Academic literature on the topic 'One-China Policy'

Amongst top national goals of the contemporary China’s leadership, the Taiwan issue occupies a particular place. This issue bears a fundamental significance since it deals with national pride, state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the unity of the PRC. Its resolution has also an applied significance – it promotes the legitimacy of the ruling China’s Communist Party and resolves some geopolitical difficulties China faces. Currently relying on the creation of island’s all-pervading economic dependency on China, yet not excluding military invasion as an option, Beijing expects to resolve the Taiwan issue by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the PRC. By using economic statecraft and exerting pressure on the world’s countries and international organizations, Beijing has succeeded in narrowing Taiwan’s international space, thus coming close to the desired goal of bringing back the island. Still, a crucial impediment to the resolution of the Taiwan issue is the US’ support of Taiwan. The article reveals specifics of the so-called “One China” policy, a policy that the US pursues towards the Taiwan issue ever since 1970s. By analyzing in details the provisions of the documents that lay the basis of “One China” policy, the author identifies its enduring principles. The author emphasizes the dual character of the US’ “One China” policy, which is its simultaneous orientation to promote relations with the PRC and to support Taiwan. The author further explains the motivation of the American support of Taiwan. The nature of the China-Taiwan relations – either confrontational (which has been the case with a few exceptions) or peaceful (like in the beginning of the 1990s and 2008–2016) – is seen in the article as a major determinant of the formulation of the US’ Taiwan policy. Beijing’s readiness to return the island with the use of force and China’s rapid military power accumulation determine the US-Taiwan close military ties, including arms sales to the island. By analyzing the development of the situation in the Taiwan Strait through the examples of three Taiwan administrations (the ones of Chen Shui-bian, Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen), the author shows that in the 21st century Taiwan leadership’s policy towards mainland China and the independence issue plays the defining role in the Taiwan-China-US triangle relations. It concludes that changes in the basics of the US’s “One China” policy and the termination of Washington’s support of Taiwan are highly unlikely.

The one child policy is considered one of the most radical population policies in the last century. Although the policy was intended to control population growth, it also had social and economic consequences. Despite the national level influences of the policy, this thesis focuses on the influences of the one child policy on individuals in China. In order to collect individuals’ thoughts about the influence of the policy, I conducted 50 interviews in 2016 in China. All respondents are Chinese citizens and have been impacted by the policy in various ways. The interviews show that the one child policy has influenced Chinese people in different ways, on the national level. Individuals’ desire to have children, opinions about having siblings and the sex preference of children seem different among the younger generation born under this policy than for older Chinese.

Contemporary China is facing the threat of rapidly aging population. Increasing portion of the economically inactive part of the population is already putting a significant strain on the Chinese pension system. Health care and social security system are still underdeveloped and also unprepared for this trend. As an attempt to reduce this issue by revitalizing the low birth rate, Chinese one-child policy underwent a significant relaxation in 2007. The expected acceleration of the birth rate however did not occur. Using the panel data from 31 regions of China between the period 2001 and 2013, I have analyzed this issue. My thesis provides the evidence, that one-child policy is not the exclusive culprit behind the continued trend of below-replacement fertility levels. Socioeconomic environment in China underwent a rapid transformation during the past 37 years. One of the socioeconomic factors newly affecting the Chinese birth rate level is the wealth. This is manifested by the inverse relationship between the wealth and fertility and it is known as the demographic-economic paradox. This thesis proves the presence of this phenomenon across the regions of China. It also demonstrates that it could have at least partly counterweighted the effect, which one-child policy easing had on birth rate in 2007. Since the one-child policy has lost significant part of its normative power to other factors affecting the birth rate, I am arguing it is the sign, that one-child policy is slowly becoming redundant on its own.

China’s infamous One-Child policy taught us how far the CPC (Communist Party of China) is willing to go to ensure that critical political demands are met. The Party has been all about population control since a little after the mid-twentieth century and now, at a time when the political and social sentiment towards birth-control methods and abortions in western societies are radically changing and floating towards more conservative ideals, the fear that the anti-natalist State power in China might reverse to extreme pro-natalist policies may become a reality in a matter of a few years or a couple decades. This thesis will start by illustrating the phenomena that caused one of the most memorable and wide-scale “violation of sexual and reproductive rights” (as described by Amnesty International) to be put into effect: the One-Child Policy. While some still proclaim it was a necessary mean to reach the current state of booming economy and prosperity that China now enjoys, others are starting to question the need for such strict measures. After a brief historical dissertation on the subject, this paper is going to discuss the consequences that this policy had on today’s Chinese society and will further analyse what these could possibly entail for the future of the country and its citizens. Moreover, a translation analysis of some of the subtitles made for the documentary “One Child Nation” is going to be presented, along with the theory behind it. The aim of the thesis is to provide an insight into this delicate and intricate matter: the reasons it was implemented, how the Party decided to carry it out and what this means and will mean for China.

Many studies have interpreted the positive and negative consequences of China's One-Child Policy on Chinese women, but few have relied upon contribution from Chinese women and only children themselves. However, by valuing personal, lived experience, researchers may discourage the propagation of Western media stereotypes of what it means to be a young Chinese woman in urban China. The use of an intersectionality framework showcases how Chinese women's lived experiences must be framed more widely than a single aspect of their identity and that gender, educational experiences, family dynamic, and single child status (among other identity markers) form a more complex and holistic identity than any marker considered individually. This thesis argues that the intersectionality of lived experience makes it necessary to consider each individual's story as valuable and that commonalities and differences are both crucial to understanding how individual's lives intersect in the context of this complex birth policy

xi, 94 p. : ill. (some col.) A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number.
Implemented as one of the basic national polices of China since 1978, the one-child policy has brought both advantages and disadvantages to one-child families in urban China. This thesis explores the various consequences of current family planning practices in urban Dalian. It explains the ways in which the implementation of the policy has influenced urban one-child families' everyday life and how parents and single children handle the policy. Urban parents have accepted the state requirement for limited births and have adopted new child-rearing practices to raise their "only hope" in the changing socioeconomic context. Single children receive comprehensive parental attention and support and are widely considered as spoiled "little emperors/empresses". But at the same time they experience great pressure to perform with academic excellence in order to be capable to excel in the competition of the global market economy. Gender norms are in transition. Urban single daughters are empowered by the benefits brought by low fertility produced by the policy. As the first generation of single children grows up, their families are now confronted with the crucial issue of the "four-two-one" (four grandparents, two parents, one child) problem, which impacts the future of the one-child policy.
Committee in Charge: Dr. Ina Asim, Chair; Dr. Kathie Carpenter; Dr. Alisa Freedman

The Chinese government cites the country's controversial One Child Policy as a key factor in China's economic rise over the last few decades. Lower birth rates, they argue, correlate to more rapid development. However, in a society with a deeply-rooted preference for sons, the policy has caused an unforeseen uptake in female infanticide and feticide, translating to a drastic imbalance in sex ratios in Chinese demography, particularly among under-20 Chinese. With some 40 million men unable to find wives by 2020, China faces an unprecedented demographic problem. One of the most devastating effects of the One Child Policy and sex ratio imbalance is a sharp uptake in demand for sex trafficking to China, particularly forced prostitution and trafficking for marriage. More sex trafficking in China may spell disaster not only for hundreds of thousands of women and girls trafficked for sex, but also for Chinese society at large--sex trafficking accelerates the spread of HIV and compromises national security as borders become more porous and organized crime becomes more ubiquitous. The Chinese government, the US government, inter-governmental organizations like the UN and ASEAN, and non-governmental organizations each have specific roles to play in curbing the flow of sex trafficking in China.

One of the mechanisms of policy of reform and openness is economic strategy «One belt, One road», which with other projects unite many countries. The article examines political changes that influence on modern social-economic development of China, also the formation of strategy of «One belt, One road» strategy.

With the advancement of the One Belt One Road policy, Sino-Russian trade continues to improve. The level of logistics performance of the two countries directly affects the degree of trade convenience. By analyzing the logistics performance index, we can compare effective suggestions to improve the convenience of cross-border logistics.

Geographically Mongolia has two neighbors. Mongolia’s existence today depends largely on mutually friendly relationships with two big neighbors. The main pillars of Mongolia’s new international strategy were incorporated in Mongolia’s National Security Concept adopted on June 30, 1994. This document, approved by the Mongolian Parliament, emphasizes a balanced policy towards the country’s two giant neighbors, underlines the importance of economic security in protecting Mongolia’s national integrity, and warns about too much dependence on any one country for trade. In today’s world of globalization and interdependence, Mongolia has to engage with other countries beyond these two neighbors, Russia and China. This is fundamental thing of the Mongolia’s searching third neighbor. Mongolia needs more friends to ensure its national security interests and achieve economic prosperity its ‘Third Neighbor Policy’1 is a policy of extending its friends all around the world. Two immediate neighbors of Mongolia, Russia and China, remain the foreign policy priority and this priority is not contradictory to the policy of having more friends. Mongolia is becoming an arena of clashes of economic interests of developed countries, multinational corporations due its rich mining deposits. Mongolia's Third Neighbor Policy is aimed to leverage the influence of neighboring countries in the national security issues of Mongolia. In contrast with other satellite states of the former Soviet Union, Mongolia concurrently instituted a democratic political system, a market-driven economy, and a foreign policy based on balancing relations with Russia and China while expanding relations with the West and East. Mongolia is now pursuing a foreign policy that will facilitate global engagement, allow the nation to maintain its sovereignty, and provide diplomatic freedom of maneuver through a “third neighbor” policy. 2 This policy is very much alive today but there is no reason to claim that its implementation is satisfactory. Mongolia has major investors from the US, Japan, Germany and France from the EU, for example. There are many universal conventions related to landlocked country. For Mongolia, access to sea via our two neighbors, means promoting economic ties with the third neighbors, as an important factor conducive to reinforcing the material foundations of Mongolia’s third neighbor policy.

The article analyzes the main directions of interaction between the People's Republic of China and one of its partners in the BRICS group - the Republic of South Africa - at the present stage. The main areas of interaction, problems and results of cooperation are considered.

With the fast development of the economics, the increasing consumption and demand of energy is challenging the energy supply and energy safety of China. At the same time, the energy safety is also one of the most critical issues for the integration process of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This paper is tending to calculate and analyze the relation between energy consumption and carbon emission intensity for China, ASEAN and developed countries. Based on the analysis and calculations, this paper is trying to state the necessarity and importance of the further collaboration on energy between China and ASEAN. The energy consumptions and carbon emissions will be estimated for China and ASEAN for the near and long future. Based on the analysis and calculation, technical and policy suggestions have been recommended for the China government and ASEAN governments on the approaches of collaboration and to make contributions to reduce the energy consumption and carbon emission.

With the rapid development of modern economy in China, the concept of “green building” is paid more attention, and the assessment to green buildings becomes more important than before. In green building assessment systems, the assessment to the environmental quality is one of the most important content. The research to the assessment index systems of environmental quality is of great significance to developing green buildings in China. In this paper, based on the technical requirements and design outlines of green buildings, the assessment rule, object, method and mode that are suitable for the situations in China are discussed by combining the characteristics of indoor and outdoor environment of green buildings, and the assessment index and system of environmental quality are set up. In the process, the evaluation models of AHP (analytic hierarchy process) are established. The weight factor of the indexes of environmental quality are made certain using the method of AHP, which will be the basis of the whole assessment system of green building and the reference for the implement of green building evaluation policy in China. All the work is to promote the development of green buildings.

In this paper, we try how the idea of economic regionalism has developed within the framework of the interests of the Russian foreign policy, which adopted a Eurasianist rhetoric for nearly fifteen years. As the trends of globalisation spread over the world after the end of the Cold War period, the regional integration movements also gained speed with different forms and contents. Meanwhile the countries in the post-Soviet geography adopted different political approaches towards regionalisation and globalisation by taking into consideration their own capabilities and interests. At its own side, Russia was in search of integration within the world economy by trying to implement its own regionalist policies both at the level of the CIS area and with the neighbouring countries like China and the EU. The Eurasianist discourse has no doubt such impact on Russian leadership’s choices of partners and orientations for economic regionalisation. At this point, we want to discuss if it is possible to talk about some “Eurasianist model of regional integration” as a new idea which can combine, at one side, the institutional integration process within the CIS area and, at the other, the strong regional cooperation with the Asian economic partners like China. This model can be also Russia’s answer to embrace both globalism and regionalism by preserving its own hegemonic expectations after the Soviet legacy.

подготовка высококвалифицированных кадров – важный фактор в стимулировании стратегических идей политики «Один пояс, один путь». Обмен и сотрудничество в области высшего образования определяется как одно из основных направлений повышения степени его интернационализации и качества. Вузы России и Китая должны готовить не только студентов, обладающих практическими навыками, но и способных к исследовательской деятельности в различных областях профессиональной деятельности, с международным кругозором, инновационным мышлением и знанием иностранных языков стран региона Нового Шелкового пути. Приводятся примеры различных образовательных проектов в рамках инициативы «Один пояс, один путь». Раскрыты трудности реализации образовательных программ. the training of highly qualified personnel is an important factor in stimulating the strategic ideas of the "One Belt, One Road" policy. Exchange and cooperation in the field of higher education is defined as one of the main directions of increasing the degree of its internationalization and quality. Universities in Russia and China should prepare students not only with practical knowledge, but also capable of research activities in various fields of professional activity, with an international outlook, innovative thinking, and knowledge of foreign languages of the countries of the New Silk Road region. Examples of various educational projects under the Belt and Road Initiative are given. The difficulties in the implementation of educational programs are disclosed.

Just over a decade ago, several forest agency leaders from around the world met in Beijing, China at a conference convened by the Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI), the State Forestry Administration (SFA) of China and the Chinese Center for Agriculture Policy (CCAP). As leaders—from Brazil, China, Mexico and the USA—we reflected on how few opportunities existed to learn from one another to discuss forest issues in an informal atmosphere outside of the protocol-laden, jurisdictionally-defined sessions we commonly attended. We wondered whether there was a better way—whether it was possible to have safe conversations where difficult issues, struggles and mistakes could be raised, acknowledged and learned from. From this first conversation, MegaFlorestais was created: a self-governing group of public forest agency leaders with RRI serving as the Secretariat and main funder. The period of 2005-2015 brought changes in forest governance, the status of forest ownership, the health of the world’s forests and the global context within which forestry decisions are made. But much has remained the same. Was MegaFlorestais a factor? What can be learned from reflecting on these changes in a decade?

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.

For the first time, a Chinese company—Huawei—is set to lead the global transition from one key national security infrastructure technology to the next. How did Washington, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, fail to protect U.S. firms in this strategic technology and allow a geopolitical competitor to take a leadership position in a national security relevant critical infrastructure such as telecommunications? This policy brief highlights the characteristics of 5G development that China leveraged, exploited, and supported to take the lead in this key technology. The Huawei case study is in some ways the canary in the coal mine for emerging technologies and an illustration of what can happen to U.S. competitiveness when China’s companies do not have to base decisions on market forces.

The internet and digital technologies are upending global trade. Industries and supply chains are being transformed, and the movement of data across borders is now central to the operation of the global economy. Provisions in trade agreements address many aspects of the digital economy – from cross-border data flows, to the protection of citizens’ personal data, and the regulation of the internet and new technologies like artificial intelligence and algorithmic decision-making. The UK government has identified digital trade as a priority in its Global Britain strategy and one of the main sources of economic growth to recover from the pandemic. It wants the UK to play a leading role in setting the international standards and regulations that govern the global digital economy. The regulation of digital trade is a fast-evolving and contentious issue, and the US, European Union (EU), and China have adopted different approaches. Now that the UK has left the EU, it will need to navigate across multiple and often conflicting digital realms. The UK needs to decide which policy objectives it will prioritise, how to regulate the digital economy domestically, and how best to achieve its priorities when negotiating international trade agreements. There is an urgent need to develop a robust, evidence-based approach to the UK’s digital trade strategy that takes into account the perspectives of businesses, workers, and citizens, as well as the approaches of other countries in the global economy. This working paper aims to inform UK policy debates by assessing the state of play in digital trade globally. The authors present a detailed analysis of five policy areas that are central to discussions on digital trade for the UK: cross-border data flows and privacy; internet access and content regulation; intellectual property and innovation; e-commerce (including trade facilitation and consumer protection); and taxation (customs duties on e-commerce and digital services taxes). In each of these areas the authors compare and contrast the approaches taken by the US, EU and China, discuss the public policy implications, and examine the choices facing the UK.

Forced by the 1997 Southeast Asian crisis to recognize the external vulnerabilities that openness to volatile capital flows result in and upset over the post-crisis policy responses imposed by the IMF, countries in the sub-region saw the need for a regional financial safety net that can pre-empt or mitigate future crises. At the outset, the aim of the initiative, then led by Japan, was to create a facility or design a mechanism that was independent of the United States and the IMF, since the former was less concerned with vulnerabilities in Asia than it was in Latin America and that the latter’s recommendations proved damaging for countries in the region. But US opposition and inherited geopolitical tensions in the region blocked Japan’s initial proposal to establish an Asian Monetary Fund, a kind of regional IMF. As an alternative, the ASEAN+3 grouping (ASEAN members plus China, Japan and South Korea) opted for more flexible arrangements, at the core of which was a network of multilateral and bilateral central bank swap agreements. While central bank swap agreements have played a role in crisis management, the effort to make them the central instruments of a cooperatively established regional safety net, the Chiang Mai Initiative, failed. During the crises of 2008 and 2020 countries covered by the Initiative chose not to rely on the facility, preferring to turn to multilateral institutions such as the ADB, World Bank and IMF or enter into bilateral agreements within and outside the region for assistance. The fundamental problem was that because of an effort to appease the US and the IMF and the use of the IMF as a foil against the dominance of a regional power like Japan, the regional arrangement was not a real alternative to traditional sources of balance of payments support. In particular, access to significant financial assistance under the arrangement required a country to be supported first by an IMF program and be subject to the IMF’s conditions and surveillance. The failure of the multilateral effort meant that a specifically Asian safety net independent of the US and the IMF had to be one constructed by a regional power involving support for a network of bilateral agreements. Japan was the first regional power to seek to build such a network through it post-1997 Miyazawa Initiative. But its own complex relationship with the US meant that its intervention could not be sustained, more so because of the crisis that engulfed Japan in 1990. But the prospect of regional independence in crisis resolution has revived with the rise of China as a regional and global power. This time both economics and China’s independence from the US seem to improve prospects of successful regional cooperation to address financial vulnerability. A history of tensions between China and its neighbours and the fear of Chinese dominance may yet lead to one more failure. But, as of now, the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s support for a large number of bilateral swap arrangements and its participation in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership seem to suggest that Asian countries may finally come into their own.