Log in

Relevant bibliographies by topics / Nuclear weapons France Testing / Journal articles

Journal articles on the topic 'Nuclear weapons France Testing'

To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Nuclear weapons France Testing.

Author: Grafiati

Published: 10 December 2022

Last updated: 29 January 2023

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Nuclear weapons France Testing.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Bracegirdle, A. M. "Case Analysis: Case to the International Court of Justice on Legality of French Nuclear Testing." Leiden Journal of International Law 9, no. 2 (June 1996): 431–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156596000325.

Full text

Abstract:

Last year, for the second time in a little over 20 years, New Zealand asked the International Court of Justice to adjudicate the legality of French nuclear testing. This followed the announcement by the new President of France to the effect that the moratorium that his predecessor had put in place three years earlier, and had promised that France would continue to observe, would be terminated. The action by the New Zealand government was based on a unanimous decision by all political parties in New Zealand. This action reflected the anger of the countries in the South Pacific at the fact that a nuclear-weapon state was still prepared, in 1996, to explode nuclear devices in fragile marine environments on the other side of the world. In short, New Zealand wanted to utilize all available opportunities to persuade France not to proceed.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Sarkisov, A. A. "Radioactive contamination mitigation in the Arctic region." Вестник Российской академии наук 89, no. 2 (March 20, 2019): 107–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s0869-5873892107-124.

Full text

Abstract:

This article discusses the most significant sources of large-scale radioactive contamination to which the Arctic has been exposed since the middle of the last century, which are identified as 1) radioactive fallout and deposition from nuclear weapon testing; 2) plum waste from the Sellafield radiochemical plant (United Kingdom) and Cap de la Ag (France) nuclear fleet operation; 3) radioisotope thermoelectric generators; and 4) submerged and sunken radioactive objects. The article assesses the comparative contribution and associated radioecological risks of these sources, and special attention is focused on the “nuclear legacy” of the USSR/Russian nuclear fleet and the search for solutions. The article describes the content and implementation results of the “Development of a Strategic Master Plan for Disposition of Decommissioned Russian Nuclear-Powered Fleet and Rehabilitation of Hazardously Radioactive Sites and Facilities of Its Support Infrastructure” which was developed with broad international cooperation. Attention is drawn to remaining environmental problems associated with submerged and sunken objects that contain spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste in the Arctic, and the article presents generalized data on such objects and associated risks of water contamination as identified by analyses of model studies of possible accident consequences.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Parmentier, Remi. "Review: Celebrated French Rainbow Warrior investigation echoes Watergate." Pacific Journalism Review 21, no. 2 (October 31, 2015): 185. http://dx.doi.org/10.24135/pjr.v21i2.129.

Full text

Abstract:

Parmentier, Rémi. (2015). Celebrated French Rainbow Warrior investigation echoes Watergate. Pacific Journalism Review, 21(2): 185-188. Review of La Troisième Équipe—Souvenirs de l’Affaire Greenpeace, by Edwy Plenel. Paris: France. Editions Don Quichotte, 2015, 140 pp. ISBN 978-235-949-462-4If you visit the headquarters of the newspaper Le Monde in Paris, on the wall facing you in the main hall after you’ve passed security you’ll find, side-by-side, the large reproductions of two covers of the daily newspaper which has been for decades the hallmark of the French intelligentsia. Testimonies of passed times, nearly three decades separate the one on the right side of the wall, ‘Marshal Stalin has died’ (March, 1953) from the one on the left, ‘The Rainbow Warrior would have been sunk by a third team of French military’ (September, 1985). Why did someone choose to juxtapose two stories that bear no relation? Maybe it is because both events marked a new point of departure in the psyche of the Parisian Left: Stalin’s death opened the key to the Soviet Pandora's box, and the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior 30 years ago by a French secret service squad in Auckland harbour to prevent Greenpeace from protesting against nuclear weapons testing in French Polynesia is now seen as the most grotesque illustration of François Mitterrand’s presidency (1982-1995) renunciation of his Socialist Party’s stated values.Image above: Rémi Parmentier alongside the 1985 Rainbow Warrior 'scoop' front page in the foyer of Le Monde.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

HEYLIN, MICHAEL. "Nuclear Weapons Testing." Chemical & Engineering News 66, no. 7 (February 15, 1988): 8–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/cen-v066n007.p008.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Jenkins, Brian. "FRANCE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS." Journal of Area Studies 6, no. 11 (January 1985): 40–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02613530.1985.9673659.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Macilwain, Colin. "Nuclear fusion without weapons testing." Nature 403, no. 6769 (February 2000): 469. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/35000712.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Lewis, Jeffrey. "Nuclear-weapons design and testing." Adelphi Series 54, no. 446 (April 3, 2014): 43–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2014.995420.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Simon, Steven L., and André Bouville. "Health effects of nuclear weapons testing." Lancet 386, no. 9992 (August 2015): 407–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(15)61037-6.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Darby, Sarah C., and Eve Roman. "Nuclear Weapons Testing and Childhood Leukaemia." Annals of Medicine 25, no. 5 (January 1993): 429–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.3109/07853899309147306.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Sanders, Emma. "Nuclear Weapons: France focuses on Mégajoule project." Physics World 12, no. 3 (March 1999): 10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/2058-7058/12/3/10.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Cohen, Samy. "France, Civil-Military Relations, and Nuclear Weapons." Security Studies 4, no. 1 (September 1994): 153–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636419409347578.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

Dworkin, H. J. "Nuclear weapons testing fallout and thyroid disease." JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association 271, no. 11 (March 16, 1994): 825a—826. http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/jama.271.11.825a.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Lapp, R. E. "Nuclear weapons testing fallout and thyroid disease." JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association 271, no. 11 (March 16, 1994): 826. http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/jama.271.11.826.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Dworkin, Howard J. "Nuclear Weapons Testing Fallout and Thyroid Disease." JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association 271, no. 11 (March 16, 1994): 825. http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/jama.1994.03510350033030.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Lapp, Ralph E. "Nuclear Weapons Testing Fallout and Thyroid Disease." JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association 271, no. 11 (March 16, 1994): 826. http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/jama.1994.03510350033031.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Kolodziej, Edward A., and Robin F. Laird. "France, the Soviet Union, and the Nuclear Weapons Issue." Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 4 (1986): 677. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2150809.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Pierre, Andrew J., and Robbin F. Laird. "France, the Soviet Union and the Nuclear Weapons Issue." Foreign Affairs 64, no. 2 (1985): 364. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20042592.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Stoddart, Kristan. "Nuclear Weapons in Britain's Policy towards France, 1960–1974." Diplomacy & Statecraft 18, no. 4 (December 13, 2007): 719–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592290701807184.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

Hacker, Barton C. "Radiation Safety, the AEC, and Nuclear Weapons Testing." Public Historian 14, no. 1 (January 1, 1992): 31–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3378439.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

HEYLLN, MICHAEL. "The Politics and Future of Nuclear Weapons Testing." Chemical & Engineering News 68, no. 41 (October 8, 1990): 7–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/cen-v068n041.p007.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Kerber, Richard A. "Nuclear Weapons Testing Fallout and Thyroid Disease-Reply." JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association 271, no. 11 (March 16, 1994): 826. http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/jama.1994.03510350033032.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Adiningsih, Aprilia Putri, and Ngboawaji Daniel Nte. "North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development: The Impact for International Security and Stability." International Law Discourse in Southeast Asia 1, no. 2 (July 31, 2022): 123–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.15294/ildisea.v1i2.58398.

Full text

Abstract:

The development of nuclear weapons today is in many cases one of the threats of future wars. In fact, the development of this weapon is considered to be able to disrupt international stability and security. Nuclear weapons have developed since World War II, which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Until now, several countries are still competing to develop nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are weapons that get power from nuclear reactions and have tremendous destructive power, a nuclear bomb can destroy a city. Countries that have nuclear weapons include the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, North Korea, and Pakistan. Nuclear weapons can become weapons of mass destruction which of course threaten the stability of international security. As one of the nuclear-armed countries, North Korea is modernizing the country by focusing its strength on the planning economy, heavy industry, and military development. This study aims to analyze the development of North Korea's nuclear weapons in the context of international stability and security and its impact on international law enforcement, especially in the region of Southeast Asian countries.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Yan, Wudan. "The Unknown Human Health Legacy of Nuclear Weapons Testing." IEEE Pulse 11, no. 2 (March 2020): 13–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/mpuls.2020.2984301.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

Christoffel, T., and D. Swartzman. "Nuclear weapons testing fallout: proving causation for exposure injury." American Journal of Public Health 76, no. 3 (March 1986): 290–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.2105/ajph.76.3.290.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Shiga, John. "The Nuclear Sensorium: Cold War Nuclear Imperialism and Sensory Violence." Canadian Journal of Law and Society / Revue Canadienne Droit et Société 34, no. 2 (August 2019): 281–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cls.2019.17.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractThis paper traces the sensory dimensions of nuclear imperialism focusing on the Cold War nuclear weapons tests conducted by the United States military in the Marshall Islands during the 1950s. Key to the formation of the “nuclear sensorium” were the interfaces between vibration, sound, and radioactive contamination, which were mobilized by scientists such as oceanographer Walter Munk as part of the US Nuclear Testing Program. While scientists occupied privileged points in technoscientific networks to sense the effects of nuclear weapons, a series of lawsuits filed by communities affected by the tests drew attention to military-scientific use of inhabitants’ bodies as repositories of data concerning the ecological impact of the bomb and the manner in which sensing practices used to extract this data extended the violence and trauma of nuclear weapons. Nuclear imperialism projected its power not only through weapons tests, the vaporization of land and the erosion of the rights of people who lived there, but also through the production of a “nuclear sensorium”—the differentiation of modes of sensing the bomb through legal, military, and scientific discourses and the attribution of varying degrees of epistemological value and legal weight to these sensory modes.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

Russ, Abel, Patricia George, Rob Goble, Stefano Crema, Chunling Liu, and Dedee Sanchez. "Native American Exposure to131Iodine from Nuclear Weapons Testing in Nevada." Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: An International Journal 11, no. 5 (October 2005): 1047–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10807030500257721.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

Schultz, Susan C., and Vincent Schultz. "Bikini and Enewetak marshallese: Their atolls and nuclear weapons testing." Critical Reviews in Environmental Science and Technology 24, no. 1 (January 1994): 33–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10643389409388460.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Spinardi, Graham. "Aldermaston and British Nuclear Weapons Development: Testing the `Zuckerman Thesis'." Social Studies of Science 27, no. 4 (August 1997): 547–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/030631297027004001.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

van der Vink, Gregory E., and Christopher E. Paine. "The politics of verification: Limiting the testing of nuclear weapons." Science & Global Security 3, no. 3-4 (March 1993): 261–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08929889308426387.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Horgan, John. "Underground nuclear weapons testing: despite improvements in simulation techniques, weapons designers defend their need for 'live' testing to help maintain the us. nuclear deterrent." IEEE Spectrum 23, no. 4 (April 1986): 32–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/mspec.1986.6370868.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Amann, Diane Marie. "Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament." American Journal of International Law 111, no. 2 (April 2017): 439–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2017.34.

Full text

Abstract:

In this trio of decisions, the International Court of Justice (ICJ or Court) rejected applications in which a small island state claimed that three larger states known to possess nuclear weapons had breached their international obligations to undertake and conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. The Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Court acknowledged, had been the location of repeated nuclear weapons testing from 1946 to 1958, when the United States administered the archipelagic nation under the trusteeship system of the United Nations. The Court further recognized that the applicant, “by virtue of the suffering which its people endured as a result of it being used as a site for extensive nuclear testing programs, has special reasons for concern about nuclear disarmament” (para. 44). Nevertheless, it ruled that the cases could not go forward because the requisite legal dispute was absent at the time that the Marshall Islands filed its applications against India, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

Pauly, Reid B. C. "Would U.S. Leaders Push the Button? Wargames and the Sources of Nuclear Restraint." International Security 43, no. 2 (November 2018): 151–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00333.

Full text

Abstract:

Why since 1945 have nuclear weapons not been used? Political scientists have cited five basic reasons: deterrence, practicality, precedent, reputation, and ethics. Scholars attempting to weight these factors face a dearth of empirical data. Declassified records of political-military wargames played by U.S. policymakers, however, open up new avenues for theory testing. An investigation of the willingness of U.S. “strategic elites”—experts with experience in diplomatic or military strategy—to use nuclear weapons in a sample of twenty-six political-military wargames reveals that elite players were reluctant to cross the nuclear threshold against both nuclear-armed and nonnuclear-armed adversaries. The only uses of nuclear weapons in the sample occurred in two wargames with nuclear adversaries. Players’ arguments for restraint in the wargames invoked reputational aversion: decisionmakers feared the opprobrium they would face if they used nuclear weapons. Wargame records also strongly support the power of deterrence and basic practicality—whether conventional weapons could accomplish the same goals—as reasons for widespread hesitation to use nuclear weapons. Precedent and ethical aversions to using nuclear weapons were less common. Finally, players also demonstrated some conformity to what they thought the president expected of them.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

Haynes, R., and G. Bentham. "Childhood leukaemia in Great Britain and fallout from nuclear weapons testing." Journal of Radiological Protection 15, no. 1 (March 1995): 37–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/0952-4746/15/1/002.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

Kraft, Alison. "Dissenting Scientists in Early Cold War Britain: The “Fallout” Controversy and the Origins of Pugwash, 1954–1957." Journal of Cold War Studies 20, no. 1 (April 2018): 58–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00801.

Full text

Abstract:

British nuclear policy faced a major challenge in 1954 when the radiological dangers of the new hydrogen bomb were highlighted by an accident resulting from a U.S. thermonuclear test in the Pacific that underscored how nuclear fallout could travel across national borders. Echoing the response from the United States, the British government downplayed the fallout problem and argued that weapons testing was safe. Some influential scientists rallied behind the government position on fallout and weapons tests, but others disagreed and were regarded within government circles as troublesome dissidents. This article focuses on two of the dissident scientists, Joseph Rotblat and Bertrand Russell, showing how they challenged government policy and sought to make public their view that fallout was dangerous and that weapons testing should stop. Their objections ensured that the fallout debate became a part of public life in Cold War Britain, imbuing the hydrogen bomb and the arms race with new meaning. The article casts new light on the process by which the fallout/testing issue came to be the most publicly controversial area of nuclear weapons policy, serving as a rallying point for scientists beyond the nation-state, at once a national and transnational problem.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Kristensen, Hans M., and Matthew G. McKinzie. "Nuclear arsenals: Current developments, trends and capabilities." International Review of the Red Cross 97, no. 899 (September 2015): 563–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1816383116000308.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractIn this article, the highly destructive potential of global nuclear arsenals is reviewed with respect to nuclear force structures, evolution of nuclear capabilities, modernization programmes and nuclear war planning and operations. Specific nuclear forces data is presented for the United States, the Russian Federation, Great Britain, France, China, Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea. Hypothetical, escalatory scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons are presented, including the calculated distribution of radioactive fallout. At more than seventy years since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and twenty-five years since the end of the Cold War, international progress on nuclear arms control and disarmament has now nearly stalled, with the emphasis shifting to modernizing and maintaining large inventories of nuclear weapons indefinitely. This perpetuates a grave risk to human health, civil society and the environment.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

REYNOLDS, WAYNE. "RETHINKING THE JOINT PROJECT: AUSTRALIA'S BID FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 1945–1960." Historical Journal 41, no. 3 (September 1998): 853–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x98007870.

Full text

Abstract:

This article concludes that Australia was determined to possess nuclear weapons from the end of the Second World War. The best prospects for this lay in working with Britain through the so-called ‘joint project’. British defence planners knew that their small island would not survive a future atomic blitz and, therefore, needed ‘active’ deterrent weapons. The problem was that the US after 1946 moved to protect its atomic monopoly and denied Britain research, raw materials, and test facilities. Australia was, therefore, an invaluable partner in the British deterrent weapons programme, in all its aspects from research to testing, as long as the US refused co-operation. The quest for atomic weapons lies at the heart of many of Canberra's initiatives after 1945 – the decision to build an Australian National University; the construction of the vast Snowy Mountains scheme; and ultimately the decision to deploy Australian forces into South-East Asia in the mid-fifties. The height of Anglo-Australian co-operation coincided with the atomic tests after 1952, London's decision to help build atomic reactors in Australia, and the Suez crisis. Britain's acquisition of deterrent weapons in 1957, however, saw the end of imperial co-operation on atomic weapons and delivery systems.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Ruff, Tilman A. "The humanitarian impact and implications of nuclear test explosions in the Pacific region." International Review of the Red Cross 97, no. 899 (September 2015): 775–813. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1816383116000163.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractThe people of the Pacific region have suffered widespread and persisting radioactive contamination, displacement and transgenerational harm from nuclear test explosions. This paper reviews radiation health effects and the global impacts of nuclear testing, as context for the health and environmental consequences of nuclear test explosions in Australia, the Marshall Islands, the central Pacific and French Polynesia. The resulting humanitarian needs include recognition, accountability, monitoring, care, compensation and remediation. Treaty architecture to comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons and provide for their elimination is considered the most promising way to durably end nuclear testing. Evidence of the humanitarian impacts of nuclear tests, and survivor testimony, can contribute towards fulfilling the humanitarian imperative to eradicate nuclear weapons.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

Grant, Matthew. "British nuclear weapons and the test ban, 1954–73: Britain, the United States weapons policies and nuclear testing: tensions and contradictions." Journal of Transatlantic Studies 10, no. 3 (September 2012): 295–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2012.698570.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Graham, Ian. "France, the CTBT and the nuclear testing controversy." Defense Analysis 12, no. 1 (April 1996): 133–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07430179608405687.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Silva, Robert J., and Heino Nitsche. "Environmental Actinide Science." MRS Bulletin 26, no. 9 (September 2001): 707–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1557/mrs2001.181.

Full text

Abstract:

Considerable progress has been made in the study of environmental plutonium science in the last 30-plus years, driven to a large extent by concerns about the release and migration of large amounts of plutonium into the accessible geosphere. Plutonium has been introduced into the environment through several pathways. Environmental contamination has been caused by nuclear-weapons production and testing, nuclear-reactor accidents, and accidents during the transport of nuclear weapons. Above-ground testing of more than 420 nuclear weapons has produced large amounts of radionuclides through fission and neutron activation products. More than three metric tons of plutonium have been distributed on the earth's surface by global fallout. For example, the MAYAK plutonium production complex in the former Soviet Union is located in the southern Urals, about 70 km north of Chelyabinsk and 15 km east of Kyshtym. Between 1949 and 1951, about 76 million m3 of liquid radioactive waste with a total activity of 100 PBq (2.7 MCi) were discharged into the Techa River.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

El Khalfi, Mohamad Amine. "AGREEMENT ON THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION (JCPOA) BETWEEN IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES." Jurnal Pembaharuan Hukum 7, no. 2 (August 30, 2020): 183. http://dx.doi.org/10.26532/jph.v7i2.11296.

Full text

Abstract:

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is the result of diplomatic negotiations reached by the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, Germany and Iran in 2015 regarding the Iran Nuclear Agreement. The emergence of this agreement was due to Iran's actions abusing its nuclear development to serve as a weapon of mass destruction in 2011. In response to this, Western countries imposed economic sanctions on Iran in the hope of weakening Iran's position so that it does not have the ability to continue its nuclear weapons program. In fact, these sanctions succeeded in weakening the Iranian economy but were not politically effective enough because the Iranian government remained strong, this led to Iran being still involved in various conflicts in the region and still insisting on developing its uranium enrichment. Iran's tough stance made Western countries choose to bring Iran into the negotiations by making offers that could attract Iran's attention. During the Obama administration, the United States succeeded in bringing Iran into the negotiations. An achievement when the United States together with Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany succeeded in getting Iran to agree to stop developing its nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of sanctions from the West. However, when the Donald Trump administration tensions began to re-emerge with the assassination of one of Iran's war generals that took place in 2020. The United States succeeded in bringing Iran into the talks. An achievement when the United States together with Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany succeeded in getting Iran to agree to stop developing its nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of sanctions from the West. However, when the Donald Trump administration tensions began to re-emerge with the assassination of one of Iran's war generals that took place in 2020. The United States succeeded in bringing Iran into the negotiations. An achievement when the United States together with Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany succeeded in getting Iran to agree to stop developing its nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of sanctions from the West. However, when the Donald Trump administration tensions began to re-emerge with the assassination of one of Iran's war generals that took place in 2020.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

Hennet, C. B., G. E. Van der Vink, P. G. Richards, V. V. Adushkin, Y. F. Kopnichev, and R. Geary. "Multi-Use seismic stations offer strong deterrent to clandestine nuclear weapons testing." Eos, Transactions American Geophysical Union 77, no. 31 (1996): 289. http://dx.doi.org/10.1029/96eo00206.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Black, S. C., and G. D. Potter. "Historical Perspectives on Selected Health and Safety Aspects of Nuclear Weapons Testing." Health Physics 51, no. 1 (July 1986): 17–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00004032-198607000-00002.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Thornton, Jack. "No Testing Allowed." Mechanical Engineering 133, no. 05 (May 1, 2011): 38–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/1.2011-may-3.

Full text

Abstract:

This article describes various features of Stockpile Stewardship programme meant for testing of nuclear weapons. Simulating the thermodynamics of a nuclear blast requires millions of variables. Although the simulations are challenging, the role of simulations continues to increase significantly in the absence of nuclear testing. Stockpile Stewardship is groundbreaking science in which experiments must comply with the nuclear test moratorium, arms limitation treaties, and budgetary and political realities that go with them. Due to the complexity and uncertainties in simulations, leading engineering organizations such as Los Alamos are changing their approach to simulating large, complicated problems such as the thermodynamics of nuclear explosions. The Department of Energy is encouraging the recognition of verification and validation as a scientific discipline in and of itself. In the Predictive Science Academic Alliance Program, five universities—California Institute of Technology, University of Michigan, Purdue University, Stanford University and the—conduct research to support the National Nuclear Security Administration’s stockpile stewardship mission, which includes training scientists and engineers in the new field of ‘predictive science’.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

Benke, А. А. "Деятельность Казахстана по всеобщему разоружению." BULLETIN of the L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University.Political Science. Regional Studies. Oriental Studies. Turkology Series. 139, no. 2 (2022): 18–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.32523/2616-6887/2022-139-2-18-32.

Full text

Abstract:

The whole world knows that with the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, Kazakhstan was the first in the world to refuse nuclear weapons. By its unprecedented decision, which has no analogs in the world, the Republic of Kazakhstan has earned the moral right to demand the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world and call upon the states that are members of the nuclear club to make the same decision. The article presents the results of deep scientific research of literature and scientific articles on the activities of Kazakhstan in the field of general disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which made it possible to present an overall picture of the current state of the problem. The ban on nuclear weapons testing has become global. During 30 years of struggle for a nuclear-free world, Kazakhstan has been doing a lot of work on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world. The following initiatives allow all countries, regardless of their political, economic, and military capabilities, to participate in the discussion and resolution of the critical issues involved in abandoning nuclear weapons and developing projects for the peaceful use of atomic energy. The materials of this article can be used for further scientific research of Kazakhstan's position on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as for conducting classes with students and cadets on the disciplines "Modern History of Kazakhstan" and "Political Science".

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Mian, Zia. "A step toward what? Nuclear weapons, the test ban, and a world without nuclear testing." Nonproliferation Review 23, no. 3-4 (July 3, 2016): 301–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2016.1263487.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

Meyrowitz, Henri. "Quel droit de la guerre pour l’OTAN?" Études internationales 17, no. 3 (April 12, 2005): 549–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/702046ar.

Full text

Abstract:

The debate which has been going on for many years now among governments of the member countries of NATO on the ratification of the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, signed in 1977, focusses mainly on the effects of such an instrument on deterrence and nuclear strategy. It is the fear of these effects that France has used to justify her refusal to become part of Protocol I. At the time of the signing of Protocol I, the US and Great Britain made the declaration that the new regulations as introduced by Protocol I "are not intended to have any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons". It appears that, for a reason which has nothing to do with atomic weapons, the Reagan administration intends not to ask the Senate for ratification of Protocol I. The governments of Italy and Belgium who ratified the Protocol in February and May 1986 respectively, have supplemented their ratification with a declaration similar to that of the two powers. As for the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, the answer must from now on rely on the combination of Protocol I and the "nuclear clause" from the declaration of the two powers and their allies. Hence the status of nuclear weapons in international law is comprised of three elements : a) The first use of nuclear weapons is not, in itself prohibited. - b) This use is subjected to the regulations of the common law of war, as has been "reaffirmed" by Protocol I, and which applies both to conventional and nuclear weapons. - c) The bans and restrictions, as provided for in these regulations, and which mark out the thin bounds which allow for the use of atomic weapons, pertain only to the use of these arms and not to nuclear deterrence.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

Coppinger, Rob. "Beyond the Pulse." Aerospace Testing International 2018, no. 3 (September 2018): 56–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.12968/s1478-2774(23)50117-4.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

Middeke, Michael. "Anglo-American Nuclear Weapons Cooperation After the Nassau Conference: The British Policy of Interdependence." Journal of Cold War Studies 2, no. 2 (May 2000): 69–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/15203970051032318.

Full text

Abstract:

The Anglo-American summit at Nassau in December 1962 did not strictly separate Britain's deterrent from the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF). As a result, Conservative governments in the 1960s tried to safeguard maximum British independence in nuclear relations with the United States. The British tried to thwart American initiatives on the mixed-manned MLF; some British officials even hoped to preserve an “independent British deterrent” through nuclear cooperation with France. For the United States, the British deterrent had political value in an intra-alliance or East-West context, but no military or political significance in itself. The MLF idea of bilateral nuclear cooperation with Britain and France was a means to contain French and German nuclear ambitions and to settle Cold War disputes with the Soviet Union. In London, however, leading officials believed that Britain's future as a great power was inextricably linked to the possession of an independent nuclear deterrent. When nuclear independence was lost, the appearance of independence became more important.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

Martinez, J. Michael. "The Carter Administration and the Evolution of American Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, 1977–1981." Journal of Policy History 14, no. 3 (July 2002): 261–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jph.2002.0019.

Full text

Abstract:

In the wake of India's May 1998 decision to resume nuclear testing for the first time since 1974, as well as arch-rival Pakistan's subsequent response, the attention of the world again has focused on nuclear nonproliferation policy as a means of maintaining stability in politically troubled regions of the world. The 1990s proved to be an uncertain time for nonproliferation policy. Pakistan acquired nuclear capabilities. Iraq displayed its well-known intransigence by refusing to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) arms inspectors access to facilities suspected of manufacturing nuclear weapons. North Korea maintained a nuclear weapons program despite opposition from many Western nations. Troubling questions about nuclear holdings persisted in Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. New nuclear powers were created in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Even the renewal of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995 failed to assuage the concerns of Western powers fearful of aggressive measures undertaken by rogue nuclear proliferants.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!