Relevant bibliographies by topics / Oligopolies / Journal articles

Journal articles on the topic 'Oligopolies'

To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Oligopolies.
Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 30 July 2024

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Oligopolies.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Demange, Gabrielle, and Dominique Henriet. "Sustainable oligopolies." Journal of Economic Theory 54, no. 2 (August 1991): 417–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90132-n.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Wirth, Todd L. "Nationwide Format Oligopolies." Journal of Radio Studies 8, no. 2 (November 2001): 249–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15506843jrs0802_4.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Szidarovszky, Ferenc, and Akio Matsumoto. "Dynamic Cooperative Oligopolies." Mathematics 12, no. 6 (March 18, 2024): 891. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math12060891.

Full text
Abstract:
An n-person cooperative oligopoly is considered without product differentiation. It is assumed that the firms know the unit price function but have no access to the cost functions of the competitors. From market data, they have information about the industry output. The firms want to find the output levels that guarantee maximum industry profit. First, the existence of a unique maximizer is proven, which the firms cannot determine directly because of the lack of the knowledge of the cost functions. Instead, a dynamic model is constructed, which is asymptotically stable under realistic conditions, and the state trajectories converge to the optimum output levels of the firms. Three models are constructed: first, no time delay is assumed; second, information delay is considered for the firms on the industry output; and third, in addition, information delay is also assumed about the firms’ own output levels. The stability of the resulting no-delay, one-delay, and two-delay dynamics is examined.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Burakov, Dmitry Vladimirovich. "Reflections on Luis Suarez-Villa’s Corporate Power, Oligopolies and the Crisis of the State." tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 16, no. 1 (January 15, 2018): 35–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v16i1.953.

Full text
Abstract:
Book review of Luis Suarez-Villa’s Corporate Power, Oligopolies and the Crisis of the State (20Book review of Luis Suarez-Villa’s Corporate Power, Oligopolies and the Crisis of the State (2015). State University of New York, ISBN: 978-1-4384-5485-6.15)
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Burakov, Dmitry Vladimirovich. "Reflections on Luis Suarez-Villa’s Corporate Power, Oligopolies and the Crisis of the State." tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 16, no. 1 (January 15, 2018): 35–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.31269/vol16iss1pp35-40.

Full text
Abstract:
Book review of Luis Suarez-Villa’s Corporate Power, Oligopolies and the Crisis of the State (20Book review of Luis Suarez-Villa’s Corporate Power, Oligopolies and the Crisis of the State (2015). State University of New York, ISBN: 978-1-4384-5485-6.15)
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Petit, Nicolas. "Re-Pricing through Disruption in Oligopolies with Tacit Collusion: A Framework for Abuse of Collective Dominance." World Competition 39, Issue 1 (March 1, 2016): 119–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2016007.

Full text
Abstract:
This article proposes an understanding of abuse of collective dominance or shared monopolization that does not outlaw oligopolistic tacit collusion as such, but that reputes abusive a set of tactics adopted by tacitly colluding oligopolists exposed to disruption. As much as deviation is an internal force likely to undermine tacit collusion, disruption is a powerful external force that can cause a return to the competitive equilibrium. The sources of disruption may be technological (e.g., radical innovation), economic (e.g., entry of a low-cost player) or legal (e.g., tax reform). But disruption may never deliver its pro-competitive promises if oligopolists tinker to restore a collusive equilibrium. This article suggests that competition agencies and courts could use the dormant doctrine of abuse of collective dominance to declare unlawful oligopolists’ conduct that seeks to ‘re-price’ through disruption, and elude its pro-competitive effect. This rationalized definition of abuse of collective dominance would both promote legal certainty by clarifying the messy state of the law in this field, and ensure economic efficiency by giving agencies and courts a market-triggered ex post remedy in mature oligopolies with lethargic M&A activity.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Chade, Hector, and Jeroen Swinkels. "Screening in Vertical Oligopolies." Econometrica 89, no. 3 (2021): 1265–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta17016.

Full text
Abstract:
A finite number of vertically differentiated firms simultaneously compete for and screen agents with private information about their payoffs. In equilibrium, higher firms serve higher types. Each firm distorts the allocation downward from the efficient level on types below a threshold, but upward above. While payoffs in this game are neither quasi‐concave nor continuous, if firms are sufficiently differentiated, then any strategy profile that satisfies a simple set of necessary conditions is a pure‐stategy equilibrium, and an equilibrium exists. A mixed‐strategy equilibrium exists even when firms are less differentiated. The welfare effects of private information are drastically different than under monopoly. The equilibrium approaches the competitive limit quickly as entry costs grow small. We solve the problem of a multi‐plant firm facing a type‐dependent outside option and use this to study the effect of mergers.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Molnar, Sandor, Ferenc Szidarovszky, and Mark Molnar. "DYNAMICAL CONTROL IN OLIGOPOLIES." IFAC Proceedings Volumes 38, no. 1 (2005): 106–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.3182/20050703-6-cz-1902.02253.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Chiarella, Carl, Akio Matsumoto, and Ferenc Szidarovszky. "Isoelastic oligopolies under uncertainty." Applied Mathematics and Computation 219, no. 21 (July 2013): 10475–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2013.04.040.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Goering, Gregory E. "Oligopolies and product durability." International Journal of Industrial Organization 10, no. 1 (March 1992): 55–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(92)90047-3.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
11

Colombo, Stefano. "Mixed oligopolies and collusion." Journal of Economics 118, no. 2 (November 30, 2015): 167–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-015-0467-z.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
12

Haruna, Shoji, and Rajeev K. Goel. "International Tariffs in a Mixed Oligopoly with Research Spillovers." Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 22, no. 3 (August 1, 2016): 277–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0007.

Full text
Abstract:
AbstractThis paper merges three strands of the literature – industrial organization, international trade, and economics of technical change – to examine the effect of tariffs on international mixed oligopolies which conduct research and development (R&D) that is prone to spillovers. Mixed oligopolies are prevalent in the defense sector, among other sectors. Using a two-stage sequential game with R&D in the first stage and production in the second stage, results show that higher tariffs reduce outputs of both the domestic public firm and foreign private firms, and private R&D. Effects on domestic R&D and welfare, and profits of foreign private firms depend upon spillovers. Within a large range of research spillovers, higher tariffs can in fact lower welfare. Some of these findings are different from traditional oligopolies and from models that ignore research spillovers. Policy implications are discussed.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
13

Hughes, John S., and Michael G. Williams. "Commitments and Disclosure in Oligopolies." Accounting Review 83, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 111–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2008.83.1.111.

Full text
Abstract:
In this paper, we examine the welfare effects of pre-production commitments made by firms competing in oligopoly markets and disclosure of such commitments. By commitments we refer to any device that provides a strategic incentive to alter production choices. Examples include forward contracts, capital structure, research and development investment, terms of compensation, and cost allocation. If the only purpose underlying commitment is to gain a strategic advantage in product market competition, then the result with disclosure can be characterized by Stackelberg warfare. Many potential commitments have non-strategic effects, implying a trade-off when optimizing, with imperfect achievement of both strategic (deterring rival production) and non-strategic goals. However, given disclosure, we show that in the limit as the number of commitment devices becomes large, firms achieve full Stackelberg warfare and total realization of non-strategic goals. Disclosure in this context is social welfare enhancing.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
14

Maksimovic, Vojislav. "Capital Structure in Repeated Oligopolies." RAND Journal of Economics 19, no. 3 (1988): 389. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555663.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
15

Gabszewicz, Jean J., and Skerdilajda Zanaj. "Free entry in successive oligopolies." International Journal of Economic Theory 7, no. 2 (May 4, 2011): 179–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00157.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
16

GABSZEWICZ, JEAN, DIDIER LAUSSEL, TANGUY VAN YPERSELE, and SKERDILAJDA ZANAJ. "Market Games in Successive Oligopolies." Journal of Public Economic Theory 15, no. 3 (March 14, 2013): 397–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12023.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
17

Farahat, Amr, and Georgia Perakis. "Profit loss in differentiated oligopolies." Operations Research Letters 37, no. 1 (January 2009): 43–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2008.08.004.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
18

Nelson, Robert G., and Richard O. Beil. "A Classroom Experiment on Oligopolies." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 27, no. 1 (July 1995): 263–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1074070800019787.

Full text
Abstract:
AbstractThis experiment demonstrates principles of decision-making in dynamic oligopolies, especially the difficulties in forming and maintaining cartels. As an illustration of firm behavior under imperfect competition, the game distinguishes between procedurally rational choices and substantively rational decisions in the context of collusive, Cournot, and competitive equilibria. The paper discusses results from an actual classroom exercise and suggests some additional variations in institutional details. Instructions for students and a spreadsheet program for producing payoff tables are provided in the appendices.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
19

Szidarovszky, Ferenc, Zhaoxia Hu, and Jijun Zhao. "Dynamic oligopolies with market saturation." Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 29, no. 3 (August 2006): 723–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2005.08.104.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
20

Meyer, Bernd, Carolin Vogt, and Rainer Vo�kamp. "Schumpeterian competition in heterogeneous oligopolies." Journal of Evolutionary Economics 6, no. 4 (December 1996): 411–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01202278.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
21

Tsitsiklis, John N., and Yunjian Xu. "Profit loss in Cournot oligopolies." Operations Research Letters 41, no. 4 (July 2013): 415–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2013.04.012.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
22

BELLEFLAMME, PAUL, and CECILIA VERGARI. "INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE IN OLIGOPOLIES." Manchester School 79, no. 1 (December 16, 2010): 6–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2009.02131.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
23

Billand, P., and C. Bravard. "Non-cooperative networks in oligopolies." International Journal of Industrial Organization 22, no. 5 (May 2004): 593–609. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2004.01.004.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
24

Mulligan, Gordon F., and Timothy J. Fik. "Price Variation in Spatial Oligopolies." Geographical Analysis 21, no. 1 (September 3, 2010): 32–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4632.1989.tb00875.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
25

SANDSMARK, MARIA. "SPATIAL OLIGOPOLIES WITH COOPERATIVE DISTRIBUTION." International Game Theory Review 11, no. 01 (March 2009): 33–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002194.

Full text
Abstract:
The main objects here are Nash equilibria in spatial Cournot oligopolies when profits depend on coordinated distribution. Production is non-cooperative, but the subsequent transportation must be performed jointly to minimize costs. Cournot-Nash equilibria for this two-stage game with partial coalitional strategies are determined by means of a mathematical-based algorithm. A numerical illustration is presented.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
26

Matsumoto, Akio, Ugo Merlone, and Ferenc Szidarovszky. "Extended oligopolies with contingent workforce." Journal of Evolutionary Economics 27, no. 5 (June 5, 2017): 989–1005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00191-017-0500-1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
27

Meyer, Bernd, Carolin Vogt, and Rainer Vo�kamp. "Schumpeterian competition in heterogeneous oligopolies." Journal of Evolutionary Economics 6, no. 4 (November 1, 1996): 411–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001910050030.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
28

Annicchiarico, Barbara, Federica Orioli, and Federico Trionfetti. "National oligopolies and economic geography." Annals of Regional Science 48, no. 1 (November 3, 2010): 71–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00168-010-0414-4.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
29

Gelfand, Matthew D., and Pablo T. Spiller. "Entry barriers and multiproduct oligopolies." International Journal of Industrial Organization 5, no. 1 (March 1987): 101–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(87)90010-5.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
30

Basu, Kaushik. "Collusion in finitely-repeated oligopolies." International Journal of Industrial Organization 10, no. 4 (December 1992): 595–609. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(92)90061-3.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
31

Sagasta, Amagoia, and Jose Usategui. "Purchase and Rental Subsidies in Durable-Good Oligopolies." Revista Hacienda Pública Española 213, no. 4 (2015): 11–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.7866/hpe-rpe.15.2.1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
32

Zhang, Wei-li, Qi-Qing Song, and Yi-Rong Jiang. "Price Discrimination in Dynamic Cournot Competition." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2019 (June 25, 2019): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/9231582.

Full text
Abstract:
This paper introduces a new Cournot duopoly game and gives an applied study for price discrimination in a market by dynamic methods. One of two oligopolies has two different prices for a homogeneous product, while the other charges one kind of price. It is found that there is only one stable equilibrium for the discrete dynamic system, and a corresponding stable condition is given. Using a discriminative price is not always beneficial to a firm in equilibrium. If both oligopolies carry out price discrimination, the market’s average price is lower than when only one oligopoly does it. The results are verified by numerical simulations.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
33

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos, and Alexander Ritschel. "Multiple behavioral rules in Cournot oligopolies." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 183 (March 2021): 250–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.12.034.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
34

Haraguchi, Junichi, and Toshihiro Matsumura. "Profit‐enhancing entries in mixed oligopolies." Southern Economic Journal 88, no. 1 (April 24, 2021): 33–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/soej.12506.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
35

Ganapati, Sharat. "Growing Oligopolies, Prices, Output, and Productivity." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13, no. 3 (August 1, 2021): 309–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190029.

Full text
Abstract:
American industries have grown more concentrated over the last 40 years. In the absence of productivity innovation, this should lead to price hikes and output reductions, decreasing consumer welfare. With US census data from 1972 to 2012, I use price data to disentangle revenue from output. Industry-level estimates show that concentration increases are positively correlated to productivity and real output growth, uncorrelated with price changes and overall payroll, and negatively correlated with labor’s revenue share. I rationalize these results in a simple model of competition. Productive industries (with growing oligopolists) expand real output and hold down prices, raising consumer welfare, while maintaining or reducing their workforces, lowering labor’s share of output. (JEL D43, L13, D24, D33, D21, D42)
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
36

Rajan, Roby. "Endogenous Coalition Formation in Cooperative Oligopolies." International Economic Review 30, no. 4 (November 1989): 863. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2526756.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
37

Bloch, Francis. "Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies." RAND Journal of Economics 26, no. 3 (1995): 537. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2556002.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
38

Belleflamme, Paul, and Eric Toulemonde. "Product differentiation in successive vertical oligopolies." Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d`Economique 36, no. 3 (August 2003): 523–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540-5982.t01-2-00001.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
39

Haskel, Jonathan, and Pasquale Scaramozzino. "Do Other Firms Matter in Oligopolies?" Journal of Industrial Economics 45, no. 1 (March 27, 2003): 27–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6451.00033.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
40

Dapeng, Cai, and Li Jie. "SUBSIDIZATION AND BARGAINING IN MIXED OLIGOPOLIES." Bulletin of Economic Research 66, no. 4 (June 7, 2012): 358–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2012.00453.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
41

Marks, Robert. "Evolved perception and behaviour in oligopolies." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 22, no. 8-9 (July 1998): 1209–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(98)00010-4.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
42

Belleflamme, Paul. "Adoption of network technologies in oligopolies." International Journal of Industrial Organization 16, no. 4 (July 1998): 415–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(98)00003-4.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
43

Szidarovszky, F., and J. Zhao. "Dynamic oligopolies with intertemporal demand interaction." Computers & Mathematics with Applications 52, no. 12 (December 2006): 1623–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.camwa.2006.10.019.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
44

Orzen, Henrik. "Counterintuitive number effects in experimental oligopolies." Experimental Economics 11, no. 4 (September 29, 2007): 390–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9174-0.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
45

Okuguchi, Koji. "Labor-managed Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies." Journal of Economics 46, no. 2 (June 1986): 115–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01229224.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
46

Liu, Xiaoding, and Jay R. Ritter. "Local underwriter oligopolies and IPO underpricing." Journal of Financial Economics 102, no. 3 (December 2011): 579–601. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.01.009.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
47

Lahmandi‐Ayed, Rim. "Natural Oligopolies: A Vertical Differentiation Model." International Economic Review 41, no. 4 (November 2000): 971–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.00092.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
48

Colombo, Stefano. "INFINITE ASYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIA IN MIXED OLIGOPOLIES." Bulletin of Economic Research 70, no. 1 (July 31, 2017): E114—E118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/boer.12131.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
49

Lee, Dongyeol. "Regulating termination charges in asymmetric oligopolies." Information Economics and Policy 32 (September 2015): 16–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2015.07.006.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
50

Cowan, Simon G. B. "Trade and Competition Policies for Oligopolies." Review of World Economics 125, no. 3 (September 1989): 464–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02707663.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
You might also be interested in the bibliographies on the topic 'Oligopolies' for other source types:
Dissertations / Theses Books
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography