and empirical models of online auctions. The objective is to provide an alternative framework for analyzing online auctions, and to characterize the distribution of intermediate prices. Chapter 1 provides a mathematical formulation of the eBay auction format and background to the data used in the empirical analysis. Chapter 2 analyzes policies for optimally disposing inventory using online auctions. It is assumed a seller has a fixed number of items to sell using a sequence of, possibly overlapping, single-item auctions. The decision the seller must make is when to start each auction. The decision involves a trade-off between a holding cost for each period an item remains unsold, and a cannibalization effect among competing auctions. Consequently the seller must trade-off the expected marginal gain for the ongoing auctions with the expected marginal cost of the unreleased items by further deferring their release. The problem is formulated as a discrete time Markov Decision Problem. Conditions are derived to ensure that the optimal release policy is a control limit policy in the current price of the ongoing auctions. Chapter 2 focuses on the two item case which has sufficient complexity to raise challenging questions. An underlying assumption in Chapter 2 is that the auction dynamics can be captured by a set of transition probabilities. Chapter 3 shows with two fixed bidding strategies how the transition probabilities can be derived for a given auction format and bidder arrival process. The two specific bidding strategies analyzed are when bidders bid: 1) a minimal increment, and 2) their true valuation. Chapters 4 and 5 provides empirical analyzes of 4,000 eBay auctions conducted by Dell. Chapter 4 provides a statistical model where over discrete time periods, prices of online auctions follow a zero-inflated gamma distribution. Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the 44,000 bids placed in the auctions, based on bids following a gamma distribution. Both models presented in Chapters 4 and 5 are based on conditional probabilities given the price and elapsed time of an auction, and certain parameters of the competing auctions. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with a discussion of the main results and possible extensions.
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Anthony, Patricia. "Bidding agents for multiple heterogeneous online auctions." Thesis, University of Southampton, 2003. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/257838/.

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Due to the proliferation of online auctions, there is an increasing need to monitor and bid in multiple auctions in order to procure the best deal for the desired good. To this end, this thesis reports on the development of a heuristic decision making framework that an autonomous agent can exploit to tackle the problem of bidding across multiple auctions with varying start and end times and with varying protocols (including English, Dutch and Vickrey). The framework is flexible, configurable, and enables the agent to adopt varying tactics and strategies that attempt to ensure that the desired item is delivered in a manner consistent with the user's preferences. Given this large space of possibilities, a genetic algorithm is employed to search (offline) for effective strategies in common classes of environment. The strategies that emerge from this evolution are then codified into the agent's reasoning behaviour so that it can select the most appropriate strategy to employ in its prevailing circumstances. The proposed framework has been implemented in a simulated marketplace environment and its effectiveness has been empirically demonstrated.
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Radkevitch, Ulad. "Online reverse auctions for procurement of services /." Rotterdam : Erasmus Research Institute of Management, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13497.

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VINIJSORN, KRIT. "Art auctions on eBay : An empirical study of bidders’ behavior on eBay." Thesis, Högskolan i Jönköping, Internationella Handelshögskolan, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-15890.

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This paper explores the determinants of the number of bidders and final price of 1900s oil paintings auctioned by resellers or dealers on eBay art auctions. We find that starting price has negative effect on bidder’s decision whether to enter the auctions or not while seller reputation variables such as seller´s feedback, being top rate seller has a positive effect. Furthermore, auction theory is introduced to study the bidder´s behavior through auction characteristics and final price. We find that, interestingly, the seller´s reputation variables have no significant effect to the final price and the number of bidders has positive effect toward final price of art work. This evidence means that art auctions on eBay has a private value auctions characteristic. However, some specific characteristics of online auctions, which are the last minute bidding and the presence of experienced bidders, significantly affect the final price. Being an experienced winner or using last minute bidding as a strategy substantially pay more than inexperienced winners or winners who do not use last minute bidding in auctioned painting. This could result from different preference of bidders toward auctioned painting or information on which each bidder is holding.
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Rameson, Tyler J. (Tyler James) 1974. "Online auctions in procurement : the cost/goodwill tradeoff." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/9157.

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Thesis (M.Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, 2000.
Includes bibliographical references (leaf 44).
Industry is rapidly adopting online auctions. Many of these auctions are occurring in the procurement of component supplies. While there are tremendous expectations for this technology, there is little data or study looking at the implications of the technology. This thesis aims to provide some insight into this topic. Primarily using data collected in a study of auctions in the procurement of automotive components, this thesis looks at the costs and benefits of using online auctions in procurement. The thesis specifically addresses the cost vs. supplier goodwill tradeoff present in procurement auction. After quantifying these variables and answering associated questions, the thesis provides a framework for evaluating the use of online auctions in industry in general. The thesis concludes with a list of suggested further research into this important subject.
Tyler J. Rameson.
M.Eng.
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Books on the topic "Online auctions"

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Ockenfels, Axel. Online auctions. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

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O'Loughlin, Luanne. Online Auctions. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001.

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Jank, Wolfgang, and Galit Shmueli. Modeling Online Auctions. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470642603.

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1971-, Shmueli Galit, and Wiley online library, eds. Modeling online auctions. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

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Collector's guide to online auctions. Paducah, Ky: Collector Books, 2000.

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Dunckel, Till. Online-Auktionen und Wettbewerbsrecht. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2007.

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Prince, Dennis L. Auction this!: Your complete guide to the world of online auctions. Rocklin, Calif: Prima Tech, 1999.

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The complete idiot's guide to online auctions. Indianapolis, Ind: Que, 1999.

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Online auctions at eBay 2000: Bid with confidence, sell with success. 2nd ed. Rocklin, CA: Prima Publishing, 1999.

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Leo, Patrick. Selling online: How to start a home-based business selling used books, DVD's and more online. Brea, CA: P & L Publications, 2009.

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Book chapters on the topic "Online auctions"

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Mochón, Asunción, and Yago Sáez. "Online Auctions." In Springer Texts in Business and Economics, 121–29. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08813-6_9.

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Deng, Yuan, Debmalya Panigrahi, and Hanrui Zhang. "Online Combinatorial Auctions." In Proceedings of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 1131–49. Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611976465.70.

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Pereira, Adriano, Fernando Mourão, Paulo Góes, and Wagner Meira. "Reactivity in Online Auctions." In Current Trends in Database Technology – EDBT 2006, 909–18. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11896548_69.

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Hajiaghayi, Mohammad Taghi, and Vahid Liaghat. "Prophet Inequality and Online Auctions." In Encyclopedia of Algorithms, 1634–36. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_759.

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Bateni, MohammadHossein. "Secretary Problems and Online Auctions." In Encyclopedia of Algorithms, 1910–13. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_760.

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Hajiaghayi, Mohammad Taghi, and Vahid Liaghat. "Prophet Inequality and Online Auctions." In Encyclopedia of Algorithms, 1–4. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27848-8_759-1.

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Bateni, MohammadHossein. "Secretary Problems and Online Auctions." In Encyclopedia of Algorithms, 1–4. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27848-8_760-1.

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Harada, Shigeaki, Eiji Takimoto, and Akira Maruoka. "Aggregating Strategy for Online Auctions." In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 33–41. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11809678_6.

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Mohapatra, Sanjay. "E-commerce and Online Auctions." In Springer Texts in Business and Economics, 127–54. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-4142-7_6.

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Brandes, Philipp, Zengfeng Huang, Hsin-Hao Su, and Roger Wattenhofer. "Clairvoyant Mechanisms for Online Auctions." In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 3–14. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42634-1_1.

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Conference papers on the topic "Online auctions"

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Hu, Wenyan, and Alvaro Bolivar. "Online auctions efficiency." In Proceeding of the 17th international conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1367497.1367621.

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Babaioff, Moshe, Liad Blumrosen, and Aaron Roth. "Auctions with online supply." In the 11th ACM conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807342.1807345.

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"SECURE ONLINE ENGLISH AUCTIONS." In International Conference on Security and Cryptography. SciTePress - Science and and Technology Publications, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0002096603870396.

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Shen, Weiran, Zihe Wang, and Song Zuo. "Ex-post IR Dynamic Auctions with Cost-per-Action Payments." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/70.

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Abstract:
Motivated by online ad auctions, we consider a repeated auction between one seller and many buyers, where each buyer only has an estimation of her value in each period until she actually receives the item in that period. The seller is allowed to conduct a dynamic auction but must guarantee ex-post individual rationality. In this paper, we use a structure that we call credit accounts to enable a general reduction from any incentive compatible and ex-ante individual rational dynamic auction to an approximate incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational dynamic auction with credit accounts. Our reduction obtains stronger individual rationality guarantees at the cost of weaker incentive compatibility. Surprisingly, our reduction works without any common knowledge assumption. Finally, as a complement to our reduction, we prove that there is no non-trivial auction that is exactly incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational under this setting.
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Bubeck, Sebastien, Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang, and Rad Niazadeh. "Online Auctions and Multi-scale Online Learning." In EC '17: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085145.

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Hajiaghayi, Mohammad Taghi, Robert Kleinberg, and David C. Parkes. "Adaptive limited-supply online auctions." In the 5th ACM conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/988772.988784.

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Sheng-li, Chen, Luo Yun-feng, and Dai Bao. "Optimal Design of Online Auctions." In 2007 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2007.4421826.

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Kuruzovich, Jason. "Online Auctions and Multichannel Retailing." In 2012 45th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/hicss.2012.457.

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Goel, Gagan, Vahab Mirrokni, and Renato Paes Leme. "Clinching Auctions with Online Supply." In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973105.44.

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Cohen, Ilan Reuven, Alon Eden, Amos Fiat, and Łukasz Jeż. "Pricing Online Decisions: Beyond Auctions." In Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973730.7.

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Reports on the topic "Online auctions"

1

Ockenfels, Axel, David Reiley, and Abdolkarim Sadrieh. Online Auctions. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12785.

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Coey, Dominic, Bradley Larsen, Kane Sweeney, and Caio Waisman. The Simple Empirics of Optimal Online Auctions. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24698.

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Decarolis, Francesco, Maris Goldmanis, and Antonio Penta. Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w23962.

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Einav, Liran, Chiara Farronato, Jonathan Levin, and Neel Sundaresan. Sales Mechanisms in Online Markets: What Happened to Internet Auctions? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w19021.

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Hendricks, Kenneth, and Alan Sorensen. Dynamics and Efficiency in Decentralized Online Auction Markets. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25002.

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Backus, Matthew, Tom Blake, Dimitriy Masterov, and Steven Tadelis. Is Sniping A Problem For Online Auction Markets? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w20942.

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