Academic literature on the topic 'Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs)'

Traditional justifications for patents are based on direct or indirect contribution to product creation. Non-practicing entities (NPEs) might provide such innovation, either directly, through working the patent or transfer of technology to others who do, or indirectly, when others copy. Available evidence suggests, however, that ex post licensing demands from NPEs do not normally involve these activities. Some have argued that patents are valuable without01/technology transfer because the ability to exclude may drive commercialization that would not otherwise occur. We demonstrate that even if commercialization theories sometimes justify patent protection, they cannot justify most NPE lawsuits or licensing demands.

Abstract This paper delves into the proliferation of non-practicing entities (NPEs), a hot topic in academia and public policy, especially in the United States. The common belief is that Europe is less exposed to NPEs due to a robust patent system, higher enforcement costs, and smaller damage awards. Yet, using a new database of NPE patent applications at the European Patent Office (EPO), the study uncovers that NPEs activity in Europe is arising: they own nearly 20,000 EPO patents, primarily in Electrical Engineering. Moreover, we contribute the literature investigating the heterogeneity of the NPE business model and its relationship with the characteristics and use of the patents they target. Our econometric analysis provides threefold original evidence. First, NPEs with higher propensity for litigation (i.e., “Litigation” NPEs) acquire patents with higher infringement risk but similar technological quality than practicing entities. Second, patent aggregators (i.e., “Portfolio” NPEs) and technology companies (i.e., “Technology” NPEs) acquire higher-quality patents compared to those acquired by practicing entities. Third, patent acquisitions by “Litigation” NPEs and “Portfolio” NPEs reduce the subsequent use of protected technologies.

AbstractResearch SummaryNon‐practicing entities (NPEs) are firms that accumulate and acquire patents but do not further develop or implement the patented inventions (known as patent trolling). NPEs seek to receive royalties or profits through out‐of‐court settlements in patent infringement cases. We examine how firms targeted by NPEs in NPE‐initiated litigations (i.e., target firms) shift their innovation strategies and trajectories in response to heightened litigation risks. We theorize and show that after the initial lawsuit, target firms draw more upon their in‐house technologies to reduce the legal ground for further lawsuits. Furthermore, nontarget firms in related technology areas shift their innovation activities away from those of target firms under high NPE litigation risks. These effects are more pronounced with higher innovation costs and under more competitive product markets.Managerial SummaryNon‐practicing entities (NPEs) are known as patent trolls that accumulate and acquire patents but do not further develop or implement these patented inventions. These patent trolls aim to obtain royalties or profits through out‐of‐court settlements in patent infringement cases. We investigate how firms targeted by patent trolls in litigations (i.e., target firms) change their innovation strategies and trajectories to deal with increased NPE litigation risks. After the initial lawsuit, we find that these target firms use their in‐house technologies more to reduce the legal ground for future lawsuits. Moreover, nontarget firms in related technology areas move their innovation activities away from those of target firms under high litigation risks. These effects are stronger when innovation costs are higher and under more competitive product markets.

Abstract We explain why competing firms form collective entities to buy patents from other entities, particularly from non-practicing entities (NPEs), and follow a catch and release patent strategy. We show why having competitors bid as a single unit is better than having competitors bid against each other. More important, we show that collusive bidding on patents held by NPEs, even when the patents are not essential for a standard (SEPs), may increase consumer surplus, particularly when technological innovation is drastic, and improve social welfare. This provides a theoretical foundation that explains why competition authorities often allow collusive bidding for patents and why courts employ the “rule of reason” to analyze agreements under competition law. We also show that a cartel of incumbents will always outbid a potential entrant, or a patent assertion entity, over a technology that can destroy the value of the incumbents’ existing assets.

Abstract We analyze the extent to which private defensive litigation insurance deters patent assertion by non-practicing entities (NPEs). We study the effect that a patent-specific defensive insurance product, offered by a leading litigation insurer, had on the litigation behavior of insured patents’ owners, all of which are NPEs. We first model the impact of defensive litigation insurance on the behavior of patent enforcers and accused infringers. We show that the availability of defensive litigation insurance can have an effect on how often patent enforcers will assert their patents. We confirm this result empirically showing that the insurance policy had a large, negative effect on the likelihood that a patent included in the policy was subsequently asserted relative to other patents held by the same NPEs and relative to patents held by other NPEs with portfolios that were entirely excluded from the insurance product. Our findings suggest that market-based mechanisms can deter so-called “patent trolling.” (JEL: G22, K41, O34)

Les brevets sont une forme de droits de propriété intellectuelle (PI) particulièrement pertinente pour promouvoir les activités innovantes. Un brevet accorde à son propriétaire un droit exclusif temporaire sur des inventions qui sont nouvelles, qui impliquent une étape inventive et qui sont susceptibles d'une application industrielle. En s'appuyant sur ce droit, les inventeurs peuvent protéger leurs idées contre l'imitation et obtenir un retour économique sur leurs investissements en recherche et développement (R&D). Cependant, l'utilisation des brevets a connu une transformation significative, s'étendant bien au-delà de l'objectif traditionnel de récompenser les efforts innovants. Particulièrement dans le domaine des technologies de l'information et de la communication (TIC), les brevets sont de plus en plus utilisés comme des outils stratégiques (Blind, 2021). De plus, au cours des trois dernières décennies, l'augmentation marquée du nombre de brevets accordés et l'essor sans précédent du commerce des brevets ont ouvert la voie à de nouveaux intermédiaires sur le marché des technologies (Hagiu et Yoffie, 2013). Les Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs)—des entreprises qui n'utilisent pas leurs brevets de manière traditionnelle dans la fabrication, mais qui se consacrent principalement à la concession de licences et à l'application—ont émergé en tant qu'acteurs importants sur le marché des brevets (Golden, 2007; Feldman et Ewing, 2012). Également Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), parfois désignées de manière péjorative sous le nom de "patent trolls," les NPEs ont fortement polarisé le débat académique et politique. En raison de leur statut de non-producteurs, les NPEs bénéficient des avantages uniques par rapport aux entreprises productrices. Ils sont généralement à l'abri des contre-réclamations pour contrefaçon de brevet et ont récemment été accusés de mettre en œuvre des stratégies de "hold-up" de brevets (Lemley et Shapiro, 2007), que certains estiment imposer un "impôt sur l'innovation" significatif avec des effets négatifs potentiels sur l'innovation future (Chien, 2008). Alors que les NPEs ont été largement analysées sur le marché des brevets aux États-Unis depuis leur apparition au début des années 2000 (Mezzanotti, 2021; Lemley et Zyontz, 2021), ce n'est que récemment que les chercheurs ont commencé à étudier leur présence sur le marché technologique européen (Fusco, 2013; Love, 2013; Leiponen et Delcamp, 2019). Cette thèse vise à combler ces lacunes de recherche en examinant le phénomène des NPEs sur le marché des brevets européens. D'abord, nous explorons et analysons de manière approfondie la littérature sur les modèles économiques des NPEs en adoptant une approche bibliométrique guidée par le protocole Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) pour les revues systématiques de littérature. De plus, nous intégrerons trois études de cas sur les modèles économiques des NPEs. Ensuite, nous étudions empiriquement la présence des NPEs sur le marché des brevets européens grâce à un nouveau jeu de données crée pour analyser les demandes de brevet et les acquisitions de NPEs à l'Office européen des brevets (OEB). Nous élaborons aussi une taxonomie originale, classant ainsi les NPEs en trois modèles économiques : "Litigation", "Portfolio" et "Technology". Enfin, nous explorons empiriquement l'interaction entre les caractéristiques de qualité des brevets revendiqués et la propension des NPEs à choisir des juridictions européennes spécifiques pour engager des poursuites (« forum shopping »)
Patents are a form of intellectual property rights (IPRs) that are especially relevant to promoting innovative activities. A patent grants its owner a temporary exclusive right over inventions that are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial application. Relying on this right, inventors can protect their ideas from imitation and gain an economic return from their investments in research and development (R&D). However, the use of patents has undergone a significant transformation, extending far beyond the traditional purpose of rewarding innovative efforts. Particularly in the field of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), patents are increasingly used as strategic tools (Blind, 2021). Moreover, over the past three decades, the sharp increase in the number of granted patents and the unprecedented flourishing of patent trading have paved the way for new intermediaries in the market for technology (Hagiu and Yoffie, 2013). Non-practicing entities (NPEs)—firms that do not use their patents in a traditional manufacturing sense, but primarily engage in licensing and enforcement—have emerged as prominent actors on the patent market (Golden, 2007; Feldman and Ewing, 2012). Also referred to as Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), sometimes pejoratively called "patent trolls," NPEs have greatly polarized the academic and policy debate. Due to their non-manufacturing status, NPEs have unique advantages over operating companies. They are typically shielded from patent infringement counter-claims and have recently faced allegations of employing patent "hold-up" strategies (Lemley and Shapiro, 2007), which some argue it imposes a significant "tax on innovation" with potential negative effects on subsequent innovation (Chien, 2008). While NPEs have been extensively analyzed in the US patent market since their emergence in the early 2000s (Mezzanotti, 2021; Lemley and Zyontz, 2021), it is only recently that researchers have started to investigate their presence in the European technology market (Fusco, 2013; Love, 2013; Leiponen and Delcamp, 2019). This thesis aims to address these research gaps by examining the NPE phenomenon in the European patent marketplace. First, we extensively explore and analyze the literature on NPE business models by adopting a novel bibliometric approach guided by the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) protocol for systematic literature reviews. In addition, we will integrate three relevant NPE business models case studies. Second, we empirically investigate the presence of NPEs in the European patent market through a brand- new dataset of NPE patent filings and acquisitions at the European Patent Office (EPO). Furthermore, we develop an original taxonomy, thus categorizing NPEs into three business models: "Litigation," "Portfolio" and "Technology" NPEs. Finally, we empirically explore the interplay between the quality characteristics of the asserted patent and the propensity of NPEs to choose specific European jurisdictions where to initiate litigation (forum shopping)

碩士
國立政治大學
科技管理與智慧財產研究所
104
Taiwanese manufacturers can’t stay away from the wars caused by global NPEs (Non-practicing entities) anymore. For the majority of domestic enterprises focusing on branding, they monitor and apply data mining of patent maps only at the competitors who are producing real products (herein called the term “practicing entities (PEs)” as opposed to “NPEs”). Since lacking experiences dealing with NPEs’ lawsuit attack, export-oriented domestic manufactures usually lose in lawsuit and their brand image being hurt. The damages are difficult to estimate. In view of this, the aim of this thesis provides an empirical study trying to compare with two kinds of plaintiff launched proceedings initiatively between PE competitors and NPEs being proficient in patent litigations but not familiar to Taiwanese brand enterprises. The study concludes that as a PE in launching litigation, the risk is lower if it transfer its patent to NPE or other PE that is not in the same industry and have them initiate the lawsuit. From the perspective of competitive dynamics, domestic enterprises must be more aware of monitoring NPEs’ activity while patent transaction from PEs to NPEs has been found because NPEs’ motivation to launch proceedings will significant increase.