Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Oligopolies'
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Zanaj, Skerdilajda. "Competition in successive oligopolies." Université catholique de Louvain, 2008. http://edoc.bib.ucl.ac.be:81/ETD-db/collection/available/BelnUcetd-04222008-124532/.
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Successive markets constitute a natural framework to study the value chain. This chain is built through the technological linkage between markets where inputs and the corresponding outputs are produced. If goods pass through a chain of imperfectly competitive markets, in excess of the value markups are also added, at each step, to the costs. This thesis firstly proposes a unified framework to analyze competition in successive oligopolies. Analyzing and developing such a general framework forms a basis for the analysis of entry of new firms and of collusive agreements in the same market, like horizontal mergers, or through different markets, like vertical integration. The results bring new insights on equilibrium outcomes of both collusive agreements and entry of new firms.
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Fik, Timothy Joseph. "Price variation in spatial oligopolies." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/184708.
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As social scientists have become increasingly aware of the welfare implications of firms' locations in space there has been a considerable amount of renewed interest in the issues pertaining to the geography of price. In the short time since Hay and Johnston (1980) lamented the insufficient attention being given to the theoretical background of geographic pricing, there has been impressive amounts of progress in certain analytical areas. However, within this bulk of literature, we still know remarkably little about the determinants of geographic price variation in spatial markets containing numerous sellers (firms) and buyers (consumers). Perhaps this should not be surprising given that much of the current research is being carried out by economists (who generally tend to emphasize market process in classically constructed structural-conduct-performance modes) rather than geographers (who tend to emphasize market description and locational patterns/properties arising from spatially defined economic and behavioral market processes). This dissertation focuses on geographic price variations in competitive oligopolies, where firms react under alternative pricing conjectures/strategies. Using computer aided simulation, the analytics of equilibrium price levels are examined in one-dimensional bounded and unbounded markets to uncover the algebraic properties of spatial markets, the effects of firm density, firm location, and demand elasticity on prices, the perversities associated with consumer-related transportation costs, and the distorting effects of mixed or asymmetrical rivals' pricing strategies. The modeling of spatial price competition is regarded as essential in the evaluation of equilibrium price as a function of boundary complications, market description, and the spatial arrangement of interdependent rivals. Long-run implications of spatial price competition are discussed with the intention of developing a model (beyond the scope of this dissertation) that not only recognizes rivals' price reactions, but also stresses locationally competitive strategies. Some empirical evidence on the nature of spatial price dependence amongst rival food chains in a metropolitan area is also examined.
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Li, Weiye. "Stability of equilibria in dynamic oligopolies." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/290535.
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The Lyapunov function method is used in proving stability, asymptotic or globally asymptotic stability of discrete dynamic systems. We show that the slightly relaxed versions of the well known sufficient conditions are also necessary. The stability of the equilibria of time-invariant nonlinear dynamical systems with discrete time scale is investigated. We present an elementary proof showing that in the case of a stable equilibrium and continuously differentiable state transition function, all eigenvalues of the Jacobian computed at the equilibrium must be inside or on the unit circle. We also demonstrate via numerical examples that if some eigenvalues are on the unit circle and all other eigenvalues are inside the unit circle, then the equilibrium maybe unstable, or stable, or even asymptotically stable, which show that the necessary condition cannot be further restricted in general. In addition, the necessary condition is given in terms of spectral radius and matrix norms. The asymptotic stability of equilibria in a number of discrete dynamic oligopolies is analyzed. First the equivalence of the equilibrium problem of a large class of nonlinear games and the equilibrium problem of a class of discrete dynamic systems is verified. Stability conditions are then derived for a certain class of dynamic models, and these results are finally applied to single-product oligopolies, multiproduct oligopolies, and labor-managed oligopolies. The economic interpretation of the stability conditions are also presented. The stability properties of a special class of homogeneous dynamic economic systems are examined. The nonlinearity of the models and the presence of eigenvalues with zero real parts in a normally hyperbolic invariant set make the application of the classical theory impossible. Some principles of the modern theory of dynamical systems and invariant manifolds are applied. The local and global strong attractivity of the set of equilibria is verified under mild conditions. As an application, special labor-managed oligopolies are investigated.
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Tonin, Simone. "Strategic foundations of oligopolies in general equilibrium." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2015. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/7046/.
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In this thesis, I study the strategic foundations of oligopolies in general equilibrium by following the approach based on strategic market games. The thesis is organised as follows. In Chapter 1, I first survey some of the main contributions on imperfect competition in production economies and the main problems which arise in this framework. I then focus on the literature on imperfect competition in exchange economies by considering the Cournot-Walras approach and strategic market games. I finally discuss the main contributions on the foundations of oligopolies. In Chapter 2, I extend the non-cooperative analysis of oligopoly to exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and traders by using a strategic market game with trading posts. I prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium with trade and show that the price vector and the allocation at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium converge to the Walras equilibrium when the number of traders increases. In a framework with infinitely many commodities, an oligopolist can be an "asymptotic oligopolist" if his market power is uniformly bounded away from zero on an infinite set of commodities, or an "asymptotic price-taker" if his market power converges to zero along the sequence of commodities. The former corresponds to the Cournotian idea of oligopolist. The latter describes an agent with a kind of mixed behaviour since his market power can be made arbitrary small by choosing an appropriate infinite set of commodities while it is greater than a positive constant on a finite set. In Chapter 3, I further study oligopolies in economies with infinitely many commodities and traders. By using the strategic market game called "all for sale model", I prove the existence of an asymptotic price-taker. Heuristically, an asymptotic price-taker exists if at least one trader makes positive bids on an infinite number of commodities and in all markets the quantities of commodities exchanged are non-negligible. In Chapter 4, I study if there is a non-empty intersection between the sets of Cournot-Nash and Walras allocations in mixed exchange economies, with oligopolists represented as atoms and small traders represented by a continuum. In a bilateral oligopoly setting, I show that a necessary and sufficient condition for a Cournot-Nash allocation to be a Walras allocation is that all atoms demand a null amount of one of the two commodities. I also provide four examples which show that this characterization holds non-vacuously.
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Suárez, Carlos. "Essays on Regulation, Liberalization and Privatization in Energy Markets." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/669284.
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The general motivation of this research is to explore the effects of the coexistence of public and private companies on the allocative efficiency of the supply of electricity. In particular, this thesis investigates from an empirical perspective to what extent the distinction between private and public companies is relevant to understand the competition in the wholesale electricity generation markets. I apply several econometric techniques and theory advances in industrial organization branch on data of the firms of the Colombian market.
The case of the Colombian electricity market is suitable to study this issues for four reasons: i) It is an oligopoly in which private and public companies compete under the same rules. ii) The most important firms in the Colombian electricity sector are mature organizations, with a conventional business vision. In fact, many of these companies belong to transnational capital that carry out activities in several continents. iii) The market setting have a conventional design similar to other liberalized electricity markets. It operates as a multi-unit uniform-price auction. iv) There is available information with daily and even hourly resolution of the generation market variables. I consider that these are key elements for justifying the external validity of the results.
This thesis presents three essays that aim to answer three questions related to the interaction between competition in electricity markets and their ownership structure.
Chapter 1 addresses the question: Do the switch from public to private management have impacts in the bidding strategy of specific generation assets?
Chapter 2 explores the question: Do public and private generation companies respond the same to the incentives to relax competition?
Chapter 3 focuses on the question: Do private companies have a greater propensity to establish coordination relationships in comparison to public firms?
In the first chapter of this thesis I evaluate the impact of privatization on the bidding of electricity units participating in a liberalized wholesale electricity market. The results of this evaluation contribute to better understand whether privatization is the right decision in an environment of imperfect competition.
In this essay I adopt a policy evaluation approach to estimate the impact of changes from public to private management on the bidding prices of electricity generation units. I use information of bidding prices of the Colombian wholesale electricity market and exploit the changes of management of generation units documented in the period 2006 - 2018. The methodologies and results presented in this thesis contributes to the literature of mixed oligopoly because they place special emphasis on the behavioral differences between private and public companies and studies a field experience in which they compete in the same relevant market. The empirical evidence resultant from the policy evaluation method is aligned with the theoretical predictions of comparative statics arising from the behavioral differences of mixed oligopoly models.
The second chapter of this dissertation proposes a methodology in order to find differences between the reactions of private and public firms when they face incentives to exercises unilateral market power. Several common events in the electricity industry such as transmission restrictions, the concentration of generation property within specific areas, the non-storage capacity of electricity and the low elasticity of demand, provide opportunities to exert market power. That is why this issue has been widely studied and discussed theoretically and empirically. The novel element of this essay in relation to this strand of the literature is accounting for the distinction
between private and public companies regarding competitive behavior.
Chapter 3 investigates from an empirical perspective the role of disclosure information in the stability of informal coordination agreements. Particularly, this chapter focuses in the economic effects of the announcement and the put into effect of a non-transparency policy implemented in the Colombian wholesale electricity market in 2009.
We propose an identification strategy for isolating the effect of a coordinating relation from the confusion factors related with unilateral market power. The characteristics of the reform of the transparency policy allow to link the simple announcement of the policy change with the collapse of a coordinated strategy of private firms in a repeated interaction context. We use several empirical tools to assess the impact of the simple announcement of a modification in the transparency conditions on the average bidding price of private firms. We present an empirical analysis of the average bidding price data over August 2008 - July 2009.
Overall, the evidence presented in the three essays of this dissertation indicates that the distinction between public and private companies may be a relevant aspect for explaining the functioning of competition in liberalized industries.
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Grandner, Thomas. "Trade unions and oligopolies in vertically structured industries /." Frankfurt a.M ; Bern [etc.] : P. Lang, 2001. http://aleph.unisg.ch/hsgscan/hm00039823.pdf.
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Singh, Heisnam Thoihen. "Essays on price competition and firm strategies in oligopolies." College Park, Md. : University of Maryland, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1903/7166.
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Thesis (Ph. D.) -- University of Maryland, College Park, 2007.Thesis research directed by: Economics. Title from t.p. of PDF. Includes bibliographical references. Published by UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, Mich. Also available in paper.
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Linnosmaa, Ismo. "Essays on product market competition and managerial incentives in oligopoly firms /." Kuopio : Kuopion yliopisto, 2001. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy035/2002507609.html.
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Mesta, Iscan Ozlem Wang X. H. "Entry biases in Cournot markets with free entry." Diss., Columbia, Mo. : University of Missouri--Columbia, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10355/6150.
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Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on Feb 15, 2010). The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file. Dissertation advisor: Dr. X. H. Wang Vita. Includes bibliographical references.
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Jacobs, Martin [Verfasser]. "Price Competition in Oligopolies with Demand Rationing : Experimental Studies / Martin Jacobs." Kiel : Universitätsbibliothek Kiel, 2016. http://d-nb.info/1102933104/34.
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Hasheminia, Hamed. "Essays in estimating air transport demand processes and the formation of oligopolies." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/43422.
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This dissertation studies three different topics in estimating air transport demand processes and the formation of oligopolies. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the thesis.
Chapter 2 investigates the sensitivity of demand for air travel by singleton passengers, couples, and families. It examines how the demand for air travel by these groups is potentially different. In this study, a compound Poisson structure of the demand of different passenger groups is considered and aggregate demand observations and decompounding techniques are used to estimate demand sensitivity of each group of customers to price, time, season, and the economic cycle. The methodology is applied to Canadian market data and the results indicate there are significant differences among the different groups of customers.
In Chapter 3 a new decompounding procedure based on rudimentary number theory is developed. The advantages and disadvantages of this new framework are discussed, and the efficiency of these methodologies for certain class of problems is demonstrated. The framework is capable of decompounding when group sizes are either pairwise co-prime or composed of two elements. Under some conditions, the methodologies are generalized to cases where data are recorded in non-equal intervals. It is also not dependent on a restrictive assumption of having some zero observations that exists in conventional decompounding algorithms such as the Panjer recursion algorithm.
Chapter 4 shows how hierarchical decision making and franchising is used as a fine-tuned strategy for brands to both compete aggressively and softly. In a hierarchical decision making process, as a part of long-run plan, the head office of a brand first decides on how many franchises they will grant. At the second stage, the flagships or company owned divisions decide on their level of output and lastly franchises decide how much to produce.
We show brands can use this strategy both as a commitment not to compete fiercely with other brands who share the same cost efficiency and to credibly threaten or possibly keep the inefficient brands out of the market. The efficient brands’ incentive to pre-empt the competition is high when either the market size is small or their cost advantage is substantial.
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Horstmann, Niklas [Verfasser], and J. [Akademischer Betreuer] Krämer. "Tacit Collusion in Oligopolies and Regulated Industries / Niklas Horstmann ; Betreuer: J. Krämer." Karlsruhe : KIT-Bibliothek, 2016. http://d-nb.info/1115251732/34.
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Dowrick, S. "Bargaining over surplus : Oligopolies, workers and the £Tdistribution of income£T." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.377111.
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Pagel-Groba, Beatrice Verfasser], Christian [Akademischer Betreuer] Wey, and Justus [Akademischer Betreuer] [Haucap. "Three Essays on Unionized Oligopolies / Beatrice Pagel-Groba. Gutachter: Christian Wey ; Justus Haucap." Düsseldorf : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek der Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, 2014. http://d-nb.info/1046404512/34.
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Pagel, Beatrice [Verfasser], Christian Akademischer Betreuer] Wey, and Justus [Akademischer Betreuer] [Haucap. "Three Essays on Unionized Oligopolies / Beatrice Pagel-Groba. Gutachter: Christian Wey ; Justus Haucap." Düsseldorf : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek der Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, 2014. http://d-nb.info/1046404512/34.
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Tsai, Shu-yi. "Essays on industries under imperfect competition /." Digital version accessible at:, 2000. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/main.
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Cunningham, Lance Brian. "Oligopoly market models applied to electric utilities : how will generating companies behave in a deregulated industry?" Access restricted to users with UT Austin EID Full text (PDF) from UMI/Dissertation Abstracts International, 2001. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/fullcit?p3023547.
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Gupta, Sudheer. "Strategic aspects of supply chain relations : an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of inter-firm cooperation and competition." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape10/PQDD_0001/NQ44446.pdf.
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Leleno, Joanna M. "A mathematical programming-based analysis of a two stage model of interacting producers." Diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1987. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/77818.
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This dissertation is concerned with the characterization, existence and computation of equilibrium solutions in a two-stage model of interacting producers. The model represents an industry involved with two major stages of production. On the production side there exist some (upstream) firms which perform the first stage of production and manufacture a semi-finished product, and there exist some other (downstream) firms which perform the second stage of production and convert this semi-finished product to a final commodity. There also exist some (vertically integrated) firms which handle the entire production process themselves.
In this research, the final commodity market is an oligopoly which may exhibit one of two possible behavioral patterns: follower-follower or multiple leader-follower. In both cases, the downstream firms are assumed to be price takers in purchasing the intermediate product. For the upstream stage, we consider two situations: a Cournot oligopoly or a perfectly competitive market.
An equilibrium analysis of the model is conducted with output quantities as decision variables. The defined equilibrium solutions employ an inverse derived demand function for the semi-finished product. This function is derived and characterized through the use of mathematical programming problems which represent the equilibrating process in the final commodity market. Based on this analysis, we provide sufficient conditions for the existence (and uniqueness) of an equilibrium solution, under various market assumptions. These conditions are formulated in terms of properties of the cost functions and the final product demand function.
Next, we propose some computational techniques for determining an equilibrium solution. The algorithms presented herein are based on structural properties of the inverse derived demand function and its local approximation. Both convex as well as nonconvex cases are considered.
We also investigate in detail the effects of various integrations among the producers on firms' profits, and on industry outputs and prices at equilibrium. This sensitivity analysis provides rich information and insights for industrial analysts and policy makers into how the foregoing quantities are effected by mergers and collusions and the entry or exit of various types of firms, as well as by differences in market behavior.Ph. D.
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Weiss, Christoph, and Dieter Pennerstorfer. "On the Relative Disadvantage of Cooperatives: Vertical Product Differentiation in a Mixed Oligopoly." Hebrew Univ. Magnes Press, 2012. http://epub.wu.ac.at/5585/1/Pennerstorfer_Weiss_2012_JRC_On_the_Relative_Disadvantage_of_Cooperatives_Accepted_Manuscript.pdf.
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We investigate the incentive to provide goods of high quality in a vertically related market for different types of business organizations, a farmer-owned cooperative and an investor-owned firm. Contrary to the firm, the cooperative is characterized by decentralized decision making, which gives rise to overproduction and problems coordinating the quality decisions of its members (free riding). Comparing both manufacturers acting as monopolists we show that the cooperative will never supply final goods of higher quality than the firm, and that the problem of quality coordination is mitigated if the cooperative succeeds in preventing overproduction. When a cooperative faces competition of an investor-owned firm (mixed duopoly), it will - except in one limit case - never produce final goods of a higher quality than the firm and will deliver lower quality in a number of scenarios.
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Kruse, Jamie Lynette Brown. "Market accessibility and the entry decision: A theoretical and experimental examination." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/184619.
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The role of market accessibility and entry is the central theme of this dissertation. Two theoretical models of oligopoly theory are examined in a controlled laboratory market setting. Experimental testing of Contestability Theory is extended beyond the natural monopoly case and a "safe haven" provides subjects with a viable alternative to the "contestable" market. Evidence reported supports the conclusion that the contestable market is robust to the introduction of the alternate market. The theory of Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly is explored from a game theoretic perspective with special attention to buyer queuing rule assumptions. Experimental evidence underscores sensitivity of market outcomes to the queuing rule adopted. The presence of excess capacity relative to market demand tends to push theoretical Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria toward competitive levels. This result is substantiated by experimental evidence and is independent of the queuing rule assumed. The similarity between the Bertrand-Edgeworth excess capacity case and a contestable natural monopoly market is investigated. The presence of excess capacity/potential entrants is shown to exert more downward pressure on observed laboratory market prices than the presence of additional competitors alone. This result is at odds with the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm. A herfindahl index calculated from experimental results has almost no power to predict market outcome.
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Clemens, Georg [Verfasser]. "Strategic and Behavioral Aspects of (Anti-)Competitive Conduct in Oligopolies: Four Essays in Industrial Organization / Georg Clemens." Düsseldorf : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek der Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, 2014. http://d-nb.info/1048467910/34.
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Cardenas, Oscar Javier. "MIXED OLIGOPOLY, ESSAY ON LOCATION AND CAPITAL OWNERSHIP." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2001. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin991745935.
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Ganjbakhsh, Omid. "St[r]ategic offers in an oligopolistic electricity market under pay-as-bid pricing." Thesis, McGill University, 2008. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=112570.
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Marginal pricing is the traditional pricing method in pool based electricity markets, however pay-as-bid is an alternative that has been the focus of recent studies. One way of comparing the outcomes of these two pricing schemes is by examining their market equilibria. These equilibria have been analyzed in depth for both pricing methods under the assumption of a perfect market. Marginal pricing market equilibria has also been examined under oligopolistic markets, however, the same attention has not been given to oligopolies based on pay-as-bid pricing.In this thesis, we study the possible outcomes of an oligopolistic electricity market under pay-as-bid pricing. For this purpose, we introduce, develop and test a new concept called defensive Nash equilibrium, which combines the risk adverseness of power suppliers with the traditional notion of Nash equilibrium. The test cases studied compare market outcomes between pay-as-bid and marginal pricing under various market power assumptions.
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Sperling, Richard. "Estimating Oligopsony Power in the United States Market for Slaughter Hogs: An Error Correction Approach." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2002. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1024511205.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2002.Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains x, 94 p.; also includes graphics. Includes abstract and vita. Advisor: Ian M. Sheldon, Dept. of Agricultural, Environmental, and Development Economics. Includes bibliographical pdnerences (p. 83-94).
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Lovatón, Palacios David. "The Inter-American balance between plurality of information and media concentration." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2014. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/116379.
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Freedom of speech as a basic right is the starting point of the article. The Inter-American legal framework contributes pondering on the importance plurality and the vast array of information have in the validity of this right and democracy in general. This consideration is done from the standards given by the Commission reports and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights case law. The article ponders on how and how much the exercise of freedom of speech right is affected by the excessive concentrationof personal property and control over the media.El artículo toma como punto de partida que la libertad de expresión forma parte del corpus de derechos fundamentales que el marco jurídico interamericano para reflexionar sobre la importancia de la pluralidad y la diversidad de la información tienen para la vigencia de este derecho y de la democracia en general. Esta reflexión se realiza a partir de los estándares construidos por los informes de la Comisión y la jurisprudencia de la Corte interamericanas. El texto reflexiona sobre cuánto y cómo afecta, al pleno ejercicio de la libertad de expresión, la excesiva concentración de la propiedad privada y del control de los medios de comunicación.
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Hasan, Ebrahim A. Rahman. "Strategic Genco offers in electric energy markets cleared by merit order." Thesis, McGill University, 2008. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=115916.
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In an electricity market cleared by merit-order economic dispatch we identify necessary and sufficient conditions under which the market outcomes supported by pure strategy Nash equilibria (NE) exist when generating companies (Gencos) game through continuously variable incremental cost (IC) block offers. A Genco may own any number of units, each unit having multiple blocks with each block being offered at a constant IC.Next, a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) scheme devoid of approximations or iterations is developed to identify all possible NE. The MILP scheme is systematic and general but computationally demanding for large systems. Thus, an alternative significantly faster lambda-iterative approach that does not require the use of MILP was also developed.
Once all NE are found, one critical question is to identify the one whose corresponding gaming strategy may be considered by all Gencos as being the most rational. To answer this, this thesis proposes the use of a measure based on the potential profit gain and loss by each Genco for each NE. The most rational offer strategy for each Genco in terms of gaming or not gaming that best meets their risk/benefit expectations is the one corresponding to the NE with the largest gain to loss ratio.
The computation of all NE is tested on several systems of up to ninety generating units, each with four incremental cost blocks. These NE are then used to examine how market power is influenced by market parameters, specifically, the number of competing Gencos, their size and true ICs, as well as the level of demand and price cap.
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Reiber, Oliver. "Wettbewerbsverhalten der deutschen Mineralölindustrie im Kraftstoffeinzelhandel, insbesondere Preisverhalten : zur Bestimmung von Kollusion und kollektiver Marktbeherrschung im Kartellrecht /." Frankfurt, M. ; New York, NY : Lang, 2009. http://d-nb.info/995244642/04.
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Thai, Doan Hoang Cau Australian Graduate School of Management Australian School of Business UNSW. "Analysing tacit collusion in oligopolistic electricity markets using a co-evolutionary approach." Awarded by:University of New South Wales. Australian Graduate School of Management, 2005. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/22478.
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Wholesale electricity markets now operate in many countries around the world. These markets determine a spot price for electricity as the clearing price when generators bid in energy at various prices. As the trading in a wholesale electricity market can be seen as a dynamic repeated game, it would be expected that profit maximising generators learn to engage in tacit collusion to profitably increase spot market prices. This thesis investigates this tacit collusion of generators in oligopolistic electricity markets. We do not follow the approach of previous work in game theory that presupposes firms' collusive strategies to enforce collusion in an oligopoly. Instead, we develop a co-evolutionary approach (extending previous work in this area) using a genetic algorithm (GA) to co-evolve strategies for all generators in some stylised models of an electricity market. The bidding strategy of each generator is modelled as a set of bidding actions, one for each possible discrete state of the state space observed by the generator. The market trading interactions are simulated to determine the fitness of a particular strategy. The tacitly collusive outcomes and strategies emerging from computational experiments are thus obtained from the learning or evolutionary process instead of from any pre-specification. Analysing many of those emergent collusive outcomes and strategies. we are able to specify the mechanism of tacit collusion and investigate how the market environment can affect it. We find that the learned collusive strategies are similar to the forgiving trigger strategies of classical supergame theory (Green and Porter, 1984). Also using computational experiments, we can determine which characteristics of the market environment encourage or hinder tacit collusion. The findings from this thesis provide insights on tacit collusion in an oligopoly and policy implications from a learning perspective. With modelling flexibility, our co-evolutionary approach can be extended to study strategic behaviour in an oligopoly considering many other market characteristics.
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Nothhelfer, Wolfgang. "Die leverage theory im europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht." Baden-Baden Nomos, 2006. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&docl̲ibrary=BVB01&docn̲umber=014939714&linen̲umber=0001&funcc̲ode=DBR̲ECORDS&servicet̲ype=MEDIA.
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Stroux, Sigrid. "US and EC oligopoly control /." The Hague : Kluwer law international, 2004. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb392226564.
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von, Negenborn Colin. "Essays in Economic Design." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/21217.
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Diese Dissertation befasst sich in drei voneinander unabhängigen Kapiteln mit dem Forschungsfeld des ökonomischen Designs. Das "Design" von Situationen wirtschaftlicher Interaktion hat zum Ziel, den Verlauf und das Ergebnis der jeweiligen Interaktion zu steuern. In dieser Arbeit werden mathematisch-theoretische "Designs" zum einen formal entwickelt und diese zum anderen durch politische oder soziale Institutionen realisiert. Das erste Kapitel thematisiert die Implementierung von Sozialwahlfunktionen in einem kollusiven Umfeld. Es wird gezeigt, wie die gezielte Schaffung von asymmetrischer Information zwischen den kolludierenden Parteien deren Koordination erschweren und die Implementierung erleichtern kann. Im zweiten Kapitel wird dieser Ansatz im Kontext der Bestechlichkeit bei Finanzaudits angewendet. Korruption kann verhindert werden, wenn der bestechliche Akteure eine Warnung über anstehende Kontrollen erhält, nicht jedoch der bestechende Akteur. Das dritte Kapitel wiederum untersucht "Design" in Form von Markt- und Wettbewerbsregulierung. Eine Beschränkung des Wettbewerbs - durch eine Begrenzung der Zahl miteinander konkurrierender Firmen - kann entgegen der ökonomischen Intuition wohlfahrtsoptimierend sein.This thesis contributes to the field of economic design in three independent chapters. Taking the perspective of a "designer", it derives formal solutions in the framework of economic theory and suggests political as well as social institutions to put these solutions to practice. The first chapter employs mechanism design to mitigate the problem of collusion. It shows how the implementation of social choice functions can be achieved by introducing asymmetric information into a system prone to collusion. In the second chapter, this methodology is applied to the context of corruption in auditing. Bribery is impeded by selectively warning one - and only one - of the corruptive parties about upcoming inspections. Finally, the third chapter studies market regulation as a means of "design". Contrary to economic intuition, it may be beneficial in terms of welfare to limit competition by restricting the number of firms allowed to enter a market.
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Benchekroun, Hassan. "Contraintes de production en oligopoles de ressources naturelles." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp02/NQ31484.pdf.
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Gavrel, Frédéric. "Oligopole de Bertrand et information imparfaite." Paris 1, 1991. http://www.theses.fr/1991PA010031.
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Venayre, Florent. "Echanges d'informations dans les oligopoles et politique de concurrence." Montpellier 1, 2001. http://www.theses.fr/2001MON10054.
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Cette thèse traite du problème des échanges d'informations dans les oligopoles et de la politique de la concurrence des autorités françaises et communautaires à l'égard de ces échanges d'informations. La littérature statique sur les échanges d'informations analyse dans un cadre non coopératif le mécanisme de formation des incitations des oligopoleurs à l'échange de l'information ainsi que l'impact des échanges d'informations sur le bien-être des consommateurs et de la collectivité. Ses résultats indiquent que les échanges d'informations peuvent émerger comme des mécanismes non collusoires de marché et qu'ils sont également suceptibles, sous certaines conditions, d'avoir des effets positifs sur le bien-être social. Néanmoins, la position des autorités de la concurrence à l'égard des échanges d'informations est fondée sur la notion de facteur facilitant l'émergence d'une collusion, ce qui échappe à la pertinence des modèles statiques. La prise en compte des enseignements de la littérature statique ne peut donc s'effectuer que conjointement aux résultats de la littérature sur la collusion dynamique qui sous-tendent la position des autorités. La mise en perspective de ces deux approches et les résultats des quatre modèles originaux qui sont proposés au cours de ce travail permettent d'obtenir des éléments de réflexion concernant l'opportunité et, le cas échéant, la direction d'une intervention des autorités. Le dernier chapitre de cette thèse propose à cet effet une étude des jurisprudences française et communautaire. La position des autorités est présentée et discutée au regard des résultats des modèles exposés ou établis. Des dispositions normatives sont proposées qui permettraient à la fois de combattre efficacement les pratiques restrictives les plus graves tout en préservant les aspects positifs que les échanges d'informations peuvent parfois présenter, tant sur le plan de l'efficacité de l'industrie que sur celui du bien-être de la collectivité.
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Sol, Emmanuel. "Le leadership dans les oligopoles dynamiques : émergence, affaiblissement et protection." Montpellier 1, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000MON10009.
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Ce travail traite du leadership dans le cadre d'un oligopole. Nous nous efforçons de répondre aux questions centrales de ce sujet : comment apparaît un leader et quelles stratégies sont mises en oeuvre par les firmes évoluant dans un environnement de ce type pour modifier la répartition du marché. Les objectifs en terme de parts de marché sont fondamentaux dans la définition des stratégies par les dirigeants d'entreprises. Aussi, nous avons choisi de présenter dans un premier temps, les modèles explicatifs du leadership dans le cadre oligopolistique qui mettent en avant l'importance du partage des marchés dans les choix des firmes. Dans un deuxième temps, nous nous sommes intéressés à la vision de la compétition moderne que proposent des spécialistes de management. En effet, plusieurs d'entre eux suggèrent que l'objectif fondamental des parts de marché ne peut être atteint aujourd'hui qu'au travers d'une redéfinition profonde des stratégies des entreprises, les concepts économiques traditionnels n'étant plus adaptés aux exigences actuelles de la concurrence, notamment suite à l'émergence de nouvelles technologies. De ce fait, nous avons tenté de réconcilier la théorie économique classique avec la vision des spécialistes de management. En s'appuyant sur un marché typiquement "moderne', celui des logiciels de navigation sur internet, nous avons voulu montrer, en proposant des modélisations de stratégies de protection et d'affaiblissement du leadership, que les événements qui se sont déroulés ces dernières années sur ce secteur d'activité correspondent effectivement à l'approche stratégique suggérée par ces spécialistes du management, tout en demeurant dans le cadre de la théorie économique traditionnelle. Pour finir, nous analysons une de ces stratégies au travers de l'économie expérimentale, pour tenter de mieux appréhender la pertinence d'une possible généralisation de ces approches de la compétition entre les firmes.
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Habersaat, Marc. "Gemeinsame Marktbeherrschung und Europäisches Kartellrecht : das Oligopol in der Europäischen Rechtsprechung /." Göttingen : Cuvillier, 2002. http://www.gbv.de/dms/spk/sbb/recht/toc/35249008X.pdf.
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Gerlach, Mathias. "Markteintrittswettbewerb in homogenen Oligopolen : Ein experimentelles Strategieturnier /." Mering, Schwab : Hampp, R, 2010. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=3436270&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
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Robert, Marc. "La discrimination par les prix du troisième degré dans les marchés oligopolistiques." Montpellier 1, 2004. http://www.theses.fr/2004MON10076.
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Cette thèse traite de la richesse stratégique de la pratique commerciale de la discrimination par les prix. La discrimination a été très largement étudiée dans le contexte monopolistique. Ce travail, quant à lui, analyse exclusivement l'utilisation de prix discriminatoires dans des marchés oligopolistiques. Nous proposons un ensemble de modèles destinés à répondre à un certain nombre d'interrogations concernant à la fois la motivation et les effets de l'utilisation de ces prix discriminatoires. Nous utilisons une formalisation spatiale de la discrimination similaire à celle de Thisse et Vives (88), basée sur les travaux d'Hotelling (29). Ce cadre théorique évolue progressivement au cours de trois modèles originaux afin d'aboutir à une représentation plus globale, dans laquelle nous analysons une discrimination multicritère. Les trois derniers chapitres exposent certaines possibilités stratégiques non explorées de la discrimination. Ils démontrent que cette stratégie peut être utilisée par les firmes, premièrement dans l'intérêt de tous les consommateurs en les protégeant de prix trop élevés, deuxièmement pour se prémunir d'un comportement prédateur d'une firme rivale (forclusion) et troisièmement afin de se protéger de consommateurs malveillants (pirates informatiques). Le principal résultat de cette analyse montre que la discrimination du troisième degré est un outil stratégique qui apporte une multitude de possibilités aux firmes qui l'utilisent. Dans les marchés oligopolistiques, la discrimination ne sera pas seulement adoptée par les firmes pour récupérer une partie du surplus des consommateurs ou pour obtenir un avantage compétitif sur leurs rivales, mais au contraire, elle sera choisie pour empêcher la mise en place d'une stratégie agressive autre que la discrimination. Elle peut être employée pour la défense des consommateurs comme pour celle des firmes privées. Ces résultats sont mis en évidence dans des modèles certes théoriques, mais dont l'ancrage est solidement fait dans des situations industrielles réelles, en particulier dans le secteur de l'informatique.
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Choy, Emmett. "Hong Kong's Economic Freedom and Income Inequality." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2013. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/718.
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Hong Kong is considered to be the most economically free country in the world, but also has the highest amount of income inequality of any developed country. The Hong Kong government is able to sustain laissez faire policies due to its monopoly on land supply. Maintaining high property values allows the government to maximize revenue from property tax, which acts as a hidden tax. A major contributor to income inequality is the formation of oligopolies in Hong Kong that creates an anticompetitive environment. The interests of the government and oligarchs are aligned as both obtain significant portions of revenue from the property sector. As globalization makes Hong Kong even more vulnerable to external shocks, the government faces the challenges of increasing competition, diversifying its revenue streams, and closing the income gap while standing by its principles in order maintain regional competitiveness as an international business hub.
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Bonazzi, Christophe. "R&D industrielle et concurrence : cas de l'agrochimie et de la pharmacie." Paris, ENMP, 1993. http://www.theses.fr/1993ENMP0701.
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Cette these a pour objet l'analyse des metiers des laboratoires de recherche et de developpement des industries de l'agrochimie et de la pharmacie. A partir d'une analyse empirique approfondie, l'auteur critique la litterature academique de l'innovation, et propose une theorie de la r&d. Cette derniere permet de decomposer la r&d d'un point de vue statique, et de comprendre son evolution et sa contribution au mode de croissance des secteurs ou elle est strategique comme les oligopoles differencies. Le presuppose de base, demontre par l'observation, est que la r&d est un metier industriel. Elle vise donc a fournir a l'entreprise des avantages concurrentiels, ici des monopoles temporaires et locaux. La rentabilite de la r&d se calcule par le rapport entre investissement et rente de monopole temporaire. L'auteur distingue la r&d d'imitation, d'exploitation et d'exploration. La premiere est fondee sur l'observation de la concurrence, sur des methodes connues et sur la rapidite. La seconde repose sur des methodes routinieres et des objectifs de recherches calques sur les plus grands marches existants. Elle propose des innovations dans la continuite. La troisieme vise a renouveler les methodes de recherche et/ou les marches vises. Elle comporte un tres haut degre de risque et s'evalue sur le long terme. Au cours des periodes de changements technologiques, certaines techniques eprouvees par la recherche d'exploration prennent le statut de recherche d'exploitation et deviennent des routines. Lors de ces transitions, les barrieres concurrentielles s'abaissent puis l'oligopole differencie se reconstitue. Ainsi s'explique l'histoire de l'agrochimieThis study analyses the know-how and the work achieved by the corporate research and development centers in the agrochemistry and pharmaceutical industry. It is based on an thorough empirical analysis and a comprehensive critical review of the academic literature on innovation in industrial economics. The author gives a new theory of industrial r&d that enables to brake it into three categories from a static point of view, and to better understand its dynamic evolution as well as its contribution to the firms competitiveness in sector where it is strategic such as in differentiated oligopolies the basic hypothesis, built on observation, is that r&d is an industrial activity, therefore it aims at producing competitive advantages to the firm, in this case temporary and local monopolies. The profitability of r&d can be calculated by comparing the investment with the monopolies benefits. The author brakes r&d into three types: imitation, exploitation and exploration. The first is based on short term competitors observation, wellknown methods and speed. The second, with the biggest budget, is based on routine methods. Its goals are based on the analysis of the existing greatest markets. It proposes product innovation within technological continuity. The last is devoted to the replacement of the r&d science base, methodologies and/or markets. It is highly risky and can only be evaluated on the long term. In the periods of technological changes, some methods move from exploratory r&d to exploitation r&d. They become routines. In those transition period, the competitive game is more open before the differentiated oligopoly is slowly reconsolidated. History of agrochemistry can be explained like that
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Kabré, Béné-Wendé Anicet. "Politiques environnementales et pollution dans des modèles d'oligopole bilatéral." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris 10, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA100138.
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Les Gaz à Effet de Serre (GES) jouent un rôle crucial dans la régulation du climat. Le changement climatique, conséquence de l'accumulation de GES dans l'atmosphère, a de nombreux impacts tels que les phénomènes météorologiques extrêmes (tempêtes, ouragans, cyclones, inondations, canicules, sécheresses), la disparition d'espèces animales et végétales, la prévalence croissante des maladies liées à la pollution atmosphérique (santé respiratoire par exemple). La pollution industrielle contribue au changement climatique. Par ailleurs, les firmes produisant un même bien sont en perpétuelle concurrence et leurs niveaux d'émission diffèrent selon leur technologie et leur pouvoir de marché. Compte tenu de ces effets néfastes croissants des agents économiques sur l'environnement, il est nécessaire que des politiques publiques soient mises en place pour réduire les émissions de GES.L'objectif de la thèse est triple. D'une part, elle vise à analyser la pollution dans des structures de marchés où tous les agents se comportent de manière stratégique (concurrence oligopolistique). D'autre part, elle vise à effectuer des exercices de statique comparative afin de mesurer les effets des variations de paramètres sur les équilibres stratégiques. Enfin, elle étudie différentes politiques publiques pour réguler les émissions liées à cette pollution. Notons ici que la thèse porte plus sur l'atténuation que sur l'adaptation au changement climatique.Le domaine exploré se situe au croisement de l'économie de l'environnement, et des jeux stratégiques de marchéGreenhouse gases (GHG) play a crucial role in climate regulation. Climate change, due to the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere, has many consequences such as extremes weather events (storms, hurricanes, cyclones, floods, heat waves, droughts), extinction of animal and plant species, the increasing prevalence in diseases related to air pollution (e.g.,health respiratory). Industrial pollution contributes to climate change. Moreover, firms which produce the same good are in constant competition and their emission levels differ according to their technology and market power. Facing these deteriorating effects of the behaviour of economic agents on the environment, it is necessary to implement public policies to alleviate GHG emissions.The objective of this thesis is threefold. On the one hand, it aims to analyze pollution in market structures where all agents behave strategically (oligopolistic competition). On the other hand, it aims to carry out comparative static exercises in order to capture the effects of parameter variations on strategic equilibria. Finally, it studies different public policies to regulate emissions related to this pollution. It should be noted here that the thesis focuses more on mitigation than adaptation to climate change.The explored domain is at the junction of environmental economics, and strategic market games
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Tito, Santa Cruz Edwin Gustavo, and Tello Gastón Cesar Otero. "El sector aeronáutico peruano se comporta como un mercado oligopólico." Master's thesis, Universidad del Pacífico, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/11354/1145.
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La evolución del transporte aéreo en el Perú ha pasado por varias fases, estando hasta unos pocos años concentrado en pocos operadores y sin lograr la masificación entre los usuarios. En la década de los 70"s y 80"s la mayor parte de las aerolíneas eran estatales, pero por el impulso que se dio sobre todo a AeroPerú está línea dejo de ser local para convertirse en internacional. En los 90's el proceso de apertura comercial y desregulación de la actividad comercial llevado a cabo, trajo consigo un mejoramiento del marco legal orientado a captar mayores flujos de inversión.
Actualmente, el mercado aerocomercial domestico está conformado principalmente por cinco empresas: LAN Perú, Star Perú, Taca Perú, Peruvian Airlines y LC Busre; las mismas que cubren el territorio nacional y, entre ellas, presentan diferentes niveles de calidad e infraestructura.
Sin embargo, a raíz de la crisis del 2008 originada por la volatilidad del precio del petróleo, que alcanzó los US$145 (en julio 2008) y la crisis financiera mundial, que generó una caída brusca en el turismo, en el mercado aerocomercial se experimentó un cambio significativo con la salida del segundo operador de transporte de pasajeros, la empresa Aerocóndor quien movilizaba el 18% del tráfico aéreo; y la entrada de un nuevo operador en el 2009, Peruvian Airlines.
En el 2011, el mercado presenta un comportamiento más dinámico que muestra a empresas compitiendo en la participación de la industria aerocomercial. Ya se registra que, en el 2010, las principales líneas aéreas tenían el 98.04% del tráfico mensual de pasajeros carga/correo y aterrizajes por compañías a nivel nacional
En este contexto, el presente estudio evalúa las condiciones de competencia en el sector aerocomercial y plantea que, bajo las condiciones actuales, el mercado peruano se convertiría en un oligopolio donde operarían tres líneas aéreas.
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Aubry, Pascal. "Les parties à l'entente : approche de la notion d'entreprise." Paris 1, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000PA010319.
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Envisager les parties a une entente suppose de se referer a la notion d'entreprise. Si ce concept est fortement ancre dans la science economique, il n'a pas, si ce n'est en droit de la concurrence, ete consacre par le droit. Et meme si certains auteurs ont essaye d'en donner une traduction juridique, il semble que ces efforts de conceptualisation aient echoue. Or, il serait regrettable que les veritables acteurs du jeu ne se reconnaissent pas dans la facon dont les theoriciens du droit en parlent. En fait, il semble que la notion d'entreprise tende a s'eloigner, par l'effet de ce droit, de l'analyse classique, tant economique que juridique, qui voit en elle une entite economique, pour devenir une unite economique. A cet egard, l'apprehension des modifications de la structure interne des societes et de la situation de l'agence commerciale et par le droit de la collusion est revelatrice de la souplesse du concept d'entreprise par rapport aux notions juridiques traditionnelles. Mais, c'est surtout lorsque l'on confronte ce droit aux phenomenes de concentration que sont les groupes de societes, les creations d'entreprises communes ou encore les structures de marche oligopolistiques que l'on s'apercoit de l'ampleur des bouleversements apportes a la science juridique. Il reflete plus exactement que les notions d'associations et de societes la realite du monde des affaires. Le pragmatisme de la matiere doit inciter les autres branches du droit a en tenir compte et notamment a accorder a l'entreprise la personnalite juridique qu'elle merite.
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Dhif, Mohamed Adel. "Renégociation, stabilité et équilibres d'oligopole." Toulouse 1, 1990. http://www.theses.fr/1990TOU10007.
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Ce travail étudie certains problèmes liés à la caractérisation du comportement rationnel dans les interactions stratégiques d'oligopole. La première partie traite de l'impact de la renégociation sur la robustesse des équilibres de Nash parfaits. Nous passons en revue les principaux résultats de la littérature sur ce sujet et nous examinons les conséquences de la renégociation sur les possibilités de collusion dans la répétition d'un oligopole de Cournot. Dans une deuxième partie, nous présentons le concept d'un ensemble stable suggéré par Kohlberg et Mertens, nous utilisons ce concept pour résoudre complètement un jeu de duopole à deux étapes et nous le confrontons a d'autres raffinements récents de l'équilibre de NashThis work studies some problems related to the caracterization of the rational behaviour in oligopoly strategic interactions. The first part deals with the impact of renegotiation on the consistency of subgame perfect equilibria. We review the main results in the literture about this subject and we examine the possibilities of collusion in finite horizon repeated oligopoly games when players are able to renegociate their actions. In the second part we present the stable set concept suggested by Kohlberg and Mertens. We make use of it in the solution of a two step duopoly game and we compare this concept to other recent refinements of Nash equilibrium
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Meunier, Guy. "Concurrence oligopolistique et investissement : application aux marchés électriques." Paris, EHESS, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008EHES0012.
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La libéralisation des secteurs électriques est une réforme majeure d'un secteur clef des économies modernes entamée à la fin du XXème siècle. La mise en place de marchés de l'électricité et le développement de la concurrence soulèvent d'importantes questions pratiques et théoriques quant à l'efficacité de ce mode d'organisation. Alors que dans la plupart des pays d'Europe d'importants investissements en capacités de production sont nécessaires, la thèse analyse les incitations à investir des producteurs dans des situations de concurrence imparfaite. La thèse comporte quatre chapitres rassemblés en deux parties. Le premier chapitre analyse le problème du choix d'un mix technologique pour satisfaire une demande variable par des firmes asymétriques. Le second chapitre porte sur l'interaction entre économie d'échelle et concurrence. Le troisième analyse l'intervention d'une firme publique qui investit pour compenser les défaillances d'investissements des firmes privés. Enfin, le dernier chapitre porte sur les marchés de permis d'émissions et les liens que ceux-ci créent entre des marchés initialement isolésLiberalisation of electricity markets is a major reform of a key sector of modem economies. One motivation behind the market reforms in electricity industries is to encourage efficient investment in the optimal mix of technologies. But there are growing concerns about the ability of the new liberalized market regime to induce sufficient investment in building capacity, in the optimal technology mix. The thesis deals with the issue of investment by an oligopoly of producers in an electricity market. It is composed of four chapters. The first chapter analyzes the strategic choice of capacity with several technologies and heterogeneous producers when demand is variable. The second chapter analyzes how economies of scale interact with imperfect competition emphasizing the difficulty to invest in nuclear capacity. The third chapter analyzes the intervention of a public firm that aims to compensate a lack of private investment. And finally the forth chapter deals with the issue of emissions permits markets. It is stressed that an integrated emissions market creates relation between markets initially isolated
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Silva, Ana Lucia Gonçalves da 1955. "Concorrencia sob condições oligopolisticas : contribuição das analises centradas no grau de atomização/concentração dos mercados." [s.n.], 2003. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/286471.
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Orientador: Luciano Galvão CoutinhoTese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia
Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-03T18:24:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silva_AnaLuciaGoncalvesda_D.pdf: 8871530 bytes, checksum: f5a7ae15efa97fa7b5c74fa541ca778d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2003
Doutorado
Teoria Economica
Doutor em Ciências Econômicas
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Cochinard, Sébastien. "Structures oligopolistiques et relations d'interface en théorie des jeux." Paris 9, 1998. https://portail.bu.dauphine.fr/fileviewer/index.php?doc=1998PA090008.
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Notre thèse a pour objet la prise en compte de l'interface définie comme la possibilité pour une entreprise de participer à des jeux de compétition simultanés. Elle s'inscrit dans la problématique des structures de marché oligopolistiques avec fusions. Dans une première partie, nous analysons les différentes approches de l'interface à travers leurs liens avec la problématique de l'oligopole dans la littérature économique, qu'il s'agisse d'approches indépendantes de la théorie des jeux ou liées à la théorie des jeux. Nous faisons ensuite appel à la littérature des sciences de gestion afin d'analyser la prise en compte qu'elle opère des phénomènes d'alliance. Nous concluons cette partie en développant une nouvelle approche de l'interface par la théorie des jeux abstraits. Dans une deuxième partie, nous proposons une modélisation de l'interface en nous basant sur un modèle de jeu de formation des coalitions dans les structures de marche oligopolistiques (espinosa et inarra, 1995). Apres avoir rappelé nos hypothèses générales et les concepts de solution fondamentaux, nous élaborons un modèle d'analyse de la stabilité des graphes de compétition. Le concept de solution employé à cette fin est l'ensemble stable abstrait au sens de (Von Neumann et Morgenstern, 1944). Le cadre formel est complété par des exemples numériques de calculs d'ensembles stables, puis nous proposons des extensions de notre modèle à des situations célèbres de compétition industrielle : le magasin à succursales multiples et la ville circulaire. La troisième partie de la thèse examine les structures de marché dans le secteur des programmes de maintenance du matériel militaire à l'aide d'exemples empiriques. Nous confrontons les résultats obtenus avec d'autres études empiriques utilisant des méthodologies différentes. La conclusion générale permet d'apprécier les extensions et les limites de notre modèleOur thesis aims at taking into account "interlinkage" defined as the possibility that firms play simultaneous competition games. It belongs to oligopolistic market structures with mergers litterature. In the first part, we analyze several approaches of interlinkage through their relations to game-theoretic and non game-theoretic oligolipoly literature. We consider further management science litterature with respect to alliances theories. We conclude this part developping a new approach to interlinkage in an abstract game- theroretic setting. The second part is devoted to an interlinkage model based on a coalition formation game in oligopolistic market structures (espinosa et inarra, 1995). General assumptions and fundamental solution concepts being recalled, we build a model that enables analyzing the stability of "competition graphs". The solution concept used for that purpose is the von neumann et morgenstern (1944) abstract stable set. Theoretic frameword is completed by computing numeric examples of stable sets, then we propose extensions of our model to famous situations of industrial competition : chain-store and circular town. The third part gives empiric examples of market structures in the armes industrial sector. We compare our results with other empiric studies using different methods. Our conclusion exhibits limits and potential extensions of our model
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Palma, André de. "Oligopole et différenciation des produits : une contribution à l'étude de la concurrence imparfaite." Dijon, 1988. http://www.theses.fr/1988DIJOE006.
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La thèse est constituée de deux parties. Dans la première partie, nous établissons un lien entre trois types différents d'approche utilisés pour décrire la demande pour des biens différenciés. La première approche est celle des modèles de choix discrets à utilité stochastique. La seconde approche est celle du consommateur représentatif. En particulier nous établissons aussi un lien entre le modèle "CES" et les modèles de choix discret. La troisième approche correspond à la représentation dans l'espace des caractéristiques (à la Lancaster). La seconde partie de la thèse propose l'utilisation des modèles de choix discret dans le cadre de l'étude de la concurrence oligopolistique. Nous analysons d'abord la concurrence en qualité et en prix. Nous analysons ensuite la concurrence en localisation et en prix dans le cadre du modèle d'hotelling. Nous montrons que les questions de non-existence peuvent être résolues lorsque les biens sont suffisamment différencies et nous comparons différentes politiques spatialesThe thesis is subdivided in two parts. In the first one, we establish a connection between three different approaches used to describe the demand for differentiated products. The first approach corresponds to the discrete choice stochastic utility models. The second approach is the representative consumer approach. In particular, we establish a connection between the ces model and the nested logit model. The third approach corresponds to the lancasterian or characteristic approach. In the second part of this thesis, we use the discrete choice models to study oligopolistic competition. First, we analyse the competition in price and quality. Then, we analyse spatial and price competition within the hotelling framework. We show that a nash equilibrium will always exist when consumer tastes are sufficiently heterogeneous. We also compare different spatial price policies
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Daidj, Nabyla. "Les stratégies de coopération dans les industries de haute technologie." Paris 1, 1994. http://www.theses.fr/1994PA010068.
Full textAbstract:
Dans ce travail, après avoir tout d'abord défini le concept de coopération inter-firmes (en insistant sur la spécificité des alliances dites stratégiques), nous avons adopté une typologie des accords en fonction des principales activités (R&D, production et commercialisation) que nous avons appliqué aux secteurs de haute technologie. En effet, on observe une accélération des formes de relations contractuelles inter-entreprises dans ces domaines. Il nous a paru cependant nécessaire de restreindre notre investigation a un secteur. Notre choix s'est porte sur l'industrie spatiale qui a un certain nombre de caractéristiques qui la différencient des autres secteurs de pointe. Celles-ci sont importantes à souligner parce qu'elles ont des répercussions sur le nombre, la nature et l'orientation des alliances. Les alliances stratégiques soulèvent des questions théoriques fondamentales. Dans la mesure ou les motivations des alliances sont multiples, nous avons constaté que leur analyse ne saurait se réduire à une théorie et qu'il n'existe pas actuellement de "théorie synthétique" des alliances à l'instar de celle de la multinationalisation des firmes. Nous avons donc été amenés à expliquer les accords de coopération dans le cadre des "nouvelles théories de la firme" (analyse des couts de transaction, théorie des droits de propriété et de l'agence). Toutefois, celles-ci n'apportent pas de réponse totalement satisfaisante à l'existence et à l'émergence des alliances stratégiques. Elles ne prennent pas en compte les difficultés auxquelles les firmes se heurtent en situation d'oligopole lorsqu'elles cherchent à se repartir des marchés (barrières à l'entrée), à imposer une technologie nouvelle (course technologique). Les alliances doivent être considérées comme des stratégies de réaction des entreprises face à d'autres firmes au sein d'un oligopole. Elles sont également liées à l'interdépendance très étroite entre les pouvoirs publics (à l'origine d'un nouvel avantage, l'avantage construit) et les firmes notamment dans le secteur spatialThe main aim of this study is to introduce current thinking on the economic analysis of strategie alliances. First, we begn with the definition of inter-firm cooperation, paying particular attention to the specificity of strategic alliances between rivals. We adopt a typology of agreements depending on the main activities within the firm (r&d, production, marketing and sales) and we apply it to cooperation in high-tech industries. In fact, the past ten or fifteen years have seen a great and rapid increase of cooperative relations between firms in these industrial fields. We focus on cooperation in the space industry because it raises fundamental issues. The remainder of this work deals with recent theoretical developments on cooperation. As the motivations of alliances are multiple, there is a great variety and breadth of literature on such cooperation. In this considerable diversity in the material, we have emphasized topics which are more pertinent to the understanding of agreements in the space sector. A first theme covers the main contributions to the economic theory of the firm. We look at three areas in which important developments have taken place : the transactional-cost approach, the property rights theory and the principal-agent model. These analyses provide relevant answers to the problem of vertical cooperation but can't explain the existence and the development of strategic alliances. These alliances must be considered in terms of strategic firm behavior in situations of oligopolistic interdependence and technological race. Firms cooperate with others in order to gain an advantage over actual or potential rivals by deterring entry and or getting around barriers. In the space industry, firms and governments act strategically which have important consequences for the nature of alliances. States can create a new sort of advantage for firms called "strategic"