Relevant bibliographies by topics / Oligopolies – Mathematical models

Academic literature on the topic 'Oligopolies – Mathematical models'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 10 March 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Oligopolies – Mathematical models"

1

Matsumoto, Akio, and Ferenc Szidarovszky. "Dynamic Models of Pollution Penalties and Rewards with Time Delays." Abstract and Applied Analysis 2020 (July 6, 2020): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/3162634.

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In cases of nonpoint pollution sources, the regulator can observe the total emission but unable to distinguish between the firms. The regulator then selects an environmental standard. If the total emission level is higher than the standard, then the firms are uniformly punished, and if lower, then uniformly awarded. This environmental regulation is added to n-firm dynamic oligopolies, and the asymptotical behavior of the corresponding dynamic systems is examined. Two particular models are considered with linear and hyperbolic price functions. Without delays, the equilibrium is always (locally) asymptotically stable. It is shown how the stability can be lost if time delays are introduced in the output quantities of the competitors as well as in the firms’ own output levels. Complete stability analysis is presented for the resulting one- and two-delay models including the derivations of stability thresholds, stability switching curves, and directions of the stability switches.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Oligopolies – Mathematical models"

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Ganjbakhsh, Omid. "St[r]ategic offers in an oligopolistic electricity market under pay-as-bid pricing." Thesis, McGill University, 2008. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=112570.

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Marginal pricing is the traditional pricing method in pool based electricity markets, however pay-as-bid is an alternative that has been the focus of recent studies. One way of comparing the outcomes of these two pricing schemes is by examining their market equilibria. These equilibria have been analyzed in depth for both pricing methods under the assumption of a perfect market. Marginal pricing market equilibria has also been examined under oligopolistic markets, however, the same attention has not been given to oligopolies based on pay-as-bid pricing.
In this thesis, we study the possible outcomes of an oligopolistic electricity market under pay-as-bid pricing. For this purpose, we introduce, develop and test a new concept called defensive Nash equilibrium, which combines the risk adverseness of power suppliers with the traditional notion of Nash equilibrium. The test cases studied compare market outcomes between pay-as-bid and marginal pricing under various market power assumptions.
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Hasan, Ebrahim A. Rahman. "Strategic Genco offers in electric energy markets cleared by merit order." Thesis, McGill University, 2008. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=115916.

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In an electricity market cleared by merit-order economic dispatch we identify necessary and sufficient conditions under which the market outcomes supported by pure strategy Nash equilibria (NE) exist when generating companies (Gencos) game through continuously variable incremental cost (IC) block offers. A Genco may own any number of units, each unit having multiple blocks with each block being offered at a constant IC.
Next, a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) scheme devoid of approximations or iterations is developed to identify all possible NE. The MILP scheme is systematic and general but computationally demanding for large systems. Thus, an alternative significantly faster lambda-iterative approach that does not require the use of MILP was also developed.
Once all NE are found, one critical question is to identify the one whose corresponding gaming strategy may be considered by all Gencos as being the most rational. To answer this, this thesis proposes the use of a measure based on the potential profit gain and loss by each Genco for each NE. The most rational offer strategy for each Genco in terms of gaming or not gaming that best meets their risk/benefit expectations is the one corresponding to the NE with the largest gain to loss ratio.
The computation of all NE is tested on several systems of up to ninety generating units, each with four incremental cost blocks. These NE are then used to examine how market power is influenced by market parameters, specifically, the number of competing Gencos, their size and true ICs, as well as the level of demand and price cap.
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3

Thai, Doan Hoang Cau Australian Graduate School of Management Australian School of Business UNSW. "Analysing tacit collusion in oligopolistic electricity markets using a co-evolutionary approach." Awarded by:University of New South Wales. Australian Graduate School of Management, 2005. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/22478.

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Wholesale electricity markets now operate in many countries around the world. These markets determine a spot price for electricity as the clearing price when generators bid in energy at various prices. As the trading in a wholesale electricity market can be seen as a dynamic repeated game, it would be expected that profit maximising generators learn to engage in tacit collusion to profitably increase spot market prices. This thesis investigates this tacit collusion of generators in oligopolistic electricity markets. We do not follow the approach of previous work in game theory that presupposes firms' collusive strategies to enforce collusion in an oligopoly. Instead, we develop a co-evolutionary approach (extending previous work in this area) using a genetic algorithm (GA) to co-evolve strategies for all generators in some stylised models of an electricity market. The bidding strategy of each generator is modelled as a set of bidding actions, one for each possible discrete state of the state space observed by the generator. The market trading interactions are simulated to determine the fitness of a particular strategy. The tacitly collusive outcomes and strategies emerging from computational experiments are thus obtained from the learning or evolutionary process instead of from any pre-specification. Analysing many of those emergent collusive outcomes and strategies. we are able to specify the mechanism of tacit collusion and investigate how the market environment can affect it. We find that the learned collusive strategies are similar to the forgiving trigger strategies of classical supergame theory (Green and Porter, 1984). Also using computational experiments, we can determine which characteristics of the market environment encourage or hinder tacit collusion. The findings from this thesis provide insights on tacit collusion in an oligopoly and policy implications from a learning perspective. With modelling flexibility, our co-evolutionary approach can be extended to study strategic behaviour in an oligopoly considering many other market characteristics.
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4

Leleno, Joanna M. "A mathematical programming-based analysis of a two stage model of interacting producers." Diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1987. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/77818.

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This dissertation is concerned with the characterization, existence and computation of equilibrium solutions in a two-stage model of interacting producers. The model represents an industry involved with two major stages of production. On the production side there exist some (upstream) firms which perform the first stage of production and manufacture a semi-finished product, and there exist some other (downstream) firms which perform the second stage of production and convert this semi-finished product to a final commodity. There also exist some (vertically integrated) firms which handle the entire production process themselves. In this research, the final commodity market is an oligopoly which may exhibit one of two possible behavioral patterns: follower-follower or multiple leader-follower. In both cases, the downstream firms are assumed to be price takers in purchasing the intermediate product. For the upstream stage, we consider two situations: a Cournot oligopoly or a perfectly competitive market. An equilibrium analysis of the model is conducted with output quantities as decision variables. The defined equilibrium solutions employ an inverse derived demand function for the semi-finished product. This function is derived and characterized through the use of mathematical programming problems which represent the equilibrating process in the final commodity market. Based on this analysis, we provide sufficient conditions for the existence (and uniqueness) of an equilibrium solution, under various market assumptions. These conditions are formulated in terms of properties of the cost functions and the final product demand function. Next, we propose some computational techniques for determining an equilibrium solution. The algorithms presented herein are based on structural properties of the inverse derived demand function and its local approximation. Both convex as well as nonconvex cases are considered. We also investigate in detail the effects of various integrations among the producers on firms' profits, and on industry outputs and prices at equilibrium. This sensitivity analysis provides rich information and insights for industrial analysts and policy makers into how the foregoing quantities are effected by mergers and collusions and the entry or exit of various types of firms, as well as by differences in market behavior.
Ph. D.
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5

BANIAK, Andrzej. "Four essays on multimarket oligopoly." Doctoral thesis, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/4867.

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Defence date: 30 January 1996
Examining board: Prof. Raymond de Bondt, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven ; Prof. Stephen Martin, University of Copenhagen and EUI ; Prof. Louis Phlips, EUI, supervisor ; Prof. Jan Svejnar, University of Pittsburgh ; Prof. Robert Waldmann, EUI, Co-Supervisor
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017
-- La Pléiade and exchange rate pass-through -- Exchange rates and Cournot vs Bertrand competition -- The multimarket labour-managed firm and the effects of devaluation -- On the comparative statics for a multimarket oligopoly
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6

GARCIA, GALLEGO Aurora. "Insights from experimentation in oligopoly and evidence from the real world." Doctoral thesis, 1995. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/4931.

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Defence date: 27 October 1994
Examining Board: Prof. Paul Geroski, London Business School ; Prof. Ronald Harstad, Rutgers University, New Brunswick ; Prof. Alan Kirman, EUI, co-supervisor ; Prof. Stephen Martin, EUI, Supervisor ; Prof. Vicente Salas, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
First made available online: 29 August 2016
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Books on the topic "Oligopolies – Mathematical models"

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Thépot, Jacques. Management systems in oligopolies. Brussels: European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management, 1992.

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2

Bischi, Gian Italo. Nonlinear Oligopolies: Stability and Bifurcations. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.

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3

Bernstein, Jeffrey Ian. Price-cost margins, exports and productivity growth: With an application to Canadian industries. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991.

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4

Shaffer, Sherrill L. Cournot oligopoly with external costs. [Philadelphia, Pa.]: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 1989.

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5

Abreu, Dilip. Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames. Stanford, Calif: Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 1985.

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6

Jean, Tirole, ed. Dynamic models of oligopoly. Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1986.

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7

Jean, Tirole, ed. Dynamic models of oligopoly. London: Routledge, 2001.

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8

Wiese, Harald. Lern- und Netzeffekte im asymmetrischen Duopol. Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, 1993.

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9

Eine allgemeine Theorie de Polypol- und Oligopolpreisbildung. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1985.

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10

Barros, Fátima. The design of incentive schemes in oligopoly theory. Louvain-la-Neuve: CIACO, 1993.

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