Academic literature on the topic 'Nonexpected utility theory'

There is an extensive literature on decision making under uncertainty. Unfortunately, up to date there are no valid decision principles. Experimental evidence has repeatedly shown that widely used principle of maximization of expected utility has serious shortcomings. Utility function and nonadditive measures used in nonexpected utility models are mainly considered as real-valued functions whereas in reality decision-relevant information is imprecise and therefore is described in natural language. This applies, in particular, to imprecise probabilities expressed by terms such as likely, unlikely, probable, etc. The principal objective of the paper is the development of computationally effective methods of decision making with imprecise probabilities. We present representation theorems for a nonexpected fuzzy utility function under imprecise probabilities. We develop an effective decision theory when the environment of fuzzy events, fuzzy states, fuzzy relations and fuzzy constraints are characterized by imprecise probabilities. The suggested methodology is applied for a real-life decision-making problem.

We obtain several variants of the classic von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theorem with and without the completeness axiom in which the derived Bernoulli utility functions are Lipschitz. The prize space in these results is an arbitrary separable metric space, and the utility functions are allowed to be unbounded. The main ingredient of our results is a novel (behavioral) axiom on the underlying preference relations, which is satisfied by virtually all stochastic orders. The proof of the main representation theorem is built on the fact that the dual of the Kantorovich–Rubinstein space is (isometrically isomorphic to) the Banach space of Lipschitz functions that vanish at a fixed point. An application to the theory of nonexpected utility is also provided.

This thesis investigates the choices under risk in the framework of non-expected utility theories. One of the key contributions of this thesis is providing an approach that allows for a complete characterisation of Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) preferences without prior knowledge of the reference point. The location of the reference point that separates gains from losses is derived endogenously, thus, without any additional assumptions on the decision maker’s risk behaviour. This is different to the convention used in the literature, according to which, the reference point is preselected. The problem arising from imposing the location of the reference point is that the underlying preference conditions might not be alligned with the predictions made by the model. Consequently, it is difficult to verify such a model or to test it empirically. The present contribution offers a set of normatively and descriptively appealing preference conditions, which enable the elicitation of the reference point from the decision maker’s behaviour. Since these conditions are derived using objective probabilities, they can also be applied to settings such as health or insurance, where the continuity of the utility function is not required. As a result, the obtained representation theorem is not only the most general foundation for CPT currently available, but it also provides further support for the use of CPT as a modelling tool in decision theory and fi…nance. Another contribution that this thesis can be credited with is an application of rank-dependent utility theory (RDU) to the problem of insurance demand in the monopoly market affected by adverse selection. The present approach extends the classical model of Stiglitz (1977) by accounting for an additional component of heterogeneity among consumers, the heterogeneity in risk perception. Speci…fically, consumers employ distinctive probability weighting functions to assess the likelihood of risky events. This aspect of consumers’' behaviour highlights the importance that the probabilistic risk attitudes within the RDU framework, such as optimism and pessimism, have for the choice of insurance contract. The analysis yields a separating equilibrium, with full insurance for a sufficiently pessimistic decision maker. An important implication of this result is that any low-risk individual who sufficiently overestimates his probability of loss will induce the uninformed insurer to o¤er him full coverage, thereby, affecting the high-risk type adversely. This outcome is consistent with the recent empirical puzzle regarding the correlation between ex-post risk and insurance coverage, according to which, agents with low exposure to risk receive a larger amount of compensation. By providing an explanation of this pattern of individual behaviour, the current work demonstrates that theory and practice of insurance demand can be reconciled to a greater extent. The paper also provides a behavioural rationale for policy intervention in the market with RDU agents, where the initial distortions in contracts due to unobservable risks are aggravated by the non-linear weighting of probability of a risky event.

This thesis is about making decisions when we are uncertain about what will happen, how valuable it will be, and even how to make decisions. Even the most sure-footed amongst us are sometimes uncertain about all three, but surprisingly little attention has been given to the latter two. The three essays that constitute my thesis hope to do a small part in rectifying this problem. The first essay is about the value of finding out how to make decisions. Society spends considerable resources funding people (like me) to research decision-making, so it is natural to wonder whether society is getting a good deal. This question is so shockingly underresearched that bedrock facts are readily discoverable, such as when this kind of information is valuable. My second essay concerns whether we can compare value when we are uncertain about value. Many people are in fact uncertain about value, and how we deal with this uncertainty hinges on these comparisons. I argue that value comparisons are only sometimes possible; I call this weak comparability. This essay is largely a synthesis of the literature, but I also present an argument which begins with a peculiar view of the self: it is as if each of us is a crowd of different people separated by time (but connected by continuity of experience). I’m not the first to endorse this peculiar view of the self, but I am the first to show how it supports the benign view that value is sometimes comparable. We may be uncertain of any decision rules, even those that would tell us how to act when we face uncertainty in decision rules. We may be uncertain of how to decide how to decide how to... And so on. If so, we might have to accept infinitely many decision rules just to make any mundane decision, such as whether to pick up a fivecent piece from the gutter. My third essay addresses this problem of regress. I think all of our decisions are forced: we must decide now or continue to deliberate. Surprisingly, this allows us to avoid the original problem. I call this solution “when forced, do your best”.
Thesis (MPhil) -- University of Adelaide, School of Humanities: Philosophy, 2021

It is natural to think that the most basic questions in ethical theory do not have much to do with probability. Given answers to these questions, we can try to extend them to cases involving probability, though this job might best be handled by more technical disciplines. This chapter is an argument for the opposite view. The major ethical problems to do with probability involve very little mathematics; many topics which seem to have nothing to do with probability are arguably all about probability; and thinking about various problems to do with probability can help solve analogous problems which do not involve probability, sometimes even revealing that popular positions about such problems are incoherent. Among the topics discussed are: interpretations of probability; expected utility theory; utilitarianism; egalitarianism; fairness; the priority view; population size; incommensurability; continuity; nonexpected utility theory; evaluative measurement; decision theory; act consequentialism; rule consequentialism; contractualism; and deontology.