Relevant bibliographies by topics / Oligopolies

Academic literature on the topic 'Oligopolies'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 30 July 2024

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Contents

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Oligopolies.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "Oligopolies"

1

Demange, Gabrielle, and Dominique Henriet. "Sustainable oligopolies." Journal of Economic Theory 54, no. 2 (August 1991): 417–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90132-n.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Wirth, Todd L. "Nationwide Format Oligopolies." Journal of Radio Studies 8, no. 2 (November 2001): 249–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15506843jrs0802_4.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Szidarovszky, Ferenc, and Akio Matsumoto. "Dynamic Cooperative Oligopolies." Mathematics 12, no. 6 (March 18, 2024): 891. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math12060891.

Full text
Abstract:
An n-person cooperative oligopoly is considered without product differentiation. It is assumed that the firms know the unit price function but have no access to the cost functions of the competitors. From market data, they have information about the industry output. The firms want to find the output levels that guarantee maximum industry profit. First, the existence of a unique maximizer is proven, which the firms cannot determine directly because of the lack of the knowledge of the cost functions. Instead, a dynamic model is constructed, which is asymptotically stable under realistic conditions, and the state trajectories converge to the optimum output levels of the firms. Three models are constructed: first, no time delay is assumed; second, information delay is considered for the firms on the industry output; and third, in addition, information delay is also assumed about the firms’ own output levels. The stability of the resulting no-delay, one-delay, and two-delay dynamics is examined.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Burakov, Dmitry Vladimirovich. "Reflections on Luis Suarez-Villa’s Corporate Power, Oligopolies and the Crisis of the State." tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 16, no. 1 (January 15, 2018): 35–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v16i1.953.

Full text
Abstract:
Book review of Luis Suarez-Villa’s Corporate Power, Oligopolies and the Crisis of the State (20Book review of Luis Suarez-Villa’s Corporate Power, Oligopolies and the Crisis of the State (2015). State University of New York, ISBN: 978-1-4384-5485-6.15)
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Burakov, Dmitry Vladimirovich. "Reflections on Luis Suarez-Villa’s Corporate Power, Oligopolies and the Crisis of the State." tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 16, no. 1 (January 15, 2018): 35–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.31269/vol16iss1pp35-40.

Full text
Abstract:
Book review of Luis Suarez-Villa’s Corporate Power, Oligopolies and the Crisis of the State (20Book review of Luis Suarez-Villa’s Corporate Power, Oligopolies and the Crisis of the State (2015). State University of New York, ISBN: 978-1-4384-5485-6.15)
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Petit, Nicolas. "Re-Pricing through Disruption in Oligopolies with Tacit Collusion: A Framework for Abuse of Collective Dominance." World Competition 39, Issue 1 (March 1, 2016): 119–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2016007.

Full text
Abstract:
This article proposes an understanding of abuse of collective dominance or shared monopolization that does not outlaw oligopolistic tacit collusion as such, but that reputes abusive a set of tactics adopted by tacitly colluding oligopolists exposed to disruption. As much as deviation is an internal force likely to undermine tacit collusion, disruption is a powerful external force that can cause a return to the competitive equilibrium. The sources of disruption may be technological (e.g., radical innovation), economic (e.g., entry of a low-cost player) or legal (e.g., tax reform). But disruption may never deliver its pro-competitive promises if oligopolists tinker to restore a collusive equilibrium. This article suggests that competition agencies and courts could use the dormant doctrine of abuse of collective dominance to declare unlawful oligopolists’ conduct that seeks to ‘re-price’ through disruption, and elude its pro-competitive effect. This rationalized definition of abuse of collective dominance would both promote legal certainty by clarifying the messy state of the law in this field, and ensure economic efficiency by giving agencies and courts a market-triggered ex post remedy in mature oligopolies with lethargic M&A activity.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Chade, Hector, and Jeroen Swinkels. "Screening in Vertical Oligopolies." Econometrica 89, no. 3 (2021): 1265–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta17016.

Full text
Abstract:
A finite number of vertically differentiated firms simultaneously compete for and screen agents with private information about their payoffs. In equilibrium, higher firms serve higher types. Each firm distorts the allocation downward from the efficient level on types below a threshold, but upward above. While payoffs in this game are neither quasi‐concave nor continuous, if firms are sufficiently differentiated, then any strategy profile that satisfies a simple set of necessary conditions is a pure‐stategy equilibrium, and an equilibrium exists. A mixed‐strategy equilibrium exists even when firms are less differentiated. The welfare effects of private information are drastically different than under monopoly. The equilibrium approaches the competitive limit quickly as entry costs grow small. We solve the problem of a multi‐plant firm facing a type‐dependent outside option and use this to study the effect of mergers.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Molnar, Sandor, Ferenc Szidarovszky, and Mark Molnar. "DYNAMICAL CONTROL IN OLIGOPOLIES." IFAC Proceedings Volumes 38, no. 1 (2005): 106–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.3182/20050703-6-cz-1902.02253.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Chiarella, Carl, Akio Matsumoto, and Ferenc Szidarovszky. "Isoelastic oligopolies under uncertainty." Applied Mathematics and Computation 219, no. 21 (July 2013): 10475–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2013.04.040.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Goering, Gregory E. "Oligopolies and product durability." International Journal of Industrial Organization 10, no. 1 (March 1992): 55–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(92)90047-3.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Oligopolies"

1

Zanaj, Skerdilajda. "Competition in successive oligopolies." Université catholique de Louvain, 2008. http://edoc.bib.ucl.ac.be:81/ETD-db/collection/available/BelnUcetd-04222008-124532/.

Full text
Abstract:
Successive markets constitute a natural framework to study the value chain. This chain is built through the technological linkage between markets where inputs and the corresponding outputs are produced. If goods pass through a chain of imperfectly competitive markets, in excess of the value markups are also added, at each step, to the costs. This thesis firstly proposes a unified framework to analyze competition in successive oligopolies. Analyzing and developing such a general framework forms a basis for the analysis of entry of new firms and of collusive agreements in the same market, like horizontal mergers, or through different markets, like vertical integration. The results bring new insights on equilibrium outcomes of both collusive agreements and entry of new firms.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Fik, Timothy Joseph. "Price variation in spatial oligopolies." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/184708.

Full text
Abstract:
As social scientists have become increasingly aware of the welfare implications of firms' locations in space there has been a considerable amount of renewed interest in the issues pertaining to the geography of price. In the short time since Hay and Johnston (1980) lamented the insufficient attention being given to the theoretical background of geographic pricing, there has been impressive amounts of progress in certain analytical areas. However, within this bulk of literature, we still know remarkably little about the determinants of geographic price variation in spatial markets containing numerous sellers (firms) and buyers (consumers). Perhaps this should not be surprising given that much of the current research is being carried out by economists (who generally tend to emphasize market process in classically constructed structural-conduct-performance modes) rather than geographers (who tend to emphasize market description and locational patterns/properties arising from spatially defined economic and behavioral market processes). This dissertation focuses on geographic price variations in competitive oligopolies, where firms react under alternative pricing conjectures/strategies. Using computer aided simulation, the analytics of equilibrium price levels are examined in one-dimensional bounded and unbounded markets to uncover the algebraic properties of spatial markets, the effects of firm density, firm location, and demand elasticity on prices, the perversities associated with consumer-related transportation costs, and the distorting effects of mixed or asymmetrical rivals' pricing strategies. The modeling of spatial price competition is regarded as essential in the evaluation of equilibrium price as a function of boundary complications, market description, and the spatial arrangement of interdependent rivals. Long-run implications of spatial price competition are discussed with the intention of developing a model (beyond the scope of this dissertation) that not only recognizes rivals' price reactions, but also stresses locationally competitive strategies. Some empirical evidence on the nature of spatial price dependence amongst rival food chains in a metropolitan area is also examined.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Li, Weiye. "Stability of equilibria in dynamic oligopolies." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/290535.

Full text
Abstract:
The Lyapunov function method is used in proving stability, asymptotic or globally asymptotic stability of discrete dynamic systems. We show that the slightly relaxed versions of the well known sufficient conditions are also necessary. The stability of the equilibria of time-invariant nonlinear dynamical systems with discrete time scale is investigated. We present an elementary proof showing that in the case of a stable equilibrium and continuously differentiable state transition function, all eigenvalues of the Jacobian computed at the equilibrium must be inside or on the unit circle. We also demonstrate via numerical examples that if some eigenvalues are on the unit circle and all other eigenvalues are inside the unit circle, then the equilibrium maybe unstable, or stable, or even asymptotically stable, which show that the necessary condition cannot be further restricted in general. In addition, the necessary condition is given in terms of spectral radius and matrix norms. The asymptotic stability of equilibria in a number of discrete dynamic oligopolies is analyzed. First the equivalence of the equilibrium problem of a large class of nonlinear games and the equilibrium problem of a class of discrete dynamic systems is verified. Stability conditions are then derived for a certain class of dynamic models, and these results are finally applied to single-product oligopolies, multiproduct oligopolies, and labor-managed oligopolies. The economic interpretation of the stability conditions are also presented. The stability properties of a special class of homogeneous dynamic economic systems are examined. The nonlinearity of the models and the presence of eigenvalues with zero real parts in a normally hyperbolic invariant set make the application of the classical theory impossible. Some principles of the modern theory of dynamical systems and invariant manifolds are applied. The local and global strong attractivity of the set of equilibria is verified under mild conditions. As an application, special labor-managed oligopolies are investigated.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Tonin, Simone. "Strategic foundations of oligopolies in general equilibrium." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2015. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/7046/.

Full text
Abstract:
In this thesis, I study the strategic foundations of oligopolies in general equilibrium by following the approach based on strategic market games. The thesis is organised as follows. In Chapter 1, I first survey some of the main contributions on imperfect competition in production economies and the main problems which arise in this framework. I then focus on the literature on imperfect competition in exchange economies by considering the Cournot-Walras approach and strategic market games. I finally discuss the main contributions on the foundations of oligopolies. In Chapter 2, I extend the non-cooperative analysis of oligopoly to exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and traders by using a strategic market game with trading posts. I prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium with trade and show that the price vector and the allocation at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium converge to the Walras equilibrium when the number of traders increases. In a framework with infinitely many commodities, an oligopolist can be an "asymptotic oligopolist" if his market power is uniformly bounded away from zero on an infinite set of commodities, or an "asymptotic price-taker" if his market power converges to zero along the sequence of commodities. The former corresponds to the Cournotian idea of oligopolist. The latter describes an agent with a kind of mixed behaviour since his market power can be made arbitrary small by choosing an appropriate infinite set of commodities while it is greater than a positive constant on a finite set. In Chapter 3, I further study oligopolies in economies with infinitely many commodities and traders. By using the strategic market game called "all for sale model", I prove the existence of an asymptotic price-taker. Heuristically, an asymptotic price-taker exists if at least one trader makes positive bids on an infinite number of commodities and in all markets the quantities of commodities exchanged are non-negligible. In Chapter 4, I study if there is a non-empty intersection between the sets of Cournot-Nash and Walras allocations in mixed exchange economies, with oligopolists represented as atoms and small traders represented by a continuum. In a bilateral oligopoly setting, I show that a necessary and sufficient condition for a Cournot-Nash allocation to be a Walras allocation is that all atoms demand a null amount of one of the two commodities. I also provide four examples which show that this characterization holds non-vacuously.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Suárez, Carlos. "Essays on Regulation, Liberalization and Privatization in Energy Markets." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/669284.

Full text
Abstract:
The general motivation of this research is to explore the effects of the coexistence of public and private companies on the allocative efficiency of the supply of electricity. In particular, this thesis investigates from an empirical perspective to what extent the distinction between private and public companies is relevant to understand the competition in the wholesale electricity generation markets. I apply several econometric techniques and theory advances in industrial organization branch on data of the firms of the Colombian market. The case of the Colombian electricity market is suitable to study this issues for four reasons: i) It is an oligopoly in which private and public companies compete under the same rules. ii) The most important firms in the Colombian electricity sector are mature organizations, with a conventional business vision. In fact, many of these companies belong to transnational capital that carry out activities in several continents. iii) The market setting have a conventional design similar to other liberalized electricity markets. It operates as a multi-unit uniform-price auction. iv) There is available information with daily and even hourly resolution of the generation market variables. I consider that these are key elements for justifying the external validity of the results. This thesis presents three essays that aim to answer three questions related to the interaction between competition in electricity markets and their ownership structure. Chapter 1 addresses the question: Do the switch from public to private management have impacts in the bidding strategy of specific generation assets? Chapter 2 explores the question: Do public and private generation companies respond the same to the incentives to relax competition? Chapter 3 focuses on the question: Do private companies have a greater propensity to establish coordination relationships in comparison to public firms? In the first chapter of this thesis I evaluate the impact of privatization on the bidding of electricity units participating in a liberalized wholesale electricity market. The results of this evaluation contribute to better understand whether privatization is the right decision in an environment of imperfect competition. In this essay I adopt a policy evaluation approach to estimate the impact of changes from public to private management on the bidding prices of electricity generation units. I use information of bidding prices of the Colombian wholesale electricity market and exploit the changes of management of generation units documented in the period 2006 - 2018. The methodologies and results presented in this thesis contributes to the literature of mixed oligopoly because they place special emphasis on the behavioral differences between private and public companies and studies a field experience in which they compete in the same relevant market. The empirical evidence resultant from the policy evaluation method is aligned with the theoretical predictions of comparative statics arising from the behavioral differences of mixed oligopoly models. The second chapter of this dissertation proposes a methodology in order to find differences between the reactions of private and public firms when they face incentives to exercises unilateral market power. Several common events in the electricity industry such as transmission restrictions, the concentration of generation property within specific areas, the non-storage capacity of electricity and the low elasticity of demand, provide opportunities to exert market power. That is why this issue has been widely studied and discussed theoretically and empirically. The novel element of this essay in relation to this strand of the literature is accounting for the distinction between private and public companies regarding competitive behavior. Chapter 3 investigates from an empirical perspective the role of disclosure information in the stability of informal coordination agreements. Particularly, this chapter focuses in the economic effects of the announcement and the put into effect of a non-transparency policy implemented in the Colombian wholesale electricity market in 2009. We propose an identification strategy for isolating the effect of a coordinating relation from the confusion factors related with unilateral market power. The characteristics of the reform of the transparency policy allow to link the simple announcement of the policy change with the collapse of a coordinated strategy of private firms in a repeated interaction context. We use several empirical tools to assess the impact of the simple announcement of a modification in the transparency conditions on the average bidding price of private firms. We present an empirical analysis of the average bidding price data over August 2008 - July 2009. Overall, the evidence presented in the three essays of this dissertation indicates that the distinction between public and private companies may be a relevant aspect for explaining the functioning of competition in liberalized industries.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Grandner, Thomas. "Trade unions and oligopolies in vertically structured industries /." Frankfurt a.M ; Bern [etc.] : P. Lang, 2001. http://aleph.unisg.ch/hsgscan/hm00039823.pdf.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Singh, Heisnam Thoihen. "Essays on price competition and firm strategies in oligopolies." College Park, Md. : University of Maryland, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1903/7166.

Full text
Abstract:
Thesis (Ph. D.) -- University of Maryland, College Park, 2007.
Thesis research directed by: Economics. Title from t.p. of PDF. Includes bibliographical references. Published by UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, Mich. Also available in paper.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Linnosmaa, Ismo. "Essays on product market competition and managerial incentives in oligopoly firms /." Kuopio : Kuopion yliopisto, 2001. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy035/2002507609.html.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Mesta, Iscan Ozlem Wang X. H. "Entry biases in Cournot markets with free entry." Diss., Columbia, Mo. : University of Missouri--Columbia, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10355/6150.

Full text
Abstract:
Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on Feb 15, 2010). The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file. Dissertation advisor: Dr. X. H. Wang Vita. Includes bibliographical references.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Jacobs, Martin [Verfasser]. "Price Competition in Oligopolies with Demand Rationing : Experimental Studies / Martin Jacobs." Kiel : Universitätsbibliothek Kiel, 2016. http://d-nb.info/1102933104/34.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Books on the topic "Oligopolies"

1

Bischi, Gian Italo, Carl Chiarella, Michael Kopel, and Ferenc Szidarovszky. Nonlinear Oligopolies. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02106-0.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Thépot, Jacques. Management systems in oligopolies. Brussels: European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management, 1992.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Matsumoto, Akio, and Ferenc Szidarovszky. Dynamic Oligopolies with Time Delays. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1786-6.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Bischi, Gian Italo. Nonlinear Oligopolies: Stability and Bifurcations. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Haskel, Jonathan. Do other firms matter in oligopolies? London: Centre for EconomicPolicy Research, 1995.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Bloch, Francis. Stable trading structures in bilateral oligopolies. London: London University, Queen Mary and Westfield College, Department of Economics, 1995.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Haskel, Jonathan. Do other firms matter in oligopolies? London: London University, Queen Mary and Westfield College, Department of Economics, 1994.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

m, Sjur Didrik Fla. "Semi-competitive cournot equilibrium in multistage oligopolies". Fontainbleau: INSEAD, 1986.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

1977-, Hagiu Andrei, and Harvard Business School, eds. Strategic interactions in two-sided market oligopolies. Boston]: Harvard Business School, 2009.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

1977-, Hagiu Andrei, and Harvard Business School, eds. Strategic interactions in two-sided market oligopolies. Boston]: Harvard Business School, 2008.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Book chapters on the topic "Oligopolies"

1

Armerin, Fredrik, and Madeleine Hoeft. "Oligopolies." In Information Economics with Real Estate Applications, 49–65. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003298441-5.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Bischi, Gian-Italo, Carl Chiarella, Michael Kopel, and Ferenc Szidarovszky. "Concave Oligopolies." In Nonlinear Oligopolies, 51–101. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02106-0_2.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Bischi, Gian-Italo, Carl Chiarella, Michael Kopel, and Ferenc Szidarovszky. "General Oligopolies." In Nonlinear Oligopolies, 103–40. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02106-0_3.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Lambertini, Luca. "Mixed oligopolies." In An Economic Theory of Managerial Firms, 60–71. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2017.: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315620879-3.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Matsumoto, Akio, and Ferenc Szidarovszky. "Dynamic Oligopolies." In Dynamic Oligopolies with Time Delays, 103–66. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1786-6_4.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Bischi, Gian-Italo, Carl Chiarella, Michael Kopel, and Ferenc Szidarovszky. "The Classical Cournot Model." In Nonlinear Oligopolies, 1–49. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02106-0_1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Bischi, Gian-Italo, Carl Chiarella, Michael Kopel, and Ferenc Szidarovszky. "Modified and Extended Oligopolies." In Nonlinear Oligopolies, 141–206. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02106-0_4.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Bischi, Gian-Italo, Carl Chiarella, Michael Kopel, and Ferenc Szidarovszky. "Oligopolies with Misspecified and Uncertain Price Functions, and Learning." In Nonlinear Oligopolies, 207–70. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02106-0_5.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Bischi, Gian-Italo, Carl Chiarella, Michael Kopel, and Ferenc Szidarovszky. "Overview and Directions for Future Research." In Nonlinear Oligopolies, 271–74. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02106-0_6.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Matsumoto, Akio, and Ferenc Szidarovszky. "Oligopolies with Partial Cooperation." In Dynamic Oligopolies with Time Delays, 211–35. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1786-6_6.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Conference papers on the topic "Oligopolies"

1

Molnar, S., F. Szidarovszky, and M. Molnar. "Controllability of Time-varying Oligopolies." In 4th International Conference on Control and Automation. Final Program and Book of Abstracts. IEEE, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icca.2003.1595086.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Zhu, Hailing, Andre Nel, and Wimpie Clarke. "An extended pricing model for wireless oligopolies." In EM). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ieem.2010.5674649.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Ferreira, Fernanda A., Flávio Ferreira, George Venkov, Vesela Pasheva, and Ralitza Kovacheva. "Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals’ costs are unknown." In APPLICATIONS OF MATHEMATICS IN ENGINEERING AND ECONOMICS: 36th International Conference. AIP, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.3515587.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Charmaison, B. "Long-term contracts in a successive oligopolies industry: the issue of price indexation." In 2009 6th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2009). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/eem.2009.5207133.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Lichter, Shaun, Terry Friesz, and Christopher Griffin. "Impact of a Non-linear Pay-Off Function on Pairwise Stable Collaborative Oligopolies." In 2013 International Conference on Social Computing (SocialCom). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/socialcom.2013.112.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Fortetsanakis, Georgios, and Maria Papadopouli. "How beneficial is the WiFi offloading? A detailed game-theoretical analysis in wireless oligopolies." In 2016 IEEE 17th International Symposium on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wowmom.2016.7523504.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Chen, Xinyang. "The Game of Three Oligopolies in China's Power Market in the Context of the Opening of the National Carbon Emission Trading Market." In 2022 3rd International Conference on Clean and Green Energy Engineering (CGEE). IEEE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cgee55282.2022.9976791.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Sa´nchez, D., H. Frej, J. M. Mun˜oz de Escalona, R. Chacartegui, and T. Sa´nchez. "Alternative Approach to Determining the Preferred Plant Size of Parabolic Trough CSP Power Plants." In ASME 2011 Turbo Expo: Turbine Technical Conference and Exposition. ASMEDC, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/gt2011-46585.

Full text
Abstract:
The share of Concentrated Solar Power plants in power generation has increased significantly in the last decade due to the need to develop and deploy clean technologies that help reduce the carbon footprint of the power generation industry and, at the same time, are less voracious in terms of fossil fuel consumption. As a governmental support to promote the installation of solar plants, different incentives are found in most countries: complementary rates to the market price of electricity (premium), tax credits, financial support, long term power purchase agreements and, in general, other mechanisms that are generally grouped in a “feed-in tariff” that should ideally be more demanding (stringent) over time. The objective of these measures is to make this technology competitive in the mid/long term. At the same time, and in order to distribute these economical resources as fairly as possible, governments have usually limited the power output of those power plants benefitting from these incentives, as a means to prevent oligopolies that would eventually stop technology evolution while concentrating on preserving market conditions. This has led to the common 50 and 80 MW limits that exist in Spain and the USA respectively. As a consequence, OEMs and EPCs have focused on developing reliable and cost-effective CSP plants of these sizes, especially 50 MW. This work is based on unrestrained regulatory or market scenarios, with the aim of finding out which plant size yields the best efficiency at the lowest cost of electricity (COE). In other words, the objective is to establish the plant size of interest for power producers and consumers, should CSP facilities compete in the same market conditions as conventional fossil-fuel plants. The work begins by reviewing briefly the origins of the usual constraints applied to CSP plants. Then, a survey of existing literature dealing with the issue of technical and economic CSP optimization is presented, with a special focus on the work by B. Kelly from Nexant Inc. Taking this work as reference, a model of performance of parabolic trough plants developed in Thermoflex environment to put forth strong project specific feature of CSP facilites. Thermal storage and natural gas hybridization are included among the key design parameters.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Tang, Huirong, Huimin Wang, and Lei Qiu. "Study on Game of Investment for Controlling Pollution about Oligopolists." In 2009 International Conference on Management and Service Science (MASS). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmss.2009.5301436.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Ginevičius, Romualdas, and Algirdas Krivka. "The model of the integrated competitive strategy of an enterprise under the conditions of oligopolic market." In The 6th International Scientific Conference "Business and Management 2010". Vilnius, Lithuania: Vilnius Gediminas Technical University Publishing House Technika, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/bm.2010.132.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Reports on the topic "Oligopolies"

1

Mansur, Erin. Do Oligopolists Pollute Less? Evidence from a Restructured Electricity Market. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13511.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Facilitating Practices in Oligopolies. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), September 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/50e7db63-en.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
You might also be interested in the extended bibliographies on the topic 'Oligopolies' for particular source types:
Journal articles Dissertations / Theses Books
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography